Under the article PHILOSOPHY, we gave a particular account of that view of nature in which the objects of our attention are considered as connected by causation; and we were at some pains to point out the manner in which this study may be successfully cultivated. By a judicious employment of the means pointed out in that article, we discover that the objects of our contemplation compose an UNIVERSE, which consists, not of a number of independent existences solitary and detached from each other, but of a number of substances connected by a variety of relations and dependencies, so as to form a whole which may with great propriety be called the SYSTEM OF NATURE.
This assembling of the individual objects which compose the universe into one system is by no means the work of a hasty and warm fancy, but is the result of sober contemplation. The natural historian attempts in vain to describe objects, by only informing us of their shape, colour, and other sensible qualities. He finds himself obliged, in describing a piece of marble, for instance, to tell us that it takes a fine polish; that it strikes fire with steel; that it burns to quicklime; that it dissolves in aqua fortis, and is precipitated by alkalis; that with vitriolic acid it makes gypsum, &c. &c. &c. and thus it appears that even the description of any thing, with the view of ascertaining its specific nature, and with the sole purpose of discrimination, cannot be accomplished without taking notice of its various relations to other things. But what do we mean by the nature of any thing? We are ignorant of its essence, or what makes it that thing and no other thing. We must content ourselves with the discovery of its qualities or properties; and it is the assemblage of these which we call its nature. But this is very inaccurate. These do not constitute its essence, but are the consequences of it. Yet this is all we shall ever know of its nature. Now the term property is nothing but a name expressing some relation which the substance under consideration has to other things. This is true of all such terms. Gravity, elasticity, sensibility, gratitude, and the like, express nothing but certain matters of fact, which may be observed respecting the object of our contemplation in different circumstances of situation with regard to other things. Our distinct notions of individuals, therefore, imply their relations to other things.
The slightest observation of the universe shows an evident connection between all its parts in their various
properties. All things on this earth are connected with each other by the laws of motion and of mind. We are connected with the whole of the solar system by gravitation. If we extend our observations to the fixed stars, the connection seems to fail; but even here it may be observed. Their inconceivable distance, it is true, renders it impossible for us to obtain any external information as to their nature. But these bodies are connected with the solar system by the sameness of the light which they emit with that emitted by our sun or any shining body. It moves with the same velocity, it consists (in most of them at least) of the same colours, and it is reflected, refracted, and inflected, according to the same laws.
In this unbounded scene of contemplation, our attention will be directed to the different classes of objects nearly in proportion to the interest we take in them. There is nothing in which we are so much interested as our fellow men; and one of the first steps that we make in our knowledge of nature, is an acquaintance with them. We learn their distinctive nature by attending to their characteristic appearances; that is, by observing their actions. We observe them continually producing, like ourselves, certain changes in the situation or condition of surrounding objects; and these changes are evidently directed to certain ends which respect themselves. Observing this subalternity of the effects which they produce to their own accommodation, we consider this adjustment of means to ends as the effect of an INTENTION, as we experience it to be in our own case, where we are conscious of this intention, and of these its effects. We therefore interpret those actions of other men, where we observe this adjustment of means to ends, as marks or signs of intention in them similar to our own. And thus a quality, or power, or faculty, is supposed in them by means of its sign, although the quality itself is not immediately cognizable by our senses. And as this intention in ourselves is accompanied by perception of external objects, knowledge of their properties, desire of good, aversion from evil, volition, and exertion, without all of which we could not or would not perform the actions which we daily perform, we suppose the same perception, knowledge, desire, aversion, volition, and exertion in them.
Thus, by the constitution of our mind, we consider the employment of means, by which ends terminating in the agent are gained, as the natural signs of design or intention. ART, therefore, or the employment of means, is the natural sign of intention; and wherever we observe this adjustment of means to ends, we infer the agency of design.
A small acquaintance with the objects around us, obliges us to extend this inference to a great number of beings besides our fellow men, namely, to the whole animal