NATIONS, LAW OF

NATIONS, LAW OF.

IN the meaning of the word Law, three principal ideas are involved; that of a Command, that of a Sanction, and that of the Authority from which the command proceeds.

Every law imports, that something is to be done; or to be left undone.

But a Command is impotent, unless there is the power of enforcing it. The power of enforcing a command is the power of inflicting penalties, if the command is not obeyed. And the applicability of the penalties constitutes the Sanction.

There is more difficulty in conveying an exact conception of the Authority which is necessary to give existence to a law. It is evident, that it is not every command, enforced by penalties, to which we should extend such a title. A law is not confined to a single act; it embraces a class of acts: it is not confined to the acts of one man; it embraces those of a

community of men. And the authority from which it emanates must be an authority which that community are in the habit of obeying. An authority to which only a temporary obedience is paid, does not come up to the notion of that authority which is requisite to give existence to laws; for thus, the commands of a hostile army, committing plunder, would be laws.

The conditions, which we have thus described, may all be visibly traced, in the laws which governments lay down for the communities to which they belong. There we observe the command; there the punishment prescribed for its violation; and there the commanding authority to which obedience is habitually paid.

Of these conditions how many can be said to belong to any thing included under the term Law of Nations?

By that term is understood, something which either does, or which, it is supposed, ought to bind the conduct of one nation towards another.

But it is not understood, that one nation has a right to command another. When one nation can be commanded by another, it is dependent upon that other; and the laws of dependence are different from those which we are at present considering. An independent nation would resent, instead of obeying, a command delivered to it by another. Neither can it properly be said, that nations, taken aggregately, prescribe those laws to one another severally; for when did they ever combine in any such prescription? When did they ever combine to vindicate the violations of them? It is therefore clear, that the term Command cannot be applied, at least in the ordinary sense, to the laws of nations.

In the next place, it would not seem, that anything, deserving the name of Sanction, belongs to them. Sanction, we have already seen, is punishment. Suppose nations to threaten one another with punishment, for the violation of any thing understood to be a law of nations. To punish implies superiority of strength. For the strong, therefore, the law of nations, may perhaps have a sanction, as against the weak. But what can it have as against the strong? Is it the strong, however, or is it the weak, by whom it is most liable to be violated? The answer is obvious and undeniable.—As against these from whom almost solely any violation of the laws of nations need be apprehended, there appears, therefore, to be no sanction at all.

If it be said, that several nations may combine to give it a sanction in favour of the weak, we might, for a practical answer, appeal to experience. Has it been done? Have nations, in reality, combined, so constantly and steadily, in favour of the law of nations, as to create, by the certainty of punishment, an overpowering motive, to unjust powers, to abstain from its violation? For, as the laws against murder would have no efficacy, if the punishment prescribed were not applied once in fifty or a hundred times, so the penalty against the violations of the law of nations can have no efficacy, if it is applied unsteadily and rarely.

On the mode in which it has been applied, we may appeal to a great authority. Montesquieu says—
"Le droit public est plus connu en Europe qu'en Asie: cependant on peut dire que les passions des princes—la patience des peuples—la flatterie des écrivains, en ont corrompu tous les principes. Ce droit, tel qu'il est aujourd'hui, est une science qui apprend aux princes jusqu'à quel point ils peuvent violer la justice, sans choquer leurs intérêts."—(Leff. Persues, XCIV.)

To go a little deeper, we may consider, whether the interest of nations, that which, in the long run, governs them all, can ever produce combinations, from which an effectual sanction, of the nature in question, can be expected to proceed. That they would derive some advantage from the general observation of those maxims which have been called laws of nations, frivolous as are the points upon which the greater part of them turn, cannot be denied. These advantages, however, are seen at a dis-

tance, and with the mind's eye; they are speculative, rather than sensible. The inconveniences, on the other hand, which must be felt, from any movement to lend effect to the law of nations, are immediate and formidable; the whole train of the evils of war are almost sure to arise from them. The latter class of impressions must, in general, be far more powerful than the former; and thus the interposition, in favour of the law of nations, will generally be shunned. A nation is often but too easily stimulated to make war in resentment of injuries done to itself. But it looks with too much coolness upon the injuries done to other nations, to incur any great chance of inconvenience for the redress of them.

Besides, the object is to be gained by the means of combination. But the combinations of nations are very difficult things. Nations hardly ever combine without quarrelling.

Again, all nations ought to combine for an object common to all. But for all nations to combine in any one enterprise is impossible. Suppose a prince to have violated the law of nations, it would be absurd to suppose that all the countries on earth should conspire to punish him. But if not all, what is to be the selection? Who shall come forward; who stand excused? By those who are condemned to the sacrifice, in what proportion are the contributions to be made? Who is to afford the greatest, and who may come with the least?

It is unnecessary to pursue any farther the analysis of this extraordinary hypothesis. It is evident from what has been said, that it is full of impracticabilities.

Are we, then, obliged to consider the maxims or rules, which pass under the name of Laws of Nations, as utterly without force and influence; and the discourse which is made about them, as mere affectation and impertinence?

Not wholly so. It is of use, that the ordinary intercourse of nations should be conducted according to certain forms, generally known and approved; because they will be observed on all occasions, when there is no particular motive to violate them, and will often prevent disputes which might arise on frivolous occasions. They resemble, in this respect, the ceremonial of a court, or the established forms of polished society.

The objects, however, which are understood to be embraced by the law of nations, are of two sorts. The first are those minor objects, which partake more of form than of substance. The other are objects which deeply affect humanity. That there are certain interests of nations, which it were good to have considered as their rights, and of which it is infinitely to be desired that the violation could be prevented, is most true. But if national law has no penalty annexed to it; if the weaker party, who is wronged, has no means of redress, where, it may be said, is the advantage of such a law? Or where the propriety of calling that a law, which is only a declaration respecting rights; violated by the more powerful party with impunity, as often, and to as great an extent, as he pleases?

There is still, however, a power, which, though it be not the physical force, either of one state, or of a

combination of states, applied to vindicate a violation of the law of nations, is not without a great sway in human affairs; and which, as it is very nearly the whole of the power which can be applied to secure the observation of that law, deserves to be carefully considered, that, by duly appreciating its efficacy in this important affair, we may neither trust to it where it will disappoint our expectation, nor neglect the use of it where it may be turned to advantage.

That the human mind is powerfully acted upon by the approbation or disapprobation, by the praise or blame, the contempt and hatred, or the love and admiration, of the rest of mankind, is a matter of fact, which, however it may be accounted for, is beyond the limits of disputation. Over the whole field of morality, with the exception of that narrow part which is protected by penal laws, it is the only power which binds to good conduct, and renders man agreeable and useful to man. It is evident, also, that where there is not great inequality, it is a power, the binding force of which must be necessarily great. Because every individual, considered in himself, is weak and helpless as compared with the rest of the community. Unless, therefore, he can prevail upon them to abstain from injuring him, he must be exposed to unlimited suffering. And if, on the other hand, he can prevail upon them to combine in doing, or in desiring to do him good, he is put in the way of receiving perpetually the greatest advantages. His motive, therefore, to obtain the favourable, and to avoid the unfavourable regards of the members of the society, in which he lives, is of the highest order. But he can obtain their favourable, and avoid their unfavourable sentiments, only by abstaining with scrupulous anxiety from doing any injury to them, and observing all such modes of conduct as are calculated to be useful and agreeable to them.

The value which men set upon these favourable regards of the persons among whom they live, is strikingly manifested by some of the most ordinary forms of their discourse and behaviour. What is more esteemed than character? What injury reckoned more deep and unpardonable than that of the man who exerts himself to take away unworthily any part of the reputation of his neighbours? But what is character, if not the title to the favourable sentiment of other men? And what is the loss of character, but the opinion of other men, that we do not deserve those favourable sentiments, with which they have been accustomed to regard us?

Honour and shame, those emotions, the intensity of which is proved by so many phenomena of human life, are but the feelings which attend upon those different situations. When a man finds himself in possession of the love, the esteem, and admiration of those by whom he is surrounded, he is filled with that delight which the belief of the secure possession of a great source of benefit, cannot fail to inspire: he is fearless, elated, and confident; the principal characteristics of that state of mind which we denominate pride. When he is conscious, on the other hand, of having forfeited in any degree the favourable sentiments of those among whom he lives, he suffers that depression which the loss of a highly valued possession is calculated to create; he ceases,

in some degree, to look forward to his fellow men for good, and feels more or less the apprehension of evil at their hands; he fears to prove how far their disapprobation of him reaches, or to excite them to define it too accurately for themselves; he hangs down his head, and dares not so much as look them in the face.

When men are favourably situated for having those impressions deeply struck; or more correctly speaking, when those combinations of ideas have consistently and habitually been presented to their minds, the association becomes at last so indissoluble and strong, as to operate, even where the connection among the things themselves may not exist.

When persons, who have been educated in a virtuous society, have, from their infancy, associated the idea of certain actions with the favourable sentiments, and all the advantages which flow from the favourable sentiments of mankind; and, on the other hand, have associated the idea of certain other actions with the unfavourable sentiments, and all the disadvantages which flow from the unfavourable sentiments of mankind; so painful a feeling comes in time to be raised in them at the very thought of any such action, that they recoil from the perpetration of it, even in cases in which they may be perfectly secure against any unfavourable sentiments of mankind, which it might be calculated to inspire.

It will, we apprehend, upon the most accurate investigation, be found, that this is the only power to which we can look for any considerable sanction to the laws of nations;—for almost the only species of punishment to which the violation of them can ever become amenable; and the only security, therefore, which mankind can ever enjoy for the benefit which laws, well contrived for this purpose, might be calculated to yield.

It is in the next place incumbent upon us to inquire, what dependence can be placed upon this security, in the set of cases now under consideration; and in what circumstances it is calculated to act with the greatest, in what with the least efficacy, toward this important end. What dependence may be placed upon the popular sanction.

A power, which is wholly derived, from the good which may follow the favourable, the evil which may follow the unfavourable sentiments of mankind, will act most efficaciously upon him who is the most, least efficaciously upon him who is the least exposed to receive good and evil from the immediate inclination of his fellow men.

It seems to be evident, that he who is most weak, as compared with the rest of the community, is the most exposed to receive good or evil in consequence of their favourable or unfavourable sentiments; and that he, on the other hand, who is the most powerful, as compared with them, is the least exposed to receive good or evil in consequence of those sentiments.

When men are nearly upon equality, no one has any chance of inducing other people to abstain from hurting him, but by his abstaining from doing hurt in any way to them. He has no means of inducing them to do him any acts of service, but by their expectation of receiving similar acts of service from him. He is, therefore, intensely interested in its

being generally believed of him, that he is a man who is careful to abstain from injuring, and ever ready to exert himself to do services to others.

The case is exceedingly different, where one man is lifted high above others. In that case he has powerful means of protection against their hurtful acts, powerful means of obtaining their services, altogether independent of his conduct, altogether independent of his disposition either to abstain from injuring them, or to render them service.

So far, therefore, as good conduct arises from a man's dependence upon the sentiments of others; and from this is derived the moral power, to which alone the term moral sanction or obligation can properly belong; the security for good conduct is apt to be lessened, in exact proportion as any one is raised above the level of those composing the mass of the community. If any man possesses absolute power over the rest of the community, he is set free from all dependence upon their sentiments. In this, or nearly in this situation is every despot, having a well established authority. So far as a man is educated as a despot, he can therefore have but few of those associations, on which a conduct, beneficent to others, depends. He is not accustomed to look— for the services which he needs, or the evils which he apprehends, from others—to the opinion which they may entertain of the goodness or badness of his conduct; he cannot, therefore, have that salutary train of associations from an evil act to the condemnatory sentiments of mankind, and from the condemnatory sentiments of mankind to the forfeiture of all those delights and advantages which spring to him from the operation of their favourable regards;—associations which in men favourably situated become at last habitual, and govern the conduct, as it were, mechanically, without any distinct recurrence to the consequences, upon the thought of which, nevertheless, this salutary and ennobling sentiment ultimately depends, and from which it has been originally derived.

If such is the situation of the despot with regard to these important associations, it is in a proportional degree the situation of all those who partake of that species of elevation. In an Aristocratical country, for example, a country in which there is great inequality of wealth, those who possess the large fortunes, are raised to a great degree above any chance of receiving evil, or of standing deprived of any good, because the great mass, the lower orders, of their countrymen, think unfavourably of them. They are, no doubt, to a considerable degree dependent upon what the people of their own class may think of them; and it is accordingly found, that those qualities and acts, which are useful to that class, are formed into a particular, an Aristocratical code of morality, which is very effectually sanctioned by the favourable and unfavourable sentiments of the Aristocratical body, at the same time that it is exceedingly different from that more enlarged and all comprehensive code, on which the happiness of the greatest number depends, and to which alone the epithet moral in propriety belongs.

Such being the state of the facts connected with

this important case, it remains to see what are the inferences, bearing upon it, which we are entitled to draw from them. We have already ascertained, that the only power which can operate to sanction the laws of nations; in other words, to reward or punish any nation, according as it obeys, or disobeys them, is the approbation and disapprobation of mankind. It follows, that the restraining force is, in this case, determined by the associations which they who govern it may have formed with the approbation and disapprobation of mankind. If they have formed strong associations, of a pleasurable kind, with the approbation, strong associations, of the painful kind, with the disapprobation of mankind, the restraining force will be great; if they have not formed such associations, it will be feeble and insignificant. It has, however, appeared, immediately above, that the rulers of a country, of which the government is either monarchical, or aristocratical, can have these associations in but a very low degree; as those alone, who are placed on a level with the great body of other men, are placed in circumstances calculated to produce them. It is only then in countries, the rulers of which are drawn from the mass of the people, in other words, in democratical countries, that the sanction of the laws of nations can be expected to operate with any considerable effect.

Having thus ascertained, what is the power which restrains from violating the laws of nations, and what the description of rulers upon whom its restraining force is the greatest, we are next to inquire, by what expedients the force of it may be raised to the greatest pitch, and the greatest amount of benefit may be derived from it.

It is sufficiently recognized, that whatever is intended to produce any effect as a punishment, produces it in a greater degree, in proportion as it operates with greater precision and certainty. The inquiry, then, regards the means of giving precision and certainty to those sentiments of the world, on which the binding power of the laws of nations so greatly depends.

Two things are necessary to give precision and certainty to the operation of laws within a community. The one is, a strict determination of what the law is, the second, a tribunal so constituted as to yield prompt and accurate execution to the law. It is evident, that these two are indispensable requisites. Without them no penalties can operate with either precision or certainty. And the case is evidently the same, whether we speak of the laws which regulate the actions of individual and individual within the state, or those which regulate the actions of one state towards another.

It is obvious to remark, in the first place, that with regard to the laws of nations, not one of these two indispensable requisites has ever yet had any existence. It has neither been determined what the laws in question are, nor has any common tribunal for cognizance of the violations of them ever been constituted. With respect to the last, not so much as the idea of it seems to have been entertained. And with respect to the first, though much has been written, it has been almost wholly in the way of vague

and general discourse. Hardly a single accurate definition has yet been applied to any part of the subject.

Here, then, we come to what is obviously the grand inquiry; namely, first, What can be done towards defining the laws of nations? and, secondly, What can be done towards providing a tribunal for yielding prompt and accurate decisions in conformity with them? in other words, for applying with the greatest possible efficacy the opinion of the world for restraining the violation of them?

In the Article JURISPRUDENCE, to which it is necessary for us here to revert, we have sufficiently made it appear, that the foundation of all law is the constitution of rights. Of two parties, unless it is previously determined what each shall enjoy, it can never be determined whether one has improperly disturbed the enjoyment of the other. To determine, however, what a party is to enjoy, is to determine his rights.

Now, then, with regard to nations, the question is, what ought to be constituted rights? or in other words, what would it be desirable, for the good of mankind upon the whole, that the several nations should respect as the rights of each other?

This, it is pretty obvious, is one of the most extensive of all inquiries, far exceeding the limits of an article in the present work. We can attempt little more than to show the way in which the inquiry may be carried on.

In the Article JURISPRUDENCE, we have endeavoured to clear up the meaning which in legislation can, without leading to confusion, be alone attached to the term Rights; and we have there likewise seen, that there are but two classes of objects, in which individuals can have rights; namely, Things, and Persons.

The case, we believe, will be found the same with respect to nations. They also can have rights, in nothing but Persons, and Things. Of course, it follows, that they can receive injury in nothing but in Persons, or Things.

The inquiry, however, with respect to the rights of nations, is not so simple, as that with respect to the rights of individuals; because between individuals, subject to the same system of laws, the legislature recognizes no state of hostility; but between nations there is the State of War, and the State of Peace, and the rights which are understood to belong to nations are different in these two different states. In the state of war, nations recognize in one another very few rights respecting either persons or things; they kill the one, and take and destroy the other, with little other limit than the want of ability. In the state of peace, they respect as rights belonging to one another, nearly the same things which are constituted rights of individuals, by the ordinary systems of national law.

We shall begin with the consideration of those things which it would be desirable that nations should respect as the rights of one another, in the time of peace.

And, first, of rights with respect to things. As the subject of the rights of nations, things may be divided into two sorts; things belonging to some in-

dividual member of the nation, and things belonging to the nation in its collective, or corporate, capacity.

Those rights in things which the nation guarantees to its individual members, within the nation, it would be desirable, with hardly any exception, that nations should respect in regard to one another; that those things, for example, which the government of the country to which a man belongs, would regard, and would compel all its subjects to regard, as his property, the governments of all other countries should respect, and compel all their subjects to respect as his property.

There are two states of circumstances in which questions may arise between nations, respecting the property of their respective subjects. The first, where the property in question, when the cause of dispute arises, is within the country of the individual to whom it belongs: The second, where the property has, by its owner, been previously removed into the country, with which, or some of the inhabitants of which, the dispute has arisen.

1. The first set of circumstances exists between two conterminous countries; the bordering inhabitants of which are neighbours to one another, and may, as any other neighbours, infringe the properties of one another. The proper mode of settling these disputes seems to be sufficiently obvious. The rights of the party complaining should be adjudged, according to the laws of the country to which he belongs. But the party sued or prosecuted, should be amenable only to the tribunals of the country to which he belongs; that is to say, the question should be tried before the tribunals of the country of the defendant; but the definition of the right in question should be taken from the law of the country to which the plaintiff belongs. It might in some cases be convenient for countries in this situation, to agree in constituting a common judicature, appropriated to these disputes, to consist, for example, of two judges, one of each country, with power to chuse a third, when they could not agree.

The injury complained of may be capable of redress by a remedy of the nature of a civil suit merely; or it may be of that more atrocious sort, theft or robbery, for which the remedy of punishment is required.

It would appear that punishment ought to be apportioned according to the laws of the country to which the party who has incurred it belongs. Whatever would be the punishment decreed for the offence, if committed against a man of his own country, such a punishment he ought to sustain, for the offence against the man of the other country. The question of punishment is here understood, as extraneous to that of compensation. This ought always to be made to the party injured, where it is capable of being made, and in a case of property it is always capable; if not by the author of the injury, from want of property, or other cause, at least by the government of the country to which he belongs.

2. Where a man has removed his property from his own into another country, there seems no peculiar reason why it should be regulated by any other laws than those of the country into which he has removed it; why the rights which it confers should be

Law of Nations. otherwise determined; or the violation of them otherwise punished.

We have now considered, though in a very general manner (and our limits preclude us from attempting any thing more), the mode in which nations should agree about the rights of one another (in other words, the laws they should establish), in as far as the property of individuals, belonging to them, is concerned. After the property of individuals, their persons are to be considered as requiring the protection of laws.

The Persons of Individuals. There is more difficulty in determining what is desirable, as international law, upon this part of the subject, than in that which regards the property of individuals. It is desirable that the persons of the inhabitants of every country should receive protection, according to the laws of their own country. But it is also desirable that each man should sustain punishment according to the laws of his country; and these two objects are to a certain extent inconsistent with one another.

The inconvenience, however, seems to be greater, in permitting the inhabitants of one country to be punished, according to the laws of another; than in leaving the inhabitants of one country to the same measure of protection against injury to their persons from the inhabitants of other countries, as is afforded to the inhabitants of those countries by their own laws. Many cases, indeed, may be conceived, in which this is a measure of protection which all reasonable men would allow to be inadequate. In such cases, however, the only remedy seems to be the formation of a compact, by which a mode of proceeding, agreeable to the sentiments of both parties, may be positively prescribed. This latter expedient is of course extraneous to that equitable construction which ought to be uniformly applied by the tribunals of one country to the injuries perpetrated, by those whom they may have to judge, upon the inhabitants of another country. If an inhabitant of Persia, for example, should force cow-broth down the throat of an inhabitant and native of Hindostan, the tribunals of Persia should not punish this outrage, as they would punish one Persian for making another swallow the same liquid. To the Persian it would be a trifling injury, and more than a trifling punishment would not be required. To the Hindu, it would be one of the greatest of all conceivable injuries. It ought to be, therefore, put upon the same footing, with an injury of an equal degree, done to a Persian; the nature of the injury, not the external act, should be the object of consideration; and whatever the punishment which would be awarded against a Persian for one of the greatest injuries of which he could be guilty to a Persian, the same ought to be inflicted upon him, for this, one of the greatest which he could occasion to a Hindu.

Besides the cases in which a government, as representative of the country, may be injured through the individuals who live under its protection, there are cases in which it may be injured more directly. Certain things belong as property to the government, without belonging to any individual; and there are persons who are members of the government, or agents of the government, and who may receive in-

juries in that capacity, distinct from those which affect them, as private individuals. These are the cases to which it now remains that we direct our attention.

Those things which belong to government as goods The Proper. and chattels; its moveables, for example; or the ty or Domi- lands which it holds, as any individual holds them, in the way of an estate; there seems to be no reason for considering as subject to any other rules, than those applicable to the goods and chattels which belong to individuals.

Of other things, those to which any government can claim a right, as representative of a nation, must be, either, first, Portions of Land, or, secondly, Portions of Water.

1. The questions which relate to the rights which Dominion any nation may claim in any portion of land, are in Land. questions regarding boundaries; and these involve the whole of the questions respecting the acquisition of dominion.

To have any standard for determining questions with regard to dominion, the different modes of acquiring dominion, must be recognized; those which are proper to be allowed and respected by other nations must be distinguished from those which are improper, must be accurately defined, and the definitions made known.

For this purpose it is easy to perceive, that the same process is necessary, as that for the definition of rights, described, at some length, in the Article in this work, entitled JURISPRUDENCE, to which we must again refer.

It is necessary, according to that example, that the events which are to be considered as giving commencement to a right of dominion, and those which are to be considered as putting an end to it, should be fully enumerated, and accurately defined.

This is the first part of the process. The other part is, to distinguish the different degrees of dominion. There is a dominion which is perfect, which includes every power over the subject in question, and leaves nothing farther to be acquired, a dominium plenum: there is also a dominion, which is but the commencement, as it were, of dominion, and includes the smallest possible fragment of a full dominion. These are the two extremes; and between them are various distinguishable degrees. All these should be fully depicted, and accurately defined.

When any of those events occurs which are to be considered as giving commencement to rights, it often happens that they are accompanied by circumstances which limit the right they would otherwise convey, and render the dominion less than full. These circumstances ought, also, to be completely enumerated; and the power of each to be accurately defined.

If this were done, an international code would be composed, in which the rights of dominion would be accurately defined; and to determine any question about boundaries, or about the degree of dominion, nothing farther would then be necessary than an adequate inquiry respecting the state of the facts.

The questions would exactly resemble those, which we have already described, in the Article JURISPRUDENCE, in analyzing what is called pleading in ju-

dicature. In a question about boundaries there is, let us suppose, a district, over which one country affirms that it has a right of dominion, a dominion more or less complete; and another country denies that it has that right. The first question is, Whether any of those events has occurred, which would give the affirming country a right of dominion? The second question is, Whether, if such an event had occurred, it was accompanied with any of those circumstances which limit dominion, and render it less than full, and if so, under what degree of limiting power they are classed? The third question is, Whether, if an event, thus giving commencement to a right of dominion had occurred, any other event, putting an end to that right, had subsequently occurred?

We need not here enlarge upon these several topics; because they will be sufficiently understood by those readers who bear in mind the expositions already given in the article referred to; and to those, who do not, we suggest the propriety of recurring to that article, as a preparation for the perusal of this.

It is evidently disproportionate to the limits which we must here prescribe to ourselves, to enumerate the events which it would be agreeable to the interests of mankind in general, that nations should regard as giving, and alone giving, commencement and termination to rights of dominion; because, in order to afford an enumeration which would be in any degree instructive, the reasons must be given why one set of events, and not another, should have the privilege in question conferred upon them.

It may be proper, however, in the mean time, to observe, that the events in question will not be found to be numerous, nor very difficult to discover. In fact, they are, and among civilized nations, almost always have been, pretty nearly agreed upon; and they are the questions of modification, and questions of fact, upon which, chiefly, differences have arisen. For example, there is no dispute, that Occupancy, where there is no prior right, is an event which should be considered as giving commencement to a right of dominion. Neither is there any doubt, that the Consent of those who have a right, may transfer that right to others: or in other words, that such consent is an event which gives commencement to a right in those others. Conquest, also, made in a lawful war, is recognized as an event of the same description; and, it will be found upon inquiry that these do, in fact, contain the whole. For on every occasion on which dominion is acquired, the territory so acquired must, before hand, either have belonged to some body, or have belonged to no body. If it belonged to no body, occupancy is the only event which can be supposed to give commencement to the right. If it belonged to some body, it must be taken from him, either willingly, or by force. If it is taken from him willingly, we have his consent. If it is taken by force, it is by conquest in war, that the new right is created.

It is evidently, however, farther necessary, that the different species of consent should be distinguished; and those to which it would be proper to attach this investive power, separated accurately from those from which it should be withheld. It is here accordingly,

that the doctrine of contracts, would need to be introduced; that the different species of them applicable to this subject, in which all treaties would be included, should be enumerated; that the effects proper to be given to each of them should be defined; and the mode of interpreting them, or fixing the sense which they ought to bear, accurately laid down.

It would also be expedient, after the principal contracts, applicable to international concerns, are ascertained, to exhibit in the international code, formulae, with blanks to be filled up, which should be employed by nations on all occasions of such contracts, and being framed with the greatest possible accuracy, would go as far as it would be possible by words to go, in excluding ambiguity, and the grounds of dispute.

With respect to conquest, the last event, calculated to give commencement to rights of dominion, mentioned in the above general enumeration, it is allowed, that as there are some conquests which ought not to be considered as conferring rights of dominion, there are others which ought to be considered as doing so. It is evidently necessary, therefore, that the line of separation should be drawn.

Whether a conquest, however, should or should not be considered as conferring a right of dominion, depends very much upon the nature of the war, through which it is made. If the war be what is regarded as just, and the mode of warfare conformable to the recognized rules, the conquest is apt to be regarded as conferring a legitimate title; if the war, and mode of war, be of a contrary description, the validity of the title conferred by the conquest may be liable to dispute.

It is evident, therefore, that in order to define the species of conquest on which the investive power in question should be conferred, the circumstances which render a war justifiable, and the mode in which it is justifiable to carry it on, must first be ascertained. This forms the second part of our inquiry: and the question regarding the investive power of conquest must be deferred, till that inquiry is performed.

Having thus far considered the mode in which should be determined the rights which nations acquire over portions of territory, or Land, it remains that we consider the mode in which their rights should be determined with regard to Waters.

Waters, as concerns the present purpose, are, either rivers or the sea. Dominion in Water.

As the sea involves the questions of greatest extent and importance, we shall attend to that part of the subject first.

Even in the language of ordinary discourse, the sea is denominated the common domain of nations.

The first principle with regard to the sea is this, that all nations have an equal right to the use of it. The utility of recognizing this principle, is so apparent, that it has never been the subject of any dispute. And all the rights assigned to nations severally, in the enjoyment of this common domain, ought to rise out of this principle; and to be limited by it. Whatever use any nation makes of it, should be such as not to prevent a similar and equal use from being made by other nations. And every use which can-

not be shown to have that effect, should be recognized as a right by the law of nations.

The principal use which nations make of the sea, is that of a passage for their ships. Agreeably to the principle which we have recognized, the ships of one nation should pass in such a manner as not to obstruct the passage of those of another. The rules according to which the possible cases of interference should be regulated, are very simple; and are, in fact, laid down and acted upon, with considerable accuracy. They resemble, in all respects, those according to which the vessels of the same country are made to avoid and to regulate their interferences in the rivers of the country, or upon its coasts. There would be no difficulty, therefore, in making accurate definitions of the requisite rights, for insertion in the international code.

The rights being established, the violations of them should be punished, on the same principles, as those which we have laid down in regard to the preceding cases. Either property has been injured, or persons. In either case, compensation is an indisputable part of the remedial process, wherever it is practicable. In loss of property, it is fully practicable. It is also practicable in many of the injuries done to the person. As in the case of offences committed on land, the rights of the individual who has suffered should be estimated according to the laws of the country to which he belongs; but the punishment of the offender should be measured according to the laws of the country to which he belongs. In the case of piracy, which is robbery, or murder, committed by persons whom no country recognizes, and upon whom, therefore, justice can be demanded from no foreign government, it has hitherto been the practice that the nation suffering has taken the punishment into its own hands. Accordingly, the punishment of piracy has always been extremely severe. It would be, no doubt, better, if a mode were adopted, by which it would not be necessary for a nation to be judge in its own cause. A rule does not seem impossible to be framed, according to which the punishment of piracy might be provided for, by referring those accused of it, either to some general tribunal, constituted for that purpose, or to the tribunals of some nation other than that against which the offence has been perpetrated. A general law, on this subject, to be observed by all nations, would be highly desirable.

Rules, therefore, seem not difficult to be laid down, for regulating the proceedings of nations on the high seas. A distinction, however, is drawn between what is called the high, and what is called the narrow seas. By the narrow seas is commonly meant some portion of sea, to a greater or less extent, immediately surrounding a particular country; and in which that country claims peculiar privileges. The question is, whether any such privileges should be allowed, and if allowed, to what extent?

The regulating principle in this, as in other cases, is the general advantage, the principle of utility. There are cases, in which certain privileges, in the waters surrounding a particular country, are of so much importance to that country; and the exercise of those advantages occasions so very little inconve-

nience to other nations, that what is lost, by all of them taken together, bears no comparison with what is gained by that particular nation. In these cases, the exercise of such privileges should be allowed; they should, however, be defined, in as many instances as possible, and promulgated by insertion in an international code.

Of the privileges in question, are all those which are essential, or to a considerable degree subservient, to the national security. In some cases, the exclusive right of fishing might perhaps come under the same rule. But this is in general provided for, by the necessity of drawing the nets, or curing the fish upon the land, a privilege which, of course, it is in the power of any nation to give or to withhold.

In obedience to this equitable principle, it appears, that such foppish privileges, as have sometimes been insisted upon, and afford no advantage to one nation, which is not wholly at the cost of others—lowering the flag, for example, and such like impositions—should not be recognized by the code of nations.

It appears, also, that those tolls which have been, sometimes, and are levied at the narrow inlets of some seas, deserve to fall under the same condemnation. The passage through these inlets is a common good to all the nations of the earth which may have a motive to use them; a good of the highest importance to the nations which are situated within, and to which it is the only means of maritime communication; and, while it imparts no evil to the contemniuous nation, the toll which that nation levies is an advantage obtained wholly at the cost of others; and imposing upon them a burthen, in the way of obstruction and trouble, which is compensated for by advantage to nobody.

The waters, we have said, in respect to which rights should be assigned to nations, are rivers and the sea. Having stated what appears necessary on the present occasion with respect to the sea, it remains that we offer the few observations required, on the subject of rivers.

Rivers are either the boundary between two countries, or they are wholly within a particular country.

Those which are wholly within a particular country, it seems most agreeable to the principle of utility to regard as wholly belonging to that country. In the case of navigable rivers which pass through several countries, it would indeed be desirable for those countries which are situated higher up than that at the mouth of each, as well as for all those who might thus have intercourse with them, that the navigation of such rivers should be free; but it would be difficult so to regulate this right, as not to affect the security of the country through which a free navigation should thus be allowed; and a slight diminution in its security would be so great a loss to that country as would require, to compensate for it, a very great advantage to those by whom the navigation was enjoyed. Unless where this advantage were very great, it would not, therefore, be agreeable to the principle which should dictate the laws of nations, that the freedom of the navigation should be regulated on any other principles than those of mutual agreement.

In regard to those rivers which flow between two

countries, the principle of regulation is sufficiently plain. The benefits derivable from the river should be shared equally between them. Its principal benefits arise from the fishing and from the navigation. The right of fishing in most cases may be fitly distributed, by each party fishing from its own bank to the middle of the stream. The right of navigating of each must be so exercised as not to obstruct the right of the other. In this case the same sort of rules are required, to prevent the ships of the two nations from obstructing one another, in a common river, as are found available to prevent the ships of different individuals from obstructing one another, in a river belonging to one country. There is no difficulty, therefore, here, which it is worth stopping to show how to remove.

What should be recognized as Rights in time of War. We have now adduced, what our limits admit to be said, upon the first great branch of the inquiry relative to the law of nations; namely, the rights which they should recognize in one another in the state of peace. We proceed to the second branch, relating wholly to the state of war.

The questions which present themselves for solution relating to the state of war, are either those which respect its commencement, or those which respect the mode of carrying it on.

What should be regarded as necessary to render the commencement of a War just. With respect to the commencement of a war, the principal question is, What are the conditions which should be regarded as necessary to render it just?

As men, in a situation where laws, and the protection derived from them, do not exist, are left to their own protection, and have no means of deterring other men from injuring them, but making them dread injury in return, so nations, which, with respect to one another, have, as we have seen before, but little protection from the legal sanction, are left to supply its place by this dread of injury in return, which, in the case both of individuals and of nations, may be called the retributive sanction, and of which, in the case of nations, war is the principal organ.

From this view of the essence and end of war, we lay down immediately one pretty extensive proposition with regard to the conditions necessary to render it just.

As the legal sanction, or punishment for the offences of individuals ought to operate only where some right has been violated, and the violation has been such as to require it, so the retributive sanction of nations, which is war, ought to operate only where some right of the nation, or something which ought to be treated as a right, has been violated, and where the violation has been such as to require that desperate remedy.

But as not all violations which may possibly be committed of the rights of a nation will justify it in inflicting war, the next object is, to draw the line of separation, and distinguish between those violations of the rights of nations which justify, and those which do not justify, the extremity of war.

As the evils which war produces are exceedingly great, it is, first of all, evident, that no violation of rights which is not very great, will, upon the principle which we have so often recognized, suffice to justify it. Of two evils, the least, is the choice of all sound legislation.

Of the violation of the rights of individuals, in the same country, the cases meet for punishment are capable of being pointed out, with a degree of accuracy, not wanting much of perfection. Of the violation of the rights of nations, committed by one nation against another, the cases which would justify the remedial operation of war are much more difficult to define. The difficulty, indeed, is not universal; for there are cases which may be very satisfactorily defined; and as far as definition can go, it is of the utmost importance that it should be carried. Uncertainty, then, pervades only one part of the field; which the more we are able to lessen, the greater the advantage in favour of humanity which we gain. If a proper code of international law were formed, there would be certain defined violations of the rights of nations which would be pointed out, not only as deserving the indignation and hatred of all the world, but as justifying the injured nation before all the world, in inflicting upon its injurer the calamities of war. There would also be certain other injuries pointed out, of a more doubtful character; which might, or might not, according to circumstances not easy to define, be such as to justify recourse to war. The injuries of this secondary character, also, which might, or might not, according to circumstances, justify a war, are capable of being pointed out with a certain degree of accuracy. To a certain degree, likewise, the circumstances which would convert them into justifying causes, are capable of being foreseen. So far definition is capable of extending, and so far, of course, it ought to be carried.

In illustration of this latter class of injuries, we may select the most remarkable, perhaps, and important of all the instances; preparations for a threatened attack. A sense of security is one of the most valuable treasures of a nation; and to be deprived of that sense of security, is one of the greatest of injuries. But what state of preparation shall, or shall not be considered as justifying the threatened nation in striking the first blow, in order not to give its enemy the advantage of completing his preparations, and making his attack just at the moment when it would be most destructive, it is perhaps impossible to determine, for all cases, beforehand; though, no doubt, a certain progress may be made towards that determination, and the bounds of uncertainty may be greatly reduced.

We are aware how general, and therefore how unsatisfactory, these observations are, on the important subject of defining those violations of the rights of nations which ought to be regarded as justificatory causes of war; but at the same time it is to be observed, that not much more could have been done without framing the code, by actually enumerating and defining the violations for which that remedy should be reserved.

Another consideration is now to be weighed. It is evident that whatever injuries are done by one nation to another, compensation may almost always be made for them. It is equally evident, that whatever injury may have been sustained, if compensation is made for it, the justificatory cause of war is removed.

The doctrine of compensation, therefore, is an important part of international jurisprudence. Before recourse is had to war, for any violation of rights, compensation ought first to be demanded; and no war, except in cases fit for exception, should be regarded as just, which this demand had not preceded; a demand which should be made through a constituted organ, and in a predetermined mode, as we shall more fully describe in a subsequent page, when we come to treat of an international tribunal.

As there can be no reason why the demand of compensation should not always precede the use of arms, except in cases of such a necessity as will not allow time for demanding compensation—a necessity for the immediate use of arms, in order to prevent an evil immediately impending—those cases of urgent necessity should, as far as possible, be sought out, and defined.

Other circumstances may be enumerated, as belonging to this first stage of the remedy, against a nation, which places itself in an attitude, affecting the sense of security of any of its neighbours. If a nation is making preparations, or executing any other measures, calculated to excite alarm, it may be called upon to desist from them; or it may be called upon to give security, that it will not make a hostile use of them. Of these securities, hostages are one of the most familiar instances. Various other instances will easily present themselves to the consideration of our readers. Upon this part of the subject, therefore, it is unnecessary for us to enlarge.

It thus appears, that we may lay down, with a considerable degree of precision, the conditions upon which the commencement of a war ought to be regarded as just. It remains, under this head of inquiry, that we show how it may, as far as possible, be determined, what ought to be regarded as just and unjust in the modes of carrying it on.

This is an inquiry of more complexity, a good deal, than the first. In looking out for a guiding principle, it is evidently necessary to keep in view the end to which every just war is of necessity restricted. That is, compensation for an injury received, and security that a fresh injury shall not be committed. Combining this with the grand principle of humanity and utility, in other words, of morality; namely, that all evil, wilfully occasioned, and not calculated to produce a more than equivalent good, is wicked, and to be opposed, we obtain one comprehensive and highly important rule; which is this: That in the modes of carrying on war, every thing should be condemned by the law of nations, which, without being more conducive, or more in any considerable degree, to the attainment of the just end of the war, is much more mischievous to the nation against whom it is done.

As the end is to be gained, in most cases, only by inflicting a loss of men and property, upon the opposing nation, it would be desirable that the distinction should be drawn between the modes of inflicting this loss, which are the most, and those which are the least calculated, to inflict pain and suffering, without being more conducive to the end.

One distinction is sufficiently remarkable; namely, the distinction between the men who are in arms or

VOL. VI. PART I.

actually opposed to the designs of the belligerent, and the men who are not so; also between the property which belongs to the government of the opposing nation, and that which belongs to private individuals composing the nation.

With respect to the first class of objects, the men in arms, and the property of the government, there is not much difficulty. To produce the loss of them, as rapidly as possible, till the end or purpose of the war is obtained, appears to be a privilege which cannot be separated from the right of warring at all.

With respect to the loss of the men, indeed, there is an important restriction. It means the loss of them for the purposes of the war, and no more. If it be practicable to put them in a situation in which they can no longer be of any service to the war, all farther injury to them should be held unjustifiable. Under this rule falls the obligation, so generally recognized, of making our enemies, as often as possible, prisoners, instead of killing them, and of treating them with humanity, while retained in that condition.

That part of the subject, therefore, which relates to men in arms, and to such property as belongs immediately to the government, it is not impossible to include in rules of tolerable precision. The difficulty is, with respect to those individuals who, composing the body of the nation, form no part of the men in arms, and with respect to the property of such individuals.

Though it would not be correct to say, that these do not contribute, or rather that they may not be made to contribute, to the means with which the government carries on the war; yet it would be absurd not to recognize a very broad distinction between them, and the men and things which are immediately applied, or applicable to the war. A difference, therefore, equally broad, ought, in reason, to be made in the mode of treating them. The mode of treating the one ought to be very different from that of treating the other. As the rule of destruction must be the rule with regard to the first, only limited by certain restrictions; so the rule of forbearance and preservation ought to be the rule with regard to the latter, only to be infringed upon special and justifying circumstances.

Thus far we seem to have travelled with the advantage of light to our path. We may go a little farther, with equal certainty, and say, that as far as regards the persons of those who are not engaged in the immediate business of hostility, very few occasions can occur, in which it would be allowable, upon any just principle of international law, to do them any injury. Leaving them out of the question, we narrow it to the case of the property belonging to individuals; and shall now proceed to see how far the protection of it can be embraced within general rules.

We must suppose the case, which is the strongest, that of an invading army. The advantage which is capable of being derived to such an enemy, by seizing and destroying the property of individuals, bears, unless in certain very extraordinary instances, no sort of proportion, to the evil inflicted upon the individuals. This, we presume, cannot admit of a dispute. Upon the principle, therefore, so often recognized,

as that, the dictates of which ought in this affair to be solely obeyed, no such destruction, unless in such instances, ought to be sanctioned by the law of nations. Such property, it is well known, can rarely be counted upon, as any considerable resource; because it is to a very great extent in the power of the people invaded to drive their property away, or to destroy it. The property of individuals, in an invaded country, would in general be a much more certain resource to an invading army, if that army were to purchase from them the articles which it desired. And, perhaps, this would be the most advantageous compromise of which the circumstances admit; namely, that the invading army should abstain from the violation of private property; but that it should in return have the benefit of an unrestricted market; that nothing should be done on the part of the government of the invaded country to prevent its subjects from buying and selling with the invaders, as they would with any other parties.

It may no doubt be true, that the plunder and devastation of a province, or other portion of a country, must have an effect in diminishing the resources of the government for carrying on the war. In this point of view it must be allowed that the destruction of private property is of some importance to the invading nation with regard to the result of the war. But the question, in settling the difficulties of international jurisprudence, is not whether an advantage is gained, but whether the advantage, such as it is, be not gained, at too great a cost of evil.

If it be certain that the losing party, in consequence of the destruction in question, loses more than the gaining party gains, it is certain that the two parties, taken together, are losers by the proceeding; and of course that nations, in the aggregate, are losers upon the whole. Nay, it is certain that each nation, taken by itself, is a loser, upon the balance of the cases in which it is liable to lose, and those in which it is liable to gain. If it loses more in the cases in which it bears, than it gains in the cases in which it inflicts invasion; and if it is as liable to bear, as to inflict, which is the usual condition of nations, it follows clearly that it is its interest to concur in a rule which shall protect the property of individuals, in cases of invasion.

Even in that more civilized mode, which has been adopted by invading armies, of availing themselves of the property of individuals; by exacting contributions through the instrumentality of the local authorities; contributions which these authorities are left to partition among the people, as they may deem equitable; though it is admitted that this is a much less hurtful proceeding than military rapine, still we think, it will easily appear, that the evil inflicted upon the contributors is greater than the benefits derived to the receivers.

Unless the amount thus received by an invading army is very considerable, the benefit which is derived, the aid which is gained towards accomplishing the end of the war, must be considered as trifling. But if a contribution, the amount of which can be of any considerable avail towards attaining the object of the war, is levied suddenly upon a particular district, a comparatively small portion of the invaded

country, it must operate upon the contributors with a dreadful weight of oppression. Upon an equitable estimate of the circumstances, it can, therefore, hardly fail to appear, that, whether the contribution exacted is heavy or light (it must always be heavy to those who sustain it), the loss to those who suffer must greatly outweigh the advantage to those who receive. If it be so, this mode of exaction should, it is evident, be forbidden by the law of nations.

If these are the principles, upon which an international code, regarding this branch of the subject, ought to be constructed, they will enable us to determine the question with regard to the property of individuals in another set of circumstances, to which the rules of civilized society have hardly yet begun to be applied. Whatever rules apply to the property of individuals found upon the land, the same rules ought, by parity of reason, it should seem, to apply to it when found upon the sea.

The conduct of nations, however, has hitherto not been conformable to the parity which appears to belong to the two sets of cases. Some tenderness, more or less, according to the progress in civilization, appears to have been shown, by all but savages, to the property of individuals upon the land. To this hour the property of individuals upon the sea is made prize of without mercy by the most civilized nations in the world.

The notions of piracy, in fact, have, on this subject, unhappily prevailed, and governed the minds of men. Pirates make prey of every thing. Sailors, originally, were all pirates. The seafaring state was a belligerent state, of almost every vessel against every other vessel. Even when nations had gradually advanced into a more civilized state, and when their vessels abstained from injury to one another in a period of peace, they appear, when the ties of peace were dissolved, and they were placed with respect to one another in a state of war upon the seas, to have felt the force of none but their old associations, and to have looked upon the state of war as a state of piracy. Two nations at war with one another continue to act towards the property of individuals belonging to one another, exactly as two nations of pirates would do.

Assuredly this is a state of things to which the present intelligence and morality of the world ought speedily to put an end. The very same reasoning which we have applied to the case of the property of individuals upon the land, is not less conclusive when applied to the property of individuals upon the sea. The loss to the party losing is more than an equivalent for the gain to the party that gains.

There is another consideration of great importance. All nations gain by the free operations of commerce. If then we were to suppose that the losses and gains of the two belligerent parties balanced one another, which yet they never do, there is an advantage derived from their commerce to every nation on the earth to which, in any degree, either directly or indirectly, that commerce extends; which advantage is either lost or diminished, by their preying upon the property of the individuals belonging to one another. This, therefore, is an unquestionable balance of loss, to the general community of na-

tions, which the law of that community ought to endeavour to prevent.

If, then, we should suppose that it were enacted as the law of nations, that the property of individuals passing on the seas should be equally respected, in peace and in war, we may proceed to consider whether any disadvantage, nearly countervailing the general good, would thence accrue to the belligerents.

It may be alleged, that a nation at war with another is retarded in reducing its antagonist, by the riches which the commerce of that antagonist, if undisturbed, will place at its disposal. But it is evident that an advantage to one of two antagonists, when compensated to the other, by a power to overcome that advantage, exactly equivalent, is in reality no advantage at all. Such is the case with the advantage accruing to the nation with which another is at war, when the property of individuals upon the sea is allowed to pass unmolested. If its riches are increased by freedom of commerce, so are those of its antagonist. The advantages are equal, where the circumstances are equal, which, in the majority of cases, they undoubtedly are.

If it be still objected, that there may be cases in which they are not equal, the answer is obvious, and incontrovertible. There is no general rule without its exceptions, but partial evil must be admitted for general good. Besides, if the case were very remarkable, it might be excepted from the general rule.

If this were adopted as part of the law of nations, all those questions respecting the maritime traffic of Neutrals, questions which have been the source of so much troublesome inquiry, so much animosity, and so much mischief, would be immediately at an end. If the traffic of the belligerents, so far as concerned the property of individuals, were free, so would be that of all neutral nations.

Places actually blockaded, that is surrounded with an hostile force for the immediate purpose of being reduced, either by arms, or by famine, would still form exceptions; because the admission of ships into them, with supplies either of food, or munition of war, would be directly at variance with the very object of the blockade.

In all other cases, the admission either of provisions or of instruments of war into a belligerent country, ought, undoubtedly, upon the principle of utility, not to be disturbed. The benefit, except in rare and remarkable cases, could not be material to the country into which they might enter, nor hence the injury to its antagonist; on the other hand, that antagonist would enjoy the same privilege of the free admission of those commodities, and thus they would be equal in all respects. The inconvenience, however, which would thus be saved to the neutrals—the annoyance of search, the loss by detention, the occasions of quarrel—are known to be evils of no ordinary magnitude.

The desertion of sailors from the ships of a belligerent to those of a neutral has given rise to disputes in one instance only, that of Great Britain and the United States of America. The question to be determined, in laying down the principles of international jurisprudence, is, whether this desertion ought to be considered as constituting a ground for the

general right of search; in other words, whether the evil to which a belligerent is exposed by desertion, or rather by that portion of desertion which can be prevented by the right of search, is an equivalent for all the evil which is unavoidably produced by it.

Desertion must take place either from the ships of war of the belligerent, or from its merchant ships.

In respect to ships of war, it is so easy for a belligerent to prevent desertion to neutrals, at least in any such degree as to constitute a great evil, that it would be altogether absurd to speak of it as an evil to be compared with those arising from the right of search. The only occasions on which ships of war can be exposed to desertion to neutrals, must be, on those occasions on which they go into a neutral port. But on those, comparatively rare, occasions, they can so easily take precaution against desertion, that the danger to which they are exposed is hardly worth regarding.

When the sailors belonging to merchant ships transfer their services to the ships of a neutral, it is not to be called desertion. It can only take place, in very considerable numbers, when seamen's wages in the neutral country are much higher than in that of the belligerent. The sailor, in this case, leaves his own for another country, only because he improves his situation by so doing. This is a liberty, which, as it ought to belong to every body, so it ought not to be withheld from the sailor. If, indeed, any nation thinks proper to forbid any class of its people to leave their country, as England with regard to its artificers, other countries cannot help that, but they ought not to be called upon to lend their aid to such an antisocial regulation, by allowing their vessels to be searched, as security against its infringement. Besides, it is evident, that there is a much greater security, arising from the very nature of the case, against the chance of a nation's being, to any considerable degree, deprived of its sailors by any such means. If the sailors go into the neutral country because wages are higher there, a small number only will have gone, when wages, from diminution of the numbers, will begin to rise in the country which they have left, and from increase of the numbers, will begin to fall in the country to which they have been tempted to repair. When the wages of seamen have thus sufficiently risen, in the belligerent country, which they are sure to do if the demand for them rises, the sailors will not only come back from every country in the world, but the sailors of other countries will hurry along with them; and the evil of desertion cures itself.

Only two questions, of any great importance, appear to remain; that relating to the march of troops, for a hostile purpose, through a neutral country, and that relating to the extent to which the operations of a successful war ought to be pursued.

According to the principles which we have already laid down for regulating the proceedings of a hostile army even in the invaded country, namely, that of committing no plunder, and enjoying the right of market, it appears that the right of passing through a neutral country on similar terms should be refused to no party. This rule, while it holds out equal advantages to all belligerents, admits, less than any other rule, grounds of dispute.

The end, which we have already described as that alone the pursuit of which can render any war justifiable, sufficiently defines the extent to which the operations of a successful war ought to proceed. The end of every justifiable war is to obtain compensation for an injury sustained, and security against the repetition of it. The last point, that of security, alone contains any uncertainty. Nations are apt to exaggerate the demand for security, to require too much; very often unconsciously, from the mere cravings of self-love; sometimes fraudulently, as a cover for ambitious views. As the question, however, respecting what may or may not, in each instance, be sufficient security, is a question of fact, not of law, it must be determined, if determined at all, by a tribunal empowered to take cognizance of the facts.

We have now then laid down the principles by which, in our opinion, the rights of nations, in respect to one another, ought to be determined; and we have shown in what manner those principles should be applied, in order to come to a decision, in the most remarkable cases. The minor points it is, of course, not in our power to illustrate in detail; but that will not, we should hope, be difficult, after the exemplification exhibited, and the satisfactory solutions at which we seem to have arrived, of all the more considerable questions which the subject presents.

From what has been shown, it is not difficult to see, what would be the course pursued by nations, if they were really actuated by the desire of regulating their general intercourse, both in peace and in war, on the principles most advantageous to them all.

Two grand practical measures are obviously not only of primary importance toward the attainment of this end, but are of indispensable necessity toward the attainment of it in any tolerable degree. These are, first, the construction of a Code; and, secondly, the establishment of a Tribunal.

It is perfectly evident, that nations will be much more likely to conform to the principles of intercourse which are best for all, if they have an accurate set of rules to go by, than if they have not. In the first place, there is less room for mistake; in the next, there is less room for plausible pretexts; and last of all, the approbation and disapprobation of the world is sure to act with tenfold concentration, where a precise rule is broken, familiar to all the civilized world, and venerated by it all.

How the nations of the civilized world might concur in the framing of such a code, it is not difficult to devise. They might appoint delegates to meet for that purpose, in any central and convenient place; where, after discussion, and coming to as full an understanding as possible upon all the material points, they might elect some one person, the most capable that could be found, to put these their determinations into the proper words and form, in short, to make a draught of a code of international law, as effectually as possible providing for all the questions, which could arise, upon their interfering interests, between two nations. After this draught was proposed, it should be revised by the delegates, and approved by them, or altered till they deemed it worthy of their approbation. It should then be referred to the several governments, to receive its final sanction

from their approbation; but, in the mean time, it should be published in all the principal languages, and circulated as extensively as possible, for the sake of two important advantages. The first would be, that, the intelligence of the whole world being brought to operate upon it, and suggestions obtained from every quarter, it might be made as perfect as possible. The second would be, that the eyes of all the world being fixed upon the decision of every nation with respect to the code, every nation might be deterred by shame from objecting to any important article in it.

As the sanction of general opinion is that upon which chiefly, as we have already seen, such a code must rely for its efficiency, not a little will depend upon the mode in which it is recognized and taught. The recognition should in each country have all possible publicity and solemnity. Every circumstance which can tend to diffuse the opinion throughout the earth, that the people of each country attach the highest importance to such a code, is to themselves a first-rate advantage; because it must be of the utmost importance to them, that all the nations of the earth should behave towards them upon the principles of mutual beneficence; and nothing which they can do can have so great a tendency to produce this desirable effect, as its being generally known that they venerate the rules which are established for its attainment.

If nations, then, were really actuated by the desire of regulating their mutual intercourse upon principles mutually beneficent, they would adopt measures for having a code of international law constructed, solemnly recognized, and universally diffused and made known.

But it is not enough that a code should exist; every thing should be done to secure a conduct conformable to it. Nothing is of so much importance for this purpose as a tribunal; before which every case of infringement should be tried, the facts of it fully and completely explored, the nature and degree of the infringement ascertained; and from which a knowledge of every thing material to the case should be as rapidly as possible diffused through the world; before which also all cases of doubt should regularly come for determination; and thus wars, between nations which meant justly, would always be avoided, and a stigma would be set upon those which justice could not content.

The analogy of the code, which is, or ought to be, framed by each state for regulating the intercourse of its own people within its own territory, throws all the illustration which is necessary upon the case of a tribunal for the international code. It is well known, that laws, however carefully and accurately constructed, would be of little avail in any country, if there was not some organ, by means of which it might be determined when individuals had acted in conformity with them, and when they had not; by which also, when any doubt existed respecting the conduct which in any particular case the law required, such doubt might be authoritatively removed, and one determinate line of action prescribed. Without this, it is sufficiently evident, that a small portion of the benefit capable of being derived from laws would actually be attained. It will presently be seen how much

of the benefit capable of being derived from an international code must be lost, if it is left destitute of a similar organ. We shall first consider in what manner an international tribunal might be constructed; and, next, in what manner it might be appointed to act.

As it is understood that questions relating to all nations should come before it, what is desirable is, that all nations should have equal security for good judicature from it, and should look with equal confidence to its decisions.

An obvious expedient for this purpose is, that all nations should contribute equally to its formation; that each, for example, should send to it a delegate, or judge. Its situation should be chosen or its accessibility, and for the means of publicity which it might afford; the last being, beyond comparison, the advantage of greatest importance. As all nations could not easily, or would not, send, it would suffice if the more civilized and leading nations of the world concurred in the design, with such a number of the less considerable as would be sure to follow their example, and to be desirous of deriving advantage from an instrument of protection, which to them would be of peculiar importance.

As it is found by specific experience, and is, indeed, a consequence of the ascertained laws of human nature, that a numerous assembly of men cannot form a good judiciary; and that the best chance for good judicial service is always obtained when only one man judges, under the vigilant eyes of interested and intelligent observers, having full freedom to deliver to the world their sentiments respecting his conduct; the whole of these advantages may be obtained, in this case, by a very effectual expedient. If precedent, also, be wanted, a thing which in certain minds holds the place of reason, it is amply furnished by the Roman law; according to which a great number of judges having been chosen for the judicial business generally of the year, a selection was made out of that number, according to certain rules, for each particular case.

Every possible advantage, it appears, would be combined in the international tribunal, if the whole body of delegates, or judges, assembled from every country, should, as often as any case for decision came before them, hold a conference, and, after mature deliberation, choose some one individual of their body, upon whom the whole duty of judge should, in that case, devolve; it being the strict duty of the rest to be present during the whole of his proceedings, and each of them to record separately his opinion upon the case, after the decision of the acting judge had been pronounced.

It would be, no doubt, a good general rule, though one can easily foresee cases in which it would be expedient to admit exceptions, that the judge, who is in this manner chosen for each instance of the judicial service, should not be the delegate from any of the countries immediately involved in the dispute. The motive to this is sufficiently apparent.

We apprehend, that few words will be deemed necessary to show how many securities are thus provided for the excellence of the judicial service.

In the first place, it seems impossible to question,

that the utmost fairness and impartiality are provided for, in the choice of the judge; because, of the two parties involved in the dispute, the one is represented by a delegate as much as the other, and the rest of the delegates are indifferent between them. In general, therefore, it is evident, that the sinister interest on the two sides being balanced, and there being a great preponderance of interest in favour of nothing but a just decision, that interest will prevail.

The best choice being made of a judge, it is evident that he would be so situated, as to act under the strongest securities for good conduct. Acting singly, he would bear the whole responsibility of the service required at his hands. He would act under the eyes of the rest of the assembled delegates, men versed in the same species of business, chosen on account of their capacity for the service, who could be deceived neither with respect to the diligence which he might exert, nor the fairness and honesty with which he might decide; while he would be watched by the delegates of the respective parties, having the power of interest stimulating them to attention; and would be sure that the merits or demerits of his conduct would be made fully known to the whole, or the greater part of the world.

The judiciary being thus constituted, the mode of proceeding before it may be easily sketched.

The cases may be divided into those brought before it by the parties concerned in the dispute; and those which it would be its duty to take up, when they were not brought before it by any of the parties.

A variety of cases would occur, in which two nations, having a ground of dispute, and being unable to agree, would unite in an application to the international tribunal for an adjustment of their differences. On such occasions, the course of the tribunal would be sufficiently clear. The parties would plead the grounds of their several claims; the judge would determine how far, according to the law, they were competent to support those claims; the parties would adduce their evidence for and against the facts, on which the determination of the claims was found to depend; the judge would receive that evidence, and finally decide. All this is so perfectly conformable to the course of pleading, and receiving proof, in the case of suits between individuals, as analyzed and explained in the Article JURISPRUDENCE, that it is unnecessary to be more particular here. If further exposition is required, it will be found upon a reference to the article to which we allude. Decision, in this case, it is observable, fully accomplishes its end; because the parties come with an intention of obeying it.

Another, and a numerous class of cases, would probably be constituted, by those who would come before it, complaining of a violation of their rights by another nation, and calling for redress.

This set of cases is analogous to that, in private judicature, when one man prosecutes another for some punishable offence.

It should be incumbent upon the party thus applying to give notice of its intention to the party against which it is to complain, and of the day on

which it means that its complaint should be presented.

If both parties are present, when the case comes forward for trial, they both plead, according to the mode described in the Article JURISPRUDENCE; evidence is taken upon the decisive facts; and if injury has been committed, the amount of compensation is decreed. When it happens that the defendant is not present, and refuses to plead, or to submit, in this instance, to the jurisdiction of the court, the inquiry should notwithstanding go on; the allegations of the party present should be heard, and the evidence which it adduces should be received. The non-appearance of the party defendant should be treated as an article of evidence to prove the truth of its opponent's allegations. And the fact of not appearing should, itself, be treated as an offence against the law of nations.

It happens, not unfrequently, when nations quarrel, that both parties are in the wrong; and on some of these occasions neither party might think proper to apply to an equitable tribunal. This fact, namely, that of their not applying to the international tribunal, should, itself, as stated before, be marked in the code as an international offence, and should be denounced as such by the international tribunal. But even when two offending parties do not ask for a decision from the international tribunal, it is not proper that other nations should be deprived of the benefit of such a decision. If these decisions constitute a security against injustice from one another to the general community of nations, that security must not be allowed to be impaired by the refractory conduct of those who dread an investigation of their conduct.

Certain forms, not difficult to devise, should be laid down, according to which, on the occurrence of such cases, the tribunal should proceed. First of all, it is evident, that the parties in question should receive intimation of the intention of the court to take cognisance of their disputes, on a certain day. If the parties, one or both, appeared, the case would fall under one of those which have been previously as above considered. If neither party appeared, the court would proceed to estimate the facts which were within its cognisance.

It would have before it one important article of evidence, furnished by the parties themselves, namely, the fact of their non-appearance. This ought to be considered as going far to prove injurious conduct on both sides. The evidence which the court would have before it, to many specific facts, would be liable to be scanty, from the neglect of the parties to adduce their pleas and evidence. The business of the court, in these circumstances, would be, to state correctly such evidence, direct or circumstantial, as it had before it; giving its full weight to the evidence contained in the fact of non-appearance; and to pronounce the decision, which the balance of the evidence, such as it was, might be found to support.

Even in this case, in which the practical effect of a decision of the international court may be supposed to be the least, where neither party is disposed to respect the jurisdiction, the benefit which would be derived would by no means be inconsiderable. A

decision solemnly pronounced by such a tribunal, would always have a strong effect upon the imaginations of men. It would fix, and concentrate the disapprobation of mankind.

Such a tribunal would operate as a great school of political morality. By sifting the circumstances, in all the disputes of nations, by distinguishing accurately between the false colours and the true, by stripping off all disguises, by getting at the real facts, and exhibiting them in the true point of view, by presenting all this to the world, and fixing the attention of mankind upon it by all the celebrity of its elevated situation, it would teach men at large to distinguish. By habit of contemplating the approbation of such a court attached to just proceeding, its disapprobation to unjust; men would learn to apply correctly their own approbation, and disapprobation; whence would flow the various important effects, which these sentiments, justly excited, would naturally and unavoidably produce.

As, for the reasons adduced at the beginning of this article, the intentions should never be entertained of supporting the decisions of the international court by force of arms, it remains to be considered what means of another kind could be had recourse to, in order to raise to as high a pitch as possible the motive of nations respectively to yield obedience to its decisions.

We have already spoken of the effect which would be produced, in pointing the sentiments of mankind, giving strength to the moral sanction, and by the existence of an accurate code, and by the decisions themselves of a well constituted tribunal.

To increase this effect to the utmost, publicity should be carried to the highest practicable perfection. The code, of course, ought to be universally promulgated and known. Not only that, but the best means should be in full operation for diffusing a knowledge of the proceedings of the tribunal; of the cases investigated, the allegations made, the evidence adduced, the sentence pronounced, and the reasons upon which it is grounded.

The book of the law of nations, and selections from the book of the trials before the international tribunal, should form a subject of study in every school, and a knowledge of them a necessary part of every man's education. In this manner a moral sentiment would grow up, which would, in time, act as a powerful restraining force upon the injustice of nations, and give a wonderful efficacy to the international jurisdiction. No nation would like to be the object of the contempt and hatred of all other nations; to be spoken of by them on all occasions with disgust and indignation. On the other hand, there is no nation, which does not value highly the favourable sentiments of other nations; which is not elevated and delighted with the knowledge that its justice, generosity, and magnanimity, are the theme of general applause. When means are taken to make it certain that what affords a nation this high satisfaction will follow a just and beneficial course of conduct; that what it regards with so much aversion, will infallibly happen to it, if it fails in the propriety of its own behaviour, we may be sure that a strong security is gained for a good intercourse among nations.

Besides this, it does not seem impossible to find various inconveniences, to which, by way of penalties, those nations might be subjected, which refused to conform to the prescriptions of the international code.

Various privileges granted to other nations, in their intercourse with one another, might be withheld from that nation which thus demeaned itself in a way so contrary to the general interests. In so far as the withholding of these privileges might operate unfavourably upon individuals belonging to the refractory nations,—individuals who might be little, or not at all, accessory to the guilt, the effect would be the subject of proportional regret. Many, however, in the concerns of mankind, are the good things which can only be attained with a certain accompaniment of evil. The rule of wisdom, in such cases, is, to be sure that the good outweighs the evil, and to reduce the evil to its narrowest dimensions.

We may take an instance first from trivial matters. The ceremonial of other nations might be turned against the nation, which, in this common concern, set itself in opposition to the interests of others. The lowest place in company, the least respectful situation on all occasions of ceremony, might be assigned to the members of that nation, when travelling or residing in other countries. Many of those marks of disrespect, implying neither injury to person nor property, which are checked by penalties in

respect to others, might be free from penalties in respect to them. From these instances, adduced merely to illustrate our meaning, it will be easy to see in what manner a number of considerable inconveniences might, from this source, be made to bear upon nations refusing to conform to the beneficial provisions of the international code.

Besides the ceremonial of other nations, means to the same end might be derived from the law. A number of cases might be found in which certain benefits of the law, granted to other foreigners, might be refused to them. They might be denied the privilege of suing in the courts, for example, on account of any thing except some of the higher crimes, the more serious violations of person or property.

Among other things it is sufficiently evident, that this tribunal would be the proper organ for the trial of piracy. When preponderant inconvenience might attend the removing of the trial to the usual seat of the tribunal, it might delegate for that purpose the proper functionaries to the proper spot.

By the application of the principles, which we have thus expounded, an application which implies no peculiar difficulty, and requires nothing more than care in the detail, we are satisfied that all might be done, which is capable of being done, toward securing the benefits of international law.

(F.F.)

N A V Y.

AN insular empire, like that of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, which is so much indebted, and always must be, for that power, prosperity, and renown which she enjoys, to the glorious deeds of her Navy, cannot but take a peculiar degree of interest in every thing that concerns it. This vast machine, indeed, has at all times been the pride and boast of Great Britain, the terror of its enemies, and the admiration of the world. It is under the impression of its vast importance that we have been induced to give, under their proper heads, such details of the civil and military branches of the naval departments, as may afford, without entering into too minute details, a comprehensive sketch of this great national bulwark, of which it is now proposed to take a general view.

The term NAVY is generally intended to express all ships of commerce as well as of war—the mercantile as well as the military marine; but the observations contained in the present article are meant to relate only to the latter, excepting that, in speaking of the progressive enlargement of ships, and improvements in naval architecture, the remarks may sometimes equally apply to ships of commerce and of war.

Navy composed of MATERIEL and PERSONEL.

The composition of a navy may be considered under the two distinct heads into which it naturally divides itself, and under which the French generally

distinguish an army, the materiel, and the personel; the former embracing every thing that appertains to the ships, their capacity, construction, armament, and equipment; the latter all that concerns the rank, the appointment, the various duties, &c. of the officers, seamen, and marines.

I.—MATERIEL OF THE NAVY.

It would occupy too large a space to give History. even a short sketch of the origin and progress of naval architecture, from a bundle of branches, or the hollow trunk of a tree—the rude raft and the frail canoe—to the more perfect coracle, or the wicker boats of the ancient Britons covered with hides. For many centuries after the expulsion of the Romans from, or their abandonment of, the British Islands, very little progress appears to have been made by us in the art of navigation or ship building: the natives would appear, for many centuries afterwards, to have acted merely on the defensive against naval invasions.

"The whole of our naval history," say the Commissioners for Revising the Civil Affairs of the Navy, "may be divided into three periods. The First, comprehending all that preceded the reign of Henry VIII. The Second, ending with the Restoration of Charles II.; and the Third, coming down from the Restoration to the present day."

To what size, and to what extent, the amount of First Period. the English ships or vessels were carried, which sup-

Navy. ported so many contests with the invading Danes, in the ninth century, our naval history has not preserved any record. We are told, however, that Alfred increased the size of his galleys, and that some of them were capable of rowing thirty pair of oars. These galleys were chiefly employed in clearing the Channel of the nests of pirates by which it was infested. It is also said, as a proof of his attention to naval matters, that under his auspices, one Ochter undertook a voyage into the Arctic Regions, made a survey of the coasts of Lapland and Norway, and brought to Alfred an account of the mode pursued by the inhabitants of those countries to catch whales. It is, moreover, on record, that his two sons, Edward and Athelston, fought many bloody actions with the Danes, in which several kings and chiefs were slain; and that Edgar had from 3000 to 5000 ships, divided into three fleets, stationed on three several parts of the coast, with which, passing from one fleet or squadron to the other, he circumnavigated the island; that after this he called himself "Monarch of all Albion, and Sovereign over all the adjacent Isles." Some notion, however, may be formed of the size of the vessels which composed his fleets, from the imposition of a land-tax, which required certain proprietors to furnish a stout galley of three rows of oars to protect the coast from the Danish pirates. The more effectually to check these marauders, and protect the coasts of the kingdom, William the Conqueror, in 1066, established the Cinque Ports, and gave them certain privileges, on condition of their furnishing 52 ships with 24 men in each for 15 days, in cases of emergency. We should not, perhaps, be far amiss in dating the period of our naval architecture from the Conquest. "The Normans," says Sir Walter Raleigh, "grew better shipwrights than either the Danes or Saxons, and made the last conquest of this land; a land which can never be conquered whilst the kings thereof keep the dominion of the seas." But Raleigh does not describe what the ships were which the Normans taught us to build; nor can it now be known in what kind of vessels William transported his army across the Channel, or what was the description of the hundred large ships and fifty galleys of which the naval armament of Richard I. consisted on his expedition to the Holy Land. We are told, however, that having increased his fleet at Cyprus to 250 ships, and 60 galleys, he fell in with a ship belonging to the Saracens, of such an extraordinary size, that she was defended by 1500 men, all of whom, with the exception of 200, Richard, after taking possession of her, ordered to be thrown overboard and drowned.

There can be no doubt that the nations of the Mediterranean, particularly the Genoese and Venetians, introduced many improvements as to the capacity and stability of their ships, in consequence of the crusades and the demands for warlike stores and provisions, which such vast and ill-provided armies necessarily created; but these improvements would seem not to have reached, or, at least, to have made but a tardy progress in Great Britain. King John, it is true, stoutly claimed for England the sovereignty of the sea, and decreed that all ships belonging to foreign nations, the masters of which should refuse

to strike to the British flag, should be seized and deemed good and lawful prize. And this monarch is said to have fitted out no less than 500 sail of ships, under the Earl of Salisbury, in the year 1213, against a fleet of three times that number, prepared by Philip of France, for the invasion of England; of which the English took 300 sail, and drove 100 on shore, Philip being under the necessity of destroying the remainder, to prevent their falling also into the hands of the English. Of the kinds of ships of which his fleet consisted, some notion may be formed by the account that is related of an action fought in the following reign with the French, who, with "80 stout ships," threatened the coast of Kent. This fleet being discovered by Hubert de Burgh, governor of Dover Castle, he put to sea with 40 English ships, and having got to the windward of the enemy, and run down many of the smaller ships, he closed with the rest, and threw on board them a quantity of quicklime, which blinded them so effectually, that all their ships were either taken or sunk.

Whatever the size and the armaments of our ships were, the empire of the sea was bravely maintained by the Edwards and the Henrys in many a gallant and glorious sea-fight with the fleets of France, against which they were generally opposed with inferior numbers. The temper of the times, and the public feeling, were strongly exemplified in the reign of Edward I. by the following circumstance: An English sailor was killed in a Norman port, in consequence of which a war commenced, and the two nations agreed to decide the dispute on a certain day, with the whole of their respective naval forces. The spot of battle was to be the middle of the Channel, marked out by anchoring there an empty ship. The two fleets met on the 14th April 1293; the English obtained the victory, and carried off above 250 sail.

In an action with the French fleet off the harbour of Sluys, Edward III. is said to have slain 30,000 of the enemy, to have taken 200 great ships, "in one of which, only, there were 400 dead bodies." This is no doubt an exaggeration. The same monarch, at the siege of Calais, is stated to have blockaded that port with 730 sail, having on board 14,956 mariners; 25 only of which were of the Royal navy, bearing 419 mariners, or about 17 men each. In various other sea actions did this great sovereign nobly support the honour of the British flag. But though we then, and ever after, claimed the "dominion of the seas," that dominion, says Raleigh, "was never absolute until the time of Henry the Eighth." It was a maxim of this great statesman, that "whosoever commands the sea, commands the trade of the world; whosoever commands the trade, commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself."

The reign of Henry V., however, was most glorious, in maintaining the naval superiority over the fleets of France. From a letter of this Sovereign to his Lord Chancellor, dated 12th August 1417, discovered by the late Mr. Lyons among the records in the Tower, and of which the following is a copy, it would appear that there was something like an established

Royal navy in his reign, independently of the shipping furnished by the Cinque Ports and the merchants, for the King's own use, on occasion of any particular expedition. The letter appears to have been written nine days after the surrender of the castle of Touque in Normandy, from whence it is dated.

"Au revend pere en Dieu L'evêque de Duresme nre
Chancellor D'Engleterre.

"Worshipful fader yn God We sende you closed within this letter a cedule conteyning the names of certain Maistres for our owne grete Shippes Carrakes Barges and Balyngers to the whiche Maistres We have granted annuittees such as is appointed upon eche of hem in the same Cedule to take yerely of owre grante while that us lust at our Exchequer of Westm^r at the termes of Michelmasse and Ester by even porcions. Wherefore We wol and charge you that unto eche of the said Maistres ye do make under our grete seel beyng in yowre warde our letters patentes severales in due forme after the effect and pourport of our said grante. Yeven under our signet atte our Castle of Touque the xij day of August."

Extract from the Schedule contained in the preceding Letter.

The remainder, to whose masters pensions were thus granted, consist of seventeen "niefs, barges, and ballyngers," some with three, and others two mariners only. But history informs us, that about this time Henry embarked an army of 25,000 men at Dover on board of 1500 sail of ships, two of which

carried purple sails, embroidered with the arms of England and France; one styled the King's Chamber, the other his Saloon, as typical of his keeping his court at sea, which he considered as a part of his dominions. Still we are left in the dark as to the real dimensions of his ships, and the nature of their armament; they were probably used only as transports for his army. It would appear, however, from a very curious poem, written in the early part of the reign of King Henry the Sixth, that the navy of his predecessor was considerable, but that, by neglect, it was then reduced to the same state in which it had been during the preceding reigns. The poem here alluded to is entitled, "The English policie, exhorting all England to keep the sea, and namely the Narrow Sea; showing what profit cometh thereof, and also what worship and salvation to England and to all Englishmen," and is printed in the first volume of Hackluyt's Collection of Voyages. It was evidently written before the year 1438, when the Emperor Sigismund died, as appears by the following passage in the prologue:

"For Sigismund, the great Emperour,
Which yet reigneth, when he was in this land,
With King Henry the Fifth, Prince of Honour,
Here much glory, as him thought, he found
A mightie land, which had take in hand
To werre with France, and make mortalitie,
And ever well kept round about the sea."

The part of the poem which alludes to the navy of King Henry the Fifth is entitled, "Another incident of keeping the Sea, in the time of marvellous werrour and victorious Prince, King Henrie the Fifth, and of his great Shippes."

The following are the most remarkable passages:

"And if I should conclude all by the King
Henrie the Fifth, what was his purposing,
Whan at Hampton he made the great dromons,
Which passed other great ships of the Commons;
The Trinitie, the Grace de Dieu, the Holy Ghost,
And other moe, which as nowe be lost.
What hope ye was the Kings great intent
Of thoo shippes, and what in mind he meant:
It was not ellis, but that he cast to bee
Lorde round about environ of the see.
And if he had to this time lived here,
He had been Prince named withouten pere:
His great ships should have been put in preese,
Unto the code that he ment of in chiefe.
For doubt it not but that he would have bee
Lord and master about the round see:
And kept it sure, to stoppe our enemies hence,
And wonne us good, and wisely brought it thence,
That no passage should be without danger,
And his licence on see to move and sterre."

Shortly after the time when this poem must have been written, it appears from the Parliament Roll (20th Hen. VI. 1442), that an armed naval force, consisting only of eight large ships, with smaller vessels to attend them, was to be collected from the ports of London, Bristol, Dartmouth, Hull and Newcastle, Winchester, Plymouth, Falmouth, &c.; and, of course, the Royal ships of 1417, the names of which are contained in the foregoing schedule, were then either gone to decay or dispersed. We are not to judge of the size of these ships from the few mariners appointed to each. These were merely the

ship-keepers, or harbour-duty men, placed on permanent pay, to keep the ships in a condition fit for the sea when wanted.

It is very probable that, until our merchants engaged in the Mediterranean trade, and that the attention of the government was turned in the reign of Henry VII. (about 1496), to imitate Portugal in making foreign discovery, under the skilful seaman Sebastian Cabot, very little was added to the capacity or the power of British ships of war. It is said, however, that on the accession of Henry VII. to the throne in 1485, he caused his marine, which had been neglected in the preceding reign, to be put into a condition to protect the coasts against all foreign invasions; and that, in the midst of profound peace, he always kept up a fleet ready to act. In his reign was built a ship called the Great Harry, the first on record that deserved the name of a ship of war, if it was not the first exclusively appropriated to the service of the state. This is the same ship that Camden has miscalled the Henry Grace de Dieu, and which was not built till twenty years afterwards, under the reign of Henry VIII. The Great Harry is stated to have cost L. 14,000, and was burnt by accident at Woolwich in 1553.

We now come to that period of our naval history in which England might be truly said to possess a military marine, and of which some curious details have been left us by that extraordinary man of business Mr Pepys, a commissioner of the navy, and afterwards secretary to Charles II., at a time when the King executed in person the office of Lord High Admiral, and also to James II. until his abdication. His minutes and miscellanies relative to the navy are contained in a great number of manuscript volumes, which are deposited in the Pepysian Library in Magdalene College, Cambridge. From these papers it appears, that in the thirteenth year of Henry VIII., the following were the names and the tonnage of the Royal Navy:

Two row-barges of 60 tons each,—making, in the whole, 16 ships and vessels measuring 7260 tons.

The Henry Grace de Dieu is stated in all other accounts, and with more probability, to have been only 1000 tons; the rule for ascertaining the measurement of ships being still vague and liable to great error, was probably much more so at this early period. This ship was built in 1515 at Erith, in the river Thames, to replace the Regent of the same tonnage,

which was burnt in August 1512, in action with the French fleet, when carrying the flag of the Lord High Admiral. There is a drawing in the Pepysian papers of the Henry Grace de Dieu, from which a print in the Archæologia has been engraved, and of which a copy has been taken as a frontispiece to Mr Derrick's Memoirs of the Rise and Progress of the Royal Navy. From these papers it appears, that she carried 14 guns on the lower deck, 12 on the main deck, 18 on the quarter-deck and poop, 18 on the lofty forecastle, and 10 in her stern ports, making altogether 72 guns. Her regular establishment of men is said to have consisted of 349 soldiers, 301 mariners, and 50 gunners, making altogether 700 men. Some idea may be formed of the awkwardness in manœuvring ships built on her construction or similar to her, when it is stated that, on the appearance of the French fleet at St Helens, the Great Harry, built in the former reign, and the first ship built with two decks, had nearly been sunk, and that the Mary Rose of 600 tons, with 500 or 600 men on board, was actually sunk at Spithead, occasioned, as Raleigh says, "by a little sway in casting the ship about, her ports being within sixteen inches of the water." On this occasion the fleets cannonaded each other for two hours; and it is remarked as something extraordinary, that not less than 300 cannon-shot were fired on both sides in the course of this action. From the prints above mentioned, which agree very closely with the curious painting of Henry crossing the Channel in his fleet, to meet Francis on the "Champ de drap d'Or," near Calais, (and now in the great room where the Society of Antiquaries hold their meetings in Somerset House,) it is quite surprising how they could be trusted on the sea at all; their enormous poops and forecastles making them appear loftier and more awkward than the large Chinese junks, to which, indeed, they bear a strong resemblance.

Henry VIII. may justly be said to have laid the foundation of the British navy. He established the dock-yards at Deptford, Woolwich, and Portsmouth; he appointed certain commissioners to superintend the civil affairs of the navy, and settled the rank and pay of admirals, vice-admirals, and inferior officers; thus creating a national navy, and raising the officers to a separate and distinct profession. The great officers of the navy then were, the Vice-Admiral of England; the Master of the Ordnance; the Surveyor of the Marine Causes; the Treasurer, Comptroller, General Surveyor of the Victualling, Clerk of the Ships, and Clerk of the Stores. Each of these officers had their particular duties, but they met together at their office on Tower-Hill once a week, to consult, and make their reports to the Lord High Admiral. He also established the fraternity of the Trinity-House, for the improvement of navigation and the encouragement of commerce, and built the castles of Deal, Walmer, Sandgate, Hurst Castle, &c. for the protection of his fleet and of the coast.

At the death of Henry VIII. in 1547, the Royal navy consisted of about 50 ships and vessels of different sizes, the former from 1000 to 150 tons, and the latter down to 20 tons, making in the whole about 12,000 tons, and manned by about 8000 mariners,

Navy. soldiers, gunners, &c. In the short reign of his son Edward, little alteration seems to have taken place in the state and condition of the Royal navy. But the regulations which had been made in the reign of his father, for the civil government of naval affairs, were revised, arranged, and turned into ordinances, which form the basis of all the subsequent instructions given to the commissioners for the management of the civil affairs of the navy. In the reign of Mary the tonnage of the navy was reduced to about 7000 tons; but her Lord High Admiral nobly maintained the title assumed by England of "Sovereign of the Seas," by compelling Philip of Spain to strike his flag that was flying at the main-top-mast head, though on his way to England to marry Queen Mary, by firing a shot at the Spanish admiral. He also demanded that his whole fleet, consisting of 160 sail, should strike their colours and lower their topsails, as an homage to the English flag, before he would permit his squadron to salute the Spanish monarch.

The reign of Elizabeth was the proudest period of our naval history, perhaps surpassed by none, previous to the Revolution. She not only increased the numerical force of the regular navy, but established many wise regulations for its preservation, and for securing adequate supplies of timber and other naval stores. She placed her naval officers on a more respectable footing, and encouraged foreign trade and geographical discoveries, so that she acquired justly the title of the "Restorer of Naval Power, and Sovereign of the Northern Seas." The greatest naval force that had at any previous period been called together was that which was assembled to oppose the "Invincible Armada," and which consisted, according to the notes of Mr Secretary Pepys, of 176 ships, with 14,992 men; but these were not all "Shippes Royall," but were partly composed of the contributions of the Cinque Ports and others. The number actually belonging to the navy is variously stated, but they would appear to have been somewhere about 40 sail of ships, manned with about 6000 men. At the end of her reign, however, the navy had greatly increased, the list in 1603 consisting of 42 ships of various descriptions, amounting to 17,000 tons, and manned with 8346 men. Of these two were of the burden of 1000 tons each, three of 900 tons, and ten from 600 to 800 tons.

James I. was not inattentive to his navy. He warmly patronized Mr Phineas Pett, the most able and scientific shipwright that this country ever boasted, and to whom we undoubtedly owe the first essential improvements in the form and construction of ships. The cumbrous top-works were first got rid of under his superintendence. "In my owne time," says Raleigh, "the shape of our English ships hath been greatly bettered—in extremity we carry our ordnance better than we were wont—we have added crosse pillars in our royall shippes, to strengthen them; we have given longer floors to our shippes than in older times," &c. The young Prince Henry was so fond of naval affairs, that Phineas Pett was ordered, by the Lord High Admiral, to build a vessel at Chatham in 1604 with all possible speed, for the young Prince Henry to disport himself in, above

London Bridge; the length of her keel was 28 feet, and her breadth 12 feet. In 1610 Pett laid down the largest ship that had hitherto been built. She was named the Prince Royal; her burden 1400 tons; her keel 114 feet; and armed with 64 pieces of great ordnance; "being in all respects," says Stowe, "the greatest and goodliest ship that was ever built in England." He adds, "the great work-master in building this ship was Mr Phineas Pett, gentleman, sometime Master of Arts, of Emanuel College, in Cambridge."

This excellent man, as appears from a manuscript account of his life in the British Museum, written by himself, was regarded by the shipwrights of the dock-yards, who had no science themselves, with an eye of jealousy, and a complaint was laid against him before the King, of ignorance in laying off a ship, and of a wasteful expenditure of timber and other matters. The King attended at Woolwich with his court, to inquire in person into the charges brought forward, and, after a painful investigation, pronounced in favour of Mr Pett. One of the charges was, that he had caused the wood to be cut across the grain; but the King observed, that, as it appeared to him, "it was not the wood, but those who had preferred the charges, that were cross-grained."

The state of the navy at the King's death is variously given, by different writers, but on this subject the memoranda left by Mr Secretary Pepys are most likely to be correct. From them it appears, that, in 1618, certain commissioners were appointed to examine into the state of the navy; and, by their report, it appears there were then only 39 ships and vessels, whose tonnage amounted to 14,700 tons; but in 1624, on the same authority, the numbers had decreased to 32 or 33 ships and vessels, but the tonnage increased to about 19,400 tons. The commissioners had, in fact, recommended many of the small craft to be broken up or sold, and more ships of the higher rates to be kept up.

The navy was not neglected in the troublesome reign of Charles I. This unfortunate monarch added upwards of 20 sail to the list, generally of the smaller kind; but one of them, built by Pett, of a description, both as to form and dimensions, far superior to any that had yet been launched. This ship was the celebrated "Sovereign of the Seas," which was launched at Woolwich in 1637. The length of her keel was 128 feet, and main breadth 48 feet, and from stem to stern 232 feet. In the description of this ship by Thomas Heywood, she is said to have "bore five lanthorns, the biggest of which would hold ten persons upright; had three flush-decks, a forecastle, half-deck, quarter-deck, and round-house. Her lower tier had 30 ports for cannon and demi-cannon; middle tier, 30 for culverines and demi-culverines; third tier, 26 for other ordnance; forecastle, 12; and two half-decks, 13 or 14 ports more within board, for murthering pieces; besides 10 pieces of chace ordnance, forward, and 10 right aft, and many loop-holes in the cabins for musquet-shot. She had 11 anchors, one of 4400 pounds weight. She was of the burthen of 1637 tons." It appears, however, that she was found, on

trial, to be too high for a good serviceable ship in all weathers, and was, therefore, cut down to a deck less. After this she became an excellent ship, was in almost all the great actions with the Dutch; was rebuilt in 1684, and the name changed to that of "Royal Sovereign;" was about to be rebuilt a second time at Chatham in 1696, when she accidentally took fire, and was totally consumed. In this reign the ships of the navy were first classed, or divided into six rates; the first being from 100 to 60 guns; the second from 54 to 36, &c.

In 1642 the management of the navy was taken out of the King's hands, and in 1648 Prince Rupert carried away 25 ships, none of which ever returned; and such, indeed, was the reduced state of the navy, that at the beginning of Cromwell's usurped government, he had only 14 ships of war of two decks, and some of these carried only 40 guns; but under the careful management of very able men, in different commissions which he appointed, such vigorous measures were pursued, that, in five years, though engaged within that time in war with the greatest naval power in Europe, the fleet was increased to 150 sail, of which more than a third part had two decks; and many of which were captured from the Dutch; and upwards of 20,000 seamen were employed in the navy. Our military marine was, indeed, raised by Cromwell to a height which it had never before reached; but from which it soon declined under the short and feeble administration of his son.

Though Cromwell found the navy divided into six rates or classes, it was under his government that these ratings were defined and established in the manner nearly in which they now are; and it may also be remarked, that, under his government, the first frigate, called the Constant Warwick, was built in England. "She was built," says Mr Pepys, "in 1649, by Mr Peter Pett (son of Phineas), for a privateer for the Earl of Warwick, and was sold by him to the state. Mr Pett took his model of this ship from a French frigate, which he had seen in the Thames."

During the first period of our naval history, we know nothing of the nature of the armament of the ships. From the time of Edward III. they might have been armed with cannon, but no mention is made of this being the case. According to Lord Herbert, brass ordnance were first cast in England in the year 1535. They had various names, such as cannon, demi-cannon, culverins, demi-culverins, sakers, mynions, falcons, falconets, &c. What the calibre of each of these were is not accurately known, but the cannon is supposed to have been about 60 pounders, the demi-cannon 32, the culverin 18, falcon 2, mynion 4, saker 5, &c. Many of these pieces, of different calibres, were mounted on the same deck, which must have occasioned great confusion in action in finding for each its proper shot.

On the Restoration of Charles II. the Duke of York was immediately appointed Lord High Admiral; and by his advice, a committee was named to consider a plan, proposed by himself, for the future regulation of the affairs of the navy, at which the Duke himself presided. By the advice and able as-

sistance of Mr Pepys, great progress was speedily made in the reparation and increase of the fleet. The Duke remained Lord High Admiral till 1673, when, in consequence of the test required by Parliament, to which he could not submit, he resigned, and that office was in part put in commission, and the rest retained by the King. Prince Rupert was put at the head of this commission, and Mr Pepys appointed secretary to the King in all naval affairs, and of the admiralty; and by his able and judicious management, there were in sea-pay, in the year 1679, and in excellent condition, 76 ships of the line, all furnished with stores for six months, eight fire-ships, besides a numerous train of ketches, smacks, yachts, &c. with more than 12,000 seamen; and also 30 new ships building, and a good supply of stores in the dock-yards. But this flourishing condition of the navy did not last long. In consequence of the dissipation of the King, and his pecuniary difficulties, he neglected the navy on account of the expences; the Duke was sent abroad, and Mr Pepys to the Tower. A new set of commissioners were appointed, without experience, ability, or industry; and the consequence was, as stated by the commissioners of revision, that "all the wise regulations, formed during the administration of the Duke of York, were neglected; and such supineness and waste appear to have prevailed, that, at the end of not more than five years, when he was recalled to the office of Lord High Admiral, only 22 ships, none larger than a fourth rate, with two fire-ships, were at sea; those in harbour were quite unfit for service; even the 30 new ships which he had left building had been suffered to fall into a state of great decay, and hardly any stores were found to remain in the dock-yards."

The first act on the Duke's return was the re-appointment of Mr Pepys as secretary of the admiralty. Finding the present commissioners unequal to the duties required of them, he recommended others. Sir Anthony Dean, the most experienced of the ship-builders then in England, was joined with the new commissioners. To him, it has been said, we owe the first essential improvement in the form and qualities of ships of the line, having taken the model of the Superbe, a French ship of 74 guns, which anchored at Spithead, and from which he built the Harwich in 1664. Others, however, are of opinion that no improvement had at this time been made on the model of the Sovereign of the Seas after she was cut down. The new commissioners undertook, in three years, to complete the repair of the fleet, and furnish the dock-yards with a proper supply of stores, on an estimate of £400,000 a year, to be issued in weekly payments; and in two years and a half they finished their task, to the satisfaction of the King and the whole nation; the number of ships repaired and under repair being 108 sail of the line, besides a considerable number of vessels of smaller size. The same year the King abdicated the throne, at which time the list of the navy amounted to 173 sail, containing 101,892 tons, carrying 6930 guns, and 42,000 seamen.

The naval regulations were wisely left unaltered at the Revolution, and the business of the Admiralty continued to be carried on chiefly, for some time,

Navy. under the immediate direction of King William, by Mr Pepys, till the arrival of Admiral Herbert and Captain Russell from the fleet, into whose hands, he says, "he silently let it fall." Upon the general principles of that system, thus established with his aid by the Duke of York, the civil government of our navy has ever since been carried on.

In the second year of King William (1690), no less than 30 ships were ordered to be built, of 60, 70, and 80 guns each; and in 1697, the King, in his speech to Parliament, stated that the naval force of the kingdom was increased to nearly double what he found it at his accession. It was now partly composed of various classes of French ships which had been captured in the course of the war, amounting in number to more than 60, and in guns to 2300; the losses by storms and captures on our side being about half the tonnage and half the guns we had acquired. At the commencement of this reign, the navy, as we have stated, consisted of 173 ships, measuring 101,892 tons; at his death, it had been extended to 272 ships, measuring 159,020 tons, being an increase of 99 ships and 57,128 tons, or more than one-half both in number and in tonnage.

The accession of Queen Anne was immediately followed by a war with France and Spain, and in the second year of her reign, she had the misfortune of losing a vast number of her ships by one of the most tremendous storms that was ever known; but every energy was used to repair this national calamity. In an address to the House of Lords in March 1707, it is declared as "a most undoubted maxim, that the honour, security, and wealth of this kingdom does depend upon the protection and encouragement of trade, and the improving and right encouraging its naval strength . . . therefore, we do in the most earnest manner beseech your Majesty, that the sea-affairs may always be your first and most peculiar care." In the course of this war were taken or destroyed about 50 ships of war, mounting 3000 cannon; and we lost about half the number. At the death of the Queen in 1714, the list of the navy was reduced in number to 247 ships, measuring 167,219 tons, being an increase in tonnage of 8199 tons.

George I. left the navy pretty nearly in the same state he found it. At his death, in 1727, the list consisted of 233 ships, measuring 170,862 tons, being a decrease in number of 14, but an increase in tonnage of 3643 tons.

George II. was engaged in a war with Spain in 1739, in consequence of which the size of our ships of the line ordered to be built was considerably increased. In 1744, France declared against us; but on the restoration of peace in 1748, it was found that our naval strength had prodigiously increased. Our loss had been little or nothing, whilst we had taken and destroyed, of the French 20, and of the Spanish 15 sail of the line, besides smaller vessels. The war with France of 1755 added considerably to the list, so that, at the King's decease, in 1760, it consisted of 412 ships, measuring 321,104 tons.

In the short war of 1762, George III. added no less than 20 sail of the line to our navy. At the conclusion of the American war in 1782, the list of

the navy was increased to 600 sail; and at the signing of the preliminaries in 1783, it amounted to 617 sail, measuring upwards of 500,000 tons; being an increase of 185 ships and 157,000 tons and upwards since the year 1762. At the peace of Amiens, the list of the fleet amounted to upwards of 700 sail, of which 144 were of the line. The number taken from the enemy, or destroyed, amounted nearly to 600, of which 90 were of the line, including 50 gun ships, and upwards of 200 were frigates; and our loss amounted to about 60, of which 6 were of the line and 12 frigates.

The recommencement and long continuance of the Revolutionary war, and the glorious successes of our naval actions, the protection required for our extended commerce, of which, in fact, we might be said to enjoy a monopoly, and for the security of our numerous colonies, contributed to raise the British navy to a magnitude to which the accumulated navies of the whole world bore but a small proportion. From 1808 to 1813, there were seldom less than from 100 to 106 sail of the line in commission, and from 130 to 160 frigates, and upwards of 200 sloops, besides bombs, gun-brigs, cutters, schooners, &c., amounting in the whole to about 500 sail of effective ships and vessels; to which may be added 500 more in the ordinary, and as prison, hospital, and receiving ships; making at least 1000 pendants, and measuring from 800,000 to 900,000 tons. The commissioners appointed to inquire into the state and condition of the woods, forests, and land revenues of the Crown, state, in their report to Parliament, in the year 1792, that, "at the accession of his Majesty (Geo. III.) to the throne, the tonnage of the Royal navy was 321,104 tons, and at the end of the year 1788, it had risen to no less than 413,467 tons." In 1808 it had amounted to the enormous extent of 800,000 tons, having nearly doubled itself in twenty years.

It must not, however, be supposed that the effective navy consisted of more than half this amount of tonnage. Since the conclusion of the war, it would appear that at least one-half of the number of ships then in existence have been sold or broken up as unfit for the service; and as, by the list of the navy at the beginning of the year 1821, the number of ships and vessels of every description in commission, in ordinary, building, repairing, and ordered to be built, has been reduced to 609 sail, we may take the greatest extent of the present tonnage at 500,000 tons; but the greatest part, if not the whole, of this tonnage may be considered as efficient, or in a state of progressive efficiency.

According to the printed list of the 1st January 1821, the 609 sail of ships and vessels appear to be as under:

The increase in the size of our ships of war was unavoidable; France and Spain increased theirs, and we were compelled, in order to meet them on fair terms, to increase the dimensions of ours; many of theirs were, besides, added to the list of our navy. The following sketch will show the progressive rate at which ships of the first rate, or of 100 guns and upwards, were enlarged in their dimensions. In 1677 the first rates were from 1500 to 1600 tons. In 1720 they were increased to 1800 tons. In 1745 we find

them advanced to 2000 tons. During the American war they were raised to 2000 tons. In 1795 the Ville de Paris, of 110 guns, measured 2350 tons. In 1804 the Hibernia, of 110 guns, was extended to 2500 tons; and in 1808 the Caledonia, carrying 120 guns, measured 2616 tons, and here we stopped; but since then, the Nelson, the Howe, the St Vincent, the Britannia, the Prince Regent, the Royal George, and the Neptune, have been built, or building, all nearly of the same dimensions, and from the same draught—nine such ships as the whole world beside cannot produce. The French had one ship larger than any of these, called the Commerce de Marseilles. She was taken by us in Toulon, but broke her back in a gale of wind.

The following are the comparative dimensions of the Caledonia and the Commerce de Marseilles:

The following is the armament of the Caledonia: On the gun-deck she carries 32 guns, 32-pounders; middle-deck 34 24-pounders; upper deck 34 24-pounders, carronades; quarter-deck 10 32-pounders, and 6 12-pounders, carronades; forecastle 2 32-pounders, and 2 12-pounders, carronades. Her complement of men 875.

At the commencement of the third period, we have a somewhat more precise account of the armament of our ships of war. On the 16th May 1677, a Committee of the Navy Board, Ordnance, and certain naval officers, recommended to his Majesty the following scheme for arming and manning the 30 new ships of the line ordered to be built by act of Parliament.

For the 1st rate, 780 men.
For the 2d do. 660 do.
For the 3d do. 470 do.

The rates of ships immediately after the Revolution were reduced, the 1st being turned to 2d rates, 2d rates to 3d, &c., and the size of each class more equalized. But from this time forward it was found impossible to preserve any thing like uniformity in the several classes. So many ships captured from the French, Dutch, and Spaniards, were added to

our navy, and so many new ones built after the models of ships taken from these maritime powers, that the various descriptions of ships of which our navy was composed became a very serious evil.

In the year 1745, a committee, composed of all flag officers unemployed, of the commissioners of the navy, who were sea-officers, under the presidency of Sir John Norris, and assisted by the master shipwrights, were ordered to meet, to consider, and propose proper establishments of guns, men, masts, yards, &c. for each class of his Majesty's ships; and, according to their recommendation, the rates, armaments, and complements of his Majesty's ships were to be as follows:

But this establishment was very soon departed from; for, on the 3d of February 1747, the Board of Admiralty acquainted his Majesty, that the French ship Invincible, lately captured, was found to be larger than his Majesty's ships of 90 guns, and 750 men; and suggested that this ship, and all other prizes of the like class, and also his Majesty's ships of 90 guns, when reduced to two decks and a half, and 74 guns, should be allowed a complement of 700 men. And it further appears, that, at the latter end of the reign of George the Second, the rates of ships had undergone a very material alteration, for they consisted as under:

1st Rate, 100 guns.
2d Rate, 90 guns.

The scales for measuring the ships were as various as their rates; and the evil was further increased by the varieties, which it was found necessary to introduce in the rigging and arming the ships of war. The masts, yards, rigging, and stores, were of so many and various dimensions, as to be not only highly inconvenient, but extremely expensive. When Lord Nelson was off Cadiz with 17 or 18 sail of the line, he had no less than seven different classes of 74 gun ships, each requiring different sized masts, sails, yards, &c. so that, in the event of one of these being disabled, the others could not supply her with such stores as could be appropriated to her wants.

Present Rating of the Navy.

To remedy the many inconveniences resulting from the irregularities above mentioned, the Lords of the Admiralty suggested, by their Memorial to the Prince Regent, which, by his Order in Council, of the 25th November 1816, was ordered to be carried into effect, that the ships of the navy should for the future be rated as under:

The 1st rate to include all three-deckers, in as much as all sea going ships of that description carry 100 guns and upwards.

The 2d rate to include all ships of 80 guns and upwards, on two decks.

The 3d rate to include all ships of 70 guns and upwards, and less than 80 guns.

The 4th rate to include all ships of 50 and upwards, but less than 70 guns.

The 5th rate to include all ships from 36 to 50 guns.

The 6th rate to include all ships from 24 to 36 guns.

And that the complements of men be established as under:

Of sloops the complements established according to their size, to consist of 135, 125, 95, or 75 men. Brigs (not sloops), cutters, schooners, and bombs, with 60 or 50 men.

Thus stands the rating and manning of the navy at present; but another war, or a new administration of the affairs of the navy, will, in all human probability, make new regulations in these respects. It is, however, of the utmost importance, with a view to convenience and economy, that the size and dimensions of the several rates should be kept as nearly as possible equal, in order that one description of stores may be applicable to every ship of the same rate. To this end, the commissioners of naval revision have recommended, "that the ships of each class or rate should be constructed in every particu-

lar, according to the form of the best ship in the same class in our navy; of the same length, breadth, and depth; the masts of the same dimensions, and placed in the same parts of the ship, with the same form and size of the sails."

Improvements in Construction.

If we look back to the days of Elizabeth, when the chain-pump, the capstan, the striking of the top-masts, the studding sails, top-gallant-sails, spritsails, &c. were first introduced into the navy, one can scarcely conceive how they contrived to keep the sea for any length of time; but these improvements, important as they were, are trifling when compared with those aids and conveniences which have gradually been introduced since her reign, and which a ship of war now enjoys. When Sir Anthony Deane, in 1664, raised the lower ports of a two-decker four and a half feet out of the water, which had before been scarcely three feet, and made a ship of this class to stow six months' provisions instead of three, it was justly considered as a most important improvement; not less so, when the breadth of a ship of this class was carried to 45 feet. "The builders of England," says Popys, "before 1673, had not well considered that breadth only will make a stiff ship." It must be confessed, however, that as far as the form of a ship's bottom depends on scientific principles, we have copied our best models from the French, sometimes with capricious variations, which more frequently turned out to be an injurious alteration than an improvement.

The first essential alteration in the form of our ships of the line was taken from the Superbe, a French ship of 74 guns, which anchored at Spithead, on the model of which, as already stated, the Harwich was built by Sir Anthony Deane in 1674; since which time we have constantly been copying from French models; improving or spoiling, as chance might determine. "Where we have built exactly after the form of the best of the French ships that we have taken," say the commissioners of naval revision, "thus adding our dexterity in building to their knowledge in theory, the ships, it is generally allowed, have proved the best in our navy; but whenever our builders have been so far misled by their little attainments in the science of naval architecture, as to depart from the model before them in any material degree, and attempt improvements, the true principles on which ships ought to be constructed (being imperfectly known to them) have been mistaken or counteracted, and the alterations, according to the information given to us, have, in many cases, done harm: while, therefore, they add, "our rivals in naval power were employing men of the greatest talents and most extensive acquirements, to call in the aid of science for improving the construction of ships, we have contented ourselves with groping on in the dark, in quest of such discoveries as chance might bring in our way."

On these grounds, and by the recommendation of the commissioners, a school for a superior class of shipwright apprentices has been established in Portsmouth Dockyard. It consists of twenty-five young men of liberal education; whose mornings are passed in the study of mathematics and mechanics, and in their

application to naval architecture; and the remainder of the day under the master shipwright in the mould loft, and in all the various kinds of manual labour connected with ship-building, as well as in the management and conversion of timber, so as to make them, at the same time, fully acquainted with all the duties in detail of a practical shipwright.

If, however, we have hitherto been inferior to the French in the scientific principles of ship-building, in the constructive part we have left them behind beyond all comparison; and notwithstanding the narrow prejudices which have been more remarkably adhered to among shipwrights, than among almost any other class of artisans, various alterations and improvements have from time to time been introduced into the mechanical part of naval architecture, which have added to the strength, the stability, the comfort, and convenience of our ships of war, and rendered them, in every point of view, superior to those of any other nation. The application of iron where wood was formerly used, and of copper for iron, have added considerably to the durability of ships; and the sheathing their bottoms with copper, to their celerity; giving them, at the same time, a protection against the worm and those marine insects which were wont to adhere to them; yet, it is remarkable, how strong the prejudice was against this practice before it obtained a due degree of credit. In the fleet of Sir Edward Hughes in India there was but one coppered ship, and Rodney's squadron in the West Indies had but four that were coppered in the year 1779; but these were enough so completely to establish their superiority over the others with wooden sheathing, that, in the year 1782, the whole British navy was coppered.

But the greatest of all improvements in the construction of ships of war, as tending to their strength and durability, is the system of diagonal bracing, introduced a few years ago by Mr (now Sir Robert) Seppings, surveyor of the navy, and now universally adopted in all ships of the line and frigates; a system that may be said to have established a new era in naval architecture. Of all large machines destined to undergo severe shocks, a ship is perhaps the least skilfully and artificially contrived. Her several parts are put together on a principle so much opposed to that which constitutes strength, that if a ship, on the old construction, should be put upon wheels, and drawn over a rough pavement, the action of a day would shake her in pieces; but being destined to move in an element that closes upon her, and presses her equally on all sides, she is prevented from falling in pieces outwards, and her beams and decks preserve her from tumbling inwards. Whoever has observed a ship in frame, as it is called, on the stocks, that is, with only her timbers erected, must forcibly be reminded of the skeleton of some large quadruped, as of a horse or ox, laid on its back; the keel resembling the back-bone, and the curved timbers the ribs, which is, in fact, the name by which they sometimes go. These ribs, issuing at right angles from the keel, consist, in a 74 gun-ship, of about 800 different pieces, the space between each rib seldom exceeding five inches. These ribs are covered with a skin or planks of different

thickness within and without, also at right angles to the ribs, and fixed to them by means of wooden pins or tree-nails. In the inside three or four tier of beams cross the skeleton from side to side, at right angles to both planks and ribs. These beams support the decks. At right angles to the beams are pieces of wood called carlings, and at right angles to these other pieces called ledges, and upon these the planks of the deck are laid in a direction of right angles to the beams, and parallel to the planking of the sides. From this sketch it will be perceived, that all the parts of a ship are either parallel or at right angles to each other. The ribs form a right angle with the keel, the planks inside and out are at right angles to the ribs, the beams at right angles to these, the carlings to the beams, the ledges to the carlings, and the planks of the decks to the ledges, the beams, and the ribs.

Now, it is well known to every common carpenter that this disposition of materials is the weakest that can be adopted. Thus, if five pieces of wood be pinned together in the shape of a parallelogram, it will require but little force to move them from the rectangular to the oblique or rhomboidal shape, as

But place a cross-bar, as in the figure Z, as carpenters are accustomed to do on a common gate, and it is no longer moveable on the points of fastening.

The strongest proof of a ship's partaking of this weakness in the old construction, is afforded on her being first launched into the water, when it is invariably found that the two extremities, being less water-borne than the middle, drop, and give to the ship a convex curvature upwards, an effect which, from its resemblance to the shape of a hog's back, is usually called hogging. In very weak or old ships this effect may be discovered in all the port-holes of the upper-deck, by their having taken the shape of lozenges declining different ways from the centre of the ship to each extremity.

To obviate this great defect, Seppings tried the experiment of applying to the ribs or timbers of the ship, from one extremity to the other, and from the orlop-deck downwards to the keelson, that well-known principle in carpentry, called trussing; being, in fact, a series of diagonal braces disposing themselves into triangles, the sides of which give to each other a mutual support and counteraction. These triangles were firmly bolted to the frame; and in order to give a continuity of strength to the whole machine, and leave no possible room for play, he filled the spaces between the frames with old seasoned timber cut into the shape of wedges; but recently with a prepared cement, thus rendering the lower part of the ship or floor one solid complete mass, possessing the strength and firmness of a rock.

The same principle of trussing is carried from the gun-deck upwards, from whence, between every port, is introduced a diagonal brace, which completely prevents the tendency of ships to stretch, or draw asunder their upper works. The decks, too, are made subservient to the securing more firmly the beams to the sides of the ship, by the planks being laid diagonally in contrary directions, from the midships to the sides, and at an angle of 45° with the beams, and at right angles with the ledges.

In frigates and smaller vessels, iron plates, lying at an angle of 45° with the direction of the trusses, are substituted for the diagonal frame of wood in ships of the line.

By this mode of construction, the ceiling, or internal planking, is wholly dispensed with, and a very considerable saving of the finest oak timber thereby effected; and what is more important, those receptacles of filth and vermin between the timbers, which were before closed up by the planking, entirely got rid of. This is not the least important part of the improvement, either as it concerns the soundness of the ship, or the health of the crew. It is stated, that a ship, which had been three years in India, on being laid open, exhibited a mass of filth, mixed up with dead rats, mice, cockroaches, and other vermin, which was taken out in cakes, not unlike in appearance the oil-cake with which certain animals are fed; that the stench was abominable, and the timbers with which it was in contact rotten. No such filth can find a lodgment in ships of war as they are now built.

The first ships on which the new principle was tried were those rebuilt or repaired in docks, from which they were quietly floated out without any shock from launching; but several of them sustained severe gales of wind, without showing the least symptoms of weakness, but quite the contrary, not even a crack appearing in the white-wash with which their sides within were covered. If these experiments were not satisfactory, the launching of two of the largest ships in the navy, established the fact of superior strength beyond the possibility of a doubt—the Nelson and the Howe. The Nelson, constructed on the old principle, was probably, in every respect, the best built ship in modern times; the timber sound and well seasoned; the workmanship admirable; and no pains were left unemployed by Mr Sison, the builder, to have her as perfect as she could be made; and her motion, when launched from

the stocks, was slow, easy, and majestic, without a shake or a plunge; yet the Nelson was found to have arched, after launching, no less than 9½ inches. The Howe is a sister ship to the Nelson, but built on the new principle; and after launching, she was found to have arched only three inches and five-eighths. The St Vincent, built on the old principle, and the same in every respect as the Howe, likewise hogged on launching nine inches and a quarter; and the whole fabric, in both cases, was found, on examination, to be greatly disturbed; whereas the Howe exhibited no such symptoms. The Plate No. CI. will show the mode of trussing ships of the line according to the plans of Sir Robert Seppings, now universally adopted in the British navy.

It has been a subject of discussion among ship-builders, whether tree-nails or metallic fastenings are to be preferred. The objection to iron bolts is, their rapid corrosion from the gallic acid of the wood, the sea-water, and perhaps by a combination of both; in consequence of which, the fibres of the wood around them become injured, the bolts wear away, the water oozes through, and the whole fabric is shaken and deranged. This corrosion of iron fastenings was most remarkable when the practice of sheathing ships with copper became general, and when iron nails were made use of to fix it: by the contact of the two metals and the sea-water, both were immediately corroded. Mixed metal nails are now used for this purpose; and copper bolts are universally employed below the line of flotation, though it is found that in these also oxidation takes place to a certain degree, and causes partial leaks. Various mixtures of metals have been tried, but all of them are considered to be liable to greater objections than pure copper. It would appear, then, that tree-nails, if properly made, well seasoned, and driven tight, are the least objectionable, being seldom found to occasion leaks, or to injure the plank or timbers through which they pass. This species of fastening has at all times been used by all the maritime nations of Europe. The Dutch were in the habit of importing them from Ireland, it being supposed that the oak grown in that country was more tough and strong than any which could be procured on the Continent, and in all respects best adapted for the purpose. "Under all circumstances," says Mr Knowles, "it appears that the present method of fastening ships generally with tough well seasoned tree-nails, with their ends split, and caulked after being driven, and securing the butts of each plank with copper bolts well clenched, is liable to fewer objections, and more conducive to the durability of the timber, than any other which has been tried, or proposed to be established."

The rounding of the form of the bow, in ships of Round Bows the line, is considered, by nautical men, of great utility and importance. The plan was first proposed to Ships of the Line. by Seppings in 1807, and has since been generally adopted. The removal of the head railing, and the continuing of the rounded form, give not only great additional strength to the ship, but also much more comfort and convenience to the crew, and security in that part of the ship when in action.

The scarcity of compass or crooked timber was, for some time, attended with serious injury to those ships of war, while on the stocks, into which it was considered necessary to be introduced. The difficulty with which it was procured, the length of time which a ship sometimes remained on the stocks waiting for a few pieces of compass timber, the green wood, when found, being immediately added to the seasoned timber in other parts of the frame, gave to the ship different periods of durability; though, in the long-run, the seasoned parts became affected by the green wood with which they were in contact, and a premature decay of the whole fabric was the consequence. Seppings, therefore, proposed a plan in 1806, which, by uniting short timbers according to a method called scarping, enabled him to obtain every species of compass-form that could be required from straight timber. Since that period, the whole frame of a ship can be prepared at once, without waiting for particular pieces, and thus every part of it be made to undergo an equal degree of seasoning.

By the same ingenious and indefatigable surveyor of the navy, a plan was proposed and adopted in the year 1813, by which ships of the line were built with timber hitherto considered as applicable only to the building of frigates, and that which had been deemed only fit for inferior uses was appropriated to principal purposes. The Talavera was the first ship built on this principle, and the expense of her hull is stated to have been about a thousand pounds less than that of the Black Prince, a ship of similar dimensions built on the old principle. The method by which the timbers were united was found, on trial of the Talavera with the Black Prince, while in frame, to give so much additional strength to the former, that it furnished the ground-work of the present mode of framing the British navy, by the introduction of the same union of materials in the application of the large, as was practised in that of the small timber; and from which both strength and economy have been united.

The building of the Talavera, and the great strength of her frame, led to the practice of putting together the frames of ships of the line from timbers of reduced lengths, and dispensing altogether with the chocks used for uniting their extremities, or, as they are technically called, their heads and heels. These chocks are of the form of an obtuse wedge, as A, and they are used to unite the two pieces of timber, as B and C, by firmly bolting the piece A to the two timbers B and C.

A diagram showing a horizontal timber labeled 'B' on the left and 'C' on the right. A triangular chock labeled 'A' is positioned above them, with its base resting on the joint between B and C, and its two points touching the top surfaces of B and C.

It generally happened, however, that, in the operation of thus fixing this chock, its two extremities split, and the surfaces of the chock and timbers not being in perfect contact, the moisture and air were admitted, and occasioned, as they always do, the dry-rot to a greater degree in those parts of the ship than in most others; and as there were from four to five hundred of these chocks in a 74 gun-ship,

it will readily be conceived what mischief was done to the whole fabric, if the greatest care was not taken by the workmen to prevent their splitting, and to bring their surfaces immediately into contact. It is obvious, also, that a great deal of timber must have been cut to waste in making these chocks; and, in fact, they consumed timber in each ship, when it was at a high price, to the value of from L. 1500 to L. 2000, besides a considerable expense in workmanship; and when the ship came to be repaired, not one chock in six was found to be in a fit state to be used again. It is not easy to conceive how this practice of uniting the timbers of a ship's frame came to be introduced so generally into the British navy, more especially as it is unknown in any other nation; it was probably first done to preserve the length of some particular timbers, one of whose ends might be defective, and the unsound part cut away in the manner we see it, and the sound chock introduced to fill up the vacancy; but it is quite surprising how a practice should have become general which creates a waste of timber, an increase of workmanship, and sows the seeds of premature decay. To obviate these disadvantages, Sir Robert Seppings brought the butt ends of the timbers together thus,

A diagram showing a horizontal timber with a central rectangular cutout. A round dowel or chock labeled 'C' is inserted into this cutout, with its ends flush with the inner surfaces of the timber.

and kept them together by means of a round dowel or chock, as C, just as the felloes of a carriage wheel are fastened together. He justly observes, that the simplicity of the workmanship, the economy in the conversion of timber, and the greater strength and durability, although of considerable moment, are of trifling importance when compared with the advantage of rendering timber generally more applicable to the frames of ships, which had heretofore been but partially so.

Another great improvement in the construction of ships of war, introduced by Seppings, is the round stern, which, however unsightly it may at first appear, from being accustomed to view the square stern with its grotesque carved work, is even in appearance more consistent with the termination of the sweeping lines of a ship's bottom, than the cutting them off abruptly with a square stern. But the additional strength which is thus given to a ship in that part which was hitherto the weakest, is alone sufficient to recommend the adoption of the plan, in our ships of war, particularly in those of the larger classes. The advantages gained by circular sterns are thus enumerated by Sir Robert Seppings.

1. 1. They give additional strength to the whole fabric of a ship.
2. 2. They afford additional force in point of defence.
3. 3. They admit of the guns being run out in a similar way to those in the sides.
4. 4. From the circular form and mode of carrying up the timbers, an additional protection against shot is obtained, if the ship should be raked.
5. 5. The stern being equally strong as the bow, no serious injury can accrue in the event of the ship being pooped; and the ship may be moored, if so required, by the stern.

Navy. 6. A ship will sail better upon a wind, from the removal of the projections of the quarter galleries.

7. Ships of the line have now a stern-walk protected by a veranda, and so contrived that the officers can walk all round, can observe the set of the sails, and the fleet in all directions.

8. The compass-timber heretofore expended for transoms is substituted with straight timber, and worked nearly to a right angle, which affords a considerable saving in the consumption of timber.

9. The counter being done away by the circular stern, the danger which arose from boats being caught under it is obviated.

In fact, the circular stern possesses many other advantages not necessary to be enumerated in this place.

Improvements in the Preservation of the Navy.

Not only the new mode of construction is highly favourable to the duration of ships, but the ravages of the disease known by the name of the dry-rot, occasioned principally by the hurry in which ships were built in the course of the late war, and the unseasoned state of the timber made use of (see Dry-rot), led to such measures as tend most effectually to the preservation of the fleet.

By Prevention of Dry-Rot. In the first place, various modes were put in practice for assorting and seasoning the timber, and for protecting it from the vicissitudes of the weather. The oak and fir of Canada, which had been introduced to a great extent into our dock-yards, during the time the Baltic was shut against this country, are now excluded; these woods having been found not only to possess little durability, but so friendly to the growth of fungi, that they communicated the baneful disease to all other descriptions of timber with which they came in contact. The practice of building ships under cover, introduced into our dock-yards in the course of the war, and carried to an extent so as to have roofed over almost every dock and slip in all the yards, has been destructive to the growth of dry-rot. (See DOCK-YARDS.) By filling in between the timber masses of cement, and then injecting by forcing-pumps a mixture of oil and tar, into all the joints and crevices of the frames; and lastly, by the care and very constant attention bestowed on ships after leaving the dock-yard, and being placed in a state of ordinary, it may be said that the dry-rot has no longer any existence in the British navy.

By Precautions in Ordinary. A ship now placed in ordinary, whether new or newly repaired, is carefully housed over, so that no rain can reach her lower decks; several streaks of planks are removed from her sides and decks to admit a thorough draft of air, which is sent down by wind-sails, and which pervades every part of the ship, and these, with the addition of two small airing-stoves in which a few cinders are burned, render her perfectly dry and comfortable on all the decks and store-rooms. All the shingle ballast is removed out of the hold, which is thoroughly cleaned and restowed with iron ballast. The lower tier of iron tanks filled with pure fresh water serves to complete the ballast, and prevent her from hogging or arching. The former practice of mooring two ships together, by which the two sides next to each other,

deprived of the sun and a free circulation of air, were generally found to be decayed, is discontinued. The lower masts are left standing, and their tops housed over; the gun-carriages and several of the stores are left on board; and such, in short, is the state of a ship in ordinary, that she may be fitted in all respects for proceeding to sea in half the usual time. "The ships," says Mr Knowles, "are frequently pumped to clear them of bilge-water; and cleanliness in every respect is attended to; the lower decks are rubbed with dry stones, commonly called holly-stones, and with sand, the use of water upon them being strictly forbidden." But that which most of all is likely to ensure the preservation of the fleet, while in a state of ordinary, is the recent regulation, which places the ordinary under the superintendence of a post-captain at each port, with several commissioned-officers under his orders, who take care that the warrant-officers and ship-keepers attend to the proper airing, ventilating, and keeping clean and dry their respective ships.

By Immersion of Timber in Salt-Water. A practice has recently been introduced into the dock-yards, of steeping oak timber in salt-water for several months, and then stacking it till it becomes perfectly dry, which is said to have entirely put a stop to the progress of dry-rot, where it had already commenced, and to act as a preventive to that disease. We have heard some doubts entertained on this point. The Americans seem to place little confidence in the good effects which are said to have been experienced from the immersion of timber. Rodgers, the commissioner of their navy, states, in an official report addressed to the Secretary, that "experiments have been made to arrest the dry-rot in ships, by sinking them for months in salt-water, but without success. The texture of the wood was found to be essentially injured by being thus water soaked, and it became more subject to this disease than before it was sunk. The ships were also injured in their fastenings, and the atmosphere within them was kept in a constant state of humidity, whence, among other ill effects, proceeded injury to provisions and stores, and sickness to the crews." Now, we know that not one of these injurious effects happened to the Eden, which was sunk in Hamaze, remained under water three or four months, was sent to India, and has been at sea ever since; but, from being covered with fungus before the operation, she has not showed a single symptom to dry-rot since the time of her being weighed, and continues a good sound ship. The truth is, the American timber, with the single exception, perhaps, of the live-oak, is remarkably subject to dry-rot, of which, during the late war, we had fatal experience. Mr Rodgers, however, accounts for the condition in which the oak and pine was received in England from Canada, by its immersion in water: "The Canada timber," he observes, "is brought down the St Lawrence in large rafts, continues months in water, and in that saturated state is landed and exposed to frost; every attempt to season it under cover is unavailing; its pores never close again, and when used as ship-timber, dry-rot ensues, which, when once commenced, can never be arrested, but by taking out all the pieces in any degree affected." The Russians, he says, are

so fully aware of the injurious effects of soaking ship-timber in water, that it is brought from great distances down the rivers in crafts, instead of rafts. The Russian ships, however, with all this precaution, are not remarkable for durability. The ships built at Antwerp by the French were in a state of rottenness before they were launched; but whether this was owing to the bad quality of the timber of the German forests, or to its being water-soaked in rafting down the Rhine, remains doubtful. But we can have no doubt that porous timber is injured by moisture, though the solid British oak may be improved by the dissolution of its sap juices, to the fermentation of which the disease, known by the name of dry-rot, may chiefly be owing. "Water," says Lescaulier, a French writer of considerable merit on the subject, "seems to be favourable to the decomposition of the sap of timber when immersed; but it substitutes in its place another kind of moisture not less destructive, of which the timber, though afterwards exposed to the air, will not easily get rid of; besides, it weakens and destroys the grain of the wood."—"The best means," he adds, "of preserving timber, appears to be that of keeping it in well constructed and airy sheds, in a vertical position, so that the moisture which remains in the interior of the logs, by running along the fibres of the wood, may be enabled to issue from the lower extremity. Timber thus kept dry, under shelter, will preserve itself for ages." Mr Knowles, secretary to the Committee of Surveyors of his Majesty's Navy, in his Treatise on the Means of Preserving the British Navy, is led to conclude, from a variety of experiments, "that timber is better seasoned when kept for two years and a half under cover, than when placed for six months in water, and then for two years in the air, protected from the rain and sun; that it loses more in seasoning, by having been, during the six months of immersion, alternately wet and dry, than the whole time under water; and that the loss in moisture is greater in all cases in a given time, when the butt-ends are placed downwards." And he adds as a general principle, "that no timber should be brought into use in this country, until it has been felled at least three years."

Next to the system of diagonal braces, and making the bottoms of ships one compact and solid mass, the roofing, thrown over them while building, and in ordinary, may be considered as the greatest of all improvements for the preservation of the navy; the utility of which is so obvious, that it is quite extraordinary such a practice should not have been earlier adopted; more especially, as at Venice, at Carlsrona, and at Cronstadt, ships of war had long been built, repaired, and protected under covered roofs. It was strongly recommended to the English ship-builders fifty years ago, but without effect; and had it not been for the extraordinary ravages of the dry-rot in the unseasoned timber-built ships of the navy, we should still have been without roofs to our docks and slips.

If the dock-yards were of sufficient capacity, there can be no doubt that the efficient plan to accomplish their durability, would be that of keeping them on the slip, when built, under cover. It was stated

by Mr Strange, when examined by the Commissioners for Land Revenue, that in the year 1790 there were 22 ships of the line under roofs, in the port of Venice, some of which had remained in that situation 59 years. Since, however, it is utterly impracticable to keep our navy on slips, or in dry docks, the next important consideration is, how best to preserve them afloat in a state of ordinary. Various expedients have been at different times resorted to in order to prevent the premature decay of ships laid up in this state during peace. The two great requisites for their preservation are ventilation and cleanliness. To promote the former, wind-sails were in general use, though, if not attended to so as to oppose the open part to the quarter from whence the wind blows, or if the weather be calm, they are of little benefit. Pneumatic machines of various kinds, as pumps and bellows, have been applied to force out the foul air, and introduce atmospheric air into the lower parts of a ship's hold. Heated air from stoves, placed in various parts of the ship, and conducted through tubes, was thought at one time to be efficacious in the preservation of the navy; but experience soon showed that the heat thus circulated was so far objectionable, as it tended to encourage the growth of fungus, where there was any moisture lodged, and in the timber which had not been thoroughly seasoned. Perhaps no better means can be suggested than those we have described to be in practice, namely, to keep them clean, to admit as much dry air as possible, and to exclude all moisture.

Finally, if we take into consideration the numerous improvements which a war, unparalleled in its duration, has been the means of introducing into the materiel of the navy, whether it regards the economy of its application, the construction of the ships, and their mode of preservation, we may safely say, that at no former period was this country in possession of such a navy as at present, in respect of the numbers, size, and good condition of the ships which compose a fleet, superior to those of the whole world besides; and it is gratifying to find, that, with all the enormous consumption of the military and mercantile navy, it does not appear that the naval resources of Great Britain are at all impaired.

Naval Resources.

It is of essential importance that the supply of stores for the use of the fleet should not only be adequate to the demand, but that a sufficient stock should be kept on hand to answer any sudden emergency. This is the more necessary with regard to those species of stores which are derived from foreign nations.

The principal articles of consumption required for Principal building and equipping a fleet are hemp, canvas, Naval Stores. pitch, tar, iron, copper, and timber. All these articles might unquestionably be produced in sufficient quantities in the United Kingdom and her colonies, if necessity absolutely required it. Hemp, for instance, might be grown to any extent in Great Britain and Ireland, were not the land more advantageously employed in raising other articles of consumption; and if it could not be cheaper imported from Russia. In the East Indies, the Sunn hemp

Navy. (inferior it is true to Russia hemp) might be procured to any extent, and other plants, both there and at home, might be substituted for the making of cordage and canvas. For pitch and tar, recourse might be had to the pitch lake on the island of Trinidad, and the coal tar, of which an inexhaustible supply may be had at home. The lake is about four miles in circumference, and many feet in depth of solid pitch; and it is stated that, when mixed with oil or tallow, it is rendered fit for all the purposes to which pitch and tar are usually applied. It has the advantage of securing ships' bottoms against the attack of the worm, which is very active in the neighbouring Gulf of Para; and it does not corrode iron. The coal tar of home manufacture, from some prejudice or other, was refused a fair trial till very lately; and it is now deemed not inferior for many purposes to the common tar. For painting or tarring over wood work of every kind, it is said to stand exposure to the weather even better than the common tar; and it is used for injecting in large quantities between the timbers of ships, as a preservative from the dry-rot; its powerful smell having also the good effect of driving rats and other vermin out of the ships on which it is employed.

Copper and Iron. In the two important articles of copper and iron, our own resources may be considered inexhaustible. Formerly it was deemed indispensable that certain articles should be made of Swedish iron, but of late years our own has been manufactured in every respect equally good; and the extensive application of this metal in bridges, barges, dock-gates, roofs, rafters, floors, &c. has been equally progressive in most naval purposes. Iron knees and other modes of binding the beams to the side timbers of ships, are now substituted for those large and crooked pieces of timber which were once deemed absolutely necessary. Our cables, rigging, buoys, and tanks for holding water, are now of iron; and we understand that hollow masts of iron are actually constructing as an experiment, which, if successful, will do away the necessity of depending for a foreign supply of that most expensive and not very plentiful article, mast-timber.

Timber. But the most important article of demand for the use of the navy is timber, principally oak; concerning the supply of which from our own territories, different opinions have been entertained. A deficiency in other articles may readily be supplied. A failure in the importation of hemp, for instance, in any one year, might be remedied the next, by an extended cultivation of that article; but it requires a whole century to repair any defalcation of oak timber, and to render us independent of other nations. Nor has the subject been sufficiently elucidated, so as to form a just opinion, by the several Committees of the House of Commons; the evidence produced being almost always loose, and generally contradictory. The committee of 1771, which was directed to inquire into the state of oak timber throughout the kingdom, either from a disagreement of opinion, or defect of evidence, or a wish to avoid giving alarm, prayed the House to discharge that part of its order which required them to report their opinion. The Commissioners of Woods and Forests, however, in their re-

port laid before Parliament in 1792, appeared to establish the fact of an alarming scarcity of oak timber in general, but more particularly of large naval timber, both in the royal forests, and on private estates. And if such was really the fact in 1792, it will readily be conceived what the state of timber fit for naval purposes must have been at the conclusion of the Revolutionary war, when the amount of private shipping had increased from 1,300,000 tons to 2,500,000 tons, or nearly doubled; that of the East India Company, in the same period, from 79,900 tons to 115,000 tons; and that of the navy, from 400,000 to 800,000 tons, to say nothing of the vast consumption of oak timber in all kinds of mill-work and other machinery, in the barrack and ordnance departments—in mines, collieries, and agriculture—in docks, and dock-gates—in piers, locks, and sluices—in boats, barges, lighters, bridges, and a great many other purposes to which this timber is applied. From these, and many other causes, the diminution of oak timber was infinitely greater than the commissioners had calculated upon, and yet they recommended that 100,000 acres, belonging to the crown, should be set apart and planted, as necessary for the future supply of the navy. A bill to this effect, relating to the New Forest, passed the Commons, but was thrown out by the Lords.

On the departments of the Surveyor-general of the Report of Land Revenue, and the Surveyor-general of the Woods and Forests being united, the Board of Commissioners of Land-revenue made their first report, which was printed, by order of the House of Commons, in June 1812. In this report, it is stated, that, taking the tonnage of the navy in 1806 at 776,087 tons, it would require, at $1\backslash frac\{1\}\{2\}$ load to a ton, 1,164,085 loads to build such a navy; and supposing the average duration of a ship to be fourteen years, the annual quantity of timber required would be 83,149 loads, exclusive of repairs, which they calculate would be about 27,000 loads, making in the whole about 110,000 loads; of which, however, the commissioners reckon may be furnished 21,341 loads as the annual average of prizes: and of the remaining 88,659 loads, they think it not unreasonable to calculate on 28,659 from other sources than British oak. "This," they observe, "leaves 60,000 loads of such oak as the quantity which would be sufficient annually to support, at its present unexampled magnitude, the whole British navy, including ships of war of all sorts, but which may be taken as equivalent together to twenty 74 gun ships, each of which, one with another, contains about 2000 tons, or would require, at the rate of a load and a half to the ton, 3000 loads, making just 60,000 loads for twenty such ships."

Now, it has been supposed, that not more than 40 Quantity of oak trees can stand on an acre of ground, so as to grow to a full size, fit for ships of the line, or to contain each a load and a half of timber; 50 acres, therefore, would be required to produce a sufficient quantity of timber to build a 74 gun ship, and 1000 acres for 20 such ships; and, as the oak requires at least 100 years to arrive at maturity, 100,000 acres would be required to keep up a successive supply, for maintaining a navy of seven or eight hundred thousand tons. The commissioners further observe,

that as there are twenty millions of acres of waste lands in the kingdom, a two-hundredth part set aside for planting would at once furnish the whole quantity wanted for the use of the navy.

This calculation, we suspect, is overrated by about one-half. In the first place, it supposes a state of perpetual war, during which the tonnage of the whole navy is considered as more than double of what it now actually is; and, in the second place, it reckons the average duration of the navy at fourteen years only, which, from the improvements that have taken place in the construction and preservation of ships of war, with the resources of teak ships, built in India, we should not hesitate in assuming at an average of twice that number of years; and, if so, the quantity of oak required for the navy will be nothing like that which the commissioners have stated. This, we think, will appear from a statement made (apparently on good authority) in the midst of the war, when the ships of the line, built in merchants' yards, were falling to decay, after a service of five or six years.

Assuming 400,000 tons as the amount of tonnage to be kept in commission, and the average duration of a ship of war at the moderate period of 12½ years, there would be required an annual supply of tonnage, to preserve the navy in its present effective state, of 32,000 tons: and, as a load and a half of timber is employed for every ton, the annual demand will be 48,000 loads. The building of a 74 gun ship consumes about 2000 oak trees, or 3000 loads of timber, so that 48,000 loads will build 8 sail of the line and 16 frigates. Allowing one-fourth part more for casualties, the annual consumption will be about 60,000 loads, or 40,000 full-grown trees; of which 25 will stand upon an acre of ground. The quantity of timber, therefore, necessary for the construction of a 74 gun ship will occupy 57 acres of land, and the annual demand will be the produce of 1140 acres. Allowing only 90 years for the oak to arrive at perfection, there ought to be now standing 102,600 acres of oak plantations, and an annual felling and planting, in perpetual rotation, of 1140 acres to meet the consumption of the navy alone: large as this may seem, it is little more than 21 acres for each county in England and Wales; which is not equal to the belt which surrounds the park and pleasure grounds of many estates."

The above calculation proceeds on the principle that every acre is covered with trees fit for naval purposes, or that it contains 35 trees, with a load and a half of timber in each. It may be doubted, however, if, on the average of plantations, we shall find more than one-tenth of that number on an acre; and as the same writer endeavours to show, that the quantity of oak timber consumed in the navy is only about one-tenth part of the whole consumption of the country, instead of 120,600 acres being sufficient for a perpetual supply, there would be required some ten or twelve millions of acres, in plantations similar to those at present existing, to supply the demand for oak timber. Whether such a quantity exists or not, the fact is certain, that, long before the conclusion of the war, a scarcity began to be felt, especially of the larger kind of timber fit for

ships of the line; and so great was this scarcity, that if Sir Robert Seppings had not contrived the means of substituting straight timber for those of a certain form and dimensions, before considered to be indispensable, the building of new ships must entirely have ceased.

If, however, the growth of oak for ship timber was greatly diminished during the war, so as to threaten an alarming scarcity, there is little doubt, that, from the increased attention paid by individuals to their young plantations, and the great extension of those plantations, as well as from the measure of allotting off portions of the royal forests to those who had claims on them, and enclosing the remainder for the use of the public, this country will, in future times, be fully adequate to the production of oak timber equal to the demand for the naval and mercantile marine. It will require, however, large and successive plantations, on account of the slow growth of the oak. But there is another tree, of late years very generally planted on rising grounds, which bids fair to become an object of great national importance, as furnishing the best, and perhaps only substitute for oak timber. We mean the larch, which thrives well and grows rapidly in bad soils and exposed situations, the timber of which has been found to be durable, and from several experiments, not inferior in strength, toughness, and elasticity to oak. So rapid is its growth, that the Duke of Atholl received twelve guineas for a single larch fifty years old; the timber was valued at two shillings a foot. A larch of 70 years' growth produces timber fit for all naval purposes, and may be considered equal in size to an oak of double that age. The dimensions of a larch tree cut down at Blair Atholl in 1817, and then 79 years of age, were as follows: stem 82 feet; top 20 feet; total height 102 feet; girth at the ground 12 feet; at 19 feet, 8 feet 3½ inches, and at 57 feet, 4 feet 10 inches; solid contents, 252,8 cubic feet. Another larch, now growing at Dunkeld, measured, in 1819, then 80 years old, and in full vigour, as follows: height of stem 75 feet, top 14 feet; total height 90 feet. At one foot from the ground, 17 feet 8 inches in girth; at 10 feet, 10 feet 4 inches, and at 70 feet, 3 feet 2 inches; its contents 300 cubic feet, or six loads. For all kinds of mill-work, as wheels, axle-trees, &c. the utility of the large larch wood is unquestionable; and the thinnings are excellent for pailing, rails, and hurdles. The value of its application for naval purposes is now under trial; two frigates of 28 guns, one built entirely of larch, from the Duke of Atholl's plantations, the other of Riga fir (which is inferior only to oak), being intended to go through the same service, precisely in the same parts of the world, in order to ascertain their comparative durability.

In addition to our resources of naval timber at home, we have wisely availed ourselves of those which India affords for building ships of war at Bombay of teak, a wood far superior in every respect to oak, and many times more durable; not liable to corrode iron or other metallic fastenings, not susceptible of the dry-rot, nor subject to the attack of the worm.

The personnel of the navy is composed of two different bodies of men—the Seamen and the Marines; each of whom have their appropriate officers.

The commissioned officers of the former consist of flag-officers, post-captains, commanders, and lieutenants. Flag-officers are divided into three ranks, and each rank into three squadrons, distinguished by the colours, red, white, and blue; as admiral of the red, white, or blue; vice-admiral of the red, white, or blue; rear-admiral of the red, white, or blue; the admiral wearing his colour at the main, the vice-admiral at the fore, and the rear-admiral at the mizzen-mast-head. There is also an admiral of the fleet, who, if in command, would carry the union flag at the main. There are besides superannuated rear-admirals, enjoying the rank and pay of a rear-admiral, but incapable of rising to a higher rank on the list. There is also in the navy the temporary rank of commodore, who is generally an old post-captain, and is distinguished by wearing a broad pendant. He ranks next to the junior rear-admiral, and above all post-captains, except where the captain of the fleet shall be a post-captain, who, in that situation, takes rank next to the junior rear-admiral.

The commissioned officers of the navy take rank with those of the army, as follows:

And all officers of the same rank command according to the priority of their commissions, or, having commissions of the same date, according to the order in which they stand on the list of the officers of the navy, except in the case of lieutenants of flag-ships, who take precedence according as the flag-officer shall think fit to appoint them.

The warrant officers of the navy may be compared with the non-commissioned officers of the army. They take rank as follows: master, second master, gunner, boatswain, carpenter. There are other warrant officers of the navy, who, though non-combatants, constitute a part of the establishment of the larger classes of ships of war. These are, the chaplain, surgeon, surgeon's assistant, purser. To which may be added, as part of the staff of a fleet or squadron, secretary to the admiral or commander-in-chief, and physician of the fleet.

The petty officers are very numerous, the principal of whom are master's mates and midshipmen. Their names or ratings will be seen in the table of the establishment of the ratings and pay in the several classes of ships of war.

By the King's Order in Council, the following regulations are established for the promotion of commis-

sioned officers of the navy. Midshipmen are required to serve six years on board some of his Majesty's ships, two of which years they must have been rated as midshipmen, to render them eligible to the rank and situation of lieutenant; or, if educated at the Royal Naval College, four years service at sea qualify for a commission as lieutenant.

No lieutenant can be promoted to the rank of commander, until he has been on the list of lieutenants for two years; and no commander to the rank of post-captain until he has been on the list for one year. Post-captains become admirals in succession, according to their seniority on the list; but if a post-captain should not have served in the course of the preceding war, when his turn arrives he is passed over, and placed on the list of superannuated and retired captains; as are those captains likewise who have accepted of commissionerships or other civil employments, provided they retain those employments, when they come within the limits of a promotion to the rank of rear-admiral.

There is also a list of superannuated rear-admirals composed of those who, not having actually served at sea in the preceding war, have been employed in regulating new raised men, or in the sea fences, or who have made offers of service, although not accepted. They enjoy the rank and half pay of a rear-admiral, but can never be employed as such, or be promoted to a higher rank.

No person can be appointed to serve as master of one of his Majesty's ships, who shall not have served as second master; and no person can be appointed as second master, until he has passed such examination as may from time to time be directed.

No person can be appointed gunner or boatswain, unless he shall have served one year as a petty officer on board one or more of his Majesty's ships, and produce certificates of his good conduct, and undergo the necessary examination.

No person can be appointed carpenter, unless he shall have served an apprenticeship to a shipwright, and been six months a carpenter's mate on board one or more of his Majesty's ships.

No person can be appointed purser, unless he shall have been rated and discharged the duties of a captain's clerk for two complete years, one year as captain's clerk, and been employed in the office of the secretary to a flag-officer for one other year, produce good certificates, and find such security for the honest and faithful discharge of his duty as shall be required.

No person can be appointed chaplain to one of his Majesty's ships, until he has received Priest's orders; but may be appointed to act while in Deacon's orders.

No person can be appointed surgeon to one of his Majesty's ships, until, by long and meritorious services, he has discharged the duties of assistant surgeon; and all persons applying for the situation of assistant surgeon must undergo an examination touching their qualifications before the medical members of the victualling board.

The Royal Marines consist of four great divisions. Royal Ma-
1st, Stationed at Chatham. 2d, At Portsmouth. 3d, At Plymouth. 4th, At Woolwich. They are com-

posed of 72 companies, besides 8 companies of Royal Marine Artillery, whose head-quarters are at Fort Monckton, Gosport. The 1st division has 21 companies; the 2d, 18 companies; the 3d, 20 companies; and the 4th, 13 companies. The officers of Royal Marines take rank with officers of the line in the army.

A colonel commandant, who is a general officer in the corps, is resident in London; and to each of the divisions is a colonel commandant, two lieutenant-colonels, and two majors, with a proper number of captains and subaltern officers. While on shore the marines are subject to the same regulations as the army, but, when embarked, are liable to the naval articles of war.

The staff of the marine corps, consists of a general, a lieutenant-general, a major-general, who are all flag-officers of his Majesty's fleet; and four colonels, who are post-captains, near the head of the list, and are selected from those who may have distinguished themselves by their services.

The paymaster of marines is resident in London, but each division has its paymaster, a captain in the corps; a barrackmaster, also a captain; two adjutants, and a quartermaster, who are first lieutenants; and to each division is a surgeon, and an assistant-surgeon.

There is also a retired list of officers who, in consideration of wounds, infirmities, and long and meritorious services, are permitted to receive their full pay.

The commissions of officers, of every rank, in the marine corps, are signed by the King, but all commissions of officers of the navy are signed by two or more of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty. But the marines, whether ashore or afloat, are, as well as the officers of the navy, under the immediate direction and control of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty. All the appointments of commissioned and warrant officers to ships are made exclusively by the Lords of the Admiralty, or made subject to their confirmation, unless in cases of the death or dismissal of officers by sentence of Court-Martial on foreign stations, when the admiral commanding has the power to fill up the vacancies. And the duties of each rank are pointed out in a code of instructions emanating from that Board, and sanctioned by his Majesty's Order in Council.

The civil powers and duties of the Lord High Admiral, or Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, are treated of under the Article ADMIRAL in this Supplement. Their military powers are more extensive and important. By their orders, all ships are built, repaired, fitted for sea, or laid up in ordinary, broken up or sold; put in commission or out of commission, armed, stored, and provisioned; employed on the home or foreign stations. All appointments or removals of commission and warrant officers, with the exception of masters and surgeons, are made by them, and all instructions issued for the guidance of their commanders; all promotion in the several ranks emanate from them; all honours bestowed for brilliant services, and all pensions, gratuities, and superannuations for wounds, infirmities, and long services, are granted on their recommendation.

All returns from the fleet are sent to the Board of Admiralty, and every thing that relates to the discipline and good order of every ship. All orders for the payment of naval monies are issued by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, and the annual estimate of the expences of the navy prepared by them, and laid before Parliament for its sanction. All new inventions and experiments are tried by their orders before introduced into the service; all draughts of ships must be approved by them; all repairs, alterations, and improvements in the dock-yards, all new buildings of every description must be submitted for their decision before they are undertaken. But the Commissioners of the Navy are held responsible for keeping up a proper supply of naval stores of every kind, and the Victualling Board of provisions.

All flag-officers, commanders-in-chief, are considered as responsible for the conduct of the fleet or in-Chief. squadron under their command; to keep them in perfect condition for service; to exercise them frequently in forming orders of sailing and lines of battle, and in performing all such evolutions as may occur in the presence of an enemy; to direct the commanders of squadrons and divisions; to inspect into the state of each ship under their command, to see that the established rules for good order, discipline, and cleanliness, be observed, and occasionally to inquire into these and other matters themselves. They are to correspond with the Secretary of the Admiralty, and report to him all their proceedings for the information of the Board.

If a commander-in-chief should be killed in battle, his flag is to be continued flying; intelligence to be conveyed by signal, or otherwise, to the next in command, who is immediately to repair on board, leaving his own flag (if a flag-officer) flying, and direct the operations of the fleet until the battle be ended, or the enemy out of sight.

Every flag-officer serving in a fleet, but not commanding it, is to superintend all the ships of the squadron or division placed under his orders; to see that their crews are properly disciplined; that all orders are punctually attended to; that the stores, provisions, and water, are kept as complete as circumstances will admit; that the seamen and marines are frequently exercised; and that every precaution is taken for preserving the health of their crews; for all which he is responsible to the commander-in-chief. When at sea, he is to take care that every ship in his division preserve her station, in whatever line or order of sailing the fleet may be formed; and in battle, he is to observe attentively the conduct of every ship near him, whether of the squadron or division under his immediate command or not; and at the end of the battle, he is to report it to the commander-in-chief, in order that commendation or censure may be passed as the case may appear to merit; and he is empowered to send an officer to supersede any captain who may misbehave in battle, or whose ship is evidently avoiding the engagement. If any flag-officer be killed in battle, his flag is to be kept flying, and signals to be repeated, in the same manner as if he were still alive, until the battle shall be ended; but the death of a flag-

Navy. officer, or his being rendered incapable of attending to his duty, is to be conveyed as expeditiously as possible to the commander-in-chief.

Captain of the Fleet. The captain of the fleet is a temporary rank, where a commander-in-chief has ten or more ships of the line under his command; it may be compared with that of adjutant-general in the army. He may either be a flag-officer, or one of the senior captains; in the former case, he takes his rank with the flag-officers of the fleet; in the latter, he ranks next to the junior rear-admiral, and is entitled to the pay and compensation of a rear-admiral. All orders of the commander-in-chief are issued through him, and all returns of the fleet through him to the commander-in-chief. He is appointed, and can be removed from his situation only by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

Commodore. A commodore is a temporary rank, and of two kinds; the one having a captain under him in the same ship, the other without a captain. The former has the rank, pay, and allowances of a rear-admiral, the latter such additional pay as the Lords of the Admiralty may direct. They both carry distinguishing pendants.

Captain. When a captain is appointed to command a ship of war, he commissions the ship by hoisting his pendant; and if fresh out of the dock, and from the hands of the dock-yard officers, he proceeds immediately to prepare her for sea, by demanding her stores, provisions, guns, and ammunition, from the respective departments, according to her establishment. He enters such men as may volunteer, and be fit for the service (in time of peace), or which may be sent to him from some rendezvous for raising men, in time of war; and he gives them the several ratings of petty officers, able-seamen, ordinary, or landsmen, as their apparent qualifications may entitle them to. If he should be appointed to succeed the captain of a ship already in commission, he passes a receipt to the said captain for the ship's books, papers, and stores, and becomes responsible and accountable for the whole of the remaining stores and provisions; and to enable him to keep the ship's accounts, he is allowed a clerk of his own appointing.

The duty of the captain, with regard to the several ship's books and accounts, pay-books, entry, musters, discharges, &c. is regulated by various acts of Parliament; but the state of the internal discipline, the order, regularity, cleanliness, and the health of the crews, will depend mainly on himself and his officers. In all these respects, the general printed instructions for his guidance are particularly precise and minute. And for the information of the ship's company, he is directed to cause the articles of war, and abstracts of all acts of Parliament for the encouragement of seamen, and all such orders and regulations for discipline as may be established, to be hung up in some public part of the ship, to which the men may at all times have access; he is also to direct that they be read to the ship's company, all the officers being present, once at least in every month. He is not authorized to inflict any corporal punishment on any commissioned or warrant officer, but he may place them under arrest,

Navy. and suspend any officer who shall misbehave, until an opportunity shall offer of trying such officer by a court-martial. He is enjoined to be very careful not to suffer the inferior officers, or men, to be treated with cruelty or oppression by their superiors. He alone is to order punishment to be inflicted, which he is never to do without sufficient cause, nor ever with greater severity than the offence may really deserve; and all the officers and the whole ship's company are to be present at every punishment; which must be inserted in the log-book, and an abstract at the end of every quarter made out and sent to the Admiralty,—a regulation which is said to have been attended with infinite benefit to the strict and just discipline of the naval service.

The lieutenants take the watch by turns, and are at such times entrusted, in the absence of the captain, with the command of the ship; but he is to inform the captain of all occurrences that take place during his watch, as strange sails that may be in sight, signals from other ships in company, change of wind, &c. He is to see that the ship be properly steered, the log hove, and the course and distance entered on the log-board; and, in short, he is to see that the whole of the duties of the ship are carried on with the same punctuality as if the captain himself were present; in whose absence, the senior lieutenant is responsible for every thing done on board.

The master receives his orders from the captain, or any of the lieutenants. His more immediate duties are those of stowing the ship's hold, and of attending to her sailing qualities; of receiving and placing the provisions in the ship, so as most conveniently to come at those which may be wanted. He is to take care that the cables are properly coiled in the tiers. The keys of the spirit-room are in his custody, and he is directed to entrust them only to the master's mates. He has the charge of the store-rooms of the warrant officers, which he is ordered frequently to visit; in short, the whole of the ship's provisions, water, fuel, and stores of every description, are under the superintendence of the master; and he is also entrusted, under the command of the captain, with the charge of navigating the ship, bringing her to anchor, ascertaining the latitude and longitude of her place at sea, surveying harbours, and making such nautical remarks and observations as may be useful and interesting to navigation in general.

The warrant officers are charged with the duty of receiving on board from the dock-yards, and examining, the various stores of their respective departments, and of keeping an account of the expenditure of them.

The gunner has the charge of the ship's artillery, and of the powder magazine; he is to see that the locks and carriages are kept in good order, and that the powder is preserved from damp; he is frequently to examine the musquetry and small arms, and to see that they are kept clean, and fit for service; and, in preparing for battle, it is his duty to take care that all the quarters are supplied with every thing necessary for the service of the guns, and, during the action, that there be no want of ammunition served out. He is frequently to exercise the men at the guns

Navy. the preference to that service, though, in all other respects, their treatment is far superior on board a King's ship; having better provisions, and being subject to much less fatigue and exposure to the weather. Indeed, the excellent regulations now rigidly adhered to on board his Majesty's ships, the attention that is paid to the health and comfort of the crew, have overcome much of that reluctance which formerly was felt to the service of a ship of war.

Health of the Crew. The state of health on board a King's ship, generally speaking, is not exceeded in the most favoured spot on shore; and that horrible disease, the seascurvy, may now be considered as unknown in the British navy, since the universal introduction of lemon juice, or the citric acid, without an ample supply of which no ship is permitted to sail on a foreign voyage. Sir Gilbert Blane, in a sensible little tract on the Health of the Navy, says, that he has never seen the scurvy resist the citric acid, and that, in the perusal of several hundreds of surgeons' journals, he has met only with two cases which seemed to resist it. Yet, though it appears to have been known as a remedy for the scurvy, far superior to all others, two hundred years ago, it seems to have lain dormant and utterly neglected till Dr Lind, more than a hundred years afterwards, revived and stated clearly the singular powers of this remedy. In 1600 Commodore Lancaster sailed from England, with three other ships, on the 2d April, and arrived in Saldanha bay on the 1st August. The commodore's crew having each had three table spoonfuls of lemon juice every morning, arrived there in perfect health; whereas the other ships were so sickly, that they were unmanageable for want of hands. We have all felt the commiseration and horror which the perusal of the narrative of Anson's Voyage produces. His ship, the Centurion, left England with 400 men, of which 200 were surviving on his arrival at Juan Fernandez, and of these eight only were capable of duty, from scurvy. Yet even this horrible catastrophe seems to have failed in rousing the nation to have recourse to a remedy so certain and efficacious. Cook was well supplied with vinegar and other acids, and found the good effects of them; but the first general supply of lemon juice to the navy was established only in the year 1795, in consequence of a trial that had been made of it the preceding year in the Suffolk of 74 guns. This ship left England, and arrived at Madras in September, without touching at any land. With every man's grog were daily mixed two-thirds of a liquid ounce of lemon juice, and two ounces of sugar. She lost not a man; and though the disease made its appearance in a few, an increased dose of lemon juice immediately removed it. Thus the Suffolk, after a voyage of 162 days, arrived without losing a man, or having a man sick of the scurvy, whereas the Centurion, in 143 days from the last place of her refreshment, lost half of her crew, and the other half so feeble and emaciated, as to be utterly helpless.

Nothing could more strongly point out the efficacy of lemon juice than the following fact. When Lord St Vincent commanded the fleet which blockaded Brest from the 27th May to the 26th Septem-

ber 1800, he maintained so close a blockade, that not a single day passed without reconnoitring the entrance of the harbour; yet, although the seamen of his fleet, consisting of at least 16,000 men, had no other than the ordinary ship's provisions, sixteen only, in the course of four months, were sent to the hospital. In 1780 the Channel fleet, as appears from Dr Lind, were so overrun with scurvy and fever, as to be unable to keep the sea, after a cruise of ten weeks only.

From the official returns collected by Sir Gilbert Blane, M. Dupin, a French author, well versed in naval subjects, has drawn out the following table, which exhibits at one view the progressive diminution of sickness, death, and desertion, in the British navy, calculated on 100,000 men.

From hence it would appear, that the diminution of sick and of deaths has been in the proportion of 4 to 1 nearly, between the years 1779 and 1813. The diminution of desertions from the hospital in the same period is not the less remarkable; and it affords, at the same time, the strongest proof of the progressive amelioration of the condition of seamen on board British ships of war. Indeed, whether on board ship, or in any of these noble institutions, the Naval Hospitals, which are established at all the principal ports at home, and in the colonies abroad, the attention that is paid to the sick sailor is above all praise. The seamen are sensible of this, and nothing keeps them back from volunteering their services, and from giving a preference to a King's ship over a merchantman, but the temptation of high wages offered by the latter in time of war, and that love of liberty and free scope for roving which are characteristic of seamen.

The speedy manning of the fleet, on the first breaking out of the war, is one of the most important objects that devolves on the Naval Administration, as by it alone depends the safety of our commerce and our colonies. This has been felt at all times; and accordingly, a variety of schemes have been brought forward for this purpose, but all of them failed of success, except the compulsory mode of raising men under the authority of press-warrants, issued by the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, by virtue of the King's Order in Council, renewed from year to year. There likewise issues, on the breaking out of a war, a proclamation from the King, recalling all British seamen out of the service of foreign princes or states; and the instructions to the commanders of all ships of war direct them to search foreign vessels, and to take British seamen out of them.

The impressment of seafaring men, however anomalous under a free constitution like that of Great Britain, is defensible on state necessity, until it can be

shown that the fleet, on an emergency, is capable of being manned without resorting to that measure. In consequence of some doubts being raised on the legality of the subject in the year 1676, when the affairs of the Admiralty were managed immediately under the direction of the King and the Great Officers of State, a discussion was held on this point, when it was decided by the Judges and Crown Lawyers, that the King had an indefeasible right to the services of his subjects when the state required them, and that the power of impressing seamen was indispensably inherent in the Crown, without which the trade and safety of the nation could not be secured. The first instance of impressing men in Ireland seems to have been in the year 1678, when the Lord Lieutenant received directions from the Privy Council to raise 1000 seamen for the fleet. In 1690, the Lords Justices of Ireland were directed to assist the officers of the navy in impressing men in that kingdom. In 1697, a register was taken of all the seafaring men in Ireland, which amounted to 4424 men, of whom it is noted 2654 were Catholics. On several occasions, during Queen Anne's reign, the Lords Justices of Ireland received directions to raise men to serve in the fleet.

In Scotland, the mode of raising men by the impress was unknown before the Union; but in various instances the Council of Scotland was directed to raise volunteers for the fleet, each man to have forty shillings as bounty.

In 1706, an experiment was tried for the speedy manning of the fleet, by virtue of an act of Parliament, which required the civil magistrates of all the counties to make diligent search for all seafaring men, and twenty shillings was allowed to the constables for each man taken up; the seamen to have pay from the day of delivery to the naval officers stationed to receive them; and if they deserted after that, were considered as guilty of felony. By the same act, insolvent debtors, fit for the service, and willing to enter it, were released, provided the debt did not exceed £30; and no seaman in the fleet was to be arrested for any debt not exceeding £20. The whole proceeding under this act incurred a very heavy expence, and totally failed.

In the same year, the Queen referred to the Prince of Denmark, then Lord High Admiral, an address from the House of Lords relating to the three following points:—1st, The most effectual means for manning the fleet. 2d, The encouragement, and increase of the number of seamen. 3d, The restoring and preserving the discipline of the navy. His Royal Highness submitted these points to such of the flag-officers and other commanders as could be assembled, who made a report, of which the substance was to the following effect:—1st, To cause a general register to be kept of all seafaring men in England and Ireland, for which they presented the draft of a bill. 2d, That all marines, qualified to act as seamen, should be discharged from the army, the officers to have levy money and the men's clothing returned. 3d, That not fewer than 20,000 seamen should be kept in employ in time of peace; but, they observe, that as to the restoring and preserving the discipline of the navy, no particular instance being laid before

them wherein it was defective, they could give no opinion on that head.

This registry of seafaring men has been tried more than once, but as the men themselves had no interest whatever in the measure, it always failed in producing the desired effect. The only chance of its succeeding in any prospective emergency is the measure recently adopted by the Lords of the Admiralty, under the sanction of the King in Council,—a measure which was called for on every principle of justice and humanity,—of granting provisions, on the paying off the fleet, to every man who had served fourteen years and upwards. The number thus pensioned amounted at one time to 33,000, and are still not far short of 30,000: and as there are voted for the peace establishment 16,000 men, mostly prime seamen, there is every reason for supposing that less difficulty will be found in manning the fleet, on any future emergency, than heretofore; and that on this account the evils of the impress will be greatly mitigated; for though numbers on the pension list will naturally be unfit for service at sea, most of them will be able to assist in fitting out the fleet.

In fact, there are now so many exemptions from the impress, that its severity is greatly abated. The following description of persons are protected by various acts of Parliament:

Masters of merchant ships or vessels.

First mates of such as are 50 tons or upwards.

Boatswains and carpenters of such as are of 100 tons or upwards.

Men belonging to vessels and craft of all kinds in the employ of Navy, Victualling, Ordnance, Customs, Excise, and Post Offices.

Watermen belonging to the Insurance Offices within the cities of London and Westminster.

All men of the age of 55 years and upwards.

All youths, not having attained the age of 18.

All foreigners.

Apprentices, not having used the sea before the date of their indentures, and not more than three years from the said date.

Landsmen not having served at sea full two years.

Masters, apprentices, one seaman, and one landsman, of all fishing vessels on the sea coast or on navigable rivers.

Harpooners, line-managers, and boat-steerers of the Greenland fishery and the Southern Whale fishery, and all seamen and common mariners who have entered for the said fisheries.

And no person whatsoever can be impressed except by an officer who has been entrusted with a press-warrant.

The discipline of the navy, or the government of Discipline. his Majesty's ships, vessels, and forces by sea, is regulated by the act of 22d Geo. II., usually known by the name of the Articles of War. By this act, the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty are empowered to order courts-martial for all offences mentioned therein, and committed by any person in and belonging to the fleet and in full pay; and also to delegate the same power to admirals commanding in chief on foreign stations, which power also may devolve on his successor in case of death or recall, provided that no commander-in-chief of any fleet or

Navy. squadron, or detachment thereof, consisting of more than five ships, shall preside at any court-martial in foreign parts, the officer next in command being ordered to preside thereat.

Courts-Martial. By this act, no court-martial can consist of more than thirteen or of less than five persons, to be composed of such flag-officers, captains, or commanders then and there present, as are next in seniority to the officer who presides at the court-martial. And when there are but three officers of the rank of post-captains, the president is to call in as many commanders under that rank as will make up five in the whole.

Articles of War. This code of laws for the government of the fleet consists of thirty-six articles, of which nine award the punishment of death, and eleven death or such other punishment as the court-martial shall deem the offence to deserve. Those which incur the former are, the holding illegal correspondence with an enemy—cowardice or neglect of duty in time of action—not pursuing the enemy—desertion to the enemy—making mutinous assemblies—striking a superior officer—burning magazines, vessels, &c. not belonging to an enemy—murder—sodomy. The penalty of death for cowardice, or other neglect of duty in time of action (Art. 12), and of not pursuing the enemy (Art. 13), was by the 19th Geo. III. so far mitigated, as to authorize the court-martial "to pronounce sentence of death, or to inflict such other punishment as the nature and degree of the offence shall be found to deserve." Under these articles thus mitigated, Admiral Byng would probably not have been condemned to death. The other eleven articles which leave the punishment to the discretion of the court, are, not preparing for fight, and encouraging the men in time of action—suppression of any letter or message sent from an enemy—spies delivering letters, &c. from an enemy—relieving an enemy—disobedience of orders in time of action—discouraging the men on various pretences—not taking care of and defending ships under convoy—quarrelling with and disobeying a superior officer in the execution of his office—wilfully neglecting the steering of ships—sleeping on watch, and forsaking his station—robbery. The remaining sixteen articles incur the penalty of dismissal from the service, or from the ship, degradation of rank, or such other punishment as the court may judge the nature and degree of the offence to deserve.

Petty Punishment. Much, however, of the internal discipline of a ship of war depends upon the captain, who being empowered to punish the men for minor offences, according to the usage of the service, courts-martial on seamen are rarely found necessary to be resorted to in well regulated ships. The principal circumstance that usually militates against the perfect good order of the crew, is the great allowance of grog served out daily to the men, as established by the King's Order in Council, and which frequently leads to drunkenness, and this to insubordination. Perhaps half the punishments in the navy are for this offence, which requires the utmost vigilance and precautions on the part of the officers to prevent.

Effects of Discipline. In other respects the discipline of a well organized ship of war is perfect; and to this discipline M. Dupin, a French writer of great sagacity, mainly ascribes the brilliant successes of the British navy,

and to the want of it, the ruin of that of France. "We have already cited," says he, "as a model, the management of the material of the English ships. In the preservation of this material—in the stowing it away—in the arrangement of whatever may be necessary either for manoeuvres or for action, the most perfect regularity is observed. At the same time, what becoming austerity is maintained by the commanding officer; what obedience among the subalterns; and, in a space so limited, considering the number of men on board, and the multiplicity of movements they have to make in obeying so many different orders, what imposing silence! It is the calmness of strength—the presiding influence of wisdom. In the midst of the most complicated operations, and even in the heat and transport of battle, one hears only the words of command, pronounced and repeated from rank to rank, with a measured tone and perfect sang froid. No unseasonable advices—no murmurs—no tumult. The commanders meditate in silence; the word is given, and the men act without either speaking or thinking."

This is remarkably so in the day of battle. Every officer and man knows precisely his place, and the duty he has to perform on that day. By the general printed instructions, the captains of his Majesty's ships are required to accustom the men to assemble at their proper quarters, to exercise them at the great guns, to teach them to point, fire, &c. under all circumstances of sea and weather. Indeed, it is well known, that the preservation of the high character of the British navy essentially depends on the proper training of the seamen to the expert management of the guns, so as to be duly prepared in the day of battle; the issue of which so mainly depends on the cool, steady, and regular manner in which the ship's ordnance is loaded, pointed, and fired. Practice in these respects is much more necessary on board ships than on shore, as it can never happen that the ship is entirely steady, and has most frequently a rolling or pitching motion, for which allowances must be made, and which can only be made with effect by long practice.

Naval Tactics. If the management of the great guns of a ship of war is more difficult than the artillery of a fort, so likewise are naval tactics more difficult than those of an army; inasmuch as there is more difficulty and less dependence in placing and directing the movements of an inanimate than an animate machine. The general principles are the same; the object of both being that of bringing the greatest possible force to bear on that point which is likely to produce the greatest possible injury to the enemy. With this view, as well as to keep a fleet together in compact order, so that straggling ships may not be cut off by the enemy, it has been found necessary to preserve a certain order of sailing, whether out of sight of an enemy or in his presence; and such an order as, according to the state of the wind and weather, and the point of bearing of the enemy's fleet, may most conveniently and expeditiously be changed into such a line of battle as the commander-in-chief may deem it most expedient to adopt in the attack to be made on his opponent.

In order to do this, it is obvious, that every indi-

vidual captain must be able to know, under all circumstances, what the ship he commands will be able to do, in order to preserve her station in the fleet; for, it is with ships as with horses, no two perhaps performing the same evolution with the same tightness of rein, or the same quantity of sail. This shows the absolute necessity of a commander-in-chief frequently exercising his fleet in naval tactics, and to observe how such and such a ship will behave under a certain quantity of canvass, and to assign her station in the line where she may appear calculated to act with the greatest efficiency.

To facilitate these movements, the admirals commanding squadrons are considered as responsible for the movement of the ships in their respective divisions. They are to see that each captain strictly obeys the general order, and if any one is perceived to neglect his duty, whether belonging to his proper division or not, if in action, he has the power to send immediately another officer to suspend him. And in order that no confusion may arise, if, in time of battle, the admiral commanding in chief, or any of the admirals commanding squadrons, should be killed, his or their flags remain flying till the battle is decided. If the commander-in-chief be killed or severely wounded, a private signal is made to the second in command, or if a junior admiral be killed or wounded, the commander-in-chief is also acquainted by signal.

This silent method of communicating what is going on is the perfection of naval tactics; indeed, it is difficult to conceive how our ancestors contrived to manage a fleet without a Code of Signals. For great and important occasions, the exhibition of a flag or flags, in some particular part of the ship, might be generally understood to imply, that the fleet should anchor, or tack, or form the order of sailing in two lines, or the line of battle, or some other great movement. The hoisting of a cask at the yard-arm might be understood to imply a want of water; or a hatchet, of wood; or an empty bag, of bread; and the tablecloth was a very significant invitation to dinner; but they had no means of interchanging freely their wants or intentions, or of conveying detailed intelligence. Even so late as the American war, there was no established code of signals in the navy. An anecdote is told of Admiral Geary, who, in the year 1780, commanded the Channel fleet, which clearly proves how little was then known or practised in the way of signals. His captain, Kempenfelt, had laboured long to improve the defective system; and having one day seen the enemy's fleet, he endeavoured to communicate the intelligence by the new code; but in the hurry of making sail and giving chase, the signals somehow or other were not understood by the rest of the fleet. Geary at last became impatient, and running up to Kempenfelt, seized him by the hand, and exclaimed with great emphasis, "Now, my dear Kempy, do, for God's sake, throw your signals over-

board, and make the old one which we all understand,—'to bring the enemy to close action.'"

"If an admiral," says Dr Beatson in his able Memoirs, "cannot command all the necessary movements of his ships by signal in the day of battle, he is not upon a footing with an enemy who possesses that advantage, and even with better ships and better men, and more experienced commanders, he may be foiled in his expectations of victory, if not defeated, from his want of the means to direct, and to perform the necessary evolutions of his fleet." "In no fight," he adds, "was the insufficiency of the present system of naval signals more conspicuous than in this (Keppel's unfortunate action); and it is to be hoped that if ever a new code be adopted for the use of the royal navy, it may be so clear and comprehensive, that such fatal errors as those which have been pointed out will in future be prevented." This we may now say has been accomplished.

The idea of numbering the flags, and of assigning a certain number of corresponding sentences to certain combinations of these numbers, was reduced to something approaching a regular system in the fleet under the command of Lord Howe; and in the year 1798 a new signal book was issued from the Admiralty, containing about 400 sentences, expressive of certain operations of a fleet, communicated by means of flags to which the numerical characters were applied, and these, as far as they went, answered very well, but did not supersede the necessity of conveying orders by boats on many occasions. The following year Sir Home Popham suggested the idea of making the flags to represent the letters of the alphabet in combination with numbers, which not only added immensely to the means of communication, but also of making use of words by signal. From this time improvements in the modes of communicating by signals and telegraphs were rapidly introduced; particularly in the shape and the colours of the flags, according to a plan of Sir Home Popham, which has rendered signals by flags as nearly perfect as they probably ever will be.

There is, however, an imperfection in the flags themselves; as in calm weather when they do not fly out, neither their shape nor colour is visible without the use of stretchers, which are not always easily managed, and never without loss of time. Again, if the wind be parallel to the line of vision, the flag shows only its edge, and neither shape nor colour can be discerned. To remedy these inconveniences, Sir Home Popham proposed a portable wooden semaphore in imitation of the French telegraph, to be mounted on the quarter-deck or poop of a ship.

It consists of two posts, each having a moveable arm, which may be placed in four positions that can never be mistaken, being at right angles to each other, as in the following figures, where the number annexed to each position is that which it conveys to the person receiving the message.

The left hand of each column represents the numbers which are exhibited by the arms either singly or in combination.

The right hand of each column represents the characters of the telegraphic signals, which are exhibited by the positions of the arms placed opposite to them.

The cornettes, triangles, and pendants, are those used in the common signals, which in the book represent the letters opposite to each.

These signs always represent the subjects placed opposite to them—for instance, when the alphabetical sign is made, the subsequent positions of the arms will represent the letters of the alphabet until the stop is made. The same with numbers, ships' names, &c. as particularly explained in the instructions of the Telegraphic Signal Book. The Stop and the other Auxiliary Signs must be placed exactly horizontal.

The mode of applying a Secret Key for RECEIVING and COMMUNICATING Messages is extremely simple, as for instance,

It is obvious, that, by a combination of letters and numerals, messages to any extent may be made either by a collection of certain sentences, or a vocabulary of words, or by spelling; the last mode being the least objectionable, though not the most expeditious, unless in very short sentences. For instance, if, on meeting a ship at sea, her name was asked by telegraph, and the answer was No. 8, which, on reference to the list of the navy, was the Hero, but by some mistake, owing to haze or other accident (which will sometimes happen to the best observers), the parallel position No. 4 was read off, opposite to which was the Bellerophon, there would be no possible means of correcting the mistake; but if the first name was spelled by the alphabetic signs, the very first signal, 8, being H, would be sufficient, but the remaining 5—3.5—2.6 would not require many seconds to remove any doubt, if no list of the navy happened to be on board. When signal flags are used, spelling is the more advisable, as the shape and colours of a flag are more liable to be mistaken.

This simple machine might be made the means of intelligible communication in all the languages of Europe, and its utility thus become universal. For instance, if a French or Spaniard should see an English ship, their wants and wishes may easily be interchanged, although the master of the one should be totally ignorant of the language of the other; that is to say, provided the established telegraph book was translated into their respective languages: for example,

The encouragement afforded by Government to improve every branch of science connected with the navy, and navigation in general, has been carried much farther by England than any other European nation; and has produced the happiest results for commercial enterprise—by determining with accuracy the precise position of ships—by shortening long voyages—and by the discovery of new lands and unexplored regions. From the commencement of the eighteenth century, when a national reward was first offered to the man of science, or the artist who should discover a method sufficiently exact to determine the longitude of a ship's place at sea, to the present time, the improvements in the construction and division of all kinds of instruments for measuring angles, in the calculations of lunar and other tables, and above all, in the manufacture and adjustments of chronometers, have continued in gradual progression; and may now be considered to have arrived at such a degree of perfection, more especially the chronometers, that the discovery of the longitude can scarcely be said to remain a desideratum. We may form an idea what the progress in the improvement of chronometers has been, when a public reward was offered by Parliament in the year 1814 to the first who should determine the longitude at sea within a degree, and in 1820, three chronometers, after remaining in the Arctic regions for eighteen months, returned to England without altering their rates more than a few seconds of time.

The officers of the Royal Navy are much more generally versed in the sciences of late years than heretofore. In fact, it is now necessary for a young man to be well acquainted with a certain portion of mathematical and astronomical knowledge, to enable him to pass an examination, without which he cannot be qualified for the commission of a lieutenant. The Royal Naval College of Portsmouth, for the education of a certain number of youths, has been the means of introducing a better system of naval education into his Majesty's ships of war. The examinations also of the several warrant officers and their qualifications for their respective stations, are more strictly attended to than heretofore; and the consequence is, that a much better system of discipline without rigour, is established throughout the fleet, and more comfort in every respect to every class of officers and men employed.

The encouragement given to the navy from its first regular establishment, has marked it as a favourite service in the minds of the public. The sea-pay, the half-pay, and other emoluments, have gene-

Navy. rally been superior to those enjoyed by the army, but subject to great fluctuations in every reign, and to frequent changes in the same reign. Thus King William, in 1693, gave to an admiral, L. 4 a day—a vice-admiral, L. 3—and a rear-admiral, L. 2—which, with the compensation for servants, amounted to more than their present pay; yet their allowances were still further increased in 1700, till a reduction took place, in consequence of an address from the Commons. From this time to the year 1806, very

little alteration took place, when a small addition was made to the pay of each class.

The following table will exhibit, at one view, the complete war-establishment of commission, warrant, petty, and non-commissioned officers, seamen, and marines, on board every class of his Majesty's ships, with the rate of pay granted to each, and the classes into which they are divided for the distribution of prize-money or seizures; as established by his Majesty's Order in Council of the 25th November 1816:

In Flag Ships all the Lieutenants (including one extra as Flag Lieutenant) are allowed 6d. per diem in addition to their pay.

NOTE.—To this Table it may be added that Captains, who, on the death or absence of a Commander-in-Chief, are authorized to hold a commanding position, are entitled to receive the pay of 1st rate, &c. in addition to their pay as Captains, while the command is lying within the limits of the station.

Salaries of 2d and 3d rates in active service.
1st rate 16s. a-day
2d rate 11s. 6d.
3d rate 11s. 6d.
4th rate 10s. 6d.
5th rate 10s. 6d.
6th rate 10s. 6d.
7th rate 10s. 6d.
8th rate 10s. 6d.
9th rate 10s. 6d.
10th rate 10s. 6d.
11th rate 10s. 6d.
12th rate 10s. 6d.
13th rate 10s. 6d.
14th rate 10s. 6d.
15th rate 10s. 6d.
16th rate 10s. 6d.
17th rate 10s. 6d.
18th rate 10s. 6d.
19th rate 10s. 6d.
20th rate 10s. 6d.

Commanders of the smaller classes of ships had enjoyed, but the first regular establishment of half-pay for all the officers, was not until the year 1809, when it was enacted by King William in the year 1809, provided that they had served a year in their respective posts, or had been in a general engagement with the enemy, or had been in a general engagement with the enemy. A regular establishment half-pay was further sanctioned by Orders in Council of 1809, and in 1810, the conditions of which were that no officer should enjoy the benefit thereof who shall absent himself without permission of the Lord High Admiral, or of the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet, or who shall be dismissed for any misconduct or for any other cause, or who shall not produce himself in court-martial, or who shall not produce himself in court-martial.

Note.—To this Table it may be added that Captains, who, on the death or absence of a Commander-in-Chief, are authorized to hoist a distinguishing pendant, are entitled to receive the pay of L. 1 per diem in addition to their pay as Captains, while the pendant is flying within the limits of the station.

Surgeons of Ships in Active Service.

Surgeons in Receiving-Ships, Prison-Ships, &c.

Establishment of Half-Pay.

Though the navy, as we have seen, was put upon a regular establishment under the reign of Henry VIII., neither officers nor seamen had any pay or emolument in time of peace, until the reign of Charles II.; when, in 1668, certain allowances were made to flag-officers and their captains out of the L. 200,000 a-year voted for the whole naval service; and in 1674, certain other allowances were granted by Order in Council, to captains who had commanded ships of the 1st and 2d rate, and to the second captains to flag-officers, on the ground, as assigned in the preamble, that they had undergone the brunt of the war, without sharing in the incident advantages of it, as prizes, convoys, and such like, which the

commanders of the smaller classes of ships had enjoyed. But the first regular establishment of half-pay for all flag-officers, captains, first-lieutenants, and masters, was, by King William, in the year 1693, provided they had served a year in their respective qualities, or had been in a general engagement with the enemy. A regular established half-pay was further sanctioned by Order in Council of Queen Anne in 1700; the conditions of which were, that no officer should enjoy the benefit thereof who shall absent himself without permission of the Lord High Admiral or Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, or who shall be dismissed for any misdemeanor, or by court-martial, or who shall not behave himself to the