ARTILLERY.

THE discovery of gunpowder by Roger Bacon in the thirteenth century, and of its application to military purposes by Schwartz in the fourteenth, caused a complete revolution in this branch of the art of war. The term artillery, previous to this discovery, denoted, in a general sense, all kinds of missiles, and the machines used in propelling them. Thus the artillery of the ancients consisted of the catapults and balista, of darts, arrows, and other purely mechanical contrivances; while, at a later period, the Franks and their contemporaries used a species of small hatchet as a missile, discharging it at their enemies much in the same manner as the North American Indians do their tomahawks in the present day. However, the signification of the term changing with the advancement of science, we understand by it, in modern phraseology, guns, howitzers, and mortars, with their carriages, beds, ammunition, and apparatus of all kinds, and the troops specially appointed for their management.

In the rapid growth of scientific improvement which, during the last thirty-five years, has extended through every branch of our military establishment, there is nothing more remarkable or more honourable to our national ingenuity and energy than the changes which have been wrought in the organization of the ordnance service.

These changes are such as to render the British artillery, from having been among the worst in Europe, absolutely the very finest and best—an example for the envy of the military powers of the Continent, and a model for the avowed imitation of even that nation which has heretofore been held to excel all others in the qualities of martial science. It has hitherto been admitted by universal consent, that, of all the people of Europe, the French have habitually, in their national character, shown most original genius and aptitude for military affairs; and it is therefore not a little gratifying to the British artillerist to observe these acknowledged masters of the art of war—these boasted instructors of our earlier years—surpassed in their own favourite vocation, and reduced to become in their turn the pupils and imitators of our military knowledge and invention.

This practical homage on the part of the French to the decided superiority of our artillery is a circumstance publicly and candidly admitted by some at least of their own writers. A memoir by the chef-de-bataillon Parizot, a skilful officer of the French artillery, details six essential advantages in the British system over that of his countrymen; and Dupin, who quotes this memoir, adds, in a note, the following testimony of a French general officer

Artillery, who attended the review of the allied armies of occupation in France in 1818. "J'ai observé, avec beaucoup d'attention, les manœuvres d'artillerie des diverses puissances; j'ai été frappé de la beauté et du luxe de toutes les troupes qui composaient l'armée, de l'ordre et de la précision de leurs mouvements et de leurs manœuvres; mais les Anglais sont les premiers sous tous les rapports."¹

All the improvements which have raised the British artillery to its present state of perfection are, as we have already said, the work of our own age. At the commencement of our share in the late war in 1793, the various ordnance equipments, as well as the whole composition of this branch of our military service, were of the rudest kind, and on the worst organized and most defective plan. The inefficiency of the whole system, indeed, was palpably betrayed whenever a force was required to take the field. The guns were dispersed among the infantry at the rate of two pieces to a battalion, thereby rendering it impracticable to employ them for their legitimate purpose—the concentrating a powerful fire of numerous guns on any important point. They were also harnessed in single team, which needlessly both lengthened the column of march and diminished the power of draught. The drivers were on foot with long whips, as were also the gunners. The ammunition was packed in large rough deal boxes; the wagons which conveyed it were heavy and ill-constructed; and the whole equipment was so cumbersome, that it was impossible for the train to move out of a foot-pace, except for a very short distance; and if increased speed were attempted before the enemy, the men came into action breathless and unable to serve their guns.²

But before the commencement of the peninsular war, that active and able officer the late Major Spearman had entirely re-organized this branch of the service; and it is to him that the country owes the present beautiful system of field artillery. The battalion guns were abolished, and the artillery was brigaded, distinct from the infantry and cavalry with which it served, in divisions of six pieces each; so that the fire of one or more of these powerful batteries could be readily concentrated on any given point. A body of military drivers was organized, while, by an ingenious contrivance of the shafts, the power of using single draught in narrow roads, or when any of the horses were disabled, was retained. The drivers were mounted on the near horses; and the gunners themselves, in the proportion of eight to each piece, were carried on the limbers and ammunition cars. The whole of the equipment was simplified and lightened to such a degree that the batteries could move at a gallop; the ammunition, packed in boxes on the limbers and cars, was always up with the guns; and the officers and men, being all mounted or conveyed on the carriages, were sure of being brought fresh into action. Finally, a system of manœuvres for artillery in the field was introduced, which gave order and precision to their own movements, and established uniformity between them and the troops of other arms.³ The advantages of this system are so ably described in the following observations of a general officer of the French artillery, who was present at the final review of the allied army of occupation in France, that we shall make no apology for introducing them in this place. "La cavalerie, soutenue par des masses d'infanterie, étant sur deux lignes, dans la plaine entre La Selle et l'Ecaillon, on vit à la fois se détacher des différens corps, plus de cent bouches à feu d'artillerie à pied et à cheval; et

se porter, avec la même vitesse, à cent toises en avant de la première ligne de cavalerie. On commença l'affaire par une canonade, qui ressemblait à un feu de file. Les mouvements des batteries et les manœuvres des bouches à feu s'exécutent avec beaucoup d'ordre et de précision. La facilité avec laquelle on met et ôte l'avant-train n'a pas échappé aux officiers d'artillerie. Il est survenu un accident à une batterie à pied qui arrivait au galop par un chemin très-escarpé. Ayant rencontré une calèche qui fermait le passage, elle n'hésita pas, dans la crainte d'un retard, à se précipiter dans le champ à gauche. Une seule pièce fut renversée, avec les canoniers, dont un fut blessé. Elle fut relevée en un instant, et rejoignit sa batterie. Il y eut successivement deux charges de cavalerie par les deux lignes, qui, repoussées, vinrent se rallier l'une derrière l'autre. On vit les canoniers, emmenant les avant-trains, abandonner les pièces, et revenir aussitôt après la charge, recommencer le feu. Le passage de l'Ecaillon, défendu par l'armée ennemie qui occupait les villages, les ponts, et tous les points importants de la position, donna lieu aux dispositions et aux manœuvres que nécessite une opération de cette importance. Le passage forcé, l'armée ennemie tournée par sa gauche, pressée par les alliés, fit sa retraite, défendant le terrain et les villages, pied à pied, jusque sur les hauteurs du camp de Famars. L'artillerie a suivi les mouvements des divisions, dans la vallée difficile de l'Ecaillon, et dans la plaine au delà (malgré les obstacles) jusqu'au pied des hauteurs de Famars, arrivant sur le terrain en même temps que les troupes; cette position est couverte par un ravin profond et difficile, qu'elle a franchi comme la cavalerie. Quelques voitures ont versé, mais ont été promptement relevées. Notre artillerie n'aurait surmonté cet obstacle qu'avec beaucoup de temps et de travail."⁴

When an army is to take the field, several considerations must be attended to in apportioning the number and calibre of the batteries to accompany it; as the face, features, and general nature, mountainous or otherwise, of the country which is to form the theatre of war,—the state of its roads, and the resources which it can supply for the means of transport,—the force and description of troops composing the army,—the nature of the war, whether offensive or defensive,—and, lastly, the intended plan of operations.⁵

In carrying on offensive operations in a champaign country, with good roads and facility of transport, the artillery should consist of 9-pounder batteries, to which a few 18 or 12-pounders should be added, to form on occasion batteries of position. There should likewise be one or more batteries of a lighter calibre, to accompany any corps of the army that may be destined by rapid marches to intercept the enemy's convoys or detachments.⁶ In mountainous or deep hilly countries, the artillery should not be composed of heavier ordnance than the 6-pounder battery; but an exact topographical acquaintance with the nature of the country is absolutely necessary, and indeed affords the only satisfactory guide for judging of the most appropriate calibres to be employed. When an army is to remain on the defensive in a country where the roads are only tolerable, and the probability of being obliged to undertake long and rapid marches is not great, the artillery should be composed of a heavier description of batteries

than would be proper to accompany an army acting offensively in the same country. But if this defensive system be carried on in a strong country, where the means of transport are attended with difficulty, and long and rapid marches may become indispensably necessary, the batteries must be so constituted as to adapt them to these se-

veral circumstances, otherwise the artillery will retard the army in its operations, instead of contributing to the attainment of the object in view.¹

The annexed table exhibits the composition of each kind of field battery, and the proportion of ammunition and laboratory stores carried with each piece of ordnance.

The following is the distribution of the above proportion of ammunition in the limber and ammunition boxes of field guns and howitzers, together with the distribution in the reserve waggon of the additional proportion judged necessary to accompany each battery in the field.

Ten waggons per battery of five guns, carrying 178 rounds of ammunition per gun.

Seven waggons per battery of five guns, carrying 163 rounds of ammunition per gun.

ARTILLERY.

6-Pounders (heavy).

24-Pounder Howitzer.

Two waggons to each howitzer, carrying 144 rounds of ammunition.

Six waggons per battery of five guns, carrying 230 rounds of ammunition per gun.

6-Pounders (light).

Six waggons per battery of five guns, carrying 220 rounds of ammunition per gun.

3-Pounders (heavy).

No reserve waggons. Three hundred and sixteen rounds of ammunition per gun.

12-Pounder Howitzer.

Two waggons to each howitzer carrying 220 rounds of ammunition per howitzer.

The flannel cartridges and small stores are distributed in the several boxes in equal proportion with the other ammunition, according to circumstances.

The following historical examples of the relative proportions of artillery acting with various armies in different countries during the late war, may, with the assistance of good topographical maps, enable an officer to form a tolerably accurate judgment on this important branch of military study.

The Austrian army, under the command of the archduke Charles in the campaign of Aspergne, Essling, and Wagram, consisted of about 75,000 men, to whom were attached 18 batteries of brigade, 13 of position, and 11 of horse-artillery; being in the proportion of one piece of ordnance to 260 men nearly.

The allied British and Portuguese army in the field in Spain, May 1813, consisted of 65,000 men and 102 pieces of artillery, including the reserve; being in the proportion of one piece of ordnance to 622 men nearly.

The grand French army under Napoleon, for the invasion of Russia, not including the Austrian contingent, consisted of 400,000 infantry, 60,000 cavalry, and 1200 pieces of artillery; being one piece of ordnance to 383 men.

The French armies united on the Tormes in December 1812 amounted to 80,000 men and 200 pieces of artillery, being in the proportion of one gun to 400 men.

Field Artillery. Napoleon in 1813 had 1400 pieces of artillery to 300,000 men, or one gun to 200 nearly. In 1815 his army consisted, as nearly as can be ascertained, by a comparison of several accounts of the campaign, of 130,000 infantry, 20,000 cavalry, and 300 pieces of artillery; being one piece of ordnance to 500 men.

The Prussian contingent of the grand French army for the invasion of Russia, under the command of General D'York, consisted of 20,000 men and 60 pieces of artillery; being in the proportion of one piece of ordnance to 333 men nearly.

Marshal Beresford, at the battle of Albuera, had 29,000 men and 32 pieces of artillery, or one gun to 900 men. His opponent Marshal Soult, in the same action, had 23,000 men and 40 pieces of artillery, or one gun to 575 men.

General L'Espinasse, who commanded the artillery of Buonaparte in Italy, supposes a division of an army to consist of 12,000 men, including a regiment of dragoons and another of hussars, to which he allots three batteries of horse and three of field artillery, each consisting of six pieces of ordnance. A battery of horse and another of field artillery are at all times to be up with the army; two batteries, similarly armed with the two in activity, are to remain with the park; and the remaining two, also appointed in like manner, should be in dépôt in rear of the army. These proportions of artillery to infantry, L'Espinasse states, are precisely those adopted with the approbation of Buonaparte in the Italian campaigns.¹

Positions and Movements of Field Artillery.

The commanding officer of artillery, in order that he may choose proper positions for his field batteries, should be made acquainted with the effect intended to be produced, with the troops that are to be supported, and with the points to be attacked, that he may place his artillery so as to support, but not incommodate the infantry, nor take up such situations with his guns as would be more advantageously occupied by the line; that he may not place his batteries too soon, nor in exposed situations; that he may cover his fronts and flanks by taking advantage of the ground; and that he may not venture too far out of the protection of the army, unless some very decided effect is to be obtained by so doing.

In a defensive position the guns of the largest calibre should be posted on those points from whence the enemy can be discovered at the greatest distance, and from whence may be seen the whole extent of his front. In an offensive position, the weakest points of the line, and those most distant from the enemy, must be strengthened by the largest calibres. Those heights on which the army, in advancing, may rest its flanks, must be secured by them, as also those from which the enemy may be fired upon obliquely.

Artillery should never be placed in such a situation that it can be taken by any enemy's battery obliquely, in flank, or in reverse, unless a position under these circumstances offers every prospect of producing a most decisive effect before the guns can be destroyed, or placed hors de combat. The most elevated positions are not the best for artillery; the greatest effects may be produced from a height of from 30 to 40 yards at the distance of 600, and from about 16 yards high at 200 yards distant. Those positions which are not likely to be shifted, but from whence an effect may be produced during the whole of an action, are to be preferred, and in such positions breast-works of two or three feet high should be thrown up to cover the carriages.

The guns must be so placed as to produce a cross-fire upon the enemy's position, and upon the ground over which he must pass to attack you. It may sometimes be necessary, in order to concentrate a cross-fire on one particular point, to subdivide your batteries. Thus, his fire may be attracted to different objects whilst your own is directed to a focus, which may be the débouché of the enemy, the head of his advancing columns, or the ground in front of the weakest point in your own line. If the enemy's position is to be attacked, your fire must become direct in proportion as the troops advance, otherwise it will impede them; and when you can no longer fire on the point attacked, the guns must be directed on the collateral points.

The guns should be placed as much as possible under cover. This is easily done upon heights, by keeping them so far back as that only the muzzles may be perceived over them. With proper attention, many situations may be found of which advantage may be taken for this purpose, such as banks, ditches, &c. everywhere to be met with. If an enemy's attack is expected, the guns must be posted so as to cannonade him with effect when he advances within 800 paces, and particularly in situations in which his march may be retarded by ditches, defiles, or other natural obstacles.

The position from whence the enemy is to be cannonaded should be kept concealed from him till the moment the batteries are to open. To effect this, the guns may until that time be placed in any other situation. Should there be any small elevations of earth in front of a defile through which the enemy may advance and be cannonaded, the guns must be kept under cover of them until he comes out and begins to form. The guns may also be masked by being covered by troops, particularly cavalry, until the enemy is within the range of case-shot. The covering party must then open right and left, and a brisk fire be kept up.

Artillery should very rarely be placed in front of a line of infantry, or distributed by batteries in the intervals. When the line is of great extent, it may become necessary to place a strong battery in the centre. This should be composed of the guns of the heaviest calibre; and it should be posted in the interval between the right and left wings of the army, by which means a double object is not offered to the enemy's fire. In general, an army in order of battle may be considered as a front of fortification, the infantry forming the curtain, and the lateral batteries the bastions, under the fire of which the troops may manoeuvre freely, and advance with confidence to attack the enemy.

The two following examples will serve to illustrate the preceding remarks:—

Battle of Castiglione, 5th August 1796.—The following diagram shows the disposition of the French under Buonaparte, and the imperialists under Wurms, in this battle:

A B the French army, G H the imperial army, A C a battery of 12 pieces of foot artillery, sustaining the left of the French on the heights in advance of Castiglione; B D

¹ Essai sur l'Artillerie, par le Général L'Espinasse.

a battery of 20 pieces of light artillery appuying on the right, which extended into the plain. The line of infantry A B being taken for the curtain, the batteries A C and B D may be considered as representing the faces of two bastions, thus forming a complete front, and crossing their fire before the curtain. The troops are consequently covered from attack, and the enemy fired upon obliquely. Wurmsier having prolonged his front from G to I with the intention of outflanking the French, General L'Espinasse took some of the guns from C A, and placed them on the other face C K, until others could be drawn from the park for that purpose, thus forming a new battery destined to follow the enemy's movements. Another battery was likewise formed on the right, from D to E, in case Wurmsier had prolonged his left from H to F.

Battle of Talavera, 27th and 28th July 1809.—At the commencement of the battle the British artillery were stationed, by batteries of six guns each, with the divisions of the army to which they were respectively attached; a temporary redoubt, unfinished, was thrown up at F, in which a battery of 3-pounders was posted; on the hill, at A, the most commanding point of the position, two batteries were posted, one of heavy 6-pounders, the other of light sixes, to which two Spanish guns were afterwards added.

The French had a battery of 14 guns at K, the centre of their position, also one at each of the flanks G and H, independently of others which were brought up during the action. On the second day, when the columns at M advanced, supported by artillery, to attack the British right, which rested on the unfinished redoubt, the three batteries E E E were formed on the oblique line L E, and thus took the advancing columns in flank, whilst the redoubt kept up a direct fire in their front.

It must here be observed, that whenever an oblique line is formed by artillery, as from L to E, it must be directed without the extremity of the enemy's flank, otherwise the guns will be exposed to his enfilading fire.

The first duty of the commanding officer of artillery, when it is intended to besiege a fortress, is to prepare an estimate of the quantity of ordnance and ammunition required for its reduction. To enable him to make this estimate with accuracy and precision, he should be master of certain data; that is to say, the commander of the forces, or general charged with the direction of the siege, should communicate to him a plan of the fortifications and environs of the place, accompanied by such profiles and remarks as may enable him, in conjunction with the commanding engineer, to ascertain which front or fronts are most assailable, with the advantages and disadvantages attending each attack, as well with respect to the works of the place, as to the nature of the soil where the trenches must be opened, and the several heights and hollows in the vicinity.¹ He should also, if possible, be informed as to whether the place be amply supplied

with artillery, ammunition, &c.; if the garrison be sufficiently numerous, and whether composed of veteran troops or raw levies; if the governor be in high estimation for his military talents; if the town be populous, and the inhabitants well affected to the garrison.² It will thus be easy to form a tolerably accurate opinion of the means of defence, and the resistance to be expected; for it is not to be presumed that any government would shut up a brave and numerous force in an ill-fortified and badly provisioned place, at the risk of seeing such a garrison sacrificed after a short resistance.

But should it be impossible to procure information on these several points beforehand, particularly as to the strength of the garrison, the requisite proportion of ordnance and ammunition must be regulated on the general principles of attack. The officer entrusted to prepare the estimate must, therefore, endeavour to ascertain, according to the fundamental maxim of all besiegers, against which front or fronts the attack can be made with the least exposure and greatest expedition. He should examine whether the siege can be most advantageously carried on by regular approaches; by taking advantage of any defect in the situation which may enable him to break ground close to the works to be breached; or by battering them from a distance. By the aid of this investigation, and the following general principles, the quantity of ordnance and ammunition required for the siege of a place may be ascertained with the greatest accuracy.

1. The number of batteries to be opened against the defences must depend upon the extent of the works to be embraced by the attack, i. e. there must be a battery to enfilade every face that can in any way annoy or retard the besiegers in their approaches.

2. The length of the epaulement of these batteries need not exceed the breadth of the terreplein of the works to be enfiladed, unless circumstances should render it necessary to place some of the guns in a situation to take the work in reverse. Each battery will only contain, therefore, five, or at most eight guns, to enfilade the face of the principal work; to which must be added two others to enfilade the branches of the opposite covered-way.

3. The situation of the breaching batteries must be determined, as, in a regular attack, they sometimes interfere with the fire of the first or enfilading batteries. Should this be the case, the same artillery must be transferred from one battery to the other.

4. The supply of ordnance must be sufficiently liberal to enable the besiegers to keep up a fire constantly superior to that of the place. This supply is determined by the extent of the fortifications of the place; one piece of ordnance must be allowed for every twelve or fifteen feet.

5. As the ricochet firing may be interrupted while the sappers are completing the third parallel, a supply of royal and coehorn mortars must be provided to harass the garrison from the second parallel, or demi-places of arms, during its cessation.³

Having thus ascertained the number of guns required, the following will be their calibres, and the proportions which the remaining ordnance should bear to them.

Guns—of the whole number required—suppose 60.

24-pounders..... $\backslash frac\{2\}\{3\}$ or 40

12-pounders..... $\backslash frac\{1\}\{3\}$ or 20

Howitzers—one for every four guns—in this case 15.

10-inch..... $\backslash frac\{1\}\{4\}$ or 5

8-inch..... $\backslash frac\{1\}\{3\}$ or 10

¹ Traité Élémentaire d'Artillerie.

² British Gunner.

³ Ibid.

Siege Artillery. Mortars—in the proportion of one-twelfth more than the number of guns—in this case 65.

In the above proportion of ordnance, it must be observed that the long 12-pounder is proposed instead of the 18-pounder formerly employed, as a gun of this description is conceived to be sufficiently powerful for annoyance and direct fire, to dismount the enemy's artillery, as well as for firing en ricochet. The diminished weight of ammunition attendant on the employment of the smaller calibre is an important advantage; but it is an arrangement which can only be admitted in cases where an adequate number of 24-pounders are provided. In all smaller equipments it would, therefore, be better that all the guns should be of the heavy calibre.¹

The proportion of small mortars should in no case be less than that of the heavy mortars and howitzers, and this proportion ought to be increased in all equipments of less than thirty pieces of ordnance: indeed, when sent at all, there should be at least twelve of them, to insure the necessary effect: in many cases a far greater number than is here proposed could be advantageously used, but this must of course depend on the nature of the service on which they are likely to be employed. The royal and cæhorn mortars have in the present instance been taken in equal proportions, and it would be advisable to adhere to this arrangement in all the larger equipments, particularly when their calibres correspond with those of the guns; but in small equipments it would be more convenient to confine the arrangement to one calibre, in which case the royal mortar is the preferable, as it possesses the power of being used at a greater distance than the cæhorn. But it must at the same time be observed, that the latter, from its lightness and the small weight of its ammunition, is a more desirable implement for the more advanced parts of the attack.

The quantity and relative calibres of the ordnance being determined, the following will be the proportion and nature of ammunition.

Gun ammunition.—Round shot,

Howitzer ammunition.—Shells,

Valenciennes composition,

Mortar ammunition.—Shells,

Pound shot,

Carcasses,

Valenciennes composition,

In the above proportion of ammunition there is an increase of two hundred rounds in favour of the 12-pounder,

as the facility of working these guns will, at an easy rate, afford the means of firing more rapidly than from 24-pounders. The proportion of one half common shells and one half spherical case should always be adhered to for the 8-inch howitzers.

Arrangement of Artillery at a Siege.

The first disposition of the artillery at a siege is to the different batteries raised near the first parallel. The object of the besieger in the construction of these batteries is, by a direct and enfilade fire, to dismount the artillery on the front attacked, destroy the embrasures, and harass the garrison in the several points of defence, so that they may be compelled to abandon them, or at least slacken their fire, and thereby enable the besieger to carry forward his approaches with greater expedition and less danger than he otherwise could do.² If these first batteries be favourably situated, the artillery may be continued in them during the whole of the siege, or until the besiegers arrive on the crest of the glacis. The garrison must be perpetually harassed along the whole front attacked, with shot and shells fired en ricochet. The batteries for this purpose are erected on the prolongations of the works to be enfiladed, from whence the defenders of the prolonged faces may be fired upon with great precision and effect.³ It, however, frequently happens, from local and other circumstances, that the besiegers cannot avail themselves of the most advantageous situations for their first batteries. There are four situations from which the defences of a place may be destroyed, though not from all of them with equal facility. The best positions for the first batteries are those before described as perpendicular to the prolongations of the faces of the works to be enfiladed. If these positions cannot be attained, the next that present themselves are on those sides of the prolongations which take the faces in reverse, and under as small angles as possible. If the ground or other circumstances will not admit of either of these situations being occupied by enfilading batteries, the battery to destroy the fire of the face must be without its prolongation, so as to fire obliquely upon the outside of it: the fourth position in point of advantage is directly parallel to the face. The guns must fire en ricochet from the first two positions, and from the last two with full charges.

The second batteries are generally placed on the glacis, within fifteen or eighteen feet of its crest; but if the foot of the revetment cannot be seen from this situation, they must be placed in the covered-way, within fifteen feet of the counterscarp.⁴ The object of these second batteries being to effect practicable breaches in the works, they should be combined, two and two together, so that while one battery is in breach, the other may play upon its defences. The breaching batteries shall commence by marking out as nearly as possible, by their fire, the extent of the breach intended to be made; first, by striking out a horizontal line as near as possible to the bottom of the revetment; and next, by aiming at two others, perpendicular to and at the extremities of this first line. Then, by continuing to deepen these three cuts, and occasionally firing salvoes at the part to be brought down, the wall will in time give way in a mass. The guns must begin by firing as low as possible in the commencement of the operation, afterwards somewhat higher in the same manner as before, and so continue advancing gradually upwards till the breach is effected; for, should they fire too high at first, the rubbish would cover the lower part of the wall, retard the operation, and tend to render the

¹ British Gunner.

² Essai Générale de Fortification.

³ British Gunner.

⁴ Traité d'Artillerie, par D'Antoni; British Gunner.

Garrison Artillery. breach impracticable. When the second batteries are placed on the glacis, or in the covered-way, they must be sunk to such a depth that the terreplein of the one, or surface of the other, may coincide with the soles of their embrasures. They are in fact but an enlargement of the sap run for the lodgement on the glacis, or in the covered-way, and should contain at least four guns each. If the space between the traverses will not admit of this number at the usual distances, the guns must be closed from twelve to fifteen feet of each other.

The mortars are generally arranged at first in battery, adjoining the first gun batteries, or upon the prolongations of the capitals of the works, in which situations they are certainly least exposed; and upon the establishment of the half parallels the howitzers are placed in battery, in their extremities, to enfilade the branches of the covered-way. These batteries are in the most advantageous situations, if, while the one bombards the work that the besieger intends to assault, and prevents the garrison from throwing up intrenchments within it, or at least retards their construction, the other directs its fire against the defences of the breach, so that the garrison may, from the continual shower of shells, &c. be compelled to abandon them, or, if they persist in remaining, be exposed to great loss. The small mortars are arranged in the third parallel, to annoy the besieged in the places of arms.

In the establishment of all these batteries, the great object is to make such an arrangement of them, that they may not mask the fire of each other more than cannot be avoided, and particularly that of the first or ricochet batteries. The aggravation of this inconvenience may very well be prevented till the establishment of the attack on the crest of the glacis, when it becomes in some degree unavoidable; however, even the operations of the glacis may be so arranged as not to mask the fire of the ricochet batteries, until the breaching batteries are in a state of great forwardness.

The proportion of ordnance, ammunition, and stores required for the defence of a fortified place depends not only on the particular situation of each individual fortress, and its relations with the surrounding country; the system according to which it is fortified, and the species of attack it may be possible to open against it; but likewise on innumerable minor circumstances, each of which may exert an important influence on the defence. If, for example, one or more of the fronts of a place be covered by an inundation, a marsh, or by any other impassable obstacle, it will manifestly require a much smaller proportion of artillery for its defence than if it were equally accessible on every front. On the contrary, a maritime fortress, which is susceptible of attack both by sea and land, will require a larger proportion of ordnance supplies than if it were assailable from only one of these points.¹

It will be seen, therefore, from the above remarks and examples, how impossible it is to lay down any general rules upon this important subject. The only satisfactory guide which an officer charged with the nice and responsible trust of arming a fortified place can with security follow, is to examine attentively all parts of the works and of the surrounding country, and then to weigh every other circumstance that can in any way influence the defence. He should consider which of its fronts are most vulnerable, and what measures are best adapted for their security.

To effect this with accuracy and expedition, he should, after a few days passed in reconnoitring and studying his position, devote his attention to the preparation of a sketch and profiles of the works and neighbouring country, as far at least as a mile in every direction, and upon a scale adapted to the features of the ground.

With this map and profiles before him, he should recur to those fundamental principles upon which every good attack and defence are based. He should not only be thoroughly acquainted with his own particular branch of the service in all its details, but capable of judging to the fullest extent of all operations in which the other troops of the garrison can bear their part; so that every supply may be adequate to its particular purpose, without deficiency on the one hand or superfluity on the other. Thus two extremes, equally prejudicial, will be avoided; the one, of making a provision insufficient for the defence which the fortress is capable of sustaining; the other, of providing such a quantity of supplies, that, on its capitulation, which, according to the natural order of things, must sooner or later happen, if it be not relieved, a complete arsenal would fall into the enemy's hands.²

These observations being held in mind, the following general maxims will be found of essential assistance.

1. The proportion of ordnance, ammunition, and stores should never exceed the quantity absolutely necessary to a brave and resolute defence.

2. Those fronts which are considered susceptible of attack should be completely armed, and the remaining fronts only in part.

3. These should be, for each of the faces of the bastions of such fronts as are deemed liable to attack, five or six pieces of ordnance; for each of the flanks of these bastions four pieces; and for the faces of the ravelin from five to seven pieces of ordnance. When these are lunettes, four pieces should be reckoned for each, and from two to three for each of the places of arms of the covered-way. Supposing, therefore, one front to be completely armed, the following proportion of ordnance will be required.

making a total for one front of from 33 to 42 pieces of ordnance.

4. In case of the place being liable to attack on two consecutive fronts, the above proportion should be augmented one half; and if on two detached fronts, it should be doubled. The remaining fronts should each be provided with such a proportion of their full armaments as will secure them from insult. It will appear from the above maxims, which are deduced from the best authorities on the subject, that a hexagon, having only one front exposed to attack, requires an armament of from 58 to 68 pieces of ordnance for its defence; and that for more extensive places, from six to eight, or at most ten pieces of ordnance, should be added for each additional front.³

The next point to be considered is the proportion which the several kinds of ordnance, and their relative calibres, should bear to each other; and here it must be remembered that the higher rates are not the only descriptions capable of being employed to advantage in the defence of a place. There are many cases in which medium guns can oppose equal resistance with the heavier calibres, and

Garrison Artillery. they possess the very important advantage of affording greater facility in manœuvring and transporting them from one situation to another; an operation of considerable difficulty with the higher natures of ordnance at all times, but particularly during a siege. They also consume less ammunition, and enable the besieged to keep up a more determined and incessant fire.¹

The following are the proportions of the several kinds and calibres usually adhered to in ordinary cases.

Guns—in the proportion of two thirds of the whole armament—suppose 60.

Howitzers—one for every five guns—in this case 14.

Mortars—in about the same proportion as the howitzers—in this case 16.

The above distribution of guns, howitzers, and mortars, applies equally to all armaments of not less than sixty pieces of ordnance; and such an armament should therefore consist of forty guns, eight howitzers, and twelve mortars. The proportions of the several calibres of each kind, except those for the guns, are calculated on a basis of not less than ninety pieces of ordnance; and in all smaller armaments it would be advisable to confine the arrangement to two calibres of each kind only.

The following will be the proportion and nature of ammunition for each species of ordnance.

Gun ammunition.—Round shot,

Case shot,

Spherical case,

Howitzer ammunition.—Shells,

Case shot,

Spherical case,

Light balls and carcasses,

Mortar ammunition.—Shells,

Pound shot,

Each round of pound shot consists of 100 shot for the 10-inch, and of 80 for the 8-inch mortar.

Light balls..... 15 per mortar.

The above proportion of ordnance and ammunition for

the defence of a fortified place is exclusive of one or more field batteries, which every place should contain, according to its extent, and which should be provided with a double proportion of ammunition. (See the preceding section on FIELD ARTILLERY.)

This estimate and arrangement is founded upon the supposition that the place is unprovided with casemated batteries, the armament for which must of course form a separate estimate, calculated, however, upon the same principles as the above.

Arrangement of the Artillery during a Siege.

The instant it is ascertained that the enemy's troops are in motion towards the place,—presuming that it is amply supplied with provisions, ammunition, and stores, and that every precaution has been taken to collect from the vicinity what might fall into the enemy's hands,—the barbette batteries must be established in the flanked angles of the bastions and ravelins, and a proportion of the light guns and howitzers must be placed in the outworks and covered-way. Should the body of the place have cavaliers, the heaviest guns should be mounted on them. The following arrangement is usually made for the reception of the investing corps, when it is not known from what point they may advance to commence operations.

There should be three guns mounted on the barbette of each bastion,—one 24 and two 18-pounders, and three 9-pounders on the barbette of each of the ravelins. In the salient places of arms of the bastions one 24-pounder howitzer, and in those of the ravelins two 6-pounders. The heavy mortars should be placed one in each bastion, and the remainder of the ordnance in reserve behind the curtains, ready to move on whichever side it may be required.

By this arrangement the whole of the barbette guns, and of the guns and howitzers in the outworks and covered-way, will be in readiness to act in any direction, till it is known on which side the enemy has determined to direct his attack, and, with the addition of the reserve, will enable the besieged to open a fire of thirty-five pieces of ordnance on the enemy the very first night he begins to work upon the trenches. In the first moments of the investment, however, the artillery of the place should not endeavour, by a useless expenditure of ammunition, to disturb the besiegers in their operations: it is only when they are making permanent dispositions for their establishment that the fire of the place should be opened upon them. It is nevertheless necessary that some guns should be loaded with reduced charges, to protect the retreat of the advanced posts, and mislead the enemy as to their range. This is also the moment, if the garrison be numerous, and composed of good troops, to annoy the besiegers, by sorties on different points of the line of contravallation, and to retard the works necessary for establishing their communications: care must, however, be taken not to purchase this advantage by a loss of men and artillery, which would cripple the means of defence.

The day succeeding the night on which the trenches are opened, and the front of attack determined, a new disposition of the artillery of the place must be made as follows:—

The 24 and 18-pounders must be removed to the front attacked, and the other batteries, if necessary, supplied with 12-pounders. The barbettes of the bastions on this front must have each five guns, three 24 and two 18-pounders, and the remaining 18-pounders arranged behind the curtains,—two towards each of the extremities

Exercises of the front curtain, and two at the farthest extremity of each of the collateral curtains. The howitzers in reserve should be placed, two in each of the salient angles of the covered-way of the bastions of this front, and two in each of those of the collateral bastions, which, with those already there, must fire en ricochet down the prolongations of the capitals. There should also be three 6-pounders in the salient place of arms of the ravelin of the front attacked, and three in each of those of the two collateral ravelins; these guns should fire over the palisading; and, lastly, there should be five 9-pounders on the barbette of the front ravelin. This arrangement will bring fifty-two guns and howitzers and four mortars to fire on the approaches, after the first night. This, with a few variations, will be the disposition of the artillery of the place till the besiegers' first batteries are ready to open. The instant they begin to work upon these batteries, the whole fire of the place must be concentrated on them, and the mortars which had previously fired at low angles must now fire with greater elevation, but at all times sparingly.

As soon as the enemy's batteries are fairly established, the guns en barbette must be covered by merlons, and the embrasures occasionally masked. While this work is carrying on, the situations of the guns should be changed, and new directions given to them; as by frequently practising this manoeuvre, the enemy will also be obliged to change his dispositions of attack, and time will thereby be gained by the besieged. As the enemy approaches towards the second parallel, the fire of the place must be spread over all parts of his line of operations; and with a view of contributing to this object, royal and coehorn mortars should be disposed in the places of arms and branches of the covered-way. When the approaches are carried on from the second parallel, and the enemy is about to establish the demi-places of arms, the fire of the place must be concentrated on the débouchés from the parallel, and multiplied with all possible activity.

In proportion as the besieger pushes forward his approaches to the third parallel, the artillery must be withdrawn from the covered-way to the ravelins, or to the ditch, if dry, or to any other favourable situation, and by degrees, as they advance, to the body of the place. During this period of the siege the embrasures must be prepared in the flanks, in the curtain which joins them, and in those parts of the faces of the bastions which command the ditch of the front ravelin. All these embrasures must be ready to open, and the heavy artillery mounted in them, the moment the enemy attempts to form a lodgment on the glacis. We have now arrived at the crisis of the siege, and every effort should be made to take advantage of this favourable moment, when the enemy, by his own works, must mask his former batteries, and before he is able to open his new ones.

EXERCISE OF ARTILLERY.

The several exercises are divided into three classes, as follows:—

1. 1. Exercise of field artillery.
2. 2. Exercise of garrison or siege artillery.
3. 3. Exercise of the various machines employed in the manoeuvres of garrison or siege artillery.

1. Exercise of Field Artillery.

The complement of men for the service of each gun or howitzer is, one non-commissioned officer and eight gunners.

Numbering and Telling Off the Detachments.

The several detachments being arranged right in front, VOL. III.

are numbered and told off by their respective non-commissioned officers in the following manner:

The non-commissioned officer is invariably No. 1, and is responsible for the proper execution of the duties of the other numbers of his detachment. The right-hand man of the rear rank is named No. 2; his front-rank man No. 3; the second man from the right of the rear rank No. 4; and his front-rank man No. 5; and so on in succession from the right of the rear to the left of the front rank, till the numbering of the whole detachment is completed.

Formation in Order of March, or for Exercise.

When detachments are formed in the order of march, or for the purpose of exercise, the even numbers are almost invariably on the right or off-side of the gun, and the odd numbers on the left or near side.

Positions of the several Numbers in Action.

No. 1 is on the left of the handspike; No. 2 outside the right wheel, in line with the muzzle; No. 3 outside the left wheel, and also in line with the muzzle; No. 4 clear of the right wheel, covering No. 2, and in line with the breech; No. 5 clear of the left wheel, covering No. 3, and also in line with the breech; No. 6 five paces in rear of and covering the left wheel; No. 7 in rear of the limber; No. 8 ten yards in rear of the gun, in line with the heads of the leading horses of the limber; and No. 9 attends the ammunition-waggon.

Duties of the several Numbers.

No. 1 points and commands; No. 2 sponges; No. 3 loads; No. 4 serves the vent and primes; No. 5 fires; No. 6 serves No. 3 with ammunition; No. 7 supplies No. 6 with ammunition, and, when firing shells, fixes the fuses; No. 8 assists No. 7, and occasionally relieves No. 2, or, when attached to 5½ inch or 24-pounder howitzers, provides No. 3 with shells; No. 9 assists in preparing ammunition.

Limbering up, or Retiring from Action.

This manoeuvre may be performed, according to circumstances, to the front, rear, right, or left. In limbering up to the front, the limber drives up to the right of the gun. No. 2 instantly passes his sponge over the axle-tree to No. 4, who straps on the sponge head; No. 2 and No. 3 go round to the trail; No. 4 and No. 5 man the wheels, assisted by No. 7 and No. 8 with heavy guns. The right wheel is run back, the left forward, and No. 1 and No. 6 throw the trail round in the opposite direction to that in which the limber drives up. The instant the trail is round, No. 1 unships his handspike, and No. 5 straps it on; No. 2 buckles on the rammer-head of his sponge, and the whole fall in close to the wheels. No. 6, No. 4, and No. 2 on one side, No. 5, No. 3, and No. 1 on the other; No. 7 attends the limber, and No. 8 moves up to his place. On the limber coming up square to the front, No. 1 orders, "halt, limber up," upon which No. 4 and No. 5 man the wheels, No. 2, No. 3, and No. 6, lift the trail and place it on the pintail; No. 1 then puts in the key, and the detachment mount, or fall into the order of march. The duties are precisely the same in limbering up to the rear, right, or left, except that in limbering up to the right or left, the trail and limber both go to the right or left; and in limbering up to the rear, the limber drives up rather to the right of the trail, which is not thrown round, and then reverses to the left.

Unlimbering or coming into Action.

This is precisely the reverse of the preceding manoeuvre. No. 1 unkeys the pintail, No. 2 and No. 3 raise the trail,

Exercise. and when it is clear No. 1 gives the word, "Drive on;" upon which the limber goes off to the left about, and the trail is thrown to the right about, the other numbers assisting as they arrive, the same as in limbering up, No. 6 at the trail with heavy guns, and No. 4 and No. 5 at the wheels. As soon as the trail is down, No. 5 unbuckles the handspike, and No. 1 ships it; No. 2 unstraps the rammer-head and goes to his place; No. 4 unstraps the sponge, and passes it over to No. 2. When the limber is sufficiently to the rear, it reverses to its left, and halts ten yards in rear of and covering its gun. The ammunition-waggon also reverses to its left, goes off in front of the limber, and again reversing to its left, halts one horse's length in rear of the gun-limber. No. 1 is responsible for the correct dressing of his gun when it comes into action; and for this purpose, immediately after the trail is in its proper direction he should place himself in line with the axle-tree of the gun upon which the formation is made, and dress his own gun with it. This position will enable him to see, not only that his gun is in its true alignement, but also that it is square to the front.

2. Exercise of Garrison or Siege Artillery.

This second branch of the exercises relates to the manner of working and serving guns, howitzers, carronades, and mortars, on batteries. The complement of men for the service of garrison or battery guns is, for the 42-pounder and 32-pounder, one non-commissioned officer and six gunners each; for the 24-pounder, one non-commissioned officer and five gunners; for the 18-pounder, one non-commissioned officer and four gunners; and for the 12-pounder and 9-pounder, one non-commissioned officer and three gunners each. The complement of men, duties, &c. are precisely the same for howitzers and carronades as the above for guns. The 13-inch mortar requires one non-commissioned officer and five gunners; the 10-inch mortar one non-commissioned officer and four gunners; the 8-inch mortar one non-commissioned officer and three gunners; and the royal and coehorn mortars one non-commissioned officer and two gunners each.

All calculations for the daily service of guns on batteries, whether in garrison or at a siege, should be made in three proportions and at three reliefs.

Numbering, Telling Off the Detachments, and Formation for Exercise.

The same in every respect as for field artillery.

Positions and Duties of the Numbers.

No. 1, directly in rear of the gun, points, commands, and assists to run the gun up; No. 2, on the right of and in line with the muzzle, sponges, runs up, and elevates; No. 3, on the left of the muzzle, and also in line with it, loads, runs up, and elevates; No. 4, on the right of the gun, clear of the track, and in line with the breech, serves the vent, primes, runs up, and traverses; No. 5, in the same relative position on the left of the gun, fires, runs up, and traverses; the remaining numbers on the right and left of the embrasure, with their backs to the merlons. No. 6 serves No. 3 with ammunition, and runs up; No. 7 assists to run up. The whole of the numbers, when not immediately employed in working the gun, should range themselves in order under cover of the parapet.

In serving mortars, No. 1 is directly in rear of the mortar, and points, commands, and serves the vent; No. 2, on the right of and in line with the front of the bed, sponges, runs up, and traverses; No. 3, in the same relative position on the left of the bed, loads, runs up, and traverses; No. 4, on the right of the mortar, covering No. 2, and in line with the vent, runs up, elevates, supplies shells, primes, and tra-

verses; No. 5, in the same relative position on the left of the mortar, runs up, supplies shells, elevates, traverses, and fires; No. 6, at the magazine, serves ammunition. No. 2 puts the shells into the 8-inch royal and coehorn mortars, and in putting them into the 13 and 10-inch mortars is assisted by No. 3.

3. Exercise of the various Machines employed in the Manœuvres of Heavy Artillery.

The method of numbering, telling off, &c. is the same in every respect for this branch of the exercises as for the two preceding, except that, in the exercise of the devil-carriage, the odd numbers are posted on the right side, and the even numbers on the left.

Exercise of the Triangle Gyn.

The complement of men for a triangle gyn is usually one non-commissioned officer and ten gunners. The following are the duties in working or carrying the gyn:

Left side.

No. 3 carries at the foot of the left cheek, works the left-hand lever, keys and unkeys the left-hand capsquare of the gun-carriage, and assists to run the carriage up or back.

No. 5 carries at the top of the left cheek, works the left centre lever, and assists to run the carriage up or back.

No. 7 carries the levers and handspikes, assists No. 6 in passing the fall round the windlass, and holds on next to him.

No. 9 carries at the top of the pry-pole with the slings, fid, trucks, &c., holds on the fall behind No. 8, and coils it up as it comes off.

No. 11 Assists in carrying the blocks and fall, reeves and unreeves the triple block, assists in slinging the gun, and steadies it at the muzzle.

Right Side.

No. 2 carries at the foot of the right cheek, works the right-hand lever, keys and unkeys the right-hand capsquare of the gun-carriage, and assists to run the carriage up or back.

No. 4 carries at the top of the right cheek, works the right centre lever, and assists to run the carriage up or back.

No. 6 carries the windlass, passes the fall round it, holds on, makes it fast, and eases off and lowers the gun.

No. 8 carries at the foot of the pry-pole with the slings, fid, trucks, &c., and holds on next to No. 7.

No. 10 assists in carrying the blocks and fall, reeves and unreeves the double block, assists in slinging the gun, and steadies it at the cascable.

Exercise of Bell's Gyn.

The complement of men for working this gyn is one non-commissioned officer and six gunners.

Left side.

No. 3 runs the carriage up or back, assists No. 6 in slinging the gun, turns the winch, assisted by No. 5, or makes fast and hauls upon the rope which is passed round the handles of the winch.

No. 5 runs the carriage up or back, and assists No. 3 at the winch.

No. 7 slings and unslings the gun at the chace, assisted by No. 3, and steadies at the muzzle.

Right side.

No. 2 runs the carriage up or back, assists No. 7 in slinging the gun, turns the winch, assisted by No. 4, or holds on upon the rope and makes it fast, the same as No. 3.

No. 4 performs similar duties to No. 5 on his own side.

No. 6 slings and unslings the gun at the first reinforce, assisted by No. 3, places the bed and quin, and steadies the gun at the cascable.