Battles. A retiring army is not always obliged to fall back upon its own frontier; it may sometimes change the direction of its operations, as Frederick did after the siege of Olmutz in 1758, when, instead of returning into Silesia, he changed his line and marched into Bohemia. This measure was also proposed to Napoleon before the battle of Leipzig. He was advised to approach the Elbe, call in the corps of St Cyr from Dresden, cross the river about Witttemberg, and descend by the right bank towards Magdeburg. The Prussian and northern armies, being on the left of the Elbe, could not have prevented the destruction of Berlin, Potsdam, and Brandenburg. And from Magdeburg, reinforced with its vast garrison, and connected with the Danes and the corps of Davoust at Hamburg, he could have operated by a new line, having his communications open by Wesel, Cassel, and all the fortresses of Holland; the allies must have followed him into a sterile country which would not have subsisted their vast cavalry, whilst the sandy roads would have prevented the transport of provisions. There were probably superior reasons, which led him to reject the proposal.
Pursuits. If the art of war consists in applying the superior force of a mass upon a weak point of the enemy, and in case of success to render the defeat decisive, it follows that a defeated army should be pursued with the utmost vivacity. "Never delay till to-morrow" is an ancient military maxim, applicable especially in pursuit; for the strength of an army consists in its organisation, in the unity resulting from the connection of all its parts with the mainspring which makes it move. After a defeat, this unity no longer exists. The harmony between the head which combines and the body which executes is broken; their connection is suspended, often destroyed. To pursue after a successful attack is to march to a certain triumph. All the late campaigns offer signal examples of this truth. Generals of mediocrity often neglect this maxim, and their victories are scarcely more than a forcible removal of their opponents. The direction of the pursuit, though guided by circumstances, should always aim at gaining the hostile line of communications, and thereby cutting off the enemy from his base; because, by so doing, he may be thrown upon such obstacles as to force him to surrender. It may be added, in opposition to what has been said respecting retreats, that the object of the pursuer should be to assume an interior line, and force the enemy to adopt exterior lines, as by separating he is liable to be defeated in detail.
Sieges. Sieges, according to Lloyd, should never be undertaken but with the following views:—1st, When fortresses are situate upon the passages which lead to the enemy, so as to render it impossible to penetrate without capturing them; 2d, when they intercept the communications, and the country is unable to furnish the necessary subsistence; 3d, when they are wanted to cover magazines formed in the country, and thereby to facilitate the operations; 4th, when the enemy has considerable depots within the fortress of which he is absolutely in want; 5th, when the capture of a fortress produces the conquest of a considerable tract of country, and enables the besiegers to winter in that vicinity. To these may be added, 6th, the recapture of a fortress essential in the defence of a frontier.
Covering As victory is best secured by taking the lead in an operation, an army covering a siege should never wait to be attacked by the enemy, but endeavour to anticipate him; for, by defeating the forces which aim at raising the siege, the place is sure to fall. If the enemy approach the covering army with an imposing mass, the siege should be raised, all the forces united, and an attack in force directed against
him. When the relieving army is defeated, the siege should be resumed, while the pursuit continues, and the enemy is not in a condition to return before the capture of the place. When an army besieges a place, in consequence of offensive movements and anterior success, the covering army should not remain in a position near the place, but drive the enemy as far as possible forward; for the relieving army will find the difficulty of raising the siege increase with the distance it is removed from the place.1
PART II.—WARLIKE OPERATIONS AT SEA.2
Referring generally to the articles ADMIRAL and AD-MIRALTY, DOCKS, NAVIGATION, NAVY, SEAMANSHIP, and SHIP-BUILDING, for much that appertains to naval war, at sea, we shall here direct our attention to that branch of the subject which is commonly designated Naval Tactics; and notwithstanding the great alteration which the introduction of steam has produced, and which will be noticed hereafter, it seems desirable to give such an insight into this subject as will enable the results of the change to be better understood. By this term is understood the art of arranging fleets or squadrons in such an order or disposition as may be most convenient for attacking the enemy, defending themselves, or of retreating with the greatest advantage. Naval tactics are founded on those principles which time and experience have enabled us to deduce from the improved state of modern naval warfare, which has occasioned not only a difference in the mode of constructing and working ships, but even in the total disposition and regulation of fleets and squadrons. We here propose to lay down the general principles of naval tactics, and to describe, as briefly as is consistent with perspicuity, the most improved systems which have been adopted in modern times.
Fleets are generally divided into three squadrons, the Ordinary van, centre, and rear, each under the command of a flag-officer. The admiral of the fleet, or chief in command, leads the centre division, while the van is usually commanded by a vice-admiral, and the rear by a rear-admiral. Each squadron is distinguished by the position of the colours in the ships of which it is composed. Thus, the ships of the centre squadron carry their pendants at the main-top-gallant mast head, while those of the van division have their pendants at the fore-top-gallant mast head, and those of the rear at the mizen-top mast head. Each squadron, as far as possible, consists of the same number of ships, and as nearly as may be of the same force. In large fleets, the squadrons are sometimes again divided in a similar manner; the van and rear of the squadron being headed by rear-admirals, or senior captains, called commodores. In the usual mode of forming the lines, each commanding admiral arranges his ship in the centre of his own squadron, and thus the admiral of the fleet is in the centre of the line. When no enemy is in sight, the sloops, store-ships, fire-ships, and other small vessels, are dispersed to windward of the fleet, that they may be more easily supported, and more readily answer signals. The frigates lie to windward of the van and rear of the convoy, thus keeping a good look-out, and keeping the small vessels in their proper station. When the fleet sails in three columns, the centre still keeps in the middle, while the van and rear form the starboard or the larboard column, according to circumstances. These arrangements are called orders of sailing, and will be better understood from the following definitions.
The starboard line of bearing is that line on which the arranged ships of a fleet bear from each other on a close-hauled line, whatever course they may be steering, so that
1 The able article in the last edition by Colonel Hamilton Smith has been freely used in the present.
2 This is adapted from the article in the former edition.
Warlike Operations at Sea. when the ships haul their wind, or tack together, they may be on a line close hauled upon the starboard tack. The larboard line of bearing is that line on which the ships, when hauling their wind, or tacking together, may be formed on a line close hauled on the larboard tack. The ships of a fleet are said to be on a line abreast when their keels are parallel to each other, and their main-masts lie in the same straight line. Ships are said to be in a line on the bow or quarter when they are arranged in a straight line cutting their keels obliquely in the same angle, so that, reckoning from any intermediate ship, the ships towards one extremity of the line will be on the bow of that ship, while those towards the other extremity will be on her quarter. When several ships in the same line steer the same course, while that course is different from the line of sailing, they are said to sail chequerwise.
When the ships of a fleet arranged in any of the orders of sailing, and on the same line, perform successively the same manoeuvre, as each gets into the wake of the ship that leads the van of the line or squadron, tacking or veering, bearing away or coming to the wind in the same point of the wake of the leading ship, they are said to manoeuvre in succession.
There are usually reckoned five orders of sailing, exclusive of the line of battle, the order of retreat, &c. In the first order (see figs. 23 and 24), the fleet is arranged on the starboard or larboard line of bearing, all the ships steering the same course. In these cases the fleet, by hauling the wind when in the starboard line, as in fig. 23, will be ready to form the line on the starboard tack; and when ranged on the larboard line of bearing, as in fig. 24, it will, by tack-
ing, be ready to form the line on the larboard tack. The arrows annexed to the diagrams mark the direction of the wind, as in ordinary charts.
This first order of sailing is now seldom employed, except in passing through a narrow strait. In the second order of sailing, the fleet steering any proper course, is ranged in a line perpendicular to the direction of the wind, as in fig. 25. This second order, besides being equally defective with the former, is subject to the additional disadvantage of rendering it extremely difficult for the ships to tack, without each ship falling on board that next astern.
In the third order of sailing, the whole fleet is close hauled, and ranged on the two lines of bearing, so as to form an angle of twelve points, having the admiral's ship (A, fig. 26) in the angular point, and the whole fleet steering the same course. Thus, supposing, as in the figure, the wind at north, the starboard division of the fleet will bear W.N.W. of the admiral, and the larboard E.N.E. This order in small fleets or squadrons is superior to either of the former; but when the fleet is numerous, the line will be too much extended.
In the fourth order, the fleet is divided into six or more columns, and is thus more concentrated. The com-
manders, ranged on the two lines of bearing, have their squadrons astern of them, on two lines parallel to the direction of the wind; the first ships of each column being, with respect to the commander of the squadron, the one on his starboard, the other on his larboard quarter. The distance between the columns should be such that the fleet may readily be reduced to the third order of sailing, and from that to the order of battle. This order is adapted
for fleets or convoys crossing the ocean, and is represented
in fig. 27. But as it requires much time to reduce a fleet from this order to that of battle, it is defective when in presence of an enemy.
In the fifth order, the fleet, close hauled, is arranged in three columns parallel to each other, the van commonly forming the weather, and the rear the lee column. See fig. 28. Fig. 29 represents the same order, except that each column is here subdivided into two, with the ship bearing the commander of each squadron in the centre of each subdivision.
In forming the order or line of battle, the ships of the Order of fleet are drawn up in a line nearly close hauled, standing battle under easy sail, so that
each ship may be at a certain distance from the ship immediately ahead, as a cable's length, or half that distance. The fireships and frigates ahead and astern form a line parallel to the former, and to the windward of it if the enemy be to the leeward, but to the leeward if the enemy be to windward. This order is denoted by fig. 30, where the fleet is sailing on the starboard tack, with the wind at north.
When a fleet is compelled to retreat before a superior Order of force, it is usually arranged in an order the reverse of the retreat, third order of sailing; the divisions of the fleet being ranged in the two lines of bearing, so as to form an angle of 135° or twelve points, the admiral's ship being in the angular point, and the frigates, transports, &c., included within the wings to leeward. See fig. 31, where the fleet is sailing right before the wind. Though any other direction may be taken, the two lines still form the same angle.
Warlike Operations at Sea. The order of convoy is that in which the ships are all in each other's wake, steering in the same point of the compass, and forming a right line. If the fleet is numerous, it
may be divided into three columns, which are to be ranged parallel to each other, that of the admiral occupying the centre, and all steering the same course.
Having thus described the ordinary positions of a fleet, we must explain the manœuvres by which they are produced, and beginning with the orders of sailing.
To form a fleet in the first order of sailing, supposing the ships to be in no particular order, that ship which is to lead on the proposed line of bearing for the order of sailing runs to leeward of the greater part of the fleet, and then hauls her wind under an easy sail. Each of the other ships then proceeds to take the proper station by chasing the ship which is to be ahead of her, and when in the wake of the leading ship, adjusts her quantity of canvas so as to preserve the proper distance. The ships thus arranged astern of each other are in the line of battle; and from this the first order of sailing is formed, by each ship bearing away at the same time, and all steering the proposed course.
In forming the second order of sailing, the leading ship runs to leeward of so many of the fleet that each ship may readily fetch her wake, and then steers a course eight points from the wind, under an easy sail. The line is formed by each ship in the same manner as in the first order, except that, before bearing away, the line is perpendicular to the direction of the wind, or each ship has the wind on her beam.
As, in the third order of sailing, the admiral's ship is in the centre, to produce this position, the fleet being formed in a line on one of the lines of bearing, and the ships steering in each other's wake, ten points from the wind, the leading or leewardmost ship first hauls her wind. The second ship does the same as soon as she gets into the wake of the former; and this is done by each ship till the admirals' ships haul their wind, when they reach the wake of the leading ship. At the same time that the admiral's ship hauls her wind, the sternmost half of the fleet does the same. The ships are now in the third order of sailing, from which the fleet can be formed in the line of battle on either tack.
To form the fourth order of sailing, the commanding admirals range themselves on the two lines of bearing, at a proper distance from each other, steering the proposed course; and the ships of the several columns take their respective places, parallel to each other, and forming lines in the direction of the wind.
To form the fifth order, the three leading ships of the divisions take their posts abreast and to leeward of each other, keeping their wind under an easy sail; then the ships of each squadron make sail, and take their respective stations at the proper distance astern of their leaders, while the commanders of each division, and the corresponding ships of each, keep mutually abreast of each other.
In forming from the first order of sailing, if the ships are running large on the tack that answers to the line of bearing on which they sail, and if the line is to be formed on the same tack, all the ships haul their wind at once, or as quickly as possible after the next to windward; but if
they be on the other tack with respect to the line of bearing, they all haul their wind and tack or veer together. If the line of battle is to be formed on the other line of bearing, the ship most to leeward veers or tacks, and hauls her wind, while the rest of the fleet veer or tack at the same time, and steer with the wind four points free, and each ship hauls her wind as soon as she gets within the wake of the leader. See figs. 32 and 33.
Suppose the fleet running before the wind in the second order of sailing. To form the line from this position, all the ships haul up together on the proper tack, presenting their heads eight points from the wind at the line on which they are arranged; the leading ship then hauls her wind, immediately making sail or shortening sail, so as to close or open the order, and the same is done successively by all the rest. See fig. 34.
In a fleet running large in the third order, the line of battle is formed by the wing which is in the line of bearing corresponding to the tack on which the line is be formed, and the ship at the angle, hauling their wind together, while the ships of the other wing haul up together eight points from the wind; each ship moving in this direction till she reach the wake of the other wing, when she hauls close up. See fig. 35.
In forming the line of battle on the same tack from the fifth order of sailing (as the fourth is not calculated for forming a line of battle) the centre brings to, so as only to keep steerage way; the weather column bears away two points, and when it gets ahead of the centre, hauls its wind, while the ships of the lee column tack together, and crowd sail to gain the wake of the centre, when they retack together, and complete the line. (See fig. 36); or the weather column brings to, while the centre and lee tack together, and bear away two points free. When the ships of the centre column have gained the wake of the van, they retack together, and bring to; and when those of the lee have gained the rear line, they retack together, and all stand on; or, lastly, the lee column brings to, the centre runs under easy sail two points free, to get ahead of the rear squadron, while the rear bears away under a press of sail two points free, to get ahead of the centre division.
Warlike Operations change. Suppose the weather and centre columns to interchange. To form the lee under these circumstances, the
column veers away seven points on the other tack, forming the rear squadron. See fig. 40.
centre stands on, while the weather column bears away eight points, and having reached the wake of the centre, which now forms the van, hauls up; the ships of the lee column tack together, and run under a press of sail, within two points free, so as just to gain the rear of the line when they retack together (see fig. 37); or the lee column brings to,
while the centre squadron bears away three points under easy sail, and having reached the wake of the van, hauls up to form the centre division.
Suppose the centre and lee columns to interchange. The lee column stands on close hauled under an easy sail; the weather column bears away two points under a press of sail, till it reach the head of the line, when it hauls up; and the centre bears away eight points, and when in the wake of the lee, now the centre, hauls its wind. See fig. 38.
If the weather and lee columns interchange, the lee column stands on under a press of sail close hauled, while the centre, under easy sail, bears away two points, and when it reaches the wake of the now van squadron, hauls its
wind; and the weather column bears away eight points, hauling up when in the wake of the centre. See fig. 39.
Suppose the centre column to form the van, and the weather the rear division. Here the lee column brings to, while the centre bears away two points, forming the line ahead of the former, now the centre; and the weather
To form the line so that the lee column may form the van, and the centre the rear, the lee column is to stand on under a press of sail, while the weather bears away three points under easy sail, and the centre bears away eight points, the ships of each column hauling their wind when in the wake of the now van division. See fig. 41.
If the line of battle is to be formed on the other tack, so that the weather shall form the van division, as in the first case, the ships of the weather column first tack successively, while those of the centre and lee stand on, the former under easy sail, and the latter shortening sail, the leading ships tacking when in the wake of the now van, taking great care that the ships of the centre and lee draw not too near to the sternmost ships of the van, or to each other. See fig. 42.
To form the line on the other tack, when the centre and weather columns interchange, the weather column brings to, while the centre column stands on, till the leading ship be fully able to clear the weather column, when the ships of the centre tack successively as they reach the wake of the van. The lee column stands on, tacking successively as the ships get into the wake of the van, under moderate sail. See fig. 43.
In forming the line on the other tack, when the centre and lee interchange, the centre brings to, while the ships of the weather tack under shortened sail, and the lee under a press of sail stands on; the leading ship having gained the wake of the line, tacks, and is followed in succession by
Warlike her division. The centre column fills and stands on, when Operations at Sea. the first ship of that column, and the last of the lee, bear from each other in a direction perpendicular to that of the wind. See fig. 44.
To form on this same tack, so that the weather and lee may interchange, the weather and centre bring to, while the lee crowds sail till it can pass ahead of the weather column, when the ships tack in succession. As soon as the leading ship of the centre, and the last of the lee, bear from each other in a line perpendicular to the wind, the centre fills and tacks in succession when in the wake of the now van; and the ships of the weather column do the same when their leading ship and the last of the centre are under similar circumstances. See fig. 45.
Suppose the centre is to form the van, and the weather the rear, in forming the line on the other tack. The weather brings to, while the other columns make sail till they can pass ahead of the former on the other tack, when they tack successively. The weather column, when the others have passed it, fills and tacks to form the rear. See fig. 46.
Suppose now the lee column is to form the van. The weather and centre bring to, while the lee crowds sail and tacks when it can pass ahead of the weather column. When the last ship of the now van has passed to windward of the former weather column, the van shortens sail, to give time for the other columns to form, and the weather
and centre fill at the same time, to gain the wake of the van, when they tack in succession. See fig. 47.
It may now be shown how a fleet may be disposed in the principal orders of sailing from the line of battle; and here, as before, we have several varieties.
1. To form the first order of sailing from the line of battle on the same tack, all the ships are to bear away together as many points as the admiral may direct, keeping in the line of bearing for the proper tack. The sternmost first bears away, and the others follow in quick succession, to avoid running foul of each other.
2. If they are to form on the other tack, the leading ship bears away four points to leeward, and the rest follow in succession. The sternmost ship having bore away, the whole haul up, and will be in bearing for the line on the other tack. See fig. 48.
3. To form the second order of sailing from the line of battle, the whole fleet is to bear away together ten points, so that when the headmost ship, which first presses sail, shall come abreast of the second ship, the second ship must adapt her sail to keep in this bearing, and so in succession, each taking care to keep the preceding ship in a line with herself, perpendicular to the direction of the wind. The whole fleet will now be before the wind. See fig. 49.
4. To form the third order, the whole fleet is to bear away together ten points, the headmost half, including the centre ship, carrying a degree of sail to preserve their line of bearing, while each of the remaining ships is successively to shorten sail, so as to form the other line of bearing with respect to that on which they were before arranged. See fig. 50.
5. To change from the line of battle to the fifth order on the same tack. Of this evolution there are several varieties, but we shall mention only two; first, when the van is to form the weather, and the rear the lee column, and the fleet to keep as much as possible to windward. In this case the van and centre tack together, and run close hauled in
bow and quarter line, while the rear proceeds in its former course under easy sail. When each ship of the centre is abreast of the corresponding ship of the rear, the centre retacks, while the van stands on till the centre and rear come up, when it also retacks, and all the columns regulate their distances. Secondly, when the van is to form the lee, and the rear the weather column, the van bears away under easy sail, and goes at right angles with the line ahead, while the centre runs two points free, each ship steering for that ship of the van which is to be abreast of her when in column. The distance must be determined by the leader of the van, who is not to haul up with her division till she and the sternmost ship of the centre column are in a line at right angles with the wind, when both stand on under easy sail, while the rear crowds sail to pass to windward of both.
6. To form the fifth order of sailing from the line of battle on the other tack. Of this there are also several varieties, but two only will be noticed. First, when the van is to form the weather, and the rear the lee column, the van tacks in succession, while the leading ship of the centre is to tack when the leader of the van passes him exactly to windward, in which she is followed by her division, and the rear manoeuvres in the same manner with respect to the centre. Secondly, when the rear is to form the weather and the van the lee column, the van tacks in succession, and when about, either shortens sail or brings to, to allow the other columns time to form. The centre and rear then crowd sail, and tack in succession; the former tacking when its leader has the centre of the lee column in a line at right angles with the wind, or when its centre passes astern of the lee column. When the centre has tacked, it regulates its rate of sailing by the lee, and both wait for the rear to pass to windward. The rear tacks when the leader has the first ship of the lee in a line at right angles with the wind, or when its centre ship passes astern of the centre column.
The preceding descriptions of the several evolutions of a fleet, principally derived from the works of Mr Clerk, are sufficient to explain the nature of naval tactics. At the time they were originally drawn up, every movement of a ship was dependent on the wind, and hence it was the great object of a fleet to get to windward of the enemy, so as to be able to select the most fitting point of attack, and to bear down upon the hostile fleet in the required direction, having in the wind a power at command. If, however, the advantage of a fair wind enabled the one fleet to make choice of the point where it was presumed the most decisive blow could be struck in respect to the action itself, the fleet attacked possessed the same in respect to retreat, and a battle could scarcely be rendered decisive unless fought under circumstances or in a position which rendered defeat decisive by cutting off the possibility of retreat. In these particulars naval warfare closely resembled warfare on land, as facility of retreat enables a defeated army to retire, and, falling back on its reserves to rally, and, when sufficiently reinforced, to resume the conflict. As, then, with a land army, it is necessary in order to obtain a decisive result either to intercept the communication of the enemy with his base of operations, or to bring him to action in a position where retreat, in case of defeat, is cut off by natural obstacles; so also a fleet should, if defeated, be unable to return into port, be forced to separate so as to fall an easy prey to detachments sent in pursuit, or by the very nature of the position obliged to surrender, or to run either ashore or on the rocks. Whilst, therefore, there was always a certain similarity in the principles of war, whether carried on at sea or on land, even when the necessity of having the wind, as a moving power, crippled or restricted most of the movements, it may be now said, that the principles of land and maritime war will be still more
assimilated, since steam, having replaced wind, both parties have nearly an equal facility in moving, though even now the wind, when it rises beyond a very moderate limit, will prove a source of advantage or disadvantage to one or other of the parties, and equality will only exist when in a perfect calm there is an absence of all disturbing influences. This change, combined with the wonderful improvement of artillery, will doubtless encourage the use of smaller vessels, which will now be able to act at a distance against large ships, just as batteries do against a fortress. The use of ships as battering-rams, the casing of ships with iron plates so as to resist shot, are amongst the natural results of the introduction of steam as a motive power, and of the great improvement of artillery. Clerk explained well the general principles of naval tactics as suited to the then powers of locomotion, and Nelson carried them out to perfection. The French claim for the gallant Suffren the merit of adopting a similar bold system of naval tactics in the East Indies, and there can be no doubt that he there displayed great nautical skill; but it was reserved for Nelson at Trafalgar to carry naval renown, whether founded on superior seamanship or the characteristic bravery and personal fitness of English sailors, to the highest pitch. The French and Spanish fleet was drawn up in one extensive line, and the English fleet bore down upon it in two columns, one led by Nelson in the Victory, and the other by Collingwood in the Royal Sovereign, and whilst the enemy's line was, almost by compulsion, nearly immovable, the advancing columns, regardless of the enfilade fire of the enemy, came down upon the line, breaking it into distinct sections, and, engaging the ships marked out for attack as each column came up, had the manifest advantage of bringing an overpowering force to bear on the ships engaged, placing them often between two fires, and cutting them off from assistance or support. The glorious victory which followed was dearly purchased by the loss of the unparalleled naval hero Nelson, to whose surpassing merit, as a sailor of genius as well as of valour Rear-Admiral Comte E. Bouët Willammez does ample justice, even whilst paying a just tribute to the valour of his own countrymen.
Nelson is gone, and some successor to him in fame will doubtless mark out a system of naval tactics more suited to the wants of the present day. It is believed that the superiority of English sailors remains unchanged, and therefore will have its weight in any future engagement, for to be at ease on board ship, a man must be a real sailor; but new systems are necessary for the most efficient application of a new motive power and improved weapons of war. A reference to fig. 51, and a full consideration of the nature of the movements on the great day of Trafalgar will satisfy every one that naval victories cannot now be won, even by British fleets, in the manner they were formerly gained. It is manifest that the success of the bold manoeuvre of Nelson was mainly due to the comparative immovability of the French and Spanish fleet. Had the ships of the French line been steamers, they would have changed their position, and not only brought a heavy fire to bear on the advancing columns, but have formed lines exterior to those of the British fleet, so as to have placed the latter between two fires. Naval history records an example of a single ship placing herself between two Spanish ships, and when the engagement had fairly commenced, running ahead and leaving the two Spanish ships to continue firing into each other, unconscious, in the smoke, that the hostile ship was not between them. Such a skilful manoeuvre was exceptional, and not likely to be applicable to more than single ships. Indeed, a conversion of the main line such as that suggested would rather lead to the formation of two lines, meeting at an angle in the centre, and embracing the two advancing columns, than to that of two
Warlike distinct lines, as before observed; but in either case it is clear that naval warfare must be carried on in a different way.
way, and that the immense advantage which steam and the improvement of artillery have conferred on small ships, which will now represent in naval warfare the light troops or riflemen of the land service, cannot be overlooked. In any new scheme of naval tactics, the movements of small ships in approaching large must be taken into consideration, as well as the best mode of combining the action of large and small ships—both in attack and defence, in advance and in retreat. Admiral Comte Bouët Willammez has sketched such a scheme of naval tactics, suitable, in his opinion, to steam-ships, and it in principle assimilates the combinations and movements of naval to those of land warfare, a result which was to be expected, now that the power of moving at will, and in any direction, has been conferred by the application of steam. He
justly concludes his description by this remark: "A new system of tactics, designed for a new description of fleet, can only be the work of time and of experience; but in order that any work should come to maturity it is necessary that it should have a beginning. Nobody has as yet undertaken the solution of this difficult problem, since the screw steamer has threatened to exclude the sailing vessel from the arena of war, and I have therefore taken the initiative. Eight simple or compound orders, and the numerous operations which flow from them, have been described, but it must not be supposed that all will be in general or even in frequent use, though the sailor should accustom himself to study and to know all the cases which may occur in the conduct of a fleet under all conditions."
No remarks on the general operation of war can be considered at the present time complete, unless they include some notice of the probable effects upon the art of war of the great improvement in firearms. With the ancients, as the means of projection were inferior, the chief reliance was upon the arms used in close conflict, either the sword or the spear; but even then the sling, the bow, the catapult, &c., in the hands of cool and skillful men, were capable of producing most important results. Coming to more modern times, the yew-bow of the English archer, and the cross-bow of the Genoese, were recognised as most important weapons, often throwing troops into confusion, and preparing the way for more close attack. It might have been expected that the invention of gunpowder, by supplying a more perfect projecting power, would have given pre-eminence to the weapon invented for firing over that used in the charge; or, when the musket had, by the addition of a bayonet, combined the advantages of a pike with those of a firearm, the former would seldom be resorted to, and that the success of battles would depend almost entirely on the fire of both artillery and musketry, and little on the charge by the bayonet. The imperfect construction of the first firearms, the rude manufacture of the gunpowder, did much to counterbalance the advantages gained by the use of firearms; and though the attention paid to artillery soon made that arm formidable in war, the little instruction given in the art of musket-firing rendered it in practice comparatively so harmless, that Marshal Saxe considered it illusory, and Suvarrow accustomed his soldiers to look upon it as a mere folly, and to trust only to the bayonet. General Warnery strongly complained of the little attention paid to the musketry training of soldiers;
1 Battle of Trafalgar.
⊕ French and Spanish Ships.
⊖ English Ships.
A V G. Advanced Guard of the Franco-Spanish Fleet.
A G. Rear-Guard of the Franco-Spanish Fleet.
C. N. Nelson's Ships.
C. W. Collingwood's Ships.
English Fleet.
N. Victory (Nelson).
S. W. Royal Sovereign (Collingwood).
A. Temeraire.
B. Neptune.
C. Conqueror.
D. Leviathan.
Z. Prince.
V. Dreadnought.
L. Belle-Isle.
M. Mars.
N. Tonnant.
O. Bellerophon.
P. Colossus.
Q. Achilles.
R. Polyphemus.
S. Swiftsure.
T. Revenge.
U. Defiance.
X. Thunderer.
Y. Defence.
Franco-Spanish Fleets.
(F. marks the French Ships, S. the Spanish.)
1. Bucentaure, F.
2. Santissima-Trinidad, S.
3. Redoubtable, F.
4. Neptune, F.
5. San-Leandro, S.
6. San-Justo, S.
7. Indomptable, F.
8. Santa-Anna, S.
9. Fougueux, F.
10. Monarca, S.
11. Pluton, F.
12. Algesiras, F.
13. Bahama, S.
14. Aigle, F.
15. Swiftsure, F.
16. Argonauta, F.
17. Montanez, S.
18. Argonauta, S.
19. Berwick, F.
20. Juan-Népo-mucine, S.
21. San-Ildefonse, S.
22. Achille, F.
23. Prince-des-Asturies, S.
24. Formidable, F.
25. Scipion, F.
26. Neptune, S.
27. Intrepid, F.
28. Rayo, S.
29. Duguay-Trouin, F.
30. Mont-Blanc, F.
31. San-Francisco, S.
32. San-Augustino, S.
33. Néros, F.
but even had the attention now bestowed on this subject in our schools of musketry been then displayed, the imperfection of the weapon would have rendered its performances unsatisfactory. M. Léon Marès states, that by experiments at St Omer, in 1846-1849, it was found that at 100 metres (110 yards) 47 per cent. of the balls fired struck a target 6½ feet high and 22 inches wide, at 192 yards 20 per cent., whilst at 440 yards only 7 per cent., struck a target 6½ feet high and 13 feet wide, so that the common musket was not sufficiently precise to turn to the best account even the skill of a good marksman; and taking into account the probable disturbance of the equanimity of a soldier in the field of battle, the interference of smoke, and the uncertainty as to distance, it was quite unequal to the wants of the soldier; although it cannot be doubted that the fire even of old Brown Bess at 110 yards, in the hands of men whose nerves were unshaken by the sight of an advancing enemy, was and would be very destructive.
The introduction generally into our service of the rifle, or as it is called by the French, an arm of precision, has totally altered the properties of the musket; for whilst with its bayonet it retains its merits as an admirable weapon for close quarters, it has acquired the power of being used with advantage and certainty at distances which would formerly have appeared incredible. The rifle was indeed used with great success in the chase, so far back as the end of the fifteenth century; but it is only recently that the tedious mode of forcing the ball into the barrel by the aid of a mallet and of an iron ramrod, has given way to the ingenious use of the principle of expansion, as applied to a bullet under the influence of the gases produced by the explosion of the charge. The same principle has been applied to cannon; and although the greater weight of the projectiles had before enabled the skilful gunner to attain a high degree of accuracy, the rifling of guns, and the saving of windage consequent on the expansion of the material used as a coating to the ball, have together conferred on cannon an accuracy and an extension of range quite proportionate to that gained by the musket. It might have been supposed that such improvements would have raised the musket in the estimation of soldiers, and so, it is believed, it really has, though some military men still speak disparagingly of it as compared with the bayonet; and the celebrated words of the present Emperor of the French have without doubt tended much to strengthen this delusion. "The new arms of precision are dangerous only at a distance; they will not prevent the bayonet from being, as formerly, the terrible arm of the French infantry."
Let us merely consider what ought to be the conduct of an army waiting in line whilst an enemy is advancing to the attack. Now, supposing the infantry, not at the moment harassed by the fire of artillery, observe the enemy halt and prepare to fire; soldiers selected as being skilful judges of distances, then give the word "sight," and they then calmly fire and reload. This may be repeated at intervals, and in every case with deadly effect. Or the men may be lying down with their muskets sighted to a particular distance, and, warned by the men on look-out, rise and fire at the exact moment. If troops are to fire whilst advancing, they should do so in the same manner, look-out-men giving the order to fire at the exact moment, the muskets being then at once loaded and sighted to a new distance, say 100 or some definite number of yards in advance. All this being made a portion of ordinary drill, it is evident that success in defence, or even in attack, would greatly depend on accuracy of judgment as to distance, and perfect coolness as to action. Much of the effect of the bayonet is moral; and there can be no doubt that if soldiers lose their coolness when they see an enemy advancing to the charge, their last fire, which ought to be decisive, will fail in accuracy and do little harm,
whilst they will turn tail, and not wait the enemy to cross bayonets with them. M. Marès rightly observes, that French soldiers ought not to rely on the permanence of this state of things, but should expect that the time may come when they will meet an enemy acting in defence with the same calmness and firmness, as they display boldness in the attack. Doubtless he had English soldiers in his mind when he penned these words.
By many it is supposed that the improvement of artillery has maintained its superiority to musketry; but there can be little doubt that skilful riflemen, hovering in front of uncovered guns, will find the means of picking off the men and shooting the horses, so as still to do, what they have on other occasions done, hold a battery in check. Reserve guns may indeed act at a distance; but unless they keep light troops in front of them, it cannot be expected that they will be allowed to continue long undisturbed. Napoleon III. would indeed have been right in saying that the new arms of precision would not materially affect the system of war, had he simply meant that the bravest and most skilful soldiers would still be the most successful.
The effect of rifled cannon on naval warfare has been already noticed, in assimilating ships to fortresses, but with this difference, that the ship is totally exposed, whilst the fortress on land is so covered that the fire of guns at a great distance is nearly as harmless as they would have been even when unimproved. In defence, the fortress on land evidently gains by the increased power of guns and accuracy of fire; and there will doubtless be in consequence much modification of the science of fortification. But the really great question is, how far the improvement of firearms conduces to the safety of Great Britain; and that deserves especial consideration. In the first place, it may be considered as demonstrated that the principal force of infantry consists in its fire; and that, however valuable ordinary drill may be to the soldier in accustoming him to move with regularity, and thus to place himself in every required position almost by instinct, the importance of accurate firing has increased with the improvement of the musket, and now far outweighs that of drill. In fact, it may be said that pliability of muscle, flexibility of body, and skill in firing, will tell in the field, when the stiffness and niceties of equipment so rigorously enforced on the parade in the English army, have been, as a matter of necessity, laid aside. It is, however, equally certain that the bayonet exercise ought to be practised diligently by our soldiers as it is by the French, the command of that weapon giving confidence, and enabling a soldier to contemplate the advance of an enemy with composure, if not with contempt.
To render irregular troops or volunteers expert with the bayonet will probably be impossible; but to render them skilful marksmen, just as their ancestors were skilful archers, will be a comparatively easy matter; and there can be no doubt that rifle firing will now become the national pastime. The light infantry movements which are suited to this class of soldiers, require indeed much practice and great intelligence and quickness; but such qualities are just those which may be expected in the volunteers; and there can be no doubt that manoeuvres suited to them are, in their character, more independent and less revolting than the stiff and restrained tactics of the line soldier. Should the volunteers be ever required to stand firm on the advance of regular troops, it is by the use of a pistol rather than of a bayonet that they should rely in repelling them. A double-barrelled pistol in his girdle on one side, and a dagger on the other, a brave, collected man, however little drilled, might, after firing his last close discharge with effect, wait coolly the attack of his enemy with a certainty of destroying him.
Warlike Operations at Sea. We have already commented on the difficulty of artillery, unless covered, maintaining their ground against skilful marksmen, taking advantage of the features of the ground, and creeping up within 800 or 1000 yards of a battery. If artillery be simply obliged to keep their distance, much will be gained, as the eye will be required to aid itself by telescopic sights to ensure that accuracy of which the gun is capable. The fire of cannister has hitherto been the most destructive; but artillery can hardly expect to be brought so near as is necessary for the effective fire of that description of missile; and although the Armstrong projectile has been so contrived as in part to supply the place of the Shrapnell shell, the effect of those fearful discharges of cannister, which were so conducive to the success of many of Napoleon's battles, are far less likely to be witnessed with modern artillery under the altered contingencies of war. It may indeed be said, that the fire of well-trained infantry, armed with the rifled musket, will partake of much of the character of cannister; cavalry will be unable to approach such infantry with any chance of success; and though for foraging, reconnaissances, and especially for pursuit, cavalry must be retained, they will doubtless be made as light, both as regards men and horses, as possible.
M. Léon Marès has concluded his observations on "Des Nouvelles Armes Rayées" (Paris, 1860), in terms so sensible, that, although not those of a military man, they are deserving the attention of both soldiers and statesmen:—
"From all which has been stated, it may be concluded, that infantry have acquired, from the use of the new arms, an additional importance in fields of battle, more particularly when acting as independent riflemen, provided only that their discipline is sufficient to enable them to act correctly under command, or rather to be under the influence of a guiding authority. Hence it is that militia, volunteers, or national guards, if duly trained to fire well, are a force which will henceforth throw a great weight into the scale of war, and ought therefore to be most carefully organised. Since, indeed, the least accident of ground, or the most simple intrenchment, is sufficient to afford cover to infantry, the rifled musket acquires in action the utmost value, since a small number of discharges, or even a single discharge, well directed, will be sufficient to destroy or cripple an advancing force. Under such an influence, the value of light cavalry will increase, whilst that of heavy cavalry will diminish; and even artillery, whatever may be the precision and increased range of its fire, will never, when uncovered, be able to defend itself against riflemen, unless supported by infantry equally skilled in musketry fire. At greater distances, the fire of artillery against masses of troops will be more formidable than ever, and hence the ground best calculated to shelter the troops, and to facilitate the approach of riflemen intended to hold it in check, should be selected.
"Lastly, it may be asked, what effect this great improvement of the weapons of destruction has had on the moral advancement of mankind? When it is reflected how great must be the advantage in defence of an accurate know-
ledge of the ground, it may be fairly said that the new arm, when wielded by a skilful hand, confers strength on weakness, and powerfully assists the attacked against the aggressor. The arm which permits infantry to fight with advantage against cavalry and artillery is that expressly fitted for poorer people when contending against richer, for it is the latter who may best incur the cost of the most expensive armaments. The arm which requires more especially for its construction a knowledge of mechanical processes, and for its successful manipulation, contempt of danger, coolness, and intelligence, is the arm of intelligence; and again, the arm which permits the mass of the people, if properly trained, to take an active and effective part in war is the arm of a free people, for it is only the citizens of a free country who can be allowed to remain armed without danger to themselves or their neighbours. It is well, therefore, that weakness should be protected against strength, liberty and independence against despotism."
Such sentiments as these from a Frenchman, unprejudiced by mere military feeling, are most gratifying; and it may be fairly deduced from the maxims of common sense, that though steam has facilitated the transport of troops, and thereby the invasion of our country, the general improvement of the weapons of war has been entirely in favour of the preservation of our liberties and independence. In landing on our coast, boats must be used, and a cloud of small steamers, issuing from all the small ports, and constructed, as many of the ancient galleys were, to run into and sink both small vessels and boats, would either render landing impossible, or throw the troops endeavour to land into such disorder as to render them easy of conquest after landing. Even, however, presuming that they have landed, can it be doubted that a comparatively small number of highly trained soldiers, prepared either to make a stand, or to attack at any moment, and covered on all sides by a cloud of skilled marksmen, would restrain the ardour, and stop the progress of the invading army. The great Napoleon anticipated, as Jomini informs us, that the transports in which troops intended for invasion were embarked, would have been convoyed by a fleet of 60 sail. One of two courses must certainly be adopted in such an enterprise; either the ships of war must precede the transports and fight a battle to clear the way for their advance, or must act as a convoy in the manner supposed by Napoleon, but in either case can we imagine that our channel fleet, even if inferior in number, could fight such a battle without destroying and crippling a large portion of the enemy's ships; and thus, even if not entirely victorious, they would leave the transports and boats open to the attack of gun-boats, and the smaller steamers which have been alluded to, with very little help or support from their larger ships. Such a naval battle could not be fought without calling the attention of artillery, cavalry, and infantry, both regular and volunteer, to the threatened point of landing, where they would be ready to make a first determined effort of resistance, of which the consequences upon the army would be nearly the same as those of the great conflict on the sea upon the enemy's fleet. (C.H.S.) (J.E.P.)