a Carthaginian general, of whose exploits an account is given under the articles Carthage and Rome. After having had the misfortune to lose a sea-fight with the Rhodians, through the cowardice of Apollonius one of the admirals of Antiochus the Great, he was forced to fly into Crete, to avoid falling into the hands of the Romans. On his arrival in this island, he took sanctuary among the Gortynii; but as he had brought great treasure along with him, and knew the avarice of the Cretans, he thought proper to secure his riches by the following stratagem. He filled several vessels with melted lead, just covering them over with gold and silver. These he deposited in the temple of Diana, in the presence of the Gortynii, with whom, he said, he trusted all his treasure: Justin tells us, that he left this with them as a security for his good behaviour, and lived for some time very quietly in these parts. He took care, however, to conceal his riches in hollow statues of brats; which, according to some, he always carried along with him; or, as others will have it, exposed in a public place as things of little value. At last he retired to the court of Prusias king of Bithynia, where he found means to unite several of the neighbouring states with that prince into a confederacy against Eumenes king of Pergamus, a professed friend to the Romans; and during the ensuing war gave Eumenes sev veral defeats, more through the force of his own genius than the valour of his troops. The Romans having received intelligence of the important services performed by Hannibal, immediately dispatched T. Quintius Flaminius as an ambassador to Prusias, in order to procure his destruction. At his first audience, he complained of the protection given to that famous general, representing him "as the most inveterate and implacable enemy the Romans ever had; as one who had ruined both his own country and Antiochus, by drawing them into a destructive war with Rome."—Prusias, in order to ingratiate himself with the Romans, immediately sent a party of soldiers to surround Hannibal's house, that he might find it impossible to make his escape. The Carthaginian, having before discovered that no confidence was to be reposed in Prusias, had contrived seven secret passages from his house, in order to evade the machinations of his enemies, even if they should carry their point at the Bithynian court. But guards being posted at these, he could not fly, though, according to Livy, he attempted it. Perceiving, therefore, no possibility of escaping, he had recourse to poison, which he had long reserved for such a melancholy occasion. Then taking it in his hand, "Let us (said he) deliver the Romans from the difficulties with which they have long been tortured, since they have not patience to wait for an old man's death. Flaminius will not acquire any reputation or glory by a victory gained over a betrayed and defenceless person. This single day will be a lasting testimony of the degeneracy of the Romans. Their ancestors gave Pyrrhus intelligence of a design to poison him, that he might guard against the impending danger, even when he was at the head of a powerful army in Italy; but they have deputed a person of consular dignity to excite Prusias impiously to murder one who has taken refuge in his dominions, in violation of the laws of hospitality." Then having denounced dreadful imprecations against Prusias, he drank the poison, and expired at the age of 70 years. Cornelius Nepos acquaints us, that he put an end to his life by a subtle poison which he carried about with him in a ring. Plutarch relates, that, according to some writers, he ordered a servant to strangle him with a cloak wrapped about his neck; and others say, that, in imitation of Midas and Themistocles, he drank bull's blood.

With respect to the character of this general, it appears to have been in military affairs what Demosthenes was in oratory, or Newton in mathematics; namely, absolutely perfect, in which no human wisdom could discover a fault, and to which no man could add a perfection. Rollin hath contrasted his character with that of Scipio Africanus. He enumerates the qualities which make a complete general; and having then given a summary of what historians have related concerning both commanders, is inclined to give the preference to Hannibal. "There are, however (he says), two difficulties which hinder him from deciding; one drawn from the characters of the generals whom Hannibal vanquished; the other from the errors he committed. May it not be said (continues our author), that those victories which made Hannibal so famous, were as much owing to the imprudence and temerity of the Roman generals, as to his bravery and skill?

When a Fabius and a Scipio were sent against him, Hannibal, the first stopped his progress, the other conquered him."

These reasons have been answered by Mr Hooke, who hath taken some pains to vindicate Hannibal's character, by fully and fairly comparing it with that of Scipio Africanus, and other Roman commanders. "I do not see (says he) why these difficulties should check our author's inclination to declare in favour of the Carthaginian. That Fabius was not beaten by Hannibal, we cannot much wonder, when we remember how steadily the old man kept to his resolution never to fight with him. But from Fabius's taking this method to put a stop to the victories of the enemy, may we not conclude that he knew no other, and thought Hannibal an overmatch for him? And why does our author forget Publius Scipio (Africanus's father), a prudent and able general, whom Hannibal vanquished at the Ticin? Livy relates some victories of Hannibal over the celebrated Marcellus; but neither Marcellus nor any other general ever vanquished Hannibal before the battle of Zama, if we may believe Polybius (lib. xv. c. 16.). Terentius Varro, indeed, is represented as a headstrong rash man; but the battle of Cannæ was not lost by his imprudence. The order in which he drew up his army is nowhere condemned; and Chevalier Folard thinks it excellent. And as to the conduct of the battle, Æmilius Paulus, a renowned captain, and a disciple of Fabius, had a greater share in it than his colleague. The imprudence with which Varro is taxed, was his venturing, contrary to his colleague's advice, with above 90,000 men to encounter in a plain field an enemy who had only 50,000, but was superior in horse. And does not the very advice of Æmilius, and the charge of temerity on Varro for not following it, imply a confession of Hannibal's superiority in military skill over Æmilius as well as Varro? It ought likewise to be observed, that Hannibal's infantry had gained the victory over the Roman infantry, before this latter suffered anything from the Carthaginian cavalry. It was otherwise when Scipio gained the victory at Zama. His infantry would probably have been vanquished but for his cavalry. Hannibal, with only his third line of foot (his Italian army), maintained a long fight against Scipio's three lines of foot; and seems to have had the advantage over them, when Masinissa and Lælius, with the horse, came to their assistance. Polybius indeed says, that Hannibal's Italian forces were equal in number to all Scipio's infantry; but this is contradicted by Livy, and is not very probable. The authority of Polybius, who was an intimate friend of Scipio Æmilianus, is, I imagine, of little weight in matters where the glory of the Scipios is particularly concerned. His partiality and flattery to them are, in many instances, but too visible."

Our author then proceeds to show, that Hannibal was not guilty of any of the faults laid to his charge as a general; and having contrasted the moral characters of the two generals with each other, makes it evident, that as a man, as well as a general, Hannibal had greatly the advantage of his rival. See Hooke's Roman history, vol. iv. p. 151. &c.