the art of war, is the method of disposing forces to the best advantage in order of battle, and of performing the several military motions and evolutions. See War.

NAVAL TACTICS;

Or, The Military Operations of Fleets.

Naval tactics is the art of ranging fleets in such order or disposition, as may be judged most convenient, either for attacking, defending, or retreating, to the greatest advantage; and to regulate their several movements accordingly. It is not a science established on principles absolutely invariable, but founded on such reasons as the alteration and improvement of arms must necessarily occasion in a course of time and experience; from which also will naturally result a difference in the construction of ships, in the manner of working them, and in fine, in the total disposition and regulation of fleets and squadrons. We shall curiously run through this succession and change of arms, &c., to the present improvement of our lines of battle, in order to make us the more sensible of the reasons which have induced the moderns to prefer so advantageous a choice as they now follow in the arrangement of their ships.

The ancient galleys were so constructed as to carry several banks of oars, very differently disposed from those in our modern galleys, which, however, vary the least of any others from their ancient model. Advanced by the force of their oars, the galleys ran violently aboord of each other, and by the mutual encounter of their beaks and prows, and sometimes of their sterns, endeavoured to dash in piece, or sink their enemies.

The prow, for this purpose, was commonly armed with a brazen point or trident, nearly as low as the furrow of the sea, in order to pierce the enemy's ships under the water. Some of the galleys were furnished with large turrets, and other accretions of building, either for attack or defence. The soldiers also annoyed their enemies with darts and flings, and, on their nearer approach, with swords and javelins; and in order that their missile weapons might be directed with greater force and certainty, the ships were equipped with several platforms, or elevations above the level of the deck. The sides of the ship were fortified with a thick fence of hides, which served to repel the darts of their adversaries, and to cover their own soldiers, who thereby annoyed the enemy with greater security.

As the invention of gunpowder has rendered useless many of the machines employed in the naval wars of the ancients, the great distance of time has also consigned many of them to oblivion; some few are, nevertheless, recorded in ancient authors. authors, of which we shall endeavour to present a short description. And first,

The Δαρά was a large and heavy piece of lead or iron, cast in the form of a dolphin. This machine being suspended by blocks at their mast heads or yard arms, ready for a proper occasion, was let down violently from thence into the adverse ships; and either penetrated through their bottom, and opened a passage for the entering waters, or by its weight immediately sunk the vessel.

The Δαρά was an engine of iron crooked like a sickle, and fixed on the top of a long pole. It was employed to cut asunder the slings of the sail-yards, and thereby letting the sails fall down, to disable the vessel from escaping, and inconvenience her greatly during the action. Similar to this was another instrument, armed at the head with a broad two-edged blade of iron, wherewith they usually cut away the ropes that fastened the rudder to the vessel.

Δαρά, a sort of spears or maces of an extraordinary length, sometimes exceeding 20 cubits, as appears by the 15th Iliad of Homer, by whom they are also called μαχαίραι.

Kriai were certain machines used to throw large stones into the enemy's ships.

Vegetius mentions another engine which was suspended to the main-mast, and resembled a battering-ram; for it consisted of a long beam and an head of iron, and was with great violence pushed against the sides of the enemy's galleys.

They had also a grappling-iron, which was usually thrown into the adverse ship by means of an engine: this instrument facilitated the entrance of the soldiers appointed to board, which was done by means of wooden bridges, that were generally kept ready for this purpose in the fore-part of the vessel. See the article Corvus.

The arms used by the ancients rendered the disposition of their fleets very different, according to the time, place, and circumstances of the engagement. They generally considered it an advantage to be to windward, and to have the sun shining directly on the front of their enemy. The order of battle chiefly depended on their power of managing the ships, or of drawing them readily into form; and on the schemes which their officers had concerted. The fleet being composed of tow-in vessels, they lowered their sails previous to the action; they presented their prows to the enemy, and advanced against each other by the force of their oars. Before they joined battle, the admirals went from ship to ship, and exhorted their soldiers to behave gallantly. All things being in readiness, the signal was displayed by hanging out of the admiral's galley a gilded shield, or a red garment or banner. During the elevation of this, the action continued; and by its depression, or inclination towards the right or left, the rest of the ships were directed how to attack or retreat from their enemies. To this was added the sound of trumpets; which began in the admiral's galley, and continued round the whole fleet. The fight was also begun by the admiral's galley, by grappling, boarding; and endeavoring to overturn, sink, or destroy the adversary, as we have above described. Sometimes, for want of grappling irons, they fixed their oars in such a manner as to hinder the enemy from retreating. If they could not manage their oars as dexterously as their antagonist, or fall alongside so as to board him, they penetrated his vessel with the brazen prow. The vessels approached each other as well as their circumstances would permit, and the soldiers were obliged to fight hand to hand till the battle was decided; nor indeed could they fight otherwise with any certainty, since the shortest distance rendered their slings and arrows, and almost all their offensive weapons, ineffectual, if not useless. The squadrons were sometimes ranged in two or three right lines, parallel to each other; being seldom drawn up in one line, unless when formed into an half-moon. This order indeed appears to be the most convenient for rowing vessels, that engage by advancing with their prows towards the enemy. At the battle of Ecnomus, between the Romans and the Carthaginians, the fleet of the former was ranged into a triangle, or a sort of wedge in front, and towards the middle of its depth of two right parallel lines. That of the latter was formed into a rectangle, or two sides of a square, of which one branch extended behind, and as the opening of the other protected the attack, was ready to fall upon the flank of such of the Roman galleys as should attempt to break their line. Ancient history has preserved many of these orders, of which some have been followed in later times. Thus, in a battle A.D. 1340, the English fleet was formed in two lines, the first of which contained the larger ships, the second consisted of all the smaller vessels, used as a reserve to support the former whenever necessary. In 1545, the French fleet under the command of the Marshal d'Annebault, in an engagement with the English in the Channel, was arranged in the form of a crescent. The whole of it was divided into three bodies, the centre being composed of 36 ships, and each of the wings of 30. He had also many galleys; but these fell not into the line, being designed to attack the enemy occasionally. This last disposition was continued down to the reigns of James I. and Louis XIII.

Meanwhile, the invention of gunpowder in 1330 gradually introduced the use of fire-arms into naval war, without finally superseding the ancient method of engagement. The Spaniards were armed with cannon in a sea-fight against the English and the people of Poitou abreast of Rochelle in 1372; and this battle is the first wherein mention is made of artillery in our navies. Many years elapsed before the marine armaments were sufficiently provided with fire-arms. So great a revolution in the manner of fighting, and which necessarily introduced a total change in the construction of ships, could not be suddenly effected. In short, the squadrons of men of war are no longer formed of rowing vessels, or composed of galleys and ships of the line; but entirely of the latter, which engage under sail, and discharge the whole force of their artillery from their sides. Accordingly, they are now disposed in no other form than that of a right line parallel to the enemy; every ship keeping close-hauled upon a wind on the same tack. Indeed the difference between the force and manner of fighting of ships and galleys, rendered their service in the same line incompatible. When we consider therefore the change introduced, both in the construction and working of the ships, occasioned by the use of cannon, it necessarily follows, that squadrons of men of war must appear in the order that is now generally adopted.

The machines which owe their rise to the invention of gunpowder have now totally supplanted the others; so that there is scarce any but the sword remaining, of all the weapons used by the ancients. Our naval battles are therefore almost always decided by fire-arms, of which there are several kinds, known by the general name of artillery. In a ship of war, firearms are distinguished into cannon mounted on carriages swivel-cannon, grenadiers, and musketry. See Cannon, &c. Besides these machines, there are several others used in merchant ships and privateers, as cohorns, carbines, fire-arrows, organs, flint-pots, &c.

The writers on naval tactics have been but few, indeed, considering the importance of the subject; and the only countries that have produced writers on this subject, so far as we know, are France and Britain, particularly the first. One would be led to imagine that Britain, from its insular situation, having bred so great a number of excellent seamen, NAVAL TACTICS.

and having so often been engaged in naval contests, would naturally have produced a number of writers on this, as well as on subjects of much less consequence to it as a nation. The reader will, however, no doubt be surprised to hear, that we have only one scientific treatise on naval tactics, intitled An Essay on Naval Tactics, &c. by John Clerk, Esq; of Elden, near Edinburgh; all the other treatises published in Britain on this subject being either translations from the French, or remarks upon the French authors (a). Some of the principal French treatises on naval tactics are the following: 1. L'Art des Armées Navales, ou Traité des Évolutions Navales, par Paul L'Hôte, vol. folio, printed at Lyons 1727. This book was translated and published by Christopher O'Bryen, Esq; in 4to, in 1762. 2. Tactique Navale, ou Traité des Évolutions et des Signaux, par M. le Vilcompte de Morogues, 4to, Paris 1763. 3. Le Manœuvrier, par M. Bourde de Villehuet. 4. L'Art de Guerre en Mer, ou Tactique Navale, &c. par M. le Vilcompte de Grenier. Translations of the two last have appeared in English in 4to in 1788, under the name of the Chevalier de Saunefu; and a translation of parts of the three last is in the 2d vol. of the Elements and Practice of Rigging and Seamanship, published at London in 1794. Other books on evolutions and tactics are, Théorie de la Manœuvre des Vaissieux, Paris, 1689. Pilot's Theory of Working Ships applied to Practice &c. translated by Stone, 1743. De la Manœuvre des Vaissieux, ou Traité de Mécanique et de Dynamique, &c. par M. Bouguer. The British Mars, &c. by William Flexney, 1763. A Sea Manual, by Sir Alexander Schomberg, 1789. A View of the Naval Force of Great Britain, &c. by an Officer of Rank, 1791, &c.

We shall occasionally consult all these works; and as some of them treat largely of the tactics in present use, while in others new systems are proposed, our article will naturally be divided into two parts, keeping the present practice and proposed innovations totally distinct from each other.

PART I. THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF NAVAL TACTICS.

CHAP. I. Of the Orders of Sailing.

A Fleet of ships of war is usually divided into three divisions or squadrons, called the centre, van, and rear; and each squadron has a commanding officer. The commander-in-chief, or admiral of the fleet, is in the centre column; the vice admiral has the command of the van; and the rear admiral, that of the rear. The ships of each squadron are distinguished by the position of their colours. The ships of the first or centre squadron carry their pendants at the main-top-gallant mast head. The ships of the second division carry their pendants at the fore top-gallant mast head, and those of the third division at the mizen-top mast head. Each squadron ought, if possible, to consist of the same number of ships; and also to be of the same force, so that each may be equally able to attack or repulse the enemy; and when in a line, the several parts will be equally strong. When the fleet is very numerous, each squadron is sometimes subdivided in a similar manner into three divisions of centre, van, and rear.

When the fleet is formed in the line or order of battle, each admiral takes his post in the centre of his squadron, the commander-in-chief being in the middle of the line. If the enemy be not in sight, the store-ships, fire-ships, sloops, &c. are to be to the windward of the fleet, because they can be more easily supported, and can more readily obey the signals that may be made to them. There are frigates to the windward of the van and rear of the convoy, for the purpose of looking out for the enemy, and keeping those vessels in their proper stations. But if the enemy is in sight, then all those ships which are not to be in the line of battle are to be on the other side of the line with respect to the enemy. If the fleet is failing in three columns, the first or centre squadron is in the middle between the second and third squadrons; one of which, according to circumstances, forms the starboard and the other the larboard column; and each admiral leads his respective division. If the fleet is destined for a certain place at a considerable distance, it is generally formed into squadrons; but if cruising in expectation of meeting the enemy, the admiral naturally keeps his ships in such failing positions as may be most advantageous to form for action as quickly as possible. These various positions or arrangements are called orders; and that they may be better understood, it is necessary to premise the following definitions:

The starboard line of bearing, is that line upon which the flagship of a fleet, being ranged, bear from each other upon a close-hauled line, whatever course they may be steering; and so that, upon hauling their wind or tacking together as may be necessary, the ships will be in a line close-hauled upon the starboard tack.

The larboard line of bearing, is that line from which the ships of the fleet, by hauling their wind, or tacking together, may be formed in a line close-hauled on the larboard tack.

A fleet of ships is said to be in the line abreast when the ships keels are parallel to each other, and their mainmasts in abreast the same straight line.

The bow and quarter line, is when the ships are ranged in bow and a straight line cutting their heels obliquely in the same angle; quarter Hence any intermediate ship, the ships towards one extremity of the line will be on the bow, and those towards the other extremity will be on the quarter, of that ship.

If several ships stand on the same line and steer the same ships free course, but different from that line, they are said to be in the echiquier, or chequerwise.

Manœuvre in succession, is when a fleet, ranged in one of the orders of sailing, and standing on the same line, the manoeuvre is successively performed by each ship as she arrives at the wake of the van ship of the whole fleet, if in one line; or of the van ship of her particular division when divided into squadrons. So that a fleet tacks or veers, bears away or comes to the wind in succession, when all the ships of every line execute, one after another, the same manoeuvre on the same point of the wake of the leading ship.

The number of orders of sailing is commonly assumed to five or five; and denominated the first, second, third, fourth, and fifth orders of sailing; besides an order of battle, an order of retreat, &c.

(a) The reason why Britain falls short of the French in this respect, is, that in various sea-ports in France there are academies established for the express purpose of educating those intended for the navy in the various branches of naval science; whereas, in Britain, there is only one academy established at the expense of government, namely, the Marine Academy at Portsmouth; and, excepting navigation, scarcely any other branch of naval science is taught in that seminary. It also requires great interest to be admitted. We are, indeed, well aware that there are boys educated for the sea-service in Christ's Hospital, London, and at Greenwich school, &c. The education there is not, however, adapted for officers in the navy, being only writing, arithmetic, a little mathematics necessary to understand navigation, and navigation. In the first order of failing, the fleet is ranged on one of the lines of bearing, and each ship steering the same course. Thus, in fig. 1, let the wind be north, and the fleet ranged on the starboard line of bearing, and let the ships steer any course, as fourth-west. In this case, the fleet is ready to form the line on the starboard tack by hauling the wind. Again, let the fleet be ranged on the larboard line of bearing, and steering the same course as before, as in fig. 2; then the fleet is in a position ready to form the line on the larboard tack, by tacking.

In a numerous fleet this method of failing is defective; as the fleet will be too much extended, and therefore the communication between the van and the rear rendered more difficult than when in a more connected order. It is of use, however, when the enemy is in sight, as then the fleet may be readily formed in order of battle; and in that case only, or in passing through a strait, will it be necessary to range the fleet in this order.

In the second order of failing the fleet is ranged on a line perpendicular to the direction of the wind, and steering any proper course. This order, which is represented in fig. 3, has the same defects as the former; and has also this disadvantage attending it, that the fleet cannot safely tack in succession from this order, as each ship at the time of tacking is in danger of falling on board the ship next astern; and therefore, if the line is close, the ship astern must bear up considerably, in order to avoid being on board the ship ahead, which at that time is in stays.

The third order of failing is that in which the whole fleet is close-hauled, ranged upon the two lines or lines of bearing, and therefore containing an angle of twelve points; the admiral's ship being at the angular point, and the whole fleet steering the same course. Thus, in fig. 4, the wind being supposed north, and the fleet close-hauled on the starboard tack; Then A being the admiral's ship, one part of the fleet bears from him west-north-west, and the other part east-north-east.

This order of failing is no doubt preferable to either of the former, as the ships are more collected, and can more distinctly perceive and obey the signals; but if the fleet is numerous, it will be too much extended.

In the fourth order of failing, the fleet is divided into five or more columns, as may be judged necessary; by which means the fleet is much more connected than in any of the former orders. The commanders, ranged upon the two lines of bearing, have their squadrons astern of them upon two lines parallel to the direction of the wind; the first ships of each column being, with respect to the commander of their squadron, the one on his starboard and the other on his larboard quarter. The distance between the columns should, however, be such, that the fleet may readily reduce itself to the third order of failing, and from that to the order of battle. This order is adapted for fleets or convoys crossing the ocean, and is represented in fig. 5. But as it requires much time to reduce a fleet from this order to that of battle, it is therefore defective when in presence of an enemy.

The fifth and last order of failing is that in which the fleet is divided into three columns close-hauled, and therefore parallel to each other; and also the respective ships abreast of each other. The van commonly forms the weather column; the centre division, the middle column; and the rear division, the lee column. Circumstances may however require the van to be the lee column, and the rear the weather column. If the fleet is very numerous, each division may be divided into two columns; and each admiral is to place himself at a little distance before, and in the direction of the middle of his division. Fig. 6 and 7 represent this order of failing.

Vol. XVIII. Part I. If the fleet be moored in a line, head to wind, the rear ship may get under way first, and haul immediately by the wind; the others in succession, from the rear to the van, can easily take their station in her wake, so that the rear ship will now become the leader. Or, the fleet may all get under way at the same time; but the van ship is to bring to, while the rest, casting the other way, would stand on by the wind on the same tack on which they have cast, and come to tack successively in her wake, to form the order of battle.

To bring a fleet to an anchor, it ought, if considerable, to anchor in three parallel lines, on one of the lines of bearing, and at the proper distance which the length of the columns require; the distance between the adjacent ships in the same column being about a cable's length. The van and rear of the columns are to correspond with each other exactly in the direction of the wind, that they may with ease get under way, and form the order of battle with facility, so as to be able to dispute the weather-gage with the enemy if he should come in sight. As this evolution is to be performed in moderate weather, the fleet being in three columns, they are all at the same time to bring their ship's head to the wind under their topgallants, and let go their anchors together, clewing up their topgallant sails with all possible dispatch; putting the foot of the sails in the tops, and loosing the sheets before hauling them down; then veering away an equal quantity of cable to preserve the alligned distance. When it blows so fresh as to require the topgallant sails being reefed, two cables length may be kept between the ships, and even three if it be likely to blow hard.

If the fleet do not exceed 20 ships, they may anchor on one of the lines of bearing; or parallel to the coast, in places where trade-winds are common, provided they blow in the direction of the land; for, in all cases, they must be in a condition to get under way at the first sight of the enemy, whose approach is never to be waited for at anchor; because, if it be dangerous for a single ship, it must be still more so for a fleet, the movements of which are interrupted by the difficulty there is in getting with celerity under way ships which are moored, and which, in that case, are not able mutually to support one another, as is absolutely requisite in a fleet.

**Chap. II. The Manner of Forming the several Orders of Sailing.**

The first order of sailing is formed as follows: As the fleet is supposed to be in no particular order, that ship which is to lead on the proposed line of bearing on which the fleet is to sail, runs to the leeward of the whole or greater part of the fleet, and then hauls her wind, carrying an easy sail; each ship then endeavours to get into her proper station, by chafing the ship which is to be next ahead of her; and when in the wake of the leader, must take care to preserve the assigned distance from the ship immediately ahead, by increasing or diminishing the quantity of sail; and if any of the fleet should happen to be so far removed from her second ahead as not to be able to chase her without getting out of her way towards the line, in that case she must take her station discretionally in a line with the leaders, and leave a proper interval. The fleet will now be formed in the line of battle; from which the first order of sailing is formed by each ship bearing away at the same instant, and steering each the same proposed course.

To form the second order of sailing, the leader runs to the leeward of the whole, or of so many of the fleet as that each ship may easily fetch his wake, and then steers a course eight points from the wind, carrying an easy sail. Each ship now gets into her proper station, by chafing that which is to be ahead of her; and when the whole fleet is formed in a line, which will be perpendicular to the direction of the wind, each ship bears away at the same instant, and the whole fleet the same intended course.

In the third order of sailing the admiral is in the middle of his fleet. Now, the fleet being formed in a line, on one of the lines of bearing, as above directed, and the ships steer-ordering in the wakes of each other, or ten points from the wind, falling, the leading or leewardmost ship first hauls her wind; the second ship, as soon as she is in the wake of the leader, hauls her wind also; and in like manner each ship until the admirals successively haul their wind as soon as they have reached the wake of the leading ship; and at the same instant that the admiral's ship hauls her wind, the other, or sternmost half of the fleet, do the same. The fleet will then be in the third order of sailing, as represented in fig. 4. From this order of sailing the fleet can be expeditiously formed into the line of battle on either tack.

As the fleet, in the fourth order of sailing, is divided into six columns, and the three commanders ranged on the two lines of bearing, the commander-in-chief being at the angular point; in order, therefore, to form this order, the admirals range themselves on the two lines of bearing, at a proper distance from each other, and steer the proper course; the ships of the several columns come each into its respective place, forming themselves into lines in the direction of the wind, and parallel to each other, as in fig. 5.

In order to form the fifth order of sailing, the three leading ships of the divisions are to take their positions abreast, and the fifth to leeward of each other, keeping their wind under an easy sail. Then the ships of each squadron making sail, will range themselves in their respective stations, after their leaders, and keeping the same course; each ship preserving the appointed distance from that next ahead; and the commanders of each division, and each second, third, &c., ship, are to keep themselves mutually abreast of each other.

To form the order of battle, it has already been observed, in the first order of sailing, that the ship which is to lead the order runs to the leeward of the whole, and then hauls her wind upon the tack directed, carrying an easy sail. Each ship then makes sail according to her distance, and chases the ship which is to be immediately ahead of her in the line, and hauls in her wake in the line on which the van ship is moving.

The admiral, or ship appointed to make the angular point, runs to the leeward of the fleet, and brings to; then each ship runs to its respective station in one of the lines of bearing, and brings to; one half of the fleet being on one of the lines of bearing, astern and in the wake of the admiral, and the other half on the other line of bearing, on the starboard or larboard bow of the admiral. When this is accomplished, the whole fleet bears away before the wind: the two wings will now bear from the admiral two points before his beam, and ready to form the line of battle upon either tack; the ships on the admiral's starboard bow being in the line of bearing for the larboard tack, and those on his larboard bow in the line of bearing for the starboard tack.

**Chap. III. To Change from the several Orders of Sailing to the Line of Battle.**

To form the line from the first order of sailing: If the fleet be running large on the tack answering to the line of bearing on which they are sailing and the line to be formed on the same tack, all the ships haul the wind at the same time, or at least each ship hauls her wind immediately after the next to windward; but if the fleet be on the other tack with To change with respect to the line of bearing, all the ships haul their wind and tack together, or all veer together according to circumstances. If the line of battle is to be formed on the other line of bearing, the leewardmost ship either veers or tacks, and hauls her wind; the rest of the fleet veer or tack at the same time, and steer with the wind four points free; and each ship successively, as soon as she gets into the wake of the leader, hauls her wind. Hence the line of battle will be formed from the first order of failing. See figs. 10.

To form the line from the second order of failing, the fleet running large or before the wind: All the ships of the fleet haul up together on the tack directed, presenting their heads on the line upon which they are ranged, or eight points from the wind. The leading ship then hauls her wind, and is followed in succession by the rest. That the ships may not be too near each other, they make sail as they haul their wind, or their seconds after shorten sail to open the order. See fig. 12.

To change from the third order of failing to the line of battle: The ships being supposed going large, that wing which is in the line of bearing for the tack on which the line is to be formed, and the ship at the angular point, haul their wind at the same time; the ships of the other wing haul up together eight points from the wind; then each ship moves in this direction until she reaches the wake of the other wing, where she hauls close up. See fig. 13.

To form the line of battle on the same tack from the fifth order of failing: Let the weather column form the van, and the lee column the rear. The centre brings to, or only keeps steerage-way; the weather-column bears away two points, and hauls its wind as soon as it is ahead of the centre; the lee-column tacks together, and runs under a press of sail, to gain the wake of the centre, when it retacks together and completes the line (see fig. 14.) This evolution may also be performed as follows: The weather-column brings to; the centre and lee columns tack together, and go away two points free; when the centre-column has gained the wake of the van, it retacks together, and brings to; and when the lee-column has gained the rear-line, it retacks together, and then all stand on; otherwise the lee-column brings to; the centre goes under an easy fail two points free, to get ahead of the rear-fleet; while the van carries a press of sail, also two points free, to get ahead of the centre divisions.

Hitherto the weather column has uniformly been supposed to form the van, and the lee-column the rear-division; the line may, however, be formed by interchanging these columns in a variety of different ways, some of which are as follow.

1. Let the weather and centre columns interchange: In this case the centre-column stands on, the weather-column bears away eight points, and as soon as it reaches the wake of the centre-column, which now forms the van, hauls up together; the lee-column tacks together, and goes under a press of sail scarcely two points free, so as just to gain the rear of the line, and then retacks together, as in fig. 15. This evolution may also be performed by the lee-column bringing to; the centre squadron then bears away together one point, and as soon as it has gained the head of the line, hauls its wind; and the weather-column bears away together three points, under an easy fail; and when it has got into the wake of the van, hauls up together, forming the centre division.

2. Let the centre and lee columns interchange: The lee-column stands on close-hauled, under an easy fail; the weather-column bears away two points under a press of sail, until it reaches the head of the line, and then hauls up: the centre-column bears away eight points; and when in the wake of the lee-column, which is now the centre division, hauls its wind. See fig. 16.

3. The weather and lee columns interchanging: For this purpose, the lee-column stands on close-hauled under a press or fail; the centre-column bears away two points under an easy fail, and hauls up as soon as it has come into the wake of the new van squadron; and the weather-column bears away the rear and lee eight points until it gains the wake of the centre-column, and then hauls up, as in fig. 17.

4. The centre forming the van, and the weather column the rear-division: The lee column brings to, the centre-column bears away together two points, and forms the head of the new centre squadron; the weather-column veers away together seven points on the other tack, and forms the rear squadron. See fig. 18.

5. The lee-column to form the van, and the centre the rear division: In order to this, the lee-column stands on under a press of sail, the weather-column bears away together three points under an easy fail, and the centre column bearing the van away eight points; and each, when it has gained the wake of the new van, hauls its wind. See fig. 19.

To form the line of battle on the other tack from the fifth order of failing: The weather-column first tacks in succession; the centre and lee columns stand on, the first line on under an easy fail, and the second under still less fail, according to the length of the columns; and the leaders tack when they gain the wake of the new-formed van, and each ship column tacks in succession as it reaches the wake of the above mentioned van (see fig. 20.) Very great care must be taken by the centre and lee columns, lest they draw too near the sternmost ships of the van, and also each other.

To perform this evolution, the centre and weather column interchange: The weather column brings to, and the centre-column stands on until the leader judges he will be able to clear the weather-column, and then the centre-column tacks in succession: when the last ship of this newly-formed van has passed the weather-column, that column stands on, and each ship tacks in succession as soon as it reaches the wake of the van. The lee-column stands on, and tacks in succession as the ships attain the wake of the van, and at the same time carrying a moderate fail, that there may be a sufficient interval left for the weather-column to form the centre division. See fig. 21.

To form the line from the fifth order of failing on the other tack, the centre and lee columns interchange: The centre-column stands to; the weather-column tacks in succession under very little fail, and the lee-column stands on under a press of sail: when the leader of the lee-column has gained the wake of the line, he tacks, and is followed in succession by his division. The centre-column is to fill and stand on, when the first ship of that column, and the last ship of the lee-column, bear from each other in a line perpendicular to the direction of the wind. See fig. 22.

To form the line on the other tack from the fifth order of failing, the weather and lee-columns interchange: The weather and centre columns bring to; the lee-column stands on under a press of fail, until it can pass ahead of the weather-column, and then tacks in succession; the centre-column fills where its leading ship, and the last ship of the lee-column bear from each other, in a line perpendicular to the direction of the wind, and tacks in succession when it has gained the wake of the new van. In like manner, the weather-column fills when its leading ship and the last of the centre bear in a line perpendicular to the wind, and each ship tacks in succession when it has gained the wake of the centre. See fig. 23.

To form the line on the other tack, the centre forming the rear. To change the van, and the weather the rear division: The weather-column brings to, the other columns make fail and stand on, line of battle till they can pass on the other tack ahead of the weather-column, when they tack in succession. When both columns have passed the weather-column, it fills, tacks in succession, and forms the rear. See fig. 24.

The lee-column: To form the line on the other tack from the fifth order of failing, the lee-column forming the van: The weather-fog to the centre column brings to; the lee-column carries a press of sail, and tacks in succession when it can pass ahead of the weather-column; and when the last ship of this new van has passed to the windward of the former weather-column, the van squadron shortens sail, to give time for the other columns to form: the weather and centre columns fill at the same time, to gain the wake of the van, when they tack in succession. See fig. 25.

To form the line from the order of retreat: The leader of the wing, which is to form the head of the line, hauls the wind, and that wing follows in succession; the other wing goes four points free together on the same tack, and thus runs parallel to the wing which first began the evolution; and they haul up together when they arrive in the wake of the line. See fig. 26.

**Chap. IV. To change from the Line of Battle to the different Orders of Sailing.**

To change from the line of battle to the first order of failing on the same tack: All the ships bear away together the number of points directed by the admiral, observing to keep themselves in the line of bearing for the tack they are in. The sternmost ship bears away first, and the rest successively as quickly as possible, to prevent being too near each other.

To change to the first order of failing in bearing for the line on the other tack: The leader bears away four points to leeward, and is followed in succession by the rear. When the sternmost ship has bore away, the whole haul up, and they will be in bearing for the line on the other tack. See fig. 27.

To change from the line of battle to the second order of failing: The whole fleet bears away together ten points; and so proportions the failing from the van to the rear of the line, that when the headmost ship, which first presses fail, shall come abreast of the second ship, the second ship adapts her sail to keep in this bearing; and so on in succession, each observing to keep the ship that immediately preceded her in the evolution in a line with herself, perpendicular to the direction of the wind; and the whole fleet will now be running before the wind (see fig. 28.) But if it is intended that the fleet shall steer any other given course than that before the wind, the whole fleet may then alter together to the proposed course.

To change to the third order of failing from the line of battle: The whole fleet bears away together ten points; the headmost half of the fleet, including the centre ships, carry an equal degree of sail, in order to preserve their line of bearing; each ship of the remainder of the fleet carries less sail in succession, such as will form and preserve on the other line of bearing with respect to that upon which they were ranged before the evolution; and by this means the fleet will be formed in the third order of failing. See fig. 29.

To change from the line of battle to the fifth order of failing on the same tack: In the treatise of Naval Tactics, published in the second volume of The Elements of Rigging and Seamanship, there are various rules for performing this evolution, according as the different squadrons in the line of battle are intended to form the weather, the centre, and the lee columns, in the order of failing. We shall give two of them as examples.

1. When it is intended to change from the line of battle to this order of failing, so as that the van shall form the weather, and the rear the lee column, and the fleet at the same time keep as much to windward as possible; the van and centre tack together, and run close-hauled in bow and forming the quarter-line; the rear moves on in its former course until the correspondent ship in the rear, the centre retacks; the van stands on until the centre and rear come up, and then retacks, and all the columns regulate their distances. See fig. 30.

2. When it is intended that the van shall form the lee, the van and the rear the weather column; the van bears away together under an easy fail, and goes at right angles with the line ahead: the centre at the same time goes away two weather points free, and each ship steers for that ship of the van column, respectively which is to be abreast of her when in column. The leader of the van must determine the distance, by not hauling up with his division until his ship and the sternmost ship of the centre-column, which is drawn up with him, are in a line at right angles with the wind: They then both stand on under an easy fail, while the rear crowding sail passes to the windward of both. See fig. 31.

To change from the line of battle to the fifth order of failing on the other tack: This evolution may be performed in as many ways as the former, according to the intended formation of the different columns; but in such a work as the line of our's, it may be sufficient to observe, that,

1. When the van is meant to form the weather, and the rear the lee column: The van tacks in succession; the leader of the centre tacks when the leader of the van is past; the rear manoeuvres in the same manner with respect to the centre. See fig. 32.

2. When the rear is to form the weather, and the van the lee column: The van tacks in succession; and when about, either brings to, or shortens sail, to allow the other columns time to form. The centre and rear then carry fail, and tack in succession. The centre tacks when its leader has the rear of the lee-column in a line at right angles with the lee-column wind, or when its centre passes astern of the lee-column. When the centre is about, it regulates its rate of failing by the lee-column, either by bringing to or making equal fail; and thus both wait for the rear to pass to windward. The rear tacks when its leader has the last ship of the lee-column in a line at right angles with the wind, or when its centre ship passes astern of the last ship of the centre-column. See fig. 33.

To change from the line of battle to the order of retreat: The leader bears away four points; and all the fleet follow, to the order of retreating close-hauled, they will come to file off in succession at the same point in the van ship's wake, till the centre ship arrives at the angle where the evolution began. Then the order of retreat will be formed, and any course whatever may be steered, since the two wings will be equal and in order on the starboard and larboard lines of bearing, forming consequently between them an angle of 135 degrees. Fig. 34 represents the order of retreat formed from the line of battle, the whole fleet going four points free.

**Chap. V. To Manoeuvre the Line of Battle.**

The method of forming the line of battle, when the ships are in no previous order, has already been explained. In this place it is intended to point out some of the various evolutions... NAVAL TACTICS.

Part I.

Manoeuvres evolutions that are, or may be, performed by a fleet which is already formed in line of battle.

The fleet being in line of battle, to form the line on the other tack, by tacking in succession: The headmost ship of the fleet tacks first, having previously made more sail, or the second having shortened sail, in order to increase the interval between them; for it often happens that one or two cables length are run over before the ship ahead has been able to fill her sails on the other tack. When the first ship is about, either the second makes more sail, or the third shortens sail; and then the second tacks as soon as she has gained the wake of the leader, the helm being put down at the instant she opens the weather quarter of the first ship, which is already on the other tack. In like manner the third, fourth, &c. ships tack each at the instant it has gained the wake of the leader; and those ships already about must preserve their aligned distances, by shortening sail, if necessary, until the whole fleet is on the other tack. If a ship misses stays, she is immediately to fill again on the same tack, and make sail with all possible expedition, taking care to keep as close as possible to the wind, and not to fall off to leeward. By this means she will get ahead and to windward of those which follow her; and they will perform successively their evolutions in the wake of the ships which are already on the other tack, only standing on a little farther than they would have done if the ship ahead had not missed stays. The ship that missed stays will return sooner to her station, by making all possible sail to windward of the line. See fig. 35.

To form the line on the other tack without tacking in succession: The whole fleet veers together: the rear ship hauls her wind on the other tack, and stands on, while all the others go two points free on the other tack, and haul up as they successively gain the wake of the leading ship. Thus the rear of the line on the one tack becomes the van on the other tack. See fig. 36.

The line to veer in succession: The van ship of the line veers round, and flees four points free on the other tack; and when she is clear of the rear ship of the line, she hauls her wind; the rest follow, and haul up in succession. See fig. 37.

The line to tack and retack together: In tacking together, the sternmost ship of the line puts in stays; then her second ahead puts her helm down; and so on through the whole line, to prevent the ship ahead from falling on board the ships astern. The fleet will then be in bow and quarter line; from which, if tacking together, no ship must put in stays till the ship on her weather quarter is in the act of tacking.

The line bear away together, preserving their bearing for the line: The rear begins this evolution, the sternmost ship bearing away the number of points proposed; and so on as quickly as possible, to prevent falling on board of each other.

To turn to windward in line of battle: When the fleet has sea-room, the most advantageous method of gaining to windward is, that all the ships of the fleet may go about together; as by this means the whole fleet will gain as much to windward as in the case of a single ship. The fleet will be in line of battle on the one board, and in bow and quarter line on the other. This is also the most proper method to get to windward on a coast when the wind is parallel to the land: But if the fleet is turning to windward in a strait or between two shores, the fleet should tack in succession; for if all the ships tacked together, the van would be soon in with the land on one side, and soon after the fleet had retacked the rear would be in with the land on the other side: hence this would occasion a number of short boards. In passing through a strait, other circumstances are also to be attended to, as tides, &c.

To interchange the van and centre squadrons: The van bears away a little, and brings to; the centre passes on to windward, edging a little, to get ahead of the former van on the same line; the rear, coming on under an easy sail, edges away likewise, to obtain the wake of the new centre squadron. See fig. 38.

To interchange the van and rear squadrons: The van and centre squadrons bear away a little, and then bring to, the van obliterating to bear away a little more to the leeward van and than the centre. The rear stands on to gain the head of rear squadron; and when abreast of the former van, the centre squadron fills, and both standing on, form ahead of the new rear, by edging down until they are in a line with it. See fig. 39.

To interchange the centre and rear squadrons: The van centre and stands on under an easy sail, while the centre bears away a rear squadron little and brings to, and the rear at the same time carries a press of sail to pass the centre to windward and get into the wake of the van. The van and centre then edge away to gain the line with the new rear squadron, which then fills. See fig. 40.

The van to pass and form the rear: The van squadron edges away a little and brings to; the other two squadrons, pass to the rear.

The rear to pass and form the van: The van and centre bear away a little and bring to; the rear makes sail, passes ahead of both, and then edges away to form on the same line. These two manoeuvres are so simple as not to stand in need of illustration by figures.

CHAP. VI. To Manoeuvre a Fleet formed in the Fifth Order of Sailing.

This order of sailing is very advantageous for a numerous fleet, as it keeps the ships closer together, and therefore more connected with each other than either of the three of failing first orders. The method of forming this order is shown in Chap. II.; and the method of manoeuvring in it, which with very little alteration is also applicable to the fourth order, is to be the subject of this chapter.

To tack the columns in succession: The ships of the lee-column having more distance to run before they can recover their position, must go about first in succession. When the centre leader finds himself abreast of the leader to leeward of him, or at right angles with the close-hauled line on the other tack, upon which the lee leader is now moving, he tacks, and is followed in succession by his division. The weather-column paying the same regard to the centre-column, manoeuvres in the same manner (see fig. 41). In this evolution the weather-column still continues to windward; and should the columns have closed too much, or be too far astern, either of which may happen from the inequality in the rate of sailing of the different ships, the order may be recovered either by the lee or windward column bearing away, so as to make an angle equal to that proposed, as two points, between any column, and a line joining the leader of that column and the sternmost ship of the next column.

If this evolution is to be performed in the night, the weather-column must tack first. In order to prevent the risk of one column passing through the van of the other columns, the next column must not tack till its leader is sensible that many ships of the column immediately to windward are about. When about, the leaders make little sail, while their followers make successively a little more, in order to form their respective columns. The columns which are NAVAL TACTICS.

To tack together: The sternmost ships of the three columns put in stays together; and when they are observed to be so, their seconds ahead immediately put their helm down, and so on through the whole fleet. Each column will then be in bow and quarter line. See fig. 42.

To veer in succession: The leader of the lee-column veers round, and fleers four points free upon the other tack, followed by the ships of that division; and of which, when he is clear of the sternmost ships, he hauls up. The centre and weather columns perform successively the same evolution, observing to continue standing on till they successively bring the point at which the lee-column began to veer to bear in a right line to leeward of them. They likewise successively spring their luffs when the point at which the lee column hauled its wind bears right to leeward (fig. 43.) Each column having the same distance to run, if the evolution be well executed, the leaders of the windward columns will find themselves, when they spring their luffs, exactly abreast of the leader of the lee-column, and so will all the other ships. But the making or shortening sail will at all events rectify the inequality of sailing.

To turn to windward in the fifth order of sailing: Let the ships of the fleet be so arranged, that the leaders, and also the corresponding ships of the columns, may be in the direction of the wind; as by this means the fleet will gain more to windward, and at the same time be less liable to disorder. Now the van ships of the columns tack at the same instant, and are followed in succession each by the remaining ships of the division, when they reach the wake of their leaders, or the same point when they went about; hence there will always be three ships in stays at the same time until the whole fleet has got on the other tack. The fleet then stands on any assigned distance, and then retacks in the same manner as before. See fig. 44.

To interchange the weather and centre columns: The weather and lee columns lie to, or only keep steerage way. The centre column tacks together; and forming a bow and quarter line, goes close-hauled to gain the wake of the weather-column; it then retacks together, and stands on, while the weather-column bears away to its new station in the centre, and the lee column fills. See fig. 45.

To interchange the weather and lee columns: The centre column brings to; the lee column stands on under a press of sail; and when its sternmost ship can pass to windward of the van of the centre column, which will be when the centre ship of the lee column is in a line perpendicular to the direction of the wind with the van of the centre column, the lee column then tacks together, and stands on close-hauled till it comes in a line with the centre column, when it goes large two points to get into the station which the weather-column left; and then veers together, hauling the wind for the other tack. At the beginning of the evolution, the weather column bears away together under little sail, and goes large five points on the other tack, so as to get into the wake of the centre column; it then hauls to the former tack, going two points large, till it ranges abreast of the centre column, when it brings to, and waits for the new weather column. See fig. 46.

To interchange the centre and lee columns: The centre and weather columns bring to, or keep steerage way, as is most convenient: the lee column tacks together, and presses sail to gain the wake of the centre column; which, when they have effected, they retack together and stand on; the centre-column then edges away under an easy sail, steering lams, if it lay to, eight points from the wind, and if it kept steerage way only two points, until it comes into the station of the lee column, where it hauls to the wind; while the weather-column fills and stands on: and the order is re-established by shortening or making sail, according to circumstances.

The weather column to pass to leeward: The weather-column stands on under very little sail, while the centre and lee columns tack together, and carry a press of sail till they reach the wake of the weather-column, when they retack, ward, and crowd sail till they come up with the weather-column; and when they have gained the wake of the weather-column, it bears away two points, to gain its station to leeward, and then hauls to the wind or brings to till the new weather and centre columns come up. See fig. 47.

The lee-column to pass to windward: The weather and the centre columns bring to, while the lee column carries sail, and tacks in succession as soon as the leading ship can wear-reefs to the headmost ship of the weather-column; and when arrived upon the line on which the weather-column is formed, it retacks in succession, forms on the same line, and either brings to or stands on under very little sail. If it brings to, the other two columns bear away together two points, to put themselves abreast of the column now to windward; but if the new weather-column stood on under an easy sail, they may bear away only one point to gain their proper stations. See fig. 48.

As it is of the utmost importance that each ship be in her method of respective station, both to preserve order, and that the various evolutions may be more readily performed, the officer of the watch will therefore be ever anxious to preserve the station of his ship. This he may do by his quadrant; but the more ready method for this purpose is by means of the naval square, which is constructed as follows:

Upon some convenient place at the middle of the quarter-deck, describe the square ABCD (fig. 49.), of which the fides AD and BC are parallel to the keel; through the centre line G draw the line EF parallel to AD or BC, and draw the diagonals AC and BD; bisect the angles EGD, EGC by the straight lines GH, GI, and the naval square will be constructed. Now since the angles FGD, FGC are equal to four points, being each half a right angle; therefore the angles EGD, EGC are each equal to 12 points, and consequently the angles EGH, EGI are each equal to six points. Hence, if a ship is running close-hauled on the starboard tack, in the direction FE, the direction of the wind will be IG, and her close-hauled course on the other tack will be GC: But if she be running in the same direction FE upon the larboard tack, her close-hauled course on the starboard tack will be in the direction GD.

In order now to apply the naval square to the keeping of ships in their respective stations, let the fleet be formed in accordance with the fifth order of sailing close-hauled, the corresponding ships of the columns coinciding with the direction of the wind, in order to turn to windward with greater facility. The corresponding ships in the column must be kept in the direction of GH, or GI, according to the direction of the wind and the tack they are upon, while all the ships of the Part I.

NAVAL TACTICS.

To restore the same column must be in the direction of EF. See fig. 50.

A gain, let the fleet be in three columns in one of the Wind lines of bearing, the ship being close hauled on the other tack. The ships of each column will be in the direction of one of the diagonals, while the corresponding ships of the other columns will be in the direction of the other diagonal (fig. 51). It will also be the same if the columns are in one line of bearing, and going four points large on the same tack. The application of the naval square in other cases will be obvious.

CHAP. VII. To restore or reform the Order of Battle upon Shifts of the Wind.

1. Let it be intended to restore the order of battle on the same tack, the wind coming forward, and shifting ahead less than six points. In this case, the whole fleet is to bring to except the leader; who, in order that the same distances between the ships may be preserved when the line is reformed, bears a course of b (fig. 52), such as to be at right angles to the middle point between the former and present direction of the wind; hence the course he must steer will be known by adding half the number of points the wind has shifted to eight points, and applying this sum to the former close-hauled course. As soon as the leader has arrived at the new close-hauled line with respect to the second ship ahead, that ship immediately fills, and bears away the same number of points as the leader; and when both these have reached the close-hauled line with respect to the third ship, the also fills, and bears away. In like manner the remaining part of the fleet bear away in succession; and when they have got into the close-hauled line b c with the sternmost ship, they all haul their wind at the same instant, and the sternmost ship fills and stands on close-hauled.

A very expeditious method of performing this evolution is as follows: The whole fleet having fallen off as soon as the wind shifted the same number of points which it changed, the leader bears away eight points from the middle point between the former and present directions of the wind; or, if the wind has shifted near six points, in this case the leader must bear away eight points from the new direction of the wind; but then the fleet will be closer than before, and the leader hauls his wind as soon as the sternmost ship bears on the close-hauled line from him. The second ship bears away when she has reached the wake of the leader, and also hauls her wind when she has again gained his wake. In like manner the third, fourth, &c., ships bear away, and also haul their wind in succession, until the sternmost and the whole line is formed again. See fig. 53.

If the wind shifts exactly four points ahead, the whole fleet is to veer round till the heads of all the ships are directed to the point exactly opposite to their former course; and the rear ship, which has now become the van, is to run four points large upon her new tack, and the rest of the fleet to follow her in succession; and when the last ship, which was the former leader, is got into the wake of the headmost in the line, the whole fleet is to veer together, and the order will be reformed on the former tack.

If the wind shifts eight points forward, the ships are to veer round altogether till their heads are on the point of the compass opposite to their former course; then the rear ship, having become the van, is to haul close by the wind on the same board; all the other ships are to haul up in succession, and range in the wake of the leading ship; and when the last ship is in her station, the order will be reformed on the same tack.

If the wind changes 12 points exactly, the fleet must veer round together, and haul their wind in succession on the first tack.

2. The wind coming forward, and the order of battle to be reformed on the other tack.

If the wind shifts ahead less than six points, all the ships of the fleet are to veer round, till their heads come to the opposite point of the compass with respect to their former wind course; and then the rear ship, which is now become the van, is to haul close by the wind on that tack, and the other ships follow her in succession. From hence the fleet might pass to the line of battle on the former tack by veering in succession. If the wind comes ahead more than six points, but less than twelve, the fleet is to manoeuvre in the same manner as before. If the wind comes ahead exactly twelve points, the tack is to be changed.

3. When the wind shifts aft, and the order of battle to be reformed on the same tack.

If the wind has shifted less than two points, the leader coming up hauls his wind, the fleet stands on as before, and each ship and the other hauls her wind in succession as she gains the wake of the leader. If it is intended to change the tack, the whole fleet tack together, and the sternmost ship, which now becomes the leader, hauls up, and the rest bear down and haul tack up in succession.

If the wind changes sixteen points, all the ships brace about for the other tack immediately, by which means the fleet will be going four points large; then the ships tacking or veering instantly together, the order of battle will be restored or formed again on the same tack as they were before the wind change.

CHAP. VIII. Of the Battle.

In a naval engagement, the present mode, as has already been observed, is to draw up the fleet in a straight line upon one of the close-hauled lines under an easy sail. The frigates, fire-ships, transports, &c., are placed at proper distances on the other side, with respect to the enemy (b). The distance between two adjacent ships in the line is usually about a cable's length; but the admiral increases or diminishes this interval according to circumstances. The nearer, however, the ships are to each other, the stronger is the line, and the more difficult to be broken or forced by the enemy; but still there must be a sufficient interval left, so that if a ship receive considerable damage, she may get out of the line without becoming foul or falling aboard of the ship next astern, which would be the means of putting the whole line in confusion.

The strength of a fleet depends also more on the largeness of the ships, and the weight of the metal, than in their number. The fewer the number of ships in a fleet, the more distinctly will the signals be perceived and answered by those fewer in number; the better also will the number of larger ships be perceived and answered by those fewer in number.

(b) Several able officers have been of opinion, that when fleets are ranged in order of battle, instead of being close-hauled, they should have the wind two points free, or upon the beam. Some of the reasons alleged in support of this opinion are, that the ships can more easily keep their stations; and if any ship should happen to fall to leeward, she may easily regain her station, which would be almost impossible were the fleet close-hauled. The Battle-deck of battle he kept, and the fleet more easily manoeuvred.

A large ship is not so soon disabled as a small one; and in the case of a three-decker, although the upper deck should happen to be confused with the wreck of broken masts, yards, &c., hence it being scarcely possible to work the guns on that deck, yet if the weather be not tempestuous, the guns on the other two decks may be worked. If boarding should be deemed practicable, it is evident that the large ship, upon account of the height of her side, as well as for other reasons, will have greatly the advantage over one of a less size. Large ships are also for the most part more able to encounter a storm than small ones; and in a gale of wind large ships have commonly the advantage in point of sailing. Hence it is obvious, that a fleet composed of large ships may have greatly the advantage over a fleet consisting of less ships, though much more numerous.

As in a naval engagement the two fleets are drawn up close-hauled, on two lines parallel to each other, one of these fleets is therefore to the windward of the other. The windward fleet has several advantages not possessed by the fleet to leeward, and the leeward fleet has also advantages over the weather fleet. The advantages and disadvantages of each of these fleets are as follow:

The fleet to windward may approach the leeward fleet at pleasure, and can therefore determine the time of commencement of the action. If the weather fleet is more numerous, it may send down a detachment of ships on the rear of the leeward fleet, and thereby put it into confusion. If any of the ships of the fleet to leeward should be disabled, the fleet to windward may with great ease send down their fire-ships upon them, or send a detachment after any part that gives way. The weather fleet may board if the admiral thinks proper; and it is scarcely incommodeed with the smoke, which is carried off by the wind to the fleet to leeward.

The disadvantages of the fleet to windward are, an inability to quit the fight when once engaged, without being obliged to pass through the enemy's line, which is extremely dangerous; because the ships being already very much injured before they are obliged to fly, they must expect to be still more so; and as they have it no longer in their power to form the order of retreat, this manoeuvre is absolutely a desperate one. If the fleet to windward tack altogether, in order to get off, the line to leeward may do the same, after having raked the weather ships in stays, and follow them on the other tack, with the advantage of having gained the wind of the centre and rear divisions of the flying line. If it blow fresh, it is seldom that weather ships have their lower deck guns sufficiently elevated; whence it results, that the ship being a little inclined on the lee side, the guns often run out again at their ports after being fired, which very much retards the service of the artillery, since the guns are obliged to be bowed in again every time for loading; and oftentimes they can make no use at all of their lower tier. Again, such of the ships as are so disabled as to be obliged to quit the line, cannot easily do it, because in veering, for want of being able to tack, they fall between the two lines, where they are raked ahead, and by that means completely put in disorder: but should they be fortunate enough to be able to finish their evolution, it is still very difficult for them, disabled as they are, to get to windward of their line, and very often they fall foul of the next ships astern of them, which have it scarcely in their power to prevent the accident on account of the fire and smoke, especially if the line is much contracted; and should these perceive it, and try to avoid being run foul of by falling back on their next ship astern, and so on thus successively, it might happen, that from one to the other a great part of the fleet being obliged to manoeuvre, their fire would lessen, and very often cease, by their covering each other; when, if the enemy take the advantage of this critical moment, the disorder increases, and all is lost. But these inconveniences may be partly prevented by having the disabled ships quickly towed out of the line by the boats of the fleet, which for that purpose should always be hoisted out from each ship before the engagement begins. Otherwise, if the ships in the weather line, not being too close, have the necessary space to observe what passes ahead of them, and to manoeuvre, they ought to range themselves to leeward of the disabled ship, in order to cover her, and approach nearer to the enemy; all the other ships bearing up also together to preserve the line.

The ships in the line to leeward have the advantage of advancing with facility and effect their lower deck guns in all cases of the weathers proper for fleets to come to action: they can wait, or quit the engagement at pleasure: their disabled ships can without difficulty quit their stations when necessity requires it: they can form the order of retreat with more readiness, or continue the action as long as convenient: in short, the lee line of battle, if superior in number, can also double the enemy, by making some of the ships in the van or rear to tack, and put one of the extremities of the enemy's line between two fires; and if they are formed in time, they may cannonade the enemy while bearing down to the attack.

The disadvantages of the fleet to leeward are, its being very much annoyed by the smoke, and a continued shower of fire from the wads falling on board, repelled by the wind, which if not attended to may be productive of dreadful consequences. The ships of the line to leeward cannot attempt to board those of the other whatever may be their inclination for it: they can hardly do more than accept the battle, without being able to determine either time or distance: it is even with great difficulty that they can avoid being boarded, or prevent their line from being broken, if the weather ships are bent upon doing it; and their fire-ships are very seldom of use.

A general rule for the adoption of either the weather or lee gage cannot be laid down. Sometimes the one is preferable, and sometimes the other; and very often the commander in chief has it not in his power to make an option.

Having proceeded so far with respect to the line of battle, other may not be improper to introduce in this place an account of a naval engagement, with the conduct to be observed previous to, and during the time of, its continuance.

The engagement will not begin till the admiral makes the signal, unless an action is inevitably brought on by some unavoidable circumstances in the line, or portion of the van or rear of both fleets in forming or approaching each other. The admiral in such case will make the proper signal for the van or rear, by the distinguishing flag of either of these divisions, which will undoubtedly regulate the necessary manoeuvres of the rest of the fleet throughout the whole line.

During the time of an engagement the greatest silence is to be observed in each ship; no one must quit his post upon the pain of death; and should any one happen to refuse obeying an officer, he shall be put to death on the spot; the same also shall be done to any one who shall hide himself, or feign to be wounded. The wounded must be carried or conducted to the surgeon by those who have been appointed by the captain for that purpose. Should any one discover an advantage to be taken, he shall inform the officer who stands nearest him. No kind of rigging whatever is to be touched without an order. Should any dangerous shot be received at the water line of the ship, such as the calkers, or carpenters, or any other person who perceives it, shall inform in private the captain with it, without saying a word of the same to any one else upon pain of death, unless... The Battle, unless it be a superior officer; the same precaution shall also be observed about any part of the ship catching fire.

Whilst the fleets are engaged, the admiral carries but little fail: in this, however, he must conduct himself by the motions of the enemy, the ships always observing to keep close in the line; and if any ship happen to get out of the line, the ship which immediately follows is to pay no regard to her, but endeavour to keep her station in the line.

A captain must not quit his post in the line upon any pretence whatever, unless his ship should be so greatly damaged as to render her incapable of continuing the action. The little fail a fleet is under at such a time may in general give the ships, though damaged in their rigging, &c., time enough to repair their defects, without causing an unnecessary interruption in the line, by withdrawing out of action when their service might perhaps be of the utmost importance to the rest of the fleet.

A captain, through too impetuous a desire of distinguishing himself, ought never to break the order of the line, however inviting the advantage of an attack might then appear to him to secure succours; he must wait with patience the signal of the admiral or commanding officer of his division, because it is always more essential to preserve and support a close line in action, as it constitutes the principal strength of a fleet in general, than to attend to a particular attack between two ships, which commonly decides but little with regard to the whole, however glorious in appearance, unless with a view at the same time of taking or destroying a flag ship of the enemy's, and where succours alone, even then, can justify the attempt.

The two immediate seconds to the admiral ought to direct part of their fire against the enemy's flag-ship, or any other that may attack their admiral; so that their chief attention should be employed more in his defence than in that of their own proper ship, as they must sacrifice every other consideration to the honour of their flag.

The same attention must likewise be paid to any other ship that may find herself engaged with one of the enemy's flag-ships; the next to her ahead and aft will serve in that respect as seconds, by dividing part of their fire against such flag-officer, in order to make him strike the sooner.

If any flag-officer stand in need of being assisted, he will of course make a signal for the corps de reserve; or if there should be none, he will signify the same to his division; on which his two seconds, with those nearest him, will close in to cover him, and continue the action. The frigates of his squadron will likewise be ready to give him the necessary assistance; and if he should still continue the attack, he will in a particular manner be supported by his whole division.

Those ships which happen to be most exposed to danger will naturally make the ordinary signals upon the occasion if they should receive any hurt or damage, in order to be supported by such of the line as are nearest to them.

When a fleet is so far superior in number as to be able to extend itself both ahead and aft considerably beyond the enemy's line, the admiral generally forms the excess into a body of reserve, drawn up in a line on the other side of the fleet with respect to the enemy. If the body of reserve is to windward, the ships composing it are to be drawn up in a line with the frigates nearest abreast of the centre; but if to leeward, a little ahead of them; being careful at the same time to keep within reach of observing distinctly all the signals and motions of the fleet, and to be ready to replace such of the ships as may happen to be dismantled or driven out of the line, where all intervals must be properly strengthened, and carefully filled up again without loss of time. The body of reserve is usually formed at the same time with the line, to prevent any irregularity that may happen on leaving any intervals or openings; yet the admiral may draw ships out of the line to form a body of reserve, according to the time and circumstances of his situation.

The oldest captain, after the senior officer who commands the body of reserve, ought to relieve the first, or close that part of the line which the disabled ship has been obliged to quit; and to go successively of the red.

The commanding officer of the body of reserve will not leave the detached with the whole corps, unless on some pressing occasion, to fortify the line, where such reinforcement is absolutely necessary. It is desired one of the flag-officers of the three squadrons, he will be followed by the next senior officer of the reserve who was not before detached, in order to place themselves as seconds, the first ahead and the other aft of the fleet; they are to support, without any diminution of the honour of his own proper seconds at the same time, as they are only called in through necessity on that emergency, being not engaged before, and consequently better able to assist and support the admiral; their duty being likewise to exert their utmost efforts in attacking, or, if possible, in boarding, the enemy's flag ship, to force him to yield, except they are particularly ordered off to some other quarter or part of the line.

The admiral will sometimes order the whole body of reserve to reinforce one of the three squadrons of the fleet, as he may see occasion; which, when he does, the body must make all the fail it can, that each ship may place herself by ro rein- successively, the first in the first interval, the second in the force second interval, and so on throughout. If a part only of the body of reserve is wanted, the proper signal will be made accordingly.

When the admiral has no further occasion for the body of reserve, he will make the proper signal for the ships command to rejoin the line, and these ships will repeat the signals.

If any captain in the fleet think he can board with success one of the enemy's ships, he will signify the same to the admiral by hoisting the boarding flag, together with his particular pendant, to be more plainly distinguished; the admiral in return will make the proper signal of approbation, or otherwise if he disapprove of the attempt, by letting fly that ship's particular pendant that he may observe the signal the better. Before the captain make the signal, he ought to consider well the ill consequences that might attend such an enterprise if he should fail or succeed; for the breaking of the order or disposition of the line, by quitting his post, may be of much greater disadvantage to the whole, than any advantage arising from his victory, except that over a flag ship.

When the admiral makes the signal for his fleet to prepare for action, the fire-ships will at the same time get ready hips to their grappling-irons, fire-engines, &c., for boarding, and will likewise dispose all their combustibles into their proper channels of communication, &c., as soon as possible after the action begins; all which, when ready, they will take care to make known by signal to the particular division or squadron they belong to, and they of course will repeat the same to the admirals.

The fire-ships must be particularly careful in placing To be out themselves out of the reach of the enemy's guns, which of the they may do abreast and under shelter of their own ships in each of the line, and not in the openings between the ships, unless to prevent any of the enemy's ships that should attempt to force through their line, when they must in such cases use their utmost efforts to prevent them. They ought always The Battle to be very attentive to the admiral's signals, as well as those of the commanding officer of the particular squadron they belong to, that they may lose no time when the signal is made for them to act, which they must quickly answer by a signal in return.

Although no ship in the line should be particularly appointed to lead down or protect the fire ships, besides the frigates already ordered for that particular purpose; yet the ship ahead of which the fire-ship passes in her way to the enemy, whatever division she may belong to, is to escort her, and must assist her with a boat well manned and armed, as well as any other succour she may stand in need of: The next two ships to her must likewise give her all necessary assistance. The captain of a fire-ship is to consider, in short, that he is answerable for the event, in proportion as he expects to be honourably rewarded if he succeed in so daring and hazardous an enterprise.

Since a general engagement of fleets or squadrons of men of war is nothing else than a variety of particular actions of single ships with each other, in a line of battle, it may not be improper to begin by describing the latter, and then proceed to represent the usual manner of conducting the former.

The whole economy of a naval engagement may be arranged under the following heads; namely, the preparation, the action, and the repair or refitting for the purposes of navigation.

The preparation is begun by issuing the orders to clear the ship for action, which is repeated by the boatswain and his mates at all the hatchways or staircases leading to the different batteries. As the management of the artillery, in a vessel of war, requires a considerable number of men, it is evident that the officers and sailors must be restrained to a narrow space in their usual habitations, in order to preserve the internal regularity of the ship. Hence the hammocks, or hanging beds, of the latter are crowded together as close as possible between the decks, each of them being limited to the breadth of 14 inches. They are hung parallel to each other, in rows stretching from one side of the ship to the other, nearly throughout her whole length, so as to admit of no passage but by hooping under them. As the cannon therefore cannot be worked while the hammocks are suspended in this situation, it becomes necessary to remove them as quickly as possible. By this circumstance a double advantage is obtained: the batteries of cannon are immediately cleared of an encumbrance, and the hammocks are converted into a sort of parapet, to prevent the execution of small-shot on the quarter-deck, tops, and forecastle. At the summons of the boatswain, "Up all hammocks!" every sailor repairs to his own, and, having stowed his bedding properly, he cords it up firmly with a lashing or line provided for that purpose. He then carries it to the quarter-deck, poop, or forecastle, or wherever it may be necessary. As each side of the quarter-deck and poop is furnished with a double net-work, supported by iron cranes fixed immediately above the gunnel or top of the ship's side, the hammocks thus corded are firmly stowed by the quarter-mast between the two parts of the netting, so as to form an excellent barrier. The tops, waist, and forecastle, are then fenced in the same manner.

Whilst these offices are performed below, the boatswain and his mates are employed in securing the fall yards, to prevent them from tumbling down when the ship is cannonaded, as she might thereby be disabled and rendered incapable of attack, retreat, or pursuit. The yards are now likewise secured by strong chains or ropes, additional to those by which they are usually suspended. The boatswain also provides the necessary materials to repair the rigging, wherever it may be damaged by the shot of the enemy, and to supply whatever parts of it may be entirely destroyed. The carpenter and his mates, in the meanwhile, prepare shot-plugs and mauls, to close up any dangerous breaches that may be made near the surface of the water; and provide the iron-work necessary to refit the chain-pumps, in case their machinery should be wounded in the engagement. The gunner with his mates and quarter-gunners is busied in examining the cannon of the different batteries, to see that their charges are thoroughly dry and fit for execution; to have everything ready for furnishing the great guns and small arms with powder as soon as the action begins; and to keep a sufficient number of cartridges continually filled, to supply the place of those expended in battle. The master and his mates are attentive to have the sails properly trimmed, according to the situation of the ship; and to reduce or multiply them, as occasion requires, with all possible expedition. The lieutenants visit the different decks, to see that they are effectually cleared of all encumbrance, so that nothing may retard the execution of the artillery; and to enjoin the other officers to diligence and alertness, in making the necessary dispositions for the expected engagement, so that everything may be in readiness at a moment's warning.

When the hostile ships have approached each other to a competent nearness, the drums beat to arms: The boatswain and his mates pipe, "All hands to quarters!" at every hatchway: All the persons appointed to manage the great guns immediately repair to their respective stations: The crows, handspikes, rammers, sponges, powder-horns, matches, and train tackles, are placed in order by the side of every cannon: The hatches are immediately laid, to prevent any one from deserting his post by escaping into the lower apartments: The marines are drawn up in rank and file on the quarter-deck, poop, and forecastle: The lashings of the great guns are cast loose, and the tompons withdrawn: The whole artillery, above and below, is run out at the ports, and levelled to the point blank range, ready for firing.

The necessary preparations being completed, and the officers and crew ready at their respective stations to obey the order, the commencement of the action is determined by the mutual distance and situation of the adverse ships, or by the signal from the commander-in-chief of the fleet or squadron. The cannon being levelled in parallel rows projecting from the ship's side, the most natural order of battle is evidently to range the ships abreast of each other, especially if the engagement is general. The most convenient distance is properly within the point blank range of a musket, so that all the artillery may do effectual execution.

The combat usually begins by a vigorous cannonade, accompanied with the whole efforts of the swivel-guns and the small arms. The method of firing in platoons, or volleys of cannon at once, appears inconvenient in the sea-fervice, and perhaps should never be attempted unless in the battering of a fortification. The sides and decks of the ship, although sufficiently strong for all the purposes of war, would be too much shaken by so violent an explosion and recoil. The general rule observed on this occasion throughout the ship, is to load, fire, and sponge the guns with all possible expedition, yet without confusion or precipitation. The captain of each gun is particularly enjoined to fire only when the piece is properly directed to its object, that the shot may not be fruitlessly expended. The lieutenants, who command the different batteries, traverse the deck to see that the battle is prosecuted with vivacity; and to exhort the men to their duty. The midshipmen second these injunctions, and give the necessary assistance, wherever it may be required, at the guns committed to their charge. The gunner The Battle gunner should be particularly attentive that all the artillery is sufficiently supplied with powder, and that the cartridges are carefully conveyed along the decks in covered boxes. The havoc produced by a continuation of this mutual assault may be readily conjectured by the reader's imagination: battering, penetrating, and splintering the sides and decks; shattering or dismounting the cannon; mangling and destroying the rigging; cutting asunder or carrying away the masts and yards; piercing and tearing the sails so as to render them useless; and wounding, disabling, or killing the ship's company! The comparative vigour and resolution of the assailants to effect their pernicious consequences in each other, generally determine their success or defeat; we say generally, because the fate of the combat may sometimes be decided by an unforeseen incident, equally fortunate for the one and fatal to the other. The defeated ship having acknowledged the victory by striking her colours, is immediately taken possession of by the conqueror, who secures her officers and crew as prisoners in his own ship; and invests its principal officer with the command of the prize until a captain is appointed by the commander-in-chief.

The engagement being concluded, they begin to repair: the cannon are secured by their breechings and tackles with all convenient expedition. Whatever sails have been rendered unseaworthy are unbent; and the wounded masts and yards struck upon deck, and fitted or replaced by others. The standing rigging is knotted, and the running-rigging spliced wherever necessary. Proper sails are bent in the room of those which have been displaced as useless. The carpenter and his mates are employed in repairing the breaches made in the ship's hull, by shot-plugs, pieces of plank, and sheet-lead. The gunner and his assistants are busy in replenishing the allotted number of charged cartridges, to supply the place of those which have been expended, and in rettling whatever furniture of the cannon may have been damaged by the action.

Such is the usual process and consequence of an engagement between two ships of war, which may be considered as an epitome of a general battle between fleets or squadrons. The latter, however, involves a greater variety of incidents, and necessarily requires more comprehensive skill and judgement in the commanding officer. A short account of which also we shall next proceed to lay before our readers.

When the admiral or commander-in-chief of a naval armament has discovered an enemy's fleet, his principal concern is usually to approach it, and endeavour to come to action as soon as possible. Every inferior consideration must be sacrificed to this important object, and every rule of action should tend to halt and prepare for so material an event. The state of the wind, and the situation of his adversary, will in some measure dictate the conduct necessary to be pursued with regard to the disposition of his ships on this occasion. To facilitate the execution of the admiral's orders, the whole fleet is ranged into three squadrons, each of which is divided into three divisions, under the command of different officers. Before the action begins, the adverse fleets are drawn up in two lines, as formerly described. As soon as the admiral displays the signal for the line of battle, the several divisions separate from the columns, in which they were disposed in the usual order of sailing, and every ship crowds sail to get into its station in the wake of the next ahead; and a proper distance from each other is regularly observed from the van to the rear. The admiral, however, will occasionally contract or extend his line, so as to conform to the length of that of his adversary, whose neglect or inferior skill on this occasion he will naturally convert to his own advantage, as well as to prevent his own line from being doubled; a circumstance which might throw his van and rear into confusion.

When the adverse fleets approach each other, the courses are commonly hauled up in the brails, and the topgallant-falls and stay-falls furled. The movement of each ship is chiefly regulated by the main and foretop sails and the jib; the mizen topsail being referred to haffen or retard the course of the ship; and, in fine, by filling or backing, hoisting or lowering it, to determine her velocity.

The signal for a general engagement is usually displayed when the opposite fleets are sufficiently within the range of point blank shot, so that they may level the artillery with certainty of execution, which is near enough for a line of battle. The action is begun and carried on throughout the fleet in the manner we have already described between single ships. The various exigencies of the combat call forth the skill and resources of the admiral to keep his line as complete as possible when it has been unequally attacked; by ordering ships from those in reserve to supply the place of others which have suffered greatly by the action; by directing his fire-ships at a convenient time to fall aboard the enemy; by detaching ships from one part of the line or wing which is stronger to another which is greatly pressed by superior force, and requires assistance. His vigilance is ever necessary to review the situation of the enemy from van to rear; every motion of whom he should, if possible, anticipate and frustrate. He should seize the favourable moments of occasion, which are rapid in their progress, and never return. Far from being disconcerted by any unforeseen incident, he should endeavour, if possible, to make it subservient to his design. His experience and reflection will naturally furnish him with every method of intelligence to discover the state of his different squadrons and divisions. Signals of inquiry and answers, of request and assent, of command and obedience, will be displayed and repeated on this occasion. Tenders and boats will also continually be detached between the admiral and the commanders of the several squadrons or divisions.

As the danger presses on him, he ought to be fortified by resolution and presence of mind; because the whole fleet is committed to his charge, and the conduct of his officers may in a great degree be influenced by his intrepidity and perseverance. In short, his renown or infamy may depend on the fate of the day.

**CHAP. IX. Manoeuvres performed by adverse Fleets when in sight of each other.**

To dispute the weather-gage with the enemy.—When the enemy is to windward, and it is wished to gain the wind with the weather-gage of him, the fleet to leeward should avoid extending itself; the length of the enemy's line, in order to oblige them to edge down upon theirs, if they intend to attack them; which will be a mean, if they still persist in doing so, of losing the advantage of the wind.

It is impossible for a fleet to leeward to gain to windward so long as the enemy keep their wind, unless a change happens in their favour: therefore all that a fleet to leeward can do, must be to wait with patience for such a change; which they will undoubtedly avail themselves of, as well as any mistake or inadvertency the enemy may commit in the mean time. And as long as the fleet to leeward does not extend its line the length of the enemy's, it will be impossible for the latter to bring them to action without running the hazard, by bearing down, of losing the advantage of the wind, which both fleets will be so desirous of preserving. Hence, that an admiral may benefit by the shifts of the wind that frequently happen, he must in a manner force them; which will not appear so extraordinary to officers of Fleet when any experience, who know what winds reign most on the coast, or off the head-lands, where they may expect an enemy; and though an admiral may be sometimes out in his conjecture, he also as often succeeds so happily as to gain the advantage of his enemy. The disposition of projecting head-lands, and the setting of tides or currents, also contribute greatly towards gaining the wind of the enemy.

Again, the fleet to windward ought to keep that to leeward as much as possible always abreast of it; because, by doing so, they will preserve the advantage they have, unless the wind changes much against them. They should force them likewise to keep their wind, unless they think it more prudent not to engage; but when that is the case, they should keep entirely out of fight.

The following observations, with respect to the shifting of the wind, are given by M. Bourde de Villehuet:

1. If the weather fleet be in order of battle, and the wind draw ahead, the lee fleet, if they be ahead and in order of battle, ought to tack off on the same tack as before, in order to tack in succession in the wake of one another, to restore the order of battle; drawing at the same time a great deal to windward. This manoeuvre may even be the means of weathering the enemy, if the wind should shift much; for they have no other method to regain the order of battle, without losing much ground; though they will always lose a great deal with respect to the position of the enemy to leeward.

2. If the lee fleet be astern, and the wind shifts aft while they are on the contrary tack with the enemy in order of sailing on one line, the lee fleet ought to tack or veer altogether, and at the same instant; because this shift of wind will be ahead for all the ships in respect to their tacks then on board, and astern in respect to the order of battle. When the van ship is full on the other tack, as well as all the rest in their former order of battle, they shall haul by the wind, while the rest of the fleet run large on their first line of battle as many points as the wind has shifted aft, to get into her wake successively, and restore the order of battle while approaching the enemy; by which they gain the wind of him, or else double him if the shift has been great; for the only means they have of restoring the line of battle is by the van ship hauling by the wind, and the rest coming into her wake in succession. If the shift of the wind was four points, the fleet to leeward would be obliged still to perform the same manoeuvre, that they might go about, after a certain time, successively to windward of the enemy, who could only in the mean time have tacked all together, to bring their fleet suddenly in a line of battle on the other board.

If, when the wind shifts aft, the lee fleet is astern in order of battle, and the enemy be on the other tack in the order of falling, the leading ship must haul close to the wind immediately, while the other vessels will, in succession, bear away as many points as the wind has shifted, in order to perform the same manoeuvre and restore the line of battle. By observing this mode of manoeuvring, you will approach the enemy, and gain as much to windward of him as possible, or get even the weather-gage of him entirely, if the wind has shifted considerably. The rear ship of the fleet to leeward may immediately keep close to this new wind on the same board, while all the rest of the fleet, after having tacked together and at the same time, will come and place themselves close by the wind in her wake, where they are again to tack successively, in order to follow their rear ship, which is now become the leader, and which may break the enemy's line, or at least gain the wind of him. But, to be able to go through this evolution, you must have nothing to fear from the enemy; for the fleet will be obliged to go about twice before the order of battle can be restored. The Fleet when weather fleet ought to keep their wind as close as possible, in holding the enemy always exactly to leeward of them, by keeping on the same tack as he; and if the wind shifts a little, and becomes favourable to the enemy which is to leeward, the weather ships are then to keep exactly their wind, without caring for the preservation of the line, unless the two fleets be very near one another.

To force the enemy to action.

1. When the enemy has the weather-gage.—When two adverse fleets are in sight of each other, an engagement is almost unavoidable: For since it may be presumed that the fastest sailing ships of the one fleet will fall faster than the windiest sailing vessels of the other fleet, hence the fleet that ward is in pursuit will gain upon the other. The lee fleet, which is willing to bring on an engagement, must therefore keep always on the same tack with the weather fleet; and taking care to keep them so exactly abreast as to prevent the least danger of losing sight of them, and hence be ready to take the advantage of the first favourable shift of wind to make the attack. Night is certainly the time when an alteration of the course may be best attempted. But the lee fleet is to have frigates on the look-out; which, by signals, will continually give notice of the manoeuvre and course of the retreating fleet to windward; which, by these means, is always exposed to be pursued without being able to get off unseen, and must sooner or later be compelled to come to action, unless they can get into some port, or a gale of wind should come to rescue them by dispersing both fleets, and thus furnish the means of retreating in a storm.

2. When the enemy is to leeward.—If the lee fleet keep when he is close to the wind in the order of battle, the fleet to windward is to stand on in the same manner till it is abreast of the enemy, ship to ship, when they are all together, and at the same time, to bear away, and steer exactly so as to bring their respective opponents, in the adverse line, on the same point of the compass with them; observing the principles of chafing, which are to be observed by every chainer to windward. Thus the fleets will be near enough to begin the action, in presenting the bow of each ship to her opponent in the order of falling, which will be easily changed for the line of battle, by all the ships hauling close to the wind together, in the moment which precedes the beginning of the action.

If the fleet to leeward be inclined to engage, it might bring to, to prevent losing time; as, by this manoeuvre, less time will be requisite for the weather fleet to join them; then they will fill as soon as the action begins, because it is more favourable to a lee line to be advancing ahead; since, if a ship be disabled in the weather line (which is obliged to follow with the topsails full), the will infallibly drop, and run foul of the next vessel astern of her, covered with fire and smoke, which may be productive of great disorder.

As the lee fleet fills, and stands on close by the wind, it is necessary that the weather-line should be abreast and parallel to the other before they bear away to come within the requisite distance for action, in order that the van ship of the weather fleet should always keep to windward of the leading ship of the lee line, and be guarded against such a shift of wind as might come ahead; which would not be the case if they were astern of the van ship in the lee fleet; which, as well as the rest of the line, would be able then to double them to windward, by tacking in succession.

Another reason for the weather line being right abreast of the enemy to leeward, and for every ship steering on the same point in approaching her opponent in the leeward line of NAVAL TACTICS.

of battle, is, that the fleets may be placed exactly parallel to each other; or, as the weather line must not be altered, because of the risk of the wind coming more forward, neither fleet when must they be ahead of the line to leeward, in case the wind in flight should come at; for then the lee fleet, keeping close by the wind in the wake of their leading ship, might, by this shift, be as far to windward as the opposing fleet, or even get the weather gage of them. But if the weather fleet keep exactly abreast of the other, they will always be in a situation to preserve their advantage without exposing themselves. It is, notwithstanding, that those ships keeping more away than the line to leeward will find themselves, when come within gun-shot, in a very disagreeable situation with respect to the enemy's ships, which will have it then in their power to rake them as they bear down. This may occasion much disorder among the ships of the weather line, which, for that moment, have it not in their power to fire their whole broadside at the enemy, who has the advantage of beginning the action.

If the lee fleet bear away four points to move their order of battle on the other tack and avoid the action, filling off in succession in the wake of the van ship, the weather line, by bearing away all together eight points, cannot fail, as both fleets are supposed to fall equally, to pass through the middle of their line, and force them to fight with disadvantage, if their extent be double the distance between the two fleets. If the extent of the fleet be less than the above limitation, then the weather fleet will divide the lee fleet more unequally; and if the distance between the fleets be considerable, the weather fleet will not be able to break through the line.

If the lee fleet bear away four points all together, being of equal extent with the fleet to windward, and their distance from each other equal to half the length of one of the lines; should the weather fleet bear away at the same time eight points, they will approach very near the sternmost of the retreating fleet; but they will not have it in their power to cut off any part of that fleet, even with an equality of falling; so that the only advantage gained by this manoeuvre will be an ability of attacking the rear, and bringing it to action.

If the van ship and the rest of the weather fleet had a sufficient velocity to keep the centre ship of the lee line on the same point of bearing; in that case the leading ship may break through the enemy's line about the middle ship of the centre division; for supposing the fleets in order of battle, on the starboard tack, steering east, with the wind at south-south east, being at two leagues distance from each other, both the lines being four leagues in extent; then the lee line bearing away all together four points, will run north-east, while the fleet to windward, bearing away all together eight points, will steer north; the van ship of which will keep the centre division of the lee line on the point of bearing north-west. As he is supposed to be able to continue in this position, it follows, that the van of the weather line must close the centre of the flying line to leeward, after having run four leagues. The time and distance necessary to cut off a retreating fleet may always be known according to the last supposition. Should the lee fleet get upon the other tack and run large, still preserving the order of battle, they will be still sooner closed and forced to action by the weather fleet, who have only to keep away from eight to nine points on the same tack, or run right before the wind.

The weather fleet can always force the lee one to action, whatever movements they make; for, if they run with the wind right aft in order of battle, they cannot, supposing an equality of falling, avoid being closed or broken nearly about the centre by the weather line, which has only to steer two points on each tack nearer the wind than the retreating fleet. So that the rear of the weather fleet having bore away no more than eight points, will be found at the end of a certain time to have approached extremely near the centre of the retreating fleet; and, in a short time more, will be able in flight to bring their rear to action. The weather fleet have yet another advantage; because, as their ships have the wind on the quarter, they sail with greater celerity than those of the lee fleet, which run before the wind. The lee fleet being absolutely determined to fly, has therefore no other expedient left to prolong time but to combat in the order of retreat right before the wind, or on the same course as the pursuing fleet; for other advantages are not to be relied on, if pursued by a victorious foe.

It, from all that has been said, it results that it is not possible for a fleet of equal force to avoid an action, how then must it be with one much inferior? The more numerous has nothing to do but to form a detachment of superior sailors, which will gain upon the lee fleet and begin the action, while some others approach to finish it. Whence we may conclude, that when in presence of too powerful an enemy, it will never be possible to avoid an action if he is determined to come to one.

To avoid coming to Action.

1. When the enemy is to windward.—The lee fleet, which is willing as much as possible to avoid an engagement, ought to form the order of retreat to fly from the enemy if they are in view of him, and run on the same tack as their windward chaser. But if he is yet out of sight, and they have intelligence of his approach by their frigates which are looking out, they may run large from the hostile fleet, without confining themselves to keep the wind exactly astern, unless they be in the order of retreat. There are, however, circumstances when the lee fleet may run with the wind astern, without assuming the order of retreat; as, for example, when they wish to gain time, or resolved to engage the enemy, if they still continue to pursue them. But except on such extraordinary occasions, a fleet should not fly before the enemy without being in the order of retreat, as the rear is then in the best situation to extricate themselves in case of accident.

2. When the enemy is to leeward.—The weather fleet can scarcely ever be forced to engage; because it can always continue on that tack which increases its distance from the enemy, by standing on one tack, while the enemy continues upon the other. If the wind was to remain on the same point of the compass for any considerable space of time, it would be very easy for the fleet to windward to keep in flight of the enemy, without being under any apprehensions of being forced to come to action; but the inconstancy of the wind obliges the most experienced admiral to avoid meeting the enemy when he thinks it improper to engage him.

To double the Enemy, or to bring a Part of his Fleet between two Fires.

1. When the enemy has the weather-gage.—The fleet which attempts to double an enemy ought always to be superior to him in number of ships. The lee fleet ought to have the endeavour to range exactly abreast of, and parallel to, the weather fleet, so that the van or rear may extend beyond the enemy's line, in order to over-reach them, by tacking in succession to double to windward their van or rear, and bring them between two fires. Provided this manoeuvre be properly executed, it will be impossible for the ships in the weather line, thus pressed, to continue long in their ports; for there is no vessel closely attacked by two others of equal force which can long resist being overcome, since it is always in the power of one of them to get into such a position. NAVAL TACTICS.

Manoeuvres performed by adverse fleets when in fight of each other.

As, in the present case, the enemy is supposed to be to windward, either their van or rear may be doubled; but the van may with the greatest facility, because, if they are engaged by the ships abreast of them, those which are advanced ahead will be able, by making all sail, to get on the perpendicular to the direction of the wind with the van of the enemy, and tack in succession to gain the wind of them on the other board, thus keeping them to leeward; and when they are come sufficiently to windward, they are again to go about, in order to keep the two headmost ships of the enemy's line continually under their fire. If there be two or three ships to tack in succession and gain the wind of the enemy, they may edge down on the van of the weather line at pleasure, keeping themselves a little to windward of it; and as that van is already engaged by the other ships abreast on the other side, she must necessarily be soon disabled. If they bear away, they must drop upon the line with which they are engaged to leeward, while the ships to windward still continue to cannonade them. If they attempt going about, in order to attack more closely the ships to windward, they will be raked, while in stays, by their opponents to leeward and to windward, who enslading them with whole broadsides, which they cannot return, must absolutely complete their disorder. If they make fail, in order to frustrate the design of the ships inclined to double, those with which they are engaged abreast to leeward have only to perform the same manoeuvre, and keep them under their fire; while the others, after having harassed them as much as possible, will do their best to perform the same manoeuvre on the succeeding ships.

The captains destined to double the enemy ought to be men of known ability, as well as of approved courage. They should not be ordered upon that service but in weather fit for sailing at the rate of three knots an hour at least; and, for the greater promptitude and certainty of success, none but the best going ships are to be employed.

If any of the ships in the van of the weather-line happen to be disabled in their masts or yards, as will most probably be the case after having been between two fires, they will drop astern and run foul of the next which follows, and these again of their subsequent comrades; at last, disorder will become prevalent, by ships running foul of each other, or manoeuvring to avoid the same accident; so that the order of battle will be broken; while, on the other hand, the line to leeward is preserved with all the advantage possible. The ships which have gained the wind of the enemy will, by continuing their manoeuvre, augment the confusion; engaging, however, no more than they like; and if, by chance or misfortune, they should be crippled, it will not certainly be an easy matter for them to extricate themselves. But as they may, on the other tack, drop astern to windward of the enemy's line, or veer again like him, they must extricate themselves as well as they can, and always advantageously enough; by doubling the van, they are able to throw it into disorder.

If the rear of the lee fleet be extended beyond the sternmost ship of the weather line, they will be obliged, if they want to double the rear of the enemy to windward, to make sail and tack in succession; in which manoeuvre the headmost ship of those destined for this service is to go about first; then, continuing to keep up a brisk cannonade as they come to the wind, they will go and heave about again a little to windward of the rear of the enemy, in order to bring their stern ships between two fires; and should they have the good fortune to oblige them to bear away, they must go on successively from one ship to another, as long as they find they succeed in forcing them to give way. Should disorder take place in the rear of the weather fleet, it will not be near to prejudicial to the enemy as if it had happened in the van; on the contrary, it may turn out to be of some advantage to them. But the vessels combating to windward can easily withdraw from the fight, by backing astern when they find themselves too hard pressed.

2. When an enemy is to leeward.—The ships of the weather-line having extended their van beyond that of the lee-line, are to veer, in order to bring the headmost ships of the enemy's line between two fires. But, let them do as they will, there never can result so much advantage from this manoeuvre as when doubling a fleet to windward, because the disabled ships can always veer with facility. True it is, they cannot fail becoming at the same time the prey of the enemy; for both those which have doubled them, and those with which they are engaged abreast in the weather-line, will always have it in their power jointly to press as close as they think proper.

If the ships which have doubled, the van of the lee fleet, with which they are engaged, be disabled, they will be obliged, as they cannot make sail, to pass along the lee-line; and they cannot escape being totally destroyed if they do not bear away before the wind, to get out of gun-shot; during which manoeuvre they cannot avoid being still in a very disagreeable situation.

Should the sternmost ships of the weather fleet be disabled in doubling the enemy's rear, they have only, if they want to extricate themselves, to drop astern, and let the two fleets advance ahead; and after having refitted themselves, they will reassume their ports.

To avoid being doubled.

1. The enemy being to windward.—For this purpose, it has been proposed to extend the line, by leaving a greater interval between the ships towards the centre than in the van or rear; but in this case the line runs the risk of being divided, unless prevented by a corps de reserve, consisting of a few ships of the line and fire-ships. It has also been proposed as a general rule, that the flag-officers of the lee fleet should oppose themselves to those of the enemy; by which means several of the enemy's ships will be rendered useless in the intervals. This method has, however, its inconveniences; as sometimes the van and rear of each division may be exposed to the fire of two ships at the same time: nor is the last division out of danger of being doubled. In order to remedy these defects, the larger ships ought to be placed in the van and rear of each division; and the whole fleet must regulate its sailing in such a manner that the rear of the enemy may not be after the rear of the last division.

Other methods have been proposed to avoid being doubled; as, that each squadron of the lee fleet should attack its corresponding squadron in the weather fleet; each division of the lee fleet, however, extending its line far enough to prevent the enemy from leaving any ships astern of it, but rather ahead. It has also been proposed, that the lee fleet should extend its line as long as the enemy's line. This method will be advantageous for the lee fleet, provided it is composed of ships of superior force, though fewer in number, than the enemy. In other cases, it is probably the worst method that can be followed by the lee fleet, as it gives the enemy's fleet all the advantage it can derive from exerting its whole force upon the inferior line.

2. When the enemy is to leeward.—The weather fleet is to keep astern of the enemy, so that the van of the weather fleet may be opposed to and attack the enemy's centre: hence... hence the enemy's van will become useless for some time; and if it should attempt to tack and double upon the weather fleet, much time will be lost in performing that evolution; and it also runs the risk of being separated by the fleet in flight of calm which generally happens in the course of a sea-engagement in consequence of the continual discharge of cannon.

A considerable interval might also be left between the centre and van, provided the necessary precautions be taken to prevent the van from being cut off.

To force the enemy's line.

This is a manoeuvre which the lee fleet may execute to gain the advantage of the wind. It is performed by the van ship, if within gun-shot, tacking when she and the centre ship of the weather line are on a perpendicular to the direction of the wind; then all the lee fleet tack in succession, and thus may pass through the enemy's line, or perhaps a little more towards the enemy's van, and go about again in succession to windward of him. But as he will not be long, without doubt, before he performs the same manoeuvre, he will thus be able to regain the wind, if he be not forced to give way before his evolution is finished. The enemy to windward may even cause his van ship to tack, as well as the rest of the van's squadron to follow in succession, as soon as the leading ship of the lee fleet shall have passed through his line and be ready to go about; by which means he will bring them between two fires. This manoeuvre, well executed, might perhaps give no little trouble to the ship attempting to force the line.

This evolution may be performed with advantage, if, by some accident or fault in the manoeuvring, the centre division of the weather-line be separated from their van or rear. For example, when the centre division to windward is encumbered with disabled ships, then the ships of the centre division of the fleet to leeward, having all sails set, are to tack in succession, and force with promptitude through the weather fleet, leaving their own van division to engage that of the enemy on the other tack.

To prevent the line being forced.

When the ships of the fleet go about in succession, in order to force the weather line, the whole line to windward is to tack together, and at the same time to get upon the same board as the lee fleet; then that fleet will neither be able to traverse nor join them. To perform this evolution with advantage, it will be requisite to permit some of the van ships of the lee fleet to pass to windward; then the weather fleet must go all about rapidly, in order to put and keep them between two fires: thus may these ships be destroyed without their own fleet being able to give them any effectual assistance.

It is easy to perceive, from what has been said, that there is little occasion to fear being traversed, as such a manoeuvre may turn out to be more prejudicial than advantageous to those who perform it. Nevertheless, it may and ought to be put in practice when the weather fleet leave such vacancies between their divisions as to allow some ships of the lee fleet to be inactive. In this case, the ships which are without opponents abreast of them are made to tack, with all sails set, in succession, and pass through these intervals in the weather line, in order to double the centre division, or any other part of it, and bring it between two fires.

Chap. X. Of Chasing.

1. In the case of single ships.—It is scarcely necessary to observe, that the ship which gives chase is usually called the chaser, and that which is pursued is called the chase. Unless the chaser be the fastest failing vessel of the two, it is generally supposed that she will seldom or never come up with the chase: but we have heard experienced officers say, that a chafing ship, sailing equally fast, in other circumstances, will gain on her chase; because she has an object to steer by, whereas the chase cannot steer so nicely by the compass. In what follows, however, we shall suppose the chaser to be the fastest failer.

When the chase is to windward, it is evident that as soon as she perceives a strange ship which she takes for an enemy, she will haul her wind, in order to prolong the chase, as otherwise her retreat would be soon cut off. The chaser then stands on also nearly close-hauled until he has the chase on his beam; he then tacks, and stands on close-hauled until the chase is again on his beam, and then retacks. In this manner he continues tacking every time he brings the chase perpendicular to his course on either board; and by manoeuvring in this manner, it is very certain that the chaser will, by the superiority only of his sailing, join the other in the shortest time. For since the chaser tacks always as soon as the chase is perpendicular to his course, she is then at the shortest distance possible on that board; and since the chaser is supposed to be the fastest failer, these shortest distances will decrease every time the chaser tacks. It is therefore of advantage to the chase to keep constantly on the same course, without losing her time in going about; as tacking cannot be so favourable to her as to her adversary, whose sailing is superior. If the chaser should so little understand his profession as to stand on a long way, and tack in the wake of the chase, the best thing she can do is to heave in stays, and pass to windward of him on the other tack, unless she would have a superiority in going large; for if the chaser permits in tacking in the wake of the other ship, it is an unquestionable fact that the chase will be very much prolonged.

The chase being to leeward, the chaser is to steer that course by which he thinks he will gain most upon her. If, after having run a short time, the chase is found to draw more aft, the chaser is then to bear away a little more; but if the chase draws ahead, the pursuer is to haul up a little, and by this means the course may be so regulated that the chase may always bear on the same point of the compass, and then the chaser will get up with the chase in the shortest time possible; for were any other course steered than that which keeps the chase always on the same-point, the chaser would then be either too far ahead, or too far astern; and hence the chase would be prolonged.

The chase ought to run upon that course which will carry her directly from the chaser; and, in general, to consult which is her best trim with respect to the wind, that she may move with the greatest rapidity possible from the ship which pursues her; for some vessels have more advantage in going large than others, some with the wind right aft, and others again are to be found that sail best close-hauled; so that attention should be paid by the officer to the known qualities of his ship, in order to take the most advantageous direction capable to effect a retreat.

Another method has also been proposed for chasing a ship to leeward, that is, by constantly steering directly for the chase: In this case, the track the pursuer describes thro' the water is called the line or curve of pursuit. In order to illustrate this, let A (fig. 54.) represent the pursuer, and B the chase directly to leeward of it, and running with less velocity than the pursuer, in the direction BC, perpendicular to that of the wind. Now, to construct this curve, let BB be the distance run by the chase in any short interval of time; join AB, and make A equal to the distance run by the pursuer in the same time. Again, make C, D, E, F, &c. each equal to BB; join CE, and make IZ equal to AC; join ZD, and make ZF equal to AD; in like manner proceed. ceed until the two distances carried forward meet as at C, and a curve described through the points A, 1, 2, 3, &c., will represent nearly the curve of pursuit; and the less the interval A1 is taken, the more accurate will the curve be formed. In this particular case the length of the distance BC may be found as follows, provided the distance AB and the proportional velocities of the two ships be known.

Let the velocity of the chase be expressed by a fraction, that of the chaser being unity. Multiply the given distance AB by this fraction, and divide the product by the complement of the square of the same fraction, and the quotient will be the distance run by the chaser E. Let AB, the distance of the chase directly to the leeward of the pursuer, be 12 miles, and the velocity of the chase three-fourths of that of the chaser; the distance to be run by the chaser before she is overtaken is required?

Now \( \frac{12 \times \frac{3}{4}}{1 - \left(\frac{3}{4}\right)^2} = \frac{9}{\frac{7}{16}} = 20 \frac{4}{7} \) miles; and since the velocity of the pursuer to that of the chaser is as 4 to 3; hence the distance run by the chaser will be \( 20 \frac{4}{7} \times \frac{4}{3} = 27 \frac{1}{7} \) miles.

As the pursuer alters his course at every point, and since it is presumed his ship will fall better with the wind in one direction, with respect to her course, than in another, her velocity will therefore be different at different points of the course. Thus suppose her to fall faster when the wind is upon the quarter, her velocity will constantly increase until she has attained a certain point, and then it will decrease; hence in real practice this curve will not be precisely the same as above, and of course the measure of BC will differ a little from the preceding determination. The investigation of the foregoing rule is in Simpson's Fluxions, p. 516; and the application of the curve of pursuit in Sir George Pococke's engagement in the East Indies in the year 1758, is given in Clerk's Essay on Naval Tactics, p. 160. It must be confessed, however, that Mr Simpson's investigation, though a pretty specimen of mathematical investigation, proceeds on certain physical assumptions, which are by no means sanctioned by experience. See what has been said of these assumptions and principles in the articles Resistance of Fluids, and Seamanship.

Hitherto we have considered chafing in the case of single ships only; the same rules are also applicable to fleets; we shall, however, subjoin the following remarks with respect to chafing as practised by fleets.

If the whole fleet is to give chase, the admiral will make the proper signal; and then each ship will instantly make possible all the fall possible. If the retreating fleet is not much inferior to the other, a few of the fastest sailing vessels only are to be detached from the victorious fleet, in order to pick up any stragglers or those ships which may have fallen astern; and the remaining part of the fleet will keep in the same line or order of falling as the retreating fleet, so that they may, if possible, force them to action. But if the retreating fleet is much inferior, the admiral of the superior fleet will make the signal for a general chase; and then each ship will immediately crowd all the fall possible after the retreating fleet; or, if the chase be still less numerous, the admiral will detach one of the squadrons of his fleet, by hoisting the proper signal for that purpose, and he will follow with the remainder of the fleet. The squadron that chases, or the cruisers detached from the fleet, should be very careful not to engage too far in the chase for fear of being overpowered; but at the same time to endeavour to satisfy themselves as much as may be in their power with regard to the object of their chase. They must pay great attention to the admiral's signals at all times; and in order to prevent separation, they should collect themselves before night, especially if there be any appearance of thick or stormy weather coming on, and endeavour to join the fleet again. The ships are diligently to observe when the admiral makes the signal to give over chase; that each regarding the admiral's ship as a fixed point, is to work back or make sail into her station, to form the order or line again as expeditiously as the nature of the chase and the distance will permit.

When a fleet is obliged to run from an enemy who is in pursuit, it is usual to draw up the ships in that form or order, called the order of retreat, which has been already described; and the admiral, when hard pursued, without any probability which is of escaping, ought, if practicable, to run his ships ashore, pursued rather than suffer them to be taken afloat, and thereby transfer additional strength to the enemy. In short, nothing should be neglected that may contribute to the preservation of his fleet, or prevent any part of it from falling into the hands of the conqueror.

**Part II. New System of Naval Tactics**

We have now laid before our readers as comprehensive a view as the limits prescribed to such articles will permit of the various evolutions usually practised by fleets in naval war. Though we have transcribed liberally from the most approved writers on the subject, we doubt not but the scientific officer will perceive that we have compiled awkwardly and untidily; but we are not seamen ourselves; and the generosity of British officers will pardon the blunders into which mere literary landmen could hardly avoid falling. The young seaman, who has the noble ambition to excel in his profession, will consult the authors whom we have mentioned in our introduction, in whose works he will find our deficiencies amply supplied; but that the present article may be as complete as we can make it, a view must be given of the system or tactics proposed by the Viscount de Grenier and our countryman Mr Clerk; because, whether these systems shall ever be adopted or not, they are the offspring of ingenuity, and as such merit attention.

**Chap. I. View of De Grenier's Tactics.**

Of all the orders, that of battle is the most important in naval tactics; but the order of battle which was first formed in the last century by the Duke of York, and has been continued in use to the present day, the Viscount de Grenier thinks extremely defective. Various causes may conspire to render the task of breaking it not difficult. Its great extent must make it no easy matter for the admiral to judge the line what orders are proper to be issued to the ships stationed in its extremities; whilst his signals, however distinctly made, are liable to be mistaken by the commanders of those ships. The extremities of a long line are necessarily defenceless, especially if it be to leeward; because, after it is formed, the enemy may throw himself with a superior number on its van or rear, and put that squadron to flight before assistance can be lent to it from the other squadrons. These defects the Viscount de Grenier thinks may be remedied by never presenting to the enemy any part of a fleet without its being flanked; so that were the commander of the adverse fleet to attack those parts which hitherto have been reckoned weakest, he might find himself defeated when he looked for conquest. With this view he proposes a new order of battle; in which the fleet, composed of three divisions, instead of being drawn up in one line as usual, shall be ranged on the three sides of a regular lozenge, formed by the interlacing of the two close-hauled lines. It is obvious that one of the divisions of a fleet ranged in this manner will always be formed in the order of battle; whilst the two others, resting upon the first ship ahead and the last astern of that division, will be formed on the close-hauled line opposite, and will stand on chequerwise on the same tack with the ships which are in the line of battle, serving to cover the headmost and sternmost of those ships, and thereby prevent the enemy from penetrating the line or doubling the rear.

Our author thinks it a great mistake, though very generally fallen into, that the weather gage is of any advantage to a fleet equal in force to its enemy and willing to engage. To him the great art of war at sea appears to consist in drawing or keeping to windward a part of the adverse fleet, and collecting all one's forces against that part; and it is chiefly to effect this purpose that he proposes his new system of tactics. The reader, who would understand his principles, must never lose sight of this evident truth, that each ship of a fleet necessarily occupies at all times the centre of an horizon; which the author divides into two unequal parts, calling the greater the direct and graduated space, and the less the indirect, crooked, and ungraduated space. The reason of these appellations is, that on the greater segment of the horizontal circle there are twenty different points, which may be marked by degrees from one of the close-hauled lines to the other, and to which a ship may fall from the centre by so many direct courses without tacking; whereas to the other twelve points, including that from which the wind blows, she cannot arrive but by steering cross courses, which must necessarily delay her progress.

Suppose now a fleet to leeward, so disposed as that only a part of it can fight with another equally numerous, and ranged to windward in a single line; and let the lee fleet be ranged on the three sides of a lozenge \(a b, c d, e f\) (fig. 55.). The squadron \(a b\), which is most to windward, being drawn up in line of battle, cannot be brought on by an equal number \(A B\) of the weather fleet \(A B, C D, F\). All the rest of that fleet therefore must remain inactive, unless the ships which are not engaged should try to pass to leeward of the fleet \(a b, c d, e f\). But should the ships of the weather fleet, which are placed between \(B\) and \(F\), bear away as they appear in the figure between \(C\) and \(F i\), it is evident that the ships between \(A\) and \(B\), which are fighting to windward, cannot bear away with them. Suppose now that, after the ships between \(C i\) and \(F i\) have passed to leeward, the squadrons \(c d, e f\), which are ranged according to the new system, and have not yet been engaged, should come to windward and join with their friends \(a b\) against that squadron of the enemy \(A B\) which is still to windward and engaged; it seems almost inevitable but that the squadron \(A B\) must be destroyed by so great a superiority, before it could receive any assistance from the ships to leeward between \(C i\) and \(F i\). No doubt those ships would endeavour to succour their friends; but with respect to them, the squadron \(A B\) must be considered as placed in that part of the horizon which our author calls crooked and indirect, and to which they would not be able to repair but by steering alternately the two close-hauled lines; and assistance brought by so tedious a course would come too late to be of essential service. It is from this apparently well supported conclusion that the viscount de Grenier deduces the propriety of his proposed orders of sailing and order of battle.

Of orders of sailing, he thinks, there can be no occasion for more than three; one, when a fleet is to pass a strait; another, when it steers in an open sea, either looking for the first enemy or trying to avoid him; and the third, when it has an extensive cruise to perform, in which the ships should be so disposed as not to be surprised or cut off by the enemy. His first order of sailing differs not from that in common use. It is and must be observed (says he) in any narrow road, whatever may be the occasion of its narrowness, whether rocks or sands.

In the second order of sailing, when the fleet is looking for the enemy or trying to avoid him, the columns \(a b, c d, e f\), are to be formed on three sides of a regular lozenge, and ranged on the two close-hauled lines. The ships of the two divisions \(c d, e f\), sometimes to windward (as in fig. 56.), and sometimes to leeward (as in fig. 57.), of the third division \(a b\), are to be formed on two parallels of one of the close-hauled lines in the wakes of their respective headmost ships; and the third division \(a b\) is to be ranged ahead or astern of the two others on the other close-hauled line, and nevertheless to steer chequerwise the same course as the two divisions \(c d\) and \(e f\). When \(a b\) is to windward of \(c d\) and \(e f\) (fig. 57.), the viscount calls that the primitive windward order of sailing; and when to leeward (fig. 56.), the fleet is in the leeward primitive order of sailing. The position of the three divisions in the windward primitive order of sailing is the same for the order of battle natural; for the order of retreat; and for the order of circumvallation, when the object is to separate from the hostile fleet a part of its ships in order to engage the remainder with more advantage. The position of the three divisions in the leeward primitive order of sailing is also the same for the order of battle inverted; for the order of chasing; and for the order of convoy; so that in no possible case, when looking for the enemy or wishing to avoid him, need the admiral perplex himself with more than these two positions on the one or the other tack, whatever movements he may wish the fleet to make.

In the third order of sailing, the divisions \(c d\) and \(e f\), instead of bearing on the headmost and sternmost ships of the division \(a b\), may be very conveniently placed at considerable distances from that division, without the smallest danger of being surprised by the enemy, provided the ships of each of the divisions keep always their respective positions in the two lines of bearing. For if we suppose the three divisions to be in such positions that \(a b\) and \(e f\) are at the distance of six leagues from each other (fig. 58.), and that the two divisions \(c d\) and \(e f\) rest on the extremities of the base of the triangle \(STV\), while the centre ship of the division \(a b\) rests on its summit \(T\); none of the divisions could be cut off by an enemy, however formidable, seen from its centre ship at the distance of six leagues. For if, upon the proper signal being thrown out, the division \(a b\) should steer from \(T\) towards \(X\), on the course opposite to the close-hauled line it steered before, and the two divisions \(c d\) and \(e f\) steer from \(V\) and \(S\) towards \(X\) likewise; it is plain that each of these three divisions would have only three leagues to run in order to join the other two in the windward primitive order of sailing, which is the same with the order of battle natural; whilst the enemy, which was first perceived at the distance of six leagues, must necessarily run nine before he could come up with the nearest of these squadrons. And if frigates were placed ahead, and in the intervals between the divisions, at the points \(y y y\) to windward and leeward of the fleet, the enemy might be seen at a still greater distance, and the danger of surprise be still so much less. We have said, that the position of the three divisions in the primitive orders of sailing is the same with our author's proposed order of battle; but there is this difference between them, that in the order of battle only the ships of one of the three divisions stand in the wakes one of another, and that those of the two other divisions are ranged on two parallel lines, and fleer chequerwise. So that if it be wanted to change a fleet from the windward primitive order of sailing to this new order of battle on the other tack, the movement will be infinitely quicker than those which, in former known tactics, are commonly prescribed, to pass from all the orders of sailing either in one line, or on the obtuse angle of chafing or retreating, or in three or six divisions, to the usual order of battle. For it will be sufficient for the ships of the three divisions, ranged in the windward primitive order of sailing, to heave in stays all together, and get on the other tack in the opposite line of bearing, and they will instantly find themselves in this new proposed order of battle (fig. 59.) and should the fleet be in the leeward primitive order of sailing, it would be sufficient for the ships of the three divisions all together to haul their wind on the same tack as they fleer, and they would find themselves in order of battle (fig. 60).

When the two columns c d, e f, are to leeward of the third division a b, ranged in order of battle, our author calls that the order of battle natural; and when c d and e f are to windward of a b, the fleet is in the order of battle inverted. The former of these orders is calculated for a fleet combating to leeward, and the latter for a fleet which must combat to windward.

That we may form some notion of the advantages which our author expects from drawing up a fleet for battle in the form of a lozenge, let us suppose the line A B, C D, E F (fig. 61.) to represent the fleet of an enemy to windward in the ordinary order of battle on the clove-hauled line of bearing, and on the starboard tack. Then the leeward line a b will represent one of the divisions, in order of battle on the starboard tack, of the fleet ranged according to the new natural order, which the enemy wishes to attack, and to which he believes himself superior, because that division offers a front much inferior to his own. The two lines c d, e f, will represent the two other divisions standing on chequerwise on the same tack as the line of battle, and formed on the opposite clove-hauled line. On this supposition, if the divisions A B, E F, of the hostile fleet, which have it not in their power to attack the ships of the line a b, wish to fall on the headmost ship a or the sternmost b of that line, they will be obliged to bear away in order to attack the two ships a and b. To prevent this, each of the divisions c d, e f, of the fleet ranged according to the new order, should make the following evolutions, according to their respective situations and to the manoeuvres of the enemy.

1st. The ships of the division a b are to slacken as much as possible their headway, and form a very close line, till the enemy makes a movement to attack the headmost or sternmost ship of that division.

2ndly, The ships of the division c d are to make sail till they come under the second or third ship of the rear of the line of battle a b, when they will take the same sail as the ships of that division, to preserve that position until the hostile ships make their evolution to attack the rear ships of that division. In this situation the ships of the division c d will be able to observe the manoeuvres of the enemy, in order to change tack and form themselves in order of battle on the opposite board as soon as the hostile ships shall have, after their bearing away, run over a certain space; because the ships of the division c d, fleering afterwards clove-hauled in the wake of the sternmost ship of the division a b, will be able to cover the rear ships of that division, and get the weather-gage of the hostile divisions which are bearing away; rake their ships; run alongside of them; double their rear-guard, and put it between two fires, if those hostile ships are following in the wake of each other (c) divide it if they bear away chequerwise, or gain to windward, and put between two fires the enemy's division C D, while it is engaged with the division a b.

3dly, The ships of the division e f may abandon their post and run chequerwise under a press of sail, in the same course and in the same order they were formed, as soon as they perceive that the enemy falls ahead of the division a b; in order that if the division A B of that enemy makes any manoeuvre to bear away and fall on the division e f, or on the van of the division a b, they may, by going about, fleer in order of battle clove-hauled on the opposite line of bearing, and cover the headmost ship of the division a b, double the hostile division C D ahead, or divide the other hostile division A B, which is running chequerwise on the opposite tack.

The two divisions c d, e f, might again manoeuvre another way, in case the ships of the enemy were ranged in one enemy is in single line, not well formed, or should be in disorder and leave too great a distance between them while they are en-formed, gaged very close with the division a b (fig. 62).

1st. By putting about the ships of the division e f, and likewise the ship a headmost of the division a b. 2dly, By making at the same time the ships of the division c d tack, and likewise the ship b of the division a b, to keep by the wind on the opposite clove-hauled line. 3dly, By making all the ships of the division a b (which stood between the headmost a and the sternmost b) bear away four points at the same time, and making them also take the same tack as the ships of the other two divisions when they are on the beam of the sternmost ships of those two divisions; because, in that position, the ships of the two divisions c d, e f, getting to windward on two parallels in order of battle, in the wake of the two headmost a and b, might put between two fires a part of the enemy's ships, which then would be obliged to take the same tack as these two divisions, because the ships of the division a b (which are on the same tack as those two divisions) might prevent the ships of the enemy fleering the course opposite to that tack.

From this succinct exposition it may be observed, that, in the first supposition, the way of thus disposing the forces of a fleet is so much the more suitable to the defence of the headmost and sternmost ships of a line of battle, as the ships of the division c d, being covered by that line of battle, are able to manoeuvre without any one ship of that division being exposed to the fire of the enemy; that the division e f, the headmost ship of which is e, always presents the side to the

(c) If the hostile ships which are not engaged with any of those of the division a b bear away in succession in the wake of their headmost, in order to pass to leeward of the division a b, and to put it between two fires; then the ships of the division e f must necessarily take the weather-gage of them, since the headmost of that division e f is by her very situation already to windward of the headmost of the adverse ships which are bearing away, and she has the opportunity to come as close as possible to the sternmost ship b of the line of battle a b. the enemy, without any one ship of that division being exposed to receive the fire of the enemy either ahead or astern, because they are not to range in a line of battle unless the enemy runs large or before the wind; and that, in the second supposition, the only ships which are liable to be raked astern, while they change tack, are the headmost and sternmost of the division in line of battle which cover the ships of the other two divisions.

As it is of the utmost advantage to know, at first sight of the enemy, whether it be to windward or leeward of the fleet ranged lozenge-like, on what tack, and on what side the fleet must be formed, in order to defend itself or attack the enemy with advantage, it is to be observed, that in both the windward and leeward primitive orders of failing the direction of the wind always traverses both the weathermost and leewardmost ships of the fleet (figs. 57 and 56); that this leewardmost ship is always placed in the centre of an horizon, which is to be considered as the horizon of the whole fleet; and that it is from that ship you are to judge, by means of the rules which are known and practised in such cases, whether the lozenge-like fleet be to windward or to leeward of that of the enemy.

If you want to know, at sight of the enemy, seen either to windward or to leeward, on what side the line of battle is to be formed in order to be able to fend one of the divisions on that side of the lozenge where there is none, it is the position of the enemy, with respect to the direction of the wind, which is to determine it; because, if the enemy is to windward of the fleet ranged in the windward primitive order of failing, and if it bears down on that fleet, with the wind large or right aft, it belongs to its weathermost ship to observe what follows. If that ship, by setting the enemy, finds him to starboard of the direction of the wind, the division which is starboard of that direction of the wind is to take the starboard tack, and range in order of battle before the enemy is arrived within gunshot: if, on the contrary, the above-mentioned ship finds the enemy to larboard, it belongs to the larboard division to assume the order of battle, and to take that tack, before the enemy can come to action. The old rule for choosing the proper tack is to be observed by a fleet in the leeward primitive order of failing; observing, that it is the business of that fleet's leewardmost ship to determine it; and the point of the horizon which is opposite to that whence the wind blows, is the point towards which the observer is to be turned to judge on what side, whether starboard or larboard, the line of battle is to be formed; because, in that position, the starboard side must always be on his right hand and the larboard on his left.

By following this general rule, the line of battle will never be exposed to be too much lengthened either to windward or to leeward, in order to oppose all the ships of the adverse fleet formed in one single line, nor even to be surprised in disorder by that fleet while you are forming in orders of battle natural or inverted.

Our author's orders of chasing, of retreat, and of convoy, are very easily formed. We have already said what they are; and the seaman, or even the landman, who has any tolerable conception of his orders of sailing and of battle, will not stand in need of any farther description of them. It must, however, be observed, that in the order of chasing, the fleet in the lozenge-like position presents the obtuse angle of chasing, as when ranged according to the ordinary tactics; with this difference, that, in order to form themselves in order of battle, it is enough that, in this lozenge-like position, the ships of the second division should all keep the wind on the same board they were standing on, because they would afterwards find themselves in a line in the wake one of another; but, according to the usual tactics, the ships have a long space to run before they can execute the same evolution.

We shall conclude this short view of the Viscount de Grenier's tactics, with his directions for the most advantageous placing of the admiral's ship, the frigates and transports, belonging to a lozenge-like fleet, whether it be ranged in the order of failing or of battle, &c.

In the order of failing, the admiral A is to be placed, are ahead of the fleet, at a short distance from the headmost of the second division, and in the direction of the wind with the headmost of the first division (fig. 63.). Two of the frigates FF are to observe the same rule and the same position, with respect to the van ship of the third division and the sternmost of the first. In the order of battle, on the contrary, the admiral is to be in the centre of the lozenge, and two of the frigates on the fourth side of the lozenge, (fig. 64.). As for the transports and store-ships, when there are any, their station is to be in one line on the side opposite to that of the enemy, when ranged in order of battle; and, if in order of failing or convoy, they may occupy the space circumscribed by the lozenge. In any other circumstances these ships are to occupy the different stations appointed for them, that they may distinguish the signals and execute the commands of the admiral. Lastly, when the fleet shall pass from the order of battle to any other order whatever, or from any order to the order of battle, the admiral's ship is to bring to, and not to take any of the positions above mentioned till after the complete execution of the movement.

**Chap. II. View of Mr Clerk's Tactics.**

Whether the Viscount de Grenier's order of battle and of failing would be attended with all the advantages which he hopes from them, experienced seamen alone can judge; but we are now to introduce to our readers part of a system which has met with very great approbation from some of the ablest officers in the British navy, and which to us appears to be founded on principles self-evident. Mr Clerk, in the introduction to his Essay, informs us, that upon considering the great superiority displayed in the three last wars by the British seamen over their enemies, when engaged in single ships, and comparing it with the very little that, previous to Lord Rodney's glorious action, they had achieved when engaged in fleets drawn up in line of battle, he was led to conclude, that there must be something wrong in our mode of making the attack. He turned his thoughts to the subject, and in 1790 published part of a large work, comprehending, 1. A Theory of Attack from Windward; 2. A Theory of Attack from Leeward; and, 3. An Historical Sketch of Naval Tactics. We think it not much to the honour of our countrymen, that he has not yet had encouragement to publish more than the first part; but in hopes of exciting their curiosity, we shall lay before them a distinct view of that part, beginning, as he begins, with

**Observations on the Present Method of Bringing Ships to Action.**

It has often, if not generally, been the practice, in the case of single ships, as well as in that of fleets, for the weather ship or fleet, when it is wished to bring the other to action, to steer directly down upon that ship or fleet, with the intention of completely disabling it, before it can attain its wished for station. For each ship in the lee line can use all the guns upon one side; whereas the ships in the weather-line, View of ther-line, bearing directly down, have it only in their power to use their bow-chains. This method of attack appears, therefore, to be the worst possible for the weather-fleet, and the most advantageous for the lee fleet. For suppose a single ship of 80 guns to windward at B (fig. 65.), discovering an enemy's ship of equal force to leeward at F, to bear directly down upon her endwife, the receiving ship F, by lying to as in fig. 66. would present a broadside of 42 heavy guns bearing upon B during a course of two miles, in which every shot might take effect; while B, in this position, would have it in her power to bring only the two light guns of her forecastle or bow-chains to bear on F; a disadvantage greatly exceeding twenty to one. Besides, the receiving ship F, by lying broadside to, will have all her masts and rigging more open, and consequently will allow shot to pass with less effect than the ship B, which, coming endwise, is liable to be raked by every shot from stem to stern. The consequence of which must be, that B would be disabled in her rigging, &c. long before she could arrive at a proper position for annoying F; and when the had attained that position, F, by being entire in her rigging, would have it in her power to fight in any position, or to make off at pleasure.

The method then is, B having the wind, should run down astern, as per dotted line, and getting into the course, or near the wake of F, or a position that will bring her parallel to the course of F, at a proper distance, she should then run up close alongside of F, upon equal terms, as in fig. 67; or otherwise, on shooting ahead, she may veer, and run down on the weather-bow of F, as in fig. 68. till the small force F to bear away to leeward, keeping close by F on equal terms; but during the course, in both cases, carefully watching that F may not have it in her power to bring her broadside to bear upon B without retaliation.

It having been often said that the French have made it a rule to throw the whole effect of their shot more particularly into the rigging of their enemy, and that the British, on the other hand, have been as attentive to point the force of their fire against the hull of the ship; it may be proper here to state the two cases, and compare the effect.

Let us suppose a ship of 80 guns wishing to avoid the effects of a close engagement, but at the same time lying as at F (fig. 63.), intending to receive, with every advantage, an enemy B of equal force, coming down with an intention to fight her; and let us suppose that F, by aiming her fire at the rigging of B, shall have carried away any of the principal stays, eight or ten windward throats, or a foretopmast, or any other rigging, though of much less consequence, but, at the same time, without having wounded a single man of the ship B; and suppose a second ship, comfort to F, receiving such another ship as B, and by firing at her hull only, shall, without other damage, have killed 30 or 40 of her men: In this critical juncture, when F and her consort are desirous of avoiding a close engagement, it is evident that the ship at B, which has lost part of her rigging, is more completely disabled from closing with them than the other ship, whose rigging is entire, though she may have lost 100 of her men.

It has been often said, that some particular ship has been exposed in battle to the cannonade of three, four, or even five ships, all extended in the enemy's line, and all bearing upon her at one and the same time; but this can never have been the case, but when the ship so exposed was at a very great distance. Let I, H, F, H, I, (fig. 70.) represent five ships extended in line of battle ahead at the distance of one cable's length, or 240 yards, from each other; let the length of each ship be 40 yards, so that the whole space between head and head of any two adjacent ships is 280 yards; and let the perpendicular line FK, proceeding right out from the beam of the middle ship F, to the distance of six cables' length or 1440 yards, be divided into six equal parts: It is evident, from inspection, that a ship stationed at the point E of the line FK, 720 yards distant, cannot for any length of time be exposed to the fire of more than the centre ship F of the fleet I, H, F, H, I. For supposing the ships H, K, ahead and aft of F, to be able to bring their broadsides to bear on E (a supposition which, if the line be close-hauled, cannot be made of the headmost of those ships), it is evident, that by putting themselves in positions proper for that purpose, the ships H, H, will not only disorder their own line, but also leave, the one her head, and the other her stern, exposed to a raking fire from their opposites B, B, in the enemy's line.

But if the opponent ship cannot well be exposed to the fire of the two ships H, H, at the point E, she must be still kept exposed at the point C, 480 yards distant; and it will be almost impossible for the ships H, H, to touch her at the point G, 240 yards, or one cable's length, distant.

But one cable's length astern is too small an allowance for accidents that may happen by the ships I, H, F, I, I, extended in line of battle ahead. Therefore let us suppose the three ships, which are said to be at once upon a single opponent, to be stationed at I, F, I, at the distance of two cables' length or 480 yards from each other. Then it is evident that the opponent ship cannot now be more exposed at the point K, at the distance of 1440 yards, than she was, on the former supposition, at the point E, 720 yards distant; and if we suppose the line of battle to be formed at one and an half cable's length astern, she must be at L, distant 1280 yards, before she can be annoyed even to this degree by the three hostile ships at once. Hence we may fairly conclude, that if one ship has any time been exposed at once to the fire of five, four, or even three ships of the enemy's line, such ship must have been at a very great distance, and in no great danger.

Having finished the above observations, our author proceeds to the principles necessary to be known for enabling us to judge of the different modes of bringing great fleets into action. For this purpose he supposes a fleet of 10, 20, or more ships, of 80 guns each, extended in line of battle to leeward, and lying to at F (fig. 71.), with the intention of avoiding an attack; whilst another fleet at B, of equal number and force of ships, also extended in line of battle, three or four miles to windward, is disposed of making an attack, and coming to close action on equal terms with the fleet F. In this disposition of the two fleets, should that to windward run down headlong ship for ship on its opponent, as in figs. 66. and 69., it is evident, from what has been said in the beginning of this chapter, that each individual ship of the weather fleet might be completely disabled before it could possibly come to close action with the fleet to leeward. But let it be supposed that the commander of the weather fleet B, though his ships have been much disabled in their rigging during their course a a a from windward (fig. 72.), has made them bring to at a great distance, from whence he can hurt F; is it to be expected that F, whose desire has always been to avoid a close engagement, and who has already disabled the ships of B, will patiently lie still, or wait until B shall have time to disable him in his turn? No surely. While enveloped in his own smoke, as well as that of his enemy, he will bear away unhurt to a new station G, and there remain out of the reach of B's cannon-shot, who must repair his rigging before he can attempt a second attack.

Again, suppose that B, in place of going headlong and endwise down, were to run down in an angular course, or looking View of luffing as it has been called; it is evident from fig. 73, that Mr. Clerk's should any ship in this angular line come to be crippled, her way being stopped, might of consequence occasion a confusion amongst the ships next astern to her, some running to leeward and others to windward of the disabled ship; and thus the time be lost for affording the necessary support to the ships ahead, and now so far separated from their companions. Should it be said, that a stoppage of one ship ahead will not necessarily produce a stoppage of every ship astern, because they may go to leeward of the disabled ship; we answer, that the ships ahead in the van A (fig. 74, n° 1.) may be now engaged, and of consequence not having much headway, may be laid to be stationary; therefore every ship astern, if she shall attempt to bear down, as at D, D', from being confined to a determined course, must be brought into the position of being raked when coming down before the wind, as in figs. 76. and 69., and consequently of being completely disabled long before she can get close enough alongside of the enemy.

Again, the headmost ships, or van of B, having attained their station at A, that is, abreast of the van of F (fig. 74, n° 1.), and having begun the cannonade, may we not suppose that F, whose conduct or desire has always been to save his ships, has instructed the commanders of those in the van of his fleet to withdraw from danger as soon as they begin to feel the effects of a cannonade? and if so, may not those ships, as soon as they have thrown in their fire upon the van of B, bear away in succession as at H, followed indeed by the whole ships of F's fleet, which, having poured in their fire upon the van of B, may form a new line of battle two or three miles to leeward at II (fig. 74, n° 2.), and there be in readiness to receive a second attack, if B shall be so imprudent as to attempt it? And is it not farther evident, that if any one or more ships of the squadron of F shall be crippled, they will have it in their power to quit their station, being covered with smoke, at any time, and to fall to leeward as at G, where they will be in safety?

In order to illustrate this still farther, let B (fig. 75.) represent a fleet putting before the wind, each ship with an intent, when brought to at a determined distance at A, to take up her particular antagonist in the line of the enemy F to leeward; and, for argument's sake, let F be supposed at rest, without any motion ahead. There seems to be no difficulty in conceiving, that while the alternate ships of F's line, under cover of the smoke, withdraw from battle to GGG, the intermediate ships left behind them in the line will be sufficient to amuse even the whole of B's fleet, till the ships G shall form a new line HII as a support from the leeward. In such case B, after being disabled, as he must be, and not having foreseen the manoeuvre, will neither be able to prevent the intermediate ships with which he is engaged from bearing away to join their friends, nor, were he able, would it be advisable to follow them; for the same manoeuvre with equal success can again and again be repeated.

In order to show the relative motion of both fleets, let F (fig. 76.) be a fleet consisting of twelve ships, drawn up in line of battle, at one cable's length or 120 fathoms astern; and let the length of each ship from the end of the jibboom to the stern be 36½ fathoms; the whole fleet will then occupy a space of two English miles; also, let its rate of sailing be four knots an hour in the direction FG, so that in the space of an hour it may have moved from F to G four miles distant from its former position.

Let B be the opponent fleet, consisting also of twelve ships, and four miles to windward; and let the point A be 440 yards, or one quarter of a mile, right to windward of the point G. Then if B, by bearing away in the direction BA, shall arrive at the point A at the same instant that F, the fleet to leeward, has arrived at the point G, the motion of the fleet B will have been at the rate of 5½ miles nearly per hour; and the angle contained between the direction of its line of bearing and present course 43° 9', or nearly 4 points. For in the right-angled triangle ABM are given BM = 4 miles, and AM = 3½ miles. Now BM = 4 m.; AM = 3½ m.; R : tan. ABM = 43° 9', and R : sec. ABM = 43° 9' : BM = 4 m.; A = 83° 83 m.

Again, if F, as in fig. 77., by carrying more sail, shall move at the rate of six miles an hour, that is, from F to G; then B, having his course made thereby the more slanting, will have just to much the greater difficulty of keeping his ships in line abreast while coming down to the attack; for the leading ship meeting with no obstruction in her course, will push on; whereas every accident of obstruction accumulating, as it happens to each ship progressively, the rear, being affected in the greatest degree, will for that reason be left the farther astern. But, from the very form of this slanting course, every ship astern will be apt to get into the wake of the ship ahead. Therefore the whole fleet of B, van and rear, will not arrive in the same time at the line AD, so as to be in a perfect line abreast, and parallel with the fleet to leeward; but will have assumed the luffing form, as represented at the points M, N, and O, in the different parts of the course. In this case, the distance run by the van of B, from B to A, is 7,075 miles, or 7 miles and 13½ yards, and the angle contained between the line of bearing and the distance BA is 32° 0'.

And again, as in fig. 78., if the fleet to leeward shall lie up one point higher, as FG, then the rears of the two fleets will thereby be removed at a much greater distance, and the van A of consequence must be sooner up with the enemy's van, and evidently too much the farther from support; while F, by bringing up his ships in succession, will have it in his power to disable the van of A, and will afterwards bear away, as at H, unhurt and at pleasure; while B, at this time, by the supposition, being crippled, or having his rear D obstructed, and at a distance, will be unable to prevent him. And in all the three cases, it is evident that the fleet B, so soon as he shall approach within reach of gun-shot, must be exposed to the fire of F's whole line; for he will be abreast of B continually in every part of his course. But the difficulty of bringing the rear of the windward fleet to action will still be more increased, if the headmost ships of the fleet to leeward, in place of keeping their wind, shall bear away occasionally as at ML. All which being admitted, the difficulty of bringing adverse fleets to close engagement may be accounted for, without being obliged to have recourse to that supposed inferiority in point of sailing, imputed to our ships, compared to those of the French enemy.

Hence it appears, that a fleet B to windward, by extending its line of battle, with a design to stop and attack a whole line of enemy's ships to leeward, must do it at a great disadvantage, and without hope of success; for the receiving fleet F to leeward unquestionably will have the four following advantages over him: 1. The superiority of a fire above 20 to 1 over the fleet B, while coming down to attack. 2. That when the ships of B are brought to at their respective station, if it blows hard, the shot from F, by the lying along of the ships, will be thrown up into the air, and will have an effect at a much greater distance; whereas, on the other hand, the shot from B, from the same cause, will be thrown into the water, and the effect lost. 3. That F will have the power of directing and applying at pleasure the fire of his whole line against the van of B, who is now unable View of Mr Clerk's Tactics.

Unable to prevent it, his ships being disabled, separated, and therefore unsupported. 4. That F will also have a greater facility of withdrawing from battle the whole or any one of the disabled ships of his line.

If then, after a proper examination of the late (n) sea-engagements or encounters, it shall be found that the French admirals have never once shown a willingness to risk the making of the attack, but invariably have made choice of, and earnestly courted, a leeward position; if invariably, upon seeing the British fleet disabled, they have made sail, and demolished the van in passing; if invariably, upon feeling the effect of the British fire, they have withdrawn at pleasure—either a part or the whole of their fleet, and have formed a new line of battle to leeward; if the French repeatedly have done this upon every occasion—and, on the other hand, if it shall be found that the British, from an irresistible desire of making the attack, as constantly and uniformly have courted the windward position; if, uniformly and repeatedly, they have had their ships to disabled and separated, by making the attack, that they have not once been able to bring them to close with, to follow up, or even to detain one ship of the enemy for a moment—shall we not have reason to believe, that the French have adopted and put into execution some system which, if the British have discovered, they have not yet profited by the discovery?

Our author therefore, instead of the usual mode of attack, which, by being made principally on the van, seems to be the result of a groundless expectation of being able to take, destroy, or disable the whole of the enemy's line, proposes

A new mode of Attack from the Windward upon the Rear of the Enemy.

Suppose, says he, a fleet of ten, twenty, or more ships, mode of extended in line of battle at F (fig. 79.), endeavouring to tack upon the rear of the enemy, der an easy sail, with the intention of receiving the usual attack from another fleet of equal number, three or four miles to windward at B, failing in any form, but let it be in three lines or divisions; it is required by what method shall B make the attack on F with advantage?

The improbability, or rather impossibility, of attacking and carrying the enemy's whole line of ships, having been demonstrated by every action which has been fought at sea, the next consideration will be, how many ships may be attacked and carried with advantage? Let it be supposed that the three sternmost ships only, and not exceeding the fourth, are possible to be carried; let a sufficient strength A be sent down to force an attack upon these three ships, disposed and supported according to the judgment of the admiral, while in the mean time he keeps to windward with the rest of his fleet, formed into such divisions as may best enable him to attend to the motions of the enemy and the effect of his attack; being himself so far disengaged from action, as to be able to make his observations, and give his orders, with some degree of tranquillity.

By placing the fleet B in such divisions as represented in the figure, when the attacking squadron comes up with the rear of the enemy, the whole will be so disposed, and so connected together, as to be able to give the support and attention that may be required to any ship, or any part of the fleet, and in preference to a long extended line of six or seven miles in length, where it must be impracticable to give the necessary support to such ships as may be disabled. The ships of the fleet F may, in general, be better sailors than the ships of the fleet B; but it is not conceivable but that the swiftest ships of B must come up alongside of the stern-attack armament and dulled sailing ships of the enemy F; while, at the same time, F, by attempting to outflank B, must be thrown into the disorder of a downright flight: Therefore, of his more course, it must be admitted, that if the enemy F continues particular-going off in line of battle, and endeavouring to avoid a close engagement, it will be impossible to prevent the fleet making the attack from getting into the position B A.

But by this position, it is evident that the three ships at I of the fleet F will be in the power of the admiral of B; for, by keeping to many ships to windward, he will be enabled to fend down fresh ships from time to time, either for the support, or to supply the station, of any of those that may be disabled in making the attack, while it may be imagined that the three ships in question, by being disabled, or being deprived of the wind now taken out of their sails by the ships to windward, will be prevented from following their friends. Hence the enemy ahead must either abandon his three sternmost ships, or he must double back to support them; which must be done either by tacking or veering. But let it be first examined what is naturally to be done by tacking; and for the greater satisfaction, let every possible care that can happen be examined separately.

First, let us suppose that the enemy at F, fig. 8c., has continued to protract his course in line of battle upon the same tack, and that the headmost ship H, with the three next astern of her, have tacked to windward, and that the three sternmost ships intend to tack the same way, but in most ships succession; is it not evident that F has then left his three sternmost ships at I in the power of the ships at A; that he must also leave exposed his fourth and fifth ship G to another attack from another division of B at C, which will also be on equal terms as with his three sternmost at I; and lastly, if he prosecutes his intention of supporting his three ships, he will be obliged to begin a disadvantageous attack upon the admiral, with the main body of the fleet lying ready to receive him? The consequence of all which must be, that he will not only lose his three sternmost ships, but in all probability the fourth and fifth also, as at G; and will be forced to begin an attack, and close and mix ship with ship on equal terms; a situation which he at all times, with the greatest anxiety, hath avoided, and which B with equal anxiety has always courted.

Again, suppose that his three sternmost ships have been attacked, and that he has ordered his fleet to tack all at one time, as in fig. 81. The consequences will then be, that this movement, having required some time and some length of course, will have produced a considerable distance between his main body and his three ships; or, in other words, that these three ships have been deserted; for it will not be in their power to tack with the rest of their friends. He must also, in bringing his ships heads round, expose the ships nearest his enemy to be raked by a dreadful cannonade; besides running the risk of having his fleet thrown into a general disorder, by many of his ships missing stays, veering, and running to leeward. Lastly, upon a supposition that his ships have all tacked, and none of them missed stays, till he

(d) This was written during the American war, and before Lord Rodney's decisive victory on the 12th of April 1782. That action, as well as the still more brilliant one of Lord Howe on the 1st of June 1794, we have heard the author distinguish from those battles which, with great propriety, he calls sea-encounters, and do ample justice to the scientific manoeuvres of both the noble admirals. Having shown the consequences of an attempt to succour the three sternmost ships by tacking, let us also examine what may be expected from an attempt to do it by veering the fleet. Suppose the two fleets in the same position as in fig. 79, that is, the main body of the enemy extended in line of battle to leeward, his three sternmost ships entangled with the fleet B, whose admiral, with the main body, keeps to windward to observe, with a rigid attention, the motions of the enemy. At the same time suppose that the admiral F has ordered his sternmost ship G to veer (fig. 82.), and afterwards the whole line; and that he is now running upon a contrary tack to leeward, as at H, wishing to support or bring off his three ships. From inspection, it will be evident that this attempt may be more dangerous than the attempt to windward; for it will expose a number of his ships to a raking fire while in the act of veering; and the squadron, by getting so far to leeward, will be unable to give the proper support to the three ships. It will open a gap for the fleet of B (who will immediately veer also and follow him) to break in, as at A, and cut off the three ships without hope of recovery. And if F shall till persist in the endeavour to recover his three ships, he will be obliged to begin the attack under all the usual disadvantages.

Again, upon another supposition, that the headmost ship of the enemy H (fig. 83.), with the four or five next astern, have wore, and are running upon a contrary tack, wishing, as before, to support or bring off the three ships, the rest of the fleet intending to veer also, and follow in succession; it is evident that this movement, being more unfeamlike, will be worse than the last: It will expose an additional number of ships, particularly the last two, as at G; and will at the same time make an opening for the main body of B's fleet to fall in and cut off the three ships, as in the former case.

Again, should the enemy F veer and bear away with his whole ships at one and the same time, it is evident that this movement must have the consequence of a downright flight, with the certainty of losing the three ships.

From what has been said, it will appear, that a fleet B, keeping connected in a body to windward, may come up with and entangle the three sternmost ships of an enemy F, extended in line of battle and going off to leeward, and at the same time be able to overawe the remaining main body of their fleet; and that, having forced the position, the whole consequences, as already described, must follow; that is, F must submit to the loss of three ships.

What has been hitherto said proceeds upon a supposition that the fleet F has kept on his course till the fleet B has come up with his rear. Let it then be examined what other attempts the enemy F can make to avoid coming to close engagement upon equal terms.

Suppose a fleet of ships of the enemy standing on the larboard tack to leeward, and going off as before at F, and a fleet of ships in a collected state or position to windward, as at B (fig. 79.) and suppose that the enemy F, perceiving the fleet B pointing an attack against his rear, in place of keeping on his course upon the same tack, should veer, and putting endeavours to pass on contrary tacks to leeward (for it will not be admitted that he can get to windward); what will then be the effect?

Is it not evident, that the headmost ships of F must be forced to leeward by the fleet B obstructing his line of direction, or the line of his course? that they must be forced to begin an attack at any distance B may choose? that they may receive such damage as will stop their way? that their way being stopped, will of course be an obstruction to the next astern; or that these subsequent ships, to prevent this stop, must bear away to leeward of their crippled ships, as at G (fig. 81.), which will not only prevent these ships from damaging the headmost ships of B, but will give time and opportunity to B to bring down his windward ships to fall in either ahead or astern, that is, to the right or left of his headmost ships A, and oppose ship for ship of the enemy upon equal terms? But should none of the headmost ships of the squadron F be crippled, that is, should F pass B without reach of cannon-shot, which undoubtedly he will do if he can; still, while bearing away, he may be forced to suffer a distant cannonade, ship with ship on equal terms, whether he veers and gets back upon his former tack, as at G in fig. 85., or continues to run before the wind, as at P in fig. 86. But if F persists to pass on a contrary tack to leeward, and without reach of cannon-shot, it is evident, whether he put right before the wind, or run off ship by ship as he best can, that B must at some time or other come up with his rear.

So far the attack has proceeded with the wind fixed in one and the same quarter. To make the propriety of this change of wind apparent, it will be necessary to inquire what might be the effect produced by a change of wind, should this take place during the action? For this purpose, let the opponent fleets be placed in some one of the preceding positions, representing the attack upon the three sternmost ships of the enemy, as in fig. 87.; in which the fleet desirous of making the attack is represented in four divisions, as at B, B, B, A, and F the fleet desirous of avoiding the attack, at the hazard of abandoning his three sternmost ships at G.

In the commencement of the attack, let us suppose the wind to be N. and the ships going two points free on the larboard tack, or standing E.; and soon after the commencement let the wind be supposed to veer round to the W.; then it is evident, by the disposition of the two fleets, that the fleet F, by such a chance, will have acquired no advantage whatever; on the contrary, it will thereby be thrown still so much the farther to leeward.

Again, if the wind, by taking an opposite course, shall shift ahead and come round by the eastern quarter to L., degrees, shifting by larboard tack, or standing E.; and soon after the commencement let the wind be supposed to veer round to the W.; then it is evident, by the disposition of the two fleets, that the fleet F, by such a chance, will have acquired no advantage whatever; on the contrary, it will thereby be thrown still so much the farther to leeward.

Let the wind be supposed to wear round gradually from the wind E. towards the S. and from thence to the W. and then quite round the compass. Then F being supposed to have gained the wind, it will be in his power to maintain it, and make a circular course to windward of B; but as he can be attended all the while by the fleet B, who will cut him off to leeward, he never will be able to recover his three ships, supposed to be cut off. This is evident without the illustration of a figure.

Lastly, if the wind in changing shall in one instant shift in direct opposition where it was when the attack began, shifting in that is, from north to south; then and in that case, before the opponent can be judged whether such change shall be favourable for the point, F or not, it will be necessary that the relative situation of the two fleets should be determined, such as it was when the change took place. For example, if the headmost ships of the fleet F, that is, if his van and centre shall have separated at any considerable distance from his rear, and shall, in Naval Tactics.

Partial consequence of this mode of attack, have advanced to a position as represented in fig. 90. It is evident that F, though by this change he shall have got to windward, will yet not be able to avail himself of this seeming advantage, the fleet B having its fill in their power to cut him off from his three ships.

On the other hand, if this instantaneous change of wind, in direct opposition, shall have taken place more early in the action, that is, when the positions of the two fleets shall be such as represented in fig. 87, (the fleet B in the position of four divisions D, B, B, and A, and the enemy in the positions F and G;) then F, who before was to leeward, by this instantaneous change of wind from the north to the south, having now got to windward of every division of the fleet B, is it not evident that it may be practicable for him to carry assistance to his three ships at G in the rear, and perhaps even to cut off some of B's ships at A, if they do not with all convenient speed bear away to put themselves under the protection of their friends B to leeward? But whether F shall attempt to effect this manoeuvre, by veering his ships in the line, or, what seems most eligible, by making his ships tack, as it is to be presumed that his three ships, which have been some time engaged, must be considerably crippled, and not able to make sufficient sail; while endeavouring to bring them off, it will be difficult for him to prevent being drawn into a general and close engagement, which, by the supposition, he has all along endeavoured to avoid.

Chap. III. Of Partial Breezes of Wind.

It often happens at sea, that when two ships are in sight of each other, one of them will be failing at a considerable rate, being favoured with a breeze of wind; while the other at the same time is lying becalmed, having no other motion than what she receives from the tide or a current, if any, or from the swell of the sea. As this may be the case with respect to two adverse fleets when in sight of each other, that fleet which has the advantage of the wind will evidently use every possible method to prosecute the advantage that may result from it. Thus if the fleet deprived of making the attack be favoured with a breeze of wind, while the other fleet at the same time is lying becalmed, it is evident that the commander of this fleet will endeavour to get as near the opponent fleet as possible; whereas, if the fleet wishing to avoid an engagement be favoured with the wind, the other lying becalmed, then that fleet will avail themselves of this opportunity of making their escape.

If the attack upon the three sternmost ships shall have commenced before this partial breeze in favour of the fleet pursued has taken place; then the variety of positions in which the two fleets may be affected is so great, and the subsequent consequences so numerous, that it would be an endless task to give a separate description of each. In the mean time, therefore, as it is imagined nothing in such investigation will be found that can materially affect the general issue; and since no breeze whatever can favour the fleet F, so as to enable it to fail round and round the fleet B, which all the while is supposed to be lying becalmed, it will not be too much to say, that this partial breeze in favour of the fleet F, taking place after the attack began, although it may facilitate the escape of his own and centre, will not avail him much in the recovery of the three ships in his rear—perhaps not in any case as yet exhibited, excepting this one, where the wind in one instant had changed in direct opposition.

Now let, as formerly, the attack be commenced before the partial breeze in favour of the fleet pursued has taken place, but that the wind has instantaneously shifted in direct opposition; then, even in this case, the same breeze which would favour F (fig. 87.) in the attempt to bring off his three ships, would at the same time favour the escape of the ships of B at A, as formerly described. That this partial breeze would require to be of considerable duration, otherwise F, in thus attempting to bring off his three ships, crippled as they will be, must hazard a general engagement, in direct opposition as already described.

Mr Clerk employs a section of his book to show the propriety of his proposed attack from windward, in places where other methods of attack are liable to encounter winds blowing in contrary directions at the same instant; but as this is a case which does not surely often happen, we shall refer our readers to the work itself, and conclude this article with some other methods of attack, which have been suggested as improvements of that which is commonly followed.

1st. It has been supposed that the attack should be made with the greater part bearing down before the wind upon the five sternmost ships of the enemy. It is, however, evident, that ships by making the attack in this manner must be exposed, without a possibility of return, to as many broadsides from each of their five ships as can be got ready during a course of two miles. Hence, as the ships making the attack will assuredly be disabled before they can have it in their power to hurt the enemy, this mode of attack cannot be proper.

2nd. It has also been imagined, that some part of the force chosen to make the attack should be sent to leeward as well as to windward of the three ships determined to be attacked. But, the danger supposed, of that falling over the enemy's ships, and striking those of friends, may be an objection to this mode.

3rd. Others have been of opinion, that the headmost ship chosen to make the attack should come close up alongside of the sternmost of the enemy, and having delivered her fire, push along the line as far as possible, which may be supposed to be the fifth ship of the enemy; and as it is evident that this first ship may have received six broadsides, that is, a broadside from every one of the five ships of the enemy during her course in passing them, it has been thought possible that the other five ships, by following close after her, may attain their stations, each abreast of her opposite, without having received a greater number of broadsides than they have had it in their power to return; and therefore that by this mode the number of ships to be attacked will be determined: For as many ships as the leading ship will be able to reach, as many will the attacking fleet be able to carry.

4th. Again, let it be supposed, as in the former case, that the fleet making the attack has been brought up to action in a collected manner, but subdivided only so far as the service may require, and that the leeward division shall be more particularly defined for the immediate attack, while, at the same time, the body of the fleet keeping to windward shall be supposed attentive to give the necessary support where required; then let it be supposed, that the headmost ship making the attack having been soon crippled, shall not have been able to push farther than the third or fourth ship of the enemy's line—is it not easy to conceive, it is asked, that none one or more of the ships to windward, attentive to support and supply her place, may bear down on the fourth ship of the enemy, under cover of the smoke, throw in her fire, and push on to the fifth or sixth ship, or perhaps farther; and that so far as this fresh ship, or a second fresh ship, may be able to push, so many ships of the enemy may be expected to be carried? For whatever ships of the enemy can can be got abreast of, at a proper distance, may be disabled, and therefore commanded, by the numerous fresh ships kept to windward for this purpose.

In all these various methods of attack, the fleet making the attack is supposed to sail faster than the other, or at least to come up with it; and that so soon as the ships are engaged, their velocity will consequently be diminished. That being premised, a more proper mode of attack than any of the preceding will perhaps be as follows:

5th. The first or headmost of the ships intended to make the attack is to range alongside of the enemy, and preserve that station. The second ship is to make all possible sail to luff up and pass the first ship, which is now supposed to be engaged, and get alongside of the last but one of the enemy, which she is to engage. In like manner, the third of the attacking ships is to get alongside of the last but two of the enemy, whom she is to engage; and if it be deemed expedient, the fourth, &c. ship may be engaged. It is, however, evident that this method can only be practised when the wind is brisk, and that a calm, in consequence of a vigorous cannonade, may render the attack upon more than three or four of the enemy's ships impossible.

In all the different attacks upon the rear, it has by some been thought a great object, if practicable, to throw a raking fire into the rear of an enemy's line of battle, by ships detached for that purpose. For if shot, as has been said, can take effect at a distance of two miles, from this position it will surely reach the fifth ship, if the enemy's line shall be formed at two cable's length astern; and if formed at one cable's length astern, it may reach and may cripple the twelfth ship.

We have now given a cursory view of Naval Tactics in its present improved state; and shall take leave of the subject, with earnestly recommending to our nautical readers Mr. Clerk's Essay, which, if allowance be made for the author's peculiarity of style, will surely meet the approbation of every officer who wishes to see the practice of naval war founded on principles of science.