KING, in the general acceptance of the word, is a person who has a supreme authority, with the power of levying taxes, making laws, and enforcing an obedience.
dience to them: but in Britain, which is a limited monarchy, the power of the king is greatly restrained; which is so far from diminishing his honour, that it adds a glory to his crown; for while other kings are absolute monarchs over innumerable multitudes of slaves, the king of Britain has the distinguished glory of governing a free people, the least of whom is protected by the laws: he has great prerogatives, and a boundless power in doing good; and is at the same time only restrained from acting inconsistently with his own happiness, and that of his people.
To understand the royal rights and authority, we must consider the king under six distinct views. 1. With regard to his title. 2. His royal family. 3. His councils. 4. His duties. 5. His prerogative. 6. His revenue.
I. His title. For this, see HEREDITARY RIGHT, and SUCCESSION.
II. His royal family. See ROYAL FAMILY.
III. His councils. See COUNCIL.
IV. His duties. By our constitution, there are certain duties incumbent on the king; in consideration of which, his dignity and prerogative are established by the laws of the land: it being a maxim in the law, that protection and subjection are reciprocal. And these reciprocal duties are what Sir William Blackstone apprehends were meant by the convention in 1688, when they declared that king James had broken the original contract between king and people. But however, as the terms of that original contract were in some measure disputed, being alleged to exist principally in theory, and to be only deducible by reason and the rules of natural law, in which deduction different understandings might very considerably differ; it was, after the revolution, judged proper to declare these duties expressly, and to reduce that contract to a plain certainty. So that, whatever doubts might be formerly raised by weak and scrupulous minds about the existence of such an original contract, they must now entirely cease; especially with regard to every prince who hath reigned since the year 1688.
The principal duty of the king is, To govern his people according to law. Nec regibus infinita aut libera potestas, was the constitution of our German ancestors on the continent. And this is not only consonant to the principles of nature, of liberty, of reason, and of society; but has always been esteemed an express part of the common law of England, even when prerogative was at the highest. "The king," faith Bracton, who wrote under Henry III. "ought not to be subject to man; but to God, and to the law; for the law maketh the king. Let the king therefore render to the law, what the law has invested in him with regard to others; dominion, and power: for he is not truly king, where will and pleasure rules, and not the law." And again: "The king hath a superior, namely God; and also the law, by which he was made a king." Thus Bracton: and Fortescue also, having first well distinguished between a monarchy absolutely and despotically regal, which is introduced by conquest and violence, and a political or civil monarchy, which arises from mutual consent, (of which last species he asserts the government of England to be), immediately lays it down as a principle, that "the king of England must rule his people ac-
cording to the decrees of the laws thereof; inasmuch that he is bound by an oath at his coronation to the observance and keeping of his own laws." But to obviate all doubts and difficulties concerning this matter, it is expressly declared by statute 12 & 13 W. III. c. 2. "that the laws of England are the birthright of the people thereof; and all the kings and queens who shall ascend the throne of this realm ought to administer the government of the same according to the said laws, and all their officers and ministers ought to serve them respectively according to the same: and therefore all the other laws and statutes of this realm, for securing the established religion, and the rights and liberties of the people thereof, and all other laws and statutes of the same now in force, are by his majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the lords spiritual and temporal, and commons, and by authority of the same, ratified and confirmed accordingly."
And, as to the terms of the original contract between king and people, these, it is apprehended, are now couched in the coronation-oath, which by the statute 1 W. & M. st. 1. c. 6. is to be administered to every king and queen who shall succeed to the imperial crown of these realms, by one of the archbishops or bishops of the realm, in the presence of all the people; who on their parts do reciprocally take the oath of allegiance to the crown. This coronation-oath is conceived in the following terms.
"The archbishop or bishop shall say, Will you solemnly promise and swear to govern the people of this kingdom of Britain, and the dominions thereto belonging, according to the statutes in parliament agreed, and the laws and customs of the same?—The king or queen shall say, I solemnly promise so to do.
"Archbishop or bishop. Will you to your power cause law and justice, in mercy, to be executed in all your judgments?—King or queen. I will.
"Archbishop or bishop. Will you to the utmost of your power maintain the laws of God, the true profession of the gospel, and the Protestant reformed religion established by the law? And will you preserve unto the bishops and clergy of this realm, and to the churches committed to their charge, all such rights and privileges as by law do or shall appertain unto them, or any of them?—King or queen. All this I promise to do.
"After this the king or queen, laying his or her hand upon the holy gospel, shall say, The things which I have here before promised, I will perform and keep: so help me God. And then shall kiss the book."
This is the form of the coronation-oath, as it is now prescribed by our laws; the principal articles of which appear to be at least as ancient as the mirror of justices, and even as the time of Bracton: but the wording of it was changed at the revolution, because (as the statute alleges) the oath itself had been framed in doubtful words and expressions, with relation to ancient laws and constitutions at this time unknown. However, in what form soever it be conceived, this is most indisputably a fundamental and original express contract; though, doubtless, the duty of protection is impliedly as much incumbent on the sovereign before coronation as after: in the same manner as allegiance,
King. giance to the king becomes the duty of the subject immediately on the descent of the crown, before he has taken the oath of allegiance, or whether he ever takes it at all. This reciprocal duty of the subject will be considered in its proper place. At present we are only to observe, that in the king's part of this original contract are expressed all the duties which a monarch can owe to his people, viz. to govern according to law; to execute judgment in mercy; and to maintain the established religion. And, with respect to the latter of these three branches, we may farther remark, that by the act of union, 5 Ann. c. 8. two preceding statutes are recited and confirmed; the one of the parliament of Scotland, the other of the parliament of England: which enact; the former, that every king at his accession shall take and subscribe an oath, to preserve the Protestant religion, and presbyterian church-government in Scotland; the latter, that at his coronation he shall take and subscribe a similar oath, to preserve the settlement of the church of England, within England, Ireland, Wales, and Berwick, and the territories thereunto belonging.
V. His prerogative. See PREROGATIVE.
VI. His revenue. See REVENUE.
Having in the preceding articles chalked out all the principal outlines of this vast title of the law, the supreme executive magistrate, or the king's majesty, considered in his several capacities and points of view; it may not be improper to take a short comparative review of the power of the executive magistrate, or prerogative of the crown, as it stood in former days, and as it stands at present. And we cannot but observe, that most of the laws for ascertaining, limiting, and restraining this prerogative have been made within the compass of little more than a century past; from the petition of right in 3 Car. I. to the present time. So that the powers of the crown are now to all appearance greatly curtailed and diminished since the reign of King James I. particularly by the abolition of the star-chamber and high-commission courts in the reign of Charles I. and by the disclaiming of martial law, and the power of levying taxes on the subject, by the same prince; by the disuse of forest-laws for a century past; and by the many excellent provisions enacted under Charles II.; especially the abolition of military tenures, purveyance, and pre-emption; the habeas corpus act; and the act to prevent the discontinuance of parliaments for above three years; and, since the revolution, by the strong and emphatical words in which our liberties are asserted in the bill of rights, and act of settlement; by the act for triennial, since turned into septennial, elections; by the exclusion of certain officers from the house of commons; by rendering the seats of the judges permanent, and their salaries independent; and by restraining the king's pardon from obtruding parliamentary impeachments. Besides all this, if we consider how the crown is impoverished and stripped of all its ancient revenues, so that it greatly depends on the liberality of parliament for its necessary support and maintenance, we may perhaps be led to think, that the balance is inclined pretty strongly to the popular scale, and that the executive magistrate has neither independence nor power enough left, to form that check upon the lords and commons which the founders of our constitution intended.
VOL. VI.
King. But, on the other hand, it is to be considered, that every prince, in the first parliament after his accession, has by long usage a truly royal addition to his hereditary revenue settled upon him for his life; and has never any occasion to apply to parliament for supplies, but upon some public necessity of the whole realm. This restores to him that constitutional independence, which at his first accession seems, it must be owned, to be wanting. And then, with regard to power, we may find perhaps that the hands of government are at least sufficiently strengthened; and that a British monarch is now in no danger of being overborne by either the nobility or the people. The instruments of power are not perhaps so open and avowed as they formerly were, and therefore are the less liable to jealous and invidious reflections; but they are not the weaker upon that account. In short, our national debt and taxes (besides the inconveniences beforementioned), have also in their natural consequences thrown such a weight of power into the executive scale of government, as we cannot think was intended by our patriot ancestors; who gloriously struggled for the abolition of the then formidable parts of the prerogative, and by an unaccountable want of foresight established this system in their stead. The entire collection and management of so vast a revenue, being placed in the hands of the crown, have given rise to such a number of new officers, created by and removable at the royal pleasure, that they have extended the influence of government to every corner of the nation. Witness the commissioners, and the multitude of dependents on the customs, in every port of the kingdom; the commissioners of excise, and their numerous subalterns, in every inland district; the post-masters, and their servants, planted in every town, and upon every public road; the commissioners of the stamps, and their distributors, which are full as scattered and full as numerous; the officers of the salt-duty, which, tho' a species of excise, and conducted the same manner, are yet made a distinct corps from the ordinary managers of that revenue; the surveyors of houses and windows; the receivers of the land-tax; the managers of lotteries; and the commissioners of hackney-coaches: all which are either mediately or immediately appointed by the crown, and removable at pleasure without any reason assigned: these, it requires but little penetration to see, must give that power, on which they depend for subsistence, an influence most amazingly extensive. To this may be added the frequent opportunities of conferring particular obligations, by preference in loans, subscriptions, tickets, remittances, and other money-transactions, which will greatly increase this influence; and that over those persons whose attachment, on account of their wealth, is frequently the most desirable. All this is the natural, though perhaps the unforeseen, consequence of erecting our funds of credit, and, to support them, establishing our perpetual taxes: the whole of which is entirely new since the restoration in 1660; and by far the greatest part since the revolution in 1688. And the same may be said with regard to the officers in our numerous army, and the places which the army has created. All which put together give the executive power so persuasive an energy with respect to the persons themselves, and so prevailing an interest with their friends and families, as will amply
King. make amends for the loss of external prerogative.
But, though this profusion of offices should have no effect on individuals, there is still another newly acquired branch of power; and that is, not the influence only, but the force, of a disciplined army: paid indeed ultimately by the people, but immediately by the crown: raised by the crown, officered by the crown, commanded by the crown. They are kept on foot, it is true, only from year to year, and that by the power of parliament: but during that year, they must by the nature of our constitution, if raised at all, be at the absolute disposal of the crown. And there need but few words to demonstrate how great a trust is thereby reposed in the prince by his people: A trust, that is more than equivalent to a thousand little troublesome prerogatives.
Add to all this, that, besides the civil list, the immense revenue of almost seven millions sterling, which is annually paid to the creditors of the public, or carried to the sinking fund, is first deposited in the royal exchequer, and thence issued out to the respective offices of payment. This revenue the people can never refuse to raise, because it is made perpetual by act of parliament: which also, when well considered, will appear to be a trust of great delicacy and high importance.
Upon the whole, therefore, it seems clear, that, whatever may have become of the nominal, the real power of the crown has not been too far weakened by any transactions in the last century. Much is indeed given up; but much is also acquired. The stern commands of prerogative have yielded to the milder voice of influence: the slavish and exploded doctrine of non-resistance has given way to a military establishment by law; and to the disuse of parliaments has succeeded a parliamentary trust of an immense perpetual revenue. When, indeed, by the free operation of the sinking fund, our national debts shall be lessened; when the posture of foreign affairs, and the universal introduction of a well-planned and national militia, will suffer our formidable army to be thinned and regulated; and when (in consequence of all) our taxes shall be gradually reduced; this adventitious power of the crown will slowly and imperceptibly diminish, as it slowly and imperceptibly rose. But, till that shall happen, it will be our especial duty, as good subjects and good Englishmen, to reverence the crown, and yet guard against corrupt and servile influences from those who are intrusted with its authority; to be loyal, yet free; obedient, and yet independent; and above everything, to hope that we may long, very long, continue to be governed by a sovereign, who, in all those public acts that have personally proceeded from himself, hath manifested the highest veneration for the free constitution of Britain; hath already in more than one instance remarkably strengthened its outworks; and will therefore never harbour a thought, or adopt a persuasion, in any the remotest degree detrimental to public liberty.