the decree of God, whereby he hath from all eternity unchangeably appointed whatsoever comes to pass; and hath more especially fore-ordained certain individuals of the human race to everlasting Predestination everlasting happiness, and hath passed by the rest, and fore-ordained them to everlasting misery. The former of these are called the elect, and the latter are called the reprobate.

This doctrine is the subject of one of the most perplexing controversies that has occurred among mankind. But it is not altogether peculiar to the Christian faith. The opinion, that whatever occurs in the world at large, or in the lot of private individuals, is the result of a previous and unalterable arrangement by that Supreme Power which presides over nature, has always been a favourite opinion among the vulgar, and has been believed by many speculative men. Thus, in that beautiful scene in the fifth book of the Iliad, Hector, taking leave of his wife and his child, speaks thus:

Andromache! my foul's far better part, Why with untimely sorrows leaves thy heart? No hostile hand can antedate my doom, Till fate condemns me to the silent tomb. Fix'd is the term to all the race of earth, And such the hard condition of our birth. No force can then resist, no flight can save, All sink alike, the fearful and the brave. 1624.

The ancient Stoics, Zeno and Chrysippus, whom the Jewish Sages seem to have followed, affected the existence of a Deity that, acting wisely, but necessarily, contrived the general system of the world; from which, by a series of causes, whatever is now done in it unavoidably results. This series, or concatenation of causes, they held to be necessary in every part; and that God himself is so much the servant of necessity, and of his own decrees, that he could not have made the smallest object in the world otherwise than it now is, much less is he able to alter any thing.

According to the words of Seneca, *Eadem necesse est et Deus eligat.* *Irrevocabili divina pariter atque humana cursus vehit.* *Ille ipse omnium conditor ac rector scripsit quidem fata sed sequitur.* *Semper paret, semel jussit.* "The same chain of necessity constrains both gods and men. Its unalterable course regulates divine as well as human things. Even he who wrote the Fates, the Maker and Governor of all things, submits to them. He did but once command, but he always obeys." The Stoical fate differs, however, from the Christian predestination in several points. They regarded the divine nature and will as a necessary part of a necessary chain of causes; whereas the Christians consider the Deity as the Lord and Ruler of the Universe, omnipotent and free, appointing all things according to his pleasure. Being doubtful of the immortality of the soul, the Stoics could have no idea of the doctrine of election and reprobation; nor did they ever doubt their own freedom of will, or power of doing good as well as evil, as we shall presently see the Christian predestinarians have done.

Mahomet introduced into his Koran the doctrine of an absolute predestination of the course of human affairs. He represented life and death, prosperity and adversity, and every event that befalls a man in this world, as the result of a previous determination of the one God who rules over all; and he found this opinion the best engine for inspiring his followers with that contempt of danger which, united to their zeal, has extended the empire of their faith over the fairest portion of the habitable globe.

The controversy concerning predestination first made its appearance in the Christian church about the beginning of the fifth century. Pelagius a Briton, and Cæsarius a Irish monk, both lived at Rome during that period, and possessed great celebrity on account of their piety and learning. They taught that the opinion is false, which affirms, that human nature is necessarily corrupted by a depravity derived from our first parents. They contended, that men are born at present in a state as pure as that in which Adam was originally created; and that they are not less qualified than he was for fulfilling all righteousness, and for reaching the most sublime eminence of piety and virtue: that the external grace of God, which is given unto all, and attends the preaching of the gospel, is necessary to call forth the attention and exertions of men; but that we do not want the assistance of any internal grace to purify the heart, and to give it the first impulse towards what is good. Having fled into Africa on account of the Goths, who at that time invaded Italy, A.D. 410, Cæsarius remained at Carthage as a Presbyter; but Pelagius went into the East, where he settled, and prospered under the patronage of John bishop of Jerusalem, to whom his sentiments were agreeable. On the contrary, the celebrated Augustine, bishop of Hippo, strenuously asserted the depravity of human nature since the fall of the first man, the necessity of a special interposition of divine grace to enable us to do any one good action; and consequently, that none could obtain salvation excepting those whom God has thought fit to elect, and upon whom he bestows this grace. The dispute was carried on with great zeal. Zozimus bishop of Rome decided at first in favour of Pelagius and Cæsarius, whose followers were called Pelagians; but he afterwards altered his opinion: and by the activity of Augustine, the council of Ephesus was called, at which the opinion of his antagonists was formally condemned.

In the course of the same century, these opinions assumed a variety of forms and modifications. One party, called Predestinarians, carried Augustine's doctrine farther than he himself had ventured to do in express words; and affirmed, that God had not only predestinated the wicked to punishment, but also that he had decreed that they should commit those very sins on account of which they are hereafter to be punished. Another party moderated the doctrine of Pelagius, and were called Semipelagians. Their peculiar opinion is expressed in a different manner by different writers; but all the accounts sufficiently agree. Thus, some represent them as maintaining that inward grace is not necessary to the first beginning of repentance, but only to our progress in virtue. Others say, that they acknowledged the power of grace, but said that faith depends upon ourselves, and good works upon God; and it is agreed upon all hands, that these Semipelagians held that predestination is made upon the foresight of good works. The affluence of Augustine, though then far advanced in life, was called in to combat these tenets, and he wrote several treatises upon the subject. In all these he strenuously maintained, that the predestination of the elect was independent of any foresight of of their good works, but was according to the good pleasure of God only; and that perseverance comes from God, and not from man. Thereafter the doctrine of Augustine, or St Aulitin as he is often called, became general. He was the oracle of the schoolmen. They never ventured to differ from him in sentiment; they only pretended to dispute about the true sense of his writings.

The whole of the earliest reformers maintained these opinions of Augustine. They assumed under Luther a more regular and systematic form than they had ever formerly exhibited. But as the Lutherans afterwards abandoned them, they are now known by the name of Calvinistic Doctrines, from John Calvin of Geneva. He asserted, that the everlasting condition of mankind in a future world was determined from all eternity by the unchangeable decree of the Deity, arising from his sole good pleasure or free will. Being a man of great ability, industry, and eloquence, Geneva, where he taught, and which was a free state, soon became the resort of all the men of letters belonging to the reformed churches, and was a kind of seminary from which missionaries issued to propagate the Protestant doctrines through Europe. Their success was such, that, excepting a part of Germany, the principles of all the reformed churches are professedly Calvinistic or Predestinarian.

The opponents of the doctrine of predestination among the Protestants usually receive the appellation of Arminians or Remonstrants. They derive the first of these appellations from James Arminius, who was, A.D. 1602, appointed professor of theology at Leyden. He was violently opposed by Gomar his colleague, and died A.D. 1609. After his death, the controversy was conducted with great eagerness on both sides. The Calvinists, however, gradually prevailed. A synod was called at Dort, A.D. 1618, to which the most celebrated divines of different countries were invited. There, in a great measure by the authority and influence of Maurice prince of Orange, the Arminians were condemned as heretics; for by this time ambitious and powerful men found themselves politically interested in this religious contest. The Arminians presented to this synod a remonstrance, containing a statement of their faith upon the subjects in dispute; and from this they derived the appellation of Remonstrants. This statement contained the following five articles: 1. That God from all eternity predestinated those to everlasting salvation whom he foreknew would believe in Christ unto the end of their lives; and predestinated obstinate unbelievers to everlasting punishment. 2. Jesus Christ died for the whole human race, and for every individual of it, but believers alone reap the benefit of his death. 3. No man can produce faith in his mind by his own free will, but it is necessary that man, who is by nature wicked and unfit for acting or thinking aright, should be regenerated by the grace of the Holy Spirit, imparted by God for Christ's sake. 4. This divine grace constitutes the source, the progress, and the fulfillment, of all that is good in man; but it is not irrefutable in its operation. 5. Believers, by the affluence of the Holy Spirit, are abundantly fitted for every good work; but whether it is possible for those who have once been truly such to fall away, and to perish finally, is not clear, and must be better inquired into by searching the Sacred Scriptures.

In opposition to these, a counter-remonstrance was presented, containing the opinions of the Calvinists, which was approved of by the synod. The substance of it was afterwards adopted, and in nearly the same expression, into the Confession of Faith compiled by the Assembly of divines which met at Westminster, A.D. 1643, and which every clergyman and probationer for the ministry in Scotland is at present required to subscribe previous to his admission. To give as clear and as fair an idea as possible of the Calvinistic doctrine up to this head, we transcribe the following passage from that Confession: "God from all eternity did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass; yet so, as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures, nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established. Although God knows whatsoever may or can come to pass upon all supposed conditions; yet hath he not decreed any thing because he foresaw it as future, or that which would come to pass upon such conditions. By the decree of God, for the manifestation of his glory, some men and angels are predestinated unto everlasting life, and others are fore-ordained to everlasting death. These angels and men, thus predestinated and fore-ordained, are particularly and unchangeably designed; and their number is so certain and definite, that it cannot be either increased or diminished. Those of mankind that are predestinated unto life, God, before the foundation of the world was laid, according to his eternal and immutable purpose, and the secret counsel and good pleasure of his will, hath chosen, in Christ, unto everlasting glory, out of his mere free grace and love, without any foresight of faith, or good works, or perseverance in either of them, or any other thing in the creature, as conditions or causes moving him thereunto; and all to the praise of his glorious grace. As God hath appointed the elect unto glory, so hath he, by the eternal and most free purpose of his will, fore-ordained all the means thereunto. Wherefore, they who are elected, being fallen in Adam, are redeemed by Christ, are effectually called unto faith in Christ, by his spirit working in due season; are justified, adopted, sanctified, and kept, by his power through faith unto salvation. Neither are any other redeemed by Christ effectually called, justified, adopted, sanctified, and saved, but the elect only. The rest of mankind, God was pleased, according to the unsearchable counsel of his own will, whereby he extendeth or withholdeth mercy as he pleaseth for the glory of his sovereign power over his creatures, to pass by, and to ordain them to dishonour and wrath for their sin, to the praise of his glorious justice."

There are two kinds of Calvinists or Predestinarians, viz. the Supralapsarians, who maintain that God did originally and expressly decree the fall of Adam, as a foundation for the display of his justice and mercy; while those who maintain that God only permitted the fall of Adam, are called Sublapsarians, their system of decrees concerning election and reprobation being, as it were, subsequent to that event. But, as Dr Priestley justly remarks, if we admit the divine prescience, there Predestina is not, in fact, any difference between the two schemes; and accordingly that distinction is now seldom mentioned.

Disputes in the church of Rome less agitated by the contest about predestination than the first Protestants of Rome were. The council of Trent was much perplexed how to settle the matter without giving offence to the Dominicans, who were much attached to the doctrine of Augustine, and possessed great influence in the council. After much dispute, the great object came to be, how to contrive such a decree as might give offence to nobody, although it should decide nothing. Upon the whole, however, they seem to have favoured the Semi-pelagian scheme. Among other things, it was determined, that good works are of themselves meritorious to eternal life; but it is added, by way of softening, that it is through the goodness of God that he makes his own gifts to be merits in us. Catarin revived at that council an opinion of some of the schoolmen, that God chose a small number of persons, such as the blessed virgin, the apostles, &c., whom he was determined to save without any forethought of their good works; and that he also wills that all the rest should be saved, providing for them all necessary means, but they are at liberty to use them or not. This is called the Baxterian scheme in England, from one of its promoters there. But at all events, the council of Trent seems to have been extremely anxious that any opinions entertained among them concerning predestination might have as little influence as possible upon practical morality. "Let no man (says they), while he remains in this mortal state, presume that he is among the number of the elect, and that therefore he cannot sin, or sin without repentance; for it cannot be known who are elected without a special revelation from God." See 6. c. 13.

The Jesuits at first followed the opinion of Augustine; but they afterwards forsook it. Molina, one of their order, was the author of what is called the middle scheme, or the doctrine of grace sufficient for all men, but subject to the freedom of the human will. Jansenius, a doctor of Louvain, opposed the Jesuits with great vigour, and supported the doctrine of Augustine. He wrote in a very artful manner. He declared, that he did not presume to state his own sentiments upon the subject; he pretended only to explain and publish the sentiments of that great father of the church St. Augustine. But the Jesuits, in consequence of that inviolable submission to the authority of the pope which they always maintained, had sufficient interest at Rome to procure the opinions of Jansenius to be condemned there; but with this addition subjoined, that nothing was thereby intended to be done in prejudice of the doctrine of St. Augustine. This produced an absurd dispute about the pope's infallibility in matters of fact. The Jansenists affirmed, that the Pope had made a mistake in condemning the opinions of Jansenius as different from those of Augustine; whereas in truth they are the same, and the one cannot be condemned without the other. But the Jesuits affirmed, that the pope is no less infallible in points of fact than he is in questions of faith; and he having decided, that the opinions of Jansenius are different from those of St. Augustine, every good Catholic is bound to believe accordingly that they are different. These disputes have never been fully settled, and still divide the Roman Catholic churches. Some of the ablest supporters of predestination have appeared among the Jansenists, and particularly among the gentlemen of Port-Royal.

With regard to Great Britain, the earliest English reformers were in general Sublapsarians, although some of them were Supralapsarians. But the rigid Predestinarians have been gradually declining in numbers, so that church, although they still subscribe the 39 articles of their faith, which are unquestionably Calvinistic. The celebrated Scotch reformer John Knox having been educated at Geneva, established in this country the doctrine of predestination in its strictest form; and it has probably been adhered to with more closeness in Scotland than in any country in Europe.

Of late years, however, the dispute concerning predestination has assumed a form considerably different from that which it formerly possessed. Instead of being considered as a point to be determined almost entirely by the sacred scriptures, in the hands of a number of able writers, it has in a great measure resolved itself into a question of natural religion, under the head of the philosophical liberty or necessity of the will (A); or, whether all human actions are or are not necessarily determined.

(A) Dr Priestley, the most celebrated Necessarian of the age, has written a whole section of his Illustrations, with a view to show, that between "the two schemes of Calvinistic predestination and philosophical necessity, there is no sort of resemblance, except that the future happiness or misery of all men is certainly foreknown and appointed by God. In all other respects (says he) they are most essentially different; and even where they agree in the end, the difference in the manner by which that end is accomplished is so very great, that the influence of the two systems on the minds of those that adopt and act upon them is the reverse of one another."

The Calvinistic doctrine of predestination, according to a very authentic statement of that doctrine*, is, that "God, for his own glory, hath foreordained whatsoever comes to pass." The scheme of philosophical necessity, as stated by an intimate friend and warm admirer of Dr Priestley's, is, "That every thing is predetermined by the Divine Being; that whatever has been, must have been; and that whatever will be, must be; that all events are pre-ordained by infinite wisdom and unlimited goodness; that the will, in all its determinations, is governed by the state of mind; that this state of mind is in every instance determined by the Deity; and that there is a continued chain of causes and effects, of motives and actions, inseparably connected, and originating from the condition in which we are brought into existence by the Author of our being." The author or compiler of the same book affirms, "That all motion indeed originates in the Deity; that the Deity is self-moved; that he possesses the singular attribute undervived of moving himself." But it is added in the very same paragraph from which this last sentence is quoted, that "the very argument we employ to prove one undervived source of motion..." determined by motives arising from the character which God has impressed on our minds, and the train of circumstances amidst which his providence has placed us? We have already discussed this point (see Metaphysics) by giving a candid statement of the arguments on both sides of the question. We shall treat the subject of predestination in the same manner, avoiding as far as possible any recapitulation of what has been advanced under the head of Necessity and Liberty.

From what has been already said, it will appear that the points chiefly at issue between the parties are the following: First, With what views and purposes did God create the world and frame his decrees concerning mankind? Did he contrive a great unalterable scheme of creation and providence only for the sake of manifesting his own glory and perfections? Or did he first consider the free motions of those rational agents whom he intended to create, and frame his decrees upon the consideration of what they might choose or do in all the various circumstances in which he intended to place them?—The second and following questions are branches of this leading one. Did Christ die for a particular portion of the human race, who shall therefore certainly be saved? or was his death intended as a benefit to all, from which none are excluded excepting those who willingly reject it? Is the divine grace certainly and irrefutably efficacious in all those minds to which it is given? or does its effect depend upon the good use which men may or may not make of it? Can any good action be done without it? Do those who have once received it certainly persevere and obtain eternal salvation? or is it possible for any of them to fall away and perish finally?

We shall begin by stating the argument on the side of the predestinarians, and in the language which they commonly use. But it is necessary to make this previous remark, that the general objections to their doctrine are, that it is hostile to all our ideas of the justice of God, representing him as a partial being, rewarding without merit, and punishing without sin; that it renders him the author of evil, destroys moral distinctions, makes useless every effort on our part, makes every prayer absurd, and even the preaching of the gospel vain; seeing that all things are immutably fixed, and none can believe or be saved excepting the elect, and they must certainly and at all events be safe. Against all this they reason thus.

The great and everlasting Author of all things existed from eternity alone, independent and essentially perfect. As there was no other, he could only consider himself and his own glory. He must therefore have designed all things in and for himself. To make him stay his determinations till he should see what free creatures would do, is to make him decree with uncertainty, and dependently upon them, which falls short of infinite perfection. He existed alone, and his councils could have no object excepting himself; he could only then consider the display of his own attributes and perfection. In doing this, as the end is more important than the means, Divine Wisdom must begin its designs with that which is to come last in the execution of them; but the conclusion of all things at the last judgment will be the complete manifestation of the wisdom, the goodness, and justice, of God: we must therefore suppose, that, in the order of things, he decreed that first, although with him, in the order of time, there is no first nor second, but all is from eternity. When this great design was laid, the means were next designed. Creation, and its inhabitants of every order, form the means by which the author and disposer of all things accomplishes his will. But creatures in his sight are nothing, and are figuratively said to be less than nothing. We may entertain proud and elevated conceptions of our own dignity if we please; but if we in our designs regard not the dust on which we tread, or the lives of ants and insects, the omnipotent Lord of all, from whom we are more infinitely distant, must regard us as at least equally inconceivable, and only valuable as we serve the accomplishment of his great and mysterious purposes, which cannot be us or our aggrandizement, but himself and his own glory.

It is only by this view of the divine conduct that some of the attributes of God can be explained, or their existence rendered possible. In the scriptures he claims the attribute of predestination as his distinguishing prerogative; but there can be no predestination of future contingencies; for it involves a contradiction to say, that things which are not certainly to be should be certainly foreseen. If they are certainly foreseen, they must certainly be, and can therefore be no longer contingent. An uncertain foresight is also an imperfect act, as it may be a mistake, and is therefore inconsistent with divine perfection. On the other side the difficulty is easily explained. When God decrees that an event shall take place, its existence becomes thenceforth certain, and as such is certainly foreseen. For it is an obvious absurdity to say, that a thing happens freely, that is to say, that it may be or may not be, and yet that it is certainly foreseen by God. He cannot foresee things but as he decrees them, and consequently gives them a future certainty of existence; and therefore any predestination antecedent to his decree must be rejected as impossible. Conditional decrees are farther absurd, inasmuch as they subject the purposes of God to the will and the actions of his creatures. Does he will, or wish that all mankind should be saved, and shall they not all be saved? Infinite perfection can with nothing but what it can execute; and if it is fit to wish, it is also fit to execute its wishes. We are indeed certainly informed by the scripture, is a gross solecism in logic; and that the ascription of this power to the Divine Being is in fact nothing else than the less of two palpable absurdities or rather impossibilities, if these could admit of degrees."

The piety of these assertions will be obvious, we are persuaded, to every one of our readers; but to some it is possible that their confidence may not be apparent. We would advise all such "to peruse once and again Dr Priestley's Illustrations," which, we have the best authority to say, will remove from their minds all libertarian prejudices, convince them "that the hypothesis of necessity is incontrovertibly true," and show them that all the defenders of that hypothesis are in perfect harmony with themselves and with one another! We conclude upon the same principles, that although the blessings resulting from the death of Christ are offered to all, yet that intentionally and actually he only died for those whom the Father had chosen and given to him to be saved by him. That Christ should have died in vain is represented by the apostle Paul as a great absurdity (Gal. ii. 21.) but if he died for all, he must have died in vain with regard to the greater part of mankind who are not to be saved by him. In so far as some inferior blessings are concerned, which through him are communicated, if not to all men, at least to all Christians, he may perhaps justly be said to have died for all; but with regard to eternal salvation, his design, to avoid rendering it fruitless, could go no farther than the secret purpose and election of God. This is implied in these words, all that are given me of my Father, thine they were, and thou gavest them me. To these his intercession is limited; I pray not for the world, but for these that thou hast given me; for they are thine, and all thine are mine, and mine are thine (Jo. xvii. 9, 10.)

Universal words are indeed used with regard to the death of Christ: but the reason is obvious, the Jewish religion was confined to the family and descendants of Abraham. In contradiction to this, the gospel is said to be preached to every creature, and to all the world; because it is not limited to any one race or nation, and because the apostles received a general commission to teach it unto all who should be willing to receive it. These extensive expressions can only be understood in this manner, because in their strict acceptation they have never been verified. Nor can their meaning be carried farther without an imputation upon the justice of God: for if he has received a sufficient satisfaction for the sins of the whole world, it is not just that all should not be saved by it, or at least have the offer of salvation made to them, that they may accept of it if they please.

But to return to the divine purposes and attributes in general: it is in vain to assert that God is partial and unjust while he prefers without merit, and predestinates to punishment those who have not yet offended. The same error misleads men here that has so often seduced them from the true path of scientific research. Instead of submitting to the patient and humble observation of nature, they boldly form some plausible hypotheses of their own, and vainly attempt to reconcile every appearance to their favorite system. This mode of procedure never has proved, and never will prove, successful in any branch of true philosophy. We are not entitled to frame to ourselves certain notions of the justice of God, and from these to decide that thus he must act and in no other manner. He takes no counsel from us concerning his conduct, and we have no right to rejudge his judgments. What he regards as just or unjust between himself and his creatures, is a question of fact not to be known by ingenious conjectures, but by the cautious observations of the manner in which he acts in the course of his providence, and by attending to what he has declared concerning himself in the sacred scriptures. If from these it shall appear that he does prefer where there is no merit, and reject where there is no crime; it will be in vain thereafter to assert that such conduct is unjust: the fact will be on our side of the question, and we shall have those to account for it who insist that their limited reason is capable of comprehending all the mysterious ways of an Infinite Being.

In the course of providence, then, we see the greatest inequalities take place, and such as appear altogether contradictory to our ideas of justice. We see the sins of the fathers punished in the persons of their children, who often derive debilitated bodies from the instance, temperance of their parents, and corrupted manners from the example of their vices. God frequently afflicts good men in this life for a great length of time, as in the case of Job, only for the manifestation of his own glory, that their faith and patience may be made manifest. Some sins are punished with other sins, and often with a course of severe miseries in the persons of those who never committed them. We may transfer this from time to eternity; for if God may do for a little time what is inconsistent with our notions, and with our rules of justice, he may do it for a longer duration; since it is as impossible that he can be unjust for a day as for all eternity: and the same inequality of management appears in the great as in the private affairs of this world. During many ages almost the whole human race were lost in the darkness of idolatry: even since the Christian religion came into the world, how few nations have received it; and of these few, the number is still smaller of those who have enjoyed it in tolerable purity. If we consider how many great nations remain under the delusion contrived by Mahomet; if we reflect upon the idolatry of the Indies and of China, and the superstition of the Greek church, and of the church of Rome—we shall find that very few nations have possessed the most ordinary means of grace. Even the blessings of civilization, of science, and of liberty, are so rarely scattered over the face of the earth, that it is to be regarded as a melancholy truth, that with a very few favored exceptions the whole human race have hitherto been sunk in the depth of barbarism, ignorance, slavery, and idolatry. When the Arminians think fit to assert, then, that the doctrine of absolute decrees is contrary to their ideas of the impartiality and justice of God, we can only answer that we are sorry for them if they have formed ideas of the character of God which are contrary to the truth. We presume not like them to call his attributes before the tribunal of our understandings; we only observe the ways of his providence, and declare that thus stands the fact. If he leaves whole nations in darkness and corruption, and freely chooses others to communicate the knowledge of himself to them, we need not be surprised if he acts in the same manner with individuals. For surely the rejecting immense empires for so many ages is much more unaccountable than the selection of a few individuals, and the leaving others in ignorance and depravity. It is in vain to allege that he extends his mercy to those who make the best use of the dim light which they have. This does not remove the difficulty of a choice and a preference; as it cannot be denied that their condition is very deplorable, and that the condition of others is much more hopeful: so that the mysterious doctrine of election and reprobation is an unquestionable truth under the government of God, seeing that great numbers of men are born in such circumstances that it is morally impossible they should not perish. Predestina- tion.

Nor are we left to common observation upon this point. The language of the sacred scriptures is positive and clear. The whole reasoning in the ninth chapter to the Romans resolves all the acts of God's justice and mercy, his hardening as well as his pardoning, into an absolute freedom and an unsearchable depth. More pointed expressions for this purpose can scarcely be conceived than those actually made use of. For the children being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil, that the purpose of God according to election might stand, not of works, but of him that calleth, it was said, The elder shall serve the younger. As it is written, Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated. What shall we say then? Is there unrighteousness with God? God forbid. For he saith to Moses, I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion. So then it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy; for the scripture saith unto Pharaoh, Even for this same purpose have I raised thee up, that I might shew my power in thee, and that my name might be declared throughout all the earth. Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will have hardened. If any man shall be sufficiently bold to declare that all this is contrary to what he is pleased to consider as just and impartial, we can only reply to him in the words of the celebrated John Calvin

† Ubi supra, p. 474.

The language of Scripture predestinarian.

means of grace are not bestowed upon those who, it is foreseen, will make a good use of them; nor denied to those who will make a bad use of them. Wo unto thee Chorazin, wo unto thee Bethsaida: for if the mighty works which were done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes. But the parables in scripture are innumerable, which declare that the whole character and destiny of every man is the result of the counsel and uncontrolled determination of God. The expression is often repeated in the book of Exodus; God hardened the heart of Pharaoh, so that he would not let his people go, (Exod. iv. 21), &c. It is said, that God has made the wicked man for the day of evil, (Prov. xvi. 4). On the other hand, it is said, as many believed the gospel as were appointed to eternal life, (Acts i. 48). Some are said to be written in the book of life, of the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world, (Rev. xiii. 8). Every prayer that is used, or directed to be used, in scripture, is for a grace that opens our eyes, that turns the heart, that makes us to go, that leads us not into temptation, but delivers us from evil. All these expressions denote that we desire more than a power or capacity to act, such as is given to all men. Indeed we do not, and we cannot, pray earnestly for that which we know all men as well as ourselves possess at all times.

The grace of God is the medium by which his sovereign will and absolute decrees are accomplished. Accordingly, it is set forth in scripture by such expressions as clearly denote its sure efficacy; and that it does not depend upon us to use it or not at our pleasure. It is said to be a creation; we are created unto good works, and we become new creatures: It is called a regeneration, or a new birth; it is called a quickening and a resurrection, as our former state is compared to a feebleness, a blindness, and a death. God is said to work in us both to will and to do: His people shall be willing in the day of his power: He will write his laws in their hearts, and make them to walk in them. In a parable already quoted, the human race are compared to a mass of clay in the hands of the potter, who of the same lump makes at his pleasure vessels of honour and dishonour. These parables, and this last more particularly, prove that there is an absolute and a conquering power in divine grace; and that the love of God constrains us, as St Paul expresses himself. Our Saviour compares the union and influence that he communicates to believers to the union of a head with the members, and of a root with the branches, which imparts an internal, a vital, and an efficacious influence. The outward means may indeed be rejected, but this overcoming grace never returns empty: these outward means coming from God, the refilling of them is said to be the refilling of God, the grieving or quenching of his spirit; and in that sense we may refuse the grace or favour of God; but we can never withstand him when he intends to overcome us; For the foundation of God standeth sure, having this seal, The Lord knoweth them that are his, (2 Tim. ii. 19.) Having predestinated us unto the adoption of children by Jesus Christ himself, according to the good pleasure of his will, (Eph. i. 5.)

That the saints shall certainly persevere unto the end is a necessary consequence of absolute decrees and reliance of efficacious grace: all depends on God. He of his own will begat us; and with him there is no variableness nor shadow of turning: whom he loves, he loves to the end: and he has promised that he will never leave nor forsake those to whom he becomes a God. Our Lord hath Prefetina hath said, I give unto them eternal life, and they shall never perish; neither shall any pluck them out of my hand, (Jo. x. 28.) Hence we must conclude, that the purpose and calling of God is without repentance, (Heb. xiii. 5.) And therefore, although good men may fall into great sins, yet of all those who are given by the Father to the Son to be saved by him, none are lost: The conclusion from the whole is, that God did in himself, and for his own glory, foreknow a determinate number in whom he would be both sanctified and glorified. These he predestinated to be holy, conformable to the image of his son; they are to be called, not by a general calling in the sense of these words, many are called, but few are chosen; but to be called according to his purpose. He justified them upon their obeying that calling, and in the conclusion he will glorify them; for nothing can separate us from the love of God in Christ, (Rom. ix. 19.) And he is not left absolute in his decree of reprobation than he is in his election: for ungodly men are said to be of old ordained to condemnation, and to be given up by God unto vile affections, and to be given over by him to a reprobate mind.

Arguments against the doctrine from the attributes of God.

Thus far we have defended the doctrine of predestination: we proceed next to state the arguments usually adduced in favour of the Arminian system.

God is just, holy, and merciful. In speaking of himself in scripture, he is pleased to make appeals to the human understanding, and to call upon men to reason with him concerning his ways. The meaning of this is, that men may examine his actions and his attributes with that measure of intelligence which they possess, and they will be forced to approve of them; nay, he proposes himself to us as a pattern for our imitation. We are required to be holy as he is holy, and merciful as he is merciful: which is a proof that he accounts us not incapable of forming just notions at least of these attributes. What then can we think of a justice that shall condemn us for a fact that we never committed? that designs first of all to be glorified by our being eternally miserable, and which afterwards decrees that we shall commit sins to justify this previous decree of our reprobation? For if God originally designs and determines all things, and if all his decrees are certainly effected, it is inconceivable how there should be a justice in punishing that which he himself, by an antecedent and irreversible decree, appointed to be done. Or, setting justice aside, is it possible that a being of infinite holiness, and who is of purer eyes than to behold iniquity, would by an antecedent decree fix our committing so many sins, in such a manner that it is not possible to avoid them? He represents himself in the scriptures as gracious, merciful, slow to anger, and abundant in goodness and truth. It is often said, that he desires that no man should perish, but that all should come to the knowledge of the truth: this is even said with the solemnity of an oath, As I live, saith the Lord, I take no pleasure in the death of sinners. What sense can these words bear if we believe that God did by an absolute decree doom so many of them to everlasting misery? If all things that happen arise out of the absolute decree of God as their first cause, then we must believe that God takes pleasure both in his own decrees and in the execution of them, consequently that he doth take pleasure in the death of sinners; and this in express contradiction to the most positive language of scripture. Besides all this, what are we to think of the predestination of God, and of the sincerity of those offers of grace and mercy, with the exhortations and expostulations upon them that occur so frequently in scripture, if we can imagine that by antecedent acts he determined that all these should be ineffectual? In one word, are we to regard our existence as a blessing, and to look up with gratitude to that paternal goodness which has placed us in a land of hope, which formed our nature, weak indeed and exposed to many imperfections, but capable of rising by virtuous efforts and by a patient continuance in well-doing to excellence and to high and immortal felicity? or, are we to curse the hour in which we were born under the dominion of a master, who is not only severe, but absurd, and even adds insult to cruelty; who, after placing us in a godly habitation, binds us hand and foot, locks the door, blocks up the windows, sets fire to the fabric, and then very mercifully calls upon us to come forth lest we perish?

It is not true that rational beings are nothing in the sight of their Maker. Compared to his Almighty strength and uncreated existence, our powers do indeed diminish into weakness, and our years into a moment: yet although our interests may be unimportant in themselves, the attributes of God with which they are connected are far from being so. There was no necessity for his calling us into existence; but the infant he bestowed upon us that gift, and conferred upon us faculties capable of rising to happiness by the contemplation of himself and of his works, he became our parent, and granted to us a right to look up to him for protection and mercy, and to hope that our existence and our faculties were not bestowed in vain. Nor will he trample upon the just and reasonable hopes of the merit of his creatures. He is watchful over our interests; he hath sent his Son to die for us; his providence has been exerted for no other purpose but to promote our welfare; and there is joy in heaven even over one sinner that repenteth. Let it be allowed, that the universe was formed for no other purpose but to promote the glory of God; that glory can surely be little promoted by the exertion of undistinguishing and blind acts of power, in the arbitrary appointment to eternal reprobation of millions of unreflecting and undeferring wretches*. Is it not more honourable to the Deity to conceive of him as the parent, guide, governor, and judge of free beings, formed after the likeness of himself, with powers of reason and self-determination, than to conceive of him, as the former and conductor of a system of conscious machinery, or the mover and controller of an universe of puppets, many of whom he is pleased to make completely miserable? The most important and fundamental point of religion, considered as a speculative science, consists in our forming high and just ideas of God and of his attributes, that from them we may understand the maxims of true and perfect morality. But were we to attempt to form our own natures upon the idea of the divine character that is given us by the doctrine of absolute decrees, we would certainly become imperious, partial, and cruel; at least we should not readily learn the virtues of kindness, mercy, and compassion.

It is true that, setting aside predestination, it is not easy to show how future contingencies should be certainly solved. certainly foreseen; but it is obvious that such foresight involves no contradiction, (see Metaphysics, no 308); and if the actions of men be free, we know from the train of prophecies, which in the sacred scriptures appear to have been made in one age and fulfilled in another, that contingencies are foreseen by that infinite Being who inhabiteth eternity, and to whom a thousand years are but as one day. The prophecies concerning the death and sufferings of Christ were fulfilled by the free acts of the Jewish priests and people: These men sinned in accomplishing that event, which proves that they acted with their natural liberty. From these and all the other prophecies both in the old and new Testament, it must be confessed that future contingencies were certainly foreknown, but where to found that certainty cannot be easily resolved. We doubt not, however, that we may safely refer it to the infinite perfection of the Divine mind. And it ought to be observed that this difficulty is of a very different nature from that to which our antagonists are reduced on their side of the argument. They are compelled to confess that they cannot reconcile their doctrine with the justice of God, an attribute the nature of which we clearly understand, and which is held forth to our imitation; whereas we are only at a loss how to explain the mode in which the divine predestination is exerted; an attribute which God claims as peculiarly his own, and which it is not to be expected that we should be able in the smallest degree to comprehend. We can go farther than this. Heaven hath given to man two revelations of itself. The one consists in the knowledge which we procure by the right use of our rational faculties; and the other is bestowed by means of the sacred scriptures. Without intending to derogate from the authority of inspiration, it is fair to assert, that we are more certain that God is the author and bellower of our reason, than that he is the author of the scriptures; at least it is certain that the last cannot contradict the first, because God cannot contradict himself. By the primary revelation from heaven then, that is, by our reason, we are informed that God is true, just, and good. If an angel from heaven should preach a doctrine contrary to this, we are entitled to say with the apostle, let him be accursed. If our antagonists then should succeed in proving that the doctrine of absolute decrees, which represents the Deity as cruel and unjust, is contained in scripture, the consequence would be, not that we would believe it, for that is impossible, but that we should be reduced to the necessity of rejecting the authority of the scriptures, because they contradict the previous sure revelation of God, our reason. We believe that the doctrines contained in the scriptures are certainly true, because they were taught by those who wrought miracles and foretold future events in proof of their being inspired by the God of truth. But miracles and prophecy are direct evidences of nothing but the power and wisdom of their Author; and unless we know by other evidence, that this powerful and wise Being is likewise the father of truth and justice, we cannot be sure that the scriptures, notwithstanding their source, are anything better than a tissue of falsehoods. The very arguments therefore by which predestination is supported, tend to sap the foundation of that revelation from which its advocates pretend to draw them. The case is very different when no doctrine is asserted that is not contradictory to our reason, but only above it. For example, when we are told that God can create rational beings, that he attends without distraction to the minutest affairs that pass in a thousand worlds, that he knows all things, the past, the present, and the future, we do not presume that we comprehend how he can do all this; but there is nothing in it that contradicts our reason; we ourselves possess a certain degree of power, can attend at once to a certain number of objects, can in some cases form very sure conjectures about futurity, and we resolve all the rest into the infinite nature and perfections of God.

It is farther to be observed, that predestination does not make effects certain because they are foreseen; but they are foreseen because they are to be; so that the certainty of the predestination is not the cause, but the consequence of the certainty of the event. The Roman republic has fallen; but our knowledge or ignorance of that event does not render it more or less true and certain. That it was to fall, was as surely true before it happened as it is now; and had we known it beforehand, as many men of sense probably did, it would neither have fallen sooner nor later on that account. This shows that the knowledge which an intelligent being has of a past or future event need not have any influence upon the circumstances that produce that event.

On some occasions the scripture takes notice of a conditional predestination*. God answered David, that Saul's life would come to Keilah, and that the men of Keilah* (1 Sam.) would deliver him up; yet both the one and the other refused upon the condition of his staying there; and he going from thence, neither of them ever happened. Such also was the† prophecy of Jonah, at the failure† Chap. iii., of which he was so absurdly offended; and such was Christ's saying, That those of Tyre and Sidon, Sodom and Gomorrah would have turned to him, if they had seen the miracles that he wrought in the towns of Galilee. Since, then, this predestination may be so certain that it can never err nor mislead the exertions of providence, and since by this, both the attributes of God are vindicated, and the due freedom of man is affected, all difficulties seem to be thus easily removed.

With regard to the purpose of Christ's death, he is said to be the propitiation for the sins of the whole world; for the and the wicked are said to deny the Lord that bought them, whole His death, as to its extent, is set in opposition to the sins of Adam; so that as by the offence of one judgment came upon all men to condemnation, so by the righteousness of one the free gift came upon all men to justification of life, (Rom. vi. 18.) The all on the one side must be as extensive as the all on the other; so, since all are concerned in Adam's sin, all must likewise be concerned in the death of Christ. To this we may add, that all men are commanded and required to believe that Christ died for their sins; but no man can be obliged to believe what is not true; he must therefore have died for all. The following passages express clearly the universality of the object of Christ's death. If any man sin, we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous; and he is the propitiation for our sins; and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world, (1 Jo. ii. 1, 2.) The love of Christ constraineth us; because we thus judge, that if one died for all, then were all dead; and that he died for all, that they which live But a proper attention to the nature of man will set the justice of our argument in a still stronger point of view. It is obvious, that such an inward freedom as renders a man the master of his own conduct, and able to do or not do what he pleases, is so necessary to the morality of our actions, that without it they are neither good nor evil, neither capable of rewards nor punishments. Madmen, or men asleep, are not to be charged with the good or evil of what they do; therefore at least some small degree of liberty must be left us, otherwise why are we praised or blamed for our conduct? All virtue and religion, all discipline and industry, arise out of this as their first principle, that there is a power in us to govern our own thoughts and actions, and to raise and improve our faculties. If this is denied, all efforts, all education, all attention bestowed upon ourselves or others, become fruitless and vain. If a man accounts himself under an inevitable decree, as he will have little remorse for the evil he does while he imputes it to that inevitable force that constrains him, so he will naturally conclude that it is no purpose for him to struggle with impossibilities. Men are sufficiently inclined to throw all censure off from themselves, and to indulge in indolence; and upon the doctrine of absolute predetermination who can blame them, seeing that their efforts can be of no value?

Matter is inactive of itself, and only moves in consequence of its being acted upon by some other being. Man is possessed of a power to begin motion, and to determine it in any direction that he may judge proper. This power and this intelligence constitute his liberty, and form that image of God that is stamped upon his nature. Whether man possesses this power of acting originally and of himself, or whether he is incapable of forming any resolution, or making any effort, without being acted upon by a foreign cause, is not a point to be reasoned on or disputed about: it is a question of fact, which, as far as it can possibly be known, every man has it in his power to determine by the evidence of his own consciousness. We do aver, then, that every man is conscious that he is a free agent, and that it is not possible for the most staunch predestinarian that has ever yet appeared seriously and practically to convince himself of the contrary. It is not possible for a man in his senses to believe, that in all those crimes which men charge themselves with, and reproach themselves for, God is the agent; and that, properly speaking, they are no more agents than a sword is when employed to commit murder. We do indeed, on some occasions, feel ourselves hurried on to impetuously by violent passions, that we seem for an instant to have lost our freedom; but on cool reflection we find, that we both might and ought to have restrained that heat in its first commencement. We feel that we can divert our thoughts, and overcome ourselves in most instances, if we set seriously about it. We feel that knowledge, reflection, and proper society, improve the temper and disposition; and that ignorance, negligence, and the society of the worthless and abandoned, corrupt and degrade the mind.

From all this we conclude, that man is free, and not under inevitable fate, or irresistible motions to good or evil. This conclusion is confirmed by the whole style of scripture, which upon any other supposition becomes a solemn and unworthy mockery. It is full of persuasions, exhortations, reproofs, expostulations, encouragements, and terrors. But to what purpose is it to speak to dead men, to persuade the blind to see, or the lame to run? If we are under impotence till the irresistible grace comes, and if, when it comes, nothing can withstand it, what occasion is there for these solemn discourses which can have no effect? They cannot render us inexorable, unless it were in our power to be improved by them; and to imagine that God gives light and blessings, which can do no good, to those whom he before intended to damn, only to make them more inexorable, and for the purpose of aggravating their condemnation, gives so strange an idea of his character as it is not fit to express in the language that naturally arises out of it.

Our antagonists seem to have formed ideas of the divine perfection and sovereignty that are altogether false. There is no imperfection implied in the supposition that some of the acts of God may depend upon the conduct of his creatures. Perfection consists in his creating the wisest designs, and in executing them by the most suitable means. The author of nature conducts the planets in their orbits with immutable precision according to fixed rules: but it would be absurd to pretend to manage free agents, or their affairs, in the same manner by mathematical or mechanical principles. The providence that is exerted over material objects is fixed and steady in its operations, because it is fit that material objects which cannot move of themselves should be moved in a regular manner; but free and intelligent beings enjoy a wider range, and ought not to be confined to a prescribed train of exertions; it may therefore be necessary that the providence which superintends them should accommodate itself to circumstances. This, however, is not injurious to the divine sovereignty; for God himself is the author of that freedom of agency which he pleases to watch over. He is not less the Lord of the universe; and surely his wisdom and benevolence are more conspicuous when he brings good out of evil, and renders the perverse wanderings of the human heart subservient to purposes of mercy, than when he hurl into the immensity of space the most enormous mass of dead and passive matter subjected to unerring laws.

As for the inequalities of moral situation that are to be observed in the world, and the giving to some nations and persons the means of improvement, and the denying them to others, the scriptures do indeed afford us the whole of the riches and freedom of God's grace. And, we confess, that the ways of Providence are often dark and mysterious. In this world there are many things which are hard to be understood, and many which appear altogether unaccountable; we see the wicked prospering in his wickedness, though it impose misery upon thousands; we see truth hiding its head, and the world governed by fraud and absurdity. Still, however, we can venture to affirm, that God bestows upon all what is necessary to enable them to fulfill the obligations expected from the state in which they are placed; and it is elsewhere shown, that physical evil is among men the parent of moral good. (See Providence). God winketh at the times of ignorance; much much is required of them to whom much is given; and it shall be more tolerable in the day of judgment for the inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrah than for the enlightened cities of Galilee. Thus God will be just when he judges; none will meet with condemnation excepting those who are inexcusable. For although he grants more to some than may be absolutely necessary, yet he grants less to none; and where he grants little, he will suit his judgments to the little which he gave. There is no injustice in this. If it was the intention of the great Creator that his creation should contain within its ample bosom every possible variety of intelligent natures, it was necessary that there should be somewhere such a being as man; and, in forming all possible varieties of human minds and situations, it was necessary that every particular individual should exist. Hence a man may as well complain that he was not formed one of the flaming seraphims that surround the throne of the Eternal, as that he is not placed in other circumstances in life than those which he now occupies; for if little is given, little will be required from him. Thus the designs of Providence go on according to the goodness and mercy of God. None can complain, though some have more cause for joy than others. What happens to individuals may happen to nations in a body; some may have higher privileges, and be placed in happier circumstances than others; but none can complain of the wise and just disposer of all, who has given enough, although we may have good reason to complain of ourselves, for not using what was sufficient.

As to the case of those who are not blessed with the light of the gospel, we may consider, that if they have fewer and less advantages than others, their nature and capacities must likewise be inferior; to which their future state may be proportioned. God is not obliged to make all men equally perfect in the next world any more than in this; and if their capacity be rendered less than that of an ordinary Christian, a lower degree of happiness may fill it. However, we need not be extremely solicitous about their state, much less cast any ungrateful imputations on the Governor of the world for not having dealt so bountifully with them as he has with ourselves; since we know that Christ died for the whole race of mankind; that every one will at length be accepted according to that he has, and not according to that he has not; and that to whomsoever much is given, of him shall much be required (b).

Upon these principles, we can easily explain all the passages in the New Testament concerning the purpose, the election, the foreknowledge, and the predestination of God. They relate to the design of calling the Gentile world to the knowledge of the Messiah: This was kept secret, though hints had been given of it by several of the prophets, so that it was a mystery; but it was revealed when the apostles, in consequence of Christ's commission, to go and teach all nations, went about preaching the gospel to the Gentiles. This was a stumbling-block to the Jews, and it was the chief subject of dispute between them and the apostles at the time when the Epistles were written: so that it was unnecessary for them to clear up this point very fully, and to mention it frequently. But, in the beginning of Christianity there was no need of amusing men with high and unsearchable speculations concerning the decrees of God; the apostles therefore take up the point in dispute, the calling of the Gentiles in a general manner. They show, that Abraham at first, and Isaac and Jacob afterwards, were chosen by a discriminating favour, that they and their posterity should be in covenant with God; but that, nevertheless, it always was the intention of Providence to call in the Gentiles, tho' it was not executed till these later times.

With this key we can explain coherently the whole of St Paul's discourses upon this subject, without afflicting antecedent and special decrees as to particular persons. Things that happen under a permissive and directing Providence, may, by a largeness of expression, be ascribed to the will and counsel of God; for a permissive will is really a will, though it is not the agent or cause of the effect. The hardening of Pharaoh's heart may be ascribed to God, though it is said that his heart hardened itself, because he took advantage of the repulses which God granted him from the plagues, to encourage himself to longer resistance. Besides this, he was a cruel and bloody tyrant, and deserved such judgments for his other sins; so that he may be considered as at that time under final condemnation, and only preserved from the first plagues, to afford a striking instance of the avenging justice of God. That this is the meaning of the passage, appears extremely probable from the manner in which Exod. ix. 16, is rendered in the Vatican and Aldus's edit. of the LXX. Instead of saying, as in our translation, "And in very deed for this cause have I raised thee up, for to show in thee my power, &c." God is represented in that version as saying, "And in very deed for this cause have I kept thee alive till now, for to show," &c. Whom he will be hardened, is an expression that can only be applied to such persons as this tyrant was. It is obvious that the words of our Saviour concerning those whom his Father had given him, are only meant of a dispensation of Providence, and not of a decree; since he adds, And I have lost none of them except the son of perdition: for it cannot be said that Judas Iscariot was in the decree, and yet was lost. And in the same passage in which God is said to work in us both to will and to do, we are required to work out our own salvation with fear and trembling. The word ordained to eternal life also signifies fitted and disposed to eternal life. The question, Who made thee to differ? (1 Cor. iv. 7.) refers to those extraordinary gifts which, in different degrees and measures, were bestowed upon the first Christians, in which they were unquestionably passive.

If the decrees of God are not absolute, neither can grace nor his grace be so efficacious as absolutely and necessarily irresistible. To determine our conduct, else why are we required not to grieve God's spirit? why is it said, ye do always fulfill the Holy Ghost; as your fathers did, so do ye? How often

(b) See Bishop Law's Considerations on the Theory of Religion, where this question is treated in a very masterly manner. The work, though less known than it ought to be, has great merit, and of the author we have given a biographical sketch in our ninth volume. often would I have gathered you under my wings, and yet would not? What could I have done in my vineyard that has not been done in it? These expressions indicate a power in us, by which we not only can, but often do, resist the motions of grace. But if the determining efficacy of grace is not acknowledged, it will be much harder to believe that we are efficaciously determined to sin. This supposition is so contrary both to the holiness of God, and to the whole style of the sacred writings, that it is unnecessary to accumulate proofs of it.

O Israel, thou hast destroyed thyself; but in me is thy help: ye will not come unto me that ye may have life: Why will you die, O house of Israel?

As for perseverance, we may remark, that the many promises made in the sacred scriptures to them that overcome, that continue steadfast and faithful to the death, do certainly intimiate that a man may fall from a good state. The words of the apostle to the Hebrews are very clear and pointed: For it is impossible for those who once were enlightened, and have tasted of the heavenly gifts, and were made partakers of the Holy Ghost, and have tasted the good word of God, and the powers of the world to come, if they fall away, to renew them again unto repentance (Heb. vi. 4.) It is also said, The just shall live by faith: but if he draw back, my soul shall have no pleasure in him, (Heb. x. 38.) And it is said by the prophet, When the righteous turneth away from his righteousness, and committeth iniquity, all his righteousnesses that he hath done shall not be mentioned; in his sin that he hath sinned shall he die, (Ezek. viii. 24.) These parables, with many others, give us every reason to believe that a good man may fall from a good state, as well as that a wicked man may turn from a bad one.

We conclude the whole by observing, that the only difficulty which attends the question arises from the mysterious, and apparently partial and unequal, course of the divine government in our present state; but there is an important day approaching, when God will condescend to remove these obscurities, and to vindicate the ways of his providence to man. On that great day, we are well assured, that the question will be decided in our favour; for we know that judgment will be given, not according to any absolute decree, but according to the deeds which we ourselves shall have freely done in the body, whether they have been good, or whether they have been evil.

Thus have we stated, we hope with fairness and impartiality, a summary of the arguments on both sides of this long agitated question. We need hardly add, that it is a question involved in considerable difficulties—Milton, who was an eminent philosopher and divine, as well as the first of poets, when he wished to exhibit the fallen angels themselves as perplexed by questions above their comprehension, set them to dispute about predestination.

They reason'd high, of knowledge, will, and fate, Fixed fate, free-will, fore-knowledge absolute; And found no end, in wand'ring mazes lost.

Paradise Lost.

The weak side of the Calvinistic doctrine consists in the impossibility of reconciling the absolute and unconditional decree of reprobation with our ideas of the justice and goodness of God. The weak side of the Arminian scheme consists in the difficulty of accounting for the certainty of the divine foreknowledge, upon the supposition of a contingency of events, or an absolute freedom of will in man.

To elude the former of these difficulties, some of the late writers upon philosophical necessity, and Dr Priestly among the number, have given up the doctrine of reprobation, and asserted, that this world is only a state of preparation for another, in which all men, of every description and character, shall attain to final and everlasting happiness, when God shall be all, and in all.—On the other side, some of the supporters of free agency, and Montefoueu * is among the number, have been disposed to deny the divine attribute of predestination.

Whatever may be thought of the practical tendency of the two opinions, there is one remark which we think ourselves bound in justice to make, although it appears to us to be somewhat singular. It is this, that from the earliest ages down to our own days, if we consider the character of the ancient Stoics, the Jewish Essenes, the modern Calvinists, and Jansenists, when compared with that of their antagonists the Epicureans, the Sadducees, Arminians, and the Jesuits, we shall find that they have excelled in no small degree in the practice of the most rigid and respectable virtues, and have been the highest honour of their own ages, and the best models for imitation to every age succeeding. At the same time, it must be confessed, that their virtues have in general been rendered unamiable by a tinge of gloomy and severe austerity.

So far as the speculative foundation of their principles is considered, however, neither party seems liable to censure in a moral point of view. Each of them wishes to support, though in a different manner from the other, the honour of the divine character. The Calvinists begin their argument with the notion of infinite perfection, independency, and absolute sovereignty, and thence deduce their opinions; making every difficulty yield to these first and leading ideas. Their opponents are more jealous of the respect due to the divine attributes of justice, truth, holiness, and mercy, and deduce their sentiments from the idea which they have formed of these. Each party lays down general maxims that are admitted by the other, and both argue plausibly from their first principles. Dr Burnet, whom we have here followed very closely, justly observes, that "these are great grounds for mutual charity and forbearance."