CAUDA Ursa Minoris, a fixed star of the third magnitude, at the end of the Lesser Bear's tail; called also the Pole Star, and, by the Arabs, Alrukabab; and marked by Bayer.
CAUSE has been defined, we think, with accuracy in the Encyclopedia, and the doctrine stated which we believe to be true. Objections however have been made to that doctrine, of which we have endeavoured to remove some, under the title ACTION, in this Supplement; and the doctrine itself has been well illustrated (at least such is our opinion) in the supplementary article ASTRONOMY. We have, therefore, very little to add here on the subject of cause, though it is the most important subject which can employ the mind of man. What is the relation between a physical cause and that which is termed its effect—between heat, for instance, and the fusion of metals? Is it a necessary connection, or only a conjunction, discovered by experience to be constant?
If by necessary connection be meant that kind of connection of which the contrary cannot be conceived, we do not think that the connection of any physical cause with its effect can be called necessary. We see no difficulty in conceiving, that fire, instead of fusing gold, might fix mercury. This may indeed be impossible; and we might perhaps see the impossibility, did we as completely know the nature of fire and of metals as we know the relations of pure geometry. We know that the three angles of a plain triangle cannot possibly be either greater or less than two right angles; for in this comparison nothing is hid from our mental view. We do not, however, perceive the impossibility of mercury being fixed, as clay is hardened, by heat; for of heat, and mercury, and clay, we know very little, and that little is the offspring of experience.
But if the connection between cause and effect be not necessary, are we not deprived of the means of demonstrating the great fundamental truth of religion? We have nowhere said, that the connection between cause and effect is not necessary; but only, that we do not perceive the necessary connection between what are called physical causes and their effects. That every event is, and must be, brought about by some cause, or some agency, we hold to be a self-evident truth, which no man can deny who understands the terms in which it is expressed; but what or where the agency is, we can very seldom, if ever, know, except when we think of our own voluntary actions. When a change is observed, we cannot doubt of its being produced by something; either the thing changed is animated and has produced the change by its own agency, just as we move our heads and legs by an act of volition; or if it be inanimate, and of itself incapable of agency, the change has been produced by something external, denominated a cause. But all external causes, which are not likewise agents, in the proper sense of the word, may be traced, we think, as effects up to some agency; and therefore, in our opinion, there is no real, ultimate, efficient, cause but mind, or that which is endowed with power. In proof of this doctrine, if it need any proof, we can only refer to what has been said elsewhere on our notions
tions of power and of physical causes. See (Encycl.) METAPHYSICS, n° 109, &c.—PHILOSOPHY and PHYSICS passim—and (Suppl.) ACTION and ASTRONOMY.