a single combat, at a time and place appointed, in consequence of a challenge. This custom came originally from the northern nations, among whom it was usual to decide all their controversies by arms. Both the accuser and accused gave pledges to the judges on their respective behalf; and the custom prevailed far amongst the Germans, Danes, and Franks, that none were excused from it but women, sick people, cripples, and such as were under 21 years of age or above 60. Even ecclesiastics, priests, and monks, were were obliged to find champions to fight in their stead.

The punishment of the vanquished was either death, by hanging or beheading; or, mutilation of members, according to the circumstances of the case. Duels were at first admitted not only on criminal occasions, but on some civil ones for the maintenance of rights to estates, and the like; in latter times, however, before they were entirely abolished, they were restrained to these four cases. 1. That the crime should be capital. 2. That it should be certain the crime was perpetrated. 3. The accused must by common fame be supposed guilty. And, 4. The matter not capable of proof by witnesses.

Duel, at present, is used for single combat on some private quarrel; and must be premeditated, otherwise it is called a rencontre. If a person is killed in a duel, both the principals and seconds are guilty, whether the seconds engage or not. (See the article Murder.) It is also a very high offence to challenge a person either by word or letter, or to be the messenger of a challenge, (See Law, no clxxxv. 20.)

The general practice of duelling, in this last sense, took its rise in the year 1527, at the breaking up of a treaty between the emperor Charles V. and Francis I. The former desired Francis's herald to acquaint his sovereign, that he would henceforth consider him not only as a base violator of public faith, but as a stranger to the honour and integrity becoming a gentleman. Francis, too high-spirited to bear such an imputation, had recourse to an uncommon expedient to vindicate his character. He instantly sent back the herald with a cartel of defiance, in which he gave the emperor the lie in form, challenged him to single combat, requiring him to name the time and place of the encounter, and the weapons with which he chose to fight. Charles, as he was not inferior to his rival in spirit or bravery, readily accepted the challenge; but after several messengers concerning the arrangement of all the circumstances relative to the combat, accompanied with mutual reproaches bordering on the most indecent scurrility, all thoughts of this duel, more becoming the heroes of romance than the two greatest monarchs of their age, were entirely laid aside.

The example of two personages so illustrious, drew such general attention, and carried with it so much authority, that it had considerable influence in introducing an important change in manners all over Europe. Duels, as has already been observed, had been long permitted by the laws of all the European nations; and, forming a part of their jurisprudence, were authorised by the magistrate on many occasions, as the most proper method of terminating questions with regard to property, or of deciding in those which regarded crimes. But single combats being considered as solemn appeals to the omnipotence and justice of the Supreme Being, they were allowed only in public causes, according to the prescription of law, and carried on in a judicial form*. Men, accustomed to this manner of decision in courts of justice, were naturally led to apply it to personal and private quarrels. Duels, which at first could be appointed by the civil judge alone, were fought without the interposition of his authority, and in cases to which the laws did not extend. The transaction between Charles and Francis strongly countenanced this practice. Upon every affront or injury which seemed to touch his honour, a gentleman thought himself intitled to draw his sword, and to call on his adversary to make reparation. Such an opinion, introduced among men of fierce courage, of high spirit, and of rude manners, where offence was often given, and revenge was always prompt, produced most fatal consequences. Much of the best blood in Christendom was shed; many useful lives were lost; and, at some periods, war itself hath hardly been more destructive than these contests of honour.

So powerful, however, is the dominion of fashion, that neither the terror of penal laws, nor reverence for religion, have been able entirely to abolish a practice unknown among the ancients, and not justifiable by any principle of reason; though at the same time we must ascribe, in some degree, the extraordinary gentleness and complaisance of modern manners; and that respectful attention of one man to another, which at present render the social intercourse of life far more agreeable and decent than among the most civilized nations of antiquity.

Public opinion is not easily controlled by civil institutions; for which reason it may be questioned whether any regulations can be contrived of sufficient force to suppress or change the rule of honour which flatters all scruples about duelling with the reproach of cowardice.

The inadequate redress which the law of the land affords for those injuries which chiefly affect a man in his sensibility and reputation, tempts many to redress themselves. Prosecutions for such offences, by trifling damages that are recovered, serve only to make the sufferer more ridiculous.—This ought to be remedied.

For the army, where the point of honour is cultivated with exquisite attention and refinement, there might be established a court of honour, with a power of awarding those submissions and acknowledgments which it is generally the object of a challenge to obtain; and it might grow into a fashion with persons of rank of all professions to refer their quarrels to the same tribunal.

Duelling, as the law now stands, can seldom be undertaken by legal punishment. The challenge, appointment, and other previous circumstances, which indicate the intention with which the combatants met, being suppressed, nothing appears to a court of justice but the actual rencontre; and if a person be slain when actually fighting with his adversary, the law deems his death nothing more than manslaughter.