See **CHRISTIANITY** and **CHRISTIANS**.

**Most CHRISTIAN King**, one of the titles of the king of France.

The French antiquaries trace the origin of this appellation up to Gregory the Great, who, writing a letter to Charles Martel, occasionally gave him that title, which his successors have since retained.

**CHRISTIAN Religion**, that instituted by Jesus Christ. See **CHRISTIANITY**.

**CHRISTIANITY**, the religion of Christians. The origin of this word is analogically derived, as other abstracts from the words their concretes, from the adjective *Christian*. This again is derived from the name *Χριστός, Christos*, from the word *χρίω, I anoint*. Christ is called the *anointed*, from a custom which extensively prevailed in antiquity, and was originally said to be of divine institution, of anointing persons in the sacerdotal or regal character, as a public signal of their consecration to their important offices, and as a testimony that heaven itself was the guarantee of that relation which then commenced between the persons thus consecrated and their subordinates.

The disciples of Jesus, after the death of their teacher, had for some time been called *Nazarenes*, from the name Nazareth in Galilee where he dwelt; which afterwards became the designation of a particular sect. They, who adopted the principles and professed the religion which he taught, were first distinguished by the name of *Christians* at Antioch. That profession, and those doctrines, we now proceed to delineate with as much perspicuity as the limits of our plan will admit, yet with the conciseness which a work so multifarious and extensive requires.

When a Christian is interrogated concerning the nature and foundation of his faith and practice, his ultimate reference, his last appeal, is to the facts, the doctrines, and the injunctions, contained in the books of the Old and New Testament. From these, therefore, and from these alone, must every fair account, or the materials of which it is composed, be extracted or deduced. Other formularies, or confessions of faith, may, according to the Christian, deserve more or less attention, as they are more or less immediately contained or implied in the scriptures. But whatever is not actually expressed in, or deduced by fair and necessary consequence from, these writings, must be regarded as merely human; and can have no other title to our assent and observation than what they derive from their conformity with the scriptures, with the dictates and feelings of a reformed and cultivated mind, or with those measures which are found expedient and useful in human life. But as those books, from whence the Christian investigates his principles of belief and rules of conduct, have been variously interpreted by different professors and commentators, these diversities have given birth to a multiplicity of different sects. It cannot, therefore, be expected, that any one who undertakes to give an account of Christianity, should comprehend all the writings and opinions which have been propagated and exhibited by historical, systematical, or polemical authors. These, if at all contained in such a work as this, should be ranged under their proper articles, whether scientifical, controversial, or biographical. It is our present business, if possible, to confine ourselves to a detail of such facts and doctrines as, in the strict and primitive sense of the word, are catholic, or in other expressions, to such as uniformly have been, and still are, recognized and admitted by the whole body of Christians.

We have already said that these, or at least the greatest number of them, appeal to the scriptures of the Old and New Testament as the ultimate standard, the only infallible rule of faith and manners. If you ask them, by what authority these books claim an absolute right to determine the consciences and understandings of men with regard to what they should believe and what they should do? they will answer you, that all scripture, whether for doctrine, correction, or reproof, was given by immediate inspiration from God.

If again you interrogate them how those books, which they call Scripture, are authenticated? they reply, that the evidences by which the Old and New Testament are proved to be the Word of God, are either external or internal. The external may again be divided into direct or collateral. The direct evidences are such as arise from the nature, consistency, and probability, of the facts; and from the simplicity, uniformity, competency, and fidelity, of the testimonies by which they are supported. The collateral events, are either the same occurrences supported by Hebraic testimonies, or others which concur with and corroborate the history of Christianity. Its internal evidences arise either from its exact conformity with the character of God, from its aptitude to the frame and circumstances of man, or from those supernatural convictions and affinities which are impressed on the mind by the immediate operation of the divine Spirit. These can only be mentioned in a cursory manner in a detail so concise as the present.

Such facts as are related in the history of his religion, the Christian affirms to be not only consistent each with itself, but likewise one with another. Hence it is, that, by a series of antecedents and consequences, they corroborate each other, and form a chain which cannot be broken but by an absolute subversion of all historical authenticity. Nor is this all: for, according to him, the facts on which Christianity is founded, not only constitute a series of themselves, but are likewise in several periods the best resources for supplying the chains in the history of our nature, and preserving the tenor of its annals entire. The facts themselves are either natural or supernatural. By natural facts we mean such occurrences as happen or may happen from the various operations of mechanical powers, or from the interposition of natural agents without higher affluents. Such are all the common occurrences of history, whether natural, biographical, or civil. By supernatural facts, we mean such as could not have been produced without the interposition of Deity, or at least of powers superior to the laws of mechanism or the agency of embodied spirits. Among these may be reckoned the immediate change of water into wine, the instantaneous cure of diseases without the intervention of medicine, the resuscitation of the dead, and others of the same kind. In this order of occurrences may likewise be numbered the exertions and exhibitions of prophetic power, where the persons by whom these extraordinary talents were displayed could neither by penetration nor conjecture unravel the mazes of futurity, and trace the events of which they spoke from their primary causes to their remote completions. So that they must have been the passive organs of some superior Being, to whom the whole concatenation of causes and effects which operate from the origin to the consummation of nature, was obvious at a glance of thought.

It has already been hinted, that the facts which we have called natural, not only agree with the analogy of human events, and corroborate each other, but in a great many emergencies nobly illustrate the history to the clue of nature in general. For this a Christian might offer citation of one instance, of which philosophy will not perhaps be able to produce any tolerable solution, without having recourse to the facts upon which Christianity is founded. For if mankind were originally descended from one pair alone, how should it have happened that long before the date of authentic history every nation had its own distinct language? Or if it be supposed, as some late philosophers have maintained, that man is an indigenous animal in every country; or, that he was originally produced in, and created for, each particular soil and climate which he inhabits; still it may be demanded, whence the prodigious multiplicity, the immense diversity, of languages? Is the language of every nation intuitive, or were they dictated by exigences, and established by convention? If the last of these suppositions be true, what an immense period of time must have passed? How many revolutions of material and intellectual nature must have happened? What accessions of knowledge, refinement, civilization, must human intercourse have gained before the formation and establishment even of the most simple, imperfect, and barbarous language? Why is a period so vast, obliterated to entirely as to escape the retrospect of history, of tradition, and even of fable itself? Why was the acquisition and improvement of other arts so infinitely distant from that of language, that the era of the latter is entirely lost, whilst we can trace the former from their origin through the various gradations of their progress.

These difficulties, inextricable by all the lights of history or philosophy, this more than Cimmerian darkness, is immediately dispelled by the Mosaic account of the confusion of tongues; wisely intended to separate... rate the tribes of men one from another, to replenish the surface of the globe, and to give its multiplied inhabitants those opportunities of improvement which might be derived from experiment and industry, variously exerted, according to the different situations in which they were placed, and the different employments which these situations dictated. Thus the time of nature's existence is limited to a period within the ken of human intellect. Thus whatever has happened might have happened during the present mode of things; whereas, if we deduce the origin and diversity of language from a period so remotely distant as to be absolutely lost, and entirely detached from all the known occurrences and vicissitudes of time, we must admit the present forms and arrangements of things to have subsisted perhaps for a much longer duration than any mechanical philosopher will allow to be possible. Other instances equally pregnant with conviction might be multiplied; but, precluded by the limits of our plan, we proceed to a single observation upon the facts which have been termed supernatural.

Of those changes which happen in sensible objects, sensation alone can be judge. Reason has nothing to do in the matter. She may draw conclusions from the testimonies of sense, but can never refute them. If, therefore, our senses inform us that snow is white, in vain would the most learned and subtle philosopher endeavour to convince us that it was of a contrary colour. He might confound us, but never could persuade us. Such changes, therefore, as appear to happen in sensible objects, must either be real or fallacious. If real, the miracle is admitted; if fallacious, there must be a cause of deception equally unaccountable from the powers of nature, and therefore equally miraculous. If the veracity or competency of the witnesses be questioned, the Christian answers, that they must be competent, because the facts which they relate are not beyond their capacity to determine. They must likewise be faithful, because they had no secular motives for maintaining, but many for suppressing or disfiguring, what they testified. Now the Christian appeals to the whole series of history and experience, whether such a man is or can be found, as will offer a voluntary, solemn, and deliberate sacrifice of truth at the shrine of caprice. But such facts as after a long continuance of time have been found exactly agreeable to predictions formerly emitted, must perpetuate the fidelity of testimony, and infallibly prove that the event was known to the Being by whom it was foretold. In vain has it been urged, that prophecies are ambiguous and equivocal. For though they may prefigure subordinate events, yet if the grand occurrences to which they ultimately relate, can alone fulfil them in their various circumstances, and in their utmost extent, it is plain, that the Being by whom they were revealed must have been actually prescient of those events, and must have had them in view when the predictions were uttered. For this see a learned and ingenious Dissertation on the Credibility of Gospel-history, by Dr McKnight; where the evidences urged by the Christian in defence of his tenets, which appear detached and scattered through innumerable volumes, are assembled and arranged in such a manner as to derive strength and lustre from the method in which they are disposed, without diminishing the force of each in particular. See also the works of Dr Hurd; consult likewise those of Newton, Sherlock, Chandler, &c. For the evidences of those preternatural facts which have been termed miracles, the reader may peruse a short but elegant and conclusive defence of these astonishing phenomena, in answer to Mr Hume, by the Rev. George Campbell, D.D.

It must be obvious to every reflecting mind, that Properties whether we attempt to form the idea of any religion common to a priori, or contemplate those which have been already exhibited, certain facts, principles, or data, must be pre-established; from whence will result a particular frame of mind and course of action suitable to the character and dignity of that Being by whom the religion is enjoined, and adapted to the nature and situation of those agents who are commanded to observe it. Hence Christianity may be divided into credenda or doctrines, and agenda or precepts.

As the great foundation of his religion, therefore, the Christian the Christian believes the existence and government theology of one eternal and infinite Essence, which for ever retains in itself the cause of its own existence, and inherently possesses all those perfections which are compatible with its nature; such are, its almighty power, omniscient wisdom, infinite justice, boundless goodness, and universal presence. In this indivisible essence the Christian recognises three distinct subdivisions, yet distinguished in such a manner as not to be incompatible with essential unity or simplicity of being. Nor is their essential union incompatible with their personal distinction. Each of them possesses the same nature and properties to the same extent. As, therefore, they are constituent of one God, if we may use the expression, there is none of them subordinate, none supreme. The only way by which the Christian can discriminate them is, by their various relations, properties, and offices. Thus the Father is said eternally to beget the Son, the Son to be eternally begotten of the Father, and the Holy Ghost eternally to proceed from both.

This infinite Being, though absolutely independent and for ever sufficient for his own beatitude, was graciously pleased to create an universe replete with inferior intelligences, who might for ever contemplate and enjoy his glory, participate his happiness, and imitate his perfections. But as freedom of will is essential to the nature of moral agents, that they may cooperate with God in their own improvement and happiness, so their natures and powers are necessarily limited, and by that constitution rendered peccable. This degeneracy first took place in a rank of intelligence superior to man. But guilt is never stationary. Impatient of itself, and cursed with its own feelings, it proceeds from bad to worse, whilst the poignancy of its torments increases with the number of its perpetrations. Such was the situation of Satan and his apostate angels. They attempted to transfer their turpitude and misery to man; and were, alas! but unsuccessful. Hence the heterogeneous and irreconcilable principles which operate in his nature. Hence that inexplicable medley of wisdom and folly, of rectitude and error, of benevolence and malignity, of sincerity and fraud, exhibited through his whole conduct. Hence the darkness of his understanding, the depravity of his will, the pollution of his heart, the irregularity regularity of his affections, and the absolute subversion of his whole internal economy. These seeds of perdition soon ripened into overt acts of guilt and horror. All the hostilities of nature were confronted, and the whole sublunary creation became a theatre of disorder and mischief.

Here the Christian once more appeals to fact and experience. If these things are so; if man is the vessel of guilt and the victim of misery; he demands how this constitution of things can be accounted for? how can it be supposed, that a being so wicked and unhappy should be the production of an infinitely perfect Creator? He therefore infers, that human nature must have been disarranged and contaminated by some violent shock; and that, of consequence, without the light diffused over the face of things by Christianity, all nature must remain an inextricable and inexplicable mystery.

To redress these evils, to re-establish the empire of virtue and happiness, to restore the nature of man to its primitive rectitude, to satisfy the remonstrances of infinite justice, to purify every original or contracted stain, to expiate the guilt and destroy the power of vice, the eternal Son of God, the second Person of the sacred Trinity, the Logos or Divine Word, the Redeemer or Saviour of the world, the Immanuel or God with us, from whom Christianity takes its name, and to whom it owes its origin, descended from the bosom of His Father; assumed the human nature; became the representative of man; endured a severe probation in that character; exhibited a pattern of perfect righteousness; and at last ratified his doctrine, and fully accomplished all the ends of his mission, by a cruel, unmerited, and ignominious death. Before he left this world, he delivered the doctrine of human salvation, and the rules of human conduct, to his apostles, whom he empowered to instruct the world in all that concerned their eternal felicity, and whom he invested with miraculous gifts to ascertain the reality of what they taught. To them he likewise promised another comforter, even the Divine Spirit, who should relume the darkness, console the woes, and purify the stains, of human nature. Having remained for a part of three days under the power of death, he arose again from the grave, discovered himself to his disciples, conversed with them for some time, then ascended to heaven; from whence the Christian expects him, according to his promise, to appear as the Sovereign Judge of the living and the dead, from whose awards there is no appeal, and by whose sentence the destiny of the pious and the wicked shall be eternally fixed.

Soon after his departure to the right hand of his Father, where, in his human nature, he sits supreme of all created beings, and invested with the absolute administration of heaven and earth, the Spirit of grace and consolation descended on his apostles with visible signatures of divine power and presence. Nor were his salutary operations confined to them, but extended to all the rational world, who did not by obstinate guilt repel his influences, and provoke him to withdraw them. These, indeed, were less conspicuous than at the glorious era when they were visibly exhibited in the persons of the apostles. But though his energy is less observable, it is by no means less effectual to all the purposes of grace and mercy.

The Christian is convinced, that there is and shall continue to be a society upon earth, who worship God as revealed in Jesus Christ; who believe his doctrines; who observe his precepts; and who shall be saved by his death, and by the use of these external means of salvation which he hath appointed.

These are few and simple. The sacraments of baptism and the eucharist, the interpretation and application of scripture, the habitual exercise of public duty, what, and private devotion, are obviously calculated to diffuse and promote the interests of truth and virtue, by promoting and superinducing the salutary habits of faith, love, and repentance.

The Christian is firmly persuaded, that at the consummation of things, when the purposes of providence in the various revolutions of progressive nature are accomplished, the whole human race shall once more issue from their graves; some to immortal felicity, from the actual perception and enjoyment of their Creator's presence; others to everlasting shame and misery.

The two grand principles of action, according to Christian the Christian, are, The love of God, which is the love-morality, reign passion in every perfect mind; and the love of man, which regulates our actions according to the various relations in which we stand, whether to communities or individuals. This sacred connection can never be totally extinguished by any temporary injury. It ought to subsist in some degree even amongst enemies. It requires that we should pardon the offences of others, as we expect pardon for our own; and that we should no farther resist evil than is necessary for the preservation of personal rights and social happiness. It dictates every relative and reciprocal duty between parents and children, masters and servants, governors and subjects, friends and friends, men and men. Nor does it merely enjoin the observation of equity, but likewise inspires the most sublime and extensive charity, a boundless and disinterested effusion of tenderness for the whole species, which feels their distresses and operates for their relief and improvement. These celestial dispositions, and the different duties which are their natural exertions, are the various gradations by which the Christian hopes to attain the perfection of his nature and the most exquisite happiness of which it is susceptible.

Such are the speculative, and such the practical principles of Christianity. From the former, its votaries contend, that the origin, economy, and revolutions of intelligent nature alone can be rationally explained. From the latter, they assert, that the nature of man, whether considered in its individual or social capacity, can alone be conducted to its highest perfection and happiness. With the determined A-ness of its theists they scarcely deign to expostulate. For, according to them, philosophers who can deduce the origin and constitution of things from casual encounters or mechanical necessity, are capable of deducing any conclusion from any premises. Nor can a more glaring instance of absurdity be produced, than the idea of a contingent or self-originated universe. When Deists and other sectarians upbraid them with mystic views... for the advancement of moral and intellectual perfection.

But the disciple of Jesus not only contends, that no system of religion has ever yet been exhibited so consistent with itself, so congruous to philosophy and the common sense of mankind, as Christianity; he likewise avers, that it is infinitely more productive of real and sensible consolation than any other religious or philosophical tenets, which have ever entered into the soul, or been applied to the heart of man. For what human nature is death to that mind which considers eternity as the career of its existence? What are the frowns of fortune to him who claims an eternal world as his inheritance? What is the loss of friends to that heart which feels, with more than natural conviction, that it shall quickly rejoin them in a more tender, intimate, and permanent intercourse than any of which the present life is susceptible? What are the fluctuations and vicissitudes of external things to a mind which strongly and uniformly anticipates a state of endless and immutable felicity? What are mortifications, disappointments, and insults, to a spirit which is conscious of being the original offspring and adopted child of God; which knows that its omnipotent Father will, in proper time, effectually assert the dignity and privileges of its nature? In a word, as earth is but a speck of creation, as time is not an instant in proportion to eternity, such are the hopes and prospects of the Christian in comparison of every sublunary misfortune or difficulty. It is therefore, in his judgment, the eternal wonder of angels, and indelible opprobrium of man, that a religion so worthy of God, so suitable to the frame and circumstances of our nature, so consonant to all the dictates of reason, so friendly to the dignity and improvement of intelligent beings, pregnant with genuine comfort and delight, should be rejected and despised. Were there a possibility of suspense or hesitation between this and any other religion extant, he could freely trust the determination of a question so important to the candid decision of real virtue and impartial philosophy.

Mr Gibbon, in his History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, mentions five secondary causes to which he thinks the propagation of Christianity, and all the remarkable circumstances which attended its rise, may be with good reason ascribed. He seems to intimate, that Divine Providence did not act in a singular or extraordinary manner in disseminating the religion of Jesus through the world; and that, if every cause from other argument which has been adduced to prove the supernatural authority of this religion can be parried or refuted, nothing can be deduced from this source to prevent it from sharing the same fate with other systems of superstition. The causes of its propagation were, in his opinion founded on the principles of human nature and the circumstances of society. If we ascribe not the propagation of Mahometism, or of the doctrines of Zoroaster, to an extraordinary interposition of divine providence, operating by an unperceived influence on the dispositions of the human heart, and controlling and confounding the ordinary laws of nature; neither can we, upon any reasonable grounds, refer the promulgation of Christianity to such an interposition. The secondary causes to which he ascribes these effects are, 1. The inflexible and intolerant zeal of the Christians; derived from the Jewish religion, but purified from the narrow and unocial spirit which, instead of inviting, deterred the Gentiles from embracing the law of Moses. 2. The doctrine of a future life improved by every additional circumstance which could give weight and efficacy to that important truth. 3. The miraculous powers ascribed to the primitive church. 4. The pure and austere morals of the Christians. 5. The union and discipline of the Christian republic, which gradually formed an independent and increasing state in the heart of the Roman empire.

In pointing out the connection between the first of these causes and the effects which he represents as arising from it, this learned and ingenious writer observes, that the religion of the Jews does not seem to have been intended to be propagated among the Heathens, and that the conversion of profelytes was rather accidental than consistent with the purport and the general spirit of the institutions of Judaism. The Jews were, of consequence, studious to preserve themselves a peculiar people. Their zeal for their own religion was intolerant, narrow, and unocial.

In Christianity, when it made its appearance in the world, all the better part of the predominant spirit of Judaism was retained; but whatever might have a tendency to confine its influence within narrow limits was laid aside. Christians were to maintain the doctrines and adhere to the institutions of their religion with sacred fidelity. They were not to violate their allegiance to Jesus by entertaining or professing any reverence for Jupiter or any other of the Heathen deities; it was not even necessary for them to comply with the positive and ceremonial institutions of the law of Moses,—although these were acknowledged to have been of divine origin. The zeal, therefore, which their religion inculcated, was inflexible. It was even intolerant: for they were not to content themselves with professing Christianity and conforming to its laws; they were to labour with unremitting assiduity, and to expose themselves to every difficulty and every danger, in converting others to the same faith.

But the same circumstances which rendered it thus intolerant, communicated to it a more liberal and a less unocial spirit than that of Judaism. The religion of the Jews was intended only for a few tribes: Christianity was to become a catholic religion; its advantages were to be offered to all mankind.

All the different sects which arose among the primitive Christians uniformly maintained the same zeal for the propagation of their own religion, and the same abhorrence for every other. The Orthodox, the Ebionites, the Gnostics, were all equally animated with the same exclusive zeal, and the same abhorrence of idolatry, which had distinguished the Jews from other nations.

Such is the general purport of what Mr Gibbon advances concerning the influence of the first of those secondary causes in the propagation of Christianity. It would be uncandid to deny, that his statement of facts appears to be, in this instance, almost fair, and his deductions tolerably logical. The first Christians were remarkable for their detestation of idolatry, and for the generous disinterested zeal with which they laboured to convert others to the same faith. The first of these principles, no doubt, contributed to maintain the dignity and purity of Christianity; and the second to disseminate it throughout the world. But the facts which he relates are scarce consistent throughout. He seems to represent the zeal of the first Christians as so hot and intolerant, that they could have no social intercourse with those who still adhered to the worship of Heathen deities. In this case, how could they propagate their religion? Nay, we may even ask, How could they live? If they could not mingle with the Heathens in the transactions either of peace or war; nor witness the marriage or the funeral of the dearest friend, if a Heathen; nor practise the elegant arts of music, painting, eloquence, or poetry; nor venture to use freely in conversation the language of Greece or of Rome;—it is not easy to see what opportunities they could have of disseminating their religious sentiments. If, in such circumstances, and observing rigidly such a tenor of conduct, they were yet able to propagate their religion with such amazing success as they are said to have done; they must surely either have practised some wondrous arts unknown to us, or have been assisted by the supernatural operation of divine power.

But all the historical records of that period, whether sacred or profane, concur to prove, that the primitive Christians in general did not retire with such religious horror from all intercourse with the Heathens. They refused not to serve in the armies of the Roman empire: they appealed to Heathen magistrates, and submitted respectfully to their decisions: the husband was often a Heathen, and the wife a Christian; or, again, the husband a Christian, and the wife a Heathen. These are facts so universally known and believed, that we need not quote authorities in proof of them.

This respectable writer appears therefore not to have stated the facts which he produces under this head with sufficient ingenuity; and he has taken care to exaggerate and improve those which he thinks useful to his purpose with all the dazzling, delusive colours of eloquence. But had the zeal of the first Christians been so intolerant as he represents it, it must have been highly unfavourable to the propagation of their religion: all their wishes to make converts would, in that case, have been counteracted by their unwillingness to mix, in the ordinary intercourse of life, with those who were to be converted. Their zeal, and the liberal spirit of their religion, were indeed secondary causes which contributed to its propagation: but their zeal was by no means so ridiculously intolerant as this writer would have us believe; if it had, it must have produced effects directly opposite to those which he ascribes to it.

In illustrating the influence of the second of these secondary causes to which he ascribes the propagation of Christianity, Mr Gibbon displays no less ingenuity than in tracing the nature and the effects of the first. The doctrine of a future life, improved by every additional circumstance which can give weight and efficacy to that important truth, makes a conspicuous figure in the Christian system; and it is a doctrine highly flattering to the natural hopes and wishes of the human heart.

Though the Heathen philosophers were not unacquainted with this doctrine; yet to them the spirituality of the human soul, its capacity of existence in a separate state from the body, its immortality, and its prospect of lasting happiness in a future life, rather appeared things possible and desirable, than truths fully established upon solid grounds. These doctrines, Mr Gibbon would persuade us, had no influence on the moral sentiments and general conduct of the Heathens. Even the philosophers, who amused themselves with displaying their eloquence and ingenuity on those splendid themes, did not allow them to influence the tenor of their lives. The great body of the people, who were occupied in pursuits very different from the speculations of philosophy, and were unacquainted with the questions discussed in the schools, were scarce ever at pains to reflect whether they consisted of a material and a spiritual part, or whether their existence was to be prolonged beyond the term of the present life; and they could not regulate their lives by principles which they did not know.

In the popular superstition of the Greeks and Romans, the doctrine of a future state was not omitted. Mankind were not only flattered with the hopes of continuing to exist beyond the term of the present life; but different conditions of existence were promised or threatened, in which retributions for their conduct in human life were to be enjoyed or suffered. Some were exalted to heaven, and associated with the gods; others were rewarded with less illustrious honours, and a more moderate state of happiness, in Elysium; and those, again, who by their conduct in life had not merited rewards, but punishments, were consigned to Tartarus. Such were the ideas of a future state which made a part of the popular superstition of the Greeks and Romans. But they produced only a very faint impression on the minds of those among whom they prevailed. They were not truths supported by evidence; they were not even plausible; they were a tissue of absurdities. They had not therefore a more powerful influence on the morals, than the more refined speculations of the philosophers.

Even the Jews, whose religion and legislature were communicated from heaven, were in general, till within a very short time before the propagation of the gospel, as imperfectly acquainted with the doctrine of a future state as the Greeks and Romans. This doctrine made no part of the law of Moses. It is but darkly and doubtfully intimated through the other parts of the Old Testament. Those among the Jews who treated the sacred scriptures with the highest reverence, always denied that such a doctrine could be deduced from any thing which these taught; and maintained that death is the final dissolution of man.

The rude tribes who inhabited ancient Gaul, and some other nations not more civilized than they, entertained ideas of a future life, much clearer than those of the Greeks, the Romans, or the Jews.

Christianity, however, explained and inculcated the truth of this doctrine in all its splendor and all its dignity. It exhibited an alluring, yet not absurd, view of the happiness of a future life. It conferred new honors on the place of punishment, and added new severity to the tortures to be inflicted, in another world. The authority on which it taught these doctrines, and displayed these views, was such as to silence inquiry and doubt, and to command implicit belief. What added to the influence of the doctrine of a future state of existence, thus explained and inculcated, was, that the first Christians confidently prophesied and sincerely believed that the end of the world, the consummation of all things, was fast approaching, and that the generation then present should live to witness that awful event. Another circumstance which contributed to render the same doctrine so favourable to the propagation of Christianity was, that the first Christians dealt damnation without remorse, and almost without making any exceptions, on all who died in the belief of the absurdities of Heathen superstition. Thus taught and improved with these additional and lightening circumstances, this doctrine, partly by presenting alluring prospects and exciting pleasing hopes, partly by working upon the fears of the human heart with representations of terror, operated in the most powerful manner in extending the influence of the Christian faith.

Here, too, facts are rather exaggerated, and the observations are inferred scarcely fairly deduced. It must be confessed, however, that the speculations of the Heathen philosophers did not fully and undeniably establish the doctrine of the immortality of the human soul; nor can we presume to assert, in contradiction to Mr Gibbon, that their arguments could impress such a conviction of this truth as might influence in a very strong degree the moral sentiments and conduct. They must, however, have produced some influence on these. Some of the most illustrious among the Heathen philosophers appear to have been so strongly impressed with the belief of the soul's immortality, and of a future state of retribution, that their general conduct was constantly and in a high degree influenced by that belief. Plato and Socrates are eminent and well known instances. And if, in such instances as these, the belief of these truths produced such conspicuous effects; it might be fairly inferred, though we had no farther evidence, that those characters were far from being singular in this respect. It is a truth acknowledged as unquestionable in the history of the arts and sciences, that wherever any person has cultivated these with extraordinary success, some among his contemporaries will always be found to have rivalled his excellence, and a number of them to have been engaged in the same pursuits. On this occasion we may venture, without hesitation, to reason upon the same principles. When the belief of the immortality of the human soul produced such illustrious patterns of virtue as a Plato and a Socrates; it must certainly have influenced the moral sentiments and conduct of many others,—although in an inferior degree. We speculate, we doubt, concerning the truth of many doctrines of Christianity; many who profess that they believe them, make this profession only because they have never considered seriously whether they be true or false. But, notwithstanding this, these truths still exert a powerful influence on the sentiments and manners of society in general. Thus, also, it appears, that the doctrines of ancient philosophy concerning a future life, and even the notions concerning Olympus, Elysium, and Tartarus, which made a part of the popular superstition, did produce a certain influence on the sentiments and manners of the Heathens in general. That influence was often indeed inconsiderable, and not always happy; but still it was somewhat greater than Mr Gibbon seems willing to allow. Christians have been sometimes at pains to exaggerate the absurdities of Pagan superstition, in order that the advantages... vantages of Christianity might acquire new value from being contrasted with it. Here we find one who is rather disposed to be the enemy of Christianity, displaying, and even exaggerating, those absurdities for a very different purpose. But the truth may be fairly admitted; it is only when exaggerated that it can serve any purpose imitative to the sacred authority of our holy religion. Mr Gibbon certainly represents the religious doctrine of the ancient Gauls, in respect to the immortality of the human soul and a future state, in too favourable a light. It is only because the whole system of superstition which prevailed among those barbarians is so imperfectly known, that it has been imagined to consist of more sublime doctrines than those of the popular superstition of the Greeks and Romans. The evidence which Mr Gibbon adduces in proof of what he affirms concerning these opinions of the ancient Gauls, is partial, and far from satisfactory. They did indeed assert and believe the soul to be immortal; but this doctrine was blended among a number of absurdities much grosser than those which characterize the popular religion of the Greeks and Romans. The latter was the superstition of a civilized people, among whom reason was unfolded and improved by cultivation, and whose manners were polished and liberal; the former was that of barbarians, among whom reason was, as it were, in its infancy, and who were strangers to the improvements of civilization.

When hasty observers found that those barbarians were not absolutely strangers to the idea of immortality, they were moved to undue admiration; their surprise at finding what they had not expected, confounded their understanding, and led them to misconceive and misrepresent. What we ought to ascribe to the savage ferocity of the character of those rude tribes, has been attributed by mistake to the influence of their belief of a future state.

In the law of Moses, it must be allowed, that this doctrine is not particularly explained nor earnestly inculcated. The author of the Divine Legation of Moses, &c., has founded upon this fact an ingenious theory, which we shall elsewhere have occasion to examine. The reasons why this doctrine was not more fully explained to the Jews, we cannot pretend to assign, at least in this place; yet we cannot help thinking, that it was more generally known among the Jews than Mr Gibbon and the author of the Divine Legation are willing to allow. Though it be not strongly inculcated in their code of laws, yet there is some reason to think that it was known and generally prevalent among them long before the Babylonian captivity; even in different passages in the writings of Moses, it is mentioned or alluded to in an unequivocal manner. In the history of the patriarchs, it appears that this doctrine was known to them; it appears to have had a strong influence on the mind of Moses himself. Was David, was Solomon, a stranger to this doctrine? We cannot here defend to very minute particulars; but surely all the efforts of ingenuity must be insufficient to torture the sacred scriptures of the Old Testament, so as to prove that they contain nothing concerning the doctrine of a future state anywhere but in the writings of the later prophets, and that even in these it is only darkly intimated. Were the Jews, in the earlier part of their history, so totally secluded from all intercourse with other nations, that a doctrine of so much importance, more or less known to all around, could not be communicated to them?

The Pharisees did admit traditions, and set upon them an undue value; yet they appear to have been considered as the most orthodox of the different sects which prevailed among the Jews; the Sadducees were rather regarded as innovators.

But though we are of opinion, that this ingenious writer allows to the doctrine of the Greek and Roman philosophers, concerning the immortality of the human soul, as well as to the notions concerning a future state, which made a part of the popular superstitions of those nations, less influence on the moral sentiments and conduct of mankind than what they really exerted; though we cannot agree with him in allowing the ideas of the immortality of the soul and of a future state, which were entertained by the Gauls and some other rude nations, to have been much superior in their nature, or much happier in their influence, than those of the Greeks and Romans; and though, in consequence of reading the Old Testament, we are disposed to think that the Jews knew somewhat more concerning the immortality of the human soul, and concerning the future state in which human beings are destined to exist, than Mr Gibbon represents them to have known; yet still we are very sensible, and very well pleased to admit, that "life and immortality were brought to light through the gospel."

The doctrine of a future life, as it was preached by the first Christians, was established on a more solid basis than that on which it had been before maintained; was freed from every absurdity; and was, in short, so much improved, that its influence, which, as it was explained by Heathen poets and philosophers, must be confessed to have been in many instances doubtful, now became favourable only to the interests of piety and virtue, and to them in a very high degree. It undoubtedly contributed to the successful propagation of Christianity; for it was calculated to attract and please both the speculative philosopher and the simple unenlightened votary of the vulgar superstition. The views which it exhibited were distinct; and all was plausible and rational, and demonstrated by the fullest evidence. But the happiness which it promised was of a less sensual nature than the enjoyments which the Heathens expected on Olympus or in Elysium; and would therefore appear less alluring to those who were not very capable of refined ideas, or preferred the gratifications of the senses in the present life to every other species of good. If the first Christians rejoiced in the hope of beholding all the votaries of Pagan idolatry afflicted with the torments of hell in a future state, and boasted of these hopes with inhuman exultation, they would in all probability rather irritate than alarm those whom they sought to convert from that superstition; the Heathens would be moved to regard with indignant scorn the preacher who pretended, that those whom they venerated as gods, heroes, and wise men, were condemned to a state of unpitiable and lasting torment. Would not every feeling of the heart revolt against the idea, that a parent, a child, a husband, a wife, a friend, a lover, or a mistress, but lately lost, and still lamented, was consigned to eternal torments for actions and opinions which they had deemed highly agreeable to superior powers? We may conclude, then, with respect to the influence of this secondary cause in promoting the propagation of Christianity, that the circumstances of the Heathen world were less favourable to that influence than Mr Gibbon pretends; that the means by which he represents the primitive Christians, as improving its efficacy, were some of them not employed, and others rather likely to weaken than to strengthen it; and that therefore more is attributed to the operation of this cause than it could possibly produce.

The third cause, the miraculous powers of the primitive church, is with good reason represented as having conduced very often to the conviction of infidels. Mr Gibbon's reasonings under this head are, That numerous miraculous works of the most extraordinary kind were ostentatiously performed by the first Christians: that, however, from the difficulty of fixing the period at which miraculous powers ceased to be communicated to the Christian church, and from some other circumstances, there is reason to suspect them to have been merely the pretences of imposture; but this (to use a phrase of his own) is only darkly intimated: and, lastly, that the Heathens having been happily prepared to receive them as real by the many wonders nearly of a similar nature to which they were accustomed in their former superstition, the miracles which the first Christians employed to give a sanction to their doctrines, contributed in the most effectual manner to the propagation of Christianity.

In reply to what is here advanced, it may be suggested, that the miracles recorded in the New Testament, as having been performed by the first Christians when engaged in propagating their religion, as well as a number of others recorded by the Fathers, are established as true, upon the most indubitable evidence which human testimony can afford for any fact. An ingenious Scotch writer*, who was too fond of employing his ingenuity in undermining truths generally received, has endeavoured to prove, that no human testimony, however strong and unexceptionable, can afford sufficient evidence of the reality of a miracle. But his reasonings on this head, which once excited doubt and wonder, have been since completely refuted; and mankind still continue to acknowledge, that though we are all liable to mistakes and capable of deceit, yet human testimony may afford the most convincing evidence of the most extraordinary and even supernatural facts. The reader will not expect us to enter, in this place, into a particular examination of the miracles of our Saviour, and his apostles, and the primitive church. An inquiry into these will be a capital object in another part of this work (THEOLOGY). We may here consider it as an undeniable and a generally acknowledged fact, that a certain part of those miracles were real. Such as were real, undoubtedly contributed, in a very eminent manner, to the propagation of Christianity; but they are not to be ranked among the natural and secondary causes.

It is difficult to distinguish at what period miraculous gifts ceased to be conferred on the members of the primitive church; yet we may distinguish, if we take pains to inquire with minute attention, at what period the evidence ceases to be satisfactory. We can also, by considering the circumstances of the church through the several stages of its history, form some judgment concerning the period during which the gifts of prophecy, and speaking with tongues, and working miracles, were most necessary to Christians to enable them to assert the truth and dignity of their religion.

The Heathens were no strangers to pretended miracles and prophecies, and other seeming interpositions of superior beings, disturbing the ordinary course of nature and of human affairs; but the miracles to which they were familiarised had been so often detected to be tricks of imposture or pretences of mad enthusiasm, that, instead of being prepared to witness or to receive accounts of new miracles with easy credulity, they must have been in general disposed to view them with jealousy and suspicion. Besides, the miracles to which they had been accustomed, and those performed by the apostles and the first preachers of Christianity, were directly contradictory; and therefore the one could receive no affiance from the other.

Yet we must acknowledge, notwithstanding what we have above advanced, that as disagreements with respect to the principles and institutions of their religion very early arose among Christians; so they likewise sought to extend its influence, at a very early period, by the use of pious frauds. Pious frauds, too, appear to have sometimes served the immediate purposes for which they were employed, though eventually they have been highly injurious to the cause of Christianity.

We conclude, then, that Christianity was indebted to the influence of miracles in a considerable degree for its propagation; but that the real miracles of our Saviour and his apostles, &c. were not among the secondary causes of its success: that the Heathens who were to be converted were not very happily prepared for receiving the miracles of the gospel with blind credulity: that, as it is possible to discern between sufficient and insufficient evidence, so it is not more difficult to distinguish between true and false miracles: and, lastly, that false miracles were soon employed by Christians as engines to support and propagate their religion, and perhaps not unsuccessfully; but were, upon the whole, more injurious than serviceable to the cause which they were called in to maintain.

The fourth of this series of secondary causes, which this author thinks to have been adequate to the propagation of Christianity, is the virtues of the primitive Christians. These he is willing to attribute to other and less generous motives, rather than to the pure influence of the doctrines and precepts of their religion.

The first converts to Christianity were most of them from among the lowest and most worthless characters. The wise, the mighty, and those who were distinguished by specious virtues, were in general perfectly satisfied with their present circumstances and future prospects. People whose minds were naturally weak, unenlightened, or oppressed with the sense of atrocious guilt, and who were infamous or outcasts from society, were eager to grasp at the hopes which the gospel held out to them.

When, after enlisting under the banner of Christ, they began to consider themselves as "born again to newness of life;" remorse and fear, which easily prevail over weak minds; selfish hopes of regaining their reputation, and attaining to the honours and happiness of those mansions which Jesus was said to have gone to prepare; prepare; with a desire to raise the honour and extend the influence of the society of which they were become members; all together operated so powerfully as to enable them to display both active and passive virtue in a very extraordinary degree. Their virtues did not flow from the purest and noblest source; yet they attracted the notice and moved the admiration of mankind. Of those who admired, some were eager to imitate; and, in order to that, thought it necessary to adopt the same principles of action.

Their virtues, too, were rather of that species which excite wonder, because uncommon, and not of essential utility in the ordinary intercourse of society; than of those which are indispensably necessary to the existence of social order, and contribute to the ease and convenience of life. Such virtues were well calculated to engage the imitation of those who had failed egregiously in the practice of the more social virtues.

Thus they practised extraordinary, but useless and unsocial, virtues, upon no very generous motives; and those virtues drew upon them the eyes of the world, and induced numbers to embrace their faith.

We must, however unwillingly, declare, that this is plainly an uncandid account of the virtues of the primitive Christians, and the motives from which they originated. The social virtues are strongly recommended through the gospel. No degree of mortification or self-denial, or seclusion from the ordinary business and amusements of social life, was required of the early converts to Christianity; save what was indispensably necessary to wean them from the irregular habits in which they had before indulged, and which had rendered them nuisances in society, and to form them to new habits equally necessary to their happiness and their usefulness in life. We allow that they practised virtues which in other circumstances would, however splendid, have been unnecessary. But in the difficult circumstances in which the first Christians were placed, the virtues which they practised were in the highest degree social. The most prominent feature in their character was, "their continuing to entertain sentiments of generous benevolence, and to discharge scrupulously all the social duties," towards those who exercised neither charity nor humanity, and frequently not even bare integrity and justice, in their conduct towards them.

It cannot be said with truth, that such a proportion of the primitive Christians were people whose characters had been infamous and their circumstances desperate, as that the character of the religion which they embraced can suffer from this circumstance. Nor were they only the weak and illiterate whom the apostles and their immediate successors converted by their preaching. The criminal, to be sure, rejoiced to hear that he might obtain absolution of his crimes; the mourner was willing to receive comfort; minds of refined and generous feelings were deeply affected with that goodness which had induced the Son of God to submit to the punishment due to sinners; but the simplicity, the rationality, and the beauty of the Christian system, likewise prevailed in numerous instances over the pride and prejudices of the great and the wise; in so many instances, as are sufficient to vindicate the Christian church from the asperity by which it has been represented, as being in the first period of its existence merely a body of criminals and idiots.

The principles, too, from which the virtues of the first Christians originated, were not peculiarly mean and selfish; nay, they seem to have been uncommonly sublime and disinterested. Renoncse in the guilty mind is a natural and reasonable sentiment; the desire of happiness in every human breast is equally so. It is uncandid to cavil against the first Christians for being, like the rest of mankind, influenced by these sentiments: And when we behold them overlooking temporary possessions and enjoyments, extending their views to futurity, and "living by faith;" when we observe them "doing good to those who hated them, blesting those who cursed them, and praying for those by whom they were despitefully used;" can we deny their virtues to have been of the most generous and disinterested kind?

We allow, then, that the virtues of the first Christians must have contributed to the propagation of their religion; but it is with pain that we observe this respectable writer studiously labouring to misrepresent the principles from which those virtues arose; and not only the principles from which they arose, but also their importance in society.

The fifth cause was the mode of church government adopted by the first Christians, by which they were better knit together in one society; who preferred the church and its interests to their country and civil concerns. We wish not to deny, that the mutual attachment of the primitive Christians contributed to spread the influence of their religion; and the order which they maintained, in consequence of being animated with this spirit of brotherly love, and with such ardent zeal for the glory of God, must no doubt have produced no less happy effects among them than order and regularity produce on every other occasion on which they are strictly observed. But whether the form of church-government, which was gradually established in the Christian church, was actually the happiest that could possibly have been adopted; or whether, by establishing a distinct society, with separate interests, within the Roman empire, it contributed to the dissolution of that mighty fabric, we cannot here pretend to inquire. These are subjects of discussion, with respect to which we may with more propriety endeavour to satisfy our readers elsewhere.

From the whole of this review of what Mr Gibbon General has so speciously advanced concerning the influence of conclusion these five secondary causes in the propagation of the concerning the influence of the gospel, we think ourselves warranted to conclude, once of the That the zeal of the first Christians was not, as he represents it, intolerant: That the doctrine of the immortality of the human soul was somewhat better understood in the heathen world, particularly among the Greeks and Romans and the Jews, than he represents it to have been; and had an influence somewhat happier than what he attributes to it: That the additional circumstances by which, he tells us, the first preachers of Christianity improved the effects of this doctrine, were far from being calculated to allure converts: That the heathens, therefore, were not quite so well prepared for an eager reception of this doctrine as he would persuade us they were; and, of consequence, could not be influenced by it in so considerable a degree, in their conversion: That real, unquestionable miracles, performed by our Saviour, by his apostles, and by their successors, did contribute signally to the propagation of Christianity; but are not to be ranked among the secondary causes: That weakness and blind zeal did at times employ pretended miracles for the same purpose not altogether ineffectually: That though these despicable and wicked means might be in some instances successful; yet they were, upon the whole, much more injurious than beneficial: That the virtues of the primitive Christians arose from the most generous and noble motives, and were in their nature and tendency highly favourable to social order, and to the comfort of mankind in the social state: And, lastly, That the order and regularity of church-government, which were gradually established among the first Christians, contributed greatly to maintain the dignity and spread the influence of their religion; but do not appear to have disjoined them from their fellow-subjects or to have rendered them inimical to the welfare of the state of which they were members.

Upon the whole, then, we do not see that these secondary causes were equal to the effects that have been ascribed to them; and it seems undeniable, that others of a superior kind co-operated with them. We earnestly recommend to the perusal of the reader a valuable performance of Lord Hailes's, in which he enquires into Mr Gibbon's assertions and reasonings, concerning the influence of these five causes, with the utmost accuracy of information, strength and clearness of reasoning, and elegant simplicity of style, and without virulence or passion.