SELF-DEFENCE implies not only the preservation of one's life, but also the protection of his property, because
cause without property life cannot be preserved in a civilized nation. The extent of property essential to life is indeed small, and this consideration may enable us to decide a question which some moralists have made intricate. By what means, it has been asked, may a man protect his property? May he kill the person who attacks it, if he cannot otherwise repel the attack?
That a man, in a state of nature, may kill the person who makes an attack on his life, if he cannot otherwise repel the attack, is a truth which has never been controverted; and he may do the same in civil society, if his danger be so imminent that it cannot be averted by the interposition of the protection provided for individuals by the state. In all possible situations, except the three following, whatever is absolutely necessary to the preservation of life may be lawfully performed, for the law of self-preservation is the first and most sacred of those laws which are impressed on every mind by the author of nature.
The three excepted situations are those of a soldier in the day of battle, of a criminal about to suffer by the laws of his country, and of a man called upon to renounce his religion. The soldier hazards his life in the most honourable of all causes, and cannot betray his trust, or play the coward, without incurring a high degree of moral turpitude. He knows that the very profession in which he is engaged necessarily subjects him to danger; and he voluntarily incurred that danger for the good of his country, which, with great propriety, annexes to his profession peculiar privileges and much glory. The criminal under sentence of death cannot, without adding to his guilt, resist the execution of that sentence; for the power of inflicting punishment is essential to society; and society is the ordinance of God, (see SOCIETY). The man who is called upon to renounce his religion ought to submit to the cruellest death rather than comply with that request, since religion is his only security for future and permanent happiness. But in every other situation, that which is absolutely necessary to the preservation of life is undoubtedly lawful. Hence it is that a person sinking in water is never thought to be guilty of any crime, though he drag his neighbour after him by his endeavours to save himself; and hence, too, a man in danger of perishing by shipwreck may drive another from a plank which cannot carry them both, for since one of two lives must be lost, no law, human or divine, calls upon either of them to prefer his neighbour's life to his own.
But though the rights of self-defence authorize us to repel every attack made upon our life, and in case of extremity to save ourselves at the expence of the life of our innocent neighbour, it is not so evident that, rather than give to an unjust demand a few shillings or pounds, we may lawfully deprive a fellow creature of life, and the public of a citizen. A few pounds lost may be easily regained; but life when lost can never be recovered. If these pounds, indeed, be the whole of a man's property; if they include his clothes, his food, and the house where he shelters his head—there cannot be a doubt but that, rather than part with them, he may lawfully kill the aggressor, for no man can exist without shelter, food, and raiment. But it is seldom that an attempt is made, or is indeed practicable, to rob a man at once of all that he possesses. The question then of
any importance is, May a man put a robber to death rather than part with a small part of his property? Mr Paley doubts whether he could innocently do so, in a state of nature, "because it cannot be contended to be for the augmentation of human happiness, that one man should lose his life or limb, rather than another a pennyworth of his property." He allows, that in civil society the life of the aggressor may be always taken away by the person aggrieved, or meant to be aggrieved, when the crime attempted is such as would subject its perpetrator to death by the laws of his country.
It is not often that we feel ourselves disposed to differ in opinion from this most valuable and intelligent writer; but on the present occasion we cannot help thinking that he does not reason with his usual precision. To us he even seems to lose sight of his own principles. No legislature can have a right to take away life in civil society, but in such cases as individuals have the same right in a state of nature. If therefore a man in the state of nature, have not a right to protect his property by killing the aggressor, when it cannot be otherwise protected, it appears to us self-evident that no legislature can have a right to inflict the punishment of death upon such offences; but if the laws inflicting death upon the crime of robbery be morally evil, it is certain that an individual cannot be innocent when he prevents robbery by the death of the robber, merely because he knows that the laws of his country have decreed that punishment against those convicted of that crime. But we think that the protection of property by the death of the aggressor may be completely vindicated upon more general principles. It is necessary in every state, that property be protected, or mankind could not subsist; but in a state of nature every man must be the defender of his own property, which in that state must necessarily be small: and if he be not allowed to defend it by every mean in his power, he will not long be able to protect it all. By giving him such liberty, a few individuals may, indeed, occasionally lose their lives and limbs for the preservation of a very small portion of private property; but we believe that the sum of human happiness will be more augmented by cutting off such worthless wretches than by exposing property to perpetual depredation; and therefore, if general utility be the criterion of moral good, we must be of opinion that a man may in every case lawfully kill a robber rather than comply with his unjust demand.
But if a man may without guilt preserve his property by the death of the aggressor, when it cannot be preserved by any other means, much more may a woman have recourse to the last extremity to protect her chastity from forcible violation. This, indeed, is admitted by Mr Paley himself, and will be controverted by no man who reflects on the importance of the female character, and the probable consequences of the smallest deviation from the established laws of female honour. See SEDUCTION.
Self-Knowledge, the knowledge of one's own character, abilities, opinions, virtues, and vices. This has always been considered as a difficult though important acquisition. It is difficult, because it is disagreeable to investigate our errors, our faults, and vices; because we are apt to be partial to ourselves, even when we have done wrong; and because time and habitual attention are
Self. are requisite to enable us to discover our real character. But these difficulties are more than counterbalanced by the advantages of self-knowledge.
By knowing the extent of our abilities, we shall never rashly engage in enterprises where our ineffectual exertions may be productive of harm: by investigating our opinions, we may discover those which have no foundation, and those also which lead us insensibly into vice. By examining our virtues and vices, we shall learn what principles ought to be strengthened, and what habits ought to be removed.
Man is a rational and intelligent being, capable of great improvement, and liable to great vices. If he act without examining his principles, he may be hurried by blind passion into crimes. If he aspire at noble and valuable acquisitions, he must act upon a plan, with deliberation and forethought; for he is not like a vegetable, which attains perfection by the influence of external causes: he has powers within himself which must be exerted, and exerted with judgment, in order to attain the perfection of his nature. To enable him to employ these powers aright, he must know, first, what is his duty; and, secondly, he must often review his principles and conduct, that he may discover whether he is performing his duty, or in what circumstances he has failed. When he finds that he has fallen into error and vice, he will naturally inquire what causes have produced this effect, that he may avoid the same for the time to come. This is the method by which every reformation in religion and science has been produced, and the method by which the arts have been improved. Before Lord Bacon introduced the new way of philosophizing, he must first have considered wherein true philosophy consisted; secondly, he must have inquired in what respects the ancient method of philosophizing was false or useless: and after determining these two points, he was qualified to describe the way by which the study of philosophy could be successfully pursued without deviating into hypothesis and error. Luther found out the errors of the church of Rome by comparing their doctrines with the Scriptures. But had this comparison never been made, the reformation could never have taken place. Without self-knowledge, or without that knowledge of our character which is derived from a comparison of our principles and conduct with a perfect standard of morality, we can never form plans and resolutions, or make any exertion to abandon the vicious habits which we have contracted, and strengthen those virtuous principles in which we are deficient.
As much may be learned from the errors of those who have been in similar situations with ourselves; so many useful cautions may be obtained from our own errors; and he that will remember these, will seldom be twice guilty of the same vice.
It was evidently the intention of Providence that man should be guided chiefly by experience. It is by the observations which we make on what we see passing around us, or from what we suffer in our own person, that we form maxims for the conduct of life. The more minutely therefore we attend to our principles, and the more maxims we form, we shall be the better fitted to attain moral perfection.
With respect to our understanding, to mark the errors which we have fallen into, either by its natural
defects or by negligence, is also of great importance; for the greatest genius and most profound scholar are liable to these errors, and often commit them as well as the weak and illiterate. But by observing them, and tracing them to their causes, they at length acquire an habitual accuracy. It is true, that men of feeble minds can never by knowing their own defects exalt themselves to the rank of genius; but such knowledge will enable them to improve their understandings, and so to appreciate their own powers, as seldom to attempt what is beyond their strength. They may thus become useful members of society; and though they will not probably be admired for their abilities, they will yet escape the ridicule which is poured upon vanity.
It is difficult to lay down precise rules for the acquisition of this self-knowledge, because almost every man is blinded by a fallacy peculiar to himself. But when one has got rid of that partiality which arises from self-love, he may easily form a just estimate of his moral improvements, by comparing the general course of his conduct with the standard of his duty; and if he has any doubt of the extent of his intellectual attainments, he will most readily discover the truth by comparing them with the attainments of others who have been most successful in the same pursuits. Should vanity arise in his mind from such a comparison, let him then compare the extent of his knowledge with what is yet to be known, and he will then be in little danger of thinking of himself more highly than he ought to think. See PREJUDICE and SELF-Partiality.