LIBERTY of the Press. The art of printing, soon after its introduction, was looked upon in England, as well as in other countries, as merely a matter of state, and subject to the coercion of the crown. It was therefore regulated with us by the king's proclamations, prohibitions, charters of privilege and licence, and finally by the decrees of the court of star-chamber, which limited the number of printers, and of presses which each should employ, and prohibited new publications unless previously approved by proper licensers. On the demolition of this odious jurisdiction in 1641, the long parliament of Charles I. after their rupture with that prince, assumed the same powers as the star-chamber had exercised with respect to the licensing of books: and in 1643, 1647, 1649, and 1652 (Seobell. i. 44, 134. ii. 88, 230.) issued their ordinances for that purpose, founded principally on the star-chamber decree of 1637. In 1662, was passed the statute 13 & 14 Car II. c. 33. which, with some few alterations, was copied from the parliamentary ordinances. This act expired in 1679; but was revived by statute 1 Jac. II. c. 17. and continued till 1692. It was then continued for two years longer by statute 4 W. & M. c. 24. but though frequent attempts were made by the government to revive it, in the subsequent part of that reign (Com. Journ. 11 Feb. 1694. 26 Nov. 1695. 22 Oct. 1696. 9 Feb. 1697. 31 Jan. 1698.) yet the parliament resisted it so strongly, that it finally expired, and the press became properly free in 1694; and has continued so ever since.
The liberty of the press, however, so essential to the nature of a free state, consists not in freedom from censure for any criminal matter that may be published, but in laying no previous restraints upon publications. Every freeman has undoubtedly a right to lay what
sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press: but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must take the consequence of his own temerity. To subject the press to the restrictive power of a licenser in the manner abovementioned, is to subject all freedom of sentiment to the prejudices of one man, and make him the arbitrary and infallible judge of all controverted points in learning, religion, and government. But to punish (as the law does at present) any dangerous or offensive writings which, when published, shall, on a fair and impartial trial, be adjudged of a pernicious tendency, is necessary for the preservation of peace and good order, of government and religion, the only solid foundations of civil liberty. Thus the will of individuals is still left free; the abuse only of that free-will is the object of legal punishment. Neither is any restraint hereby laid upon freedom of thought or inquiry; liberty of private sentiment is still left; the disseminating or making public of bad sentiments, destructive of the ends of society, is the crime which society corrects. A man (says a fine writer on this subject) may be allowed to keep poisons in his closet, but not publicly to vend them as cordials. And to this we may add, that the only plausible argument heretofore used for restraining the just freedom of the press, "that it was necessary to prevent the daily abuse of it," will entirely lose its force, when it is shewn, (by a seasonable exertion of the laws) that the press cannot be abused to any bad purpose without incurring a suitable punishment: whereas, it can never be used to any good one when under the controul of an inspector. So true will it be found, that to censure the licentiousness, is to maintain the liberty of the press.