in theology, rising again from the dead; or a person's returning to a second life, with new bodily organs adapted to the state of its new existence.

One of the greatest arguments for the truth of Christianity is drawn from the resurrection of our Saviour; the circumstances of which are handed down to us in so plain and distinct a manner by the Evangelists, as make the evidence of this important truth amount to a demonstration.

Christians generally believe, that at the day of judgment the very identical body they have now, with the same flesh, blood, and bones, will be raised from the dead. But, in opposition to this opinion, many texts of Scripture have been urged, particularly the account given of this important event by St Paul; besides several philosophical objections, the principal of which are these.

That the same substance may happen to be a part of two or more bodies: thus a fish feeding on a man, and another man afterwards feeding on the fish, part of the body of the first man becomes incorporated with the fish, and afterwards with the body of the last man. Again, instances have been known of one man's immediately feeding on the body of another; and among the cannibals in the West Indies, who devour their enemies, the practice is frequent. Now it is alleged, where the substance of one is thus converted into the substance of another, each cannot arise with his whole body; to which then shall the common part be allotted?

To this objection some answer, That as all matter is not capable of being assimilated to the body, and incorporated with it, human flesh may very probably be of this kind; and therefore what is thus eaten, may be again excreted and carried off.

But Mr Leibnitz observes, that all that is essential to the body, is the original flamen, which existed in the semen of the father: that this may be conceived as the most minute point imaginable, and therefore not to be separated, nor any part of it united to the flamen of any other man: that all this bulk we see in the body, is only an accretion to this original flamen; and therefore there is no reciprocation of the proper matter of the human body.

Another objection is, that we know, by the late discoveries in the animal economy, that the human body is continually changing, and that a man has not entirely the same body to-day as he had yesterday; and it is even computed, that in less than seven years time the whole body undergoes a change. Which of those many bodies, then, which the same person has in the course of his life, is it that shall rise? or does all the matter that has ever belonged to him rise again? or does only some particular system thereof? the body, for example, he had at 20, at 40, or at 60 years old? If only this or that body arise, how shall it be rewarded or punished for what was done by the other? and with what justice does one person suffer for another?

To this it has been answered, on the principles of Leibnitz, that notwithstanding these successive changes, this flamen, which is the only essential part of the body, has always remained the same; and that, on Mr Locke's principles, personal identity, or the sameness of a rational being, consists in self-consciousness, in the power of considering itself the same thing in different times and places. By this, every one is to himself what he calls self; without considering whether that self be continued in the same, or in several substances. It is the same self now it was then; and it was by the same self which now reflects on an action, that that action was performed. Now it is this personal identity that is the object of rewards and punishments, which it is observed may exist in different successions of matter; so that to render the rewards and punishments just and pertinent, we need only to rise again with such a body, as that we retain the consciousness of our past actions.