GENERAL Terms, among logicians, those which are made the signs of general ideas. See ABSTRACTION and IDEA.
All things that exist, Mr. Locke observes, being particulars, it might be expected that words should be so too in their signification: but we find it quite contrary; for most of the words that make all languages are general terms. This is the effect of reason and necessity. For,
First, it is impossible that every particular thing should have a distinct name; because it is impossible to have distinct ideas of every particular thing; to retain its name, with its peculiar appropriation to that idea.
Secondly, it would be useless, unless all could be supposed to have the same ideas in their minds. For names, applied to particular things, whereof I alone have the ideas in my mind, could not be significant or intelligible to another who is not acquainted with all those particular things which have fallen under my notice.
Thirdly, it would be of no great use for the improvement of knowledge; which, though founded in particular things, enlarges itself by general views; to which things, reduced into sorts under general names, are properly subervient.
In things where we have occasion to consider and discourse of individuals and particulars, we use proper names; as in persons, countries, cities, rivers, mountains, &c. Thus we see, that jockeys have particular names for their horses, because they often have occasion to maintain this or that particular horse when he is out of sight.
Afterwards observing that a great number of things resemble each other in shape, and other qualities, we frame a general idea that takes in only the qualities in which those many particulars agree; and to this idea we give the name man, for example: in which there is nothing new; that which is peculiar to each individual being left out, and only that which is common to all retained. And thus we come to have a general idea and a general name. By the same method the mind proceeds to more general notions and names; as those of animal, substance, being, thing, and such universal terms as stand for any ideas whatsoever.
As to the signification of general words, it is evident they do not barely signify one particular thing; neither do they signify a plurality; but they signify a genus, kind, or sort of things. See the articles ABSTRACTION and GENUS.