in general, the operation of giving a gloss or lustre to certain substances, as metals, glasses, marble, &c.

The operation of polishing optic-glasses, after being properly ground, is one of the most difficult points of the whole process. See **TELESCOPE**.

**POLITENESS** means elegance of manners or good breeding; Lord Chesterfield calls it the art of pleasing. It has also been called an artificial good nature; and indeed good nature is the foundation of true politeness; without which art will make but a very indifferent figure, and will generally defeat its own ends. "Where compliance and afflent, caution and candour, says an elegant essayist *, arise from a natural tenderness of disposition and softness of nature, as they sometimes do, they are almost amiable and certainly excusable; but as the effects of artifice, they must be despised. The persons who possess them are, indeed, often themselves dupes of their own deceit, when they imagine others are deluded by it. For excellent art always betrays itself; and many, who do not openly take notice of the deceiver, from motives of delicacy and tenderness for his character, feebly deride and warmly resent his ineffectual subtlety."

*Dr Knox, and candour, says an elegant essayist *; arise from a natural tenderness of disposition and softness of nature, as they sometimes do, they are almost amiable and certainly excusable; but as the effects of artifice, they must be despised. The persons who possess them are, indeed, often themselves dupes of their own deceit, when they imagine others are deluded by it. For excellent art always betrays itself; and many, who do not openly take notice of the deceiver, from motives of delicacy and tenderness for his character, feebly deride and warmly resent his ineffectual subtlety."

**True politeness (says another author †) is that continual attention which humanity inspires us with, both to please others, and to avoid giving them offence. The purely plain-dealer exclaims loudly against this virtue, and prefers his own shocking bluntness and Gothic freedom. The courtier and fawning flatterer, on the contrary, substitute in its place insipid compliments, cringings, and a jargon of unmeaning sentences. The one blames politeness, because he takes it for a vice; and the other is polite, the occasion of this, because that which he practises is really so."

Both these characters act from motives equally absurd, though not equally criminal. The conduct of the artful flatterer is guided by self-love, while that of the plain-dealer is the effect of ignorance; for nothing is more certain, than that the desire of pleasing is founded on the mutual wants and the mutual wishes of mankind; on the pleasure which we wish to derive from society, and the character which we wish to acquire. Men having discovered that it was necessary and agreeable to unite for their common interests, they have made laws to repress the wicked, they have settled the duties of social life, and connected the idea of respectability with the practice of those duties; and after having prescribed the regulations necessary to their common safety, they have endeavoured to render their commerce with one another agreeable, by establishing the rules of politeness and good breeding. Indeed, as an elegant author already quoted remarks, the philosopher who, in the austerity of his virtue, should condemn the art of pleasing as unworthy cultivation, would deserve little attention from mankind, and might be dismissed to his solitary tub, like his brother Diogenes. It is the dictate of humanity, that we should endeavour to render ourselves agreeable to those in whose company we are destined to travel in the journey of life. It is our interest, it is the source of perpetual satisfaction; it is one of our most important duties as men, and particularly required in the professor of Christianity."

It is needless to particularize the motives which have induced men to practise the agreeable virtues; for, from whatever source the desire of pleasing proceeds, it has always increased in proportion to the general civilization of mankind. In a rude state of society, pleasure is limited in its sources and in its operation. When the wants of mankind, and the means of attaining them, are few, personal application is necessary to gratify them, and it is generally sufficient; by which means an individual becomes more independent than can possibly be the case in civilized life, and of course less disposed to give or receive affluence. Confined to the solitary wish of furnishing means for his own happiness, he is little intent on the pleasures of conversation and society. His desire of communication is equal to the extent of his knowledge. But as soon as the natural wants of life are filled up, we find unoccupied time, and we labour hard to make it pass in an agreeable manner. It is then we perceive the advantage of possessing a rational nature, and the delights of mutual intercourse. When we consider society in that state of perfection which enables a great part of the members of it to pursue at leisure the pleasures of conversation, we should expect, both from the ease of acquitting ourselves to the satisfaction of our associates, and from the advantages arising from this conduct, that the art of pleasing might be reduced to a few plain and simple rules, and that these might be derived from a slight attention to general manners.

The art of pleasing, in our intercourse with mankind, is indeed so simple, that it requires nothing more than the constant desire to please in all our words and actions; and the practice of it can neither wound a man's self-love, nor be prejudicial to his interest in any possible situation. But though this be certain, it is doubtless less attended to than in reason it ought to be. Each particular man is so zealous to promote his own ends or his own pleasure, as to forget that his neighbour has claims equal to his own; that every man that enters into company gives up for the time a great many of his peculiar rights; and that he then forms part of an association, met together not for the particular gratification of any one, but for the purpose of general satisfaction. See Breeding, Conversation, and Good Manners.

The qualities essential in the art of pleasing, are virtue, knowledge, and manners. All the virtues which form a good and respectable character in a moral sense are essential to the art of pleasing. This must be an established principle, because it depends on the wants and mutual relations of society. In all affairs of common business, we delight in transacting with men in whom we can place confidence, and in whom we find integrity; but truth is so naturally pleasing, and the common affairs of life are so interwoven with social intercourse, that we derive abundantly more satisfaction from an honest character than from specious manners.

"Should you be suspected (says Chesterfield) of injustice, malignity, perfidy, lying, &c. all the parts and knowledge of the world will never procure you esteem, friendship, and respect."

The first of virtues in our commerce with the world, and the chief in giving pleasure to those with whom we associate, is inviolable sincerity of heart. We can never be too punctual in the most scrupulous tenderness to our moral character in this respect, nor too nicely affected in preserving our integrity.

The peculiar modes, even of the fashionable world, which are founded in dissimulation, and which on this account have induced several to recommend the practice, would not prevent a man of the highest integrity from being acceptable in the very best company. Acknowledged sincerity gives the same ornament to character that modesty does to manners. It would abundantly atone for the want of ridiculous ceremony, or false and unmeaning professions; and it would in no respect diminish the lustre of a noble air, or the perfection of an elegant address.

If integrity be the foundation of that character which is most generally acceptable, or which, in other words, possesses the power of pleasing in the highest degree, humanity and modesty are its highest ornaments.

The whole art of pleasing, as far as the virtues are concerned, may be derived from the one or other of these sources. Humanity comprehends the display of everything amiable to others; modesty removes or suppresses everything offensive in ourselves.

This modesty, however, is not inconsistent with firmness and dignity of character; it arises rather from the knowledge of our imperfection compared with a certain flattery, than from conscious ignorance of what we ought to know. We must therefore distinguish between this modesty and what the French call mauvais honte. The one is the unaffected and unassuming principle which leads us to give preference to the merit of others, the other is the awkward struggling of nature over her own infirmities. The first gives an additional lustre to every good quality; while some people, from feeling the pain and inconvenience of the mauvais honte, have rushed into the other extreme, and turned impudent, as cowards sometimes grow desperate from excess of danger. The medium between these two extremes marks out the well-bred man; he feels himself firm and easy in all companies, is modest without being bashful, and steady without being impudent.

A man possessing the amiable virtues is still farther prepared to please, by having in his own mind a perpetual fund of satisfaction and entertainment. He is put to no trouble in concealing thoughts which it would be disgraceful to avow, and he is not anxious to display virtues which his daily conversation and his constant looks render visible.

The next ingredient in the art of pleasing, is to possess a correct and enlightened understanding, and a fund of rational knowledge. With virtue and modesty we must be able to entertain and instruct those with whom we associate.

The faculty of communicating ideas is peculiar to man, and the pleasure which he derives from the interchange alone is one of the most important of his blessings. Mankind are formed with numberless wants, and with a mutual power of afflicting each other. It is a beautiful and happy part of the same perfect plan, that they are likewise formed to delight in each other's company, and in the mutual interchange of their thoughts. The different species of communication, in a highly polished age, are as numerous as the different ranks, employments, and occupations of men; and indeed the knowledge which men wish to communicate, takes its tinge from their peculiar profession or occupation.

Thus commercial men delight to talk of their trade, and of the nature of public business; men of pleasure, who with merely to vary or quicken their amusements, are in conversation light, trifling, and insincere; and the literati delight to dwell on new books, learned men, and important discoveries in science or in arts. But as the different classes of men will frequently meet together, all parties must so contrive matters, as to combine the useful and agreeable together, so as to give the greatest delight at the time, and the greatest pleasure on reflection. An attention to these principles would make the man of pleasure and the man of learning meet together on equal terms, and derive mutual advantage from their different qualifications. With due attention to such ideas, we proceed to mention the kinds of knowledge which are most fitted for conversation. Those who wish to please should particularly endeavour to be informed in those points which most generally occur. An accurate or extensive knowledge on learned subjects is by no means sufficient: we must also have an accurate and extensive knowledge of the common occurrences of life.

It is the knowledge of mankind, of governments, of history, of public characters, and of the springs which put the great and the little actions of the world in motion, which give real pleasure and rational instruction. The knowledge which we communicate must in some shape be interesting to those to whom we communicate it; of that nature, that the desire of receiving it may overbalance every kind of disgust, excited too often on the score of envy and self-love, against those who happen to possess superior endowments, and at the same time of that importance, as to elevate the thoughts somewhat above the actions and the faults of the narrow circle formed in our own immediate neighbourhood. On this account it is recommended by an author who fully knew mankind, as a maxim of great importance in the art of pleasing, to be acquainted with the private character of those men who, from their station or their actions, are making a figure in the world. We naturally wish to see such men in their retired and undignified moments; and he who can gratify us is highly acceptable. History of all kinds, fitly introduced, and occasionally embellished with pleasing anecdotes, is a chief part of our entertainment in the intercourse of life. This is receiving instruction, without exciting much envy; it depends on memory, and memory is one of those talents the possession of which we least grudge to our neighbour. Our knowledge of history, at the same time, must not appear in long and tedious details; but in apt and well-chosen allusions, calculated to illustrate the particular subject of conversation. But the knowledge most necessary is that of the human heart. This is acquired by constant observation on the manners and maxims of the world, connected with that which passes in our own minds. This leads us from the common details of conduct, from slander and defamation, to the sources and principles of action, and enables us to enter into what may be called the philosophy of conversation. We may see both the practicability of this kind of discourse, and the nature of it, in the following lines of Horace:

Sermo oritur, non de villis domibufve alienis; Nec male necne Lepos saltet: fed quod magis ad nos Pertinet, & nefcire malum eft, agitamus: utrumque Divitis homines, an sint virtute beat? Quidve ad amicitias, ufos rectumne, trahat nos? Et qua fit natura boni, sumnumque quid ejus? &c.

By this means constant materials are supplied for free, easy, and spirited communication. The restraints which are imposed on mankind, either from what their own character may suffer, or from the apprehension of giving offence to others, are entirely taken off, and they have a sufficient quantity of current coin for all the common purposes of life.

In addition to virtue and knowledge, which are the chief ingredients in the art of pleasing, we have to consider graceful and easy manners. Lord Chesterfield indeed considers these as the most essential and important part; as if the diamond received its whole value from the polish. But though he is unquestionably mistaken, there is yet a certain sweetness of manners which is particularly engaging in our commerce with the world. It is that which constitutes the character which the French, under the appellation of *paimable*, so much talk of, and so justly value. This is not so easily described as felt. It is the compound result of different things; as complaisance, a flexibility, but not a servility of manners, an air of softness in the countenance, gesture, and expression, equally whether you concur or differ with the person you converse with. This is particularly to be studied when we are obliged to refuse a favour asked of us, or to say what in itself cannot be very agreeable to the person to whom we say it. It is then the necessary gilding of a disagreeable pill. But this, which may be called the *suaviter in modo*, would degenerate and sink into a mean and timid complaisance and patience, if not supported by firmness and dignity of character. Hence the Latin sentence, *suaviter in modo, fortiter in re*, becomes a useful and important maxim in politeness.

Genuine easy manners result from a constant attention to the relations of persons, things, time, and places. Were we to converse with one greatly our superior, we are to be as easy and unembarrassed as with our equals; but yet every look, word, and action, should imply, without any kind of servile flattery, the greatest respect. In mixed companies, with our equals, greater ease and liberty are allowed; but they too have their proper limits. There is a social respect necessary. Our words, gestures, and attitudes, have a greater degree of latitude, though not an unbounded one. That easiness of carriage and behaviour which is exceedingly engaging, widely differs from negligence and inattention, and by no means implies that one may do whatever he pleases; it only means, that one is not to be stiff, formal, and embarrassed, disconcerted and ashamed; but it requires great attention to, and a scrupulous observation of, what the French call *les bienfiances*; a word which implies "decorum, good-breeding, and propriety." Whatever we ought to do, is to be done with ease and unconcern; whatever is improper, must not be done at all. In mixed companies, also, different ages and sexes are to be differently addressed. Although we are to be equally easy with all, old age particularly requires to be treated with a degree of deference and regard. It is a good general rule, to accustom ourselves to have a kind feeling to every thing connected with man; and when this is the case, we shall seldom err in the application. Another important point in the *bienfiances* is, not to run our own present humour and disposition indiscriminately against everybody, but to observe and adopt theirs. And if we cannot command one present humour and disposition, it is necessary to single out those to converse with who happen to be in the humour the nearest to our own. Peremptoriness and decision, especially in young people, is contrary to the *bienfiances*; they should seldom seem to dissent, and always use some softening mitigating expression.

There is a *bienfiance* also with regard to people of the lowest degree; a gentleman observes it with his footman, and even indeed with the beggar in the street. He considers them as objects of compassion, not of insult; he speaks to neither in a harsh tone, but corrects the one coolly, and refuses the other with humanity.

The following observations perhaps contain the sum of the art of pleasing:

1. A fixed and habitual resolution of endeavouring to please, is a circumstance which will seldom fail of effect, and its effect will every day become more visible as this habit increases in strength.

2. This resolution must be regulated by a very considerable degree of good sense.

3. It is a maxim of almost general application, that what pleases us in another will also please others in us.

4. A constant and habitual attention to the different dispositions of mankind, to their ruling passions, and to their peculiar or occasional humours, is absolutely necessary.

5. A man who would please, must possess a firm, equal, and steady temper. And,

6. An easy and graceful manner, as distant from bashfulness on the one hand as from impudence on the other. A variety of excellent rules for acquiring politeness, with strictures on particular kinds of impoliteness, may be found in the Spectator, Rambler, Idler, Lounger, Mirror, and other periodical works of that kind; in Knol's Essays, and among Swift's Works; see Good Manners. Chesterfield's Art of Pleasing, and his Letters, are also worthy of perusal, provided the reader be on his guard against the infelicity and other vices which those books are calculated to infuse, and provided he always bears in mind what we have endeavoured to show in this article, that true politeness does not consist in sycophantic manners and a dissimulating address, but that it must always be founded on real worth and intrinsic virtue.