Moral SENSE, is a determination of the mind to be pleased with the contemplation of those affections, actions, or characters, of rational agents, which we call good or virtuous.
This moral sense of beauty in actions and affections may appear strange at first view; some of our moralists themselves are offended at it in Lord Shaftesbury, as being accustomed to deduce every approbation or aversion from rational views of interest. It is certain that his lordship has carried the influence of the moral sense very far, and some of his followers have carried it further. The advocates for the selfish system seem to drive their opinions to the opposite extreme, and we have elsewhere endeavoured to show that the truth lies between the contending parties. See MORAL PHILOSOPHY, No 27—32.
Public SENSE is defined by the noble author of the Characteristics to be an innate propensity to be pleased with the happiness of others, and to be uneasy at their misery. It is found, he says, in a greater or less degree in all men, and was sometimes called xaromeia, or sensus communis, by ancient writers.
Of the reality of this public sense we have great doubts. The conduct of savages, who are more under the influence of original instinct than civilized men, gives no countenance to it. Their affections seem all to be selfish, or at least to spring from self-love variously modified. For the happiness of their wives they have very little regard, considering them merely as instruments of their own pleasure, and valuing them for nothing else. Hence they make them toil, while they themselves indulge in listless idleness. To their children we believe they exhibit strong symptoms of attachment, as soon as they derive assistance from them in war, or in the business of the chase; but during the helpless years of infancy, the child is left by the selfish father wholly to the care and protection of its wretched mother; who, impelled by the storge of all females to their young, cherishes her offspring with great fondness.— The savage is, indeed, susceptible of strong attachments, similar to that which we call friendship; but such attachments are not proofs of disinterested benevolence, or what his lordship calls the public sense. Two barbarous heroes are probably first linked together by the observation of each other's prowess in war, or their skill in pursuing their game; for such observation cannot fail to show them that they may be useful to one another; and we have elsewhere shown how real friendship may spring from sentiments originally selfish. The savage is very much attached to his horde or tribe, and this attachment resembles patriotism: but patriotism itself is not a sentiment of pure benevolence delighting in the happiness of others, and grieving at their misery; for the patriot prefers his own country to all others, and is not very scrupulous with respect to the rectitude of the means by which he promotes its interest, or depresses its rivals. The savage pursues with relentless rigour the enemies of himself or of the tribe to which he belongs; shows no mercy to them when in his power, but puts them to the cruellest death, and carries their scalps to the leader of his party. These facts, which cannot be controverted, are perfectly irreconcilable with innate benevolence, or a public sense comprehending the whole race of men; and show the truth of that theory by which we have in another place endeavoured to account for all the passions, social as well as selfish. See PASSION.