DEFORMITY, (Enycl.) Deformity is either natural or moral. These are both referred by Mr Hutchison to an internal sense; and our perceptions of them, as he supposes, arises from an original arbitrary structure of our own minds, by which certain objects, when observed, are rendered the occasions of certain sensations and affections.
That many objects give no pleasure to our sense, is obvious. Many are certainly void of beauty; but then, says this author, there is no form which seems necessarily disagreeable of itself, when we dread no other evil from it, and compare it with nothing better of the kind. Many objects are naturally displeasing and distasteful to our external senses, as well as others pleasing and agreeable; as smells, tastes, and some separate sounds: but with regard to our sense of beauty, no composition of objects which give not unpleasant simple ideas, seems positively unpleasant or painful of itself, had we never observed any thing better of the same kind.
Had there been a species of the form which we now denominate ugly or deformed, and had we never seen or expected greater beauty, we should have received no disgust from it; though the pleasure would not have been so great in this form as in those we now admire. Our sense of beauty seems designed to give us positive pleasure; but not positive pain or disgust, any farther than what arises from disappointment.
There are indeed many faces which, at first view, are apt to raise dislike. But this is generally not from any positive deformity; but either from want of expected beauty, or from the carrying some natural indications of morally bad dispositions, which we all acquire a faculty of discerning in countenances, airs, and gestures. That this is not occasioned by any form positively disgusting, appears hence, that if, upon long acquaintance, we are sure of finding sweetness of temper, humanity, and cheerfulness, though the bodily form continues, it shall give us no disgust. There are horrors raised by some objects, which are only the effect of fear for ourselves, or compassion towards others, when either reason, or some foolish association of ideas, makes us apprehend danger; and not the effect of any thing in the form itself. For we find, that most of those objects which excite horror at first, when experience or reason has removed the fear, may become the occasion of pleasure.
The casual conjunction of ideas gives us disgust, where there is nothing disagreeable in the form itself. And this, in effect, is the cause of most of our fantastic aversions to the figures of divers animals, &c. Thus serpents of all kinds, and many insects, really beautiful enough, are beheld with aversion by many people, who have got some accidental ideas of mischief associated to them. A similar reasoning is applied to our perception of moral beauty and deformity. Inquiry into the original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, passim.
But it is more just to distinguish between the sentiments of delight or disgust, excited in us by beautiful
or deformed objects, which are effects of some causes, and the natural and real qualities of the perceived objects by which they are produced. There are objects, says an excellent writer, which have a natural aptitude to please or offend, or between which and the contemplating mind there is a necessary congruity or incongruity; and though the actual perception of the understanding, and consequent feeling of the heart, in contemplating the actions and affections of moral agents, may exist in very different degrees, on account of the incidental obstructions arising from bodily indisposition, mental prejudices and biases, and the association of ideas;
yet, to every rational mind properly disposed, morally good actions must for ever be acceptable, and can never of themselves offend; and morally evil actions must for ever be disagreeable, and can never of themselves please. What is right in actions and characters is beautiful and amiable, and gives pleasure; what is wrong is deformed and odious, and excites disgust: right and pleasure, wrong and pain, are as distinct as cause and effect. It is no less absurd to maintain, that the perception of virtue is nothing distinct from the reception of the pleasure resulting from it, than to infer, with some metaphysicians, that solidity, extension, and figure, are only particular modes of sensation, because attended, whenever they are perceived, with some sensations of sight or touch. Thus does this author show, that moral beauty and deformity are real qualities of certain actions; in which consists their aptitude to please or disgust. With respect to natural beauty, he observes, that uniformity amidst variety pleases, because of the natures of variety and uniformity, which are such, that, whenever united, they are adapted to please every free unbiased mind that discerns them. He accounts for the pleasure they afford, without referring them to an arbitrary internal sense, by the following circumstances that attend them. They are more easily comprehended by the mind: order and symmetry give things their stability and strength, and subservience to any valuable purpose; regularity and order evidence art and design. Disorder and confusion, whence deformity arises, denote only the negation of regularity and order; or any arrangement and disposition of things, which are not according to a law, rule, or plan, and prove not design. These are not positively displeasing; except where we previously expected order, or where impotence or want of skill appear, and the contriver has either failed of his design or executed it ill. See on this subject Dr Price's Review of the principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals, ch. ii. passim. See an admirable Essay on bodily Deformity, by Mr Hay, in the Fugitive Pieces, vol. i. p. 93. &c.