its general and natural sense, denotes a persuasion, or a strong assent of the mind to the truth of any proposition. In which sense, belief has no relation to any particular kind of means or arguments, but may be produced by any means whatever. Thus we are said to believe our senses, to believe our reason, to believe a witness, &c. And hence, in rhetoric, all sorts of proofs, from whatever topics deduced, are called proofs, because apt to get belief or persuasion touching the matter in hand.

its more restrained and technical sense, invented by the schoolmen, denotes that kind of assent which is grounded only on the authority or testimony of some person or persons, asserting or attesting the truth of any matter proposed.

In this sense, belief stands opposed to knowledge and science. We do not say we believe that snow is white, or that the whole is equal to its parts; but we see and know them to be so. That the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, or that all motion is naturally rectilinear, are not said to be things credible, but scientific; and the comprehension of such truths is not belief but science.

But when a thing propounded to us is neither apparent to our senses, nor evident to our understanding; neither certainly to be collected from any clear and necessary connection with the cause from which it proceeds, nor with the effects which it naturally produces; nor is taken up upon any real arguments, or relation thereof to other acknowledged truths; and yet, notwithstanding, appears as true, not by manifestation, but by an attestation of the truth, and moves us to assent, not of itself, but in virtue of a testimony given to it—this is said to be properly credible; and an assent to this is the proper notion of belief or faith.