PREDETERMINATION, in philosophy and theology. The schoolmen call that concurrence of God, which makes men act, and determines them in all their actions both good and evil, physical predestination, or promotion.
Divines hold, that God hath no part in sin, inasmuch as he only affords his concurrence to the physical part of human actions, not to the moral part.
Physical predestination, or promotion, if there be any such thing, is that action of God, whereby he excites a second cause to act; or by which, antecedently to all operations of the creature, or before it could operate in consequence either of the order of nature or reason, he really and effectually moves and occasions it to produce all its actions: that is, whatever the creature does or acts, is really done and acted by the agency of God on the creature, who is all the time passive. So that, without such predestination of God, all creatures must remain in an eternal state of inactivity; and, with such predestination, it is impossible but that they should do what they are thus put upon doing.
Presbytery, Pringle. It is strongly controverted, whether or no such a physical predetermination be necessary to the action of natural causes: the Scotists maintain the negative; urging, that all natural causes are of their own nature determined to a certain action; whence it should seem needless to call in a new predetermination of God, e. gr. to fire, to make it warm the hand. For if an object be, by the course of divine providence, applied to fire; what need a second application of the fire, to make it warm the object applied thereto; since beings are not to be multiplied unnecessarily.
And such predetermination some philosophers hold still less requisite to produce the acts of the will: at least, say they, the human mind must be allowed the common power and privilege of a second cause, and therefore be intitled to produce its own acts, as well as other strictly natural agents.
The Thomists, on the other hand, stand up strenuously for the physical predetermination: one of their principal arguments is drawn from the subordination of second causes to the first. Where there are several subordinate agents, say they, the lower agents do not act, unless first moved and determined thereby by the first; this being the very essence of subordination.
Again, the like they argue from the dominion of God over all his creatures: It is of the essence of dominion, say they, to apply and direct things subject thereto, to its own operations; and this, if the dominion be only moral, morally; but if it be also physical, physically. And that this is the case in respect of God and his creatures, is confessed.