in commerce, a premium paid by government to the exporters of certain British commodities, as sail-cloth, gold and silver lace, silk-stockings, fish, corn, &c. The happy influence which bounties have on trade and manufactures is well known; nor can there be a more convincing proof of the good intentions of the government under which we live, than the great care that is taken to give all possible encouragement to those who shall establish or improve any hazardous branch of trade.

All undertakings, in respect either to mercantile enterprises, or in the establishment of manufactures, are political weak and feeble in their beginnings; and if unsuccessful, Survey of either kind entirely, or at least are seldom revived in Britain, the same age. Accidents of this nature are not only destructive to private persons, but exceedingly detrimental to the public interest. On this principle, more especially since trade, for which Providence designed us, hath been attended to, such attempts have been thought deserving, and have been favoured with, public support. This in former times usually flowed from the crown, in the form of letters-patent, charters, or other grants of privileges, which, however requisite they might be, were notwithstanding very frequently objects of censure. If such as obtained them failed in their endeavours, they were reputed projectors; if, on the other hand, they succeeded, they were considered as monopolizers. Corporations, which imply the uniting certain individuals into a body, that they may thereby become more useful to the community, are created by the crown. Many of these were formed for promoting trade; and, according to the old system of our government, were necessary and useful. On the same principle, privileges were granted to private persons, sons, on a suggestion, that what was immediately of use to them would terminate in public utility. These also did good in bringing in many arts and manufactures; though, in some cases, tending to private interest more than public emolument, they were liable to legal correction. In later times, and in concerns of moment, a much better method has been adopted, as often as it hath been found practicable, by rejecting private or particular interest, and proposing the designed advantages to such as should perform the stipulations on which they are granted. These bounties, as they are paid by the public, so they are solely calculated for the benefit of the public. They are sometimes given to encourage industry and application in raising a necessary commodity; which was intended by the bounty on exporting corn. The intention of this bounty was to encourage agriculture; and the consequence hath been, that we now grow more than twice as much as we did at the establishment of the bounty; we even consume twice as much bread as we then grew; yet in A.D. 1697, we exported a fifteenth part of what we grew, of late years a twenty-ninth part only. The bounty on this twenty-ninth part amounted to somewhat more than L.50,000, and the produce to more than L.400,000. It is evident that all this is so much clear gain to the nation. But this is far from being all that we have annually gained. For if our cultivation is doubled, as indeed it is, then the rent of lands, the subsistence of working hands, the profits of the tradesmen supplying them with utensils, clothes, the value of horses employed, &c., must all be taken into the account. Besides this we must add the freight (amounting to half the bounty), to make the idea of the advantages complete.

Sometimes bounties are given with a view to promote manufactures, as in the case of those made of silk. Many laws are to be found in our statute-books in favour of the silk manufacture, made with great wisdom and propriety, for the encouragement and support of many thousands of industrious persons employed therein. By statute 8 Geo. I. cap. 15, § 1, a bounty was given on the due exportation of ribbons and stuffs, of silk only, of three shillings upon a pound weight; silks, and ribbons of silk, mixed with gold and silver, four shillings a pound; on silk, gloves, silk stockings, silk fringes, silk laces, and sewing silk, one shilling and threepence a pound; on stuffs of silk and grogram yarn, eightpence a pound; on silks mixed with mule or cotton, one shilling; on stuffs of silk mixed with worsted, sixpence a pound, for three years; and, from experience of their utility, these were continued by subsequent statutes.

Sometimes bounties are given to support a new manufacture against foreigners already in possession of it, as in making linen and sail-cloth. The promoting of the manufacture of British sail-cloth was undoubtedly a very important national object, as the consumption was very large, and of consequence the purchase of it from foreigners an heavy expense on the public. Many methods were therefore devised, and countenanced by law, both here and in Ireland, for introducing and encouraging our own in preference to that of strangers, more especially in the royal navy. By stat. 12 Anne, cap. 16, § 2, a bounty was given of one penny per ell on all that was exported for a term, and continued by subsequent statutes. By 4 Geo. II. cap. 27, § 4, an additional bounty of another penny an ell is granted. These bounties were to be paid out of an additional duty on imported sail-cloth. By the same statute every ship built in Britain, or in the plantations, is, under the penalty of L.50, to be furnished with a complete suit of sails of British manufacture. The amount of these bounties mark the progress of the manufacture, which is also assisted by the fund on which the payment is assigned.

These assistances, however, are never bestowed but on mature deliberation, in virtue of strong proofs, and with a moral certainty of a national benefit. The great intention of bounties is to place the British trader on such ground as to render his commerce beneficial to his country. In order to this, some profit must accrue to himself, otherwise he would not embark therein; but this, whatever it be, must prove inconsiderable in comparison of what results to the public. For if, by the help of such a bounty, one or many traders export to the value of 1000, 10,000, or 100,000 pounds worth of commodities or manufactures, whatever his or their profit or loss (for the latter, through avidity and overloading the market, sometimes happens) may be, the nation gains the L.1000, L.10,000, or L.100,000; which was the object of the legislature in granting the bounty. Upon this consideration, that the entire produce of what is exported accrues to the nation, the legislature, when an alteration of circumstances required it, have made no scruple of augmenting a bounty; as in the case of refined sugar exported, from three to nine shillings per hundred weight. In like manner, the original bounty of one pound per ton in favour of vessels employed in the whale-fishing hath been doubled, and many new regulations made, in order to render this fishery more advantageous to the public. As a bounty is given on malt when allowed to be exported, so an equivalent of 30 shillings per ton hath been granted on all British made malt-spirits when exported, which is a common benefit to land, manufacture, and commerce.

It is indeed true, that on whatever account, or to whatever amount, this reward is given, the public seem to pay, and private persons seem to receive. But these private persons receive it as the hire from the public, for performing a service which otherwise they would not perform, the benefit of which accrues to the public, and who can therefore very well afford to pay that reward in reality, which, as we have stated it, the only seems to do. For, looking a little closer, we cannot help observing, that the bounty is paid to individuals, who, as such, make a part of the public. But the commodities or manufactures exported are sold to foreigners; and the whole produce of them, be it what it will, comes into the purse of the public. By attending to this self-evident doctrine, every reasonable and public-spirited man will be easily reconciled to bounties; and the three following considerations will be sufficient to obviate the most common objections that have been made to the practice of giving them. 1. That no bounty can be desired but on the plea of national utility, which always deserves notice, and cannot be mistaken. It must likewise be alleged and proved, that this is the only means whereby the national benefit can be attained. 2. The sums issued on this account not only show the clear expense of the bounty, but also indicate the profit gained by the public; for as the one cannot exist without the other, that amount must be the incontestable index of both. 3. It must be remembered (and of this too some instances might be given), that if bounties should be improperly bestowed, they will of course prove ineffectual, and after a few fruitless trials will remain unclaimed, and consequently produce no expense. There is indeed another objection which hath been made against the giving of bounties. This is grounded on the frauds to which they are supposed to be liable; and particularly the relanding of the goods on which the bounty hath been paid, and thereby deceiving and cheating the public. But whoever peruses the laws made on this head, and attentively considers the numerous precautions taken to fix every circumstance relative to the obtaining the bounty, the checks on the shipping of goods, the securities taken for their due exportation, the certificates required to ascertain their being actually delivered and sold in a foreign market, must be convinced, that to discharge all those securities, in case of an intended fraud, is a thing very difficult, if not impossible.

To these remarks we may add, that bounties are usually granted only for a limited time, and then expire; are always liable to be suspended; and of course can never be the cause of any great national loss. There is no doubt that, exclusive of frauds, the immoderate thirst of gain may tempt interested men to aim at converting what was calculated for public benefit to its detriment, for their own private advantage. Thus, on a prospect of short crops in other countries, men may take measures within the letter, but directly against the spirit, of the law, to send so much of our corn abroad as to endanger a famine at home. For this the wisdom of parliament provides, not barely by suspending the bounty, but by prohibiting exportation and opening the ports for foreign supplies. We cannot with any shadow of justice ascribe scarcity to the bounty on the exportation. If this was the case, suspensions would be frequent, whereas there have been but five in a course of 70 years. If the bounty had any share, the larger the exportation, the greater would be the scarcity. In A.D. 1750 we exported more than one fifth of our growth of wheat, which was notwithstanding but at four shillings per bushel; whereas a century before, A.D. 1650, when we had neither bounty nor exportation, wheat was at nine shillings and sixpence per bushel. The causes of scarcity are unkind seasons; which though human policy cannot prevent, yet their sad effects have been evidently lessened by our increased growth, since the taking place of bounty and exportation.

Queen Anne's Bounty, for augmenting poor livings under L.50 per annum, consists of the produce of the first-fruits and tenths, after the charges and pensions payable out of the same are defrayed. A corporation for management of the same was settled, &c. in 1704. See Augmentation.