PART I. OF the GREATER OPERATIONS in DEFENSIVE WAR

Defensive Operations. But yet the reward that follows such irksome labours ought to animate men to undertake them. Obstacles, however numerous they may be, are not insurmountable, since so many great men have got the better of them: difficulties should stir up a soldier's emulation, but should never terrify him; he should endeavour to copy such great originals, though he should not be able to equal them.

This treatise is divided into four parts.

In the first are mentioned all the greater operations of a

campaign; and the means of executing those operations, in any kind of country, are endeavoured to be laid down.

In the second, the precautions that are to be taken to attack the enemy in all the forementioned operations, are considered.

The third treats of the Petits Guerres, or the operations of detached parties, and the war of noils.

The fourth, of sieges, both with regard to attack and defence.

PART I. OF the GREATER OPERATIONS in DEFENSIVE WAR.

SECT. I. Of the Knowledge of a Country.

A CAMPAIGN of which the plan is well formed, and the dispositions well concerted, may nevertheless prove unsuccessful, if the general, to whose direction the operations are intrusted, hath not a thorough knowledge of the country in which they are to be carried into execution.

There is one knowledge of a country, which for an officer to be without should be considered as a reproach; that of the situation of cities, towns, villages, forests, streams, rivers, which is to be acquired by studying of geographical maps. There is another branch of knowledge yet more particular, such as, of the passes, or the boundaries of the country, the situation, the nature of the ground, whether it is plain, or divided by hollows, rivulets, hills, &c. which is to be acquired by the assistance of topographical maps. In the study of these last, care must be taken, not blindly to follow the marks they lay down. It very seldom happens, that topographical maps are perfectly exact: for, besides the many circumstances which may sometimes in a year alter a large extent of country, they seldom take notice of fords, bridges over the small rivulets, small hills, and hollows of little importance; neither can they mark whatever may be occasioned by recent inundations and disruptions of the earth: whereas any of these unforeseen circumstances may prove an obstruction to a great design, either by retarding the march of an army, preventing a column of troops from advancing, or leaving the enemy in possession of some passes from which he might have been driven.

In order to avoid the errors into which a general may be drawn by the maps, the safest method is to apply to the inhabitants of the country, go over it with the most intelligent of them, and remark every obstacle, however trifling it may appear.

For marching with greater security, a general ought to form a company of guides of the peasants, be assured of their fidelity, and attach them to him by all possible methods, particularly by unbounded liberality. It is by money only that truly spies and faithful guides can be secured; the latter are less expensive, but full as necessary as the former. Parsimony should be avoided in war: for, as Vegetius observes, money should never be spared when expense is necessary to secure possession. In proportion as an army advances into a country, great care must be taken to change the guides.

The general should send out detachments along with some of these guides to examine the streams which cross the country, whether or no their mouths are at a distance, into what rivers they empty themselves, from whence they take their source, whether they may be easily forded, if their banks are steep or sloping, marshy or covered with bushes; other detachments should be employed in examining the woods, in order to find out whether troops can pass through them or not.

A general ought himself to examine into the truth of the reports made to him by these small detachments, or send out others more considerable under the command of general officers; however certain a general may be of the fidelity of his spies and guides, yet he should not always rely upon their reports: mistrust, which in general is accounted a vice, may almost be esteemed a virtue in the business of war.

Furnished with these lights, a general can allot the easiest road to the artillery and baggage, the shortest to the infantry, and longest to the cavalry: he can at once judge, from the nature of the ground, into how many columns the army can be divided in order to expedite the march, and what dispositions will be necessary for the columns with regard to the enemy's position.

By the knowledge of the country, a general is informed of what camps the enemy doth or can occupy, and of those necessary to be taken to oppose his designs; whether the enemy's detachments can easily approach, or how he can himself advance towards him, without being discovered; if there is forage in the neighbourhood of the enemy's camp, or whether he is obliged to draw it from a distance; where he hath fixed his magazines, and whether an attempt to carry them off is practicable or not; in what manner his quarters are disposed, and which of them is most exposed; what distance there is between himself and the enemy; where the enemy hath established posts, and which those are that himself ought to occupy with regard to the situation of his own camp and quarters, and those belonging to the enemy; which is the properest road for the detachments and the patrols to keep, in order to gain intelligence; and lastly, with what degree of ease the enemy can attack the army on its march, and whether in front or flank. This knowledge is essential to a general in every kind of country; but in a woody or mountainous country it would become more particularly dangerous, and even impossible for him to march an army, if unacquainted with it.

In 1702, the duke of Burgundy, being desirous to attack the enemy who were behind Cleves, but not being perfectly acquainted with the forest in his front, he detached the marquis d'Alegré with 500 grenadiers, and 800 horse, to see if it was not possible to find some passage thro' it. M. d'Alegré met with a castle which was occupied by the enemy: he attacked and forced it; but being advanced beyond it, found it was not possible to proceed farther, by reason of the great number of defiles that succeeded to each other: he thereupon turned back, sent, and had another passage surveyed, where there were found still greater obstacles. He gave an account of this to the duke of Burgundy, who, not choosing to miss the opportunity of attacking the enemy, sent him out again with a larger detachment, that he might examine whether, by keeping along the side of the forest, it would not be practicable for him to march up to them by way of the heights of Mook, on

Defensive Operations. the side of Grave and Nimeguen. The marquis d'Alegre discovered a defile which led to these heaths: he took possession of it, and sent notice thereof to the duke of Burgundy; who ordered the army to advance, obliged the enemy to send their infantry into Nimeguen, and cannonaded their cavalry which had taken post on the glacis, but were unable to maintain it; and the consequence was, that the enemy sustained a great loss in men, artillery, waggons, and baggage.

This example tends to prove, that maps are not always to be relied on. There can be no reason to doubt that the duke of Burgundy was furnished with the most exact: but yet it is probable that he might not have succeeded in this enterprise, if he had neglected sending M. d'Alegre to survey the passes, and examine two, before he proceeded to that through which he marched.

The following is a general rule: That it is upon the ground, and not upon maps, that the roads through which an army is to march must be examined, as well as the situation of places where camps are to be fixed, and fields of battle chosen. An army should never move before ways are opened for every column: with regard to a detachment it is different, as there may arise circumstances which will prevent the general from foreseeing what road it may take. The command of a detachment should always be given to an intelligent officer, and one who has made his business his only study; who hath been particularly careful to acquire a knowledge of the country, and of whose genius the general should entertain no doubt. A particular choice stirs up emulation in young men, and induces them to exert their utmost endeavours to deserve so distinguishing a mark of approbation.

Into how many mistakes have even the greatest generals fallen, by not being thoroughly acquainted with a country, and by suffering themselves to be guided by general notions? M. de Feuquiers cites many examples of great enterprises which have miscarried by it.

Toward the end of the year 1673, when a considerable body of infantry, with only few cavalry, was on its return from Holland, under the conduct of M. de Luxemburg, the prince of Orange having assembled the whole force of the Dutch and the Spaniards (under his command), came upon the Maese, with an intention to fight M. de Luxemburg between Maestricht and Charleroy. This march made it necessary for the court to send an order to M. de Schomberg to assemble all the cavalry that were in Hainault and Flanders, and immediately join M. de Luxemburg, who was greatly inferior to the prince of Orange in cavalry. The prince's aim then should have been to prevent the two generals from joining, and to have fought one or other of them before their junction. The prince's being unacquainted with the country, made him mistake for real the feints made by M. de Luxemburg, whilst he was upon the river Ourte; as if his intention was to march by way of the Condros and the Ardennes, in order to gain Sedan and the Meuris. The prince of Orange drew near Huy and Namur; and by that means was at such a distance from the high-road, that M. de Schomberg had an opportunity of advancing with his cavalry to Tongres; at the same time that M. de Luxemburg, by a forced march, passed the Maese at Maestricht, and arrived at Tongres, where the junction of the two armies was effected without any accident.

If the prince of Orange had made only two reflections upon the nature of the country, he would have avoided the mistake he fell into; the first of which is, that scarcely any body can be ignorant that the Condros and the Ardennes are sterile and mountainous countries; from whence it is evident, that M. de Luxemburg could not have subsisted

his army, especially in the month of December: the roads in those parts, very bad in the summer, are almost impassable during the winter; consequently the carriages could not have passed but with the utmost difficulty.

The second reflection is, that if M. de Luxemburg had actually designed to pass through the Ardennes, why did M. de Schomberg advance towards Tongres, and so expose himself to the danger of being beaten, without a possibility of receiving help from M. de Luxemburg, who was on the other side of the Maese? If the prince of Orange had had a thorough knowledge of the country through which M. de Luxemburg pretended he would pass, he would soon have perceived that it was only to throw him into a perplexing uncertainty with regard to the road which the enemy's general should naturally take: in a word, he would not have remained a moment in doubt on the part he had to act.

By this, then, it appears, that the prince ought to have continued on the side of Liege; by which position he would have stopped M. de Schomberg, who would have scarcely dared to advance to Tongres, nor would M. de Luxemburg have attempted the passage of the Maese at Maestricht: by this means, the junction would have been prevented; or, if either of the two armies had advanced, the prince could have attacked and beaten it; neither would it have been in the power of the other to have assailed it.

It hath frequently happened, and will continue to do so, that a general who knows how to take advantage of the knowledge of the country, although inferior in point of force, may chance a defensive into an offensive war. In 1671, M. de Créqui, who began the campaign on the defensive, ended it with obliging the duke of Lorraine to pass the Rhine: that prince dispersed his army, and then M. de Créqui formed the siege of Fribourg.

The knowledge of a country is still more essential in retreats: there is more art and more precaution required in a retreat than in any other action; that operation is the conclusion of all preceding ones. If a general, obliged to retreat precipitately, hath but a superficial knowledge of the country, how will he be able to re-assemble his troops, re-establish order, or march with any degree of security?

Xenophon's retreat with the ten thousand Greeks is one of the most useful lessons a commander can study: in that undertaking were united the virtues of a consummate general, and the most intrepid courage of a soldier; and in particular it exhibits the most profound knowledge of the country.

The knowledge of a country is as necessary for a private officer as for the commander in chief, because he is to execute with part what the general performs with all the troops. When an officer, to whose conduct an expedition is intrusted, joins this knowledge, one of the chief branches of military science, to practice and experience, he will with so much the greater ease comprehend and execute the general's intention and plan; and he will be also enabled to take the properest measures for success: if, on the contrary, he begins a march, without being acquainted with the country, his mind misgiving him, will increase the danger, by the very means he takes to avoid it: he will suppose it in places where there is nothing to be feared, and often fall into it where he was least apprehensive of it.

The general who commands in the cantonments and winter-quarters, and each officer who commands a particular quarter, will never be able to take proper measures if they are unacquainted with the country: they will be unable to preserve a proper strength when separated, or to assemble without difficulty on the first order; and for want of knowing

Defensive Operations ing the posts which it is proper to guard, they will occupy such as are unnecessary, and leave those deſenceless that are most liable to be attacked; the troops will be greatly fatigued by increasing the number of posts without occasion, by superfluous or too numerous detachments or patrols. In a word, whatever precautions are taken within, the quarters will never be in security, if the country round about them is not perfectly known, and every important pass between them and the enemy occupied.

SECT. II. Of the Preparations before taking the Field, and the March of an Army on leaving its Quarters to go into Cantonments.

THE time for an army to come out of winter-quarters, is always regulated by the plan which the general has formed for the ensuing campaign. But whether by the situation of the quarters the army is enabled to enter immediately on the campaign, or whether it must be first of all cantoned, the magazines should be so situated as to be always within reach, especially in that early season of the year, when there can be no forage upon the ground, and consequently the cavalry must be subsisted out of the magazines. The magazines ought to be distributed about in different parts, that the troops may have less way to go for their forage. And this distribution should be regulated by the movements which the general foresees the army will make on leaving its quarters, supposing it leaves them when there is only dry forage; but if the army is in an enemy's country, and there is forage upon the ground, it is certainly better to reserve the magazines entire, by which not only great trouble will be avoided in transporting the forage, but also a great expence saved to the government.

OF what nature soever the country may be (an enemy's country is supposed), it should be foraged in front as much as possible, in order to reserve that which is in the rear, that, when the campaign is over, it may be found laid up in the barns; if this precaution is not attended to, the army will be destitute of forage at its return, and will of course be obliged to draw it from home, and consume those magazines which were before spared; consequently there will be nothing saved, the expence will only have been deferred, but it will be increased by transporting the forage from the magazines to the army.

THE forming of the magazines should never be delayed till the time for opening the campaign approaches. The intendant, pursuant to the general's order, should lay in the provisions during the winter, and distribute them in the frontier towns, by which means they can easily be transported to whatever place the general shall order. By these precautions, the general will not only avoid the inconvenience of being obliged to wait till there is forage upon the ground, but he will also be enabled to be first in the field. The same precautions should also be taken with respect to the artillery. It should be assembled upon the glacis of the frontier towns, or rather upon that of the conquered places: the more it is within reach of readily joining, the sooner the operations will be commenced.

FROM prudence in the execution of these dispositions, as well for the magazines and for the artillery, as for every thing that is necessary to an army, it follows, that a general hath often formed a siege, or at least invested a place, and completed his lines of circumvallation, before the enemy could be in a condition of coming out of his quarters; he may likewise have made many marches, and will possess himself of advantageous posts, without the enemy having it in his power to oppose him.

A general should observe, that, in order to cause his

army to be cantoned within a march of the country where he designs to commence the operations, he must make all the troops leave their quarters together; assemble them in many bodies in different frontier towns; proportion the marching days to the distance of the quarters and the rendezvous that shall have been appointed for them, that they may arrive on the day appointed, and that from thence they may march in a body to the place where they are to canton.

All the bodies march, either in the number of columns that the situation of the country will allow, and arrive at the cantonment together; or else they march separately, and arrive on different days: but, in either of these cases, the cantonments for each regiment ought to have been marked out; and, if possible, forage for at least three or four days distributed to each quarter.

In the marching-orders which are sent to each commander, the situation and name of the place where each regiment is to canton, should be carefully expressed; whether on the right, the left, or in the centre; the discipline to be there observed, the place where to go and receive orders, and that where to receive forage, should also be particularly specified.

Troops, when upon a march, should always observe the most exact discipline; and never be suffered to advance, but in the same order, and with the same precaution, as if they were in danger of being molested or attacked.

Whenever an army is cantoned, it is generally in an enemy's country; therefore, for the greater security of the cantonments, there should at least be one place that may serve for a support. If no place of this sort can be found, the army must then march out together and encamp, instead of going into cantonments.

As the cantonments are properly nothing more than a halting place, where the troops are to remain till the season permits them to take the field, till the proper quantity of forage is collected, or till the necessary preparations for the intended operations are completed, they should be more connected than the winter-quarters. But as soon as the weather permits, and all the necessary preparations which should have been forwarded during the winter are finished, there is then no time to be lost; for an army will always find its advantage in encamping early, getting the start of the enemy as much as it possibly can, and beginning the campaign, no matter by what operations, before the enemy can have time to assemble.

If any particular column, upon the march, presents its flank to any of the enemy's towns, although it is indispensably necessary for every column to observe all possible order and discipline on the march, yet this column is more particularly obliged to it; necessity makes it become a duty. But that it should not be too much exposed, some hussars ought to be appointed to march upon its flank, who should also be ordered to advance till they come within sight of those towns. This column, whether consisting of infantry or cavalry, must detach some troops to sustain the hussars, in case they should be attacked and repulsed. By posting these detachments upon the flank, the enemy will be kept at a distance from the column, and the hussars will be also sustained.

SECT. III. The March of an Army in an open Country.

To direct the march of armies is not the least difficult part of a general's duty, and it is only by a thorough knowledge of the country that he can perform this duty; that he can concert the measures for conducting them in safety;

Defensive safety; and that he will be enabled to foresee the enemy's operations and motions.

There are but three sorts of countries which may become the theatre of war; an open country divided by rivers, a woody, or a mountainous one.

When an army is in an open country, the general may take whatever road he thinks most convenient, without being under a necessity of keeping the beaten road. If he chooses to march across the country, it may be done by cutting down the hedges, filling up the ditches, levelling the ridges, filling up the hollow ways, thereby rendering their ascent or descent easy, and by building bridges over the streams and rivulets which divide the country. But nevertheless it is very imprudent for a general to suppose himself entirely free from danger upon a march; for the consequences of self-security are generally fatal. The effects of negligence in any military operation are pernicious, but more particularly so upon a march; and although a general should never fear his enemy when in presence of him, he should nevertheless always apprehend the worst from him when he is out of his sight.

The number of columns in which an army can march in an open country is arbitrary, whilst it is advancing, and the enemy at too great a distance to attack or annoy it upon its march. But if, on the contrary, the enemy is near at hand, and there is a possibility of his attacking the army, it should then be disposed after such a manner as to form in order of battle in a very short time, and to be able to take a favourable position for action upon the first signal.

If the army presents its flank to the enemy, the dispositions, without considering the probability of its being attacked, should be changed; for an army upon a march ought to be always prepared against any accident that may happen.

A general should never cause an army to move without having previously considered and examined the intended march of it, nor without a thorough knowledge of the enemy's position, and where he is, or without knowing particularly the ground intended to encamp on. An army ought never to move but with some design, either to seize on some advantageous post, to prevent an intended march of the enemy's, to draw him into a disadvantageous situation, to deprive him of subsistence, or to procure some for itself.

This maxim being established, let it be supposed, that a general would cause his army to march, and the enemy's distance to be also such as to secure him from any danger of attacks; he hath it in his power to open four, six, or eight roads, in proportion to the number of the troops under his command: for the greater the number of columns, the less is the body of troops contained in each; consequently there will be less confusion, and the sooner will the army arrive at its destined camp.

Before the march is planned, and the number of columns determined upon in which the army is to march, notwithstanding the general is acquainted with the country, he should send out a detachment some days before, to reconnoitre the intended route of the army, as well as the camp it is to occupy. This detachment is to be commanded by the officers of the day appointed for its setting out: they must have staff-officers and guides with them, to conduct and to inform them of the nature of whatever may prove an obstacle, of the places where the roads begin, and those where they terminate: they should also have labourers with them, to mend the ways, enlarge the roads, and make new ones, if necessary; to cut down the hedges, fill up the ditches, level the ridges of the hollows, and build or repair bridges.

When the general commanding this detachment is ready to enter the different ways through which the army is to follow, he will divide his detachment into as many separate bodies as the army is to be divided into upon its march; and distribute staff-officers, guides, and labourers, to each detachment, with orders to meet again at the same place from whence they separated.

Each of these detachments should advance to the extremities of the woods, if they meet with any, and of the roads leading to the camp, intended to be occupied: the commanding and staff-officers will then advance with an escort to reconnoitre its situation, and will leave part of their men in ambuscade in the woods, or concealed behind some heights, or in some hollows. The knowledge of the situation of the camp being attained, each detachment will return by the road it came; but first, the commanding officer of each detachment will make a report to the general of the roads they have passed, what discoveries they have made, and, in short, will give him a particular detail of every thing they have met with on their way, whether woods, villages, hollows, bridges, and of every thing they have done to render the road easy for the column that is to pass through it. This detachment being assembled at the place appointed for meeting, will take the road to the camp, where being arrived, the lieutenant-general will make his report to the commander in chief of the army.

With these precautions the army may not only advance in safety, but the roads also for every column having been reconnoitred and repaired, no accident can happen to retard the march of the army.

The general must take care to have detachments of hussars or dragoons always in the front and upon the flanks, to observe and clear the march of the army; neither should a general suppose himself to be in absolute security from the distance of the enemy: but whilst he sees all clear before him, it would show great weakness for him to be apprehensive of a surprise, especially when every necessary precaution for avoiding it hath been taken. It is certainly a mark of prudence to take precautions; but multiplying them without cause is an undoubted sign of fear and anxiety.

It is proper to make the army march, as near as possible, in the same order in which it is to encamp; by which means the troops may enter the camp without confusion. The army being supposed to march in six columns, the infantry will form three, the artillery and baggage the fourth; the cavalry, with the remainder of the corps of hussars that are not detached, and the dragoons, the two last upon the flanks; so that the army, on its march, will be in the following disposition: The column upon the right will consist of cavalry, the one adjoining to it of infantry, and that which comes next will be formed by the artillery and baggage; then two columns of infantry, and the sixth closing the left, will be composed of cavalry. It is to be observed, that, if the baggage-waggons belonging to the army form too long a row, some of them may be sent into the rear of the columns of infantry, with express orders to the officers to make them march in the column.

There should be an advanced and a rear guard to each column, formed from the troops of which the column is composed; there should be also detachments of light horse upon the flanks of the cavalry, in order to keep off any of the enemy's parties that might advance to annoy the army upon its march. The rear-guard to the column of baggage should consist of infantry, cavalry, or dragoons, besides the escort always appointed for it. The general officers who are at the head of the two columns of cavalry should not march too fast, lest they should get too far advanced before the infantry; a matter always to be avoided. The march

Defensive of an army being disposed after this manner, every column Operations will enter the camp at the same time, and find itself opposite to its ground. See Plate DXIV, where a is the army formed in order of battle, ready to march. b, The park of artillery, where the baggage belonging to the army, and their escorts, also are assembled. c, March of the cavalry, to form the column on the right. d, March of the cavalry, to form the column on the left. e, March of the infantry, to form in three columns. f, March of the artillery and baggage, to form in a column. g, Parties of hussars, covering the flanks of the army, and forming the rear-guards of the column, when the army hath passed. h, Bridges and fords, discovered by the advanced detachments, who have marked the route of the army. i, Bridges built by the same detachments. k, Front and rear-guards of the columns drawn from the troops of which the columns are formed. l, Parties of hussars, marching upon the flanks of the army. m, Parties of hussars marching at the head of the army, to scour the country through which the army is to pass, and also to examine the routes marked by the advanced detachments.

If, by the enemy's position, although at a distance, the army should, on its march, present a flank to the enemy, without fearing its being attacked; yet as the enemy may have stolen one or two marches, as hath happened on many occasions, there must be only two columns of infantry placed in the centre. The third must be placed upon that flank which the army presents to the enemy; so that the army will find itself disposed upon its march after the following manner: Supposing it is the right which presents the flank to the enemy, the first column will consist of infantry, the second of cavalry, the third of artillery, the fourth and fifth of infantry, and the sixth of cavalry. The baggage will then be distributed to the three columns upon the left; so that neither the two columns upon the right, or the artillery, will have the least embarrassment, in case an action ensues. The same disposition must be made upon the left, if it is that which presents the flank. Particular care must be taken that the artillery have orders, supposing the enemy advancing in full force to attack, to transport itself to the column of infantry, and to divide itself along the front, when it shall be in order of battle, and to keep up a constant fire, in order to give the general time to make such dispositions as he shall find necessary.

The column of cavalry should be divided into two, and be posted upon the flanks of the infantry that is drawn up in the face of the enemy; the other columns must follow the orders which have been delivered to them, and execute them with the utmost dispatch.

If it appears, either from the proximity or position of the enemy, that the army is liable to be attacked in front, the disposition for the march should be in the same order as the army is to form in for action: the artillery must then be distributed among the columns of infantry; so that, following the divisions where it is placed, the brigades will find themselves spread over the front of the first line. In this case, the infantry will form four columns, which will march in the centre of the two columns of cavalry upon their flanks; so that the head of each column, as far as the

centre, when placing itself in order of battle, shall make the first line, and the remainder, from the centre downward, the second; and the reserve which follows shall form itself behind the other two lines. Defensive Operations

It is necessary that an army disposed after this manner should have orders to draw itself into order of battle on the very first signal, which should be a discharge of two or three pieces of cannon. The signal being given, the first and second lines, and the reserve, will find themselves formed in a very short time. It, from the proximity and position of the enemy, and the facility with which he can attack, the general hath reason to imagine he will do it, the heavy baggage, with a good guard and escort, ought to be removed into the rear.

On this occasion the campement (A) should not be far before the army, the escort should be increased, and some detachments of light horse should march in front to cover it, and also to make observation at a distance. The remainder of the body of light horse shall continue upon the flanks of the army intimated by dragoons, who, on the signal being given, shall immediately go and form themselves in the place assigned to them during the action.

On the first fight of the enemy the campement should retire; for when fighting becomes necessary, all thought of encamping must be laid aside; but the escort shall put itself in order of battle, and the light horse shall approach the enemy as near as possible, in order to reconnoitre his disposition and strength. The officer commanding them will immediately send a report of the discoveries he hath made to the commander in chief, who on every occasion should be in the front, and even a little advanced, to survey the nature of the ground; it being very certain, that in these cases a man can much better rely upon his own than upon the judgment of others. This was marshal Saxe's method; particularly when he was apprehensive of being attacked upon a march, or had himself an intention of attacking. In proportion as the enemy shall advance, the escort of the campement must retire in good order; at the same time not neglecting the opportunity, if it offers, of harassing the enemy's advanced guard, so as to retard his march, and give more time for the army to form in order of battle, and to the general to make such dispositions as he shall judge necessary: after which, the escort having amused the enemy, or caused him to slacken the briskness of his march, must retire in good order; and when it shall be near the body of the army, each body shall return to its own brigade.

If, from his knowledge of the country, although an open one, the general knows there are any thickets, holl's, or heights, either on the right or the left, and that this spot may prove favourable to the enemy, he should try to possess himself of it. If that attempt is not practicable, as the enemy will undoubtedly take advantage of it, and post infantry either at these thickets or heights, the general must place a brigade of infantry at the head of each column of cavalry, which shall mix by platoons with that line of cavalry when formed in order of battle. This disposition was made by M. de Turenne at the action of Sinzheim, and at the battle of Euzheim.

If, by the situation of the country, the flanks cannot be sheltered

(a) This is a French term, for which we have not a synonyme equally expressive in the English language. It is used to denote a certain number of troops, who proportion their time of setting out before the army, by the distance or proximity of the enemy, in order to trace or mark out the camp. For this purpose, a quarter-master and a trooper is draughted from every troop of every regiment of horse; and a sergeant and a corporal, in like manner, from every regiment of infantry, furnished with ropes and pickets, to lay out the ground for the tents and the intervals; so that every regiment will, on its arrival, find its ground properly marked out. A field-officer of every regiment also marches with the campement, besides the officers of each corps, who command the detachment.

Defensive Operations sheltered either by an hollow, a morass, a river, a town, or a village, the hussars and dragoons must be polled upon the wings, but sidewise, so as to be able to take the enemy in flank when he shall come down to charge the first line, or at least to keep back his second: these hussars and dragoons should be sustained by the infantry of the light troops belonging to the army. If the right can be formed next a village, and the left next an hollow, some infantry and artillery must be posted there: if there is only the right or the left that can be sheltered, that which cannot must be properly sustained; and the same disposition must be observed that hath been just now mentioned, with regard to an army whose flanks cannot be covered.

If, on leaving the camp, the army presents a flank to the enemy, who may have it in his power to attack it on the march, it must then march but in two or three columns at most. Each column should be disposed after such a manner, that by a motion to the right or to the left, according to the wing that is liable to be attacked, each battalion and squadron may find itself formed in order of battle before the enemy.

The advanced guard should be composed of light horse, sustained by dragoons: the rear-guard of cavalry sustained by infantry: there should be also some light horse upon the flanks of the cavalry, and some pieces of cannon with the infantry. The artillery should be distributed by brigades in the column of infantry nearest to the enemy: so that, performing the same movement as the troops, it may find itself placed in the front of the first line, ready to fire on the first order. The number of three columns is given to the army, in order that the first and second lines and the reserve shall be formed at the same time, which cannot be done if the army marches only in two columns: for troops must then be taken from these two lines in order to form the reserve, which would require a considerable time, and consequently retard the dispositions; whereas this reserve, forming the third column, is separated from the main body, and in a condition to act with readiness, according to the orders it shall have received. As the baggage, in this manner of marching, must necessarily be an embarrassment, it must be sent into the rear under a good escort, with orders to join the next day at the new camp.

SECT. IV. The March of an Army in a mountainous and woody Country.

If the situation of the places in a mountainous country furnishes a general with a greater variety of expedients to conceal his dispositions, it also renders more precautions, and a greater degree of knowledge, necessary to avoid being surprised. If these kind of countries, on the one hand, present greater advantages for the concealment of marches, they also, on the other, offer many difficulties in the transporting of the provisions and the artillery, and require a greater degree of vigilance for the safety of the magazines and the preservation of the communications with the frontier towns.

It is to be feared, that in mountainous countries, in roads that cannot be enlarged, the troops pressed too close together will not be able to move but with great difficulty; and as they will embarrass each other, the front, the rear-guard, and the flanks, must be equally secured; the columns must be unbroken and close, that there be no distance left between them; and halting should be particularly avoided, as that is a circumstance by which an army is most fatigued.

It is again dangerous, as the commentator upon Onofander observes, when troops find themselves straitened of room

in a narrow road, for the general, in order to enable them to move with greater ease, to lengthen the columns too much: from whence would arise two inconveniences; the first of which is, that the columns would be weakened, and that in case of a surprise it would not be difficult for the enemy to separate them entirely, and it would also be impossible for them to rally; in the second place, these columns thus lengthened, in going round a mountain and descending into a valley, would take up a prodigious extent; from whence it hath often happened, that the windings of the road hiding the middle of the column, those who march in the front rank can see only those who are in the last, and retard their march, because that, being deceived by distance, they will be scarcely able to distinguish whether they advance or whether they are halted.

In order to avoid these inconveniences, it is not barely sufficient for a general to have a thorough knowledge of the country: he ought immediately to inform himself of every particular, however minute, relating to it; he should take the same precautions which have been pointed out as necessary for a march in an open country, and send out a detachment, such as hath been supposed in the foregoing section. This detachment will examine the narrow passes, survey and found the roads, run round the windings of the mountains; and if there are many roads, it will find out which is the most practicable, and that through which the army, the artillery, and baggage, can pass with the greatest ease; what streams cross it, and whether there are bridges over them: it will examine whether they are sufficiently strong, and repair them, or build new ones. It often happens in a mountainous country, that the road which would be very short and commodious proves to be divided, either by the separation of two rocks or by hollows. As these breaches, however deep they may be, cannot be all of a certain breadth, therefore, in order to avoid marching over the unnecessary ground that going round them would take up, bridges should be thrown over, if possible, from one rock to another.

But as in a march, whether in an open or in a mountainous country, occasions for throwing bridges very often present themselves, it is very necessary to say a word or two relative to the manner of their construction.

Six or eight thick pieces of timber are laid across a rivulet, or any other bad place necessary to be passed, at six feet distance from each other; these must be crossed again by other pieces of timber not so thick, at the distance of three feet from each other; which must be fixed to one another by large pegs, and faggots well fastened together must be laid over them. When the bridge shall be thus covered, some earth must be thrown over it, which ought to be well trampled, in order to fill up the vacancies of the faggots; and then, for the greater firmness, new earth should be thrown over it, which ought to be well beaten down. The bridge thus made, the troops, the artillery, and the baggage, will pass over it with great ease.

It must be observed, that the bridges should be of the same breadth with the roads; they should be broader rather than narrower, because, exclusive of the danger the artillery and baggage would run if they were narrower, the ranks being obliged to be straitened and the column to be lengthened, the march would of course be retarded, and it would be difficult to avoid confusion. The labourers that accompany the detachment ought to be furnished with every sort of tool necessary for the removing of earth, the felling of trees, and working and fitting them for use.

On the report of the commanding officer of this detachment to the general, he will order as many detachments as there

The March of an Army through a Mountainous Country.

A. Bell. Pror. M. R. Sculpsit fecit.

Defensive Operations there are columns intended, to set out two or three hours before the time appointed for the march of the army. These detachments will march carefully over the ways already examined and prepared: they will scour every thing, hedges, narrow passes, entrances of passes, woods, heights, villages, in short all that may serve as shelter for troops in ambuscade; and for greater security, they will post guards in the villages, which guards are not to retire till the rear-guard of the army comes up.

The commanding officer of each detachment should possess himself of the heights on the right and left, and should distribute platoons of infantry at proper distances from the rocks and narrow passes: he should be careful of what may be done to oppose him, and be attentive even to the smallest paths. When the commanding officer of the detachment shall be advanced to the end of the passes, or to the ground intended for the camp, he will establish his infantry in the most advantageous post; he will place his light horse or dragoons in the front, but within reach of assistance; he will send out patrols of light horse advanced before the infantry. If he receives any intelligence of the enemy, he will send immediate notice of it to the general; but if, from the report made to him, the enemy does not appear to be sufficiently strong to annoy the army on its march, or only some parties were willing to try if they could enter the passes, his detachment will be sufficient to keep them at a distance, particularly as he is in possession of the heights and the passes.

With such precautions as these, if the enemy is at too great a distance to attack the army, the march will be performed without any trouble: there will be no obstacle in the roads, or reason to fear that the wagons will be mired; and if the wheels or axle-trees of any of them should break, they will be repaired from those which have spare ones: if, on the contrary, the enemy should be so near as to give cause to apprehend an attack, the necessary precautions are taken for forming the troops in order of battle, and for the necessary dispositions during the action.

It has been already observed, that an army on a march should be divided into as many columns as the detachments have found openings or roads leading to the camp the general intends to occupy; suppose two, the army will consequently march in two columns. The disposition of the troops in their march differs entirely from what it would be in an open country; the advanced-guard of each column must consist of infantry, some must be distributed either in the narrow passes or on the heights, and there should be some advanced detachments of light horse to scour the narrow passes: the rear-guard should consist of infantry only. The remainder of the troops may be disposed after the following manner:

Four or five brigades of infantry, according to the number which composes the army, should be placed at the head of each column; the same partition should be made with regard to the artillery, which must follow the infantry; the cavalry must march next, and the baggage of each column, well escorted by infantry, must follow the cavalry; then the remainder of the corps of light horse which are not detached; and the dragoons are placed the last, in order to dismount and sustain the rear-guard in case it shall be attacked.

Each column should consist of the same number of troops as well infantry as cavalry. Platoons of infantry should be detached to march on the heights, at proper distances, in order to cover the flanks on the right and left. Care must be taken to march very leisurely in the front, otherwise the rear will not be able to keep up; then, in order to give the

rear time to come up, the front will be forced to halt, by which the march will be much retarded and the troops fatigued. Defensive Operations

Plate DXV. represents the march of an army through a mountainous country. A is the position of the army before it begins its march. P is the artillery and baggage, with their escorts in the front of the camp. B, Parties of hussars forming the advanced guard of the army on its march. C, Parties of infantry of the advanced-guards of the columns. D, The infantry of the army forming the head of the columns. E, The artillery, and wagons belonging to the artillery. F, Battalions of artillery. G, The cavalry. H, The baggage of the army. I, The escort of the baggage. K, Parties of hussars. L, Parties of dragoons. M, The infantry of the reserve, forming the rear-guard of the army. N, Platoons of infantry marching upon the heights, to cover the flanks of the columns. O, Villages in front of the camp the army is to occupy, and of which the light infantry have taken possession.

These dispositions are necessary, because, as the enemy in a mountainous country will be able to attack with infantry only, he must be opposed with troops of the same nature: the reason why the artillery is posted behind the infantry is, that in case the enemy should attack briskly in front, and the road through which the columns pass be broad enough, some pieces of cannon may be sent into the front, which firing with grape-shot will soon thin the enemy's ranks, and abate something of his ardour: if the road be too narrow to permit the bringing forward of the artillery, resolution must supply the want of that assistance which the cannon would give, and the enemy must be charged with bayonets. The cavalry does not follow immediately, because, not being able to act in this sort of country, it must be covered by infantry. The baggage which follows is sufficiently defended by the columns that cover it, and the infantry that escorts it: this infantry should nevertheless join as often as circumstances will permit, without being fearful of exposing itself, that upon the heights being to reinforce it in case the head of the army should be attacked.

There are some mountainous countries so difficult of access, that it is impossible for the cavalry to follow, because some post must either be immediately seized, or the enemy, being in possession of the hills, must be driven from them before it can advance; or because it would be difficult for it to be subfisted.

If the army can march in four columns, the dispositions should still be the same; but as the head of the columns will be weaker in infantry, the heights should be guarded accordingly, and the rear-guard sufficiently strong to resist the enemy: the same disposition should be made for one column only.

If the march is to be made through a woody country, the precautions which have been already mentioned in regard to examining the ways through which the army is to pass, and for the detachments which set out in order to be before the army, should still be observed; but the disposition and order of the troops must be different. If by the situation of the country, the army is obliged to march continually through woods till it arrive at the camp, the cavalry and the baggage should be in three columns in the centre; but some infantry should be placed at their head and their rear-guard: the infantry should march in two columns, one on the right, the other on the left of the cavalry and baggage; some brigades of artillery should be distributed to each column of infantry, the remainder must march at the head of the columns of baggage; the flanks of the columns must be covered by platoons of infantry, placed about at proper

proper distances, which are to follow the columns at 40 or 50 paces distance, without ever losing sight of them.

Plate DXVI. represents the march of an army through a woody country. A, Is the army formed in order of battle previous to the commencement of the march. B, The cavalry, which hath marched some paces in advance, in order to make room for the infantry. C, The infantry, which, by facing to the right, forms the column upon the right. D, The infantry, which, by facing to the left, forms the column upon the left. E, Bodies of infantry, which are to march at the head of the columns of cavalry. F, The park of artillery, where the baggage belonging to the army, and the escorts, also are assembled. G, The march of the infantry, forming in columns. H, The march of the cavalry, forming in columns. I, The march of the artillery and baggage with their escorts, forming in column. K, The army in march. L, Hussars of the advanced guard keeping the roads, marked out by the detachments sent on before. M, Infantry, forming the advanced guard of the columns. N, Small parties of infantry, marching upon the flanks of the columns. O, Parties of hussars, marching upon the flanks of the army. P, Infantry of the reserve forming the rear-guard of the army.

If by the knowledge which the general has of the country, or rather from the report of the officers who commanded the detachment sent out to view, open, and repair the roads, he knows that the country is interrupted by woods and little plains, the disposition ought to be wholly changed; it will then be sufficient that the second detachment, which in other cases ought to set out the evening before, sets out only two hours before the campement. This detachment should be composed of infantry, light horse, and dragoons; the infantry to scour the villages and the woods, the light horse to penetrate into the woods wherever they can enter, and clear the march of the infantry, and the dragoons to sustain the whole.

When the disposition for the march of the army is supposed to be in five columns, the infantry should form two, the cavalry two more, and the artillery and baggage the fifth. If it is thought there will be any occasion for artillery, a brigade or two may be distributed to the columns of infantry; and the remainder may march at the head of the escort of the baggage, which is to be defended by the regiment of artillery; to which must be added a detachment of infantry, which will form the advanced guard. The cavalry and dragoons are to keep the open country as much as possible, and the infantry the inclosed; and the best and most accessible road should always be given to the artillery and baggage. In order that the columns may preserve the same length in marching, a brigade of infantry should be placed at the heads of the columns of cavalry; if this precaution, which fixes the head of the columns of cavalry, is neglected, the cavalry will extend a great way before the columns of infantry, which should always be avoided. The rear-guard should consist of infantry, cavalry, or dragoons; the light horse should always march on the flanks on the right and left, and before the army.

It is after this manner that the march of an army may be disposed through a woody and a mountainous country; but an army must always suit its motions to circumstances, and to the situation of the country where the war is carried on. If the general is inferior in point of number, he should make choice of defiles; because in them he can always present a front equal to the enemy's. Who can be ignorant that Leonidas with 8000 Greeks, at the straits of Thermopylæ, stopped the almost innumerable army of Xerxes, who was unable to force him?

A mountainous and woody country, when thoroughly

known, becomes a more favourable theatre for practising the wiles and stratagems of war than an open country; it is true that the knowledge of it is more difficult to attain, and that it requires more vigilance and readiness in the general. Hannibal was even drawn into ambuscades by his own guides; an example worthy the notice of a general who takes guides that have either but little regard for him, or are unacquainted with the country: it is impossible to try them too much; and their ignorance is often more fatal than treachery itself.

The marches that require most precaution are those made in the night, those made in sight of the enemy, and those that should be kept secret.

The first should be avoided as much as possible; but if circumstances require and force an army to march over a mountainous country in the night, care should at least have been taken to survey the roads during the day; to make the guides march at the head of the army; to keep the ranks very close together, that the men may not lose sight of each other; and that part of the troops do not mistake one defile for another, which may easily happen in the dark, if the advanced guard has marched a little too fast, and the officers hastened too much. The Greeks, according to Xenophon, on like occasions, gave the heaviest arms to the troops that marched at the head, thereby to oblige them to proceed leisurely.

In those marches that are made in sight of the enemy, besides the precautions necessary to be taken for the safety of the troops, and which have already been mentioned, the general should endeavour to deceive them by false appearances, and by an ostentation, often in such circumstances, necessary: as extensive a front as possible should be given to the army; the intervals of the ranks and columns should be widened, but not so as to weaken them; the general should take advantage of an height, possess himself of it, and post some troops on it, in order to make the enemy inspect there may be still more behind: advantage should be taken of a wood, and, by marches and countermarches, the same troops should be made to pass and repass, in order to make the enemy believe the army stronger than it really is. There have been instances of generals, who, on like occasions, have made such good use of their ground, that, by the arrangement of troops, they have seemed to multiply them in the enemy's eyes; and who, although inferior in strength, appearing to have the advantage of numbers, have kept the enemy in awe.

But still, unless it is to deceive the enemy, a general should conceal his force and management: his force, because, if inferior, he will not fail to profit by that advantage; and if superior, he should avoid a battle: he will conceal his management, because he will prevent the designs of the enemy's general, who will receive as much information from his successes as from his misfortunes. Pyrrhus, who taught the art of war to the Romans, was in the end conquered by them. The Mexicans often turned the arts and wiles of Cortez and the Spaniards against them; and the Czar Peter I. never regretted a defeat when it became the means of instructing him how to conquer in his turn.

It is impossible to lay down fixed rules for secret marches: it is by his address that a general will improve circumstances; it is by art and contrivance that he will evade the enemy's vigilance, and deceive his spies.

General rules only can be given for the dispositions to be made of troops upon a march; particular ones would be merely conjectural, because the general of an army must always depend upon circumstances: it is the situation and nature of the country, the number of troops, the nearness of the enemy, the facility of foraging, and the passes of

Plan of the Position of an Army in its Camp.

Plate DXVII.

Defensive operations of which the enemy is possessed, that ought to determine him.

In a word, whatever is the order and disposition of the troops, it must be such, that they shall always be able to sustain each other; that the flanks shall be well guarded, and the fronts secured; the roads must have been surveyed and opened; and whatever the nature of the country is, all the columns should arrive at and enter the camp at the same time.

SECT. VI. Of Camps in defensive War.

It is in general more difficult to carry on a defensive than an offensive war, but more particularly so in an open than in a mountainous country. In the former, there is nothing to conceal the movements and dispositions of the army from the enemy; whereas, in the latter, the nature of the places prevents the enemy from discovering them: but whatever may be the nature of the country, the choice of a camp, when on the defensive, and the art of pitching upon an advantageous situation, is what proves the genius and talents of a great officer. Exclusive of a thorough knowledge of the country, this operation requires a quick and penetrating eye in a general, to enable him to seize the posts which from their situation may prevent the enemy either from attacking him or penetrating into the country.

A general who acts on the offensive, takes what state or circumstances he pleases; he may act as he chooses, and is not under a necessity of regulating himself entirely by the enemy's motions: whereas a general that is not sufficiently strong to attack, is commonly obliged to continue quiet till the enemy hath acted, and then to regulate his motions according to those made by the opposite army, unless his superior abilities give him a particular advantage over the enemy's general.

Although it is always necessary for a general to have a thorough knowledge of the country, this knowledge will yet become more necessary to him when acting on the defensive. He ought to prevent the enemy's entering his country, and forming any siege there (a plan which he cannot execute, unless he is possessed of the most advantageous posts, and also of those which cover the towns liable to be threatened), by proper dispositions that secure his camp; by covering his fronts and rears, and keeping the communication between the camp and the places where the magazines are; by endeavouring to annoy the enemy in his convoys and foragings; by harassing him in his camp, and perplexing him with small detachments, to which he will be obliged to oppose more considerable ones: these dispositions, properly managed, may destroy any enterprises the enemy may have formed against the army.

Plate DXVII. represents an army properly encamped to serve these purposes. A, Is the camp of the main body of the army. B, An advanced camp, composed of dragoons and hussars, in order to cover the right of the army, to guard the passes by which the enemy might make incursions upon the flanks and rear of the army, molest the convoys, and cut off the communications. C, Villages and bridges, guarded by the light infantry. D, Posts of dismounted dragoons in the front of their camp. E, Posts of dragoons on horseback, to secure the communication between their camp and that of the main body of the army. F, Bridges built, to keep up the communication between the grand and the advanced camp. G, Bridges and villages guarded by detachments of infantry. H, Grand guards of horse. I, Guards of infantry. K, Bridge, village, and mill, guarded by the infantry belonging to the army. L, Camp of dragoons and hussars covering the left of the army, and sup-

porting the light infantry. M, Villages and bridges guarded by the light infantry. N, Posts of dismounted dragoons in the front and on the flanks of their camp. O, Posts of dragoons on horseback. P, Posts and detachments of hussars, to patrol in the front and upon the flanks of the army, and their camp.

By the enemy's superiority, the nature of the country, and the success of campaigns, the general should determine whether or not his camp should be entrenched: the entrenching of camps requires much observation. It is easy (says Vigetius) to entrench a camp while at a distance from the enemy; but it becomes a very difficult operation when the enemy is near at hand. The Romans, according to him, used to keep all their cavalry and half their infantry drawn up in order of battle, in order to cover those troops that were employed in working at the entrenchments. Cæsar, when in Spain, fortified himself after this manner under the eyes of Afranius and Petreius, without their having the least knowledge of it.

Before a general fortifies a camp in a plain, he must observe the position in which the ground will permit him to form his camp; whether or no it will be liable to be surrounded; if it will entirely cover the country it is to protect, and the towns for which there is most reason to be apprehensive; if the parts in the rear are open; if forage is in plenty; if provision can easily be brought; if there is wood and water; if it is impossible for the enemy to enter the country without forcing the camp; if all these circumstances concur, it is certainly most advantageous to entrench the camp.

A general should never be too secure by having a superiority of numbers; he ought not on that account to neglect fortifying his camp: even when he acts on the offensive, these entrenchments will not hinder him from marching out to the enemy whenever he judges it proper, and his army will by that means be sheltered from the enemy's attempts.

There are many methods of entrenching a camp by lines beginning on the right, and covering the whole front of the camp to the left; these lines, in their extent, have redoubts and angles at proper distances; and the line being continued from one to the other, forms the curtains. In the front of them there is a large and also deep ditch; sometimes a covered way is added, which is palliaded and floccaded throughout the whole front of the lines. To render them yet stronger and more difficult to be forced, there are pits sunk before the covered way. These pits are ranged chequered-wise, about six feet deep and five broad, and are in form like a reversed cone. Such were the pits which the duke of Berwick caused to be made in 1734 to the lines of circumvallation before Philippsburg; only with this difference, there was no covered way. Without doubt these lines are formidable, and even very difficult to attack; but a great deal of time is required for constructing them; and if there is not a sufficient number of peasants in the army to work at them, troops must be employed to expedite them; which will not only greatly fatigue them, but may also cost the lives of many; because the removing of earth often causes great disorders, particularly where the ground is swampy or clayey.

The method practised by marshal Saxe seems much superior to these lines. It contained as large an extent of ground, without diminishing the labour; because, instead of lines, it consisted of redoubts, which require as much work to form the four faces and the covered way as lines always continued. At the siege of Maelstricht, in 1748, he used these redoubts instead of lines; their distance from each other was 48 yards; they were floccaded, and the covered way

Defensive Operations. way pallisaded. These redoubts presented an angle to the field, and consequently were a mutual protection to each other; they were each of them capable of containing a battalion.

His design, supposing the enemy come to attack the army, was to cause all the redoubts to be occupied; to plant ten pieces of cannon between each, and to draw the army up in order of battle behind them: by this means the enemy would be obliged to force the redoubts before they could attack the army, which could not be done without great loss. But supposing the redoubts to be forced, how would the enemy be able to enter the intervals without dividing? The army behind, in order of battle, would charge him, without giving him time to recover himself, and it is highly probable would beat him.

By following this method of entrenching a camp, if some of the enemy's battalions should, for example, force three or four redoubts, they certainly would not dare to advance as long as the remainder should hold out; so that a general might, by detaching some brigades, and causing them to march to the assistance of the battalions that have been forced, retake the redoubts; or, without disordering the order of battle, drive away the troops which are in possession of them with his cannon. In short, this method seems to be excellent, because it proves that all the redoubts may be forced, and yet the army not be beaten, because it has not suffered in the action, but remained the whole time in order of battle with all its cannon; so that the enemy will be reduced to the necessity of beginning a second battle.— Lines, on the contrary, have not the same advantage; all the troops, or the greatest part of them, must line them; the cannon is planted at proper distances either on the angles of the redans, or those of the redoubts. If one part only is forced, the army is beat, and the cannon taken, because the enemy makes the attack with his whole front.

Lines are indeed never good, unless when there is a large extent of country to be guarded, and some frontier to be covered from the incursions of the enemy; the front of an entrenched camp seldom exceeds six miles, more or less, whereas lines to cover a country have sometimes extended 30 miles in front. By some it is thought, that, in order to cover a country, it is sufficient to have certain holds, which shall be strong and well entrenched, with patrols continually going from one end of the posts to the other, and each post to be provided with signals both for day and night. It is unnecessary that these patrols should be strong, provided they follow, and are continually crossing each other; this will be sufficient to prevent the enemy passing undiscovered. It is certain that the enemy will not dare to pass between these posts, whether he be strong or weak; if he pass in a body, he will be cut off behind, and his convoys intercepted; if he pass only in parties, they will be cut off with the greater ease. However, lines of this nature would require much labour, and also take up years to complete them.

Marshal Saxe's method for entrenching a camp in a woody country interspersed with small plains, seems also to be a very good one. The redoubts are to be erected in the plain; and lines thrown up in the woods according to the usual method, with redans placed on the side of each other, at 24 toises distance; there should be a pallisaded ditch in the front, and the lines as well as the half-moon should be frayed with pointed stakes; behind these lines, which cannot be very extensive, because they only cover part of the front of the camp, must be placed the troops necessary for defending them; a considerable entrenchment of felled trees must be made behind, with the branches of the trees intangled with each other, and some openings must be left wide e-

nough to permit the troops who guard the lines to pass through, in case they should be overpowered and obliged to retire; the cannon must be planted in the front of these openings; and the remainder of the army must be drawn up in order of battle, 100 paces at most behind the retranchments of trees and the half-moons. The retranchments of trees are placed about 60 or 80 paces behind the lines, and not before them, because it will be a new and unexpected obstacle to the enemy. These retranchments, carefully made, and with large trees, can be destroyed by cannon only, which would take up a considerable time; if they were in the front of the lines there would certainly be a rampart more; but that might be useless, and perhaps hurtful, because the fire of the enemy to make a passage would drive the splinters of the trees into the lines, which would do more harm than even the shot itself.

Plate DXVIII. represents an entrenched camp; in which A is the main body of the army encamped behind its entrenchments. B, the camp of the troops of the reserve. C, Camp of the dragoons, to secure the rear of the army. D, Camp of hussars, to cover the ground upon the right of the army. E, Villages and redoubts guarded by the light infantry, to secure the camp of the hussars. F, Bridges built to secure the communication of the army with the ground upon the right, and to favour the retreat of the troops posted on the opposite side. G, Brigades of artillery distributed upon the flanks, and along the whole front of the army. H, The park of artillery. I, A bridge entrenched, to secure the communication between the army and the ground upon the left. K, Villages and farm-houses, guarded by detachments of hussars and light infantry, to patrol in the front of the army.

In a mountainous country the dispositions for entrenchments are different: it is impossible there to find plains sufficiently large to draw up an army in order of battle, and place it beyond redoubts, as in an open country; the avenues and the passes only can be entrenched; the redoubts would not be sufficient, because not only the avenues must be guarded, but the heights also occupied. Now, as it will often happen among mountains that there is not a foot of earth, how can redoubts be erected there? A general must then make use of such assistance as the country can furnish him with, whether by heaping stones upon each other, or by retranchments of trees well joined; and thus construct lines sufficiently strong to shelter the soldiers from fire and all injury. In an open country, a general in a manner suits the ground to his dispositions; in a mountainous country, he must apply his dispositions to the ground; but in any country whatever, he must use all the assistance of art for entrenching of camps. In mountainous countries there are more inequalities of ground, which render the enemy's approach to the lines difficult; and altho' it is almost impossible for a camp in a mountainous country to be attacked in front, nothing should be neglected for its safety: but all the avenues by which it may be surrounded must be entrenched with care, and all the heights which overlook it secured; because the enemy, without intending to attack in front, will amuse him during the time necessary for troops to take a long round, in order to penetrate to the camp on another side. If Leonidas, with his 8000 Greeks, had been possessed of all the avenues, ways, and heights, by which he could be cut off, in the same manner as he was of the pass of Thermopyle, Xerxes with his innumerable army could never have forced him in the defiles which he guarded.

The entrenchment should never be more than 250 or 300 toises, which make from 500 to 600 paces, distant from the camp, and which ought to be divided into three parts. This distance should be made, that the troops may be able

WAR.
Plan of an Intrenched Camp.

to judge of the parts that can be carried with greatest ease, and of those which are most in need of assistance, that they may march there with greater order, dispatch, and facility: whereas, if this distance is not observed, it will happen, as hath been sometimes seen, that the troops not having ground sufficient to range themselves in order of battle, the dispositions will be impeded by confusion and disorder, and the enemy will have forced the lines before the troops can be in a condition of opposing him.

But in a mountainous country, it is not sufficient for a general that he cannot be turned; that he hath profited so well by the advantages of ground, as to render the enemy's approach to the camp difficult; that the assistance of art hath been joined to nature; and that the country to be guarded is entirely covered: he must also be careful that the communication with the neighbouring towns where the magazines of war and provision are established, is safe and easy. If any one of these particulars is neglected, the camp is exposed, neither can the general continue in it the time that would be necessary to retard the march and designs of the enemy. As it hath been already observed, that there is scarcely any post that is not liable to be turned or overlooked, the camp should be entrenched only so far as the entrenchments may become an obstacle to the enemy, and as they may be a means of giving the general time to retire to occupy another post.

When the enemy undertakes the siege of some town, and the general, although with an inferior army, is willing to succour it, or cause the siege of it to be raised, he should seek out a spot naturally strong, and entrench it according to its situation: if an open country, according to the method above mentioned; if among mountains, according to the assistance that the nature of the country may give; and make use of these entrenchments as a sure asylum from whence to make sallies upon the enemy, to attack his forages and his convoys, and to oblige him to raise the siege as well by the fatigues of it, when it hath been drawn out to a greater length of time than was designed by the enemy, as by the want to which he is reduced by the continual inquietudes that the entrenched army hath given him.

When an army is in an open country, it generally continues in the same camp for some space of time; because it is certain the enemy cannot conceal his designs so effectually from the general, but he may be able to circumvent them; but in a mountainous country, it is uncertain whether an army will continue in the same post till morning that it occupied over-night. A general must then encamp in such a position, and after such a manner, that in case the enemy comes to attack him in force and with advantage, he may be able, without danger, to proceed to another post, and evade the enemy's designs.

It requires great skill in a general to judge when it is proper or improper to make choice of places which have a great many avenues on one side; because if he should be attacked in a camp inclosed by rocks, or deep in a valley which hath but one or two passes open, it will be very difficult for him to disengage himself from the enemy: on the contrary, if there are many small passes or avenues to the ground of which he is possessed, and by which the enemy may easily invest his camp, it will require a great number of men to guard them. But on these occasions a general should be ever careful to make a good disposition of his troops, to maintain strict order and discipline in his camp, and to send out his patrols with the greatest regularity; by which means he will free himself from all apprehensions of being surprised.

There ought to be no difference between a well-governed town and a well-ordered camp; the exactest order should

be observed, and the strictest discipline kept up: if a soldier is at liberty to quit or enter it at pleasure, the enemy's spies will not fail to make their advantages of it. If the camp is unhealthy, or distressed for provision, water, wood, or forage, and the soldier hath real cause of complaint, every method should be tried to avoid the danger that will attend his being discouraged. It is often owing to the little order existing in the camp, that the soldiers are seized with a panic, occasioned by the absurd and groundless reports that are diffused throughout it; troops thus terrified, are in a manner vanquished before they come to action.

In a mountainous country, such places should be avoided as are subject to be overflowed, either by the melting of the snow, or by torrents, which at some seasons appear no more than trifling rivulets, but which, at others, swell and carry off every thing they meet with in their way: of this nature were those mentioned by M. de Feuquieres, which he found near the rock that he attacked and took in 1690 from the Baduais. Situations in the neighbourhood of woods are generally to be feared, because the enemy may set them on fire, and the flames be communicated to the camp. The general ought also to satisfy himself with regard to the nature of the springs, which may agree very well with the inhabitants, but prove very unwholesome to strangers: such, according to the reports of the French, is the nature of the springs in many parts of Italy. The water belonging to certain streams or rivers will be pernicious, while that belonging to the fountains and wells in the same country will be very wholesome and salutary.

SECT. VII. Of escorting Convoys.

THE conducting of convoys is one of the most important and most difficult of all military operations. In the escort assigned them, and the number of horse and foot of which this escort is composed, the general ought to be guided by the distance of the town from whence they set out; the dangers to which they are exposed from the different parties they may meet; the distance and strength of the enemy, and the extent and nature of the country they have to travel over, whether an open or a mountainous one; the number of wagons, and the quality of the convoys, whether they consist of money, or ammunition for war or provision; and whether they are extraordinary or daily. When escorts are too numerous, the troops are fatigued, and no end answered; and when they are too weak, they are liable to be beaten. M. de Puyféguir observes, that it is as dangerous to give an escort of 2000 men to a convoy where only 1000 are requisite, as to give but 500 to one where 1000 are absolutely necessary; in the first, the troops are unnecessarily fatigued, and in the second, the convoy is exposed to the danger of being carried off.

All these considerations suppose the general to be a man whose natural parts are matured by experience, and who is sensible that, without a thorough knowledge of the country, the foundation of all conduct, it will be impossible to make a proper disposition of troops. If a general is ignorant of the places most proper to form ambuscades; of those where there are bridges and fords; of the passes which are most dangerous, and those which will favour the enemy's approach in order to attack, and whether in head, flank, or rear—he acts but as chance directs, and his dispositions will have no meaning, either with respect to the situation of places, or the nature of the ground; the orders will be ill executed, the evolutions performed without exactness, and the disposition of the troops will be faulty; the separate bodies being, consequently, unable to sustain and assist each other,

Defensive Operations. will soon be beaten and dispersed, and the convoy carried off.

The general officer commanding the convoy ought, for its security, to distribute his troops after such a manner that they may be a mutual assistance to it. The choice of the troops to form the escort is undetermined, as it is by the nature of the country their quality should be decided. In mountainous and woody countries, only infantry, hussars, or dragoons, can be made use of; the hussars or dragoons are to march in the front and on the flanks, to scour the woods, examine the avenues, and make sure of the defiles; in an open country, the escort should be composed of infantry, cavalry, hussars, or dragoons. But whatever may be the nature of the country, the convoy ought never to advance without first sending out detachments to reconnoitre at a distance.

If the convoy marches through a mountainous country, a large body of cavalry would not only be useless, but also an embarrassment, as it would be unable to act, except with great difficulty; whereas, in an open country, cavalry is very serviceable. In any kind of country a convoy can be escorted with infantry, especially when the enemy can only act with his; but as in an open country it is necessary for the infantry to be supported, the cavalry must be used for that purpose. In a mountainous country, infantry can carry on war alone.

In this last case the officer commanding the escort ought to place a body of infantry at the head, another in the centre, and a third at the rear-guard; to distribute small bodies at proper distances on the right and left; and he should be particularly careful to possess himself of the heights. The hussars must be distributed to the advanced and rear-guards, and, in order to be more certain that every part hath been strictly examined, as the convoy advances, notwithstanding the hussars of the advanced guard have already scoured the avenues, woods, valleys, villages, and hollows, the hussars belonging to the rear-guard should again look into those places, to see whether any thing hath escaped the notice of the advanced guard. These precautions are never without their use, and do not in the least retard the march of the convoy.

The small detachments should advance as far as possible into the country, without exposing themselves to the danger of being cut off, the hussars with pistol or musquetoon, and the dragoons with their carbine in hand, in order that, if they should meet the enemy, they may, by firing, give the officer commanding the escort notice of it, so that he may have time to make his dispositions for defending and preserving the convoy. The convoy may continue marching on till the enemy is discovered: but on the first notice of him, it must stop, and the officers belonging to the convoy should park their waggons; or, if the ground will not admit of that, they should cause them to keep very close together, and double them up with the distance of four paces, which should be filled with infantry, between each wagon. By this movement the length of ground taken up by the waggons will be contracted, the troops will be brought closer together, and will form a stronger and heavier body, capable of assisting each other with more ease.

In a mountainous country it is almost impossible for the enemy to attack the advanced and rear guards and the centre at the same time. Nevertheless, if he should find an opportunity of forming these three attacks at once, by following the dispositions above mentioned, he will find troops at every part to receive him: neither will he be able to make himself master of the heights without attacking them, and the troops already in possession of the ground will easily repulse him; and by the assistance which the officer commanding the ef-

fort should endeavour to send them, they will be enabled to maintain themselves in them, to protect the convoy, and the enemy will be unable to attack by more than one or two passes.

If the enemy forms but one attack, only a part of the troops must be opposed to him, because it is to be supposed this attack may be made only with a design to draw the whole strength of the detachment to that part, and which, by being altogether in that one place, will give the enemy concealed in ambush an opportunity of falling with ease upon that part of the convoy that is unprovided with troops, and which will of course be incapable of making any defence. The troops of the centre should never march to the assistance of the advanced guard, if it is that which is attacked, nor those of the rear-guard to the assistance of the centre; but a party from those troops which cover the flanks of the convoy should be collected in a body, and sent to assist the part that is attacked. However narrow and confined the country may be, a convoy may be easily conducted by infantry, when it would be impossible to do it with cavalry.

When any pass or avenue crosses the road on which the convoy marches, it should be covered by a body of infantry, which will remain there till the rear-guard is come up; then it will fall into the post assigned it for conducting the convoy. It is always to be supposed, that this pass hath been examined by the advanced detachments. If the escort is composed of infantry and dragoons, the latter should be dismounted, in order to give an additional strength to the guards, and their horses may be tied to the waggons. The hussars, if the nature of the country renders them unserviceable on horseback, may also be dismounted; by which means, instead of being an embarrassment to the infantry, they will become useful to it. The nature of hussars is such as will admit of their being employed on every occasion; and although the difference of their arms will not permit them to be as serviceable as dragoons, they may nevertheless amuse a party of troops belonging to the enemy in such a manner as to enable the infantry to beat them, or at least to oblige them to retire.

Hussars are more particularly necessary in the escorting of convoys, because they scamper about on all sides, and are very active and ready in scouring a country thoroughly; they leave no place till they have perfectly examined it, unless the thickness of the woods, or any other unavoidable obstacle, should prevent their penetrating as far as they would otherwise do; and even then they protect the infantry, who can with greater ease pass into those places where the hussars cannot. Whatever country the convoy passes through, there should always be hussars with it; otherwise the officer commanding the escort cannot be certain that the country is thoroughly surveyed, because for want of hussars he must employ cavalry on that service. Not that there can be any doubt of the cavalry's exposing itself to danger with as much cheerfulness and courage as the hussars; but as the horses belonging to the cavalry are naturally heavier than those of the hussars, and often encumbered with forage, they cannot venture to a proper distance without running the danger of being taken, because they cannot retire with that expedition which is requisite: On the other hand, the hussar being more active, and more accustomed to reconnoitre, knows how to go over a country with proper caution and care to himself; besides, the trooper who is used always to march in a body, and to be under command, will have a very imperfect idea of the method of scouring a country. Although the disposition of the troops should always be regulated by the nature of the country through which the convoy marches, and by the nature and

Defensive Operations. number of the enemy by which it is liable to be attacked, yet the general should never neglect, whatever his situation may be, to secure the head, centre, and rear. Before the convoy begins its march, the disposition in case of an attack should be settled; by which means the commanding officers of different corps will know where to post themselves, and after what manner to act at the time the attack is made. By the knowledge which the commanding officer ought to have of the country, he will form a judgment of those places where it is most probable he may be attacked, and of course make his dispositions accordingly. In any disposition that may happen, a general should always foresee in what manner the attack, defence, and retreat, will be conducted.

When a convoy marches through an open country, the advanced and rear guards should consist of cavalry furnished by infantry; the infantry in the centre should be continued on the right and left of the waggons, and the cavalry divided into troops should be distributed on the flanks, at 100 or 150 paces from the infantry; squadrons of horse, intermixed with platoons of infantry, should be placed at proper distances on the flanks of the remaining part of the convoy. By this position, if the convoy should be attacked in head, centre, or rear, these squadrons and platoons should have orders to march immediately to the assistance of the party that is attacked.

The advanced detachments of hussars, and those upon the flanks, by giving notice that the enemy is at hand and coming to attack, will furnish time for parking the waggons and uniting the troops; in which case the infantry must form in the park, and the cavalry post itself on the flank of that front which expects to be attacked, and the hussars place themselves upon the flanks of the cavalry.

The attack of a convoy is always sudden and rapid, and the success of it is generally decided in the first onset; and as the enemy, whether he succeeds in his attempt or not, must retire with great expedition, for fear of any succour that may arrive, it is evident that it can be attacked only by cavalry, hussars, or dragoons; there have indeed been some instances where the cavalry have brought infantry behind them. If the convoy has had time to park itself, the effort of the infantry can only be turned against that which it intrenched behind the waggons. The enemy's cavalry and that belonging to the escort attacking each other, will fight upon equal terms: but with regard to the infantry, it will be different; that which is sheltered by the carriages having a great advantage over that which attacks it. On the contrary, if the enemy's infantry is furnished by hussars only, they will be briskly attacked by the cavalry and hussars belonging to the escort, who will take them in flank and rear. The enemy's hussars being hemmed in, his infantry, for want of being furnished, will be easily beaten: part of the cavalry and hussars belonging to the escort should be left in pursuit of the enemy's hussars, and the remainder ought to take his infantry in flank. If the enemy is beaten, as it is probable he will, his retreat seems impracticable, or at best very difficult; because, being deprived of his cavalry, he will be forced to make head against the infantry that attacks him in front, and to repulse the cavalry that harasses him in flank.

If the enemy gives ground, the general should be cautious of pursuing him too far, lest, if he should receive a reinforcement, the troops in pursuit of him, finding themselves at too great a distance, will not only be beat, but also be deprived of every method of retreating.

There are some occasions on which the enemy must not be pursued at all; such as when the armies are very close to each other, or the convoy draws near to some of the ene-

my's posts; because then, by the nearness of the army, the enemy's infantry can come to the attack without being under the necessity of mounting behind the cavalry. A general, to whose care a convoy is intrusted, should never seek any other advantage than the conducting it in safety, even though he should be sure of beating and taking a detachment belonging to the enemy; a real advantage is often given up by endeavouring to follow an uncertain victory. There is less shame in being beat, when an officer hath done his utmost, and acted with propriety, than there is glory acquired in conquering when he hath exceeded the limits of his duty. An officer is no longer praise-worthy, than whilst he acts up to the orders he hath received with exactness and discretion; whereas he who, depending too much on his own courage, rashly suffers himself to be drawn on by the appearance of success, is not only charged with, but ought to be answerable for, the consequences.

There still remains another disposition to be made in an open country, whether the convoy marches on a causeway or in the high road, which is to divide the escort into many equal parts, with troops of every sort belonging to each; the first body should set out an hour before the convoy is to begin its march, the second half an hour after, with orders to the commanding officers to scour the adjacent country with great exactness, and to be careful not to be cut off by any detachments the enemy may have in the country; for which reason these two bodies should never be more than three quarters of a league distant from each other, by which means they will be within reach of assisting each other. The body which sets out last should never be more than half a league before the advanced guard of the escort.

As the convoy is supposed to march through an open country, the above-mentioned distances are allotted between the first and second bodies, and between the second body and the advanced guard of the convoy; but if the country should grow rough and unequal, these bodies should draw closer together, and always keep sight of each other, so as to be able to assist one another in case of an attack.

When these bodies are set out, the general must put the convoy in motion, and form the advanced guard of one of the divided detachments belonging to the escort; the infantry of which detachment will remain at the head of the waggons, the cavalry shall march by troops 300 paces in advance, and the rear-guard must be formed equal to the advanced; but besides this rear-guard, there should be a body of hussars and dragoons reserved, to march a quarter of a league or more, according to the nature of the country, in the rear of the convoy; the remainder of the infantry shall be distributed at proper distances on the sides of the convoy, and the remainder of the cavalry shall be placed on the flanks of the convoy, about 300 paces distance.

When a convoy happens to be of such importance that its being taken may influence the operations during the remainder of the campaign, the general should not only assign a stronger or more numerous escort to it, but should also send off detachments, which, without having orders to attack the enemy, should keep between him and the road that the convoy keeps, in order to oppose and baffle any designs the enemy may have formed to carry it off. The following examples will show both the security and necessity of this method.

During the campaign of 1746, marshal Saxe, being encamped on the Orne, was in expectation of a considerable convoy from Judoigne. As its safe arrival in the camp was of great consequence, he caused the marquis of d'Armentieres, then major-general, to set out with a large detachment in the night preceding the day on which the convoy was

was to begin its march, with orders to march on the side of Ramillies. At the same time, he caused another detachment to set out from the camp of his serene highness the prince of Clermont, with orders to march on the side of the abbey of Rame; these two detachments, by amusing the enemy on one side, and by entirely concealing the march of the convoy on the other, enabled it to proceed in security, and it arrived in the camp without having been at all molested.

In the beginning of the campaign in 1748, the same general having a design to lay siege to Maastricht, and consequently having occasion for all his troops, was willing to throw a supply of provisions into Bergen-op-Zoom, as he was going to a distance from that place, and could no longer be in a situation of assisting it. For that purpose he ordered a considerable convoy, which set out from Antwerp for that town under a good escort; but in order to prevent an attack, which circumstance had often happened during the winter, and that with loss, the allies at that time occupying a chain of quarters from Breda as far as Voude, he detached the count d'Estrees with a considerable body of cavalry to march on the side of Breda, with orders to push on detachments almost to Voude. This detachment had two objects in view; one of which was to keep the allies in suspense with regard to the siege that was to be formed, and the other to cause them to remain near Breda. This large body of cavalry kept the allies, who were in the neighbourhood of that town, in suspense; during which interval marshal Saxe marched to Maastricht, the allies not daring to attack the convoy, because they would have put themselves between the escort and the troops under count d'Estrees. From these two examples may be concluded the necessity of covering convoys of importance by detachments, independent of the escort assigned them. In short, a general should do every thing that will contribute to the security of his dispositions; and precautions ought never to be thought superfluous when they are managed with prudence, and have for their end the success of a well-concerted plan.

SECT. VIII. Of Detachments for forming a Chain of green Forage.

It is very difficult to provide a large army with forage; and a general often exposes it to inevitable danger, if he is not thoroughly experienced in this operation, or if he is destitute of that knowledge which at once presents all the wants of an army, and the means of supplying them, to his view.

Foraging parties, like convoys, are attended with a greater or lesser degree of danger, according as the country is more or less accessible, and the forage at a distance or near at hand. The disposition for the chain in an open country is different from what it must be in a mountainous one. When forage is within reach of the camp, and the enemy at a distance, fewer troops and attendants are required; because, in case of an attack, there is assistance near at hand; but in proportion as the forage is farther from the camp and nearer to the enemy, the precautions should be increased, and more troops should be allotted to the chain, which should also sometimes be furnished with cannon.

A general should never forget that maxim which says, The enemy must always be opposed by troops of the same nature as those with which he makes the attack: if the forage, therefore, is in an open country, the chain, as it is certain the enemy will be more numerous in cavalry than infantry, should consist chiefly of cavalry, and only have

infantry sufficient to occupy such posts as are necessary to be guarded: in a mountainous country the dispositions will be quite different; because, as it is impossible for cavalry to move easily, the chain should be strongest in infantry. In short, the number and quality of the troops for the chain should be regulated in the same manner as in regard to the convoys; in proportion to the nearness or distance of the enemy; by the extent of ground to be foraged; and by the nature of the country: and as marshal Puysegur observes, before the ground to be foraged is examined, there should be a calculation made of the number of horses to be fed, and of the fertility of the ground that is to be foraged; for if it is a plentiful spot, a less extent will be sufficient; if it is not plentiful, a larger must be taken; but in either case the chain must be always proportionable.

Before a forage is undertaken, the ground on which it is to be performed should be always thoroughly known; in order for which the general should send out in the evening, or the day before, the officer who is to command it, with a detachment, to survey the situation of the country; the places where he must post his troops of cavalry and dragoons; the posts which the infantry must occupy; the ground necessary for the foragers; that where the corps of reserve must be posted; and what part in the front of the chain it will be necessary for the hussars to scour. After having examined all these particulars, the officer makes his report to the general, who, from the account given him, will order the troops necessary to secure the forage, and render the execution of it easy. The chain of forage should be in proportion to the number of troops that are to forage, as well as to the quantity of sown fields and the thickness of the grain. Besides the horse, dragoons, and infantry, there should be hussars to scour the country in the front of the chain: the number of them is undetermined, as it will be sufficient for them to cover and protect the front, and give the commanding officer immediate notice of every thing that makes its appearance.

If the forage is to be made at a distance from the camp, the troops destined for the chain should set out at day-break, or the evening of the foregoing night. The commanding officer must take care to establish the chain before the foragers arrive, and also that the hussars have scoured the country; first, because the foragers should not, by waiting, fatigue the horses; and secondly, that no trooper or servant shall pass; which will undoubtedly be the case if there is any vacancy where troops are not placed.

The whole of the troops should be disposed after such a manner as to be able to see one another; and the vedets also, that are placed between the troops to prevent the foragers from passing, should be within hearing. The infantry should be posted in hollows and villages and behind hedges, with horse or dragoons to sustain it and support the flanks; and the disposition of the chain will be still better, if these troops can be mixed with it, provided the infantry can be sheltered by any hollows, hedges, or bushes.

Grenadiers, sustained by horse and cannon, if there are any, should be posted on those sides which, either from the situation of the country or the nearness of the enemy, are most liable to be attacked: but in reinforcing these posts, the commanding officer must be careful not to weaken the chain too much in any particular part. When an enemy attacks a foraging party, he generally attempts to penetrate at different parts; but if he forms only one attack, the disposition of the chain becomes useless, as all the troops must be brought to that part where the attack is made. But as it is naturally to be supposed the enemy will form many attacks, particularly if his general acts like a man understanding

Defensive Operations. understanding his business, he must be strong in every part; the reserve, which is in the centre, will, with expedition and speed, send assistance to the parts which are attacked.

Before the commanding officer fixes the chain, he should detach some hussars to survey and scour with great exactness the woods, villages, hollows, and all such places, for at least three quarters of a league or a league, in front, as may be capable of containing ambuscades: and during the time of this surveying, the troops destined for the chain will remain in order of battle, in the front of the ground that is to be foraged, in order to cover it and protect the hussars, in case they should be attacked.

When this examination is finished, the commanding officer may begin to establish his chain, and the hussars will remain in the front till the foraging is finished; and will detach small bodies to march round about the chain, crossing each other, halting at times, and sending some hussars before them to patrol.

If the hussars gain intelligence of the enemy's being either in march, or placed in ambuscade, they will send immediate notice of it to the commanding officer of the chain, who should always fix himself in a particular spot, that there may be no time spent in seeking him; his post should be in the rear of that part of the chain that is nearest to and most in front of the enemy, and he will regulate the dispositions for his defence according to the report made to him. When an ambuscade is discovered, and troops marching to attack, a general should always suspect there may be more ambuscades, and more troops in march, to form different attacks; he must therefore, instead of weakening the chain in any part, strengthen it as much as he can, by causing either the whole reserve, or part of it, to march where circumstances shall require.

The avenues and the heights in a mountainous country should be occupied by infantry; the avenues, in order to prevent the enemy from penetrating into the valley or plain where the forage is made; the heights, in order to observe the enemy at a distance, and to prevent his getting possession of them, and flanking the troops which guard the avenues. In this case there should be a greater number of infantry than cavalry; no more of the latter being requisite than what is necessary to sustain and support the infantry, in case it should be attacked, repulsed, and obliged to retire through a valley or plain. Then, if it hath no cavalry to support it, the wings will be entirely exposed, and the enemy being superior, can at the same time attack the front and the flanks; whereas, by the means of horse, which can act with ease in a plain or a valley, this inconvenience will be prevented, and the infantry greatly assisted.

If the forage is made at a distance from the camp, and in the neighbourhood of the enemy, the infantry guarding the avenues should throw up some entrenchments in its front, which will be soon done; and it is then cannon becomes necessary, as there should be two or three pieces planted at each avenue. The heights also must, on every occasion, be occupied, which should be constantly observed as a general rule, whether the enemy is at a distance or near at hand, in every disposition that is to be executed in a mountainous country.

If the enemy forms one or more attacks, the small escorts belonging to each regiment must join on the first order, and cover the foragers as much as possible, who should at the same time assemble in the centre by regiments. The foragers should always be provided with their carbine or sword; and although they may not be very formidable against troops completely armed, yet there have been instances where they have charged with success.

If it is in a plain, and the enemy, having formed but one

attack, charges the chain in one particular part, the troops of horse and dragoons which are opposite to him should march up resolutely and sustain his efforts: if they are repulsed, they will be supported by the infantry that hath remained in its post; the hussars which were in front will unite, and place themselves upon the flanks of the troops which are attacked, in order to cover them, and endeavour to defeat the enemy by charging him in flank and rear. If the general is certain that the whole of the enemy's troops are engaged in this one attack, he may then bring up all the troops belonging to the chain, both cavalry and infantry, in order to oblige him to retire the sooner: which if he does, some hussars, sustained by horse and dragoons, should be sent in pursuit of him, till his retreat becomes certain; but with caution not to pursue too far, lest he should rally upon those troops, who, being too far from the chain, cannot receive assistance so soon as would be necessary; and besides, the making and accomplishing the forage being the grand object, the commanding officer should be contented with succeeding in that, without seeking for any other advantage unconnected with the original destination of the troops.

If the enemy forms more attacks than one, the foragers, who, as hath been already observed, must be assembled in the centre, should have orders to take the road to the camp, and will re-enter it covered by the small escorts from the rear-guard: but as a forage should never be abandoned till the last extremity, they should be ordered to draw up in order of battle, when they are within a quarter of a league of the camp, in order to return and complete the forage on the first order. But if the enemy is in force, and by his superiority all hope of obtaining the forage is destroyed; or if it is made at so great a distance from the camp that the troops belonging to the chain cannot expect to be readily assisted; the commanding officer ought to make a retreat, with every disposition a good officer is capable of, and to join courage and vigilance with knowledge and experience.

If, on the contrary, the enemy is weaker, or of equal force with the chain, he should be charged without hesitation; because the enemy, regulating his attack by his defence, will be obliged to contract himself, in order to make his attack heavier and more considerable; so that the troops being united, will charge the enemy: and if, by the assistance of the hussars who are advanced, and act after the manner already mentioned, the enemy is forced to retire, he must be pursued in the manner above directed; after which the troops must return and complete the forage.

As a commanding officer is, in case of a forced retreat after being beat, obliged to submit to circumstances, and regulate his dispositions by the enemy's, he must retire with the greatest order possible, causing the infantry to march in the centre, either in columns or in order of battle, as the situation of the ground will best allow; the horse and dragoons upon the wings, the hussars upon the flanks, that they may not confuse the dispositions, but serve as a support for the chain, and prevent its being taken in flank; and the disposition of the troops should be so managed, that the enemy shall not be able to present a larger front than that which is opposed to him: and although it is impossible for a general to foresee, for certain, what will be the dispositions for an attack and retreat, because they must be changed according as those of the enemy alter, or as the nature of the ground varies; they should nevertheless be so ordered, that each body shall be supported, and capable of acting without confusion. It is only on occasions thus pressing, that the commanding officer should suffer the forage to be abandoned; and even then it will be some satisfaction that he hath been able to place the foragers and their horses in a state of security.

If, during the retreat of the chain, it should receive assistance from the army, it should charge the enemy, notwithstanding its being too late to go on with the foraging; and if this charge should prove successful in either beating or causing the enemy to retire, he should be pursued without intermission, in order to deprive him of all desire for repeating the attack. In order to improve this advantage to the utmost, the commanding officer should leave a large detachment, consisting of infantry, cavalry, dragoons, and hussars, to continue all night upon the spot, and the next morning betimes, the foragers, properly escorted, will come to take away the forage; and as soon as the escort is arrived in the front of the chain, the detachment which hath remained there all night must return to the camp.

There still remain many other precautions to be taken for the security of foraging parties, but the limits prescribed to us will not admit of our stating them. We shall only add, that the foragers, in entering the ground they are to encompass, do not occupy more than is absolutely requisite, and that they do not spoil more grain than they carry away with them; first, because by extending the chain it would be weakened, and become easier to be forced; and in the second place, every prudent officer should be an economist in the article of forage; the officers commanding the small escorts which march at the head of each regiment should be charged with the care of this. These officers will cause their troops to march as much as possible through roads and over grounds which are untilled, till they arrive at the place intended to be foraged. If all the grounds are sown, the commanding officer must cause the cavalry to dismount at the place where the chain halts, and part of the troopers furnished with scythes must go and cut the grain, while the remainder hold the horses; and when there shall be no farther room to fear damaging the forage, the cavalry will remount and take it up. Each place should be marked out for a brigade or a regiment; which distribution should be made by the staff officers before the troops arrive.

SECT. IX. Of the Detachments for forming a Chain of dry Forage.

Is there is great exactness and knowledge required in the conducting of parties for green forage, those for dry forage perhaps require more; and, in general, every thing that regards foraging parties, whether green or dry, excites a particular attention in the commander in chief; and, according to the chevalier Folard, all success in war depends upon secrecy, diligence, activity, and the thorough knowledge of the country.

The dispositions for forming a chain of dry forage, which differ from those for forming one of green, will direct the means for extending the chain in proportion to its strength, and at the same time place the foragers in security; although, in parties of dry forage, the foragers generally take up less ground, according to the distance of the villages that are to be foraged from each other.

The dispositions for a chain of dry forage are also varied according to the nature of the country; but whether it be open or mountainous, each different body should be placed in that part where it can act with the greatest facility; the infantry therefore should occupy the villages, and the cavalry the plain in front, and should be disposed after such a manner as to be able to retire easily to the protection of the infantry. Before the foraging is put in execution, the commander in chief should mark out the villages to the general officer who is to command the foraging party, and regulate their number by the quantity of troops that are to forage. The first dispositions will be the same with those mentioned

in the foregoing section in relation to green forage: therefore the general who is to command the forage ought to set out with a detachment in order to examine the ground, the posts necessary to be occupied, the villages which are to be foraged, their situation, the rivers which cover or run through them, the bridges to be guarded, the distance from one village to another, and with what degree of ease the communication with them may be secured. After having thoroughly examined into these particulars, he can with ease form a judgment of the number of troops that will be necessary to form the chain and secure the foragers; after having done this, he will order the bailiff or burgomaster of every village to come to him, and inquire of them the number of husbandmen, and how many ploughs each husbandman hath belonging to him; by which he will be able to calculate the number of sheaves reaped by each husbandman.

The general may, for every plough, reckon about 30 acres of ground; and, in proportion to the fertility of the ground, every acre will produce from 120 to 160 sheaves; by this method may be computed the number of sheaves reaped by an husbandman who hath three or four ploughs; and from this calculation the general will judge whether the number of sheaves, supposed to be in each village, will be sufficient for the troops coming to them.

Let every acre of ground be supposed to yield 144 sheaves; then a husbandman who hath three ploughs will have reaped 12,960 sheaves; so by reckoning 12 sheaves to a trust, and every trust to weigh 600 pounds weight, this husbandman will supply sufficient for 124 trusts. It is true, that some deduction should be made from the number of trusts that every acre may yield, as the husbandman or farmer may have preserved or consumed some either for daily use or for feed.

It is very necessary that the general should take care to leave sufficient grain, not only to enable the husbandman to live, but also to sow his grounds; particularly if he foresees a probability of the next campaign being carried on in the same country.

Nevertheless, as this manner of reckoning may be attended with inconveniences, because there are some villages which keep up a particular trade of forage and grain, and therefore the granaries and barns may sometimes be found empty, yet the quantity of sheaves and grain remaining in the village may be calculated by the number of inhabitants to be subsisted. Marshal de Puyégui's method, which consists in informing himself of the number of horned cattle and horses, and by deducting the time they graze, is a very good one; but still there must be some deficiency in this calculation, as it will be impossible to fix with certainty the time of their grazing.

When the general shall have arrived at a tolerable certainty of the quantity of forage; the ground where to establish his chain; the posts which the infantry are to occupy; and taken a note of the quantity of forage; he will carry away one or two of the bailiffs or burgomasters, as hostages for the security of the forage; he will also direct them to inform the inhabitants, that if they conceal or purloin but even a single sheaf from the whole, he will cause their village to be first pillaged, and afterwards set on fire; so that the peasants, on whom these threats have often great effect, will scarcely give the enemy information of the intended forage. The general must leave some companies of infantry, sustained by a detachment of hussars in every village, who, by constantly patrolling on the outskirts, will stop all comers and goers; while the infantry will keep a strict guard on the inside of the village, and permit no person to go out of it; nor suffer the bells to be rung, colours

colours to be hoisted upon the steeples, or fires to be lighted; and will put a stop to every thing that may be supposed to be a signal agreed on with the enemy. When the general hath completed all these dispositions, he will return and give an account of them to the commander in chief.

The same general shall, upon the day appointed for the forage, set out at day-break, with the troops destined for the chain, and the staff-officers. As soon as he shall be got within sight of the villages, he will not fail to have them examined, notwithstanding he left troops in them the foregoing evening. When they are all examined, he will leave them in the rear, march on into the front, and draw up in order of battle; after that, he will form the chain, regulating the dispositions of it by the situation of the ground, and of the villages examined over-night. The hussars will advance three quarters of a league or a league, in order to scour the country; during which time the staff-officers, instructed by the general of the quantity of fleas contained in each village, will, attended by the bailiffs or burgomasters, make a distribution of the forage by regiment or brigade, and assign a barn to each, or one to two. When this distribution is made, the staff-officers will make a report of it to the general commanding the party.

As all the villages marked out to be foraged are not in the same line, those which are in the rear, and covered by others in which there is infantry, and by the chain of horse and dragoons in the front, require but a small number of troops; and if a detachment of infantry is posted in

them, it is more with a view of preventing the troopers and servants from marauding than any thing else.

The escort belonging to each regiment, commanded by a captain, should remain upon the spot where the regiment forages, and, with the assistance of the infantry, prevent disorder among the foragers, and send off those who are loaded. As soon as a regiment is set off, the captain commanding the small escort must report it to the general officer commanding the forage; after which he will follow, and form the rear-guard of it.

As soon as the general shall be apprised by the staff-officers, and the captains commanding the small escorts, that a village is evacuated, he may contract his chain, and draw it nearer together, till the foragers are gone; which when they are, he will assemble his troops, and detach as many platoons of infantry as there are villages; or rather the body of infantry posted in each village during the forage, should leave a party to make a strict search after all draggles and marauders; the first they should keep with them, and make the others prisoners, and punish them severely on their return to the camp. When all the different bodies shall be re-assembled, and the officers commanding them have made the report, the general will order the hussars to be called in, and form a rear-guard according to the manner directed in the foregoing section, and return to the camp in the same order, and with the same dispositions, as if he expected to be attacked.

PART II. OF THE OPERATIONS OF OFFENSIVE WAR.

JUSTICE and humanity having been considered, in this article, as the first principles of war, the chief intention of the first part hath therefore been, rather to convey maxims for a just defence, than to lay down rules for attacking. But though defensive war be that alone to which religion and philosophy give their sanction, it does not follow that a nation is bound to wait patiently for the attack of its enemies. When the conduct of other nations is such as evidently to show that they meditate a war, the nation threatened may arm itself, and strike the first blow when it can be struck with advantage. There is only one precaution for avoiding the danger with which it is beset. By observing the various operations of an offensive war, it may indeed be often seen that the whole is nothing more than a series of defence, and that the fear of being attacked is the real source whence these precautions for attacking spring.

SECT. I. Of Spies.

It is impossible for a general, or even for an officer charged with the command of a detachment, to act with certainty if he have not spies or secret intelligence dispersed about the enemy's army; for, without the information which they alone can give, he will have the mortification to see all his designs miscarry, and all his precautions become useless, because improperly taken.

No expense therefore should be spared to procure intelligent spies; but care should be taken that they are unacquainted with each other, and particularly that they are not known to any inferior officer; they should be always spoken to alone, and never be suffered to meet each other. The general should study their character, and prove them by repeated trials; he should found them by degrees, beginning with things not difficult to be explained, and which, if discovered, will not be of great consequence; he should engage them in long conversations, thereby to form a judge-

ment of their parts and comprehension; and he should also employ them often in bringing him intelligence.

Although a general should always be upon his guard with a spy whom he hath cause to suspect of treachery, he may nevertheless draw great advantage from him, provided he knows how to deceive him properly; because he may be very certain he will inform the enemy of all the resolutions which have been taken.

The emperor Leo, in his Tactic, advises a general, who hath reason to imagine his counsels are betrayed to the enemy, to conceal his real designs, by speaking in a manner quite opposite to them: For, says he, in the maxims at the end of his book, an enemy must be deceived who receives intelligence from spies or deserters directly contrary to what is actually resolved upon. But, adds he, should these spies be entrusted with the general's real intention, he should, by some alteration in his operations, endeavour to persuade the enemy that they have deceived him; upon which he will grow mistrustful of them, and be obliged to look out for others, no longer daring to confide in the former.

If a spy employed by the enemy is discovered, and brought to the general, he ought to take him in private, question with mildness, speak to him with a sort of confidence, and, instead of threatening, should promise him a reward if he will discover to him what he knows of the enemy's intentions. If the general finds him intelligent, he should endeavour to engage him in his service; and, provided he can gain him over by force of money, a thing not difficult, he may derive great advantage from him; but he should be careful how he employs him, till he hath very good reason to be assured of his fidelity.

There are many different methods of trying the veracity of a spy: if, for example, the general receives information, that, on such a day, a detachment of the enemy is to set out on some expedition, he should then send out troops to double the number of those detached by the enemy; by

Offensive which means, if the spy's intelligence is true, the enemy
Operations will not only be balked in his design, but may also be beat
by the superior detachment. If the enemy's detachment
has but a trifling object in view, it will be sufficient to send
just troops sufficient to examine into the truth of the spy's
report. The general may also pretend to appoint a for-
aging within two days, and order but few troops for the
chain; in which interval, if the spy is false, he will find an
opportunity of giving the enemy notice of it: but, instead
of the few troops publicly ordered, the general will privately
add another body to them, which will be placed in ambu-
scade behind the place where the pretended forage is to be
made. If the enemy, in consequence of this information,
should come and attack the chain, it should immediately
retire, as it is too inferior in number to continue the forage,
toward the troops in ambuscade; when, being joined, they
will fall upon the enemy on all sides. If this attack is made
with vivacity and resolution, there may be great reason to
expect it will terminate in a complete victory.

If, on the contrary, the spy does not appear intelligent,
or affects stupidity, the general should punish him with
death, and cause him to be hanged in the sight of the whole
army, in order to deter others, which may be dispersed in the
camp, by his fate. It would be needless to question him con-
cerning the enemy, because it would appear inhuman to ex-
ecute a man who had given intelligence of importance,
whether extorted from him by fear, force, or perhaps a pro-
mise of pardon.

Spies are as necessary to a general as arms are to an
army: but it is money only that can secure their fidelity;
and if a general finds himself ill served, it is because he has
been too sparing of the funds intended by his sovereign for
that purpose. Notwithstanding it is the duty of a good
subject to manage his master's finances as much as it is in his
power, yet there are intelligences of so great importance,
that it is scarcely possible to pay sufficiently for them. A
man is sufficiently indemnified when, by means of the in-
telligence he has received, he has concerted his measures
in such a manner as to beat the enemy, gain some marches
over him, or to be beforehand with him in some enterprise.

Spies, when discovered, should not always be punished
with death; great advantage may be made of them by pre-
tending ignorance of their real quality, especially if they are
not sufficiently disguised. Tacitus, in his Annals, says,
that Vitellius's party got information of Otho's designs by
means of his spies, who, by endeavouring to dive too mi-
nutely into their enemy's secrets, did not sufficiently conceal
their own. Vigetius's method for discovering spies who are
suspected to be ranging about in a camp, is to order all the
soldiers and servants into their tents during the day, and the
spies will be taken immediately.

When a general is ignorant of the enemy's designs he
should always affect a knowledge of them; but whenever
he is informed of them, he should, on the contrary, pretend
to be ignorant of them; by which means the enemy, being
easy with regard to his spies, will not alter his designs, or
suspect the general of having any knowledge of them.

If the general can procure such spies as, by their em-
ployment, are near the person of the enemy's general;
as, for example, a secretary, or any others who are near
him, and who consequently can give intelligence more to
be relied upon than those who are constantly passing from
one army to another; their service may be turned to a very
great account.

If a general discovers an enemy's spy to be one of those
who, by their employment, are near his person, he can re-
ceive great advantage, by forcing him to write a letter of
false intelligence, thereby to divert the enemy's attention

from the plan he would execute; but he should cause him
to be hanged immediately after, for it would be very im-
prudent to use him above once. The prince of Orange,
when he came to attack M. Luxemburg at Steinkirk, hav-
ing discovered one of his musicians who gave the enemy
intelligence of every thing he intended, made use of this
stratagem; and although it was rendered abortive by the
vigilance of M. de Luxemburg, and the courage of his
troops, there are nevertheless but very few instances where
it hath failed: and even M. de Luxemburg would have
been beaten, if he had not had early notice given him
by his advanced detachments; by which means he had
time sufficient to make his dispositions, and to avoid being
surprised.

There is a stratagem which may be made use of when
spies are wanting, and which is less expensive; that is, to
send supposititious letters by the first peasant that comes in
the way, who will have nothing to fear; and so far from
concealing himself, he must take a road where he will be
sure of falling into the enemy's hands: these letters should
be directed to the general officers commanding a body of
troops, or even to the general of the army, supposing they
come from an advanced body. They should contain schemes
that are good, and practicable in their execution, but quite
opposite to what is intended and will really be undertaken:
it often happens that the enemy, too credulous, abandons
his original designs to pursue chimerical ones, which to him
appear very good, and do not present any obstacle to those
which the general designs to execute. Prince Eugene
succeeded, by this stratagem, in raising the siege of Coni,
formed by the French in 1691.

But nevertheless a general should take care that, through
a fear of being deceived by supposititious letters, he does
not himself too much neglect the intimations which are given
him: a general ought, says Orosander, to listen to every
body at all times, and upon all occasions. Alexander, when
at a great distance from his own country, not being able to
receive his couriers till very late, refused to give attention to
a peasant, who came to inform him of a shorter route; but
soon repenting of what he had done, he sent to seek after
him, but in vain.

The same reason that should make a general always have
spies in the enemy's army, should also make him suspect
that the enemy has some in his; therefore he should endeav-
our to deceive them, he should keep his intentions secret,
mention them to very few, and always talk openly, contrary
to what is really designed. Orosander observes, that it
shows great folly in a general to mention his designs pub-
licly, especially when they are on the eve of execution;
for defectors generally go over to the enemy at the time an
action is unavoidable.

But if it is discovered that the enemy has received in-
formation, Vigetius says, that the dispositions must be im-
mediately changed. Polybius, on like occasions, particularly
recommends silence and dissimulation; he even stretches
this rule as far as the thoughts themselves, which he says
must sometimes be repressed, for fear our actions should
sometimes betray and discover them. Metellus answered
one of his friends, who, on an important occasion, asked him
the reason of certain dispositions, "that if his shirt knew
what he thought, he would burn it."

To avoid the danger of treachery, sealed orders have
been used with great success, which have been sent to of-
ficers, with express orders not to open them till at such
a time and at such a place: this is an established rule at
sea, and can also be practised on shore when employed
in an expedition which it is essential to conceal from the
enemy.