denotes a young child. See INFANCY.

Infants, amongst the Jews, Greeks, and Romans, were swaddled as soon as they were born, in a manner similar to that practised by the moderns. The Jews circumcised and named their infant children on the eighth day from the birth. Upon the birth of a son, the Grecians crowned their doors with olive—of a daughter, with wool. The infant was washed in warm water, and anointed with oil—by the Spartans with wine; it was then dressed, and laid in a basket, or on a shield if the father was a warrior, particularly amongst the Spartans. At five days old they ran with it round the fire, and the mother's relations sent presents. The Greeks named their children on the tenth day, the Romans on the ninth: The naming was attended with sacrifices and other demonstrations of joy. The maternal office of suckling their own children was never declined, when circumstances would permit. How much different is this from the unnatural delicacy observed by modern mothers, a delicacy which to the child is cruelty! The 40th day was a day of solemnity for the mother. The names of children were registered both by the Greeks and Romans. See REGISTER.

For an account of the custom of exposing infants, see EXPOSING.

Infants were kept from crying in the streets by means of a sponge soaked in honey. Nurses had also their bugbears and terrible names to frighten the children into peace.—The figure with which they were principally intimidated was Μορμωνικόν, a sort of rawhead and bloody bones.

in law, is a person under 21 years of age; whose capacities, incapacities, and privileges, are various.

1. In criminal matters. The law of England does in some cases privilege an infant under the age of 21, as to common misdemeanours; so as to escape fine, imprisonment, and the like; and particularly in the cases of omission, as not repairing a bridge, or a highway, and other similar offences; for, not having the command of his fortune till the age of 21, he wants the capacity to do those things which the law requires. But where there is any notorious breach of the peace, a riot, battery, or the like, (which infants when full-grown are at least as liable as others to commit); for those, an infant above the age of 14 is equally liable to suffer, as a person of the full age of 21. With regard to capital crimes, the law is still more minute and circumspect; distinguishing with greater nicety the several degrees of age and discretion. By the ancient Saxon law, the age of twelve years was established for the age of possible discretion, when first the understanding might open; and from thence till the offender was 14, it was *aetatis pubertatis proxima*, in which he might, or might not, be guilty of a crime, according to his natural capacity or incapacity. This was the dubious stage of discretion; but, under twelve, it was held, that he could not be guilty in will, neither after fourteen could be supposed innocent, of any capital crime which he in fact committed. But by the law, as it now stands, and has stood at least ever since the time of Edward III., the capacity of doing ill, or contracting guilt, is not so much measured by years and days, as by the strength of the delinquent's understanding and judgment. For one lad of 11 years old may have as much cunning as another of 14; and in these cases our maxim is, that *malitia supplet eudem*. Under seven years of age, indeed, an infant cannot be guilty of felony; for then a felonious discretion is almost an impossibility in nature; but at eight years old, he may be guilty of felony. Also, under 14, though an infant shall be *prima facie* adjudged to be *dolus in capax*, yet if it appear to the court and jury that he was *doli capax*, and could discern between good and evil, he may be convicted and suffer death. Thus a girl of 13 has been burnt for killing her mistress; and one boy of ten, and another of nine years old, who had killed their companions, have been sentenced to death, and he of ten years actually hanged; because it appeared upon their trials, that the one hid himself, and the other hid the body he had killed; which hiding manifested a consciousness of guilt, and a discretion to discern between good and evil. And there was an instance in the last century, where a boy of eight years old was tried at Abington for firing two barns; and, it appearing that he had malice, revenge, and cunning, he was found guilty, condemned, and hanged accordingly. Thus also, in very modern times, a boy of ten years old was convicted on his own confession of murdering his bedfellow; there appearing in his whole behaviour plain tokens of a mischievous disposition; and, as the sparing this boy merely on account of his tender years might be of dangerous consequence to the public, by propagating a notion that children might commit such atrocious crimes with impunity, it was unanimously agreed by all the judges, that he was a proper subject of capital punishment. But, in all such cases, the evidence of that malice, which is to supply age, ought to be strong and clear beyond all doubt and contradiction.

2. In civil matters. The ages of male and female are different for different purposes. A male at 12 years old may take the oath of allegiance; at 14 is at the years of discretion, and therefore may consent or disagree to marriage, may choose his guardian, and, if his discretion be actually proved, may make his testament of his personal estate; at 17 may be an executor; and at 21 is at his own disposal, and may alienate his lands, goods, and chattels. A female also at seven years of age may be betrothed or given in marriage; at nine is entitled to dower; at 12 is at years of maturity, and therefore may consent or disagree to marriage, and, if proved to have sufficient discretion, may bequeath her personal estate; at 14 is at years of legal discretion, and may choose a guardian; at 17 may be executrix; and at 21 may dispose of herself and her lands. So that full age in male or female is 21 years, which age is completed on the day preceding the anniversary of a person's birth; who till that time is an infant, and so styled in law. Among the ancient Greeks and Romans, women were never of age, but subject to perpetual guardianship, unless when married, *nisi convenienter in manum viri*: and, when that perpetual tutelage wore away in process of time, we find that, in females as well as males, full age was not till 25 years. Thus by the constitution of different kingdoms, this period, which is merely arbitrary, and *juris positivae*, is fixed at different times. Scotland agrees with England in this point; (both probably copying from the old Saxon constitutions on the continent, which extended the age of minority ad annum *vigintimum primum*, et eo *ufique juvenes sub tutelam reproment*); but in Naples persons are of full age at 18; in France, with regard to marriage, not till 30; and in Holland at 25.

The very disabilities of infants are privileges; in order to secure them from hurting themselves by their own improvident acts. An infant cannot be sued but under the protection, and joining the name, of his guardian; for he is to defend him against all attacks as well by law as otherwise; but he may sue either by his guardian, or *prochein amicus*, his next friend who is not his guardian. This *prochein amicus* may be any person who will undertake the infant's cause; and it frequently happens, that an infant, by his *prochein amicus*, institutes a suit in equity against a fraudulent guardian.

With regard to estates and civil property, an infant hath many privileges. In general, an infant shall lose nothing by nonclaim, or neglect of demanding his right; nor shall any other laches or negligence be imputed to an infant, except in some very particular cases.

It is generally true, that an infant can neither alienate his lands, nor do any legal act, nor make a deed, nor indeed any manner of contract, that will bind him. But still to all these rules there are some exceptions; part of which were just now mentioned in reckoning up the different capacities which they assume at different ages; and there are others, a few of which it may not be improper to recite, as a general specimen of the whole. And, first, it is true, that infants cannot alienate their estates; but infant-truillees, or mortgagees, are enabled to convey, under the direction of the court of chancery or exchequer, or other courts of equity, the estates they hold in trust or mortgage, to such person as the court shall appoint. Also it is generally true, that an infant can do no legal act; yet an infant, who has an advowson, may present to the benefice when it becomes void. For the law in this case dispenses with one rule, in order to maintain others of far greater consequence: it permits an infant to present a clerk (who, if unfit, may be rejected by the bishop), rather than either suffer the church to be unfurnished till he comes of age, or permit the infant to be debarred of his right by lapse to the bishop. An infant may also purchase lands, but his purchase is incomplete; for, when he comes to age, he may either agree or disagree to it, as he thinks prudent or proper, without alleging any any reason; and so may his heirs after him, if he dies without having completed his agreement. It is, farther, generally true, that an infant, under 21, can make no deed but what is afterwards voidable: yet in some cases he may bind himself apprentice by deed indented or indentures, for seven years; and he may by deed or will appoint a guardian to his children, if he has any. Lastly, it is generally true, that an infant can make no other contract that will bind him; yet he may bind himself to pay for his necessary meat, drink, apparel, physic, and such other necessaries; and likewise for his good teaching and instruction, whereby he may profit himself afterwards.