ignifies dignity, grandeur, or greatness; more particularly, it signifies antiquity of family, joined with riches: in the common acceptation of the word, it means that quality or dignity which raises a man above the rank of a peasant or a commoner.

At a time when the public mind is so much agitated on this subject, or subjects nearly allied to it, perhaps the less that is said on it the better. We should therefore (as far as concerns the question about its expediency in civil life, or the contrary) most cheerfully pass it over in silence, did we not esteem it our duty to give our readers at least some idea of it, and were it not our business to lay before them a few of those arguments which of late have been so copiously retailled both for and against this illustrious order of civil society: leaving them, however, that liberty which every man unquestionably ought to be allowed, of judging for themselves as they shall feel most proper.

Whether that equality of rank and condition which has of late been so loudly contended for would be more agreeable to the order of nature, or more conducive to the happiness and prosperity of mankind, may indeed be made a question; but it is a question, we apprehend, which cannot receive different answers from men capable of reflecting without prejudice and partiality. A state of perfect equality can subsist only among beings possessing equal talents and equal virtues; but such beings are not men. Were all mankind under the constant influence of the laws of virtue, a distinction of ranks would be unnecessary; but in that case civil government itself would likewise be unnecessary, because men would have attained all that perfection to which it is the object of civil government as well as of religion to guide them: every man then would be a law unto himself. But whilst, in so many breasts, the selfish passions predominate over those which are social, violence must be restrained by authority; and there can be no authority without a distinction of ranks, such as may influence the public opinion.

It is well observed by Hume, that government is founded only on opinion; and that this opinion is of two kinds, opinion of interest, and opinion of right. When a people are persuaded that it is their interest to support the government under which they live, that government must be very stable. But among the worthless and unthinking part of the community, this persuasion has seldom place. All men, however, have a notion of rights—or a right to property and a right to power; and when the majority of a nation considers a certain order of men as having a right to that eminence in which they are placed, this opinion, call it prejudice or what we will, contributes much to the peace and happiness of civil society. There are many, however, who think otherwise, and imagine that "the society in which the greatest equality prevails must always be the most secure." These men conceive it to be the bane of a good government to distribute as equally as possible those blessings which bounteous nature offers to all." It may readily be allowed that this reasoning is conclusive; but the great question returns, "How far can equality prevail in a society which is secure? and what is possible to be done in the equal distribution of the blessings of Nature?" Till these questions be answered, we gain nothing by declaiming on the rights and equality of men; and the answers which have sometimes been given to them suppose a degree of perfection in human nature, which, if it were real, would make all civil institutions useless, as well as the reveries of those reformers. The conduct of the democratic states of Pagan antiquity, together with the oppressive anarchy and shameful violences which we have seen and still see in a neighbouring kingdom, will be considered by many as a full and satisfactory answer, deduced from experience, to all the schemes of the visionary theorist: such facts at least render the abolition of the order of nobility a matter of more importance, and of infinitely greater difficulty, than those who plead for it are disposed to allow.

It is an opinion not uncommon, and at least plausible, that the nobility of a well regulated state is the best security against monarchical despotism, or lawless usurpation on the one hand, and the confusion of democratic influence on the other. Self-interest is the most powerful principle in the human breast; and it is obviously the interest of such men to preserve that balance of power in society upon which the very existence of their order depends. Corrupted as the present age confessedly is, a very recent instance could be given, in which the British House of Peers refused at once the sovereign and the people from the threatened tyranny of a factious junto. As it is our business, however, to exhibit all opinions of any celebrity, we shall lay before our readers a short extract from Du Laure's Critical History of the French Nobility, which contains, in few but forcible words, some of the common arguments against this distinction of ranks.

"Nobility (says he), a distinction equally impolitic and immoral, and worthy of the times of ignorance and of rapine, which gave it birth, is a violation of the rights of that part of the nation that is deprived of it; and as equality becomes a stimulus towards distinction, so on the other hand this is the radical vice of a government and the source of a variety of evils. It is almost impossible that there should be any uncommon instances of virtue in a state, when recompenses belong exclusively to a certain class of society, and when it costs them no more to obtain these than the trouble of being born. Amongst this list of privileged persons, virtues, talents, and genius, must of course be much less frequent than in the other classes, since, without the possession of any of these qualities, they who belong to it are still honoured and rewarded. Those who profit by this absurd subversion of principles, and those who lose by this unjust distribution of favours, which seem to have grown into a right, cannot have any other than false, immoral, and pernicious ideas concerning merit."

A perfect equality, however, in rank and fortune has seldom been contended for, except by the most ignorant enthusiasts. It is indeed doubtful whether Nobility, it could possibly exist. The more moderate and rational reformers have acknowledged, that as these differences have always existed in some way or other, so from the infinite variety of talents and attainments in the world, we have reason to expect they will exist in every form of government and among every people. The question, therefore, is reduced to this: Whether the present mode of distinction, or any other which could be instituted in its stead, be upon the whole the best? That the present is not perfect, or wholly without faults, few will be sanguine enough to contradict; and a wise man in the sober hour of philosophical reflection will scarce presume to assert, that any other scheme which human ingenuity can plan would be wholly without imperfection, or altogether free from error. The case is, the errors of our own system are present, and on this account we see and feel them with peculiar force; the other plan we look forward to, perhaps in too sanguine a manner, and we probably forget, in the delusive heat of imagination, that if distinction depended entirely on merit, we should scarce find a society of men so honest, or so able, as always to reward it according to its deserts; or if this were possible, as perhaps in the nature of things it is not, such is the self partiality of the generality of men, that few would think he were dealt justly by if he were not promoted as well as his neighbour; and it is clearly impossible to promote every one. For such reasons then, and many more which our limits oblige us to omit, many think (and we are inclined to think with them), that it is safer to remain as we are, as we know the evils that attend our situation, and are still able to bear them, rather than to hazard a change, which, with some benefits, might also perhaps increase the troubles, and destroy many of the pleasures, of social life.

Perhaps it may not be amiss to lay before our readers the following observations from that most judicious commentator on the laws of England, Mr Justice Blackstone, on this important subject.

"The distinction of rank and honours (says he) is necessary in every well-governed state, in order to reward such as are eminent for their services to the public, in a manner the most desirable to individuals, and yet without burden to the community; exciting thereby an ambitious, yet laudable ardour, and generous emulation, in others. And emulation, or virtuous ambition, is a spring of action which, however dangerous or inviolate in a mere republic or under a despotic sway, will certainly be attended with good effects under a free monarchy; where, without destroying its existence, its excellencies may be continually restrained by that superior power from which all honour is derived. Such a spirit, when nationally diffused, gives life and vigour to the community; it sets all the wheels of government in motion, which, under a wise regulator, may be directed to any beneficial purpose; and thereby every individual may be made subservient to the public good, while he principally means to promote his own particular views. A body of nobility is also more peculiarly necessary in our mixed and compounded constitution, in order to support the rights of both the crown and the people, by forming a barrier to withstand the encroachments of both. It creates and preserves that gradual scale of dignity, which proceeds from the peasant to the prince; rising like a pyramid from a broad foundation, and diminishing to a point as it rises. It is this ascending and contracting proportion that adds stability to any government; for when the departure is sudden from one extreme to another, we may pronounce that state to be precarious. The nobility, therefore, are the pillars, which are reared from among the people, more immediately to support the throne; and, if that falls, they must also be buried under its ruins. Accordingly, when in the last century the commons had determined to extirpate monarchy, they also voted the house of lords to be useless and dangerous. And since titles of nobility are thus expedient in the state, it is also expedient that their owners should form an independent and separate branch of the legislature. If they were confounded with the mass of the people, and like them had only a vote in electing representatives, their privileges would soon be borne down and overwhelmed by the popular torrent, which would effectually level all distinctions. It is therefore highly necessary that the body of nobles should have a distinct assembly, distinct deliberations, and distinct powers from the commons."—These remarks, at a time like the present, deserve our serious attention; nor do we suppose our readers will be displeased, if we add the following observations on the subject from a periodical publication of long standing and very considerable merit.

"Birth and nobility are a stronger obligation to virtue than is laid upon meaner persons. A vicious or dishonourable nobleman is in effect perjured; for his honour is his oath.

"Under the patriarchal scheme, and at the first setting out of the tribes, the heads of families had their particular escutcheons, and their genealogies recorded with the utmost exactness: Even the Ancient of Days confirmed this; he often put his people in mind of the glory and virtues of their forefathers; and hath set a precedent for attainders, by visiting the third and fourth generation.

"It is a vulgar error to suppose, that his blessed Son chose his followers out of the meanest of the people, because mechanics; for this was part of the education of every Jewish nobleman: Two of the number, being his kinsmen, were of the royal house of David; one was a Roman gentleman, and another of the royal family of Syria; and for the rest, he had the same right of creation as his father and his vicegerents, of advancing the poor to honour, and of exalting the lowly and meek.

"The ancient Greeks and Romans paid great regard to nobility; but when the levelling principle obtained, and the people shared power and honour, those states soon dwindled and came to ruin. And in present Rome, great respect is paid to the renowned families of Colonna and Caesariani. In Venice, the notion of nobility is carried so high as to become inconsistent with a republican scheme. The Spaniards pay more regard to their old nobles than to their old Christians; and the French are but little behind them. What was said of the duke of Montmorency by Henry IV.

"That he was a better gentleman than himself," was, perhaps, the reason why the last heir of so illustrious a family was cut off, to make the house of Bourbon... nobility at all: That the high employments of the Nobility, commonwealth should be bestowed amongst the most ancient families, unless where a person should distinguish himself by some signal service to the state. Such a man would think himself sufficiently rewarded by the honour of being put upon a foot with the ancient nobility; and the nobility would be pleased to find that no commoner, except some of great reputation and merit, was to hold any of the employments usually possessed by their body. If the person so preferred should not be rich enough to support the dignity of the office, the state may give him a pension, but by no means should employments be made lucrative; which not only exhaust and weaken the commonwealth, but wherever the high employments are sought for profit, the nobility lose their generous sentiments, and it is a means of introducing corruption among them.

The origin of nobility in Europe is by some referred to the Goths; who, after they had seized a part of Europe, rewarded their captains with titles of honour, to distinguish them from the common people. We shall only in this place further consider the manner in which in our own country they may be created, and the incidents attending them; referring for a fuller account of their origin in Europe to the articles Revolution, and Society (Civil).

1. The right of peerage seems to have been originally territorial; that is, annexed to lands, honours, castles, manors, and the like; the proprietors and possessors of which were (in right of those estates) allowed to be peers of the realm, and were summoned to parliament to do suit and service to their sovereign; and, when the land was alienated, the dignity passed with it as appendant. Thus in England the bishops still sit in the house of lords in right of succession to certain ancient baronies annexed, or supposed to be annexed, to their episcopal lands; and thus in Henry VI the possession of the castle of Arundel was adjudged to confer an earldom on its possessor. But afterwards, when Alienations grew to be frequent, the dignity of peerage was confined to the lineage of the party ennobled, and instead of territorial became personal. Actual proof of a tenure by barony became no longer necessary to constitute a lord of parliament; but the record of the writ of summons to him or his ancestors was admitted as a sufficient evidence of the tenure.

Peers of Great Britain are now created either by writ or by patent; for those who claim by prescription must suppose either a writ or patent made to their ancestors; though by length of time it is lost. The creation by writ, or the king's letter, is a summons to attend the house of peers, by the style and title of that barony which the king is pleased to confer: that by patent is a royal grant to a subject of any dignity and degree of peerage. The creation by writ is the more ancient way; but a man is not ennobled thereby, unless he actually take his seat in the house of lords; and some are of opinion that there must be at least two writs of summons, and a fitting in two distinct parliaments, to evidence an hereditary barony; and therefore the most usual, because the surest, way is to grant the dignity by patent, which endures to a man and his heirs. heirs according to the limitation thereof, though he never himself makes use of it. Yet it is frequent to call up the eldest son of a peer to the house of lords by writ of summons, in the name of his father's barony: because in that case there is no danger of his children losing the nobility in case he never takes his seat; for they will succeed to their grandfather. Creation by writ has also one advantage over that by patent; for a person created by writ holds the dignity to him and his heirs, without any words to that purport in the writ; but in letters patent there must be words to direct the inheritance, else the dignity endures only to the grantee for life. For a man or woman may be created noble for their own lives, and the dignity not descend to their heirs at all, or descend only to some particular heirs: as where a peerage is limited to a man and the heirs male of his body by Elizabeth his present lady, and not to such heirs by any former or future wife.

2. Let us next take a view of a few of the principal incidents attending the nobility,—exclusive of their capacity as members of parliament, and as hereditary counsellors of the crown, for both which we refer to the articles Lords and Parliament. And first we must observe, that in criminal cases a nobleman shall be tried by his peers. The great are always obnoxious to popular envy: were they to be judged by the people, they might be in danger from the prejudice of their judges; and would moreover be deprived of the privilege of the meanest subjects, that of being tried by their equals, which is secured to all the realm by magna charta, c. 29. It is said, that this does not extend to bishops; who, though they are lords of parliament, and fit there by virtue of their baronies which they hold jure ecclesiae, yet are not ennobled in blood, and consequently not peers with the nobility. As to peeresses, no provision was made for their trial when accused of treason or felony, till after Eleanor duchess of Gloucester, wife to the lord protector, had been accused of treason, and found guilty of witchcraft, in an ecclesiastical synod, through the intrigues of Cardinal Beaufort. This very extraordinary trial gave occasion to a special statute, 20 Hen. VI. c. 9. which enacts, that peeresses, either in their own right or by marriage, shall be tried before the same judicature as peers of the realm. If a woman, noble in her own right, marries a commoner, she still remains noble, and shall be tried by her peers: but if she be only noble by marriage, then by a second marriage with a commoner she loses her dignity; for as by marriage it is gained, by marriage it is also lost. Yet if a duchess-dowager marries a baron, she continues a duchess still; for all the nobility are pares, and therefore it is no degradation. A peer or peeress (either in her own right or by marriage) cannot be arrested in civil cases; and they have also many peculiar privileges annexed to their peerage in the course of judicial proceedings. A peer sitting in judgment, gives not his verdict upon oath, like an ordinary jurymen, but upon his honour; and answers also to bills in chancery upon his honour, and not upon his oath: but, when he is examined as a witness either in civil or criminal cases, he must be sworn; for the respect which the law shows to the honour of a peer does not extend so far as to overturn a settled maxim, that in judicio non creditur nisi juratus. The honour of peers is however so highly tendered by the law, that it is much more penal to spread false reports of them, and certain other great officers of the realm, than of other men: scandal against them being called by the peculiar name of scandalum magnatum, and subjected to peculiar punishment by divers ancient statutes.

A peer cannot lose his nobility but by death or attainder; though there was an instance, in the reign of Edward IV. of the degradation of George Nevile duke of Bedford by act of parliament, on account of his poverty, which rendered him unable to support his dignity. But this is a singular instance: which serves at the same time, by having happened, to show the power of parliament; and, by having happened but once, to show how tender the parliament hath been in exerting so high a power. It hath been said indeed, that if a barest wastes his estate, so that he is not able to support the degree, the king may degrade him: but it is expressly held by later authorities, that a peer cannot be degraded but by act of parliament.

Anton. Matthæus observes, that nobility, among the Romans, was a quite different thing from what it is among us. The nobles, among the Romans, were either those raised to the magistrature, or descended from magistrates: there was no such thing as nobility by patent.

Bartoli says, that doctors, after they have held a professor's chair in an university for 20 years, become noble; and are intitled to all the rights of counts.

But this claim is not admitted at court, &c. though Bartoli's sentiments be backed with those of several other authors, particularly Chassanæus in his Confucetudin Burgundia; Boyer sur la Coutume de Berry; Faber C. de Dig. Def. 9. &c. which last, however, restrains Bartoli's rule to doctors in law, and princes physicians.

By an edict of the French king in 1669, it is declared, that trade shall not derogate from nobility, provided the person do not sell by retail.

In Bretagne, by ancient custom, a nobleman loses nothing by trading even in retail: but he resumes all his rights as soon as he ceases traffic, his nobility having slept all the time.

In Germany, a woman, not noble by birth, doth not become, v. gr. a countess or baroness by marrying a count or baron: a lady of the higher degree indeed becomes a princess by marrying a prince; but this doth not hold of a lady of the lower nobility.

On the coast of Malabar, children are only capable of being noble by the mother's side; it being allowed them to take as many husbands as they please, and to quit them whenever they think good.