the last case, is the most necessary and useful of all the sciences: the various kinds of knowledge which ought to furnish the mind of a soldier are not without great difficulty to be attained. Of most other sciences the principles are fixed, or at least they may be ascertained by the assistance of experience; there needs nothing but diligence to learn them, or a particular turn of mind to practise them. Philosophy, mathematics, architecture, and many others, are all founded upon invaluable combinations. Every man, even of a narrow understanding, may remember rules, apply them properly, and sometimes draw just consequences from them: but the science of war branches out into so many particulars; it takes in so many different parts; there are so many reflections necessary to be made, so many circumstances and cases to be brought together; that it is only by a continual application, grounded upon the love of his duty, and an inclination to his profession, that any man can attain it.

To march an army in every sort of country, whether open, woody, or mountainous; to know how to form a camp in all those countries, with which the general must be thoroughly acquainted in order to do it with security; to make a proper disposition for a battle, whether with a view to the posture of the enemy, or to the situation of the country; to foresee events which depend in a manner upon chance; to be capable of making a good retreat on proper occasions; to direct the forages without fatiguing or exposing the troops; to send out detachments with precaution; to conduct the convoys in safety; to know how to canton an army; to establish magazines in places, both safe and within reach of the army, so that it shall never be in want of subsistence—these are the great ends of the military science.

It is commonly thought sufficient for a military man to know how to obey; and it is also supposed that the faculties of a day cannot be dubious, if a general joins the confidence of the soldiers to personal courage, a cool head, and a knowledge of the country.

It is true that, in cases of perplexity, many generals have in a great measure owed to their own capacity, and the confidence their soldiers have repaid in them, the advantages they have gained over the enemy; and confidence will always be repaid by the soldiers in that general in whom they perceive coolness united with courage. At the battle of Cannae, when Gisco seemed to be much astonished at the superiority of the enemy's number, Hannibal answered him coolly, "There is, Gisco, a thing still more surprising, of which you take no notice. Gisco asking him what it was, "It is (replied Hannibal) that in all that great crowd there is not one man whose name is Gisco." Plutarch observes, that this coolness of Hannibal greatly animated the Carthaginians, who could not imagine that their general would joke at so important a time, without being certain of overcoming his enemies.

Although bravery and courage are the most essential qualifications of a subordinate officer, yet he should not be deficient in those which are required in a general, and which have been already mentioned; obedience to the orders delivered. livered to him is no longer a virtue than whilst he comprehends and knows the invention of them. War, says a celebrated author, is a business which, like all others, must be learned; it supposes some qualities to be born with us, and demands others which are to be acquired: but since all these qualities must have the original source in genius, a man who proposes war for his profession, should never engage in it without having consulted his natural bent, or without knowing the particular turn and power of his mind. Ability, whether in a general or an officer, is the effect of his genius, quickened by a natural liking to his business.

A quick eye, which is of great importance to a soldier, is natural to some, and in them it is the effect of genius; others acquire it by study or experience; he who knows how to command himself, and has courage enough to keep himself cool on the most urgent occasions, has the readiest and quickest eye. A quick, hot headed man, however brave, sees nothing; or if he does, it is confusedly, and generally too late.

It is this quick eye which enables a general to judge of an advantageous post, of a manoeuvre to be made, and of a good disposition for the troops, whether with respect to that of the enemy, or to the situation and nature of the country.

The quick eye is no other than that penetrating genius which lets nothing escape it. A general who knows how to unite this quality with perpetual coolness, never is in want of expedients; he will see how those events, which to any other would be the prelude of his own defeat, may end in the overthrow of his enemies.

The choice of the general officers depends upon this genius, which discovers every thing; they ought to be the right-hand of the general, and as capable of commanding the army as himself. Whatever good dispositions a general may make, they must prove ineffectual if not seconded by the general officers under his command; he cannot be everywhere, neither can he foresee all exigencies that may arise. He is obliged to give only general orders; it is therefore the business of those who command under him to know how to take advantage of a wrong movement of the enemy; to take upon them to attack, or sustain the troops which are engaged; and, as circumstances vary, to make them advance towards the enemy, either to keep him back or to attack him.

But the qualities already mentioned would be useless, if order and discipline were not severely observed: the most numerous and best composed army would soon become little else than a body of rangers, who being only united by the hope of booty, would separate as soon as that motive ceased; and trusting each to his own head, or indulging his own humour, would be cut in pieces party by party: so that if the general does not keep up subordination (the soul and strength of discipline), his army will be nothing more than a troop of Tartars acting more from the hope of plunder than the desire of glory. What art and what genius is there not requisite to maintain this subordination? Too much levity disgusts the soldier, and renders him mutinous; too much indulgence sinks him into indolence, and makes him neglect his duty; licentiousness causes that subordination to seem burdensome, which should never in any degree be given up: he loses that respect, and often that confidence, which he should have with regard to his officer; and indulgence often makes a well-disciplined body become a set of sluggards, who march against their will, and who, on the most pressing emergencies, think only on their own safety.

Besides these qualities, which are essential to a general, and which who would attain that rank ought of course to have, there are still many others necessary to make a great man. A general who would merit the title of a hero, ought to unite in himself all civil, military, and political excellence. It is by this that he will easily attain to make war with success: nothing will escape him; he will know without difficulty the genius of every country, and of the nations which compose the enemy's army, the abilities of the generals who command, and the nature of the troops under them; he knows that he may venture a motion with some troops that he would not dare to attempt with others that are equally brave. One nation is vehement, fiery, and formidable in the first onset; another is not so hasty, but of more perseverance: with the former, a single instant determines success; with the latter, the action is not so rapid, but the event is less doubtful.

No man is born a general, although he bring into the world with him the seeds of those virtues which makes a great man: Cæsar, Spinola, Turenne, the great Conde, and some others, showed, even in their earliest years, such qualities as ranked them above other men; they carried within them the principles of those great virtues which they drew forth to action by profound study, and which they brought to perfection by the help of practice: those who came after them, with perhaps fewer natural talents, have by study rendered themselves worthy of being compared to them. Cæsar and all conquerors had this advantage, that they were able to make their own opportunities, and always acted by their own choice. A man may be a good general without being a Marlborough or a Turenne: such geniuses are scarcely seen once in an age; but the more they are raised above the rest of mankind, the more they ought to excite emulation. It is by endeavouring to surpass the intellects of the second rate; it is by striving to equal the most sublime, that the imitation of them is to be attained. This passion in a soldier is neither pride nor presumption; it is virtue; and it is by this only that he can hope to be serviceable to the state, and add to the glory of his king and country.

How much ever the honour of commanding armies may be sought after, it degrades him who is not worthy of it; this rank, so much desired, borders on the two extremes of glory and ignominy. A military man who labours to make himself capable of commanding, is not to be blamed; his ambition is noble; by studying the art of commanding, he learns that of obeying and of executing. But it is astonishing in the highest degree to see soldiers thinking only on pretension, and neglecting the study of their business. It is perhaps less surprising if we see others, without having been tried, proposing to themselves to command in chief; because such attempts suppose in the projector an absurd temerity, founded on a profound ignorance of the talents he ought to have, and the virtues which he has not. Such boldness is the character of a man whose mind is too narrow to perceive his danger: We should rather approve the timidity that suffers itself to be dejected by terror, since it shows at least that he knows to what hazards he is exposed; both one and the other are blamable: modesty is the only proper quality of a soldier; it gives splendour to virtue, it argues diffidence of himself, and desire of arriving at perfection.

The title of general would be less tempting, if proper attention was paid to the qualities it requires, and the duties it imposes; it would then appear a very honourable, but painful burden. The most firm and intrepid genius might be discouraged, merely by thinking that on the conduct of a general depends the fate of the state, the glory of his prince's arms, and his own reputation. But yet the reward that follows such irksome labours ought to animate men to undertake them. Obstacles, however numerous they may be, are not insurmountable, since so many great men have got the better of them: difficulties should stir up a folder's emulation, but should never terrify him; he should endeavour to copy such great originals, though he should not be able to equal them.

This treatise is divided into four parts. In the first are mentioned all the greater operations of a campaign; and the means of executing those operations, in any kind of country, are endeavoured to be laid down.

In the second, the precautions that are to be taken to attack the enemy in all the aforementioned operations, are considered.

The third treats of the Petite Guerre, or the operations of detached parties, and the war of posts.

The fourth, of sieges, both with regard to attack and defence.

**PART I. Of the GREATER OPERATIONS in DEFENSIVE WAR.**

**Sect. I. Of the Knowledge of a Country.**

A Campaign of which the plan is well formed, and the dispositions well concerted, may nevertheless prove unsuccessful, if the general, to whose direction the operations are intrusted, hath not a thorough knowledge of the country in which they are to be carried into execution.

There is one knowledge of a country, which for an officer to be without should be considered as a reproach; that of the situation of cities, towns, villages, forests, streams, rivers, which is to be acquired by studying of geographical maps. There is another branch of knowledge yet more particular, such as, of the passes, or the boundaries of the country, the situation, the nature of the ground, whether it is plain, or divided by hollows, rivulets, hills, &c., which is to be acquired by the affluence of topographical maps.

In the study of these last, care must be taken, not blindly to follow the marks they lay down. It very seldom happens, that topographical maps are perfectly exact; for, besides the many circumstances which may sometimes in a year alter a large extent of country, they seldom take notice of fords, bridges over the small rivulets, small hills, and hollows of little importance; neither can they mark whatever may be occasioned by recent inundations and disruptions of the earth: whereas any of these unforeseen circumstances may prove an obstruction to a great design, either by retarding the march of an army, preventing a column of troops from advancing, or leaving the enemy in possession of some passes from which he might have been driven.

In order to avoid the errors into which a general may be drawn by the maps, the safest method is to apply to the inhabitants of the country, go over it with the most intelligent of them, and remark every obstacle, however trifling it may appear.

For marching with greater security, a general ought to form a company of guides of the peasants, be assured of their fidelity, and attach them to him by all possible methods, particularly by unbounded liberality. It is by money only that truly spies and faithful guides can be secured; the latter are less expensive, but full as necessary as the former. Parsimony should be avoided in war; for, as Vitellius observes, money should never be spared when expense is necessary to secure possession. In proportion as an army advances into a country, great care must be taken to change the guides.

The general should send out detachments along with some of these guides to examine the streams which cross the country, whether or no their mouths are at a distance, into what river they empty themselves, from whence they take their source, whether they may be easily forded, if their banks are steep or sloping, marshy or covered with bushes; other detachments should be employed in examining the woods, in order to find out whether troops can pass through them or not.

A general ought himself to examine into the truth of the reports made to him by these small detachments, or send out others more considerable under the command of general officers; however certain a general may be of the fidelity of his spies and guides, yet he should not always rely upon their reports: mistrust, which in general is accounted a vice, may almost be esteemed a virtue in the business of war.

Furnished with these lights, a general can allot the easiest road to the artillery and baggage, the shortest to the infantry, and longest to the cavalry: he can at once judge, from the nature of the ground, into how many columns the army can be divided in order to expedite the march, and what dispositions will be necessary for the columns with regard to the enemy's position.

By the knowledge of the country, a general is informed of what camps the enemy hath or can occupy, and of those necessary to be taken to oppose his designs; whether the enemy's detachments can easily approach, or how he can himself advance towards him, without being discovered; if there is a town in the neighbourhood of the enemy's camp, or whether he is obliged to draw it from a distance; where he hath fixed his magazines, and whether an attempt to carry them off is practicable or not; in what manner his quarters are disposed, and which of them is most exposed; what distance there is between himself and the enemy; where the enemy hath established posts, and which those are that himself ought to occupy with regard to the situation of his own camp and quarters, and those belonging to the enemy; which is the properest road for the detachments and the patrols to keep, in order to gain intelligence; and lastly, with what degree of ease the enemy can attack the army on its march, and whether in front or flank. This knowledge is essential to a general in every kind of country; but in a woody or mountainous country, it would become more particularly dangerous, and even impossible for him to march an army, if unacquainted with it.

In 1702, the duke of Burgundy, being desirous to attack the enemy who were behind Cleves, but not being perfectly acquainted with the forest in his front, he detached the marquis d'Alegre with 500 grenadiers, and 800 horse, to see if it was not possible to find some passage through it. M. d'Alegre met with a defile which was occupied by the enemy: he attacked and forced it; but being advanced beyond it, found it was not possible to proceed farther, by reason of the great number of defiles that succeeded to each other: he thereupon turned back, feet, and had another passage surveyed, where there were found still greater obstacles. He gave an account of this to the duke of Burgundy, who, not choosing to miss the opportunity of attacking the enemy, sent him out again with a larger detachment, that he might examine whether, by keeping along the side of the forest, it would not be practicable for him to march up to them by way of the heights of Mook, on the Defensive the side of Grave and Nimoguen. The marquis d'Alegre discovered a defile which led to these heaths; he took possession of it, and sent notice thereof to the duke of Burgundy; who ordered the army to advance, obliged the enemy to send their infantry into Nimoguen, and cannonaded their cavalry which had taken post on the glacis, but were unable to maintain it; and the consequence was, that the enemy sustained a great loss in men, artillery, wagons, and baggage.

This example tends to prove, that maps are not always to be relied on. There can be no reason to doubt that the duke of Burgundy was furnished with the most exact: but yet it is probable that he might not have succeeded in this enterprise, if he had neglected sending M. d'Alegre to survey the passes, and examine two, before he proceeded to that through which he marched.

The following is a general rule: That it is upon the ground, and not upon maps, that the roads through which an army is to march must be examined, as well as the situation of places where camps are to be fixed, and fields of battle chosen. An army should never move before ways are opened for every column: with regard to a detachment it is different, as there may arise circumstances which will prevent the general from foreseeing what road it may take. The command of a detachment should always be given to an intelligent officer, and one who has made his business his only study; who hath been particularly careful to acquire a knowledge of the country, and of whose genius the general should entertain no doubt. A particular choice fires up emulation in young men, and induces them to exert their utmost endeavours to deserve so distinguishing a mark of approbation.

Into how many mistakes have even the greatest generals fallen, by not being thoroughly acquainted with a country, and by suffering themselves to be guided by general notions? M. de Feuquieres cites many examples of great enterprises which have miscarried by it.

Toward the end of the year 1673, when a considerable body of infantry, with only few cavalry, was on its return from Holland, under the conduct of M. de Luxemburg, the prince of Orange having assembled the whole force of the Dutch and the Spaniards (under his command), came upon the Maas, with an intention to fight M. de Luxemburg between Maestricht and Charleroy. This march made it necessary for the court to send an order to M. de Schomberg to assemble all the cavalry that were in Hainault and Flanders, and immediately join M. de Luxemburg, who was greatly inferior to the prince of Orange in cavalry. The prince's aim then should have been to prevent the two generals from joining, and to have fought one or other of them before their junction. The prince's being unacquainted with the country, made him mistake for real the feints made by M. de Luxemburg, whilst he was upon the river Ourte; as if his intention was to march by way of the Condors and the Ardennes, in order to gain Sedan and the Meuris. The prince of Orange drew near Huy and Namur; and by that means was at such a distance from the high-road, that M. de Schomberg had an opportunity of advancing with his cavalry to Tongres; at the same time that M. de Luxemburg, by a forced march, passed the Maas at Maestricht, and arrived at Tongres, where the junction of the two armies was effected without any accident.

If the prince of Orange had made only two reflections upon the nature of the country, he would have avoided the mistake he fell into; the first of which is, that scarcely any body can be ignorant that the Condors and the Ardennes are sterile and mountainous countries; from whence it is evident, that M. de Luxemburg could not have subsisted his army, especially in the month of December: the roads defensive in those parts, very bad in the summer, are almost impassable during the winter; consequently the carriages could not have passed but with the utmost difficulty.

The second reflection is, that if M. de Luxemburg had actually designed to pass through the Ardennes, why did M. de Schomberg advance towards Tongres, and expose himself to the danger of being beaten, without a possibility of receiving help from M. de Luxemburg, who was on the other side of the Maas? If the prince of Orange had had a thorough knowledge of the country through which M. de Luxemburg pretended he would pass, he would soon have perceived that it was only to throw him into a perplexing uncertainty with regard to the road which the enemy's general should naturally take; in a word, he would not have remained a moment in doubt on the part he had to act.

By this, then, it appears, that the prince ought to have continued on the side of Liege; by which position he would have stopped M. de Schomberg, who would have scarcely dared to advance to Tongres, nor would M. de Luxemburg have attempted the passage of the Maas at Maestricht: by this means, the junction would have been prevented; or, if either of the two armies had advanced, the prince could have attacked and beaten it; neither would it have been in the power of the other to have assisted it.

It hath frequently happened, and will continue to do so, that a general who knows how to take advantage of the knowledge of the country, although inferior in point of force, may change a defensive into an offensive war. In 1671, M. de Crequi, who began the campaign on the defensive, ended it with obliging the duke of Lorraine to pass the Rhine: that prince dispersed his army, and then M. de Crequi formed the siege of Fribourg.

The knowledge of a country is still more essential in retreats: there is more art and more precaution required in a retreat than in any other action; that operation is the conclusion of all preceding ones. If a general, obliged to retreat precipitately, hath but a superficial knowledge of the country, how will he be able to re-assemble his troops, re-establish order, or march with any degree of security?

Xenophon's retreat with the ten thousand Greeks is one of the most useful lessons a commander can study: in that undertaking were united the virtues of a consummate general, and the most intrepid courage of a soldier; and in particular it exhibits the most profound knowledge of the country.

The knowledge of a country is as necessary for a private officer as for the commander in chief, because he is to execute with part what the general performs with all the troops. When an officer, to whose conduct an expedition is intrusted, joins this knowledge, one of the chief branches of military science, to practice and experience, he will with so much the greater ease comprehend and execute the general's intention and plan; and he will be also enabled to take the properest measures for success: it, on the contrary, he begins a march, without being acquainted with the country, his mind misgiving him, will increase the danger, by the very means he takes to avoid it: he will suppose it in places where there is nothing to be feared, and often fall into it where he was least apprehensive of it.

The general who commands in the cantonments and winter-quarters, and each officer who commands a particular quarter, will never be able to take proper measures if they are unacquainted with the country: they will be unable to preserve a proper strength when separated, or to assemble without difficulty on the first order; and for want of know- ing the posts which it is proper to guard, they will occupy such as are unnecessary, and leave those defences that are most liable to be attacked; the troops will be greatly fatigued by increasing the number of posts without occasion, by superfluous or too numerous detachments or patrols. In a word, whatever precautions are taken within, the quarters will never be in security, if the country round about them is not perfectly known, and every important pass between them and the enemy occupied.

Sect. II. Of the Preparations before taking the Field, and the March of an Army on leaving its Quarters to go into Cantonments.

The time for an army to come out of winter-quarters, is always regulated by the plan which the general has formed for the ensuing campaign. But whether by the situation of the quarters the army is enabled to enter immediately on the campaign, or whether it must be first of all cantoned, the magazines should be so situated as to be always within reach, especially in that early season of the year, when there can be no forage upon the ground, and consequently the cavalry must be subsisted out of the magazines. The magazines ought to be distributed about in different parts, that the troops may have less way to go for their forage. And this distribution should be regulated by the movements which the general foresees the army will make on leaving its quarters, imposing it leaves them when there is only dry forage; but if the army is in an enemy's country, and there is forage upon the ground, it is certainly better to reserve the magazines entire, by which not only great trouble will be avoided in transporting the forage, but also a great expense saved to the government.

Of what nature ever the country may be (an enemy's country is supposed), it should be foraged in front as much as possible, in order to reserve that which is in the rear, that, when the campaign is over, it may be found laid up in the barns; if this precaution is not attended to, the army will be destitute of forage at its return, and will of course be obliged to draw it from home, and consume those magazines which were before spared; consequently there will be nothing saved, the expense will only have been deferred, but it will be increased by transporting the forage from the magazines to the army.

The forming of the magazines should never be delayed till the time for opening the campaign approaches. The intendant, pursuant to the general's order, should lay in the provisions during the winter, and distribute them in the frontier towns, by which means they can easily be transported to whatever place the general shall order. By these precautions, the general will not only avoid the inconvenience of being obliged to wait till there is forage upon the ground, but he will also be enabled to be first in the field. The same precautions should also be taken with respect to the artillery. It should be assembled upon the glacis of the frontier towns, or rather upon that of the conquered places; the more it is within reach of readily joining, the sooner the operations will be commenced.

From prudence in the execution of these dispositions, as well for the magazines and for the artillery, as for everything that is necessary to an army, it follows, that a general hath often formed a siege, or at least invested a place, and completed his lines of circumvallation, before the enemy could be in a condition of coming out of his quarters; he may likewise have made many marches, and will possess himself of advantageous posts, without the enemy having it in his power to oppose him.

A general should observe, that, in order to cause his army to be cantoned within a march of the country where he designs to commence the operations, he must make all preparations, the troops leave their quarters together; assemble them in many bodies in different frontier towns; proportion the marching days to the distance of the quarters and the rendezvous that shall have been appointed for them, that they may arrive on the day appointed, and that from thence they may march in a body to the place where they are to canton.

All the bodies march, either in the number of columns that the situation of the country will allow, and arrive at the cantonment together; or else they march separately, and arrive on different days; but, in either of these cases, the cantonments for each regiment ought to have been marked out; and, if possible, forage for at least three or four days distributed to each quarter.

In the marching orders which are sent to each commander, the situation and name of the place where each regiment is to canton, should be carefully expressed; whether on the right, the left, or in the centre; the discipline to be there observed, the place where to go and receive orders, and that where to receive forage, should also be particularly specified.

Troops, when upon a march, should always observe the most exact discipline; and never be suffered to advance, but in the same order, and with the same precaution, as if they were in danger of being molested or attacked.

Whenever an army is cantoned, it is generally in an enemy's country; therefore, for the greater security of the cantonments, there should at least be one place that may serve for a support. If no place of this sort can be found, the army must then march out together and encamp, instead of going into cantonments.

As the cantonments are properly nothing more than a halting place, where the troops are to remain till the season permits them to take the field, till the proper quantity of forage is collected, or till the necessary preparations for the intended operations are completed, they should be more connected with the winter-quarters. But as soon as the weather permits, and all the necessary preparations which should have been forwarded during the winter are finished, there is then no time to be lost; for an army will always find its advantage in encamping early, getting the start of the enemy as much as it possibly can, and beginning the campaign, no matter by what operations, before the enemy can have time to assemble.

If any particular column, upon the march, presents its flank to any of the enemy's towns, although it is indispensably necessary for every column to observe all possible order and discipline on the march, yet this column is more particularly obliged to it; necessity makes it become a duty. But that it should not be too much exposed, some hussars ought to be appointed to march upon its flank, who should also be ordered to advance till they come within sight of those towns. This column, whether consisting of infantry or cavalry, must detach some troops to sustain the hussars, in case they should be attacked and repulsed. By posting these detachments upon the flank, the enemy will be kept at a distance from the column, and the hussars will be also sustained.

Sect. III. The March of an Army in an open Country.

To direct the march of armies is not the least difficult part of a general's duty, and it is only by a thorough knowledge of the country that he can perform this duty; that he can concert the measures for conducting them in safety; Defensive safety; and that he will be enabled to foresee the enemy's operations' motions.

There are but three sorts of countries which may become the theatre of war; an open country divided by rivers, a woody, or a mountainous one.

When an army is in an open country, the general may take whatever road he thinks most convenient, without being under a necessity of keeping the beaten road. If he chooses to march across the country, it may be done by cutting down the hedges, filling up the ditches, levelling the ridges, filling up the hollow ways, thereby rendering their ascent or descent easy, and by building bridges over the streams and rivulets which divide the country. But nevertheless it is very imprudent for a general to suppose himself entirely free from danger upon a march; for the consequences of self-security are generally fatal. The effects of negligence in any military operation are pernicious, but more particularly so upon a march; and although a general should never fear his enemy when in presence of him, he should nevertheless always apprehend the worst from him when he is out of his sight.

The number of columns in which an army can march in an open country is arbitrary, whilst it is advancing, and the enemy at too great a distance to attack or annoy it upon its march. But if, on the contrary, the enemy is near at hand, and there is a possibility of his attacking the army, it should then be disposed after such a manner as to form in order of battle in a very short time, and to be able to take a favourable position for action upon the first signal.

If the army prefers its flank to the enemy, the dispositions, without considering the probability of its being attacked, should be changed; for an army upon a march ought to be always prepared against any accident that may happen.

A general should never cause an army to move without having previously considered and examined the intended march of it, nor without a thorough knowledge of the enemy's position, and where he is, or without knowing particularly the ground intended to encamp on. An army ought never to move but with some design, either to seize on some advantageous post, to prevent an intended march of the enemy's, to draw him into a disadvantageous situation, to deprive him of subsistence, or to procure some for itself.

This maxim being established, let it be supposed, that a general would cause his army to march, and the enemy's distance to be also such as to secure him from any danger of attacks; he hath it in his power to open four, six, or eight roads, in proportion to the number of the troops under his command; for the greater the number of columns, the less is the body of troops contained in each; consequently there will be less confusion, and the sooner will the army arrive at its destined camp.

Before the march is planned, and the number of columns determined upon in which the army is to march, notwithstanding the general is acquainted with the country, he should send out a detachment some days before, to reconnoitre the intended route of the army, as well as the camp it is to occupy. This detachment is to be commanded by the officers of the day appointed for its setting out; they must have staff-officers and guides with them, to conduct and to inform them of the nature of whatever may prove an obstacle, of the places where the roads begin, and those where they terminate: they should also have labourers with them, to mend the ways, enlarge the roads, and make new ones, if necessary; to cut down the hedges, fill up the ditches, level the ridges of the hollows, and build or repair bridges.

When the general commanding this detachment is ready to enter the different ways through which the army is to follow; he will divide his detachment into as many separate bodies as the army is to be divided into upon its march; and distribute staff-officers, guides, and labourers, to each detachment, with orders to meet again at the same place from whence they separated.

Each of these detachments should advance to the extremities of the woods, if they meet with any, and of the roads leading to the camp, intended to be occupied: the commanding and staff officers will then advance with an effort to reconnoitre its situation, and will leave part of their men in ambuscade in the woods, or concealed behind some heights, or in some hollows. The knowledge of the situation of the camp being attained, each detachment will return by the road it came; but first, the commanding officer of each detachment will make a report to the general of the roads they have passed, what discoveries they have made, and, in short, will give him a particular detail of every thing they have met with on their way, whether woods, villages, hollows, bridges, and of every thing they have done to render the road easy for the column that is to pass through it. This detachment being assembled at the place appointed for meeting, will take the road to the camp, where being arrived, the lieutenant-general will make his report to the commander-in-chief of the army.

With these precautions the army may not only advance in safety, but the roads also for every column having been reconnoitred and repaired, no accident can happen to retard the march of the army.

The general must take care to have detachments of hussars or dragoons always in the front and upon the flanks, to observe and clear the march of the army; neither should a general suppose himself to be in absolute security from the distance of the enemy; but whilst he sees all clear before him, it would show great weakness for him to be apprehensive of a surprise, especially when every necessary precaution for avoiding it hath been taken. It is certainly a mark of prudence to take precautions; but multiplying them without cause is an undoubted sign of fear and anxiety.

It is proper to make the army march, as near as possible, in the same order in which it is to encamp; by which means the troops may enter the camp without confusion. The army being supposed to march in six columns, the infantry will form three, the artillery and baggage the fourth; the cavalry, with the remainder of the corps of hussars that are not detached, and the dragoons, the two last upon the flanks; so that the army, on its march, will be in the following disposition: The column upon the right will consist of cavalry, the one adjoining to it of infantry, and that which comes next will be formed by the artillery and baggage; then two columns of infantry, and the fifth closing the left, will be composed of cavalry. It is to be observed, that, if the baggage-waggons belonging to the army form too long a row, some of them may be sent into the rear of the columns of infantry, with express orders to the officers to make them march in the column.

There should be an advanced and a rear guard to each column, formed from the troops of which the column is composed; there should be also detachments of light horse upon the flanks of the cavalry, in order to keep off any of the enemy's parties that might advance to annoy the army upon its march. The rear-guard to the column of baggage should consist of infantry, cavalry, or dragoons, besides the escort always appointed for it. The general officers who are at the head of the two columns of cavalry should not march too fast, lest they should get too far advanced before the infantry; a matter always to be avoided. The march

Plate DXIV.

Plan of the March of an Army in Six Columns.

Scale of \( \frac{1}{2} \) a League. Defensive of an army being disposed after this manner, every column operations will enter the camp at the same time, and find itself opposite its ground. See Plate XIV, where a is the army formed in order of battle, ready to march. b, The park of artillery, where the baggage belonging to the army, and their escorts, also are assembled. c, March of the cavalry, to form the column on the right. d, March of the cavalry, to form the column on the left. e, March of the infantry, to form in three columns. f, March of the artillery and baggage, to form in a column. g, Parties of hussars, covering the flanks of the army, and forming the rear-guards of the column, when the army hath passed. h, Bridges and fords, discovered by the advanced detachments, who have marked the route of the army. i, Bridges built by the same detachments. k, Front and rear-guards of the columns drawn from the troops of which the columns are formed. l, Parties of hussars, marching upon the flanks of the army. m, Parties of hussars marching at the head of the army, to scour the country through which the army is to pass, and also to examine the routes marked by the advanced detachments.

15. By the enemy's position, although at a distance, the army should, on its march, present a flank to the enemy, without fearing its being attacked; yet as the enemy may have stolen one or two marches, as hath happened on many occasions, there must be only two columns of infantry placed in the centre. The third must be placed upon that flank which the army prefers to the enemy; so that the army will find itself disposed upon its march after the following manner: Supposing it is the right which prefers the flank to the enemy, the first column will consist of infantry, the second of cavalry, the third of artillery, the fourth and fifth of infantry, and the sixth of cavalry. The baggage will then be distributed to the three columns upon the left; so that neither the two columns upon the right, or the artillery, will have the least embarrassment, in case an action ensues. The same disposition must be made upon the left, if it is that which prefers the flank. Particular care must be taken that the artillery have orders, supposing the enemy advancing in full force to attack, to transport itself to the column of infantry, and to divide itself along the front, when it shall be in order of battle, and to keep up a constant fire, in order to give the general time to make such dispositions as he shall find necessary.

The column of cavalry should be divided into two, and be posted upon the flanks of the infantry that is drawn up in the face of the enemy; the other columns must follow the orders which have been delivered to them, and execute them with the utmost dilpatch.

If it appears, either from the proximity or position of the enemy, that the army is liable to be attacked in front, the disposition for the march should be in the same order as the army is to form in for action; the artillery must then be distributed among the columns of infantry; so that, following the divisions where it is placed, the brigades will find themselves spread over the front of the first line. In this case, the infantry will form four columns, which will march in the centre of the two columns of cavalry upon their flanks; so that the head of each column, as far as the centre, when placing itself in order of battle, shall make the defensive first line, and the remainder, from the centre downward, the second; and the reserve which follows shall form itself behind the other two lines.

It is necessary that an army disposed after this manner should have orders to draw itself into order of battle on the very first signal, which should be a discharge of two or three pieces of cannon. The signal being given, the first and second lines, and the reserve, will find themselves formed in a very short time. If, from the proximity and position of the enemy, and the facility with which he can attack, the general hath reason to imagine he will do it, the heavy baggage, with a good guard and escort, ought to be removed into the rear.

On this occasion the campment (A) should not be far before the army, the escort should be increased, and some detachments of light horse should march in front to cover it, and also to make observation at a distance. The remainder of the body of light horse shall continue upon the flanks of the army sustained by dragoons, who, on the signal being given, shall immediately go and form themselves in the place assigned to them during the action.

On the first sight of the enemy the campment should retire; for when fighting becomes necessary, all thought of encamping must be laid aside; but the escort shall put itself in order of battle, and the light horse shall approach the enemy as near as possible, in order to reconnoitre his disposition and strength. The officer commanding them will immediately send a report of the discoveries he hath made to the commander in chief, who on every occasion should be in the front, and even a little advanced, to survey the nature of the ground; it being very certain, that in these cases a man can much better rely upon his own than upon the judgment of others. This was marshal Saxe's method; particularly when he was apprehensive of being attacked upon a march, or had himself an intention of attacking. In proportion as the enemy shall advance, the escort of the campment must retire in good order; at the same time not neglecting the opportunity, if it offers, of harassing the enemy's advanced guard, so as to retard his march, and give more time for the army to form in order of battle, and to the general to make such dispositions as he shall judge necessary; after which, the escort having amused the enemy, or caused him to slacken the briskness of his march, must retire in good order; and when it shall be near the body of the army, each body shall return to its own brigade.

If, from his knowledge of the country, although an open one, the general knows there are any thickets, holvs, or heights, either on the right or the left, and that this spot may prove favourable to the enemy, he should try to possess himself of it. If that attempt is not practicable, as the enemy will undoubtedly take advantage of it, and post infantry either at these thickets or heights, the general must place a brigade of infantry at the head of each column of cavalry, which shall mix by platoons with that line of cavalry when formed in order of battle. This disposition was made by M. de Turenne at the action of Sinzheim, and at the battle of Enzheim.

It, by the situation of the country, the flanks cannot be sheltered.

(A) This is a French term, for which we have not a synonyme equally expressive in the English language. It is used to denote a certain number of troops, who proportion their time of letting out before the army, by the distance or proximity of the enemy, in order to trace or mark out the camp. For this purpose, a quarter-master and a trooper is draughted from every troop of every regiment of horse; and a sergeant and a corporal, in like manner, from every regiment of infantry, furnished with ropes and pickets, to lay out the ground for the tents and the intervals; so that every regiment will, on its arrival, find its ground properly marked out. A field-officer of every regiment also marches with the campment, besides the officers of each corps, who command the detachment. Defensive sheltered either by an hollow, a morass, a river, a town, or a village, the hussars and dragoons must be posted upon the wings, but sidewise, so as to be able to take the enemy in flank when he shall come down to charge the first line, or at least to keep back his second; these hussars and dragoons should be sustained by the infantry of the light troops belonging to the army. If the right can be formed next a village, and the left next an hollow, some infantry and artillery must be posted there; if there is only the right or the left that can be sheltered, that which cannot must be properly sustained; and the same disposition must be observed that hath been just now mentioned, with regard to an army whose flanks cannot be covered.

If, on leaving the camp, the army presents a flank to the enemy, who may have it in his power to attack it on the march, it must then march but in two or three columns at most. Each column should be disposed after such a manner, that by a motion to the right or to the left, according to the wing that is liable to be attacked, each battalion and squadron may find itself formed in order of battle before the enemy.

The advanced guard should be composed of light horse, sustained by dragoons; the rear-guard of cavalry sustained by infantry; there should also be some light horse upon the flanks of the cavalry, and some pieces of cannon with the infantry. The artillery should be distributed by brigades in the column of infantry nearest to the enemy; so that, performing the same movement as the troops, it may find itself placed in the front of the first line, ready to fire on the fifth order. The number of three columns is given to the army, in order that the first and second lines and the reserve shall be formed at the same time, which cannot be done if the army marches only in two columns; for troops must then be taken from these two lines in order to form the reserve, which would require a considerable time, and consequently retard the dispositions; whereas this reserve, forming the third column, is separated from the main body, and in a condition to act with readiness, according to the orders it shall have received. As the baggage, in this manner of marching, must necessarily be an embarrassment, it must be sent into the rear under a good effort, with orders to join the next day at the new camp.

Sect. IV. The March of an Army in a mountainous and woody Country.

If the situation of the places in a mountainous country furnishes a general with a greater variety of expedients to conceal his dispositions, it also renders more precautions, and a greater degree of knowledge, necessary to avoid being surprised. If these kind of countries, on the one hand, present greater advantages for the concealment of marches, they also, on the other, offer many difficulties in the transporting of the provisions and the artillery, and require a greater degree of vigilance for the safety of the magazines and the preservation of the communications with the frontier towns.

It is to be feared, that in mountainous countries, in roads that cannot be enlarged, the troops pressed too close together will not be able to move but with great difficulty; and as they will embarrass each other, the front, the rear-guard, and the flanks, must be equally secured; the columns must be unbroken and close, that there be no distance left between them; and halting should be particularly avoided, as that is a circumstance by which an army is most fatigued.

It is again dangerous, as the commentator upon Onofander observes, when troops find themselves straitened of room in a narrow road, for the general, in order to enable them to move with greater ease, to lengthen the columns too much; from whence would arise two inconveniences; the first of which is, that the columns would be weakened, and that in case of a surprise it would not be difficult for the enemy to separate them entirely, and it would also be impossible for them to rally; in the second place, these columns thus lengthened, in going round a mountain and descending into a valley, would take up a prodigious extent; from whence it hath often happened, that the windings of the road hiding the middle of the column, those who march in the front rank can see only those who are in the last, and retard their march, because that, being deceived by distance, they will be scarcely able to distinguish whether they advance or whether they are halted.

In order to avoid these inconveniences, it is not barely sufficient for a general to have a thorough knowledge of the country: he ought immediately to inform himself of every particular, however minute, relating to it; he should take the same precautions which have been pointed out as necessary for a march in an open country, and send out a detachment, such as hath been supposed in the foregoing section. This detachment will examine the narrow passes, survey and found the fords, run round the windings of the mountains; and if there are many roads, it will find out which is the most practicable, and that through which the army, the artillery, and baggage, can pass with the greatest ease; what streams cross it, and whether there are bridges over them; it will examine whether they are sufficiently strong, and repair them, or build new ones. It often happens in a mountainous country, that the road which would be very short and commodious proves to be divided, either by the separation of two rocks or by hollows. As these breaches, however deep they may be, cannot be all of a certain breadth, therefore, in order to avoid marching over the unnecessary ground that going round them would take up, bridges should be thrown over, if possible, from one rock to another.

But as in a march, whether in an open or in a mountainous country, occasions for throwing bridges very often present themselves, it is very necessary to say a word or two relative to the manner of their construction.

Six or eight thick pieces of timber are laid across a rivulet, or any other bad place necessary to be passed, at six feet distance from each other; these must be crossed again by other pieces of timber not too thick, at the distance of three feet from each other; which must be fixed to one another by large pegs, and faggots well fastened together must be laid over them. When the bridge shall be thus covered, some earth must be thrown over it, which ought to be well trampled, in order to fill up the vacancies of the faggots; and then, for the greater firmness, new earth should be thrown over it, which ought to be well beaten down. The bridge thus made, the troops, the artillery, and the baggage, will pass over it with great ease.

It must be observed, that the bridges should be of the same breadth with the roads; they should be broader rather than narrower, because, exclusive of the danger the artillery and baggage would run if they were narrower, the ranks being obliged to be straitened and the column to be lengthened, the march would of course be retarded, and it would be difficult to avoid confusion. The labourers that accompany the detachment ought to be furnished with every sort of tool necessary for the removing of earth, the felling of trees, and working and fitting them for use.

On the report of the commanding officer of this detachment to the general, he will order as many detachments as there Defensive there are columns intended, to set out two or three hours before the time appointed for the march of the army. These detachments will march carefully over the ways already examined and prepared; they will secure every thing, hedges, narrow passes, entrances of passes, woods, heights, villages, in short all that may serve as shelter for troops in ambuscade; and for greater security, they will post guards in the villages, which guards are not to retire till the rear-guard of the army comes up.

The commanding officer of each detachment should possess himself of the heights on the right and left, and should distribute platoons of infantry at proper distances from the rocks and narrow passes; he should be careful of what may be done to oppose him, and be attentive even to the smallest paths. When the commanding officer of the detachment shall be advanced to the end of the passes, or to the ground intended for the camp, he will establish his infantry in the most advantageous posts; he will place his light horse or dragoons in the front, but within reach of artillery; he will send out patrols of light horse advanced before the infantry. If he receives any intelligence of the enemy, he will send immediate notice of it to the general; but if, from the report made to him, the enemy does not appear to be sufficiently strong to annoy the army on its march, or only some parties were willing to try if they could enter the passes, his detachment will be sufficient to keep them at a distance, particularly as he is in possession of the heights and the passes.

With such precautions as these, if the enemy is at too great a distance to attack the army, the march will be performed without any trouble; there will be no obstacle in the roads, or reason to fear that the wagons will be missed; and if the wheels or axle-trees of any of them should break, they will be repaired from those which have spare ones; if, on the contrary, the enemy should be so near as to give cause to apprehend an attack, the necessary precautions are taken for forming the troops in order of battle, and for the necessary dispositions during the action.

It has been already observed, that an army on a march should be divided into as many columns as the detachments have found openings or roads leading to the camp the general intends to occupy; suppose two, the army will consequently march in two columns. The disposition of the troops in their march differs entirely from what it would be in an open country; the advanced-guard of each column must consist of infantry, some must be distributed either in the narrow passes or on the heights, and there should be some advanced detachments of light horse to secure the narrow passes; the rear-guard should consist of infantry only. The remainder of the troops may be disposed after the following manner:

Four or five brigades of infantry, according to the number which composes the army, should be placed at the head of each column; the same partition should be made with regard to the artillery, which must follow the infantry; the cavalry must march next, and the baggage of each column, well escorted by infantry, must follow the cavalry; then the remainder of the corps of light horse which are not detached; and the dragoons are placed the last, in order to dismount and sustain the rear-guard in case it shall be attacked.

Each column should consist of the same number of troops as well infantry as cavalry. Platoons of infantry should be detached to march on the heights, at proper distances, in order to cover the flanks on the right and left. Care must be taken to march very leisurely in the front, otherwise the rear will not be able to keep up; then, in order to give the rear time to come up, the front will be forced to halt, by which the march will be much retarded and the troops fatigued.

Plate DXV. represents the march of an army through a mountainous country. A is the position of the army before it begins its march. P is the artillery and baggage, with their escorts in the front of the camp. B, Parties of hussars forming the advanced guard of the army on its march. C, Parties of infantry of the advanced-guards of the columns. D, The infantry of the army turning the head of the columns. E, The artillery, and wagons belonging to the artillery. F, Battalions of artillery. G, The cavalry. H, The baggage of the army. I, The escort of the baggage. K, Parties of hussars. L, Parties of dragoons. M, The infantry of the reserve, forming the rear-guard of the army. N, Platoons of infantry marching upon the heights, to cover the flanks of the columns. O, Villages in front of the camp the army is to occupy, and of which the light infantry have taken possession.

These dispositions are necessary, because, as the enemy in a mountainous country will be able to attack with infantry only, he must be opposed with troops of the same nature; the reason why the artillery is posted behind the infantry is, that in case the enemy should attack briskly in front, and the road through which the columns pass be broad enough, some pieces of cannon may be sent into the front, which firing with grape-shot will soon thin the enemy's ranks, and abate something of his ardour; if the road be too narrow to permit the bringing forward of the artillery, resolution must supply the want of that assistance which the cannon would give, and the enemy must be charged with bayonets. The cavalry does not follow immediately, because, not being able to act in this sort of country, it must be covered by infantry. The baggage which follows is sufficiently defended by the columns that cover it, and the infantry that escorts it; this infantry should nevertheless join as often as circumstances will permit, without being fearful of exposing itself, that upon the heights being to reinforce it in case the head of the army should be attacked.

There are some mountainous countries so difficult of access, that it is impossible for the cavalry to follow, because some post must either be immediately seized, or the enemy, being in possession of the hills, must be driven from them before it can advance; or because it would be difficult for it to be subsisted.

If the army can march in four columns, the dispositions should still be the same; but as the head of the columns will be weaker in infantry, the heights should be guarded accordingly, and the rear-guard sufficiently strong to resist the enemy; the same disposition should be made for one column only.

If the march is to be made through a woody country, the precautions which have been already mentioned in regard to examining the ways through which the army is to pass, and for the detachments which set out in order to be before the army, should still be observed; but the disposition and order of the troops must be different. If by the situation of the country, the army is obliged to march continually through woods till it arrive at the camp, the cavalry and the baggage should be in three columns in the centre; but some infantry should be placed at their head and their rear-guard; the infantry should march in two columns, one on the right, the other on the left of the cavalry and baggage; some brigades of artillery should be distributed to each column of infantry, the remainder must march at the head of the columns of baggage; the flanks of the columns must be covered by platoons of infantry, placed about at proper proper distances, which are to follow the columns at 40 or 50 paces distance, without ever losing sight of them.

Plate DXVI. represents the march of an army through a woody country. A, Is the army formed in order of battle previous to the commencement of the march. B, The cavalry, which hath marched some paces in advance, in order to make room for the infantry. C, The infantry, which, by facing to the right, forms the column upon the right. D, The infantry, which, by facing to the left, forms the column upon the left. E, Bodies of infantry, which are to march at the head of the columns of cavalry. F, The park of artillery, where the baggage belonging to the army, and the escorts, also are assembled. G, The march of the infantry, forming in columns. H, The march of the cavalry, forming in columns. I, The march of the artillery and baggage with their escorts, forming in column. K, The army in march. L, Hussars of the advanced guard keeping the roads, marked out by the detachments sent on before. M, Infantry, forming the advanced guard of the columns. N, Small parties of infantry, marching upon the flanks of the columns. O, Parties of hussars, marching upon the flanks of the army. P, Infantry of the reserve forming the rear guard of the army.

If by the knowledge which the general has of the country, or rather from the report of the officers who commanded the detachment sent out to view, open, and repair the roads, he knows that the country is interrupted by woods and little plains, the disposition ought to be wholly changed; it will then be sufficient that the second detachment, which in other cases ought to set out the evening before, sets out only two hours before the campment. This detachment should be composed of infantry, light horse, and dragoons; the infantry to scour the villages and the woods, the light horse to penetrate into the woods wherever they can enter, and clear the march of the infantry, and the dragoons to sustain the whole.

When the disposition for the march of the army is supposed to be in five columns, the infantry should form two, the cavalry two more, and the artillery and baggage the fifth. If it is thought there will be any occasion for artillery, a brigade or two may be distributed to the columns of infantry; and the remainder may march at the head of the escort of the baggage, which is to be defended by the regiment of artillery; to which must be added a detachment of infantry, which will form the advanced guard. The cavalry and dragoons are to keep the open country as much as possible, and the infantry the inclosed; and the best and most accessible road should always be given to the artillery and baggage. In order that the columns may preserve the same length in marching, a brigade of infantry should be placed at the heads of the columns of cavalry; if this precaution, which fixes the head of the columns of cavalry, is neglected, the cavalry will extend a great way before the columns of infantry, which should always be avoided. The rear-guard should consist of infantry, cavalry, or dragoons; the light horse should always march on the flanks on the right and left, and before the army.

It is after this manner that the march of an army may be disposed through a woody and a mountainous country; but an army must always suit its motions to circumstances, and to the situation of the country where the war is carried on. If the general is inferior in point of number, he should make choice of defiles; because in them he can always present a front equal to the enemy's. Who can be ignorant that Leonidas with 8000 Greeks, at the straits of Thermopylae, stopped the almost innumerable army of Xerxes, who was unable to force him?

A mountainous and woody country, when thoroughly known, becomes a more favourable theatre for practising the wiles and stratagems of war than an open country; it is true that the knowledge of it is more difficult to attain, and that it requires more vigilance and readiness in the general. Hannibal was even drawn into ambuscades by his own guides; an example worthy the notice of a general who takes guides that have either but little regard for him, or are unacquainted with the country; it is impossible to try them too much; and their ignorance is often more fatal than treachery itself.

The marches that require most precaution are those made in the night, those made in sight of the enemy, and those that should be kept secret.

The first should be avoided as much as possible; but if circumstances require and force an army to march over a mountainous country in the night, care should at least have been taken to survey the roads during the day; to make the guides march at the head of the army; to keep the ranks very close together, that the men may not lose sight of each other; and that part of the troops do not mistake one file for another, which may easily happen in the dark, if the advanced guard has marched a little too fast, and the officers hastened too much. The Greeks, according to Xenophon, on like occasions, gave the heaviest arms to the troops that marched at the head, thereby to oblige them to proceed leisurely.

In those marches that are made in sight of the enemy, beside the precautions necessary to be taken for the safety of the troops, and which have already been mentioned, the general should endeavour to deceive them by false appearances, and by an ostentation, often in such circumstances, necessary: as extensive a front as possible should be given to the army; the intervals of the ranks and columns should be widened, but not so as to weaken them; the general should take advantage of an height, possess himself of it, and post some troops on it, in order to make the enemy suspect there may be still more behind: advantage should be taken of a wood, and, by marches and countermarches, the same troops should be made to pass and repass, in order to make the enemy believe the army stronger than it really is. There have been instances of generals, who, on like occasions, have made such good use of their ground, that, by the arrangement of troops, they have seemed to multiply them in the enemy's eyes; and who, although inferior in strength, appearing to have the advantage of numbers, have kept the enemy in awe.

But still, unless it is to deceive the enemy, a general should conceal his force and management: his force, because, if superior, he will not fail to profit by that advantage; and if inferior, he should avoid a battle; he will conceal his management, because he will prevent the designs of the enemy's general, who will receive as much information from his inefficacies as from his miscarriages. Pyrrhus, who taught the art of war to the Romans, was in the end conquered by them. The Mexicans often turned the arts and wiles of Cortez and the Spaniards against them; and the Czar Peter I. never regretted a defeat when it became the means of instructing him how to conquer in his turn.

It is impossible to lay down fixed rules for secret marches; it is by his address that a general will improve circumstances; it is by art and contrivance that he will evade the enemy's vigilance, and deceive his spies.

General rules only can be given for the dispositions to be made of troops upon a march; particular ones would be merely conjectural, because the general of an army must always depend upon circumstances: it is the situation and nature of the country, the number of troops, the nearness of the enemy, the facility of foraging, and the passage of

Plate D XVI.

Plan of the March of an Army through a Woody Country.

Scale of \( \frac{1}{4} \) a League. In a word, whatever is the order and disposition of the troops, it must be such, that they shall always be able to sustain each other; that the flanks shall be well guarded, and the fronts secured; the roads must have been surveyed and opened; and whatever the nature of the country is, all the columns should arrive at and enter the camp at the same time.

Sect. VI. Of Camps in defensive War.

It is in general more difficult to carry on a defensive than an offensive war, but more particularly so in an open than in a mountainous country. In the former, there is nothing to conceal the movements and dispositions of the army from the enemy; whereas, in the latter, the nature of the places prevents the enemy from discovering them; but whatever may be the nature of the country, the choice of a camp, when on the defensive, and the art of pitching upon an advantageous situation, is what proves the genius and talents of a great officer. Exclusive of a thorough knowledge of the country, this operation requires a quick and penetrating eye in a general, to enable him to seize the points which from their situation may prevent the enemy either from attacking him or penetrating into the country.

A general who acts on the offensive, takes what state or circumstances he pleases; he may act as he chooses, and is not under a necessity of regulating himself entirely by the enemy’s motions; whereas a general that is not sufficiently strong to attack, is commonly obliged to continue quiet till the enemy hath acted, and then to regulate his motions according to those made by the opposite army, unless his superior abilities give him a particular advantage over the enemy’s general.

Although it is always necessary for a general to have a thorough knowledge of the country, this knowledge will yet become more necessary to him when acting on the defensive. He ought to prevent the enemy’s entering his country, and forming any siege there (a plan which he cannot execute, unless he is possessed of the most advantageous points, and also of those which cover the towns liable to be threatened), by proper dispositions that secure his camp; by covering his fronts and rears, and keeping the communication between the camp and the places where the magazines are; by endeavouring to annoy the enemy in his convoys and foraging; by harassing him in his camp, and perplexing him with small detachments, to which he will be obliged to oppose more considerable ones; these dispositions, properly managed, may destroy any enterprises the enemy may have formed against the army.

Plate XVII. represents an army properly encamped to serve these purposes. A, Is the camp of the main body of the army. B, An advanced camp, composed of dragoons and hussars, in order to cover the right of the army, to guard the passes by which the enemy might make incursions upon the flanks and rear of the army, molest the convoys, and cut off the communications. C, Villages and bridges, guarded by the light infantry. D, Posts of dismounted dragoons in the front of their camp. E, Posts of dragoons on horseback, to secure the communication between their camp and that of the main body of the army. F, Bridges built, to keep up the communication between the grand and the advanced camp. G, Bridges and villages guarded by detachments of infantry. H, Grand guards of horse. I, Guards of infantry. K, Bridge, village, and mill, guarded by the infantry belonging to the army. L, Camp of dragoons and hussars covering the left of the army, and supporting the light infantry. M, Villages and bridges guarded by the light infantry. N, Posts of dismounted dragoons in the front and on the flanks of their camp. O, Posts of dragoons on horseback. P, Posts and detachments of hussars, to patrol in the front and upon the flanks of the army, and their camp.

By the enemy’s superiority, the nature of the country, and the success of campaigns, the general should determine whether or not his camp should be entrenched: the entrenching of camps requires much observation. It is easy (says Vigiatus) to entrench a camp while at a distance from the enemy; but it becomes a very difficult operation when the enemy is near at hand. The Romans, according to him, used to keep all their cavalry and half their infantry drawn up in order of battle, in order to cover those troops that were employed in working at the entrenchments. Caesar, when in Spain, fortified himself after this manner under the eyes of Afranius and Petreius, without their having the least knowledge of it.

Before a general fortifies a camp in a plain, he must observe the position in which the ground will permit him to form his camp; whether or no it will be liable to be surrounded; if it will entirely cover the country it is to protect, and the towns for which there is most reason to be apprehensive; if the parts in the rear are open; if forage is in plenty; if provision can easily be brought; if there is wood and water; if it is impossible for the enemy to enter the country without forcing the camp; if all these circumstances concur, it is certainly most advantageous to entrench the camp.

A general should never be too secure by having a superiority of numbers; he ought not on that account to neglect fortifying his camp; even when he acts on the offensive, these entrenchments will not hinder him from marching out to the enemy whenever he judges it proper, and his army will by that means be sheltered from the enemy’s attempts.

There are many methods of entrenching a camp by lines beginning on the right, and covering the whole front of the camp to the left; these lines, in their extent, have redoubts and angles at proper distances; and the line being continued from one to the other, forms the curtains. In the front of them there is a large and also deep ditch; sometimes a covered way is added, which is pallisaded and stuccoed throughout the whole front of the lines. To render them yet stronger and more difficult to be forced, there are pits sunk before the covered way. These pits are ranged chequered-wise, about five feet deep and five broad, and are in form like a reversed cone. Such were the pits which the duke of Berwick caused to be made in 1734 to the lines of circumvallation before Philippsburg; only with this difference, there was no covered way. Without doubt these lines are formidable, and even very difficult to attack; but a great deal of time is required for constructing them; and if there is not a sufficient number of peasants in the army to work at them, troops must be employed to expedite them; which will not only greatly fatigue them, but may also cost the lives of many; because the removing of earth often causes great disorders, particularly where the ground is swampy or clayey.

The method practised by marshal Saxe seems much superior to these lines. It contained as large an extent of ground, without diminishing the labour; because, instead of lines, it consisted of redoubts, which require as much work to form the four faces and the covered way as lines always continued. At the siege of Maestricht, in 1748, he used these redoubts instead of lines; their distance from each other was 45 yards; they were stuccoed, and the covered Defensive way pallifadoed. These redoubts presented an angle to the field, and consequently were a mutual protection to each other; they were each of them capable of containing a battalion.

His design, supposing the enemy come to attack the army, was to cause all the redoubts to be occupied; to plant ten pieces of cannon between each, and to draw the army up in order of battle behind them; by this means the enemy would be obliged to force the redoubts before they could attack the army, which could not be done without great loss. But supposing the redoubts to be forced, how would the enemy be able to enter the intervals without dividing? The army behind, in order of battle, would charge him, without giving him time to recover himself, and it is highly probable would beat him.

By following this method of entrenching a camp, if some of the enemy's battalions should, for example, force three or four redoubts, they certainly would not dare to advance as long as the remainder should hold out; so that a general might, by detaching some brigades, and causing them to march to the assistance of the battalions that have been forced, retake the redoubts; or, without disordering the order of battle, drive away the troops which are in possession of them with his cannon. In short, this method seems to be excellent, because it proves that all the redoubts may be forced, and yet the army not be beaten, because it has not suffered in the action, but remained the whole time in order of battle with all its cannon; so that the enemy will be reduced to the necessity of beginning a second battle.

Lines, on the contrary, have not the same advantage; all the troops, or the greatest part of them, must line them; the cannon is planted at proper distances either on the angles of the redans, or those of the redoubts. If one part only is forced, the army is beat, and the cannon taken, because the enemy makes the attack with his whole front.

Lines are indeed never good, unless when there is a large extent of country to be guarded, and some frontier to be covered from the incursions of the enemy; the front of an entrenched camp seldom exceeds six miles, more or less, whereas lines to cover a country have sometimes extended 30 miles in front. By some it is thought, that, in order to cover a country, it is sufficient to have certain holds, which shall be strong and well entrenched, with patrols continually going from one end of the posts to the other, and each post to be provided with signals both for day and night. It is unnecessary that these patrols should be strong; provided they follow, and are continually crossing each other; this will be sufficient to prevent the enemy paling undetected. It is certain that the enemy will not dare to pass between these posts, whether he be strong or weak; if he passes in a body, he will be cut off behind, and his convoys intercepted; if he passes only in parties, they will be cut off with the greater ease. However, lines of this nature would require much labour, and also take up years to complete them.

Marshall Saxe's method for entrenching a camp in a woody country interposed with small plains, seems also to be a very good one. The redoubts are to be erected in the plain; and lines thrown up in the woods according to the usual method, with redans placed on the side of each other, at 24 toises distance; there should be a pallifadoed ditch in the front, and the lines as well as the half-moon should be frayed with pointed stakes; behind these lines, which cannot be very extensive, because they only cover part of the front of the camp, must be placed the troops necessary for defending them; a considerable entrenchment of felled trees must be made behind, with the branches of the trees intangled with each other, and some openings must be left wide enough to permit the troops who guard the lines to pass through, in case they should be overpowered and obliged to retire; the cannon must be planted in the front of these openings; and the remainder of the army must be drawn up in order of battle, 100 paces at most behind the retrenchments of trees and the half-moons. The retrenchments of trees are placed about 60 or 80 paces behind the lines, and not before them, because it will be a new and unexpected obstacle to the enemy. These retrenchments, carefully made, and with large trees, can be destroyed by cannon only, which would take up a considerable time; if they were in the front of the lines there would certainly be a rampart more; but that might be useless, and perhaps hurtful, because the fire of the enemy to make a passage would drive the splinters of the trees into the lines, which would do more harm than even the shot itself.

Plate DXVIII represents an entrenched camp; in which A is the main body of the army encamped behind its entrenchments. B, The camp of the troops of the reserve. C, Camp of the dragoons, to secure the rear of the army. D, Camp of hussars, to cover the ground upon the right of the army. E, Villages and redoubts guarded by the light infantry, to secure the camp of the hussars. F, Bridges built to secure the communication of the army with the ground upon the right, and to favour the retreat of the troops posted on the opposite side. G, Brigades of artillery distributed upon the flanks, and along the whole front of the army. H, The park of artillery. I, A bridge entrenched, to secure the communication between the army and the ground upon the left. K, Villages and farm-houses, guarded by detachments of hussars and light infantry, to patrol in the front of the army.

In a mountainous country the dispositions for entrenchments are different: it is impossible there to find plains sufficiently large to draw up an army in order of battle, and place it beyond redoubts, as in an open country; the avenues and the passes only can be entrenched; the redoubts would not be sufficient, because not only the avenues must be guarded, but the heights also occupied. Now, as it will often happen among mountains that there is not a foot of earth, how can redoubts be erected there? A general must then make use of such assistance as the country can furnish him with, whether by heaping stones upon each other, or by retrenchments of trees well joined; and thus construct lines sufficiently strong to shelter the soldiers from fire and all injury. In an open country, a general in a manner suits the ground to his dispositions; in a mountainous country, he must apply his dispositions to the ground; but in any country whatever, he must use all the assistance of art for entrenching of camps. In mountainous countries there are more inequalities of ground, which render the enemy's approach to the lines difficult; and although it is almost impossible for a camp in a mountainous country to be attacked in front, nothing should be neglected for its safety; but all the avenues by which it may be surrounded must be entrenched with care, and all the heights which overlook it secured; because the enemy, without intending to attack in front, will amuse him during the time necessary for troops to take a long round, in order to penetrate to the camp on another side. If Leonidas, with his 8000 Greeks, had been possessed of all the avenues, ways, and heights, by which he could be cut off, in the same manner as he was of the pass of Thermopylae, Xerxes with his innumerable army could never have forced him in the defiles which he guarded.

The entrenchment should never be more than 250 or 300 toises, which make from 500 to 600 paces, distant from the camp, and which ought to be divided into three parts. This distance should be made, that the troops may be able Part I.

Defensive operations to judge of the parts that can be carried with greatest ease, and of those which are most in need of affiance, that they may march there with greater order, dispatch, and facility; whereas, if this dillance is not observed, it will happen, as hath been sometimes seen, that the troops not having ground sufficient to range themselves in order of battle, the dispositions will be impeded by confusion and disorder, and the enemy will have forced the lines before the troops can be in a condition of opposing him.

But in a mountainous country, it is not sufficient for a general that he cannot be turned; that he hath profited so well by the advantages of ground, as to render the enemy's approach to the camp difficult; that the affiance of art hath been joined to nature; and that the country to be guarded is entirely covered; he must also be careful that the communication with the neighbouring towns where the magazines of war and provision are established, is safe and easy. If any one of these particulars is neglected, the camp is exposed, neither can the general continue in it the time that would be necessary to retard the march and designs of the enemy. As it hath been already observed, that there is scarcely any post that is not liable to be turned or overlooked, the camp should be entrenched only so far as the entrenchments may become an obstacle to the enemy, and as they may be a means of giving the general time to retire to occupy another post.

When the enemy undertakes the siege of some town, and the general, although with an inferior army, is willing to succour it, or cause the siege of it to be raised, he should seek out a spot naturally strong, and entrench it according to its situation: if an open country, according to the method above mentioned; if among mountains, according to the affiance that the nature of the country may give; and make use of these entrenchments as a sure asylum from whence to make sallies upon the enemy, to attack his forages and his convoys, and to oblige him to raise the siege as well by the fatigues of it, when it hath been drawn out to a greater length of time than was designed by the enemy, as by the want to which he is reduced by the continual quietudes that the entrenched army hath given him.

When an army is in an open country, it generally continues in the same camp for some space of time; because it is certain the enemy cannot conceal his designs so effectually from the general, but he may be able to circumvent them; but in a mountainous country, it is uncertain whether an army will continue in the same post till morning that it occupied over-night. A general must then encamp in such a position, and after such a manner, that in case the enemy comes to attack him in force and with advantage, he may be able, without danger, to proceed to another post, and evade the enemy's designs.

It requires great skill in a general to judge when it is proper or improper to make choice of places which have a great many avenues on one side; because if he should be attacked in a camp inclosed by rocks, or deep in a valley which hath but one or two passes open, it will be very difficult for him to disengage himself from the enemy: on the contrary, if there are many small passes or avenues to the ground of which he is possessed, and by which the enemy may easily invest his camp, it will require a great number of men to guard them. But on these occasions a general should be ever careful to make a good disposition of his troops, to maintain strict order and discipline in his camp, and to send out his patrols with the greatest regularity; by which means he will free himself from all apprehensions of being surprised.

There ought to be no difference between a well-governed town and a well-ordered camp; the exactest order should be observed, and the strictest discipline kept up: if a soldier is at liberty to quit or enter it at pleasure, the enemy's spies will not fail to make their advantages of it. If the camp is unhealthy, or destitute for provision, water, wood, or forage, and the soldiers hath real cause of complaint, every method should be tried to avoid the danger that will attend his being discouraged. It is often owing to the little order existing in the camp, that the soldiers are seized with a panic, occasioned by the absurd and groundless reports that are diffused throughout it; troops thus terrified, are in a manner vanquished before they come to action.

In a mountainous country, such places should be avoided as are subject to be overflowed, either by the melting of the snow, or by torrents, which at some seasons appear no more than trifling rivulets, but which, at others, swell and carry off everything they meet with in their way: of this nature were those mentioned by M. de Feuquieres, which he found near the rock that he attacked and took in 1690 from the Baduais. Situations in the neighbourhood of woods are generally to be feared, because the enemy may set them on fire, and the flames be communicated to the camp. The general ought also to satisfy himself with regard to the nature of the springs, which may agree very well with the inhabitants, but prove very unwholesome to strangers: such, according to the reports of the French, is the nature of the springs in many parts of Italy. The water belonging to certain streams or rivers will be pernicious, while that belonging to the fountains and wells in the same country will be very wholesome and salutary.

Sect. VII. Of escorting Convoys.

The conducting of convoys is one of the most important and most difficult of all military operations. In the escort assigned them, and the number of horse and foot of which this escort is composed, the general ought to be guided by the distance of the town from whence they set out; the dangers to which they are exposed from the different parties they may meet; the distance and strength of the enemy, and the extent and nature of the country they have to travel over, whether an open or a mountainous one; the number of wagons, and the quality of the convoys, whether they consist of money, or ammunition for war or provision; and whether they are extraordinary or daily. When escorts are too numerous, the troops are fatigued, and no end answered; and when they are too weak, they are liable to be beaten. M. de Puyfègur observes, that it is as dangerous to give an escort of 2000 men to a convoy where only 1000 are requisite, as to give but 500 to one where 1000 are absolutely necessary; in the first, the troops are unnecessarily fatigued, and in the second, the convoy is exposed to the danger of being carried off.

All these considerations suppose the general to be a man whose natural parts are matured by experience, and who is sensible that, without a thorough knowledge of the country, the foundation of all conduct, it will be impossible to make a proper disposition of troops. If a general is ignorant of the places most proper to form ambuscades; of those where there are bridges and fords; of the passes which are most dangerous, and those which will favour the enemy's approach in order to attack, and whether in head, flank, or rear—he acts but as chance directs, and his dispositions will have no meaning, either with respect to the situation of places, or the nature of the ground; the orders will be ill executed, the evolutions performed without exactness, and the disposition of the troops will be faulty; the separate bodies being, consequently, unable to sustain and assist each other, Defensive will soon be beaten and dispersed, and the convoy carried off.

The general officer commanding the convoy ought, for its security, to distribute his troops after such a manner that they may be a mutual assistance to it. The choice of the troops to form the escort is undetermined, as it is by the nature of the country their quality should be decided. In mountainous and woody countries, only infantry, hussars, or dragoons, can be made use of; the hussars or dragoons are to march in the front and on the flanks, to scour the woods, examine the avenues, and make sure of the defiles; in an open country, the escort should be composed of infantry, cavalry, hussars, or dragoons. But whatever may be the nature of the country, the convoy ought never to advance without first sending out detachments to reconnoitre at a distance.

If the convoy marches through a mountainous country, a large body of cavalry would not only be useless, but also an embarrassment, as it would be unable to act, except with great difficulty; whereas, in an open country, cavalry is very serviceable. In any kind of country a convoy can be escorted with infantry, especially when the enemy can only act with his; but as in an open country it is necessary for the infantry to be supported, the cavalry must be used for that purpose. In a mountainous country, infantry can carry on war alone.

In this last case the officer commanding the escort ought to place a body of infantry at the head, another in the centre, and a third at the rear-guard; to distribute small bodies at proper distances on the right and left; and he should be particularly careful to possess himself of the heights. The hussars must be distributed to the advanced and rear-guards, and, in order to be more certain that every part hath been strictly examined, as the convoy advances, notwithstanding the hussars of the advanced guard have already scoured the avenues, woods, valleys, villages, and hollows, the hussars belonging to the rear-guard should again look into those places, to see whether anything hath escaped the notice of the advanced guard. These precautions are never without their use, and do not in the least retard the march of the convoy.

The final detachments should advance as far as possible into the country, without exposing themselves to the danger of being cut off, the hussars with pistol or musketoon, and the dragoons with their carbine in hand, in order that, if they should meet the enemy, they may, by firing, give the officer commanding the escort notice of it, so that he may have time to make his dispositions for defending and preserving the convoy. The convoy may continue marching on till the enemy is discovered; but on the first notice of him, it must stop, and the officers belonging to the convoy should park their waggon; or, if the ground will not admit of that, they should cause them to keep very close together, and double them up with the distance of four paces, which should be filled with infantry, between each waggon. By this movement the length of ground taken up by the waggon will be contracted, the troops will be brought closer together, and will form a stronger and heavier body, capable of afflicting each other with more ease.

In a mountainous country it is almost impossible for the enemy to attack the advanced and rear guards and the centre at the same time. Nevertheless, if he should find an opportunity of forming these three attacks at once, by following the dispositions above mentioned, he will find troops at every part to receive him: neither will he be able to make himself master of the heights without attacking them, and the troops already in possession of the ground will easily repulse him; and by the assistance which the officer commanding the escort should endeavour to send them, they will be enabled to maintain themselves in them, to protect the convoy, and the enemy will be unable to attack by more than one or two parties.

If the enemy forms but one attack, only a part of the troops must be opposed to him, because it is to be supposed this attack may be made only with a design to draw the whole strength of the detachment to that part, and which, by being altogether in that one place, will give the enemy concealed in ambush an opportunity of falling with ease upon that part of the convoy that is unprovided with troops, and which will of course be incapable of making any defence. The troops of the centre should never march to the assistance of the advanced guard, if it is that which is attacked, nor those of the rear-guard to the assistance of the centre; but a party from those troops which cover the flanks of the convoy should be collected in a body, and sent to assist the part that is attacked. However narrow and confined the country may be, a convoy may be easily conducted by infantry, when it would be impossible to do it with cavalry.

When any pass or avenue crosses the road on which the convoy marches, it should be covered by a body of infantry, which will remain there till the rear-guard is come up; then it will fall into the post assigned it for conducting the convoy. It is always to be supposed, that this pass hath been examined by the advanced detachments. If the escort is composed of infantry and dragoons, the latter should be dismounted, in order to give an additional strength to the guards, and their horses may be tied to the waggons. The hussars, if the nature of the country renders them unserviceable on horseback, may also be dismounted; by which means, instead of being an embarrassment to the infantry, they will become useful to it. The nature of hussars is such as will admit of their being employed on every occasion; and although the difference of their arms will not permit them to be as serviceable as dragoons, they may nevertheless amuse a party of troops belonging to the enemy in such a manner as to enable the infantry to beat them, or at least to oblige them to retire.

Hussars are more particularly necessary in the escorting of convoys, because they scamper about on all sides, and are very active and ready in scouring a country thoroughly; they leave no place till they have perfectly examined it, unless the thickness of the woods, or any other unavoidable obstacle, should prevent their penetrating as far as they would otherwise do; and even then they protect the infantry, who can with greater ease pass into those places where the hussars cannot. Whatever country the convoy passes through, there should always be hussars with it; otherwise the officer commanding the escort cannot be certain that the country is thoroughly surveyed, because for want of hussars he must employ cavalry on that service. Not that there can be any doubt of the cavalry's exposing itself to danger with as much cheerfulness and courage as the hussars; but as the horses belonging to the cavalry are naturally heavier than those of the hussars, and often encumbered with forage, they cannot venture to a proper distance without running the danger of being taken, because they cannot retire with that expedition which is requisite: On the other hand, the hussar being more active, and more accustomed to reconnoitre, knows how to go over a country with proper caution and care to himself; besides, the trooper who is used always to march in a body, and to be under command, will have a very imperfect idea of the method of scouring a country. Although the disposition of the troops should always be regulated by the nature of the country through which the convoy marches, and by the nature and number of the enemy by which it is liable to be attacked, yet the general should never neglect, whatever his situation may be, to secure the head, centre, and rear. Before the convoy begins its march, the disposition in case of an attack should be settled; by which means the commanding officers of different corps will know where to post themselves, and after what manner to act at the time the attack is made. By the knowledge which the commanding officer ought to have of the country, he will form a judgment of those places where it is most probable he may be attacked, and of course make his dispositions accordingly. In any disposition that may happen, a general should always foresee in what manner the attack, defense, and retreat, will be conducted.

When a convoy marches through an open country, the advanced and rear guards should consist of cavalry sustained by infantry; the infantry in the centre should be continued on the right and left of the wagons, and the cavalry divided into troops should be distributed on the flanks, at 100 or 150 paces from the infantry; squadrons of horse, intermixed with platoons of infantry, should be placed at proper distances on the flanks of the remaining part of the convoy. By this position, if the convoy should be attacked in head, centre, or rear, these squadrons and platoons should have orders to march immediately to the affluence of the party that is attacked.

The advanced detachments of hussars, and those upon the flanks, by giving notice that the enemy is at hand and coming to attack, will furnish time for parking the wagons and uniting the troops; in which case the infantry must form in the park, and the cavalry post itself on the flank of that front which expects to be attacked, and the hussars place themselves upon the flanks of the cavalry.

The attack of a convoy is always sudden and rapid, and the success of it is generally decided in the first onset; and as the enemy, whether he succeeds in his attempt or not, must retire with great expedition, for fear of any succor that may arrive, it is evident that it can be attacked only by cavalry, hussars, or dragoons; there have indeed been some instances where the cavalry have brought infantry behind them. If the convoy has had time to park itself, the effort of the infantry can only be turned against that which it entrenched behind the wagons. The enemy's cavalry and that belonging to the escort attacking each other, will fight upon equal terms; but with regard to the infantry, it will be different; that which is sheltered by the carriages having a great advantage over that which attacks it. On the contrary, if the enemy's infantry is sustained by hussars only, they will be briskly attacked by the cavalry and hussars belonging to the escort, who will take them in flank and rear. The enemy's hussars being hemmed in, his infantry, for want of being sustained, will be easily beaten; part of the cavalry and hussars belonging to the escort should be left in pursuit of the enemy's hussars, and the remainder ought to take his infantry in flank. If the enemy is beaten, as it is probable he will, his retreat seems impracticable, or at best very difficult; because, being deprived of his cavalry, he will be forced to make head against the infantry that attacks him in front, and to repulse the cavalry that harasses him in flank.

If the enemy gives ground, the general should be cautious of pursuing him too far, lest, if he should receive a reinforcement, the troops in pursuit of him, finding themselves at too great a distance, will not only be beat, but also be deprived of every method of retreating.

There are some occasions on which the enemy must not be pursued at all; such as when the armies are very close to each other, or the convoy draws near to some of the enemy's posts; because then, by the nearness of the army, the enemy's infantry can come to the attack without being under the necessity of mounting behind the cavalry. A general, to whose care a convoy is intrusted, should never seek any other advantage than the conducting it in safety, even though he should be sure of beating and taking a detachment belonging to the enemy; a real advantage is often given up by endeavouring to follow an uncertain victory. There is less shame in being beat, when an officer hath done his utmost, and acted with propriety, than there is glory acquired in conquering when he hath exceeded the limits of his duty. An officer is no longer praiseworthy, than whilst he acts up to the orders he hath received with exactness and discretion; whereas he who, depending too much on his own courage, rashly suffers himself to be drawn on by the appearance of success, is not only charged with, but ought to be answerable for, the consequences.

There still remains another disposition to be made in an open country, whether the convoy marches on a causeway or in the high road, which is to divide the escort into many equal parts, with troops of every sort belonging to each; the first body should set out an hour before the convoy is to begin its march, the second half an hour after, with orders to the commanding officers to scour the adjacent country with great exactness, and to be careful not to be cut off by any detachments the enemy may have in the country; for which reason these two bodies should never be more than three quarters of a league distant from each other, by which means they will be within reach of afflicting each other. The body which sets out last should never be more than half a league before the advanced guard of the escort.

As the convoy is supposed to march through an open country, the above-mentioned distances are allotted between the first and second bodies, and between the second body and the advanced guard of the convoy; but if the country should grow rough and unequal, these bodies should draw closer together, and always keep sight of each other, so as to be able to assist one another in case of an attack.

When these bodies are set out, the general must put the convoy in motion, and form the advanced guard of one of the divided detachments belonging to the escort; the infantry of which detachment will remain at the head of the wagons, the cavalry shall march by troops 300 paces in advance, and the rear-guard must be formed equal to the advanced; but besides this rear-guard, there should be a body of hussars and dragoons reserved, to march a quarter of a league or more, according to the nature of the country, in the rear of the convoy; the remainder of the infantry shall be distributed at proper distances on the sides of the convoy, and the remainder of the cavalry shall be placed on the flanks of the convoy, about 300 paces distance.

When a convoy happens to be of such importance that its being taken may influence the operations during the remainder of the campaign, the general should not only assign a stronger or more numerous escort to it, but should also send off detachments, which, without having orders to attack the enemy, should keep between him and the road that the convoy keeps, in order to oppose and baffle any designs the enemy may have formed to carry it off. The following examples will show both the security and necessity of this method.

During the campaign of 1746, marshal Saxe, being encamped on the Orne, was in expectation of a considerable convoy from Judoigne. As its safe arrival in the camp was of great consequence, he caused the marquis of d'Armentières, then major-general, to set out with a large detachment in the night preceding the day on which the convoy was Defensive was to begin its march, with orders to march on the side of Ramillies. At the same time, he caused another detachment to set out from the camp of his serene highness the prince of Clermont, with orders to march on the side of the abbey of Rame; these two detachments, by amusing the enemy on one side, and by entirely concealing the march of the convoy on the other, enabled it to proceed in security, and it arrived in the camp without having been at all molested.

In the beginning of the campaign in 1748, the same general having a design to lay siege to Maastricht, and consequently having occasion for all his troops, was willing to throw a supply of provisions into Bergen-op-Zoom, as he was going to a distance from that place, and could no longer be in a situation of afflicting it. For that purpose he ordered a considerable convoy, which set out from Antwerp for that town under a good escort; but in order to prevent an attack, which circumstance had often happened during the winter, and that with loss, the allies at that time occupying a chain of quarters from Breda as far as Voude, he detached the count d'Effrees with a considerable body of cavalry to march on the side of Breda, with orders to push on detachments almost to Voude. This detachment had two objects in view; one of which was to keep the allies in suspense with regard to the siege that was to be formed, and the other to cause them to remain near Breda. This large body of cavalry kept the allies, who were in the neighbourhood of that town, in suspense; during which interval marshal Saxe marched to Maastricht, the allies not daring to attack the convoy, because they would have put themselves between the escort and the troops under count d'Effrees. From these two examples may be concluded the necessity of covering convoys of importance by detachments, independent of the escort assigned them. In short, a general should do everything that will contribute to the security of his dispositions; and precautions ought never to be thought superfluous when they are managed with prudence, and have for their end the success of a well-concerted plan.

**Sect. VIII. Of Detachments for forming a Chain of green Forage.**

It is very difficult to provide a large army with forage; and a general often exposes it to inevitable danger, if he is not thoroughly experienced in this operation, or if he is destitute of that knowledge which at once presents all the wants of an army, and the means of supplying them, to his view.

Foraging parties, like convoys, are attended with a greater or lesser degree of danger, according as the country is more or less accessible, and the forage at a distance or near at hand. The disposition for the chain in an open country is different from what it must be in a mountainous one. When forage is within reach of the camp, and the enemy at a distance, fewer troops and attendants are required; because, in case of an attack, there is affluence near at hand; but in proportion as the forage is farther from the camp and nearer to the enemy, the precautions should be increased, and more troops should be allotted to the chain, which should also sometimes be furnished with cannon.

A general should never forget that maxim which says, "The enemy must always be opposed by troops of the same nature as those with which he makes the attack;" if the forage, therefore, is in an open country, the chain, as it is certain the enemy will be more numerous in cavalry than infantry, should consist chiefly of cavalry, and only have infantry sufficient to occupy such posts as are necessary to be guarded; in a mountainous country the dispositions will be quite different; because, as it is impossible for cavalry to move easily, the chain should be strengthened in infantry. In short, the number and quality of the troops for the chain should be regulated in the same manner as in regard to the convoys; in proportion to the weakness or distance of the enemy; by the extent of ground to be foraged; and by the nature of the country; and as marshal Puylégur observes, before the ground to be foraged is examined, there should be a calculation made of the number of horses to be fed, and of the fertility of the ground that is to be foraged; for if it is a plentiful spot, a less extent will be sufficient; if it is not plentiful, a larger must be taken; but in either case the chain must be always proportionable.

Before a forage is undertaken, the ground on which it is to be performed should be always thoroughly known; in order for which the general should send out in the evening, or the day before, the officer who is to command it, with a detachment, to survey the situation of the country; the places where he must post his troops of cavalry and dragoons; the posts which the infantry must occupy; the ground necessary for the foragers; that where the corps of reserve must be posted; and what part in the front of the chain it will be necessary for the hussars to scour. After having examined all these particulars, the officer makes his report to the general, who, from the account given him, will order the troops necessary to secure the forage, and render the execution of it easy. The chain of forage should be in proportion to the number of troops that are to forage, as well as to the quantity of sown fields and the thickness of the grain. Besides the hussars, dragoons, and infantry, there should be hussars to scour the country in the front of the chain; the number of them is undetermined, as it will be sufficient for them to cover and protect the front, and give the commanding officer immediate notice of every thing that makes its appearance.

If the forage is to be made at a distance from the camp, the troops destined for the chain should set out at day-break, or the evening of the foregoing night. The commanding officer must take care to establish the chain before the foragers arrive, and also that the hussars have scoured the country; first, because the foragers should not, by waiting, fatigue the hussars; and secondly, that no trooper or servant shall pass; which will undoubtedly be the case if there is any vacancy where troops are not placed.

The whole of the troops should be disposed after such a manner as to be able to see one another; and the vedets also, that are placed between the troops to prevent the foragers from passing, should be within hearing. The infantry should be posted in hollows and villages and behind hedges, with horse or dragoons to sustain it and support the flanks; and the disposition of the chain will be still better, if these troops can be mixed with it, provided the infantry can be sheltered by any hollows, hedges, or bushes.

Grenadiers, sustained by horse and cannon, if there are any, should be posted on those sides which, either from the situation of the country or the weakness of the enemy, are most liable to be attacked; but in reinforcing these posts, the commanding officer must be careful not to weaken the chain too much in any particular part. When an enemy attacks a foraging party, he generally attempts to penetrate at different parts; but if he forms only one attack, the disposition of the chain becomes useless, as all the troops must be brought to that part where the attack is made. But as it is naturally to be supposed the enemy will form many attacks, particularly if his general acts like a man understanding understanding his business, he must be strong in every part; operations the reserve, which is in the centre, will, with expedition and speed, send assistance to the parts which are attacked.

Before the commanding officer fixes the chain, he should detach some hussars to survey and secure with great exactness the woods, villages, hollows, and all such places, for at least three quarters of a league or a league, in front, as may be capable of containing ambuscades: and during the time of this surveying, the troops destined for the chain will remain in order of battle, in the front of the ground that is to be foraged, in order to cover it and protect the hussars, in case they should be attacked.

When this examination is finished, the commanding officer may begin to establish his chain, and the hussars will remain in the front till the foraging is finished; and will detach small bodies to march round about the chain, crossing each other, halting at times, and sending some hussars before them to patrol.

If the hussars gain intelligence of the enemy's being either in march, or placed in ambush, they will send immediate notice of it to the commanding officer of the chain, who should always fix himself in a particular spot, that there may be no time spent in seeking him; his post should be in the rear of that part of the chain that is nearest to and most in front of the enemy, and he will regulate the dispositions for his defence according to the report made to him. When an ambuscade is discovered, and troops marching to attack, a general should always suspect there may be more ambuscades, and more troops in march, to form different attacks; he must therefore, instead of weakening the chain in any part, strengthen it as much as he can, by causing either the whole reserve, or part of it, to march where circumstances shall require.

The avenues and the heights in a mountainous country should be occupied by infantry; the avenues, in order to prevent the enemy from penetrating into the valley or plain where the forage is made; the heights, in order to observe the enemy at a distance, and to prevent his getting possession of them, and flanking the troops which guard the avenues. In this case there should be a greater number of infantry than cavalry; no more of the latter being requisite than what is necessary to sustain and support the infantry, in case it should be attacked, repulsed, and obliged to retire through a valley or plain. Then, if it hath no cavalry to support it, the wings will be entirely exposed, and the enemy being superior, can at the same time attack the front and the flanks; whereas, by the means of horde, which can act with ease in a plain or a valley, this inconvenience will be prevented, and the infantry greatly assisted.

If the forage is made at a distance from the camp, and in the neighbourhood of the enemy, the infantry guarding the avenues should throw up some entrenchments in its front, which will be soon done; and it is then cannon becomes necessary, as there should be two or three pieces planted at each avenue. The hussars also must, on every occasion, be occupied, which should be constantly observed as a general rule, whether the enemy is at a distance or near at hand, in every disposition that is to be executed in a mountainous country.

If the enemy forms one or more attacks, the small efforts belonging to each regiment must join on the first order, and cover the foragers as much as possible, who should at the same time assemble in the centre by regiments. The foragers should always be provided with their carbine or sword; and although they may not be very formidable against troops completely armed, yet there have been instances where they have charged with success.

If it is in a plain, and the enemy, having formed but one attack, charges the chain in one particular part, the troops of horse and dragoons which are opposite to him should march up resolutely and sustain his efforts: if they are repulsed, they will be supported by the infantry that hath remained in its post; the hussars which were in front will unite, and place themselves upon the flanks of the troops which are attacked, in order to cover them, and endeavour to defeat the enemy by charging him in flank and rear. If the general is certain that the whole of the enemy's troops are engaged in this one attack, he may then bring up all the troops belonging to the chain, both cavalry and infantry, in order to oblige him to retire the sooner: which if he does, some hussars, sustained by horse and dragoons, should be sent in pursuit of him, till his retreat becomes certain; but with caution not to pursue too far, lest he should rally upon those troops, who, being too far from the chain, cannot receive assistance so soon as would be necessary; and besides, the making and accomplishing the forage being the grand object, the commanding officer should be contented with succeeding in that, without seeking for any other advantage unconnected with the original destination of the troops.

If the enemy forms more attacks than one, the foragers, who, as hath been already observed, must be assembled in the centre, should have orders to take the road to the camp, and will re-enter it covered by the small efforts from the rear-guard; but as a forage should never be abandoned till the last extremity, they should be ordered to draw up in order of battle, when they are within a quarter of a league of the camp, in order to return and complete the forage on the first order. But if the enemy is in force, and by his superiority all hope of obtaining the forage is destroyed; or if it is made at so great a distance from the camp that the troops belonging to the chain cannot expect to be readily assisted; the commanding officer ought to make a retreat, with every disposition a good officer is capable of, and to join courage and vigilance with knowledge and experience.

If, on the contrary, the enemy is weaker, or of equal force with the chain, he should be charged without hesitation; because the enemy, regulating his attack by his defence, will be obliged to contract himself, in order to make his attack heavier and more considerable; so that the troops being united, will charge the enemy; and if, by the assistance of the hussars who are advanced, and act after the manner already mentioned, the enemy is forced to retire, he must be pursued in the manner above directed; after which the troops must return and complete the forage.

As a commanding officer is, in case of a forced retreat after being beat, obliged to submit to circumstances, and regulate his dispositions by the enemy's, he must retire with the greatest order possible, causing the infantry to march in the centre, either in columns or in order of battle, as the situation of the ground will best allow; the horse and dragoons upon the wings, the hussars upon the flanks, that they may not confute the dispositions, but serve as a support for the chain, and prevent its being taken in flank; and the disposition of the troops should be so managed, that the enemy shall not be able to present a larger front than that which is opposed to him: and although it is impossible for a general to foresee, for certain, what will be the dispositions for an attack and retreat, because they must be changed according as those of the enemy alter, or as the nature of the ground varies; they should nevertheless be so ordered, that each body shall be supported, and capable of acting without confusion. It is only on occasions thus pressing, that the commanding officer should suffer the forage to be abandoned; and even then it will be some satisfaction that he hath been able to place the foragers and their horses in a state of security. If, during the retreat of the chain, it should receive assistance from the army, it should charge the enemy, notwithstanding its being too late to go on with the foraging; and if this charge should prove successful in either beating or causing the enemy to retire, he should be pursued without intermission, in order to deprive him of all desire for repeating the attack. In order to improve this advantage to the utmost, the commanding officer should leave a large detachment, consisting of infantry, cavalry, dragoons, and hussars, to continue all night upon the spot, and the next morning betimes, the foragers, properly escorted, will come to take away the forage; and as soon as the escort is arrived in the front of the chain, the detachment which hath remained there all night must return to the camp.

There still remain many other precautions to be taken for the security of foraging parties, but the limits preferable to us will not admit of our stating them. We shall only add, that the foragers, in entering the ground they are to encompass, do not occupy more than is absolutely requisite, and that they do not spoil more grain than they carry away with them; first, because by extending the chain it would be weakened, and become easier to be forced; and in the second place, every prudent officer should be an economist in the article of forage; the officers commanding the small escorts which march at the head of each regiment should be charged with the care of this. These officers will cause their troops to march as much as possible through roads and over grounds which are untilled, till they arrive at the place intended to be foraged. If all the grounds are sown, the commanding officer must cause the cavalry to dismount at the place where the chain halts, and part of the troopers furnished with scythes must go and cut the grain, while the remainder hold the horses; and when there shall be no farther room to fear damaging the forage, the cavalry will remount and take it up. Each place should be marked out for a brigade or a regiment; which distribution should be made by the staff officers before the troops arrive.

Sect. IX. Of the Detachments for forming a Chain of dry Forage.

If there is great exactness and knowledge required in the conducting of parties for green forage, those for dry forage perhaps require more; and, in general, every thing that regards foraging parties, whether green or dry, excites a particular attention in the commander in chief; and, according to the chevalier Polard, all success in war depends upon secrecy, diligence, activity, and the thorough knowledge of the country.

The dispositions for forming a chain of dry forage, which differ from those for forming one of green, will direct the means for extending the chain in proportion to its strength, and at the same time place the foragers in security; although, in parties of dry forage, the foragers generally take up less ground, according to the distance of the villages that are to be foraged from each other.

The dispositions for a chain of dry forage are also varied according to the nature of the country; but whether it be open or mountainous, each different body should be placed in that part where it can act with the greatest facility; the infantry therefore should occupy the villages, and the cavalry the plain in front, and should be disposed after such a manner as to be able to retire easily to the protection of the infantry. Before the foraging is put in execution, the commander in chief should mark out the villages to the general officer who is to command the foraging party, and regulate their number by the quantity of troops that are to forage. The first dispositions will be the same with those mentioned in the foregoing section in relation to green forage; therefore the general who is to command the forage ought to set out with a detachment in order to examine the ground, the posts necessary to be occupied, the villages which are to be foraged, their situation, the rivers which cover or run through them, the bridges to be guarded, the distance from one village to another, and with what degree of ease the communication with them may be secured. After having thoroughly examined into these particulars, he can with ease form a judgment of the number of troops that will be necessary to form the chain and secure the foragers; after having done this, he will order the bailiff or burgomaster of every village to come to him, and inquire of them the number of husbandmen, and how many ploughs each husbandman hath belonging to him; by which he will be able to calculate the number of sheafs reaped by each husbandman.

The general may, for every plough, reckon about 30 acres of ground; and, in proportion to the fertility of the ground, every acre will produce from 120 to 160 sheafs; by this method may be computed the number of sheafs reaped by a husbandman who hath three or four ploughs; and from this calculation the general will judge whether the number of sheafs supposed to be in each village, will be insufficient for the troops coming to them.

Let every acre of ground be supposed to yield 144 sheafs; then a husbandman who hath three ploughs will have reaped 12,960 sheafs; so by reckoning 12 sheafs to a truffle, and every truffle to weigh 600 pounds weight, this husbandman will supply sufficient for 124 truffles. It is true, that some deduction should be made from the number of truffles that every acre may yield, as the husbandman or farmer may have preserved or consumed some either for daily use or for seed.

It is very necessary that the general should take care to leave sufficient grain, not only to enable the husbandman to live, but also to sow his grounds; particularly if he foresees a probability of the next campaign being carried on in the same country.

Nevertheless, as this manner of reckoning may be attended with inconveniences, because there are some villages which keep up a particular trade of forage and grain, and therefore the granaries and barns may sometimes be found empty, yet the quantity of sheafs and grain remaining in the village may be calculated by the number of inhabitants to be subsisted. Marshal de Puysegur's method, which consists in informing himself of the number of horned cattle and horses, and by deducting the time they graze, is a very good one; but still there must be some deficiency in this calculation, as it will be impossible to fix with certainty the time of their grazing.

When the general shall have arrived at a tolerable certainty of the quantity of forage; the ground where to establish his chain; the posts which the infantry are to occupy; and taken a note of the quantity of forage; he will carry away one or two of the bailiffs or burgomasters, as hostages for the security of the forage; he will also direct them to inform the inhabitants, that if they conceal or purloin but even a single sheaf from the whole, he will cause their village to be first pillaged, and afterwards set on fire; so that the peasants, on whom these threats have often great effect, will scarcely give the enemy information of the intended forage. The general must leave some companies of infantry, sustained by a detachment of hussars in every village, who, by constantly patrolling on the outskirts, will stop all comers and goers; while the infantry will keep a strict guard on the inside of the village, and permit no person to go out of it; nor suffer the bells to be rung, colours Part I. Of the OPERATIONS of OFFENSIVE WAR.

JUSTICE and humanity having been considered, in this article, as the first principles of war, the chief intention of the first part hath therefore been, rather to convey maxims for a just defence, than to lay down rules for attacking. But though defensive war be that alone to which religion and philosophy give their sanction, it does not follow that a nation is bound to wait patiently for the attack of its enemies. When the conduct of other nations is such as evidently to show that they meditate a war, the nation threatened may arm itself, and strike the first blow when it can be struck with advantage. There is only one precaution for avoiding the danger with which it is beset. By observing the various operations of an offensive war, it may indeed be often seen that the whole is nothing more than a series of defence, and that the fear of being attacked is the real source whence these precautions for attacking spring.

Sect. I. Of Spies.

It is impossible for a general, or even for an officer charged with the command of a detachment, to act with certainty if he have not spies or secret intelligence dispersed about the enemy's army; for, without the information which they alone can give, he will have the mortification to see all his designs miscarry, and all his precautions become useless, because improperly taken.

No expense therefore should be spared to procure intelligent spies; but care should be taken that they are unacquainted with each other, and particularly that they are not known to any inferior officer; they should be always spoken to alone, and never be suffered to meet each other. The general should study their character, and prove them by repeated trials; he should found them by degrees, beginning with things not difficult to be explained, and which, if discovered, will not be of great consequence; he should engage them in long conversations, thereby to form a judgment of their parts and comprehension; and he should also employ them often in bringing him intelligence.

Although a general should always be upon his guard with a spy whom he hath cause to suspect of treachery, he may nevertheless draw great advantage from him, provided he knows how to deceive him properly; because he may be very certain he will inform the enemy of all the resolutions which have been taken.

The emperor Leo, in his Tactic, advises a general, who hath reason to imagine his counsels are betrayed to the enemy, to conceal his real designs, by speaking in a manner quite opposite to them: For, says he, in the maxims at the end of his book, an enemy must be deceived who receives intelligence from spies or defectors directly contrary to what is actually resolved upon. But, adds he, should these spies be entrusted with the general's real intention, he should, by some alteration in his operations, endeavour to persuade the enemy that they have deceived him; upon which he will grow mistrustful of them, and be obliged to look out for others, no longer daring to confide in the former.

If a spy employed by the enemy is discovered, and brought to the general, he ought to take him in private, question with mildness, speak to him with a sort of confidence, and, instead of threatening, should promise him a reward if he will discover to him what he knows of the enemy's intentions. If the general finds him intelligent, he should endeavour to engage him in his service; and, provided he can gain him over by force of money, a thing not difficult, he may derive great advantage from him; but he should be careful how he employs him, till he hath very good reason to be assured of his fidelity.

There are many different methods of trying the veracity of a spy; if, for example, the general receives information, that, on such a day, a detachment of the enemy is to set out on some expedition, he should then send out troops to double the number of those detached by the enemy; by which Offensive which means, if the spy's intelligence is true, the enemy's operations will not only be baulked in his design, but may also be beat by the superior detachment. If the enemy's detachment has but a trifling object in view, it will be sufficient to send just troops sufficient to examine into the truth of the spy's report. The general may also pretend to appoint a foraging within two days, and order but few troops for the chain; in which interval, if the spy is false, he will find an opportunity of giving the enemy notice of it: but, instead of the few troops publicly ordered, the general will privately add another body to them, which will be placed in ambuscade behind the place where the pretended forage is to be made. If the enemy, in consequence of this information, should come and attack the chain, it should immediately retire, as it too inferior in number to continue the forage, toward the troops in ambuscade; when, being joined, they will fall upon the enemy on all sides. If this attack is made with vivacity and resolution, there may be great reason to expect it will terminate in a complete victory.

If, on the contrary, the spy does not appear intelligent, or affects stupidity, the general should punish him with death, and cause him to be hanged in the sight of the whole army, in order to deter others, which may be dispersed in the camp, by his fate. It would be needless to question him concerning the enemy, because it would appear inhuman to execute a man who had given intelligence of importance, whether extorted from him by fear, force, or perhaps a promise of pardon.

Spies are as necessary to a general as arms are to an army: but it is money only that can secure their fidelity; and if a general finds himself ill served, it is because he has been too sparing of the funds intended by his sovereign for that purpose. Notwithstanding it is the duty of a good subject to manage his master's finances as much as it is in his power, yet there are intelligences of so great importance, that it is scarcely possible to pay sufficiently for them. A man is sufficiently indemnified when, by means of the intelligence he has received, he has concerted his measures in such a manner as to beat the enemy, gain some marches over him, or to be beforehand with him in some enterprise.

Spies, when discovered, should not always be punished with death; great advantage may be made of them by pretending ignorance of their real quality, especially if they are not sufficiently disguised. Tacitus, in his Annals, lays, that Vitellius's party got information of Otho's designs by means of his spies, who, by endeavouring to dive too minutely into their enemy's secrets, did not sufficiently conceal their own. Vigeius's method for discovering spies who are suspected to be ranging about in a camp, is to order all the soldiers and servants into their tents during the day, and the spies will be taken immediately.

When a general is ignorant of the enemy's designs he should always affect a knowledge of them; but whenever he is informed of them, he should, on the contrary, pretend to be ignorant of them; by which means the enemy, being easy with regard to his spies, will not alter his designs, or suspect the general of having any knowledge of them.

If the general can procure such spies as, by their employment, are near the person of the enemy's general; as, for example, a secretary, or any others who are near him, and who consequently can give intelligence more to be relied upon than those who are constantly passing from one army to another; their service may be turned to a very great account.

If a general discovers an enemy's spy to be one of those who, by their employment, are near his person, he can receive great advantage, by forcing him to write a letter of false intelligence, thereby to divert the enemy's attention from the plan he would execute; but he should cause him to be hanged immediately after, for it would be very imprudent to use him above once. The prince of Orange, when he came to attack M. Luxemburg at Steinkirk, having discovered one of his musicians who gave the enemy intelligence of every thing he intended, made use of this stratagem; and although it was rendered abortive by the vigilance of M. de Luxemburg, and the courage of his troops, there are nevertheless but very few instances where it hath failed; and even M. de Luxemburg would have been beaten, if he had not had early notice given him by his advanced detachments; by which means he had time sufficient to make his dispositions, and to avoid being surprised.

There is a stratagem which may be made use of when spies are wanting; and which is less expensive; that is, to send supposititious letters by the first peasant that comes in the way, who will have nothing to fear; and so far from concealing himself, he must take a road where he will be sure of falling into the enemy's hands: these letters should be directed to the general officers commanding a body of troops, or even to the general of the army, supposing they come from an advanced body. They should contain schemes that are good, and practicable in their execution, but quite opposite to what is intended and will really be undertaken; it often happens that the enemy, too credulous, abandons his original designs to pursue chimerical ones, which to him appear very good, and do not present any obstacle to those which the general designs to execute. Prince Eugene succeeded, by this stratagem, in raising the siege of Coni, formed by the French in 1691.

But nevertheless a general should take care that, through a fear of being deceived by supposititious letters, he does not himself too much neglect the intimations which are given him: a general ought, says Onozander, to listen to everybody at all times, and upon all occasions. Alexander, when at a great distance from his own country, not being able to receive his couriers till very late, refused to give attention to a peasant, who came to inform him of a faster route; but soon repenting of what he had done, he sent to seek after him, but in vain.

The same reason that should make a general always have spies in the enemy's army, should also make him suspect that the enemy has some in his; therefore he should endeavour to deceive them, he should keep his intentions secret, mention them to very few, and always talk openly, contrary to what is really designed. Onozander observes, that it shows great folly in a general to mention his designs publicly, especially when they are on the eve of execution; for defectors generally go over to the enemy at the time an action is unavoidable.

But if it is discovered that the enemy has received information, Vigeius says, that the dispositions must be immediately changed. Polybius, on like occasions, particularly recommends silence and dissimulation; he even stretches this rule as far as the thoughts themselves, which he says must sometimes be repressed, for fear our actions should sometimes betray and discover them. Metellus answered one of his friends, who, on an important occasion, asked him the reason of certain dispositions, "that if his friend knew what he thought, he would burn it."

To avoid the danger of treachery, sealed orders have been used with great success, which have been sent to officers, with express orders not to open them till at such a time and at such a place: this is an established rule at sea, and can also be practised on shore when employed in an expedition which it is essential to conceal from the enemy. A general who loses a battle, says Vizetius, may attribute his ill luck to fortune, although these kind of events are generally the effects of art and skill; but he who suffers himself to be surprised, and who falls into the snares laid for him by the enemy, has no excuse to make, because, by his vigilance, and the goodness of his spies, he might have avoided them.

A design should never be formed for an attack upon marches, detachments, convoys, forages, or upon one or many quarters, without knowing the ways which are to be passed, and the places where ambuscades may be formed; whether to avoid, or whether to conceal troops in them, in order to facilitate a retreat, or to draw the enemy into it.

A general who receives information from his spies that some enterprises are intended upon some bodies detached from the army, upon one of his convoys, on a forage, or upon his quarters, ought also, on his side, to form ambuscades in the ways leading to it. The number of troops in ambuscade ought to be regulated by that of the detachment intended to be surprised; it should be sufficiently strong to attack the enemy on all sides, that is, in head, flank, and rear. The troops who set out to form an ambuscade should always march by night, unless it be in a country so covered that the enemy cannot perceive them.

A general, according to Santa Cruz, should endeavour to form as many ambuscades as possible; so that if the enemy should not fall into one, he may not escape the others: they ought to be disposed after such a manner, that one can neither attack nor be attacked without being heard, sustained, and assisted by the others: this junction is a stratagem which the enemy could not expect, and which will allure the victory. If, from the fewness of the troops, or the fatigues of the campaign, it is impossible to form many, there should at least be one sufficiently strong to resist the enemy it would attack: but still it is not requisite that it should be as numerous as the enemy, because troops in ambuscade, who charge a detachment that is unprovided on all sides, ought, by this surprise, to have a particular advantage, and consequently supply the place of number; which will certainly be the case, particularly if the enemy falls into the ambuscade during the night, and that care hath been also taken to place a great number of drums and trumpets, that when the troops of ambush charge, they may serve to increase the numbers in appearance, by the terror which noise always raises in the night time.

In order to deceive the enemy who is in detachment, small bodies should be sent out towards him, with orders to retire to the troops in ambuscade as soon as they meet him.

Ambuscades should always have some object. Before they are undertaken, it should be known whether the enemy is in the field; if he intends either to attack or molest the quarters; whether it is proper to wait for him or to seek him: without these precautions the troops will be fatigued, and no end answered.

Ambuscades may be composed of infantry, hussars, or dragoons; but it is the situation of the country that must determine which. These troops may be mixed together or sent separately; but that must be according to the design intended to be executed, or according to the nature of the troops employed by the enemy in his detachments.

If the design is to attack a convoy, all these troops are necessary, because the escort of it will undoubtedly consist of infantry, cavalry, or dragoons, and also some hussars to clear the march; if a green forage, infantry is very neces-

fary, but it should always be left in the rear to secure the offensive retreat: cavalry, with hussars or dragoons, is sufficient to attack a forage, to beat the escort of it, or at least to prevent the foraging being executed. If a dry forage is to be attacked, it must be done with infantry, because, as it can only be performed in the villages, it is certain they will be occupied by infantry, and that there will be a chain of cavalry in the front, which will be protected by it: if a detachment, it is according to the nature of the country through which it marches; if an open country, hussars, hussars, or dragoons, must be employed: but in a woody or mountainous country, infantry must be made use of. After all that can be said, it is impossible to lay down fixed rules for the kind of troops which should be employed: there are some woody countries where hussars and dragoons can act with ease, and be of great service; there are mountains where they can act securely, because very fine plains, divided by woods, are to be found in the bodies of them, where they can place themselves in ambuscade; but care must be taken to secure their retreat. There are, on the other hand, plains so divided by hollows and canals, that infantry only are capable of acting; therefore it is the general's business to discover from which kind of troops, in either country, he may expect the greatest advantage.

There is no country but presents some place proper for forming ambuscades; hollows from which it is easy to fall, the least height, woods, hedges, ruins, vineyards, sometimes corn-fields, marshes covered with reeds, all present expedients to a general who knows how to take advantage of them: he must only be careful to place the ambuscades after such a manner that they shall not be discovered by the enemy's parties; and that they are not themselves discovered by the inattention of any of the soldiers, by noise, or by other accidents.

If the ambuscade consists of hussars or dragoons, the horses must not be together; their neighings may prove very prejudicial. Even a peasant, attracted by the barking of a dog or the neighing of a horse, may go into a wood, discover an ambuscade, and, often induced by the hope of a reward, will go and give the enemy information of the whole. Every person passing near an ambuscade should be stopped, and that without noise; the peasants should be tied to trees, and guarded by sentries. If the ambuscade is formed in an hollow way, behind an high ground, or in any places whatever, the general must cause every body that is taken to be tied together, and well guarded.

The troops in ambuscade must fall on all parties of the enemy that pass near them, unless when the design is to carry off a convoy or to attack a large detachment. It should in that case continue silent, and let them pass; but if these parties, by making a strict examination, discover the ambuscade, as there can no longer remain any hope of attacking the convoy or detachment, it should fall upon and endeavour to surround them, and, if possible, take them prisoners; and if the troops in ambuscade are too lucky as not to let any of the enemy escape, the ambuscade may remain in its first situation, but always pursue its first object, because here will be no reason to apprehend the enemy's having received intelligence of it.

The troops in ambuscade should attack these parties sword in hand, and not with their firearms, and, if possible, prevent them from using theirs. From this manner of attacking, there will result two considerable advantages. The first is, that a brisk and unexpected attack astonishes, and scarcely gives them time to think of their defence. The second is, that, by firing, it is to be feared, that if there are any other parties farther off they will hear it, and send and give notice. In that case, the ambuscade must change situ- The least thing, as has already been said, may be the occasion of an ambuscade's being discovered. The fire of a pipe may be seen at a great distance in the night-time; besides, however small the number of soldiers who smoke may be, the wind may carry the smoke and the smell of the tobacco toward that part where the enemy patrols. The ambuscade should not be cumbered with servants, or any thing else that is unnecessary; orders should be given that the horses are tied with care, and that a profound silence is observed by every body. As it is very difficult for hussars or dragoons to march without leaving marks behind them, by which means the road leading to the ambuscade may be discovered, they should try to enter it by some bye-way, or at least by as dry a one as possible. In order to efface the marks of the horses feet, eight or ten hussars or dragoons may tie branches of trees to their horses tails, and, by marching behind the detachment, in as large a front as the whole body, will destroy any marks that are made: as soon as they shall have entered the wood, they will close up the entrance with the same branches, of which they will make a sort of hedge.

If the detachment intended to form an ambuscade, whether infantry or cavalry, is obliged to march upon a high-way, as soon as it comes near the place appointed, the commanding officer should detach a body on before, with orders to take up the same front as the whole detachment. As soon as it shall have proceeded a quarter or half a league, it will return by another way; and it should also make a large circuit, so that the enemy's parties, coming the same way, will not perceive that they shall be stopped by any troops in that place. This body will rejoin the troops which are in ambuscade, by a road the most out of the enemy's view, never in a body, but scattered, so that they may leave fewer marks behind them. Sentinels should be concealed behind bushes, in the front of the ambuscade, so that they may be able to see the country and ways about them, without being seen themselves: two or three soldiers should also be made to climb into trees, in order to see at a great distance, and give notice if they perceive any troops; the same method must be observed with regard to hussars or dragoons.

Before the commanding officer enters the wood where he would form his ambuscade, he should detach two or three patrols to secure it, for fear the enemy should happen to be there in ambuscade himself; after every part has been searched, the troops must enter the wood, and range themselves according to the order that shall have been given them. The commanding officer will form three bodies of his detachment, and place them at a distance one from another; one will be destined to attack the advanced guard, the other the centre, and the last the rear-guard. If the detachment consists of cavalry, the half of each corps should be on horseback; no persons should slip or pass the sentries or vedettes under pain of being declared deserters. During the night, the cavalry should be mounted, and the infantry under arms; in the day-time, half those on foot will relieve those on horseback every three hours; and the same should be done with the vedettes, as well as the infantry and sentries.

If the ambuscade is behind an height or small mountain, sentries must be placed on the top, lying on their bellies, and without hats: in other respects the same dispositions ought to be observed, whether on the march or for the conducting of ambuscades, always paying a proper regard to circumstances and the situation of the country.

There are divers methods of drawing the enemy into ambuscades. The general commanding the army or quarters sends out a detachment under the command of an intelligent officer, to form an ambuscade, at the distance of one or two leagues, more or less, according as the country is fitting for that sort of dispositions, or according to the daintiness of the enemy. The general must acquaint this officer, that two hours after he is set out, he will send out another detachment, of less force, with orders to go on the side where the enemy is, to endeavour to meet him, and at first sight to make a feint of charging him; but, as it finding him too strong, he will begin his retreat, directing it toward the place where the troops are in ambuscade; furnished with these instructions he will let out.

Then the general will send for the officer intended to command the detachment, that is to go in search of the enemy, and inform him of that which is let out to form the ambuscade, and of the place where it is; he will order him to advance as near to the enemy as he can, and to draw him by a feigned retreat upon the troops in ambuscade.

These two officers should be the only persons informed of the design: but nevertheless the commandant of the detachment which is to go towards the enemy, may communicate it to the principal officers under his command; so that in case he should be taken or killed in the retreat, he that succeeds in the command may be able to act according to the general's intentions. He must be particularly careful, that no folder, trooper, hussar, or dragoon, penetrate into the design of the detachment, as it would then be in the power of a single deserter to make the ambuscade miscarry. The detachment which is to go and seek the enemy, in order to draw him into the ambuscade, ought to be composed of hussars, unless the country be of such a nature that infantry only is capable of acting.

During the time that the hussars are gone before, endeavouring to draw on the enemy, the troops in ambuscade will be on horseback, and waiting in silence for their commander's order to go out and charge. As soon as they shall have charged and beaten the enemy, for fear left another detachment, at a little distance from that which has been beaten, should come to its assistance, they will take the shortest way, and march leisurely, but with order, towards the camp or the quarters. The detachment which drew the enemy into the ambuscade, must form the rear-guard of it, and will march slowly on, while the rest of the troops will retreat, conducting the prisoners with them. If the enemy finds any succours, as soon as the rear-guard perceives them, it will double its pace, but with order; there will be no reason to apprehend the enemy's coming too briskly upon it, because he will be fearful of falling into another ambuscade: thus the rear-guard will retreat with ease, and the troops who conduct the prisoners have time enough to reach the camp, without any molestation.

It is on these occasions that a man should know how to keep his courage within proper bounds, and be sensible that flight is glorious: the despair of an enemy that is surprised, and even beaten, is always to be feared, when he is not entirely defeated. A man should always be content with one victory, without attempting a second; he may, by pursuing the enemy too eagerly, fall himself into ambuscades more dangerous than that he has just drawn the enemy into.

If there is reason to apprehend that the enemy, having notice from some deserters, are coming in full strength, the ambuscade must then change its situation and draw nearer to the place from whence it set out. This will serve two purposes; for should the enemy appear in force, the ambuscade will have the shorter way to retreat; or it may again happen that that the enemy, not finding the ambuscade in the places pointed out by the deserters, will imagine it to be retired, and, in that belief, will neglect the precautions necessary in such a situation.

An ambuscade that is successful may cause the destruction of a whole army. The example cited by M. de Feuquieres, in his Memoirs, on that head, is striking. M. de Luxemburg, still attached to the prince, took all the baggage belonging to M. Turenne's army, because the lieutenant-general who commanded the escort did not foresee that the enemy, shut up in his lines or circumvallation before Arras, having two armies near his camp with a design of attacking him in his lines, could think of sending out a large detachment of cavalry on an enterprise of such a fort. In the mean time M. Luxemburg, who was in ambuscade, within reach of the column of baggage, seeing that the lieutenant-general was gone on before with the head of the escort, imagining the baggage in security, marched speedily to the head of that column, whose march he stopped, and turned toward St Pol, where he conducted the whole baggage belonging to M. Turenne's army, without his knowing anything of the matter. It is thus that, by the negligence of an officer, and by an ambuscade featonably placed, an army finds itself stripped of all its baggage, and, as may be said, not in a condition of continuing the campaign.

If this lieutenant-general had been provided with spies, detachments in front and on the flanks, these detachments would have discovered the ambuscades, and, by the precautions usual on such occasions, he would have placed the baggage of the army in safety. Again, his spies would have given him notice, that a large body of cavalry was detached from the camp before Arras, consequently he would have been upon his guard; instead of which, being full of a false confidence, he marched as if in a campaign country, and, by this unpardonable remissness, occasioned the loss of the whole baggage. An officer who commands a detachment for any expedition whatever, cannot possibly take too much care to foresee the checks that may happen to him; if he is beaten, it should be wholly owing to a superiority of force. He who, after having taken all the precautions possible, is beaten by an enemy who has the advantage of number, has nothing to reproach himself with; but he who, with ability, has nevertheless neglected certain precautions, and is beat because they were not taken, is certainly culpable in the eyes of intelligent men.

**Sect. III. Of Camps in Offensive War.**

To take an advantageous position for an army; to make choice of a spot that by its situation is strongly secured; to establish a camp there, and to be able to have the army within distance of marching easily to the enemy, without fear of being molested; in short, to throw such difficulties in the enemy's way as may prevent his harassing the army, is one of the most essential branches of knowledge for a general. He who is endowed with this talent can, with an inferior army, not only make head against the enemy, but also cause his designs to miscarry; fatigue him the whole campaign by marches and counter-marches, which lead to nothing; oblige him to remain inactive, and at length draw him into a favourable position, where he will be morally sure of beating him. All this was done by M. Turenne in 1675, who, after having exhausted every expedient wherewith his military knowledge could furnish him to draw M. de Montecuccoli into a disadvantageous point, at length succeeded, found an opportunity of attacking him, and gloriously fell at the instant victory declared itself in his favour.

Before a general takes the field, he ought to be very certain what number of troops he shall have, that his magazines both of war and provision are ready, as well as the waggons, pontons, and all other implements whatever that are necessary for an army; for events may happen that it is almost impossible to foresee, and which often alter the best concerted designs. But when every thing is in order, a general possessed of the necessary talents can foresee the event even before taking the field: he will know beforehand the marches he is to make, the camps he is to occupy, and those which the enemy will endeavour to seize in order to oppose his designs.

An offensive war is undoubtedly carried on with greater ease in an open than in a mountainous country. But whether in the one or in the other, no superiority of number should make a general negligent of the safety of his troops in their camp; he should always be anxious in preserving the strictest order and discipline among them; one or two checks are generally sufficient to discourage the soldier, and take away that confidence which he ought to have in his general: the advanced posts should be well guarded, the flanks secured, and detachments frequently sent out towards the enemy; for as success is insured by vigilance and care, so negligence and slack discipline are ruin to the most formidable army, and entertaining a contemptible opinion of an enemy renders him more daring.

It is to be observed, that a camp ought never to be fixed on the banks of rivers; but a sufficient space should always be left between them and the camp, to draw out the army in order of battle. If this precaution is not taken, it may happen that the enemy, encamped either near to or at a distance from the other side of the river, being informed of the position of the army, will come in the night to alarm the camp, and by a discharge of artillery and small arms throw the whole camp into confusion, without risking the loss of a single man. For this reason, a camp should always be placed at least eight or ten hundred yards from a river; so that the guards may be advanced without being exposed, and within the circumference of the camp and compass of the guards the army may be supplied with forage for at least four days, and more if possible.

There are some situations for a camp which are in appearance strong, but may notwithstanding prove very dangerous, if care be not taken to examine whether or not the army can with ease come out of it, to form itself in order of battle; or whether the enemy can prevent it, by blocking up the avenues and outlets. If this precaution be not taken, an army may be the means of shutting itself up; as was done at Senef in 1673, and by the allies at Aachenbourg in 1743.

The choice and strength of a camp depend on the position of the enemy and situation of the country: a general should always avoid encamping the cavalry in a wood, and should be particularly careful that the wings are sheltered; the woods should be occupied by the infantry, and entrenchments thrown up in front, according to the designs intended to be put in execution. If the wings are sheltered by a village, it should be entrenched, and infantry posted in it; and the camp should be covered by a river as much as possible, unless the intention is to march towards the enemy; then all the obstructions that can prevent the army coming up with him should be avoided; but if, from some successe of the enemy, or from his superiority of troops, the general cannot determine upon opening the campaign offensively, he must use other means to bring it about; and in the meantime should strengthen himself in his camp, establish posts on the banks of the river, and cover them by continual detachments of light horse; who, by extending themselves, will prevent parties of the enemy from passing to seize on the hind-parts of the camp, molest the convoys, and attack the foragers.

Whatever may be the nature of the country, it is often necessary to have corps detached from the body of the army, to cover or keep open a communication with some place, in order to prevent the enemy from foraging too near the camp; to preserve the forage; to raise contributions at a distance; to occupy some advantageous post; to oblige the enemy to divide his forces in order to oppose that body; to cover the camp either in the front or on the flanks, according to that side which is left most unguarded and exposed; in a word, there should always be continual detachments toward the enemy, as hath been the practice of many generals, and particularly of marshal Saxe. The strength of this body is to be proportioned to the use designed for it by the general; but it is usually composed of light horse, some regiments of light infantry, and a brigade or two of dragoons. In the end will be seen what use should be made of this body; but in whatever situation it is to be placed, the communication between it and the army must always be kept open, that it may at any time be able to join it on the first order; and its camp must be so chosen, that the general may always receive intelligence from it of the least movements made by the enemy. See Plate DXVII.

In every country, and on every occasion, a camp is always defective if the wings are not sheltered, or can be easily disturbed by the enemy; if the front is not guarded and the rear well covered; if the communications with the frontier towns are not secure and easy; if there is any want of forage, wood, and water; and if there are not detachments in front, to prevent the enemy from approaching the camp.

A general who joins experience and study together, ought to see into the intention of the enemy's general, and judge of his designs by any of his proceedings, however trifling. All those who are destined to the command of armies cannot indeed be endowed with this quick and exact eye, that ready power of judging of a good motion or a good position upon the spot. Some generals have excelled in marches, others in the position of camps; these in the arrangement of troops in order of battle, those in their conduct in time of action; others in providing subsistence, others in projecting a campaign. There have nevertheless been some of these great men, whose genius and temper have united and carried all these qualifications to the greatest degree of perfection; but the rarer these examples are, the more a man ought, by continual study, to endeavour to augment their number, and strive to merit the honour of being enrolled among those heroes, the ornament of mankind, their country's support, and their master's glory.

Sect. IV. Of the Attack of an Army on its March.

However difficult certain operations in war may appear, they are nevertheless not impracticable when a general knows how to take the necessary precautions for lessening those difficulties. The attack of an army on its march seems to be above all reach of attempting; whereas the success of such an attempt depends only upon knowing how to take proper measures, on choosing the ground, and on seizing a favourable opportunity.

When an army would attack another upon its march, it should endeavour to be beforehand with it, and, by the means of stolen marches, come up with it before it can know anything of the matter: some parties should be detached, who must place themselves in ambuscade, in order to stop all the comers and goers, so that the march and designs of the army may be kept secret from the enemy. Whenever a general hath determined to attack his enemy, he should fend off all the baggage, both great or small, belonging to the army; and it should be left in the rear under a good escort, near enough to join after victory, without the army's being obliged to wait three or four days for it.

The general should be well assured of the day on which the enemy's army sets out; of the country through which it is to march; whether it is an open, mountainous, or woody country; if it is divided by rivers; whether there are many bridges to pass; and in how many columns it marches: he should also get all possible information of the disposition of it. In the third section of the first part, relative to the march of an army in an open country, the disposition which it ought to make, in case it presents its front or flank to the enemy, hath been laid down. The general designing to attack ought to regulate his dispositions by those which the enemy hath taken, and which he can only know from his spies; but if he cannot receive any information concerning them, the best rule for him is to suppose them good, and to form his own accordingly.

As in the case of a surprise there cannot be signals given, without running the risk of the enemy's discovering that he is going to be attacked; it is therefore necessary, that every general officer leading columns should have a watch, regulated by the general's, so as to march all at the same time, at the hour agreed on and ordered. The ancients, destitute of watches, regulated their motions by the course of the stars; and it is, without doubt, on that account that Polybius, Onozander, Aelian, and many others, exhorted military men to the study of astronomy: but as it is not often that an army marches by night, this knowledge would be very useless for an attack in the daytime; besides, the fun, by which they were also regulated, could be no way serviceable to them, should the sky be overcast.

If the general's intention is to attack the enemy's army in front, he must detach all his light troops, sustained by a large body of cavalry and some battalions, with orders to harass the flanks, in order to perplex the enemy with regard to the real attack. It is impossible to give the enemy too many false alarms with regard to what is really designed; the hussars, from their readiness in retreating, and their quickness in passing from one spot to another, are the fittest troops for these sort of expeditions. The same rule ought to be observed if the real attack is designed to be upon the flank; then the false attacks should be upon the front. In Santa Cruz may be seen the dispositions which he has made to attack an army on its march.

Stratagem, and the means of surprising an army, are allowable in war, provided treachery is avoided. Whilst the law of nations is not infringed, successful stratagems add lustre to the genius of the general; but there is no profession in which rectitude of mind is more necessary than in that of war.

In order to carry on a surprise by stratagem, one of the most certain methods is, to calculate what time is necessary for the army to arrive at day-break near the road by which the enemy is to pass, so as to be able to examine the country, and make the necessary dispositions for the attack. In an open country the army may be concealed behind corn, or behind a rising ground. Prince Eugene, in 1702, after the battle of Guadalo, having gained some days' march of the king of Spain, posted himself between the Zara and the Po. He so well concealed his army behind the bank of the Zara, that the combined army of France and Spain, which was on its march, and ready to enter into its camp, was obliged to range itself in order of battle, and to fight, without having scarcely time to make any disposition. A woody country offers more expedients for the concealing of troops; but as it is to be supposed the enemy's advanced guard will be advanced at least a half or three quarters of a league, to scour the country; therefore, if the general's design is to attack the enemy's flank, he must present some cavalry and hussars in the front of the enemy's army, so as to engage his attention. Some infantry should be placed in the woods, in the rear of these troops, in order to sustain them: this cavalry and the hussars should retire in proportion as the advanced guard advances, in order to induce the enemy to believe they are not sufficiently strong, and that the reason of their advancing was only to examine the march of the army. As soon as the enemy shall have reached the place agreed on by the generals leading columns that are to attack, the body of infantry that is in ambuscade in the wood, the number of whose columns should be regulated according to the situation of the country, will march silently, and near enough to the enemy, and will charge him with bayonets, without giving him time to recover himself: during this attack the cavalry, dragoons, and hussars, who keep the enemy's front in awe, will charge the troops who have passed the wood and spread themselves over the plain. These troops of cavalry must be sustained by the infantry which was in their rear in the wood, and which should be furnished with cannon. These two attacks, made one after the other, but at some small distance of time, will render the enemy doubtful with regard to the dispositions he is to make; he will be determined where to send assistance, as the cannon which he will hear at the head will induce him to believe that attack the real one: he will fly to that part, and will consequently weaken the flank, which is designed to be attacked by all the infantry. By this diversion the flank will with greater ease be broken through, and the enemy taken in rear: the enemy thus surrounded, and finding himself between two fires, cannot avoid being beaten.

It is more difficult to form ambuscades in an open country, particularly for a whole army, unless it should find a bank like that at Zero; then the general should consider whether or not the attack of the army on its march is practicable. If the general by his superiority can, without weakening himself, divide his army, and find means to conceal it, he will attempt the attack, provided that each detached body is posted before the enemy has begun his march, and that they can all join on the first order, without a possibility of being cut off or finding any obstacle to prevent their marching up to the enemy: but, in order to a greater certainty of success, these first dispositions being made, great exactness in giving, and diligence in the execution of the orders, is necessary; each separate body should charge at the same time, and at different parts. But as the attack may prove unsuccessful, whether owing to the good disposition of the enemy, or whether because the attacks were not made together or executed with equal vivacity, it is necessary that the general should have provided for a retreat, and that the officers commanding different bodies should know after what manner and from what part it is to begin. For the greater security, the general officers ought to communicate their instructions to the commanding officer of each body composing that which they command, so that at the time of the attack or of the retreat, they may instantly comprehend the meaning of whatever they are ordered to perform.

If the army intending to attack the enemy on his march is weaker, or equal, either in number or in the nature of the troops, it is then only the situation of the country, and the facility with which the enemy may be surprised, that should determine the attempt of this grand enterprise: the prudence of the general, his experience; that of the generals who are under his command; the quality of his troops; whether they are well disciplined or not; whether they are composed of one or of many nations; the quality of the troops to be attacked; and, in short, the genius of their general, are circumstances by which the attacking or not attacking should be decided. It is impossible to be decisive upon these circumstances, which depend entirely upon the ground, upon the vigilance of the enemy's general, upon the order which he causes his troops to observe in their march, and in short upon the troops under his command. A general, at the head of a well-disciplined army, composed of veterans and good general officers, will undertake and execute designs which he would not even dare think of with a newly-raised army, however numerous: it is also very difficult to surprise a vigilant general, who is besides a good soldier, and who is also assisted by the counsels of able and intelligent officers.

A general should also be guided, in attacking the enemy on a march, by the country and the nature of the troops of which his army is composed. If the enemy marches through an open country, and the general is equal to him in infantry but superior in cavalry, he should make no hesitation in attacking him; but if the country is woody or mountainous, and the enemy's army is more numerous in cavalry than infantry, the general has still the same advantage with a superiority of infantry; because the enemy's cavalry in those kind of countries is unable to act against infantry; and the infantry also which the enemy may have will never be sufficiently strong to maintain itself upon the heights against forces superior: and if the heights are forced, there can be no doubt of the enemy's being beaten, of his cavalry being ruined and crushed to pieces, or that his retreat will be attended with great difficulty, and that he will lose the greater part, if not the whole, of his army.

Sect. V. Of the Attack of entrenched Camps.

The principles of war among all nations and in all times have been still the same; but the little experience of the early ages of the world would not permit those principles to unfold themselves, as they have since done, and to which it is owing that new expedients both for attack and defence have been discovered.

What a sensible difference is there in the military art, such as it at present is, compared with that of which the rules are handed down to us by Onozander, Vigetius, the emperor Leo, Frontinus, Ælian, and many others? The towns, in their times, had no other defence than walls, raised at a great charge, flanked at little distances with towers, and a large ditch in front: it is true that the little force of their weapons contributed much to the advantages of their fortifications. Their entrenched camps had only a large ditch with some wagons placed behind it; and whenever the ancients were willing to practise all the art at that time known in war, they surrounded the camp with walls, in the same manner as they did their towns, with towers at little distances. Of this kind was Pompey's camp at Dyrrachium in Epirus, the plan of which is given in the marshal de Puyfeyr's Art of War: the wall by which it was surrounded was 15,000 paces in extent.

The emperor Leo was unacquainted with any other method of entrenching a camp, than by heaping fascines together, putting trees upon one another, and posting advanced guards.

The experience which hath been since acquired, hath, without increasing the labour, rendered the works of places stronger, and easier to be defended: the labour of the trenches... Offensive Operations.

Trenchments for camps hath been shortened; they have taken a new form; and being constructed upon the same principles as the fortifications of towns, they are become more difficult to be forced (see Part I. sect. vi.). By this same experience the means of attacking them hath been discovered; and in proportion as offensive weapons have changed, and are become more powerful, the system of fortification has been new-modelled.

Let an army be supposed entrenched behind lines where art and nature are both joined; whose flanks are sustained and secured, furnished with troops and artillery along the whole front, with more troops behind to sustain those which line the lines. The general who would attack, ought first to survey the situation of the lines himself, and as much as possible the enemy's disposition; he should examine the construction of the lines, how they are supported, their extent, and whether the soil is firm or light. As soon as he shall be perfectly acquainted with these circumstances, he may form his plan of attack, and cause his army to march in as many columns as there are attacks to be made; but he should endeavour as much as possible to occupy the whole front of the enemy, in order to prevent him from sending assistance to those places where the attack will be directed. The head of each column should be well furnished with artillery; and as soon as it shall be within distance of cannonading the lines with effect, it should keep up a brisk and continual fire for the space of an hour at least, so as to beat down the earth of the parapet, and tumble it into the ditch, which will in some measure render the passage of it less difficult for the troops. The time of the attack should be an hour before day, so that the cannon may have fired before the enemy shall know where to direct his artillery: after every discharge, the situation of the cannon should be changed either to the right or the left, in order to deceive the enemy's gunners, and prevent their knowing where to direct their pieces. If there should be any height within proper distance, the cannon should be planted upon it; if the cannon can be brought to cross each other upon the lines, the artillery will then have a very great effect.

The infantry should follow the artillery, furnished with hurdles, planks, fascines, pick-axes, and shovels; the fascines will serve to fill up the wells, if there are any, before the ditch; or if there are no wells, they will fill up the ditch, and the hurdles will be thrown over them. The cavalry should be formed in two lines in the rear of the infantry, in order to sustain it. The general should endeavour to find some ridges, to conceal the cavalry from the enemy; but should there be none, it must be placed at such a distance, as not to be exposed to the cannon of the lines; for should it be placed too near, it will very soon be destroyed, without having it in its power to be of any service. In the beginning of an attack of lines, the cavalry cannot be of any assistance, and cannot even act till the infantry hath penetrated in some part. It would therefore be useless to cause it to advance too near, provided it is within reach of marching readily when the infantry has passed, and hath made a passage large enough for it, by beating down the lines and filling up the ditch; the cavalry then will have no more to fear from the cannon of the lines, because the enemy's attention will be more engaged with endeavouring to repulse the infantry, than with firing upon the cavalry. As soon as the lines have been beaten down, and the enemy thrown into confusion, the infantry should march resolutely and together; and should take care to leave room for the artillery, so that it may advance at the same time, and continue its fire. The attack should be made by the grenadiers, sustained by the piquets: they will protect the soldiers who fill up the wells and the ditch; and as soon as they find an opportunity of passing, they will endeavour to get over the entrenchments, sustained by the whole infantry of the column, which will then be disencumbered of the fascines, hurdles, &c., in order to drive the enemy from his lines. As soon as there are soldiers enough upon the lines to bear the resistance of the enemy, the soldiers who have the shovels and pick-axes, and who ought to be last, will finish the filling up of the ditch by beating down the parapet of the lines, and making an opening sufficient for the passage of a squadron in order of battle. Then the whole infantry of the column that has broke through, will pass and divide into two parts, to let the cavalry pass, which will form under the cover of the fire of the infantry, and will not attack the enemy's cavalry till it shall have collected its whole force together.

If one of the attacks succeeds, on the first news, which will soon be spread throughout the army, all the troops at that time ought briskly to attack the whole front of the line, in order to employ the enemy, and prevent his sending assistance to that part that is forced. The reserve, which is composed of infantry and cavalry, ought to join the troops that have broke through the lines, to sustain the cavalry which is charging that of the enemy, and cannot be sustained by the infantry who passed first, because it is employed in taking the enemy in flank to the right and left. In this situation, when the reserve and all the cavalry which followed the column that hath passed, and to which others may yet be joined shall have passed, it should attack the enemy; if it is repulsed, it can never be to any great distance, because it has infantry behind it, to sustain it, and by its fire to stop the enemy. If the lines are forced by many columns, the success and also the defeat of the enemy will be thereby rendered more certain.

When the duke of Savoy and prince Eugene, still encamped between the town of Pianezza and la Venerie, in 1706, marched to attack the lines of the French army that besieged Turin, they caused their armies to march in eight columns; the infantry formed the advanced guard, the artillery, distributed by brigades, marched at the head between the columns, the cavalry was behind in fix, and out of reach of cannon-shot.

The disposition of marshal de Coigny in 1744, in order to attack the lines of Wiffenbourg, of which the enemy were in possession, was similar to this, except that the whole of his army had not time to get up; but as the moments were precious, he did not wait for it. The army which came from Landau divided itself into four, which formed the four attacks; one of which was at Wiffenbourg, the other at the mill between that town and the village of Picards, the third at the village of Picards, and the last was made above that village, which was entrusted to the Hessian troops. His cavalry, which was behind, passed after the infantry had broken through the lines; but the enemy were then almost either killed or taken, and those who could save themselves, retired to Lautrebourg, where their army had assembled after having passed the Rhine. It is difficult to determine which is most to be admired, whether the general's disposition, the quickness and exactness of his eye, and his coolness in a circumstance so delicate, or the courage of the French troops, who forced these lines in less than two hours.

As soon as the enemy is beat and abandons his lines, he must be pursued, but with precaution. The vivacity with which he should be pursued depends upon the order with which he retires: if it is an open country, the general may follow him so long as he sees all clear before him; but if the country is divided with ditches and woods, it would by no means be prudent for him to engage himself in them, for Offensive for fear of any ambuscades being placed there by the enemy, in order to secure his retreat; nevertheless, the general should endeavour to make the most of his victory, and should never be content to win a battle by halves; at least it should be carried so far as to make the enemy sensible of his loss, and of rendering him incapable of continuing openly in the field.

But if the army that attacks the lines should be unable to force them, after many repeated attacks, and if the general perceives that his troops are disheartened, he should immediately retire. If the retreat is made over an open country, he should begin it by marching off the cannon, the infantry next, and the cavalry will form the rear-guard in two or three lines; the hussars and dragoons will be upon the flanks of the cavalry: if there are any defiles or woods to pass through, the general should leave some infantry at the entrance of them, to sustain and protect the cavalry, which will retreat by files. If the enemy is in full strength, the general should leave some field pieces with the infantry that is posted at the entrance of the woods and defiles, which will certainly stop the enemy's impetuosity: if, on the contrary, the enemy pursues the army with only a few troops, it will be proper to charge him if he approaches too near. In this disposition an army may retreat easily, provided that order is observed, and the movements not made with too much precipitation.

Sect. VI. Of the Attack of a Convoy.

The same motive that ought to oblige a general to practice every resource of art, in order to conduct the escort of a convoy in safety, should also induce him to use the same expedients to carry off the enemy's subsistence; for to deprive him of the means of subsisting, is, in reality, to overcome him without fighting.

An advantageous method for attacking a convoy is, by forming three attacks, one real and two false. Those attacks are called real which the troops make with vigour and in full strength, and when their charging is provided for and determined; the false ones are when the enemy's intention is only to keep back the enemy, and prevent his sending assistance to the troops that are really attacked.

Those attacks, true or false, are determined by the situation of the country, and in proportion to the degree of ease with which the convoy may be turned from the road it is in; that is, if the general should meet with an avenue near the advanced guard, which will draw the enemy some distance from his main body, and which also leads to that of the troops which attack, it is at that part the real attack should be made: if this avenue is found at the rear-guard, the two false attacks should be made at the advanced guard and at the centre, supposing there is an opportunity of attacking the centre. Those false attacks ought to be sufficiently numerous in troops, to be able to employ the enemy, without running a hazard of being beaten, and to prevent his sending assistance to other parts.

If the troops designed to attack the convoy are sufficiently numerous, although divided into three bodies, to attack every part at the same time with equal vigour, the success will thereby become more certain. The escort of a convoy is often more numerous than the troops which attack it; but it being certainly weakened by the division it is obliged to make in order to guard the whole length of the convoy, the troops which attack have greatly the advantage, although inferior in number, because those which they attack cannot send assistance to the parts attacked, especially if attacked on all sides.

If the road is wide enough, and there is room for a waggon to turn, the general should rather choose to attack the advanced and rear guards than the centre, to prevent the enemy's having any of the waggons belonging to the rear-guard, which will undoubtedly be the case, if only the advanced guard and centre are attacked. If the road is too narrow that the waggons cannot turn about in order to go back, the general should attack the advanced guard, and employ the centre and rear-guard as much as possible.

A convoy may also be attacked at the opening of a defile into a small plain; then it is again the advanced guard that the general should attack, though he should also contrive to have the rear-guard attacked at the same time. The troops in the centre will be confused, and not know where to send assistance, because they will hear firing both in front and rear; nevertheless, the general should defer charging till part of the waggons are passed, and the troops of the centre are still on this side the defile. An attack, when unforeseen, brisk, and sustained, can never fail of succeeding, particularly when the troops attacked are so divided as not to have it in their power to assist each other; and if the whole convoy is not taken, there is almost a certainty of taking a great part of it, or at least of setting it on fire, and hamstringing the horses, if there is not time to carry them off.

The success of these attacks partly depends upon the choice of those places where the troops which are to fall upon the convoy are placed in ambush; the most secure are those which are least liable to the inspection of the enemy's parties. It is sufficient to have sentries upon the tops of the hills, so that they may see into the roads, and give notice when the convoy is near the place appointed for the attack; then the troops charged with the attack of the rear-guard, having nothing more to apprehend from being discovered by the enemy's parties, may draw near the entrances of the avenues.

If the ambush is discovered, the conduct which ought to be observed by the troops composing it depends entirely upon their force and that of the escort; nevertheless, even when they are weaker, the attack should be attempted, which, if unsuccessful, will at least have retarded the march of a convoy, for want of which the enemy may be greatly disheartened. A general never risks much in attacking a convoy; the object of the officer commanding the escort being to conduct it in safety, and to avoid fighting: it is the same with the escort of a convoy as with a chain of forage, the end of which is only to complete it; and consequently the troops charged with them will rather be attentive to execute the orders which have been given them, than to pursue the enemy, although beaten and driven back.

When a convoy marches through an open country, there should be many ambuscades formed: an enemy is less apprehensive in an open country, because, seeing all before him, his searches become the less exact, in proportion as the country is unfavourable for troops to form ambuscades; nevertheless, a general may always find some hollows, heights, or places of the same nature, where troops may be concealed. As soon as the convoy shall be arrived at the place fixed on for the attack, the general should fall upon the advanced and rear-guards, in order to take in the whole, and to induce, if possible, the troops in the centre to divide themselves, to run to their assistance; then the third ambuscade must show itself, and attack the centre, and endeavour to divide the convoy, before the commandant of the escort has had time either to park it or double it up. If the general succeeds in dividing the convoy, and if the troops in the centre of the escort are beaten and broke, he should detach some infantry, cavalry, and hussars, in pursuit of them: the remainder must be divided into two parts, in order... Offensive Operations

Offensive Operations

A convoy that is divided is half taken, as soon as the detachment of the centre is beaten; because the victorious troops can be divided, and part sent in pursuit of the body that is beaten, and the other part employed to reinforce those who still meet with resistance; whereas, if only one part is attacked, that which is not attacked can readily send assistance, especially in an open country, where there is nothing to prevent either cavalry or infantry from acting, and being a mutual assistance to each other.

A general who would attack a convoy never runs any hazard by dividing his troops, in order to divide those of the enemy: the more the troops of an escort are divided, with the greater ease will they be beaten. An officer who would attack, should know the strength of the escort, in order to regulate the number of his troops by the enemy's, and to be proportionally stronger. He who is attacked, being ignorant of his enemy's force, and being charged on all sides, is at a loss where to send assistance, and how to take care of every part: he who attacks by the knowledge he should have of the country, is enabled to post his troops after such a manner as to employ all those belonging to the enemy, without weakening himself. The troops which attack have certainly great advantages, because, in dividing them, they are still stronger than the body attacked; and then they can choose the place most favourable for the attack: whatever may be the precautions taken by the officer commanding the escort, whatever may be his vigilance, it will be very difficult for him, considering these different attacks and the number of the enemy's troops, to dispose his own with sufficient quickness to place the convoy in security, especially if the attack is made with great quickness and vigour.

When a convoy is to be attacked as it passes a bridge, the commanding officer should divide his troops into three bodies, placing two of them in ambuscade on that side of the bridge to which the convoy is advancing, and the third on the side from which it is marching. All the three bodies should remain concealed, if possible, till the advanced guard of the convoy, the body at the centre, and some of the waggons, have passed the bridge; when they should instantly advance and attack, each that division of the convoy properly opposed to it. Three such attacks, made at the same time by superior force, will have the whole advantage of the action; and the more so as the troops of the escort being everywhere employed, cannot lend assistance to any particular part. If the two bodies which attacked the advanced guard and the centre should break them and put them to flight, there should be troops enough left in pursuit of them to finish their entire defeat, without any fear of being repulsed; the remainder ought to march to the bridge, and cause the waggons that are upon it to be ranged in order, and march to the rear-guard, in order to finish its defeat, if it still continues to make resistance.

It is necessary to observe, that some troops ought to be left at the head and along the convoy, in order to take care that the horses are not taken off from the waggons, and that none of the folderos or drivers make use of that method to escape.

If the general has not troops sufficient to be divided into three bodies, he can place ambuscades to attack only the advanced guard and the centre. This must be done with vigour, but not till the troops of the centre shall have passed; and the attack should always be executed by the infantry with the bayonets fixed, and without firing, and by the cavalry, hussars, and dragoons, sword in hand. The general should not then stay to make prisoners; but should put to death all those whom he finds armed. If the two first detachments are beaten, he should march with the remainder to the rear-guard, which, not being strong enough to resist a body of troops much more numerous, will undoubtedly betake itself to a retreat. As it is the convoy, and not the troops of the escort, that is the principal object, the general should leave only some troops of hussars to pursue the rear-guard; he should make the waggon file off as fast as possible, and conduct them the nearest way to the camp or the neighbouring town; or if this cannot be done, he must burn them and carry away the horses.

Sect. VI. Of the Attack of green and dry Foragers.

Next to the convoys, the forages become most necessary for the subsistence of an army, as it is by them that the cavalry is supported; and if a general can contrive to deprive the enemy of them, or to molest him in the making of them, his cavalry will soon be without resource, his infantry without baggage, and his artillery without the means of being conveyed.

The detachment destined to attack a party on a green forage, made in an open country, should be composed of infantry, cavalry, and hussars: the infantry should not appear, but ought to remain in ambuscade in some hollows, behind some hedges, or other favourable places; and it should be careful not to show its arms; because, by the glittering of the steel, they may be discovered: the cavalry should be divided into two bodies, three quarters of a league one from the other, taking care to be able to join in case of necessity. As for the hussars, they should be distributed about in many small detachments to the right and left, and in the centre of the two bodies of cavalry; upon one of the flanks there should be a more numerous body of hussars placed in ambush, at a greater distance than the small detachments. Every one of those small troops should have a number of trumpets with them; and when the chain is formed, and the foragers spread over the plain, a part of these detachments should leave the ambuscades, making a great noise, and attack those belonging to the enemy which are advanced; and these detachments will charge them with so much the more vigour, as they will be sustained by the large body of hussars in ambuscade behind them, and which should march to sustain them, and attract the attention of the officer commanding the escort. It may happen that this first attack, made on one side only, may induce the enemy to unfurnish the chain in some place, by which it will consequently be weakened; and if to the other detachment of hussars shall instantly advance, followed by one of the bodies of cavalry, in order to attack that part that has been unfurnished. If the enemy, more prudent, does not weaken the chain in any particular part, but contents himself with making the reserve march to the assistance of the troops which have been attacked, the second attack ought always to take place; but in order to employ the enemy everywhere, the second body of cavalry should march and attack the centre. This attack ought to be made with great briskness sword in hand, whether the enterprise succeed or not: if it succeed, a great advantage may be drawn from the rout of the chain. Whilst the cavalry and part of the hussars are pursuing the troops of the chain, the other part should fall upon the foragers, where they will without doubt find but little resistance. If the attack do not succeed, and that, by the good disposition of the troops of the chain, the detachment has not been able to force it, it should retire to the infantry that has remained not be abandoned till the last extremity, the troops that would prevent the enemy from attacking it should be absolutely bent upon it, at the same time without exposing themselves to the danger of being beat by any affluence that may come from the camp to the troops belonging to the chain.

Sect. XI. Of the Passage of Rivers.

There is hardly an operation of war more difficult than the passage of rivers, whilst war cannot be carried on in countries where there are not rivers to be passed.

Rivers may be passed by swimming, by fording, or upon bridges; but small bodies alone can pass with safety by swimming, and, unless the stream be very shallow, none but the cavalry should pass at a ford; for it is surely much better to throw over a bridge or two, than to expose the infantry to the fatigue of wading through a deep current, or the artillery and baggage to the danger of being damaged by water. When a ford is discovered and intended to be made use of, it should be secured in every part, and the soldiers employed for that purpose should be furnished with proper instruments to clear the bottom of everything which may retard the passage. Its banks should likewise be examined, that it may be known whether they are of difficult or easy access, and whether the ground on the other side be marshy, or such as will permit the troops to form immediately on their landing. When bridges are to be built for the passage of the army, they must be laid upon boats, pontons, piles, or wooden horses (see these articles); or in some cases rafts may be employed instead of them; and when a general is furnished with these necessaries, he will pass the largest river, in the absence of the enemy, without difficulty or the loss of a man.

It is not, however, to be supposed that the enemy will be absent. When a country is invaded, the army that is defending it will endeavour to meet the invaders with the greatest advantage; and as in the passage of rivers the advantage is wholly on the side of the defensive army, the general commanding it should, there, if possible, oppose the enemies of his country. We shall therefore, in this section, treat, 1stly, Of the defence necessary to be made for opposing the enemy, and preventing his passage; 2ndly, Of the means which a general should employ in order to facilitate the passage, notwithstanding the enemy's opposition; and, 3rdly, We shall demonstrate by facts the securest method of retreating.

I. It would be impossible to run through every precaution that can be taken to dispute the passage of a river; we shall therefore confine ourselves to the principal ones, by a succinct relation of the different systems of the authors who have treated on that subject.

The first precaution to be taken, according to the chevalier de Roland, is, to draw off all the boats which are upon the river; to observe whether any other river has a communication with it; to examine the course, the windings, and the most accessible parts of it; to raise good redoubts near the banks; to render the bottom uneven by means of facks and balusters filled with stones, large trees with their branches, and by stopping them with stakes.

To this precaution may be also added another, which, executed with exactness, may produce great effects; that is, to throw whole trees with their branches into the river, not so heavy as to sink to the bottom, but whose size and quantity shall be so considerable as not to be easily stopped; their branches should also be interwoven, and formed like a chain from one bank to the other; they should be held fast till the enemy's army is engaged in the fords or upon the bridges, Offensive bridges, at which time they should be let into the current, the quickness of which will increase the force of this kind of moving bank, which will overturn every thing it meets with; soldiers, baggage, horses, bridges, and boats: in short, nothing will be capable of withstanding it, if there is any degree of rapidity in the torrent. This method is pointed out in M. de Puysegur as levelled against bridges only. To avoid also giving any suspicion to the enemy, this chain of trees can be placed upon the bank of the river, of which some engineer must have been careful to take the dimensions beforehand; and when it shall be nearly the same size of the river, and the enemy is passing, it must be held at one end, whilst it is shoved off by the other; the whole of it will be taken by the current, which, without any other assistance, will direct it against the enemy.

In regard to the troops designed for the defence, the best method, according to M. Folard, is to form small camps of 2000 or 3000 men, a league distant from one another, with patrols and signals from one to another; to have canoes, in order that the river may be crossed silently in the night by soldiers, who will endeavour to make some prisoners, and who will also listen in order to discover whether the enemy is preparing to march. A general should particularly endeavour to possess himself of the islands, if any, under cover of which the enemy may attempt the passage; and if the general can be certain that the enemy's intention is to throw over a bridge where they are, in order to get out from thence, to save so much of the way, the general will by this means assure himself of the place where the enemy will attempt the passage, which circumstance will be almost sufficient to prevent him.

But in order the better to explain the manner in which a river should be defended, let two armies be supposed, one of which, consisting of 40,000 men, defends the passage against another of 60,000. This last is divided into three bodies; that of the centre consists of 40,000 men, and the two others of 10,000 each: the centre-body is encamped nearly opposite to the place where the passage is intended to be effected; of the two bodies which are upon the flanks of the centre, one will serve to keep the enemy in suspense, with relation to the true place where the passage is designed. They ought to be continually moving, sometimes at a distance from the main body of the army, and pretend to throw bridges higher up, or lower down, in order to induce the enemy to divide and separate the different bodies of his army in such a manner, that they can no longer be of assistance to each other, or be in a condition of opposing a superior body of troops that may attempt the passage.

The army defending the passage is divided into many bodies; three of 10,000 men each, at a league distance from one another, and two others of 5000 men each, composed of the light troops, both horse and foot, and dragoons, encamped at half a league upon the two flanks of the army. The communication should be preserved between each separate body, and constant patrols kept upon the side of the river, which ought continually to cross each other; and detachments of hussars upon the right and the left, both up and down the river: the general is also supposed to have planted batteries of cannon, in different parts upon the shore; and to be possessed of two islands which he has fortified, and in which lie has also placed troops and cannon: in short, he is supposed to have taken every advantage of ground for rendering the passage difficult to the enemy, and to oppose troops to him in every part where he may attempt it.

See Plate DXIX. fig. 1, where A represents the camp of the main army, divided into three parts, for the defence of the river. B, The camp of the light horse, light infantry, and dragoons upon the wings of the army. C, Cattle and village, guarded by light infantry. D, A town occupied by the infantry belonging to the army. E, Bridge broken down. F, Islands occupied by infantry. G, Posts of infantry distributed along the side of the river. H, Batteries established along the side of the river. I, Posts of cavalry, to keep up the communication between the camps. K, Bridges constructed to preserve the communication of the islands. L, Bridges constructed for the communication of the camps.

If notwithstanding all these obstacles, the enemy attempts the passage, he should be attacked as he debarks; and it is for this reason that the defending army should not be divided into very small bodies, which, too weak to resist a superior number, will be easily routed. In attacking the enemy, there is no danger to be feared from their cannon, which they cannot make use of without annoying their own troops; whereas the cannon planted upon the side of the river, to defend the passage, can always fire upon the troops which follow, in order to sustain those who attempt the passage: there should also be infantry placed near these batteries, to defend them, and to flank such of the enemy as have already passed.

There yet remain many stratagems to be practised on these occasions: a general may make use of those mentioned in the section which treats of ambuscades; and they should be particularly directed against such places as are supposed to be most favourable for the enemy. The history of prince Eugene, whom the chevalier Folard styles a great traveller of rivers, furnishes many examples.

The general should be particularly attentive in disturbing the enemy when constructing his bridges; which appears the more practicable, as the bridge is never properly established, if not guarded at each end: besides, by the assistance of artillery, the enemy may be easily prevented from going on with his work. M. Feniques indeed relates examples, where the enemy hath not been able to prevent the bridges from being built under their very noses; but besides the rarity of these examples, the precautions he used are a very convincing proof of the difficulty attending such undertakings.

A prudent general, and one who is himself acquainted with the river, of which the enemy would attempt the passage, is guided by its depth, by the difficulty of gaining its banks, and in proportion to its rapidity: he often pretends to be inactive, permits the enemy to throw his bridges over it, and waits till he is in the middle of his passage; at which time he makes a furious fire upon him, spreads disorder among his troops, and overthrows his ranks; and the enemy, besides losing a great number of men, also fails in the success of his enterprise.

11. With respect to the means to be employed for passing a river in the face of the enemy, it is to be observed, that the general who attempts such a passage, ought, in the first place, to be very certain of the steadiness of his troops. He should place the most intrepid in the front, in order to encourage those who follow them: on such occasions every thing is to be apprehended from ill-disciplined troops, who, as soon as they are engaged in the river or upon the bridges, having no longer any place of refuge to fly to, will be discouraged, and spread the panic throughout the whole army.

If the army passes upon two bridges, it is impossible to take too much care for their security: history is filled with fatal examples of bridges falling under the weight of troops. One of the greatest dangers ever experienced by Charles XII. was when, having caused a bridge to be thrown Offensive thrown across the Vistula, the wood which had been made use of being too weak, and the timber-work ill secured, the bridge broke down whilst the king was passing. Charles, the prince of Würtemberg, and many others, fell into the water; the king, having caught hold of a piece of the timber that was floating, was carried away by the current. The troops which had already passed found themselves at the enemy's mercy, who might have destroyed them; but they did nothing, says the historian Nordberg, because of the heights of which the Swedes were in possession, and from whence they kept a fire upon the Saxons. Was it not rather an influence of the good fortune which usually attended that intrepid prince?

It is probable, when a river is passed upon bridges in presence of the enemy, that they have been built before his arrival, and consequently there has been time to entrench them at each end, but particularly on that side next the enemy. These entrenchments should be made in such a manner as to prevent the bridges from being flanked by the enemy's cannon; therefore, instead of the entrenchments usual at the heads of the bridge, such as a horn-work, a crown-work, or a half-moon, the general should cause redoubts to be thrown up, the farther off which should be 400 yards distance, and opposite to the bridge; and the others should be thrown up nearer to the backs of the river, forming a semicircle; in order for their better defence, the general should follow the same dispositions which have been laid down in the preceding part. If there are many bridges, they should be constructed as near each other as possible, that the same redoubts may equally serve to cover them: the reason of these redoubts being placed at a distance from the bridges is, that, as the troops pass, they may have room to form, and sustain those occupying the redoubts. These redoubts, it must be acknowledged, require a greater degree of labour than is requisite for the construction of a half-moon, or even a crown-work; but it seems impossible to pass a river upon bridges in presence of an enemy, however strongly they may be entrenched, if there is not space enough left between the entrenchments and the bridges to contain a number of troops sufficient to oppose the enemy, and to give time for the remainder of the army to pass. Labour should never be considered when an enterprise is successful; a general, therefore, should never spare any pains for the attainment of his ends, but should take every precaution necessary for success, without troubling himself about the time and the labour it will cost: the glory of having forced the enemy to leave the passage open to him makes sufficient amends for the trouble he has given himself in order to attain it.

Suppose an army of 60,000 men would pass a river, guarded by an army of 40,000. Let it also be supposed, that the army intending to pass has got the start of the enemy, either because he was not yet arrived, or because he has been amused with marches and counter marches; that the general has also had time to construct three bridges, and to entrench them in the manner above-mentioned: he must begin the passage by causing the redoubts to be occupied by a battalion, or half a battalion, according to their size; and he must plant cannon between those redoubts, with infantry to guard them. These dispositions being made, the army must march in three columns; the centre column must be entirely infantry, and the other two composed of infantry and cavalry. As the infantry passes the bridges, it must divide, and form columns, consisting of four battalions each, which must pass between the redoubts, having cannon upon their flanks: the cavalry must pass to the right and left through the interval of the two redoubts nearest the river, and form in order of battle upon the flanks of the columns; the right wing with its right towards the river, and the left with its left. When all these columns shall be formed, and ready to march towards the enemy, the right and left of the two lines of cavalry must sustain it; and the right of those of the right, as well as the left of those of the left, will march to put themselves in a line in presence of the enemy: in this position the army must march towards the enemy, and attack him, if he is so rash as to hazard an action; and if he should retire before the army is entirely passed, the passage will be the more easily effected.

See Plate DXIX. fig. 2. where AAA are bridges of boats. B, Redoubts which cover the bridges. C, A battery, under cover of which the infantry work at the construction of the redoubts. D, A battery to prevent the enemy from annoying the army on its march. E, The march of the army. F, The artillery distributed among the brigades of infantry. G, Infantry, forming in columns to open on the opposite side through the intervals of the redoubts. H, March of the columns into the front of the redoubts, where they halt in order to give time for a part of the cavalry to form upon its flanks. I, A battery erected to facilitate the forming of the cavalry. K, Cavalry, which, in gaining the opposite shore, forms in order of battle, and posts itself upon the flanks of the infantry. L, Eight battalions in column upon the right wing of the army, to go and examine the village, and attack the enemy in it, in case he should be posted off it. M, Hussars and dragoons, who have taken possession of the height which is on the left wing of the army. N, A brigade of infantry posted next the height, covering the left wing of the cavalry. O, The disposition of the army marching up to the enemy.

From this disposition it appears, that the army which attempts the passage is almost certain of succeeding; it is sheltered behind the redoubts during the passage of the bridges; it has ground to form itself upon, and to show itself in full strength. But it is seldom that a general has time to build the bridges and entrench them after this manner, when the enemy is on the opposite side with an intention of disputing the passage: so circumstanced, he must endeavour to find some fords, and, under shelter of one or more islands, construct a number of rafts behind them; he must endeavour to keep the enemy at a distance from those places by marches and counter-marches; and when that is done, he must cause the cavalry to ford over with grenadiers and labourers behind them; these labourers must throw up entrenchments as fast as they can, whilst fresh infantry is caused to pass over upon rafts. Provided these entrenchments can stop the enemy for some time, and contain infantry enough to resist him, the remainder of the army will be very soon passed: the cavalry will at the same time pass at the fords which have been discovered, in order to cover the flanks of the infantry; when it will spread over the plain, being itself protected by the infantry, as it leaves the entrenchments in columns.

The passage of a river cannot be safely attempted, if the general does not provide for a defence, and take infinite precautions to protect the army in its passage.

All that authors have said upon this subject, arises from this principle of Vegetius, which they seem to have commented upon, and to which they have applied different examples. "As the enemy (says he) are accustomed to form ambuscades, or to attack openly at the passage of rivers, the general should post himself beforehand on a good post on the opposite side, and entrench himself even on that on which he already is, to hinder the enemy from attacking his troops, separated by the channel of the river; and still, in order for greater security, the general should cause the two posts to be entrenched and well palliadoed, that in case of..." Offensive an attack, he may be able to sustain the efforts of the enemy without great loss.

It may not be improper, in this place, to relate a disposition of M. de Valiere's, formed upon this principle.

He says, "After the cannon are planted, a parapet should be raised upon the banks of the river, 200 yards in length or thereabouts, behind which some infantry should be immediately launched from the centre of the parapet, and some soldiers with labourers sent over, who must immediately erect a small half-moon; as soon as that is done, more soldiers should be sent in order to defend it in case it should be attacked; more labourers should also be sent to erect another half-moon, both upon the right and the left.

"If the labourers are not annoyed by the enemy, they should at the same time erect a horn-work, whose wings should be flanked by the first parapet, and the cannon planted in it: if the river is so large that the wing of the horn-work cannot be defended by musketry, it must be defended from the half-moon, made from thence to the water."

In the meantime, the general should cause the bridge to be continually worked at; and, as soon as it is finished, make the troops pass over it, if the enemy is not in flight; but if he is, the horn-work must be completed, to prevent the enemy from falling upon the troops as they pass. The horn-work being made as strong as is judged necessary, as much infantry as it will hold should be lodged in it, with some field-pieces; and, as the cannon upon the rising will keep the enemy at a distance, the general may order the cavalry to pass; but still all this cannot be effected but before an army very inferior. If the enemy's army is of superior force, the safest method is to try a passage at some farther distance, still keeping the army in sight as long as possible, and concealing from the enemy that any troops have been detached.

It is impossible to foresee every stratagem that may be employed, as they depend upon many circumstances; but it is always right to send, if possible, some trusty spy to discover the enemy's position on the other side of the river, what obstacles he can place in the passage, what methods are to be used to avoid them, and what parts of the bank are most accessible or best guarded.

A general should make many false attempts, particularly at those parts where he least intends passing; they should be made as secretly as possible; and also, in order to deceive the enemy, the general may throw over two or three bridges at hazard, in sight of the enemy, at those very places where he has resolved not to pass: the enemy's whole attention will be directed to that side; and a constant fire will be made on him from the other side, so that he may not be misinformed of the stratagem. There is no doubt of these bridges being taken, which is of no consequence, provided the enemy is amused, and the general has time to throw over another bridge at a distance from that place, by which he can pass.

We cannot pretend to recapitulate every stratagem which a general may practise: in the histories of prince Eugene and Charles XII., the reader may see the different methods which they made use of; it will be sufficient here to relate the rules laid down by Montecuccoli, with some modern examples, by which they seem to be corroborated.

1. The general must plant artillery upon the bank opposite to the point he intends taking; which will be attended with great advantage, if the river forms a re-entering angle, and if there is any ford near it. 2. In proportion as the construction of the bridge advances, he should post some infantry upon it, in order to keep a fire upon the opposite shore. 3. When the bridge is completed, he must cause a body of infantry, some cavalry, some field-pieces, and some pioneers, to pass it, in order to fortify the head of the bridge on the other side. 4. The general must take great care that the enemy has not posted armed barks, or other machines, to break down the bridge when half the army shall have passed. 5. If the general would preserve the bridge, he must fortify it at both ends, and place sufficient guards in it.

In 1743, prince Charles intending to pass the Rhine, kept a continual fire upon all the French posts from 11 o'clock at night till three in the morning, in order to conceal his real design with regard to the passage. Marshal de Conty assembled his army in three large bodies, and lay all night upon his arms, the only prudent step he could take on that occasion. By this disposition he found himself in a condition of transporting himself opposite to the isle of Rai, of which the enemy was in possession; and it is well known that they ended the campaign there, without being able to penetrate into Alsace.

The number of columns ought to be regulated by the breadth of the ford, or by the number of bridges that are established.

The third of June 1747, at day-break, the army commanded by M. de Belleisle passed the Var in five columns. This passage was effected without any resistance on the part of the enemy, and M. Belleisle had 15 men drowned, although there was a chain formed of peasants, acquainted with the ford, to direct the march of the columns, and to assist the soldiers who were carried away by the rapidity of the current.

III. All passages of this nature, whether in a march, in defence, or for an attack, may be foreseen. A general may, at a distance, make all the preparations necessary for these operations; he may anticipate or foresee the dispositions of the enemy: in regard to a retreat it is otherwise; for although it may have been provided for, a general cannot be certain whether it can be effected after the manner he hath intended; besides, he must, in a retreat, unite all the different dispositions already mentioned: the least negligence becomes irreparable, and gives the enemy a very great advantage. A moment lost, a movement discovered, may also be the cause of a rout, and render the retreat impossible, or at least very bloody; therefore if a general, in these circumstances, has not a perfect knowledge of the river he has to pass, if he has not been careful to preserve the bridges, or to keep the materials and instruments proper for the throwing over of new ones, he will be unable to pass in sight of the enemy. Xenophon's retreat with the 10,000 Greeks, furnishes examples of the passageways of rivers, which a general should always have present to his view. What prudence, what activity in founding the fords himself, whenever he met with any stream or river to be crossed! What orders to prevent confusion among his troops, and what stratagems to avoid being repulsed!

If a general is certain of returning by the same place at which he has formerly passed, the best way would be, as Vegetius says, to have the bridges guarded, and to erect a fort with large ditches at the head of each, for their security, and to place troops in it to guard the bridges and the passage, as long as shall be thought necessary.

Thus circumstanced, a general should entrench the heads of the bridges in the manner already directed; and that the troops may pass the bridges without confusion, according as one brigade of infantry shall enter the circle formed by the redoubts, another shall pass the bridge, and that which enters shall take possession of the points which that which passes occupied; he must be careful to establish batteries of cannon to the right and the left, on the other side of the river, to flank the redoubts, and defend the approach to them; Offensive so that when the whole army shall have passed, the troops who occupy the redoubts may retire with ease. The cavalry will pass the bridges without stopping behind the redoubts.

If a retreat of this kind, the infantry should march in column, and the cavalry in order of battle, upon the flanks of the infantry. Before the march is begun, some troops must be sent to occupy the redoubts; and as soon as they shall be in possession of them, the army will put itself in march, and proceed towards them. The cavalry of the right must pass over the bridge nearest to it, and that of the left will do the same. The columns of infantry must enter by the spaces which are between each redoubt; the grenadiers and the pikemen must remain, in order to sustain the troops occupying the redoubts; some pieces of cannon should also be left to fire upon the enemy in case he should approach too near; the columns must pass over the three bridges; the grenadiers and the pikemen must also draw near the head of the bridges at night-fall; the troops occupying the redoubts must quit them silently, and pass the bridges; they must be followed by the cannon that has been left during the day; the grenadiers must pass last of all; after they are passed, the bridges must be broken down. This may be easily executed, provided order and silence are preserved; but if the enemy entertains the least suspicion of the redoubts being abandoned, he will come in full strength to attack the troops still remaining on that side. These troops, too weak to resist a superior number, cannot avoid being beaten, slaughtered, or drowned, the cannon taken, and the bridges burnt.

For greater security, the grenadiers and the pikemen may be furnished with chevaux de-frise, which will make an entrenchment, till the troops which occupied the redoubts are retired. A retreat never merits the epithet of fine, except it is performed with order, and with the loss of as few brave men as possible, to save the rest of the army.

In every enterprise formed by a general in difficult places, he must, according to M. de la Valiere, provide for his retreat. In retreats of all kinds, adds the duke of Rohan, a general cannot be too attentive to render it safe, and to avoid disorder: when it is the effect of his own choice, it ought to be made so early, and so expeditiously, that he may not be under a necessity of fighting.

During the passage of a river, or even after a general has passed it, if he should be repulsed, the retreat becomes very difficult, and cannot be performed without great loss; it is for that reason that many generals, who have been mistrustful of the firmness of their troops, have burnt their ships in the port, in order to animate them to victory, from considering the impossibility of retreating.

The following retreats by M. Saxe across rivers, will give the reader some notion how such enterprises should be conducted.

In the campaign of 1742, the disposition of that commander for passing the Danube owed its whole success to secrecy, to his address in profiting by circumstances, and particularly to a very thick fog.

The two armies were encamped two leagues distant from each other, and the light troops skirmished together the whole day. At seven o'clock at night, count Saxe sent for the general officers, furnished them with instructions, and caused the guards to be doubled. At nine o'clock, the baggage fell off over two bridges; one of rafts and another of piles; after which the infantry passed, and the grenadiers, who formed the rear-guard, cut down and burnt the two bridges. The enemy advanced in order to charge his rear-guard; but 18 pieces of cannon that had been planted beforehand, very soon silenced the fire of their musketry, and he lost not a single man. At day-break the army formed in order of battle, upon two lines, in order to give time for the Imperialists to retire from Plading; and as soon as they had joined, the army put itself in march in four columns.

It is particularly necessary, either in passages or retreats, to be acquainted with the nature of places, and if they are fit to furnish the timber necessary for making rafts and bridges. In Germany, and countries where wood is very plenty, in order to pass with greater expedition, a general can make use of rafts or flying bridges. (See Flying Bridges.) Two may be placed, one upon the right, the other on the left, of a bridge built upon piles; by which means three columns can pass at once. It should be observed, that the flying bridges are by no means secure against torrents.

In 1742, count Saxe having beforehand possessed himself of Thonallau, caused two flying bridges of rafts, and a great work of redans, to be erected, in which he posted five battalions and some cannon.

On the 9th of September all the baggage passed the Danube; on the 10th the army put itself in order of battle in two lines, which retired successively toward the river. The lines passed one after the other; that is, the cavalry at the ford, and the infantry upon the flying bridges.—Six thousand of the enemy's advanced guard were witnesses of this retreat without daring to molest it; so prudently were the orders given, and so exactly executed.

It is in retreats that bridges are most liable to break under the weight of the troops; it is at that time the precautions are neglected, because the danger becomes more pressing, and they are not sufficiently acquainted with the rivers over which the bridges are thrown.

Sect. XI. Of Battles.

Of all the operations of a campaign, the most important, and that which is most deserving of attention, is a battle, because it is generally decisive; every other operation is but preparatory to, or consequent of it. A general engagement, says Virginius, is often decided in two or three hours; after which there scarcely remains any resource for the vanquished. Baules, says M. de Montecuccoli, below and take away crowns; from their decisions princes cannot appeal; by them war is put an end to, and the name of the conqueror immortalized.

A general should by no means suffer himself to be forced to a battle; neither should he offer it but when there is a real necessity for it; and even when he gives battle, it should be rather with an intention of saving than shedding blood; more with a view of asserting the rights of his matter, and the glory of his country, than of oppressing mankind. However bloody a battle may be, it is always less so than a long war; which, by reiterated troubles, consumes the treasures of sovereigns, that shine of a state, and drains the blood of the subjects.

Nevertheless, there are some occasions where it is not left to a general's choice, either to give or accept of battle. An army of observation, and an army acting on the defensive, neither can nor ought to be delirious of coming to action. Both the one and the other should have no other object in view, than that of posting itself in so advantageous a situation, that the enemy may neither entertain a thought of attacking it in its camp, or any hope of forcing it. The army of observation, whose only object is to protect, or to cover the troops forming a siege, should never seek to fight the enemy, unless attacked by him; the other, obliged by its want of strength to act upon the defensive, should only be desirous. Offensive desirous of occupying advantageous posts, to prevent the enemy's penetrating into the country, and attacking it in any position it shall have taken.

If the choice is left to the general, he ought to be particularly careful, before he comes to a resolution of giving battle, to examine whether he can gain greater advantage by winning it, than he will sustain damage by losing it.

It is therefore neither caprice, nor a mistaken courage, or the desire of distinguishing himself at an improper time, that should determine a general to give battle; but his superiority over the enemy, both in the number and quality of troops, the enemy's incapacity, his ill-chosen encampments and negligent marches, the necessity of succouring a place, or the certainty of a reinforcement, by the junction of which the enemy will become superior, or circumstances which may change the original designs of the campaign.

This was the reason which induced the vicomte Turenne, in 1674, to give the battle of Einheim, because the prince of Bourbonville waited the arrival of the elector of Brandenburg, who was coming to join him with a considerable reinforcement; and if he had not given battle before that junction, the enemy's army would have had a very great superiority over his. The reasons given by Montecuccoli for avoiding a battle are, "when the loss of it will be more prejudicial than the gaining will be advantageous; when inferior to the enemy, or when succour is expected; when the enemy has the advantage of the ground; when it is perceived the army is working its own ruin, either by the fault or division of the commanders, or through the disagreement of confederates." It may also be added, when the enemy's army labours under some disease; when it is in want of provisions and forage; and that, disheartened by these circumstances, his troops desert from him.

It is on a day of battle that it becomes particularly necessary for a general to be acquainted with his own ground, and also that which is occupied by the enemy; to know in what manner his wings are supported, the nature of the places where these supports are; whether he can be surrounded, and in what part he can be attacked with the greatest facility.

But however essential these branches of knowledge may be, it is not always the superiority of number, or quality of the troops, or advantage of ground, that will secure the best disposed army from being routed: it is the foresight of the general in the precautions he has taken before the battle; it is his genius, his activity, his coolness, in the time of action, and the capacity of the general officers acting under him, that determine the success.

Ground, seemingly the most advantageous, often presents obstacles, which do not immediately strike a general, although an experienced one, and which may prove fatal in the course of a battle; how, therefore, will a general be able to correct these mistakes, if he considers them as only trivial? At the battle of Cerignola, fought on the 28th of April 1593, the enemy's front being more extended than at first it was supposed to be, in order to give a greater extent to that of the French army, it was necessary to continue the lines across vineyards and thickets; by which means, the neglecting to fill up a ditch caused the defeat of the French, and the death of M. de Numours their general.

A general should not always pursue his own opinion, it being impossible for one man to see everything; he should, therefore, cause an exact account to be given to him of whatever he cannot have an opportunity of seeing personally; to inform himself by spies of the enemy's order of battle, and act in consequence of that knowledge; he should possess himself of all places capable of containing ambuscades, which he ought to have had examined some days before the battle.

Santa Cruz hath given a particular detail of all these preparations.

It is in these moments, which decide the fate of nations, that the genius and prudence of a general ought to be conspicuous; he should see, at the same time, what is doing among his own and the enemy's troops. Besides the precautions which ought to have preceded the day of battle, those which ought to be taken in the course of the action are so numerous, that it is impossible for them all to find a place here.

Some depend upon the general's ability, others upon circumstances, which it is almost as difficult to describe, as to mark out the necessary dispositions for them.

It depends upon the general's genius and foresight to make choice of intelligent, active, and prudent aids-de-camp, to assign to each particular body the properest commander; not, for example, to place, at the head of infantry, one who has been long accustomed to the service of the cavalry; or, at the head of cavalry, one who is more used to the infantry, &c.; to encourage the soldiers by the hope of rewards, and by motives which may spirit them up, and to threaten those who are too unmannerly as to tremble at the sight of an enemy, or rash enough to run forwards without order.

The general should also be capable of forming new schemes, in order to render those of the enemy abortive; he should also take care, whatever may be the nature of the country, to dispose his army after such a manner, as to render it equally strong in every part, that all the bodies of which it is composed may protect and assist one another without confusion; that the intervals necessary for acting be well preserved, and that the reserve can easily march wherever it shall be ordered; in a word, the troops should be disposed after such a manner, that even before the action they may perceive in what manner they are to act.

It is the work of genius to take advantage of circumstances, and to submit to them; it is impossible to foresee the precautions dependent on them, as the very circumstances must be themselves unforeseen: it is by a general's address, in knowing how to profit by circumstances, that he shows his superiority in the day of battle. M. de Montecuccoli reduces all the advantages that can be gained over an enemy to four principal heads, which, in reality, are of themselves reduced to the knowledge of profiting by circumstances; such are the advantages of number, when the enemy is beaten in his points, his convoys, and in his forages; when an ambuscade is surrounded, or when a whole army falls upon a small, weak, and separated body; the second head consists in the knowledge of the commander; the third in the manner of fighting; and the fourth in the advantage of the ground. A general, who properly considers these heads, will dispose of a combined army after such a manner, that it may, at the same time, receive orders without mistake, and execute them without confusion; a very necessary precaution, and one which Hannibal, general of the Carthaginians, neglected to take with regard to the strangers allied with them, which occasioned the troubles related by Polybius. He should have mixed the soldiers belonging to those countries, where bravery is in a manner natural to them, with those belonging to countries where it is more extraordinary.

Vigetius points out the precautions necessary to be taken by a general, to avoid having either the wind or the sun in his front. The wind, which raised the dust, and blew it into the eyes of the Romans, contributed to the loss of the battle of Cannae: the sun, on the other hand, dazzles the soldiers, and lays open their dispositions and evolutions to the enemy: in a word, the general should not neglect even Offensive; those precautions which may be in appearance useless, whether before the battle, or at the very time they may be put in execution after the action; as the rallying the troops, the refreshing of them, the retreating from before the enemy, or the pursuit of him, supposing the battle to be gained. A general should have beforehand formed the plans of the marches and the enterprises he would attempt, and be almost certain of the means of executing them; if, on the contrary, he fails, he should have determined the positions by which the army, fixed in a camp strong by situation, may prevent the enemy from reaping any great advantage from his victory: he should also have provided for the security of the prisoners, the hospitals, the plunder of the soldiers; in short, for all that is necessary for preserving order and discipline, and every thing contributing to the security of the troops; the distresses of the enemy, and the glory of the sovereign, should be provided for without waiting for the event; for at that time confusion and disorder would prove more fatal than even the battle.

In the treatise written by Santa Cruz, upon the dispositions before and after a battle, may be seen a long detail of the precautions depending upon genius, and of those which are regulated by circumstances.

The general's post during the action ought to be, according to Vigeius, on the right wing, between the cavalry and the infantry. Onozander fixes it upon some height, and Santa Cruz towards the centre, in the front of the second line. Titus Livius and Polybius have observed, that the posts of Scipio and Hannibal were always in those parts which were least exposed; because, as observed by Onozander, a general who runs into danger is a rash man, fuller of presumption than courage: neither is daringness, adds his commentator after Plato, always a sign of courage; besides, a man who is really brave, is never daring but when it is absolutely necessary.

A general should not always suppose that what particularly strikes him is right; he should reason calmly upon the probability of it, in order to come to a greater degree of certainty with regard to the practicability: he ought also, says Vigeius, to be acquainted with the nature of the enemy, and the characters of his generals, whether they are prudent or rash, daring or timid; whether they fight upon principles or at hazard: in effect, a general ought to be earlier or later in making an attack in proportion to the rashness of the enemy. If, says M. de Montecuculi, any sign of fear or confusion is perceived among the enemy, which will be known when the ranks are disordered, when the troops mix together in the intervals, when the colours wave about, and the pikes shake all at the same time, then he should charge and pursue the enemy without giving him time for recollection: some dragoons, light cavalry, platoons, some loose troops, should be sent forward; who, whilst the army advances in order of battle, will go before to seize some posts into which the enemy must fall. A general ought also, says Vigeius, to find the spirit of his soldiers, and observe whether they have a firmer countenance than the enemy. It is dangerous to lead an army on to action that is not thoroughly determined to do its duty. "Battles," says Vigeius elsewhere "are generally won by a small number of men." The great mystery consists in the general's knowing how to choose them, to post them well, conformable to his plan, and the services required of them.

I cannot affirm the reason (says he) why particular bodies fight better against other particular ones, or why those who have beat bodies stronger than themselves, have in their turn been often beaten by those that were weaker: It is undoubtedly owing to want of confidence; because the place of action has been different; or from other circumstances which cannot be laid hold of, but on the very instant. The situation of the mind is shown in the countenance of the soldiers; it is declared in their discourse, and by the most trifling of their actions. The general should consult them; he ought even to go farther—the best countenance is not always a sign of the firmest courage. Cowardice often conceals itself under the mask of intrepidity; but soon as the action begins, the veil falls off, and the coward shows himself, notwithstanding all his endeavours to the contrary. Neither at this time should a proper degree of fear be thought blamable; nature must be allowed to shrink in that awful and uncertain situation: the coward gives himself up to his fears; the bully seeks in vain to dissemble them; and the rash man, who cannot distinguish between danger and safety, is sensible of both; the real soldier is always modest, and contented with having done his duty. A good general turns everything, even want of strength, to advantage. Hannibal, at the battle of Canae, posted his best troops upon the wings, that the centre, which was composed of those on whom he had the least dependence, might be the sooner broke, in order to give the wings an opportunity of surrounding the Romans.

It also requires a very strict examination in a general, in order to be thoroughly master of the circumstances on which he should regulate his dispositions; and he will also find it sometimes necessary to make some change in his original intentions. It is always proper that the corps of reserve should be composed of veterans, and even of part of the flower of the army; for should the army happen to be broke, this reserve alone may probably give a new face to the action: it was this method which Hannibal pursued at the battle of Zama; where Scipio, after having defeated the troops which presented themselves to him, was astonished to find he had a new army to fight with. At the battle of Fontenoy, the household troops placed in reserve, with some brigades of infantry, determined the success of the day. Nevertheless, on some occasions this disposition may prove disadvantageous; as, for instance, where it would be necessary to present a large front to the enemy, or where it is necessary to prevent his getting possession of a pass or a defile; where a general finds himself too inferior, and where there are also posts to be defended.

It would be unnecessary to repeat everything mentioned by Vigeius, relative to the precautions necessary to be taken before a battle; time, and the difference of weapons, have greatly altered dispositions: firearms, which are now made use of instead of darts and flings, and the bayonet instead of the pike, have contracted the intervals which must necessarily be left between every soldier.

The order and disposition of troops for action depend entirely upon the general, who knows how to profit by circumstances; the just execution of them depends upon the capacity of the general officers. The general cannot be everywhere, or see everything; he is obliged to rely upon the understanding of those who command under him for the just execution of his orders; the general officers should know how to vary them, in proportion as circumstances, and the situation of the enemy changes. They should have an exactness and quickness of eye, both to operate and profit by them; and, as M. de Puységur observes, the disposition of the troops being once regulated by that of the enemy, by the situation of the country, and the general orders that have been delivered, the only part the general can have in the action lies in those places where he is within reach of giving orders himself.

M. de Montecuculi with great reason observes, that there cannot be too many officers in an army on the day of battle, in order to supply the places of those who are killed; but can a man possessed of any degree of humanity approve of what he adds, that this number should be increased in time of war, and reduced in time of peace? What a prospect for a soldier, who, after having lavished his blood for the safety of his country, and the glory of his prince, sees himself exposed to the fate of Belisarius! Whatever were the virtues of his master Justinian, can any one, without indignation, see this general, after having overcome the Persians, reunited Africa to the empire, punished the Vandals, driven the Goths out of Italy, ravaged Aegyptia, scattered at a distance from both empires that throng of barbarians by which they were over-run, and preserved the throne, and the life of the emperor; upon the bare suspicion, or rather under the pretence of a conspiracy, deprived of sight, and reduced to beg alms of passengers in the streets of that city which he had so often saved?

It has been already seen, that the dispositions in a mountainous country change according to the situation of the ground. Vigetius repeats, speaking of a field of battle, what has been so often established in the foregoing sections, that an open country is always most advantageous for an army that is strongest in cavalry; and that an enclosed spot, divided by ditches and marshes, covered with mountains and woods, is most convenient for infantry. In this last, the knowledge of the country, the art, the ability of the general, and the understanding of the general officers under his orders, sooner ascertain the success, than a superiority of troops in an open country, which presents little or no variety of ground, and which allows the greatest part, or indeed the whole, of the troops to act; the superiority in troops is attended with great advantage, provided also the disposition is good.

The different dispositions for troops are so many, the circumstances differ so greatly, that were it even possible to connect in one body only all the battles which have been fought since the time mankind resolved to regulate their properties by the law of the strongest, the number of contrivances which remained to be collected would be greater than of those which have been actually executed. It is impossible to give a detail of every thing; for in that case every particular spot, and the disposition proper for it, every country, and all the circumstances that may oblige these dispositions to vary, must be described. Those now going to be mentioned, are only with a view of giving the rules, and of more clearly demonstrating those precepts which lead to the knowledge of all others.

Disp. I. Let two armies of equal force be supposed, in an open country divided by a river, consisting of 57 battalions and 72 squadrons each, cavalry, hussars, and dragoons. The two armies are on the same side, the right of the one, and the left of the other, to the river. The left of the army whose right is to the river is unsupported; and that whose left is supported, has a wood on its right. By this disposition may be seen the necessity of covering the wing of the army A, that is exposed. Plate DXX.

The army I, whose right and left are supported, is formed upon two lines, and presents the same front as the army A, with a reserve in the rear. The following is therefore thought to be nearly the disposition which should be made by the general commanding the army whose left is unsupported. The first line ought to consist of 20 battalions, with intervals of about three toises between each battalion; 12 squadrons on the right, with their proper intervals; four battalions on the right of the cavalry, 10 pieces of cannon, and a battalion in column close to the river; 12 squadrons on the left of the first line, with their proper intervals; 16 battalions in the second line, 300 paces distance from the first; 11 squadrons on its right, placed behind the intervals of those in the first line; and on their right, five squadrons of dragoons next the river, in order to sustain the infantry and cannon covering the right; 11 squadrons on the left, placed in the same manner as those on the right; 10 pieces of cannon, supported by a battalion in column, between the infantry and the cavalry of the right; 10 others, supported also by a battalion between the infantry and the cavalry of the left; four battalions in the rear of the second line on the left, with orders to transport itself obliquely, or sidewise, as soon as the army moves to attack that which is drawn up against it; 12 squadrons of cavalry in the rear of the first line upon the left, to post themselves obliquely upon the flank, at 100 paces distance from the first squadron on the left, next to the four battalions and the cannon; the reserve, consisting of 10 battalions and eight squadrons of dragoons, in the third line upon the left flank, so that it may fall into the first line as soon as the squadrons of cavalry, which were in the rear of those of the first line, shall be posted obliquely; in this position, the army will move forward, the right never quitting the banks of the river.

If the enemy's army should advance, the disposition of the army A will become still better, because the army I will quit the support it had on its right; but if, on the contrary, it remains in its post, in order to keep this support, then the 10 battalions of the reserve, followed by the eight squadrons of dragoons, will join the four which support the flanks of the cavalry which is posted obliquely. When marching, this line posted sidewise should proceed obliquely; and when the cannon shall be near enough to cannonade with effect, it should make several discharges, in order to break and beat down the entrenchments, or felled trees, which the enemy may have made, and also to destroy their disposition. As soon as the army A shall be near enough to cannonade the army I with success, it must halt, and amuse it with a continual fire of the cannon. The principal attack ought to be made at the wood by the 14 battalions; in order to give more strength and certainty to this attack, fix other battalions, with 10 pieces of cannon, should be detached to it from the second line, always keeping up a fire from the front. If during this attack, it is perceived that the enemy weakens his line, in order to carry assistance to the wood that is attacked, then the centre and the right of the army should march up and charge him briskly. The troops who cannonade the wood ought not to advance, but should only keep the troops posted in it at bay; because that part which the enemy has weakened will then become the principal object of attack: it is probable, that the enemy having weakened his front, will certainly be broke. If the enemy should not weaken his front, and the attack of the wood should succeed, as soon as the enemy is driven out of it, the troops which attacked it should take the enemy in flank; then the body of the army, by advancing, ought to determine an affair already half gained. If by the intelligence the general hath received, and the number which he knows the enemy's army to consist of, and which he sees before him, he judges the wood is filled with infantry, and that consequently the attack of it will be attended with difficulty, he must attack on the side of the river, by marching by degrees from the right, as if to sustain the left. For the greater certainty of succeeding in this attack, he should reinforce the five battalions upon the right with some others from the second line: the left should continue in the position already mentioned, to keep back the enemy. If it should happen that the enemy, seeing his left attacked, causes the troops to leave the wood in order to replace those of the centre, which he caused to march to the assistance of the left, the 14 battalions... Offensive which are posted sidewise, ought briskly to attack the wood sustained by dragoons. These last should post themselves upon the left flank of the infantry in order to cover it; and as soon as it shall be within 60 paces of the enemy, it should march up to him with bayonets fixed; and the dragoons ought to attack him in flank at the time the infantry does the same in head. The wood is all this while supposed to be practicable for the dragoons on horseback; but in case it should not be so, they must dismount, the infantry being sufficiently supported by the 12 squadrons of cavalry, which are placed sidewise.

The general may with ease, especially in an open country, attack the enemy's whole army together; but this may be attended with great danger, and if the whole front of the first line is broken, there will not be much difficulty in breaking the second; whereas, by attacking the enemy's army in one or two parts, if one of these attacks succeeds, the battle is won; because the troops who are victorious, take the enemy in flank, at the same time that he is attacked in head by the rest of the army. In case it should not succeed, the troops who made the attack can retreat, protected by the whole army, which hath not at all suffered.

The general should, as much as possible, conceal the motions he intends making from the enemy; consequently the five battalions and 10 pieces of cannon which support the right of the army next the river ought to march in the rear of the squadrons of the first line, the infantry with their arms secured, and not range themselves in the order of battle intended, till the two armies are ready to march to charge each other. It is the same with regard to the squadrons of cavalry, which should be posted behind those of the first line, to execute the design already laid down.

Disp. II. If the two armies are not supported either on their right or their left, the same position should subsist that hath already been established for the cavalry, which is in the rear of that belonging to the first line, except that it should be distributed on the right and the left. If there is not cavalry sufficient, hussars must be substituted in its place; but if there should be cavalry enough, it must be used on this occasion; because cavalry being a greater body, its charge is heavier, and it also makes a greater impression upon other cavalry opposed to it, provided they execute their order with great quickness. This cavalry or hussars, which are posted sidewise, should not quit their post, but wait the success of the attack. If the enemy is repulsed, they must then fall upon his flanks, and by a brisk and vigorous charge endeavour to involve the second line in the confusion of the first; they will be followed by part of the wing of cavalry that is victorious, in order to give a greater force to the attack of the second line, taking as much care as possible not to leave any body of cavalry upon the wing of infantry that is in a condition of protecting it. After these two lines of cavalry have been broken and pursued, half of the victorious line should remain in order of battle; and, by a motion to the right from the left, take the enemy's infantry in flank, at the same time that it is attacked in head by the infantry of the army. The second line should then move into the place of the first, in order to be near enough to assist it in case the enemy's infantry should stand its ground firmly; but it is probable, that being deprived of its cavalry, it will neither have the same firmness, nor the same spirit, as if it was supported, especially when it is attacked on every side.

The cavalry and the hussars who pursue the beaten wing should not expose themselves too much, or break their order in the pursuit, for fear the enemy's hussars which are behind should fall upon and beat them by attacking them on all sides; which may very probably happen, if they do not take care to keep in order of battle; which should at least be attended to by the cavalry. After the hussars have pursued the enemy's cavalry so long as to entirely disorder them, they should return and take their former posts, in order to march from thence to whatever place they may be serviceable. Although it may appear something hard to make the hussars return, there is nothing so difficult but what may be accomplished, when order and discipline are firmly established, and when an officer has the art of making himself obeyed.

At the battle of Cannae, the Carthaginian cavalry, superior to that of the Romans, having broke through them, one part continued the pursuit, and the other fell upon the rear and the flanks of their infantry; at the same time the Carthaginian infantry charged that of the Romans in all parts, which decided the victory. Thus Hannibal owed his victory partly to his superiority in cavalry, and to his attack upon the flanks. The Numidians, who were upon the right wing of the Carthaginian army, and who fought nearly in the same manner as the hussars, performed on this occasion the same service as the hussars would certainly do in the disposition now before us; so true it is, that infantry, destitute of its cavalry, hath no longer the same firmness, nor the same spirit; and if it is also attacked in head by infantry, it cannot avoid being beat. The principal attention of a general, says M. de Montecuculi, ought to be to secure the flanks; experience having taught, that when the wings of cavalry are broke, the infantry is easily surrounded, and hath no longer the means, nor even the courage, of defending itself. The reader may see the principles he lays down upon that subject. It is seen by the example of the battle of Cannae, what use the cavalry ought to be put to, particularly in an open country where it can easily act. What advantage may not be expected from it, when an army of Romans, 80,000 strong in infantry, and 6000 horse, was overcome by the Carthaginians, weaker by the half in infantry, but which derived its principal strength from 15,000 cavalry, all veterans, and well disciplined.

But if the wing of cavalry is beat, it ought to retreat with as much order as possible. The cavalry, or hussars, that are posted sidewise, should always continue in the same place; there is no reason to fear that the enemy will advance briskly to the pursuit; because he will be taken in flank by the body that is posted sidewise; a circumstance which ought not only to abate the eagerness of the conquerors, but also animate the conquered. By this manner of acting they gain time to pass through the intervals of the second line, and to rally in the rear of it, which they can perform with the greater ease, as they are neither pursued nor molested, at least but very slightly.

In order to prevent the inconveniences that may arise if the hussars in charging the first line of the enemy in flank are charged by the second, it is necessary to detach instantly from the reserve a body of dragoons sufficient to fill up the intervals of the hussars, which will form a full line without taking up more ground; this can be so much better effected, as there would be no ground on the other side of the troops who are posted sidewise, and that, besides, these troops would be at too great a distance from the main body of the army.

Again, without causing them to fill up the intervals of the hussars, they may be placed in a second line behind them; and when the hussars attack the flank of the enemy's wing, the dragoons will take their place, in order to keep back the enemy's second line. This method hath the same effect, and is performed with less difficulty. It is almost evident, that the second line will not dare advance to protect the first for fear of being charged in flank. This disposition, the performance of which appears very difficult, is not in reality so, if the general hath taken the necessary measures, and if his troops are well disciplined, and know how to move with order and exactness. Even when this motion is not performed with all the exactness possible, it can never be dangerous, because the front of the two lines will not be destroyed, and because it is also made upon the rear; and that if the dragoons and hussars are attacked and beat in marching up, their defeat cannot be any way prejudicial to the main body of the army.

When the field of battle is in an open country, all the troops generally come down, especially when there is no obstacle to prevent them. On these occasions, it is requisite that the disposition of the troops should be strong in every part; there should always be a reserve, whether of infantry or dragoons, in order to be ready to assist the troops which have suffered.

If it is possible, in an open country, to find any hollow to support the right, and a village to support the left, the general should make choice of that situation, supposing his intention is to accept, and not offer battle. If he designs to give battle, it would be unnecessary to take this position, because he must quit it in order to attack the enemy; but if circumstances require his accepting it, he must seize this point, and place infantry and cannon in the village, and station other infantry in the rear to support that which is in the village.

As to the disposition for the order of battle, especially for the front of the line, it must be regulated by the ground, by the disposition the enemy has taken, by the troops that can most easily act, and by those that the enemy can oppose to them.

If the enemy has pitched upon a field of battle, and the general would attack him in it, he should keep his whole front employed; but should make his chief efforts on one or two parts, upon the wings, or at the centre. This was the method practised by marshal Saxe in all his battles; when he accepted battle, as he was obliged to do at Fontenoy in 1745, he was in expectation that the opposite army would attack him on one side sooner than another; in this situation the dispositions should be properly regulated, the points entrenched and occupied, the cannon distributed, and troops placed in the rear of each point to sustain those which are in it; victory should then be expected from the capacity of the commanders, the firmness of the troops, and the assistance that is properly given them. But when a general gives battle, he may attack either the right, the left, or the centre, always conforming to the situation of the ground, and the field of battle which the enemy has chosen, which cannot be ascertained but by a thorough knowledge of the country.

It is dangerous to attack the whole front of the opposite army with equal vivacity, because, if the attack does not succeed, the troops are disheartened, and are witnesses of each other's defeat. If the first line is repulsed, the second is seldom of any great use; whereas, by only employing the whole front of the enemy, and making a strong attack upon one or two parts, if it is successful, the troops can take the enemy in flank; and those which amused his front will then attack him briskly, and prevent him sending assistance to the troops that are beat. If the general does not succeed in the first attack, he can try it again with greater force, by causing the troops of the second line to march as was done at the battle of Lafeldt fought in 1747; the French troops being repulsed four times, M. Saxe sent them a reinforcement; these troops being united, carried the village at the fifth attack, which determined the fate of the battle.

In a plain but inclosed country, a general can attack only part of an army. Antiquity furnishes many examples of this. Examinondas, at the battle of Leuctra, attacked only the right of the Lacedemonian army, with a large column of infantry that formed his left; causing the right to be supported, and making the left march, the whole army, according to the opinion of the chevalier de Folard, wheeled. The battle of Mantinea, won by the same general, is also of the same nature; with this exception, that it was the centre of the Lacedemonian army that was attacked. These examples are only proposed as what may possibly happen, but which it would be dangerous to imitate on every occasion, and which should be pursued in circumstances only where a general expects great advantage from them.

As the cavalry can easily act in an open country, and be of great assistance to the infantry, all possible means should be used to contribute to the success of their attack; they should always be supported by troops in their rear. Cavalry is of great use, particularly where the two armies, from the situation of the country, find no obstacle to prevent their joining; and if the cavalry, as M. de Puyregar observes, is beat, even when the infantry of the same army is victorious, the best thing that can afterwards happen to it is, to retire in good order.

The ground so often varies, that even in an open country there are unevennesses, thickets, morasses, and hollows; in each of these situations the dispositions should be changed. If these thickets happen to be in the line of cavalry, and it can act there (for if it cannot, it would be a very great fault to place it in them), it should be intermixed with platoons of infantry, observing also not to take them from the main body of the army, but from the reserve, in order not to diminish the strength of the front; which should never be done on any occasion whatever, unless part of the army, either by its own or the enemy's position, cannot act offensively, by reason of some morass, hollow, or any other obstacle that the enemy may have placed before him; if, nevertheless, a general can take an advantageous position, by causing these thickets or these hedges to be occupied by infantry, he should give it the preference, to enable the cavalry to act with the greater facility.

The dispositions vary not only according to the situation of the ground, but also according to the general's views. Some draw up the battalions without intervals, or like a wall; others, with small intervals; others leave the distance of half a battalion between each; and others, in pursuance of the chevalier de Folard's method, place them in columns.

The first disposition is without doubt formidable as to infantry; but, as it has been already remarked, it is defective with regard to cavalry. In the third, the interval of half a battalion is too wide: it would require an immense tract of ground; besides, the battalions would not be near enough to have it in their power to protect each other. The second seems better, because the front is not so large, the battalions are more within reach of afflicting each other, and have only the distance necessary to prevent their mixing confusedly together. The fourth is undoubtedly very good; but can a general promise himself, that the soldiers can always march at an equal pace together, and without stopping? The fire of the column is continual, it defends itself on all sides; but its oblique fire does not do much execution, and there are situations and spots where this position in column would be faulty. When it cannot approach the enemy, and is also exposed to his cannon, this disposition would be dangerous; because it is certain that cannon Offensive cannon plays with much greater advantage upon depth than upon breadth: besides, not being able to get near the enemy, there are only the heads of the columns able to fire, and the rest remains inactive, exposed to the cannon. The position of the column is therefore only very good, when it can get up to the enemy and charge him.

The marshal de Puysegur affirms, that an army in an open country, formed in two lines, the first of which is without intervals, ought of course to beat an army that is formed with intervals.

The reason he gives for it is plausible; it being certain, that a full line keeps itself much closer in marching; and that, charging the first line of the army that has intervals, it ought to have broken through it before the second line, which is 150 toises or 300 paces behind, can have time to come up to its assistance; which might very well happen, and examples of it may also be cited. But could not there be another disposition opposed to this disposition in wall, keeping the necessary intervals, not only capable of resisting it, but also stronger, whether by the position and arrangement of troops, or by the ready assistance they can give each other, without being confused in their motions?

Let two armies be supposed in a plain country, without support to the wings of either side, or without any obstacle that may prevent their getting up to each other. The enemy's army, as hath already been said, is in two lines; the first of which is formed in wall, both infantry and cavalry; the second is formed with large intervals, and a body of hussars in the rear. The army to be opposed to it is of equal force, and consists of 40 battalions and 14 squadrons, cavalry, hussars, and dragoons. The following seems to be nearly the manner in which it ought to act against the enemy, who is supposed to be drawn up in wall.

The first line of infantry composed of 15 battalions, has the distance of three toises between each battalion, and the distance of half a battalion between each brigade, eight squadrons on the right, and as many on the left, with their proper intervals; 15 battalions in the second line, 200 paces distant from the first, seven squadrons on the right, and the like number on the left, in the rear of the intervals of those of the first line, supporting the infantry of the second; 10 battalions in reserve in two columns, one of which in the rear of the squadrons on the right of the second line, and the other of the same force posted in the same manner on the left; 12 squadrons of dragoons in the rear of the second line, half on the right, half on the left; and 12 squadrons of cavalry, or hussars if there is not cavalry, in the rear of those of the first line.

By this disposition, the army appears to be ranged in two lines, with a reserve, and will leave no room for the enemy to doubt of the motions it may make in marching; this disposition will undoubtedly have that effect, and does not appear very formidable; but as soon as the two armies begin to move forward, the second line of infantry must advance as unperceived as possible, forming itself in columns by battalions, each of which, with its head to a battalion of the first line, will form as many T's. The 10 battalions in reserve, which form two columns of five battalions each, will march and fill up the space on the right and left, between the infantry and cavalry. The cavalry, or hussars, which are in the rear of the first line, one by a motion to the right, the other by a motion to the left, will post themselves likewise, at 100 paces from the wings of the army; the dragoons must post themselves in the rear of them in a second line. This will be performed much easier marching, because it is not complicated; it is also performed in the rear, and the front of the first line is not put into disorder; and consequently, the enemy will not perceive it soon enough to change his position, and oppose the disposition which is presented to him. This first line, by this disposition, forming as many columns as there are battalions, of course ought to break through the enemy's army, which is in wall, but not above four deep, because the impression of a column ought to be much stronger than that of a battalion four or five deep. See Plate DXXI.

Supposing the wings of each T to give way, the battalions which penetrate there will find themselves between two columns hedged in with bayonets; the 10 battalions in reserve, which, according to this disposition, ought to join the right and the left of the infantry, should of course separate the two wings of the infantry, which are on the outside of the disposition in columns. Four battalions should remain in pursuit of them, and the two last take the line in flank, at the same time that it is attacked in head. The cavalry should charge the line which is in wall with great vigour; and the second line should follow it very close, but in good order: the cavalry, or hussars, which are posted likewise, will attack it in flank, and the dragoons must remain in their post, in order to keep back the enemy's second line.

Whatever dispositions are made in the drawing up of an army, they should always have some object. A general should foresee all that may be done by the enemy, whose disposition he should always suppose to be a good one, and to which he should oppose one at least as strong, and always better if possible; he should particularly conceal from him the motions he intends making, or disguise them from him in such a manner, that he shall not have time to oppose them, or at least not readily enough: neither should a general be too near as to give the enemy an opportunity of discovering and profiting by the method he intends following.

The disposition of an army in wall is good; but in general only so with respect to infantry, because that body acting by itself requires but very little ground to retreat, or present itself to the enemy, or to make a motion to the right or to the left. But this same disposition is defective, and even hurtful to cavalry, unless there is a moral certainty of its getting the better; but as, with regard to war, a moral certainty would be a real presumption, this disposition of cavalry in wall would be dangerous, because it may be broke. If that which is opposed to it marches up to it resolutely without confusion, and without being afraid of that mass of cavalry, and charges it the first, I word in hand, how can it retire in order if it is broke, being as much straitened in its retreat as in its disposition? All the squadrons filling up the ground, it will neither be able to make any evolution, or to act; and if it retreats through the large intervals of the second line, it will carry it away with it in its flight; were there even five lines behind it, they would all be carried away, the second by the first, the third by the second, and so on with the others.

It is true that it may give the first charge, and consequently make those squadrons which have intervals give way; but as these last have more ground to act on, they can retreat with greater ease than those who have none, by passing through the intervals of the second line, which is not to be done by a line that hath no interval. They can rally in the rear, while the second will charge the line that is without interval, and which is already disunited by its first attack; even when these two lines are beaten, they can retire with greater ease, each squadron having ground enough to act upon. They will never be so much disordered as the line which has no interval, which cannot escape being cut in pieces if broke, or which can only find its safety in flight; whereas, those that have intervals can retire one after another, and in a folder-like manner, sustaining each other.

Besides, in order to prevent the impetuosity of this cav- Offensive Operations.

In wall, it appears that nothing is to be done but to post hussars, if there is not a sufficiency of horse, behind the squadrons of the first line, who, when the two armies begin to move forward in order to charge, will place themselves on the right and the left likewise, 100 paces distant from the first lines of cavalry; by this position, they will be able to take the enemy's line in flank, whenever it comes to attack the cavalry. If a part of this line perceiving this motion, divides into two, one part to attack the line that has intervals, and the other the hussars, it is so much strength lost; consequently, the line with proper intervals has fewer troops to fight, and may expect to break them by giving the first charge. If the hussars should be beat, it is of no great consequence, the defeat of those troops never deciding the success of the battle; it is the body of the army the enemy must break, and not two regiments of hussars, which retreat with great ease from before cavalry, and rally and return to the attack as readily as they retired. But if, instead of hussars, cavalry can be posted there, the enemy's line, which is divided into two, will find itself obliged to fight upon equal terms; the certainty of success depends upon the quickness with which the enemy is attacked; and the more so, as he will be obliged to make a motion in the presence of troops already posted and ready to charge. If this line without intervals advances, without showing any attention to the hussars, in order to charge the cavalry, the hussars, at least a great part of them, ought to fall upon the flanks; and the dragoons, which are in the rear of them in reserve, should take their place, to keep back the enemy's second line, and to prevent the hussars from being taken in the rear.

These two dispositions are ideal. A general seldom chooses to fight upon a spot where the wings are void of support; and prevents the enemy, as much as possible, from getting possession of an advantageous post, or at least does not attack him when he cannot prevent him doing it, especially if the ground which he occupies is everywhere exposed; there are, nevertheless, circumstances where a general is obliged to fight, although not in a post strong by situation. By the two dispositions just now described, the order which would be most proper to be preferred for covering the wings, which may be exposed by the situation of the ground, has been endeavoured to be shown; it has been seen of what consequence it is for a general to know, and to secure all the heights, morasses, hollows, and every obstacle he may meet with. On occasions so important, a general should take the same precautions that he would use under the cannon of a place, if he found heights that overlooked the works; in which case he would not fail of constructing others more advanced, to prevent the enemy from getting there, and retarding their approaches.

If the duke of Savoy, at the battle of Marfaillle, gained in 1698 by the French army, commanded by M. de Catinat, had been possessed of the heights of Piofac, the two wings of that prince's army would have been supported; instead of which, his left wing was exposed. M. de Catinat, profiting from this fault, extended his right to the foot of those heights, of which he possessed himself, and outstretched the enemy's left; it was from these heights that the disorder in the duke of Savoy's army commenced; it soon communicated to the whole front, and got possession of the whole army: so true it is, that the most trifling object, being neglected, changes the order of things; that the least fault becomes essential; that confidence in the number and in the courage of the troops is often dangerous; and that having a contemptible opinion of an enemy is always fatal. The enemy, although inferior in troops, will soon attain a degree of superiority, if he has the advantage of ground.

Armies can engage in so many different positions, that it is impossible to particularise all of them. In this section two armies have already been presented in an open country, without any support to their wing; two others have been posted, one of which is upon a spot advantageously situated, its two wings covered; the other hath only its right wing supported, and its left exposed. It has been endeavoured to give to that, whose left wing is unsupported, the greatest strength in its whole front that is possible, and by the disposition of the left wing it is both strong and secure; but there are such a variety of spots where two armies may meet, that it will suffice to know in general the advantages they may derive from their situation.

Disp. III. A third disposition very different from the two former is as follows. The enemy's army is supposed to be advantageously posted; it hath a hollow on its right, through which run the waters of an impassable morass, forming a rivulet. Its left is supported by a large town, crossed by a rivulet. In the centre is an height, capable of containing 12 battalions; in the front of it is a plain of 700 or 800 toises, which extends from its left to the cavalry on its right. Opposite to this cavalry the plain grows narrower, by reason of an height which reaches to the rivulet, and which the cavalry could not occupy, because the enemy hath taken possession of it during the night. The town is entrenched, and filled with infantry and artillery; 16 battalions in two lines are posted next the town, in order to sustain the troops that are in it. Behind the town there are three bridges upon the rivulet: in the front of the town, on the other side of the rivulet, are posted four battalions and five pieces of cannon, in order to flank the troops intending to attack the town; these four battalions are sustained by eight squadrons of dragoons. The centre of the army consists of 20 battalions in the first line, and as many in the second; eight of which are next to the morass, sustained by six squadrons of dragoons; 12 squadrons in the first line, and 12 in the second. The cavalry on the right consists of 11 squadrons in the first line, and 11 in the second. Thirty squadrons of hussars, distributed half on the right, and half on the left, and the whole front of the army lined with artillery. Plate DXXII.

The army A, which was encamped a quarter of a league from the height by which it is separated from the enemy, began its march at dark; it halted at the foot of the height, and sent some detachments of infantry to take possession of the summit of it. The army I made the above-mentioned dispositions, because the army A was too near to be able to avoid a battle. The army I is composed of 78 battalions and 90 squadrons: these two armies are nearly of equal strength.

The left of the army A hath a fine plain before it, extending from the morass to that part where the height commences. In that place are posted eight battalions in two columns of four battalions each, next the morass, with 10 pieces of cannon between the two columns: there are 14 battalions in the first line, and 13 in the second; four battalions towards the height, and next the cavalry. Sixteen battalions occupy the height as far as the small wood; four battalions occupy the other side of the wood, and 32 battalions upon two lines very close together; 12 battalions behind the height next the rivulet; 12 squadrons of horse, and 20 of hussars, who have orders to pass three bridges thrown over the rivulet, and attack the town with three columns of four battalions each, sustained by the 12 squadrons of horse, and the 20 of dragoons. In the rear of the cavalry upon the left, are posted 16 squadrons of dragoons at a little distance, with intervals; so that, if the enemy should attack this left and beat it, the cavalry may easily retire through the intervals of the dragoons, to give them the greater facility of acting, and turn their defeat into an Offensive an almost certain victory. Fifteen squadrons of horse are posted behind the height, with their right toward the height, and their left toward the camp, in order to take the enemy in flank, whilst he is employed in pursuing the cavalry of the left, which he has beaten. The chief object of the attack should be the town, although the most difficult. If it is forced, the enemy will be beat without resource; because the infantry who has driven him from that post, will attack him in the rear; at the same time that the infantry which remained on the height will come down from it, and join, either to attack, or at least to employ the enemy upon the height, and by that attack prevent him from sending assistance to the troops already driven from the town and put to flight: the cavalry upon the left will advance at the same time to support the infantry, and, if necessary, to charge the enemy's cavalry.

The 32 battalions which are upon the height in two lines, will be divided into six columns, of which four of five battalions will be employed in attacking the town, the last battalion of every column excepted; which must remain at the entrance of the wood, with four columns of four battalions upon the left, in order to sustain the infantry attacking the town, and to keep back the enemy's cavalry upon the left. They will descend from the height under the protection of the wood by which it is covered, and which ends at about 400 toises from the town. These troops will be followed by artillery, which must be posted between the columns; they must halt on leaving the wood, and will begin by making a continual fire of cannon upon the town and the cavalry: during this fire of the artillery, the 12 battalions on the other side of the rivulet ought to attack the four battalions and the eight squadrons of dragoons belonging to the enemy; and when they have forced them to give way, they will annul them by a constant fire of musketry. When the artillery shall have played long enough to have broken down the enemy's entrenchments, and destroyed the order of the troops, the four columns, formed of 20 battalions, will march up, and with their bayonets endeavour to penetrate at some part; the 12 battalions on the other side of the rivulet will charge at the same time; the two columns of four battalions each, as well as the four last battalions belonging to the columns which attack the town, will remain at the entrance of the wood with the artillery, in order to keep back the enemy's infantry and cavalry which was next the town. If any one of the columns can penetrate as far as the bridge that is in the town, it will take possession of it, as well as of the market-place; the others following it will take possession of the hedges and gardens. One column only will be sufficient to secure the banks of the rivulet, and take possession of the bridges. As soon as the bridges are free from the enemy, the 12 squadrons of horse and the 20 of hussars will pass and attack everything they find to oppose them; then the left ought to advance: the battalions which have remained upon the heights should come down from them, and all together attack the front of the army, whose left wing is already broken and taken in flank.

But if the enemy, after having examined the disposition of the army A, imagining that the principal attack will be directed against the town, instead of remaining in his first disposition, changes it entirely, and causes a part of his second line of infantry to march to the town; and if he strengthens his right by the cavalry of the left (a spot more favourable for cavalry than infantry), the attack of the town will then become impracticable, because of the great superiority of the troops defending it; therefore it would be useless to persist in it; but his right should be vigorously and briskly attacked. It is true, that it is reinforced by the cavalry from the left; but as the ground between the height and the eight battalions which are next the morass can contain but 12 squadrons, those which the enemy hath drawn from the left can only be posted behind the height, or in the third line; if they are behind the height, nothing can prevent their being attacked; but supposing the first line broken, it should not be too warmly pursued, for fear of separating, and being taken in flank by the cavalry behind the height. The 16 squadrons of dragoons which are behind, ought to remain in that situation; the 15 squadrons of horse, which are with their right to the height, and their left to the old camp, ought to take the place of those who have attacked the enemy; and then the 20 battalions which are upon the height will come down into the plain and attack the enemy's infantry, at the same time that the 15 squadrons of cavalry and the 16 of dragoons attack the cavalry which is posted behind the height. If they succeed in beating it, or whether they do or not, if the enemy sends assistance, he will weaken his left, and then the 44 battalions, who till this time have remained inactive, may come down from the height and attack the town, not so much with a design of forcing it, as to oblige the enemy not to take any troops from it; if no assistance is sent to the right wing, it will be undoubtedly beaten, being attacked by forces greatly superior to it: the whole of the cavalry being thus put to flight, the most prudent part the enemy can take is, to endeavour to pass the rivulet by the three bridges behind the town, and by so doing, secure himself from farther insult; if the enemy does this, the 12 battalions, the 12 squadrons of horse, and the 20 of dragoons, will retire by the same road they marched up, and they will be in security as soon as they are in the wood: besides, a beaten army is seldom to be feared; therefore, they may retire unmolested, and in order.

But if it happens that the enemy, without changing his position, is not to be forced in any of these attacks, the general had better retire to the height, where there will be no danger of the enemy's endeavouring to attack him: but if he should attempt the attack of the left wing of the army A, it must be reinforced by all the cavalry that can be employed without causing confusion, and two brigades of infantry should be joined to the two which are next the morass.

Disposition IV. The fourth disposition is supposed in a country mixed with thickets and plains. The enemy's army hath its right to some mountains, and its left to a river; in about a third part of the length of his front, there is a village a little behind its right. His disposition is, four battalions and six pieces of cannon upon an height which overlooks the plain, to which is also added the cavalry of the right. Behind are two passes entrenched and guarded by four battalions; upon the heights of these passes there are four more, to prevent the enemy penetrating at the flank. There are eight squadrons in the first line, four battalions posted at the village, and 12 in it with cannon: 16 battalions on the left of the village, 14 squadrons and four battalions next the river. The second line consists of 11 squadrons upon the right, eight battalions behind the village, in order to carry timely assistance to it; 12 battalions in the rear of the 16 of the first line; 15 squadrons and four battalions to the river. The reserve consists of 18 squadrons of dragoons next the mountains (in order to dismount and be within reach of afflicting the battalions guarding the passes), and of 24 squadrons of hussars on the left next the river. An island is supposed a little in the front of the first line: in this island are placed two battalions and six pieces of cannon. A stone bridge is also supposed between the two lines, behind which is posted two battalions, to support those in the island, and to facilitate their retreat. It seems impossible to attack an army thus situated; Offensive situated; all the troops are a mutual support to each other; the flanks are secured and well guarded; artillery is planted along the whole front; and the passes are entrenched, and troops posted in them.

In the front of the enemy's army is a large plain, which runs from the mountains as far as the river; but the large nets of it is broke into by some thickets, where nevertheless cavalry may act; in order to attack this army, thus advantageously posted, a disposition must be made, entirely different from that which it is in. If the village, which is entrenched and well furnished with troops and artillery, is attacked, the forcing it will be doubtful; but supposing it should be forced, it will not be without losing a great number of men; which should be avoided, because it is the duty of a general to spare the blood of his soldiers as much as possible, and even, if practicable, to employ but few of his troops against a greater number of the enemy's. If the passes only are attacked in order to take the enemy in flank, it is very certain he can send assistance to it without weakening his front, having it in his power to cause the eight battalions in reserve behind the village to march there, and to cause the 18 squadrons of dragoons to dismount. If only the left wing next the river is attacked, it is true that attack is more practicable, there being no obstacle or entrenchment to prevent coming up with the enemy; but still there is but one wing beaten; and that, by falling back upon the troops in the village, can retreat by the mountains of which the enemy is master. There is great reason to imagine it will be beat; but the general must endeavour to reap as much profit from that victory as he can: it is therefore thought that, not to lose the fruit of it, the enemy should be attacked on the left wing, from the centre to within about 200 toises of the river, at the same time that the entrenched passes are attacked. During these two attacks, a brisk cannonade should be kept up upon the village, the infantry and cavalry upon the right, the infantry that is posted in the island, and that which is next the river: by these two attacks the enemy's front and right wing will be equally annoyed; he will not know where to send assistance, and in that state of uncertainty may probably send it to a part where the danger is not so pressing. But suppose he should act in the most proper and prudent manner, as it should always be imagined he will, the assistance which he will send to that part, cannot be effected without unturnishing or weakening some other: if he strengthens the passes and the heights with the eight battalions behind the village, they perhaps will not be forced; but he will scarcely venture to take any troops from the village, in order to send them to the assistance of the front that is attacked. But if he should unturnish the village, it must then be attacked, and that vigorously; which may be the easier done, as it hath been for some time cannonaded, and consequently the earth hath been tumbled down, and openings made, at least large enough for the infantry to enter it: this attack will not at all prevent that at the front from going on.

In order to execute the attack upon the enemy's army, it is imagined the troops ought to be distributed after the following manner: all the infantry should be placed in the first line, excepting that of the reserve, which should consist of 20 battalions; the second line should consist of the cavalry; and the third should be formed of the dragoons and hussars. The 20 battalions on the left, forming five brigades, should remain in order of battle at the coming out of the thickets, with artillery distributed between the intervals of each brigade; the 28 battalions, after making seven brigades as soon as they come out of the thickets, will form in column; then the 24 squadron, which are in the rear of the infantry, formed in column, will post themselves, four squadrons in the intervals of each brigade. The brigade supporting the right flank will advance on the side of the river; and then the seven columns and the 24 squadrons will march up to the enemy and attack him with their bayonets, without losing time in firing. As soon as the columns have broken or staggered the enemy's first line, the cavalry will fall furiously upon them, sword in hand; a part of the dragoons and hussars should follow, in order to be within distance of sustaining the troops who have attacked, or to join themselves to the cavalry who have broken in among the enemy: it should be observed, that as soon as the hussars are engaged and pursuing the enemy, the cavalry should rally in order to sustain them, or to flank the infantry which may still make resistance. The brigade of infantry which supported the right, followed by the seven squadrons, should attack the four battalions on the left of the first line, and the seven squadrons will take them in flank; which they can with the greater ease effect, as the cavalry hath been put to flight. The seventh column should, with four squadrons, attack the four battalions of the second line, at the same time that this attack is executed from the front as far as the river; 16 battalions of the 20 in reserve should attack the passes, and also the heights; the remaining four will march under cover of the mountains, sustained by a brigade of infantry and eight squadrons, in order to attack the cavalry on the right; thus of the whole front of the enemy's army, there will remain only the village that hath not been attacked, unless there hath been such a number of troops drawn from it, as to render the carrying of it not difficult. It is to be supposed that one of these attacks will succeed; that made by the columns sooner than the rest: the disposition of columns intermixed with cavalry is very formidable, because each body is supported without confusion: besides, it is to be supposed that a column four battalions in depth, and from 18 to 20 men in front, ought to break through a line that is only four deep, and which being once penetrated, the cavalry will find no difficulty in breaking through it. See Plate DXXIII.

The movement of the infantry to form itself in column, and the evolutions of the cavalry to fill up the intervals of each column, ought to be performed with great quickness, and near enough to the enemy to surprise him, but not at such a distance as to give him time to remedy it.

The nature of the ground, which is continually changing, cannot be followed through all its various shades; the author from whose work we take this article hath therefore endeavoured to form his dispositions in those situations which most ordinarily occur, in order that these general dispositions may be affiant to the ideas in more particular and critical situations. Mountainous countries have not been mentioned, because it is very rare that they present an opportunity of coming to a general action: the affairs which happen among them are generally with regard to some post, which can never decide the fate of an army, however brittle they may be. The four dispositions now mentioned are ideal; and although the propriety of them may be defended, it would be very imprudent to answer for their success; because with regard to the buffets of war, the whole depends upon circumstances, and the least accident often renders a disposition, seemingly the best, the most prejudicial that can be taken. A motion of the enemy's troops ill conducted by their commanders, too much flloth or too much eagerness in the execution of orders, an accidental word falling from the mouth either of an officer or a soldier, and which is always increased when told again, may occasion the defeat of an army, however well disposed or advantageously situated. The epithet "left" should be given to that general who commits the fewest faults; for there Part III. Of the PETITE GUERRE.

THE Petite Guerre consists in the manoeuvres of the Partisan in secret marches, occupying, defending, or attacking posts, reconnoitring countries or the enemy, placing of ambuscades, &c.

Sect. I. Of the Qualifications of a Partisan, and the Nature of his Corps.

They generally call every officer a partisan who is destined to go at the head of a detachment, whether drafted from the body of the army, or of a party which he belongs to, and for that reason has no other name than that of a partisan.

Of all military employments, there is none which require more extraordinary qualities than that of the partisan. A good partisan ought to have an imagination fertile in projects, schemes, and resources; a penetrating spirit, capable of combining the whole circumstances of an action; a heart intrepid against every appearance of danger; a steady countenance, always assured, and which no signs of disquiet can alter; a happy memory, that can call every one by his name; a disposition alert, to carry him through everything, and give a foil to the whole; a piercing rapid eye, which instantly catches faults or advantages, obstacles and dangers of situation, of country, and every object as it passes; his sentiments ought to be such, as to fix the respect, confidence, and attachment of the whole corps. Without these dispositions, it is impossible to succeed.

A partisan ought to spare nothing to be assured by his spies of the march, force, designs, and position of the enemy. As chief, he owes the example of an irreproachable conduct to his corps, by which he will inspire respect, love, zeal, and vigilance, and gain the hearts of the whole to his service. It is extremely dangerous for such an officer to contract the least attachment to women, wine, or riches. The first makes him neglect his duty, and frequently occasions the most ruinous treacheries; the second leads to dangerous indiscretions, and is sure to draw down contempt; the third leads to guilt, and destroys all sentiments of honour. The partisan must be content without the delicacies of the table, as he may be often exposed to want provision; his bed the same with the men, a cloak and straw, never stripping but to change linen. Nothing animates soldiers so much as the presence and vigilance of a commanding officer sharing with them the fatigues of the service; the officers follow his example; the men are assured, encouraged, and content.

A corps capable of carrying on the Petite Guerre to advantage should be composed of infantry and cavalry; and as it is inconceivable that the cavalry ought to be the most active in carrying on the Petite Guerre, it were to be wished that they were likewise the strongest, so as to have 600 cavalry and 400 infantry in a corps of 1000 men, making four companies of infantry and 12 troops of cavalry.

The commanding officer should have the naming of the officers of this corps, or at least have liberty to reject such as he is convinced are not qualified for such service, as every officer who may be ambitious to serve in the corps, tho' possessed of great military merit, may not have the talents requisite for the duties of the partisan.

To support the honour of this corps upon a solid and respectable footing, the strictest subordination must extend from the chief to all the officers, and the most rigid discipline inspire vigilance, patience, bravery, and love of glory, to the whole corps.

It is of the utmost importance for the officer that commands, to have the choosing his men and officers whom he knows to be fitted for his enterprise, and thereby preventing many difficulties, contradictions, and dangers, which jealously and distrust always occasion among strangers.

No recruit for the corps of a partisan, either cavalry or infantry, should exceed 30 years of age; but the younger they are, if they can carry arms, so much the better for such a service, to which youth is particularly inclined. In the choice of recruits for the cavalry, it were not unworthy the attention of officers to prefer men that are lovers of horses, and to recruit chiefly in those countries where such are mostly to be expected.

As for arms, the firelock and bayonet is sufficient for a foot soldier; and in the corps of the partisans, barrels of 36 inches, with a long bayonet, but to have the caliber the same as that of the rest of the army, which, for the sake of having ammunition made up to suit the whole, ought to be invariably the same. A helmet likewise is preferable to a hat, as the sword is almost the only thing to be dreaded from the enemy's cavalry. Four spades and four pick-axes should be given to each company of infantry.

The present manner of equipping the light dragoons is so perfect, it is unnecessary to say anything on that head; but no white horse, stone horse, or mare, should be suffered in the corps of the partisan, as the least neighing or perceivable colour may make enterprises fail. No horse should be mounted for service till six years old. The size of the light dragoons is very proper for the partisan; and while they have firm ground to act upon, and plenty of forage, none can excel them; but when they come among marshes, and feel the severity of want, perhaps the Hungarian hussars may be found more equal to the duty; possibly, therefore, in forming the corps of the partisan, 200 horse, such as are bred in the mountains of Wales or Scotland, mounted by the lightest men, might be found of good service.

The principal attention of an officer of cavalry should be to see that the men feed and dress their horses well. During the whole campaign they should have dry food only, as green weakens them. When the exigency of the service requires the horses to be kept saddled day and night, every horsemanship should seize some moment to turn the saddle-cloth, which greatly comforts a horse, keeps him at ease, and less apt to gall; and care should be taken to keep the cloth soft, and clean from sweat and dust.

Sect. II. Of Posts, &c. and the different Works with which they may be fortified.

Posts are generally such places as bodies of troops can fix in when detached from the army, to cover and secure the frontiers; and upon the vigilance and readiness of the parties that are detached there, depends the safety of the army. Whatever the abilities of a general may be, it is scarce possible that he can have an eye to every detail that contributes to their defence; it is sufficient if he knows that the guards are properly placed, and the line that they make properly established. It is then the business of the particular officers who command them, to make the best disposition for a vigorous defence, and answering the views of the general.

An officer who is detached to a post, is either to relieve a party, or take possession for the first time. In the first case, if the guard which he relieves happens to be entrenched, as soon as he arrives at the post, and has taken his instructions from the officer who commands, he should prepare himself for his defence, as shall be mentioned in that article. In the second, if an officer who is detached is to entrench himself, he must examine if the place is advantageous for the execution of his projects, the defence of his people, and the securing a retreat.

He must consult, 1st, Whether the situation be convenient for sending parties to discover the enemy; whether to give intelligence of their situation and march, or to disturb and surprise them. 2d, If it has some natural defence on its front or flanks, such as a river, rivulet, morass, or small wood that can be easily penetrated. 3d, If he can preserve his communication with the army, and if there are some covered places to favour his retreat. 4th, If he can discover all the approaches; because if the enemy can come within a small distance of the post without being seen, he will place himself under cover there, and rest while the besieged are obliged to remain continually under arms, and will watch the moment for making an attack. If then he finds hollow roads, clumps of wood, or any place where the enemy can secure himself in the neighbourhood of his post, he must fill them up, or guard them with detachments of six or seven men. 5th, He must take care not to be commanded by any neighbouring heights, or must prevent the enemy from profiting by that advantage; because if they can take his soldiers in the rear, it will be impossible for them to defend themselves. 6th, The extent of the work must be proportioned to the number of men that are to defend it. Good sense and numberless examples prove, that too large entrenchments can only be defended by considerable bodies. 7th, He should take care to have all the parts of his entrenchment nearly of an equal strength, so as to be able to make an equal resistance everywhere; and, lastly, He will take care to fulfil exactly the intention of the general in posting a guard in that place.

There are some places so advantageously posted by nature, that though they are not fortified, they may in a short time, and with little charge, be made so strong, that it will require as much art to before them as many others that are perfect fortifications; such as islands, peninsulas, and places seated on eminences of difficult access, or in morasses.

If the post is in a level country, or upon a height that may be surrounded, as happens almost always to small detachments, they should construct a redoubt, or small square fort, composed of a parapet with its banquette and ditch.

The ground being chosen, you must trace a straight line AE (fig. 1.), and raise the perpendicular BC, as directed in practical geometry; observing to give to each of these lines which mark the interior side of the parapet but two toises, or two and a half for 30 men, four toises for 50, and eight for 100; which will leave a space of two feet at least against the parapet for each man. Having traced the two first lines A, B, you must put the cord over the picquet C of the perpendicular B, and with the same length trace the arch D, then put the cord over the picquet E of the line A, and trace the arch F. The point where the arches intersect each other, is the point to end the lines EH and CG. These four lines mark the interior side of the parapet.

Then trace four other lines at the distance of two or three feet parallel to the first, as I, L, M, N, to mark the size of the banquette, which should be greater or less according to the number of soldiers you would place in a file. Then trace a third parallel square on the outside of the first, as O, P, Q, R, to mark the exterior side of the parapet, and to determine its thickness, which is usually eight or nine feet, or 18 if it is to resist cannon, which you should always be prepared to do.

Then trace a fourth and last square STVX, to determine the width of the ditch, which is the same or two feet more than the thickness of the parapet; leaving a picquet planted at all the angles, as likewise at the lines already traced, so as not to lose the points from whence the lines were drawn.

While you are employed with two or three men in tracing, five or six men should be ordered to cut down the trees that are in the neighbourhood of the post, not only to open the approaches, but to serve for constructing the intrenchments. The smallest branches serve to make fascines, which are a sort of faggots about six feet long, two feet thick, and of the same size all over, tied in the middle and at the two ends, to serve for supporting the earth, which would tumble down without that support. The middling branches serve to make picquets proper for mixing with the fascines, and fixing them in the ground, or one above another to raise the parapet. The trunks to which the large branches are left, serve to increase the strength of a post, as shall be mentioned afterwards.

Having traced all in the manner directed, fix a row of fascines upon the small square ILMN, to support the earth of the banquette; then fix a second row upon the square ABGH, to support the interior side of the parapet; then a third row on the third square OPQR, to support the exterior side of the parapet. You should observe in the beginning to picquet the fascines, to leave a passage of three feet PB, on the side least exposed to the enemy, to serve for an entry to the redoubt; but if this passage can be taken in a straight line, it should be made like a mortoise, as you see at Y, fig. 2.

After having picqueted the three rows of fascines as directed, you must dig the ditch AB, as in the profile, fig. 2, a foot distant from the exterior side of the parapet. This distance or breadth is called berme, and serves to support the earth, or receive what falls from the parapet by the enemy's cannon. This berme is more or less according to the fertility of the earth; the earth to be thrown into the intervals C, D, E, marked for the parapet and banquette, taking care to make the men tread it well down, and observing to leave a talus or slope on the two sides of the ditch FG, more or less according to the consistence of the earth, so that it may not tumble down. The slope F, which is on the side of the redoubt, is called the scarf; and the opposite slope, which is next the country, is called the counter-scarp. Care must be taken in picqueting the fascines with which the parapet is raised, to bring them nearer one another by degrees in raising it as at H, so as to leave the same slope on each side. The distance DE marks the banquette; the distance DC the thickness of the parapet at the bottom; the distance IL the thickness of the parapet at the top; MN the width of the ditch at bottom; AB the width of the ditch at top.

If the ground is level, the banquette of this work must be raised two feet; but in low places two banquettes are necessary, the one above the other like steps; but if this banquette is raised on account of some neighbouring heights from whence you may be taken in the rear, the parapet must be raised to such a height, that the enemy's shot can no longer plunge down upon you. A slope must be left on the top of the parapet, as LL, so that the soldiers may see round the post, and fire easily towards the country at O.

Though the square form of a redoubt, which we have given the method of constructing, is almost the only one used in the field, yet it has its faults, which ought to make it be rejected, at least for those posts which ought to defend the environs equally. Experience shows us, that we ought never to depend on the oblique fitting of musketry, as the soldiers almost always fire right forwards, as at A, fig. 4, and often even without taking aim. This being the case, there are large spaces opposite to the angles of the redoubt at B that are not defended, and where we may say that the enemy remains in safety. The chevalier Clairac proposes an excellent method to prevent this inconvenience, by constructing the interior edge of the parapet like the edge of a saw, in form of small redans, to hold a man or two in each side, fig. 6, which by the crossfire takes the enemy on the two flanks, so that there are no approaches but what are defended; but the construction of this redoubt is too tedious and complex to be executed by small detachments.

The same author prefers constructing circular redoubts as at C, fig. 5, because all the points of the circumference being equally disposed, the soldier posts himself indifferently over all; and the exterior spaces D which are defended, varying every moment, the enemy is nowhere in safety.

The circular redoubt, then, is the most perfect that can be constructed; but where a road or the edge of a river, is to be defended, the square, or long, or triangular redoubt, is preferable, because they ought to oppose the faces of the intrenchment as parallel as possible to the places they are to fire at, observing always to round the angles.

To trace a circular redoubt, after fixing the central point of the post, let a picquet be fixed in that point, and draw from it as centre the circle EE, with a length of cord in proportion to the number of the party, to mark the interior side of the parapet; then trace another within the first, at the distance already given, to mark the banquette; then trace a third FF, to mark the exterior edge of the parapet; then trace a fourth GG, to mark the width of the ditch; which being done, picquet the fascines, and make them take the bend of the circle, finishing as in a square redoubt.

If an officer is posted with a detachment on a passageway before a bridge, in a defile, or opposite to a ford, he may make a parapet either bending or straight, with a banquette or ditch which should shut up the whole entry; or he may make a redan, which is a work with two faces, and in such a situation should be made with a re-entrant angle (that is, the angle pointing from the enemy); taking care when he is to guard a ford, to construct it so near the river that the enemy cannot have room to form after they have passed. A deep ditch may be dug opposite to the ford, into which they should let the water of the river pass; they may likewise make the banks steep; throw trees across, and scatter chaufetrapes, which are instruments of iron with four spikes, made so as to have always one point erect.

The strength of a redoubt or any other work may be augmented by blocking up the passageway that leads to it, surrounding the post with felled trees, and sinking their trunks three or four feet deep in the earth, which must be dug on purpose, leaving a number of large branches on them, which must be sharpened at the ends, and the leaves taken away, and placed as near to one another as possible, so that the branches may mix, and taking care that they incline towards the enemy. Two or three rows may be made in this manner; but they should be at least two toises distant from each other, that the enemy may not burn them all at once to approach the entrenchments. M. Saxe in his Reverie says, that redoubts are proportionably advantageous as they take less time in constructing, and are proper for numberless circumstances, where one often may serve to stop an army in a close country, hinder them from troubling you on a critical march, or to occupy a large space of country when you have but few troops.

There is no need to mention large works which require engineers to construct, and great bodies to defend them, as these have been described under the article Fortification; but a redoubt, such as A, fig. 7, may be strengthened by filling the ditch with water, by turning a rivulet, or cutting a river or pond. If the ground is uneven, so that the water cannot be put equally in all parts of the ditch, dams should be left in digging, at C; or little traverses of earth to form banks proper for keeping the water in the upper part of the ditch D, from whence it may be let run into the lower E. These banks should have but half a foot in thickness at the height D, which should be raised sharp; but a good deal more must be left below at E, by sloping the two sides pretty much. Dams likewise are made of planks or boards, as at F; but they must be strong, and supported by large stakes, so that the body of water above may not overturn them; and then they are reckoned preferable to those that are of earth: but a more particular explanation of this figure may be of use.—A therefore is the ground within the redoubt. B, The bottom of the ditch. C, D, E, Dam of earth. F, Dam of planks, boards, or fascines. G, Upper part of the redoubt constructed of fascines, and the earth dug out of the ditch. H, The lower part of the redoubt dug in the earth. I, The berme or space left at the bottom of the parapet to support the earth. L, The entry of the redoubt. M, The inside of the parapet. N, The upper part of the parapet. O, The banquette. P, The glacis. Q, Rivulet from whence water may be let into the ditch of the redoubt.

But it is not with the works alone which have been already mentioned that an officer may fortify a post; there are an infinity of ways to stop an enemy, to tire him, and even to repulse him, with which it is necessary that every commander should be acquainted.

All the schemes for opposing the enemy, of which we have given a detail, serve only to add to the exterior strength of posts; there are others which have some natural fortifications, such as churches, church-yards, mills, or farmhouses, &c. An officer who is sent to a post of this kind, which is detached from other buildings, ought, before he begins to work, to make the inhabitants go out, and the magistrates of the nearest place receive and lodge them. He should then entrench the house with a turning parapet, if he have people enough to defend it; but if he have only a few, he should make a breast-work of felled trees round the house, especially opposite to the angles, to prevent the enemy from undermining it. He must likewise take off the tiles and slates, lest the enemy should get up by ladders, and crush his people that are within. If the house is covered with thatch, it should be pulled off and burnt, as well as everything combustible that can be found in the neighbourhood, lest the enemy make use of it against the house.

Though the house is surrounded with a parapet of felled trees, yet the walls should yet be pierced with loop-holes, about a foot from the ground, so as to discover the enemy's legs, that they may not get footing on the outside. These loop-holes should be four inches wide, and three feet distant from one another; and a little ditch should be made a foot and a half from the wall within the house, to place the soldiers in who are to defend it. Other loop-holes should likewise be pierced seven or eight feet from the ground, opposite to the interstices of the lower ones, and of the same width, placing the soldiers that are to defend them upon tables, planks, or ladders; and taking care to pierce a greater number opposite to the avenues, before, and at the sides of the gate, and the angles of the house, because these are the places where the enemy usually makes his greatest efforts. If the house has an inner court, the walls should be pierced which inclose it, so as to fire upon the enemy after he has made himself master of it. If there are several gates, they should all be blocked up except one, to be left for an entrance to the post, which should be made so as to admit but one man at a time.

If there is a broad staircase for going up to the first floor, it should be broken down, or blocked up with stones or casks filled with earth. If it is a winding stair, the wall should be pierced in different places with loop-holes, to fire upon the enemy that are already entered, keeping ladders for the troops defending the house to get up to the first floor, which should have the boards pierced with a number of holes about four inches diameter, to fire down upon the enemy, observing to pierce them only where there are no trees below, but to have a greater number over the door and other weak places which the enemy can force. A post entrenched in this manner may resist a great while, and even tire out the besiegers if defended by resolute men.

Captain d'Entremont of a French regiment, with a company of volunteers, in the campaign of 1748, took post in the church of Bevera, two miles from Venturiola. It is detached from other buildings, and he fortified it with a parapet and ditch full of water; but his entrenchment was commanded by some houses in the village, so that the enemy could fire down upon his party. He remedied this defect by covering the commanded part with a kind of blind made with rafters, leaning with one end on the wall of the church, and the other upon posts raised a foot higher than the top of the parapet, which left room to fire through. This blind, covered with fascines and earth, prevented the enemy's fire from piercing, and did not prevent his firing upon them, so that they durst not attack him.

This example is mentioned to show how to secure a post that is commanded by a height. When there is no redoubt or entrenchments of earth, the interior side of the parapet which is commanded should be raised, or a fort of penthouse should be made with rafters, placed perpendicularly against the inner side of the parapet, upon which planks or fascines are nailed, taking care to leave room between the bottom of the penthouse and the top of the parapet for the men to fire through.

If an officer has not time to oppose all the schemes which have been mentioned to the enemy, when the general wants to make a forage, and throws infantry into the house to form a line, he should immediately place a couple of trees across before the door, pierce the boards, shut the windows, and prepare for his defense, which gives time to the foragers to retire, and the supporting parties to advance.

The fortification of villages, if they consist of scattered houses, differs nothing from the fortification of a few contiguous posts, between which a communication is to be preserved. If they consist of houses collected, the commander must proceed upon the principles laid down in another article. See Fortification.

Sect. III. Of going on Detachments and Secret Marches.

Detachments are particular bodies of soldiers detached from a greater body, to guard a post, or to go on an expedition.

When an officer is ordered on a detachment, he should provide himself with a cord regularly divided, in case he has occasion to entrench; and be at the parade by times, to get information from the brigade-major, whether he is destined to relieve a detachment, or to occupy a post for the fifth time. If to relieve a party, he is only to know where the guide is who is to conduct him; the guide is a soldier, lent by the officer who is to be relieved, as orderly-man to the major-general, who by having been at the post before can lead a new detachment to it.

If it is a post that is to be occupied for the first time, the officer is to ask the brigade-major for instructions relating to its defense; which being got, he must inspect his party, and take care that every soldier is properly equipped; his firelock loaded, fresh primed, and a good flint well fixed; his caisson-box filled with cartridges; and that he carries provision for 24 hours, which is the time that detachments commonly continue, and are not allowed to go away to eat. Care must be taken to have spades, pick-axes, hatchets, and wood-bills, one or two of each kind; and if any thing is wanting, to apply to the brigade-major for it, that they may have everything necessary for entrenching.

When an officer has inspected his party, he ought to get information from his guide whether the way is broad or narrow, open or inclosed; if the enemy's posts are near; if they go on patrols, or see their parties in the day; and, lastly, if he is to pass mills, farms, manors, &c., and from these informations take the necessary precautions for his march.

When the whole are ready to march, the advanced guard A (fig. 8.), which should consist of cavalry only, should set out. It is surprising that all the authors who have written on this part of the art of war, have neglected to show sufficient attention to so essential a point: the greatest part are silent, and the rest passing slightly over the different duties of this corps, are content that it should be composed of infantry; though, on the least reflection, in the most ordinary cases of a secret march, reason must determine that none but cavalry ought to be placed there, whether it be to stop palfangers who may discover your route, or suddenly to attack an advanced guard of the enemy whom they meet face to face, or to harass their corps, in order to gain time for your own to form: it is incontestable, that for all these purposes, cavalry has greatly the advantage of infantry; who are by no means capable of running here and there to seize palfangers, or of pouring suddenly on an advanced guard of the enemy; or of retreating their cavalry a moment in case of a sudden rencontre, when they must expect to be thrown down and trod under the horses' feet, and the corps attacked before the commanding officer has had a moment to prepare for his defense.

As examples serve best to illustrate opinions that have been seldom declared, the spirited behaviour of Cornet Nangle of the 15th regiment of light dragoons merits our particular notice, and will serve as a proof of the great advantage of having the advanced guard of cavalry. In the campaign of 1761, when the French army under the command of Marshal Broglio and the prince of Soubise were retiring towards Hoxter, where they passed the Weisser, Prince Ferdinand followed close after them for several days, and and on the evening before they gained the pass over the river, one of Prince Ferdinand's German aide-de-camps directed the grenadiers and Highlanders who were in front, to push on and take some of the enemy's baggage, which was a little way before them but weakly guarded. They were immediately formed, and marched in a hurry over a plain with a thick wood in front, which they were told was clear, and had got within 400 paces of the enemy's baggage, when several squadrons of French dragoons rushed suddenly out upon them from the skirts of the wood upon both flanks, and were hewing them down without mercy, when Cornet Nangle with an advanced guard of 20 men coming up the hill, got sight of the attack, and instantly rushing on, charged the French cavalry, who started at the briskness of an attack which they were not expecting, immediately reined back; when the rest of the regiment getting in view, came on; and attacking the French, drove them off, having killed and wounded a few, and taken some prisoners. The determined bravery of this young officer with his 20 men saved a great number of the grenadiers and Highlanders from being cut to pieces, and shows what may be effected by the sudden attack of an advanced guard of cavalry.

An advanced guard by night should be of double the force of one by day. In an open country, it is a matter of indifference at what distance they advance, provided they keep in view of the commanding officer, who should continually observe them; but in covered places, and in the darkness of the night, they should not be more than 50 paces distant.

This advanced guard should have an advanced corporal B, with six horsemen divided into three pairs; one in the centre B, the two others out of the road on the right and left at CC, to examine as wide as possible, silently and attentively searching all hollow and covered places, taking care that there is nobody lying on the ground, or hid in dry ditches, behind trees or bushes. At the same distance of 50 paces upon the flanks of the corps, should march two wings DD, consisting of eight or twelve horsemen, each according to the strength of the corps, led by a non-committed officer. They can harass an enemy who may happen to rush suddenly out of ambuscade, and give time to the corps to form. Each wing to detach two men EE, keeping 50 paces wide from the others, and preserving the same route as exactly as the face of the country will permit. At the entrance of the wood NN, the horsemen should spread, and close again at coming out, and do the same at meeting any little hills, to examine them on both sides. When they perceive any traces of a party, they should immediately communicate it from one to another, till it comes to the commanding officer.

The advanced guard ought to march slowly, and the commanding officer at the head of the corps should follow at the same rate, so that the rear of the detachment may not be obliged to gallop. As the rear-guard H is only established for form, there is no need of its being numerous. The officers and quarter-masters should be careful to keep the men from sleeping, as a horse is easily hurt under the irregular motions of a sleeping rider, which retards the march. The whole corps should be forbid to smoke or speak; and if any one is obliged to cough or spit, let him cover his mouth so as to make no noise.

When the corps is numerous, the cavalry should march by squadrons, the infantry by platoons, to follow alternately, so that each platoon of infantry FFF may march at the head of a squadron of cavalry GGG; which disposition will preserve the whole at an equal pace, and keep them readier to form in case of meeting the enemy, or being suddenly attacked, as we are about to mention.

When the advanced guard perceives an enemy at a distance, whether it is day or night, they should not pursue them, for fear of falling stupidly into some ambuscade; if it is not in a country that has been well examined; but if they meet them suddenly face to face, as may happen at the entrance of a hollow way I, opening obliquely upon them, then the advanced guard, without deliberating about their strength, should instantly rush upon them. This manoeuvre cannot fail against infantry, and gives a great advantage in a rencontre with the cavalry; but if the advanced guard falls back, they expose the whole body to be defeated with them.

When the commanding officer sees the action of his advanced guard, he will instantly turn the infantry on the side of the road most proper to protect them from the enemy's cavalry, and will form them quickly at the side LLL, or on some neighbouring height MM. If it is day, they ought to face the cavalry, stooping down till the instant of the attack, while the first squadron advances to sustain the advanced guard. If the enemy appears desirous to renew the charge, and obstinate in disputing the passage, he may make use of a feint, and by falling back bring them opposite to his infantry, who will have them in the flank, and by a well-placed fire put them instantly in disorder. His cavalry profiting by this, must immediately face about, and fall upon them with all possible violence; which cannot fail to complete their defeat.

All villages, hamlets, and houses, should be avoided, especially by night (which is the most common time for the partizan), to avoid being discovered by the barking of dogs, or being seen by peasants who can inform the enemy. You will see equally how dangerous it is to keep the great roads by day, or to cross places that are too open in an enemy's country.

If you cannot avoid passing through a village, it should be done in a hurry, marching confusedly, very close, and filling up the whole breadth, by which you will conceal your strength from the peasants; some officers should remain at coming in, and in the rear, till the whole are passed, taking care that no one stops or withdraws. The same care should be taken at every road that opens upon your route. At the approach of every place that is covered or hollow, such as house, wood, gully, &c. they should halt till it is well examined, and continue attentive in passing it.

At the passage of defiles, bridges, or fords, the advanced guard should stop at 100 paces, and form till the whole corps is passed and in order. The ancients employed dogs to discover the enemy in ambuscade; but it will be well to distrust such spies, and to suffer none with the corps, as there is nothing more dangerous; their disposition leading them to bark at meeting the least animal, they will furnish the enemy with a thousand opportunities of observing you, before you can know where they are.

You should always detain the guides that were taken at setting out; but if necessity requires another, the quarter-master should go and take one without making a noise, and lead him a round-about way, that none of the peasants may discover either your party or route. If any of the party discover passengers in flight of the march, they should be stopped and brought to the corps, and care taken to prevent their escape.

The party should never refresh in a village, but in a wood by day, and open country by night, causing every necessary to be brought to them from places in the neighbourhood, which ought to be received from the peasants at a distance, so that they can neither discover the number nor quality of your corps. During the whole time of stopping, you should not be springing of sentries, and have always fix horsemen ready to secure any person by whom you imagine you are perceived; when their number becomes considerable, they should be tied together, and great care taken that none escape till the stroke is struck. The officers should be equally attentive that no soldier gets out of sight; and if they meet a deserter from the enemy, he should be conducted immediately to the corps, and then to the army, under the care of a non commissioned officer.

When necessity obliges you to stop in the neighborhood of some farm or hamlet, you must take possession of it, and carry off the farmer or chief of the place at going away, threatening to kill him and set his house on fire; if any one flees from the place before he is released. Every horseman should take care to have a spare fore shoe, and a peck of oats.

If an officer of the infantry marches a detachment to relieve a post at a distance, he should not mount his horse till out of sight of the camp, and should dismount on coming in sight of the post; but if it is only about a league distant from the army, and near the enemy, it is better to go on foot, so as to be less encumbered in case of engaging with any parties of the enemy. The men should not be pressed too much for fear of lagging in the rear, but should march close without stopping, and in as many files as the roads will permit, keeping profound silence, that they may hear any orders that are given.

An officer who marches at the head of a party, ought to keep exact order and profound silence, that they may be in a state to execute whatever he may order for their defense; but in giving his orders, he should take care to do it with a firm and determined countenance, so as to make the soldiers think that he is sure of what he is about, and that nothing better can be done. When the men see their officer hesitating, or varying in his orders, they imagine he does not know what to do; and seeing him disordered, they become so. It is upon such occasions that an officer should be steady to restrain his party, and make them instantly obey. The danger is greater on a march than in an attack. Here the soldiers have their arms in their hands; and, seeing the enemy before them, are ready to engage. It is otherwise on a march; they are left upon their guard, and have not their arms in readiness; then, says Vizetius, an attack confounds them, an ambush disorder them. An officer ought therefore to take every precaution in examining, by his advanced guard, all places that may conceal any of the enemy.

But as the greatest precaution cannot prevent an officer on a march from being attacked, it is necessary, as soon as he perceives the enemy, to observe if the party is superior to his detachment; whether it consists of cavalry or infantry, or both together. If it is cavalry, and superior, there is no necessity of being discouraged; but, on the contrary, he should profit by every advantage that offers, by gliding into land that is furrowed, uneven, cut, and difficult or inaccessible to cavalry; or if the country is inclosed, he should line the hedges, and cheer up his soldiers by some encouraging language, while he dispatches a trusty fellow with advice of his situation to the general. If the enemy march up to him in this situation, he must do all that he can to sustain the attack, by ordering his party not to press upon one another, to keep up their fire, and not to discharge their pieces till they are at the muzzles.

When you have the advantage of rocks or other obstructions to the acting of cavalry, continue the route as near as possible, keeping the party close, and always ready to receive the enemy. If the number of the enemy's cavalry do not exceed your party, you may continue your route; and keeping your men close together and prepared, they will not venture to attack you. If an officer fees no means of possessing an advantageous post, or of getting to the post he was detached to, he can do nothing better than retreat to the camp, along some river or wood, to prevent being broken; but if he is so closely pursued that he cannot avoid being beaten or taken, there is no better maneuver to imitate than that of the Barbets (a); who scatter themselves, and retire from tree to tree, from rock to rock, and destroy a party, who can neither beat them, nor take one of them.

The moment of taking possession of a post is the most critical that a detachment can have; officers have been frequently attacked at the very time they thought they had nothing to do but quietly take the necessary measures for remaining in safety.

If the party which arrives at a post is to relieve another, the officer that is to be relieved gets under arms as soon as his sentries give notice of the approach of the relief. The detachment being known, they are permitted to enter and occupy the post in the room of those that are to depart; at the same time, the corporals go to relieve the sentries, and the officers and sergeants give the counter-sign, with the detail of all that is to be done at the post by day or night. He ought likewise to get information from the officer he relieves, if the enemy make incursions in the neighborhood; if their guards are distant, whether cavalry or infantry, and whereabouts placed. After these precautions let him guard against his post being surprised.

The sentries being relieved, the officer that is to go out must form his detachment, and return to camp with the same precautions as in coming. The new detachment remain under arms till the other is within 50 paces; then the officer is to make them lay down their arms against the parapet, putting their haversacks against the gun-locks, to prevent dust from spoiling them, or the dew of the night from wetting the powder. In an open country without fortification, the men must not go to any distance from their arms when they lay them down in the day, and keep them between their knees when they sit round their fires in the night, with the locks inward, to prevent accidents.

Sect. IV. Of Reconnoitring.

Parties ordered to reconnoitre, are to observe the country or the enemy; to remark the routes, conveniences and inconveniences of the first; the position, march, or forces of the second. In either case, they should have an expert geographer, capable of taking plans readily; he should be the best mounted of the whole, in case the enemy happen to scatter the escort, that he may save himself more easily with his works and ideas.

All parties that go for reconnoitring only, ought to be but few in number. They should never consist of more than 12 or 20 men. An officer, be his rank what it will, cannot decline going with so few people under his orders; the honour is amply made up by the importance of the expedition,

(a) They are peasants subject to the king of Sardinia, who abandon their dwellings when the enemy take possession, and are formed into bodies to defend the Alps which are in his dominions. It must be evident that the success of such a commission depends upon secrecy, and that it is impossible to fulfill the intention without keeping out of sight of the enemy. It is incontestable, that a numerous party cannot glide along so imperceptibly as a small handful of men. As these detachments must finish their course quickly, it is necessary that they should consist of cavalry only; but if they are to go far, they may increase each with 30 foot, to remain in ambush about half-way in a wood or covered place, with whom the cavalry can leave their provision they brought with them.

An officer charged to reconnoitre in front, should take his instructions in writing, and set out at such time as to arrive at the place proper for beginning his observations at day break. Every time that he has occasion to stop, the party should face toward the enemy, and send a non-commissioned officer with two horsemen to run over the neighbouring heights, and closely examine the environs. When near the enemy, avoid stopping in a village.

The officer, and geographer who is supposed to be present, should remark every interesting particular: The heights, woods, ponds, morasses, rivulets, rivers, fords, bridges, roads, crossings, difficult and dangerous passages, by-ways, meadows, fields, heaths, gullies, hills, and mountains; the distance and strength of villages, hamlets, houses, farms, and mills; what sovereign the country belongs to, and what are its productions.

If the enemy comes in sight, the officer should quickly assemble his party, though his reconnoitring be not finished, and let him retire to his infantry, if he placed any; but if not, let him gain some other place that he has chosen for a retreat. After being refreshed, let him go back with the cavalry to finish the reconnoitring; but if he was obliged to return quite to the post, he should not go back till next day. Mid-day is the time of being least inconvenienced, as detachments are less frequent at that hour. The commanding officer ought always to avoid coming to blows, even though he thinks himself secure of success, unless he happen to be on his return, and near to his post, so that he foresees the grand guard, hearing the firing, cannot fail to run to his assistance. If obliged to engage with a party who are cutting off your retreat, and that no other means is left of turning them, you must risk all without hesitating, by rushing on, and try to save the geographer with the fruits of his commission, especially if the reconnoitring was of importance to the general of the army, and merits the sacrificing a dozen men, which they can easily retrieve on another occasion.

When a party goes out to obtain news of the enemy, it ought to approach as near as possible, but cautiously: day-break is not the time proper for such a purpose, because at that time the enemy send their different parties and patrols to make discoveries; you should therefore prevent them by approaching in the night. You may easily reconnoitre their position and extent by their fires, which they never extinguish at the head of the guards and picquets; and you may easily remark if they are about to change their position, by hearing a more than ordinary noise; besides, as it is easy to approach by night, you may discover many of things by the light of the fires.

A partisan ought not to neglect to reconnoitre every place round his post for two or three leagues, or farther, if it is possible on the side of the enemy; and for that purpose he should employ the method of Mr Jeney; who, during the campaigns that he made, often examined the enemy's posts without approaching, in the following manner, which he recommends as infallible.

I suppose myself, says he, with my party at Soest in Westphalia A (fig. 2.), and the enemy posted at Bervick B, two leagues from me. To know the situation of this place without stirring from Soest, I take the map of the country; and from Soest as centre, I draw a circle whose circumference passes half a league beyond Bervick. I draw a circle of the same size upon a leaf of paper, to make my plan as in fig. 2. and then place Soest in the centre A; and I mark all the villages which I find in the map near the circumference, upon my plan, with the distances and bearings as they are represented in the map, making use of a pencil to mark the places DDD, so as to correct the errors more easily which the map may have led me to make.

Having thus formed my plan, with a scale of two leagues (which is the distance I suppose Bervick), I go to the burgomaster of the town of Soest, where I cause some of the most intelligent inhabitants to come, speaking to them freely, and openly induce them to communicate all the information I have occasion for.

The better to conceal my designs, I begin my reconnoitring by Brokhusen, a village distant from the enemy. I ask the distance from Soest to Brokhusen; if they say it is seven quarters of a league, I correct the distance of my plan which made it two leagues; then I inform myself of all that is to be found on the road from Soest to Brokhusen; chapels, houses, woods, fields, orchards, rivers, rivulets, bridges, mills, &c. If they say that at half a league from Soest they pass the village of Hinderking, I mark that place upon my plan. I ask if the road from Soest to Hinderking is crossed by any other road; if there is any morals or heath; if the road is inclosed, paved, or straight; if there is any bridge to pass, and at what distance. I take care to mark everything in my plan, forgetting nothing, even to mills, bushes, gibbets, gullies, fords, and every thing that can be got from their informations; which will probably be perfect, because one always knows more than another. I continue my questions from Hinderking to Brokhusen; and advancing by little and little, observe the same method on the roads of the other villages round, marked DDD. In this manner I cannot fail to acquire an entire knowledge of all the places; besides, I find myself imperceptibly instructed in the position of the enemy, by seeing the different routes by which I can approach most secretly.

It is plain that such a plan must be very useful to regulate secret expeditions. It is chiefly useful, not to lay necessary, for a commander of a party, who can give more ample and precise instructions to his officers, by accompanying them with a copy of the routes marked out, which they can consult even in the night, if it happens to be clear; by which they will be guarded against being deceived by ignorant or treacherous guides, which occasion the mistakes of too many who go unprovided with such helps.

There is still another means to secure a reconnoitring party; which is, to compose them of people who speak the language of the enemy, and give them furtouts of the colour of a regiment of the enemy, and cockades the same. This scheme may be carried so far as to line the furtouts with the colour of another regiment of the enemy, provided that by turning the furtouts, they appear to be a different corps, and deceive guards, spies, and peasants, and confound their reports.

Sect. V. Of the Defence of Posts.

When a partisan has taken every precaution that prudence suggests in reconnoitring a place where he would fix. a post, he is to take possession in the following manner. The infantry remain under arms in the middle of the place, the cavalry to patrol without, while the commanding officer, escorted by a dozen horsemen, goes to examine the environs to make his arrangements; having sent several small detachments before, to cover him in time of reconnoitring.

Having remarked the places proper for his guard, defense, and retreat, as well as the dangerous ones by which the enemy can make approaches secretly to surprise him, he should choose the most convenient in the front of his post to fix his grand guard D (fig. 1.), which must face the enemy. He must mark the heights for this guard to place their vedettes EEEE, and regulate the number according to the exigencies of the situation. In a covered country you must not be sparing of them, and must reinforce every guard. At 50 paces before the front of the grand guard, a subaltern or non-commissioned officer with eight horsemen should be always ready to set out at K, to go and reconnoitre, when the vedettes have observed any party.

The grand guard being fixed, you should form another in the middle of the village, called the ordinary guard, composed of cavalry and infantry, placing sentries at the entries and vedettes all round; the last at such distance as to see one another. A picquet should likewise be fixed before the quarters of the commanding officer, which should be near the ordinary guard and the whole corps. In the day, half the cavalry of the picquet must keep their horses bridled and ready to mount; but if the enemy is near, they must remain on horseback, the other half to unbridle till the hour of relief.

According to the arrangement we have given for composing the corps of a partisan, the grand guard may consist of a captain, a first and second lieutenant, a quarter-master, two sergeants, four corporals, a trumpeter, farrier, and 52 private horsemen. The ordinary guard to have cavalry equal to the grand guard, with a captain, a first and second lieutenant of infantry, two sergeants, and 60 men, including four corporals, two lance-corporals, and a drummer; the picquet to consist of the same number of cavalry and infantry as the ordinary guard.

If there is any dangerous place capable of covering the approaches of the enemy in the environs of the post, and out of the circuit of the patrols, there should be a guard placed there, more or less strong according to the importance of the place, and care should be taken to preserve the communication. The guards and picquets being placed, the detachment that was sent out on the roads must be called in, and then go to work to lodge the party in the gardens that open upon the country, and the commanding officer's quarters; beating down hedges, filling up ditches, and levelling a piece of ground large enough to draw up the whole corps. The horses to be put under cover in barns contiguous to the gardens; but in case there are no barns, they may substitute sheds open on one side, that the horses may go out altogether in case of alarm.

The officers should occupy the houses in the neighborhood of the sheds, and one of each company remain day and night with the company, to prevent any of the men from entering the village without leave, upon any pretence. The commanding officer must acquaint the officers of his having chosen the place M for the rendezvous in case of a retreat; which ought to be at some distance from the village, and on the side he judges most convenient for retiring to the army. At sunset the grand guard are to return to the post and join the picquet, the one half of each to mount alternately till day-break, and then the grand guard to return to the place they posted the day before. The sentries and vedettes should be doubled, and all the passages shut up with wagons placed in two rows, except one for sallying out at, in case of a retreat, made wide enough for the passage of the patrols or the whole cavalry.

The corporals of the ordinary guard should lead the relief of the vedettes every hour, setting off together; but when they come to the passage of the post A, they must separate into two parties, the one to the right to relieve the vedettes BBB, the other to the left for the vedettes CCC; then each of them with the parties they have relieved should go on at their head a quarter of a league, by the two routes pointed out in the plan, to examine the environs, supposing an hour to each. Besides this reconnoitering, the captain of the grand guard should send two patrols in the night. To fill up the intervals, they should set one about half an hour after the corporals, and make the same round. At returning to the post, the corporals to make their report to the officer of the ordinary guard; the conductors of the patrols to the captain of the grand guard.

A little before sunrise or sunset, a grand patrol detached from the corps should be sent under the conduct of an officer to search the whole environs of the post minutely, especially the dangerous places, because at these times the enemy are most likely to attempt a surprize. If the patrols discover them, they will be in a state to repulse them, or at least to harass them till the commanding officer, upon the first notice, draws up the whole corps. The officers should take great care to instruct the sentries in their duty, explaining it to them every time of their mounting, and forbid them to smoke, as the least fire can be easily perceived in the dark, and serve to direct the approaches of the enemy. No sentry to move more than 50 paces to the right, and as many to the left of his post; and let the weather be ever so bad, he must not get under cover. No one to be allowed to go out of the post without leave of the commanding officer; and to prevent desertion or maulauing, the sentries and vedettes must be charged to let no folder pals.

The vedettes must stop all passengers, and take them to the next entry, who must call a corporal to conduct them to the commanding officer. If there are a great number passing at once, the vedette at the challenge must halter to stop them at 100 paces, till the officer has sent to reconnoitre them; but if he finds them to be a party of the enemy, he must fire upon them and retire. At the first alarm, the grand guard and picquet ought to mount, and each of them to detach a subaltern officer immediately at the head of the best mounted horsemen, to go quickly to encounter the enemy. The rest of the grand guard and cavalry of the picquet to follow immediately, led by their captains to sustain the first detachments, to repulse or keep back the enemy as long as it is possible, and give time to the commanding officer to form the whole corps.

If the commanding officer observes that the enemy are of no very extraordinary force, he must without hesitating put himself at the head of his cavalry, and instantly charge them, pouring upon them with his whole force, which is the best way to succeed; and in the mean time, the infantry should form to sustain the cavalry. One essential circumstance should not be forgot here, which is, that at the going of the detachments of the grand guard and picquet, all the infantry of the picquet should march immediately to the place appointed for the rendezvous in case of a retreat, and a strong detachment of cavalry should follow to occupy the place. If it is at the entrance of a wood or some covered place which the enemy may occupy, and thereby cut off your retreat, you must prevent it by fixing the infantry of the picquet in the post, to remain day and night, with a lieutenant. lieutenant at the head of 20 horsemen to clear round it. If the enemy is too superior, and appears to form an attack on that side, the commanding officer should get there before with all his force to oppose them, till all his detachments join, and then regulate his retreat, as will be seen in the section of the Retreat.

To be better secured in a post which you expect to remain in for some time, and where you find that the enemy will not fail to disturb you, it will be proper immediately to employ some of your people with the peasants, to form some intrenchments in a hurry in the most dangerous places, to have breakfasts of felled trees in the woods; herds placed in the fords (see Herse); pits dug at the entries and plains without defense; so that the cavalry coming full speed to charge you, may tumble in. If there happen to be a bridge either in the front or on the flanks of the post, as at N, by which the enemy can facilitate their approach or retreat, it must be instantly destroyed, unless you find it may be of use, and necessary to fix a good guard on it.

To regulate the attack and defense most advantageously, you should take care to observe the places by which the enemy can approach, and form a plan of operations for cutting off, or taking in flank, the different routes which he can attempt. You should inform your officers, and not fail to hearken to the advice of those whose talents, genius, and experience, render them competent judges of your designs. These arrangements will be of great use in surprising the enemy's parties, who will come from time to time to reconnoitre the post. If the enemy approaches in the night, take care how you attack him; you cannot reconnoitre his force, and you ought to suppose that he is informed of yours.

Do not suffer any suspected woman to approach the soldiers; their visits are dangerous in debauching your people, and the enemy frequently employ them to discover your strength. Let no deserter stop in your post; and if he comes in the night, keep him till day-break is near, and then send him to the army. Every party that approaches your post will profess belonging to you; but if they are not provided with a proper passport from the general, or if you do not know any of the officers, trust neither to their word nor uniform.

These instructions may serve for the corps of a partisan according to the proposed arrangements; but partisans of less force must regulate their precautions according to their strength; and detachments of 30, 50, or 100 men, will seek to post themselves in redoubts proportioned to their number, or in mills, farms, hamlets, detached houses, churches, churchyards, &c., observing that the more a post is extended, the more care and fatigue it requires.

The principal object for an officer that is detached, says Monseigneur Vauban, is to foresee every troublesome event. The want of exactness, and the smallest relaxation in the service of out-posts, may have the most fatal consequences; and history furnishes a thousand examples of camps being surprised, and armies cut in pieces, by the negligence of detachments that ought to have watched for their preservation.

The manner of relieving detached posts has been mentioned; but if an officer is detached to a mill or house, let him draw up his party about 15 or 20 paces from the post, and send a sergeant or corporal with five or six men to search the chambers, cellars, and barns; which being done, the sentries must be placed, the post taken possession of, the arms ranged so that every one can find his own without confusion, and the inhabitants lodged in some other house; and then intrench himself according to the rules given.

Vol. XVIII. Part II.

If an officer is to fix in a village where it is difficult to examine every place where the enemy may lie in ambush, he should send for the magistrates to come and speak with him, while his party remain drawn up at the end of the village, that they may declare if they know whether there are any of the enemy's parties, suspected persons, or concealed arms in the place; which being done, the sentries are to be placed, and the party to take possession; putting small detachments of five or six men, more or less according to the strength of the party, at the avenues; and examining the church, or any detached house, to make the principal post in case the advanced posts are forced. The men best acquainted with the duty should be planted on the most exposed and distant places, so as to see all the approaches; and sometimes in trees, that they may see at a distance, and remain concealed from the enemy.

If he finds any place near him where the enemy can lie concealed, he should place a corporal with five or seven men there, with orders to fall back upon his post if attacked, or remain till they find themselves disengaged. The soldiers of this lesser post should take care to make no fires, because it would serve for a guide to the enemy to avoid them when they want to fall upon the principal post; but fires may be lighted in the places where they have no guards, to make the enemy think they have them everywhere, at the same time placing soldiers in ambush where there are none lighted. This scheme may serve for all posts in a level country, where two or three soldiers should be kept going all night to stir up the fires.

The exterior arrangements being made, and sentries placed on the avenues, bridges, and steeples, the works for fortifying the post should be marked out, and executed by the workmen, and the magistrates ordered to send straw to the nearest houses for lodging the soldiers, who must never absent themselves. The officer must always be in readiness to go where his presence may be wanted, and make his sergeants and corporals frequently go the rounds. Monseigneur Vauban says, that if an officer is to remain but four hours in a post, he ought to intrench. If he is to pass only some hours in a post, it is a good way to make a parapet of felled trees; or if it is in a village, to intrench a detached house.

The way to guard against being surprised, betrayed, or made prisoner, is to take precautions against all that the enemy can undertake; and whatever distance he may be at, we ought not to found our security on probabilities, but extend them even to possibilities. Neither stranger nor soldier of any other party should be admitted into the post; and the roll should be called three or four times a-day, that the men may not absent themselves: the commander should likewise examine the sentries, to see whether they are acquainted with the detail of their duty, and should show them how to defend themselves in case of being attacked; observing to them, that if the enemy make such a manoeuvre, they should oppose such another; if they try this scheme, to retake with that, and deceive them at every step. He may make some of them try to scale the intrenchment, to show the difficulty of mounting it; and by exercising them in this manner, he will prepare them to retake the enemy; it will flatter their vanity, and give them a confidence in him.

An hour or two before day, the men should be kept alert, sitting on the banquette near their arms; and the patrols sent at that time, rather than in the night, to march slowly, to listen attentively, and examine every place round the post where a man can conceal himself.

It frequently happens that two armies are encamped opposite to one another, and have several posts on the same line, and two patrols meet in the night. As it is impossible ble to distinguish whether they are friends or enemies, they who first discover the others, should conceal themselves on the sides of the road, behind bushes, or in a ditch, to examine if they are stronger; and in that case to let them pass in silence, and return another way to the post to tell what they have seen: but if they find them weaker, he who commands the patrol should make the signal which is ordered for the patrols of the night, which is commonly a stroke or two on the cartouch-box or butt-end of the firelock, which is answered by an appointed number; but a word is the safest. If the patrol does not answer, they should advance upon them with fixed bayonets, fire upon them if they see them retiring, and make them surrender.

If detached opposite to the enemy, it is to be presumed that you may be attacked: therefore small detachments should be advanced between the sentries in the night, about 30 or 40 paces from the post, with their bellies on the ground, in those places where they imagine the enemy may come; with orders to those who command them, to make a folder-reconnoitre any parties that are seen, so as not to confound their own patrols with the enemy's parties, and to retire to the post on the first firing.

In villages there should be great care taken of suspected persons, or of the peasants revolting; and for this purpose, you should make the magistrates order two peasants, the best known in the place, to be put on duty with the sentries of the party, at the passages left in intrenching. These peasants, whom the magistrates must cause to be relieved every two hours, should be charged to recollect all who pass out or in of the village; and both one and the other must be told, that they shall be answerable for all the accidents that may happen from the treachery or negligence of those sentries who have let enemies in disguise enter the village.

They must likewise order the soldiers who guard the intrenchments, to let no peasant approach, and to shut up the passage, with two trees across in the night, and not to open them till day, except for the passing of the patrols. They must examine with iron spits, or their swords, all carts that pass loaded with hay, straw, or casks, or any thing that can conceal men, arms, or ammunition.

An officer cannot watch too carefully to prevent schemes that may be contrived against him; and the attempt on Brissac in the month of November 1724, is so much to the purpose, that it ought not to be passed in silence. The governor of Fribourg having formed the design of surprising Brissac, set out in the night of the 9th or 10th of November, with 2000 men, and a great number of waggons loaded with arms, grenades, pitch, &c. and some chosen soldiers: all these waggons were driven by officers disguised like waggoners, and were covered with perches, which had hay placed over them, so that they appeared like waggons loaded with hay coming in contribution. They arrived at the new gate by eight o'clock in the morning, under the favour of a thick fog: three waggons entered the town, two full of men, and one with arms, when an Irishman, an overseer of workmen, observing 30 men near the gate, who, though they had the dress, had not the manner of peasants; asked them what they were, and why they did not go to work like other people? Upon their not answering, and appearing confounded, he struck some of them with his cane; upon which the disguised officers run to the arms which were in the wagon next them, and fired 15 or 20 shot at him within half a dozen paces, without wounding him. The Irishman leaped into the ditch, where likewise fired several bullets shot at him, while he called To arms, to arms, with all his might.

At this noise, the guards of the half-moon and the gate run to arms, and would have pulled up the draw-bridge, but were prevented by the waggons which the enemy had placed upon it. The officers and soldiers who were in the waggons, rushed out with their arms, and having joined the rest, attacked the guard commanded by a captain of grenadiers; but being repulsed, and five of them killed, the rest were dismayed, and fled either into the town, or out into the country. The captain of the guard made the first gate, which was a grate, to be shut; across which the enemy, who were upon the bridge, fired at all who appeared; and having left the half of his guard, he mounted the rampart with the other half, and continued firing upon the enemy. A lieutenant who commanded 12 men of the advanced guard, was attacked at the same time by an officer who presented a pistol to his breast; but snatching it from him, he fired it at him, and killed him: this lieutenant defended himself to the end of the action; but having received several wounds, he died that day.

Upon hearing the noise of the surprise, the commanding officer of the place distributed his garrison to their proper posts: and having made every disposition necessary for his defence, the enemy saw that their design had failed; and retired in disorder, leaving a number of waggons behind them, and more than 40 soldiers who were killed or wounded. Such was the enterprise on Brissac, which failed by a trifling accident.

This example, and many others which might be cited, show that an officer who commands in a post cannot be too much on his guard to prevent his falling into the snares which the enemy prepare for him, as the seizing of a post, of however little importance it may seem, may be attended with the most troublesome consequences.

In an enemy's country, the inhabitants are always ready to revolt and betray; therefore the commanding officer ought to take one or two of the magistrates children, or three or four of the most considerable families of the village, and keep them in the principal post as a pledge of the fidelity of the inhabitants. The children (to whom they should take care to do no manner of hurt) should only be kept half a day each, and changed for some others. The commanding officer should forbid the inhabitants to assemble in taverns or public walks, or any place whatever, and cause these orders to be fixed up at the door of the church. If they are seen to stop and converse at coming out of church, or in the market-place, let the patrols oblige them to retire. The tavern-keepers and all the inhabitants must be forbid to receive any stranger without acquainting the commanding officer. None to be permitted to stir abroad after retreat beating, on pain of being killed by the sentries who see them, or stopped and conducted to dungeons by the patrols; who ought to march slowly, stop from time to time to hearken if they hear any noise, go over all the quarters that are marked out to them, and give an account of every thing that they have discovered that can cause any alarm in the post.

If fire breaks out anywhere, or the inhabitants quarrel among themselves, an officer should take care how he sends a party to their assistance, because they are frequently snared of the enemy to divide the strength of a detachment on purpose to attack them; he should therefore ring the alarm bell, make all the different posts get under arms, and order those who command them, to make the soldiers remain armed against the parapet, so as to observe what passes without the village. The soldiers of the principal post should likewise get under arms, and the officer detach four or five men with a sergeant or corporal to part the fray, or set the inhabitants to work in extinguishing the fire.

As all the necessary precautions for the safety of a post are are too many to have them executed by giving them verbally, the commanding officer should give his orders in writing, and have them fixed up in all the lesser posts. One thing to which officers who are detached to a village should give particular attention, is, not to vex the inhabitants by making them furnish too much; whatever they are allowed by the general to exact, such as firing, forage, candle, &c., for the guards, should be demanded in proportion to the abilities of the inhabitants; and an officer cannot be too delicate in preserving the character of a gentleman in ordering contributions, and preserving the inhabitants from being robbed or treated ill by the soldiers.

It is not sufficient for the preservation of a post, to raise intrenchments, nor to take every precaution against being surprised. As the enemy must attack with a superior force, your dispositions must be made in such a manner as not to confuse one another, and every one being properly placed, contributes to the common safety. If it is a redoubt, or other intrenchment of earth that is to be defended, seven or eight trees with their branches should be kept in reserve, to throw into the breaches the enemy may make, and the parapet kept well lined with men, who ought not to fire till the enemy are on the glacis. They should be provided with grenades to throw in the midst of the enemy who have jumped into the ditch, nay even ashes or quicklime, whose burning dust cannot fail to blind the enemy, should be had if possible. If the strength of your detachment will admit of it, eight or ten soldiers should be placed in the ditch (on the opposite side from the enemy), so divided as to take the enemy on the flanks, who have jumped into the ditch. This kind of fallacy, by running round upon the right and left at the same time, must astonish an enemy who could not dream of being attacked.

If there are heights from whence the enemy can crush your people with stones, they must be occupied with eight or ten men covered with a breast-work, to prevent the enemy from posting them, or guard against them, as has been formerly directed.

In the defence of houses, mills, &c. as well as regular fortifications, the men should be made acquainted with the different manoeuvres they may employ for their defence; without which they do not foresee the intentions of their officer, and may counteract one another by their being in disorder.

The obstinate defence of a post is the action where an officer detached singly can acquire the greatest glory; the resistance not proceeding from the number of soldiers destined to defend it, but from the talents of the officer who commands. It is in him that the strength of the intrenchment lies; and if he joins to determined bravery the abilities necessary on these occasions, and can persuade his soldiers that the lot the enemy prepares for them is a thousand times worse than death, he may be said in some fort to have rendered his post impregnable.

In the defence of detached buildings, there are so many different retreats, that it becomes an arduous task to succeed in an attack, when brave people are to defend them. They have the loop-holes on the ground-floor to defend, when beat from the intrenchments without, and may resist great numbers, by retiring gradually to the different floors of the house, where they should have large buckets of water provided to throw upon the enemy, which, though it may appear trifling, is one of the most disagreeable that can be opposed to the assailants; for at the same time that it wets their powder, arms, and clothes, it hinders them from seeing what is doing above, prevents every scheme for setting fire to the house, and may oblige them to desist from the attack.

Having observed that the defence of a post does not depend upon the soldiers who are destined for that service, but upon the officer who commands, the following example may serve to confirm the observation, and will at the same time show the utility of having stones collected to throw over upon the enemy, as formerly recommended.

In the month of September 1761, captain-lieutenant Alexander Campbell of the 88th regiment, with 100 men under his command, was pitched on to defend the remarkable post near Cassel in Hesse, called the Hercules. Monsieur Rozierie, the celebrated partisan and engineer of marshal Broglio's army, with 600 infantry and four squadrons of cavalry, arrived in the neighbourhood of the post the morning of the 22nd; and having beat a parley, surrounded and carried off the two men who were sent out to receive the message. After having examined them separately, he caused a detachment, under cover of his musketry from a hill that was opposite to the principal pallage, to advance and mount the stair, three men abreast; which they did to slowly and without any interruption, that the whole stair of about 100 steps was full of men, when Captain Campbell (who had made an excellent disposition for the defence of all the parts of his post), having some chosen men at each side of him, waited to receive those who advanced first upon their bayonets, and firing at the same time, gave the signal for the rest to throw over large stones which he had collected and disposed for that purpose; which made such havoc, that Monsieur Rozierie, startled at the unexpected reception, and despairing of success, wished to get his party off. Captain Campbell seeing the destruction of the enemy without a man of his being hurt, and that he could renew the reception as often as they chose to repeat the attempt, was elated with his success, and encouraging his men, when he happened to move from the wall that covered him, and received a musket shot from the opposite hill, which entered a little below the left temple and came out at the same distance below the right; upon which he fell, and the party beat the chamade and surrendered. After two hours possession the French retired, carrying off the prisoners, and leaving Captain Campbell, whom they thought dead, to be saved by our troops, who soon took possession again, and sent him to be recovered, and to display new merits in his profession.

If the enemy take cannon to force the post, it does not appear how it can be resisted, unless the house is low, and they cannot range round the intrenchments, as every shot can make a large opening in bad built houses, and may crush the besieged. The only means then to thun being massacred is to capitulate, or to rush out boldly upon the enemy when they least expect it. The first is not resolved upon but when the honours of war can be obtained, which is to march out with drums beating to return to the army with a proper escort. But if this capitulation cannot be obtained, the besieged have nothing left confident with true bravery, but to rush out sword in hand, and enter their way through the enemy. The necessity of conquering changes the brave man into the determined soldier, which gives him the means of retiring to the army or some neighbouring post.

If a post is to be abandoned when it can no longer hold, and you are going to make the fallacy, you should continue to fire with spirit, taking away barricades from the door through which you are to pass with as little noise as possible. When they are assembled, the whole party should go out close together, rushing with their bayonets to the place the officer thinks the least guarded. You ought never (says Mr Folard) to wait for day to execute these fallacies, which cannot succeed but in a dark night, by which you easily easily conceal from the enemy the road you have taken; for which reason you should not fire, but open to yourselves a passage sword in hand, lest the enemy come where they hear the noise.

Officers should be attentive to distinguish between the true and false attacks, and not despair when beat from their first intrenchments. The defense of posts is so easy, that it is surprising they do not hold out longer than they commonly do. There wants only resolution and vigilance, taking every advantage of the ground, and persuading the soldiers that nothing but the most manifest benefices can let the enemy penetrate. The example of Cremona, surprized by prince Eugene in 1702, will remain a proof to posterity of what determined bravery can do; and show, that though an enemy is master of half the ramparts, and part of the town, he is not master of the whole.

Prince Eugene having formed the design of surprizing this town, which was defended by a garrison of French and Irish, got some thousand Austrian soldiers admitted at a secret passage by a priest. These troops seized the two gates, and a great part of the town; the garrison buried in sleep were awakened by the assault, and obliged to fight in their shirts; but by the excellent maneuvers of the officers, and resolute bravery of the men, they repulsed the Imperialists from square to square, from street to street, and obliged Prince Eugene to abandon the part of the town and ramparts of which he had been in possession.

Posts have often resisted the first and greatest efforts of the assailants, and have yielded or been abandoned to subsequent attacks, though much less spirited. How comes this? It is owing to an officer's not daring to abandon his post at the first attack: he repulses the enemy, because if forced they will be put to the sword with their whole party; but when the enemy comes back, he thinks he has nothing to reproach himself with, having defended it for some time, so retires, or surrenders. Since he could repulse the enemy when in good order and quite fresh, how much more easy and less to be dreaded when they return harassed with fatigue?

Is not the great cause of misconduct among military men the want of encouragement to excite emulation? An officer who is not protected, who is never sure of the least favour, neglects himself, and takes less trouble to acquire glory, rarely heard of, though merited by the bravest actions, than to enjoy the tranquility of an ordinary reputation.

It is not expected that an officer who is placed in a post should seek to engage; but that he should steadily resist when he is pressed, and die rather than abandon his intrenchment.

Historians have been very silent about posts being well defended; though the lessons to be drawn from them may be more generally instructive, and as agreeable to read, as those left us of the best fortified places of a state. We are astonished at the account of 100,000 men perishing before Olten in 1604, and their general, the archduke Albert, with the ruins of his army, not making himself master of it, till after a three years siege: nor is our wonder less, to see Charles the XII. of Sweden, in the year 1713, with seven or eight officers and some domestics, defend himself in a house of wood near Bender against 20,000 Turks and Tartars.

Several historians mention the defense of this house because it was done by a crowned head; but brave actions, whoever are the authors, should never be buried in oblivion, as they excite emulation, and are full of instruction.

Sect. VI. Of the Attack of Posts.

Although the taking of a post is always difficult when you have to do with people who know how to defend it, nevertheless you may succeed in attacking them by surprise and stratagem. We ought never to form a scheme for an attack upon simple speculation, because from reasoning we often think that things are feasible, which we find impossible in the execution. When you intend to undertake an action of this kind, you ought to form a just idea of it, by examining all the branches separately, and the different means you can use, so that, by comparing them together, you may see if they concur, and answer to the general purpose; and lastly, you are to take such measures as may in a manner render you certain of success before you begin.

As it is not the practice of the army to choose a particular officer for the attack of an entrenched post if he does not offer himself, so an officer should not embark in such an enterprise, without having examined the means of succeeding, and being capable of showing the general a plan of what he has projected, to see if he will consent to the execution of it. If the general approves the plan, he must beg leave to go to reconnoitre the post with a man or two, that he may take his measures more judiciously.

When he has been to reconnoitre, as is directed in a former section, and has got every necessary information, he should go to give the general an account of his discoveries, and receive his last orders for the attack, for the soldiers of his party, and for those who are to march to sustain him.

The choice of men that are to go upon the attack of a post, is so much the more essential, as the success of the enterprise depends on it. None but volunteers of determined bravery ought to be taken, men who are not stupid, and have no colds upon them; because he who does not attend to the orders of his officers, runs on with blind zeal; and he who coughs or spits, may discover the party to the enemy's sentries, and cause the best concerted scheme to fail. As to those who are to support them, they may be taken according to their rank in the guard or detachment, as the general judges proper.

The disposition for an attack must depend on the discoveries that are made, so as not to be obliged to return in the midst of the execution. The men being chosen, they must be inspected, to see that nothing is wanted which can contribute to their success; because, if the post is fortified with an intrenchment of earth or fascines, the two first ranks should be provided with spades and pickaxes beside their arms; if fraised or pallisadoed, they must likewise have hatchets; and if covered with masonry, they must have ladders.

The men should be in their waistcoats, to be less constrained. If they propose to make one or two true, and as many false attacks, so many platoons must be formed of the chosen party, as they are to make true ones, and the sustaining party to make the false attacks, so as to divide the enemy and share their fire. A man must be placed at the head of each platoon, who is capable of commanding them, and, if possible, the same who had been employed before to make discoveries, as he may more easily guide the division. The orders which should be given to those leaders, are to march together to the place where they are to separate, and then each to go to the spot which is appointed for him, in the neighborhood of the post, and wait there, with their belles on the ground, for the signal to jump into the ditch and scale the post.

If you are to be conducted by spies or guides, they should be examined about every thing that can be of use before they are employed, especially about the road by which they propose to conduct you. The reason of this is, because we often see simple people, animated with the hope of gain, imagine they can easily lead a party, when they have only a great deal of good-will; but if you find in those who offer all the necessary qualities, you must immediately secure them to you as much as possible, by making them dread the destruction of their houses, and pillaging their goods, if they lead the party into a snare; you may likewise ask their wives and children as pledges of their fidelity, and, the moment of setting out, place them between the corporals of the first rank, tied with a small chain; which precaution is the more essential, as traitors have often been known, on pretence of conducting a party to seize a post, to have led them where they have had their throats cut in the middle of the night, and have disappeared at the very moment of its execution. If you make your guides hope for a recompense proportioned to their services on one side, on the other you must make them fear the cruellest punishment if they betray you.

The night being the most proper time to march to the attack of a post, you should set out soon enough to be ready to make the attack an hour or two before day. Care must be taken that it is not moon-light when you propose making the attack; the soldiers ought to march two and two, with the least noise possible, especially when passing between the enemy's sentries: you must likewise recommend to them, neither to speak, spit, nor smoke. The detachments must get as opposite as possible to the salient angles of the intrenchment, as it is probable that they will be the least defended by the enemy's musketry. If a patrol of the enemy comes while you are on your march, or ambushed in the environs, you need not be alarmed, nor make the least motion which may make the enterprise fail, but remain concealed in the profoundest silence, that the patrols may pass without perceiving anything, and afterwards pursue your design.

If the post which you want to carry is a redoubt with a dry ditch and parapet of earth, your two first ranks must have spades and pickaxes, with their arms flung, and, on the signal being given, jump into the ditch together; because it ought to be a general maxim in attacking a post, to strike all at once. When the first rank have jumped down, the second must stop a moment, that they may not fall upon the shoulders or bayonets of the first. The two first ranks having got into the ditch, they should immediately run to sap the angles of the scarp and the parapet of the redoubt, to facilitate the mounting of the rest of the party; the leaders of each division should observe at the same time, that the soldiers who remain armed with their firelocks, and who have likewise leaped into the ditch, do not interrupt those who are demolishing the scarp of the redoubt, but protect them by presenting their bayonets to the right and left, and be ready to repulse any of the enemy that happen to be placed in the ditch.

If the parapet is frailled, they should break as many of the fraises with hatchets as is necessary to let the men pass. When the breach is made, the workers should drop their working tools; and taking their arms from the slings, mount up with fixed bayonets, and rush upon the enemy huzzaring.

When you march to attack a redoubt or such post, where the enemy have a connection with more considerable posts, the commanding officer should charge on that side, so as to cut off the communication. People who see themselves briskly attacked without hope of succour or retreat, will very soon beg for quarter.

When the scarps and parapets are of stone, they can only be carried by scaling; but you may succeed by being brisk in surrounding and sustaining the attack. An officer who is to attack a post of this kind, should take care that his ladders are rather too long than too short, and to give them in charge only to the stoutest of the detachment. The soldiers should carry these ladders with the left arm palled through the second step, taking care to hold them upright at their sides, and very short below, that they may not dislocate their shoulders in leaping into the ditch.

The first ranks of each division provided with ladders, should set out with the rest at the signal, marching reluctantly with their firelocks flung at their backs to jump into the ditch. When they are arrived, they should apply their ladders against the parapet, observing to place them towards the salient angles rather than the middle of the curtain, because the enemy have less force there. They must take care to place their ladders within a foot of each other, and not to give them too much nor too little slope, that they may not be overturned or broken with the weight of soldiers mounting upon them.

The ladders being applied, they who have carried them, and they who come after, should mount up and rush upon the enemy sword in hand. If he who goes first happens to be overturned, the next should take care not to be drawn down by his comrade; but on the contrary, help him to pass between two ladders, and immediately mount himself, so as not to give the enemy time to load his piece.

As the soldiers who mount the first may be easilyumbled over, and their fall may cause the attack to fail, it would perhaps be right to protect their breasts with the fore-parts of light carriages; because if they can penetrate, the rest may easily follow.

The success of an attack by scaling is infallible, if they mount the four sides at once, and take care to shower a number of grenades among the enemy, especially when supported by some grenadiers and picquets, who share the attention and fire of the enemy.

During the siege of Caffel, under the Count de la Lippe, in the campaign of 1762, a young engineer undertook to carry one of the outworks with a much smaller detachment than one which had been repulsed; and succeeded with ease, from the use of grenades; which is a proof that grenades ought not to be neglected, either in the attack or defence of posts.

If the ditch of a post is filled with water, and but middle-deep, that should not hinder you from jumping into the ditch to attack, in the manner that has been mentioned; but if there is a greater quantity, and you cannot pass, the soldiers of each platoon should carry fascines, or faggots of small branches well bound, and made as large as possible, to fill up the ditch, and make a kind of ford, so as to get at the parapet, either to demolish or scale it.

Many ways of filling up the ditch, recommended by different authors, might be mentioned; but the fascines are preferable to them all, as the soldiers can easily carry them before them, and march quicker, and make use of them as a defence against musketry, and reaching them from hand to hand, soon make a ford.

If the approaches of the post are defended by chevaux de frise, the first and second rank of each platoon must break them down with hatchets; or with iron grappling-tied to ropes, they may pull them to them, and separate them. If it is a breast-work of felled trees, you must have fascines thrown against the points, or upon the branches, upon which the soldiers can easily pass. If there are two or three rows, you may burn them with dry fascines lighted at one end, and thrown in the middle row. In case of trying this last scheme, the soldiers must retire to a little distance after throwing the fascines, that the enemy may not see to fire at them by the light of the fire, but place them- In the attack of detached buildings, you must seize the approaches, and strive to scale them; to get on the top, and crush the people who are below, with the tiles or slates; but if the enemy has uncovered the house, you must throw as many grenades as you can at the windows and doors; or dry fascines, with lighted faggots dipped in rosin; or fire-balls, to endeavour to set fire to them, and smoke them out. If the weather is windy, you should profit by it to set fire to the house, and try to shut up the loop-holes which the enemy have pierced near the ground, with bags of earth, so as to sap the corners. If you have some cannon, you may shorten the ceremony, by planting them against the angles of the post. If you have none, you may successfully suspend a large beam by a rope, to three bars placed in a triangle, in imitation of the Roman battering ram: this beam pushed violently against the walls, will soon make a breach; but you must observe, in suspending it, to do it in a dark night, so that the enemy cannot prevent it by firing at the soldiers who are employed in the work.

It is glorious to get out with honour on such an attack, it is no less so to make it so as to cost but few people. The blood of the soldiers is precious, and cannot be too much prized, and an able chief will neglect no means that can contribute to their preservation. The comparing of two examples will show the importance of what is advanced.

During the two sieges of Barcelona, by Monsieur de Vendome in 1697, and Monsieur de Berwick in 1713, the first of these generals caused the convent of Capuchins, situated out of the place, to be attacked sword in hand by several detachments of infantry, and carried it in three hours, with the loss of 1700 men. Marshal Berwick caused the same convent to be attacked in the year 1713. They were equally intrenched, and reckoning to make him pay as dear as Monsieur de Vendome had done; but this general having opened a fort of trench before the convent, they not expecting to be attacked in form, surrendered at discretion, after having held it 24 hours. The reader is left to judge which example to follow.

You should prepare for the attack of a village, or such like post of large extent, as has been directed in the section for detached posts: but as these sort of attacks are always more difficult than others, on account of the multiplicity of schemes they have to encounter at every step, an officer should not march there till he is acquainted with the strength of the intrenchments; the situation of the smaller posts; the obstructions to be met with in every street or square; and even what terms the inhabitants are on with the soldiers of the garrison.

While the assailants have penetrated into the village, the commanders of each division ought to take care to leave small detachments at all the churches and squares they find; to stand firm and sustain the main body in case they are repulsed. You must watch very carefully that the soldiers do not withdraw to pillage the houses of the inhabitants, as whole detachments have been driven from towns and villages where they had penetrated, from having neglected this precaution.

Three days after the surprise of Cremona in 1702, some Germans were found in the cellars, where they had got drunk; and were astonished when they were told that they must quit these agreeable retreats. An officer who would shun a disorder so fatal, should forbid his soldiers to flirt from their party on pain of death; and by placing a sentry in the rear of each division, take care that no one falls behind.

If you find cavalry drawn up in the squares or open places, the assailants should remain firm at the entrance of the streets that meet there, while some go up to the houses that are at the corners, and fire upon them from the windows; if this causes any disorder among them, they should be charged with fixed bayonets to make them surrender. If the interior part of the village is defended with cannon, you should march quickly to the place where they are, and take them, or nail them up, or turn them against the enemy or principal post of the village.

Polybius, in his seventh book, gives an account of an attack full of instruction for military men. The blockade of Sardis by Antiochus the Great, had lasted two years, when Lagoras of Crete, a man of extensive knowledge in war, put an end to it in the following manner. He considered that the strongest places are often taken with the greatest ease, from the negligence of the besieged, who, trusting to the natural or artificial fortifications of their town, are at no pains to guard it. He knew likewise that towns are often taken at the strongest places, from their being persuaded that the enemy will not attempt to attack them there. Upon these considerations, though he knew that Sardis was looked on as a place that could not be taken by assault, and that hunger only could make them open their gates, yet he hoped to succeed. The greatness of the difficulties only increased his zeal to contrive a means of carrying the town.

Having perceived that a part of the wall which joined the citadel to the town was not guarded, he formed the design of surprising it at that place: he observed that this wall was built on the top of a rock which was extremely high and steep, at the foot of which, as into an abyss, the people of the town threw down the carcases of their dead horses and other beasts of burden; at which place great numbers of vultures and other carnivorous birds assembled daily to feed; and after having filled themselves, they never failed to rest upon the top of the rock or wall, which made our Cretan imagine that this place was neglected, and without any guard upon it.

On this thought, he went to the place at night, and examined with care how he could approach it, and where he ought to place his ladders. Having found a proper place for his purpose, he acquainted the king with his discovery and design; and the king, delighted with the project, advised Lagoras to pursue it, and granted him two other officers whom he asked for, and who appeared to him to have all the necessary qualities for afflicting him in his scheme.

The three having consulted together, they only waited one night, at the end of which there was no moon; which being come, they chose 15 of the stoutest and bravest men of the army to carry the ladders, to scale the walls, and run the same risk that they did. They likewise took 30 others to place in ambush in the ditch, and to assist those who scaled the wall to break down a gate into which they were to enter. The king was to make 2000 men follow them, and favour the enterprise by marching the rest of the army to the opposite side of the town. Everything being prepared for the execution, Lagoras and his people approached softly with their ladders; and having scaled the rock, they came to the gate which was near them, and having broken it, let in the 2000 men, who cut the throats of all they met, and set fire to the houses, so that the town was pillaged and ruined in an instant.

Young officers who read this account, ought to reflect on this attack. The attention of Lagoras, who went himself to examine the places proper for fixing the ladders; his discernment in the choice of the officers and soldiers who were to support him; and the harmony of the whole means that were employed on the occasion, afford very excellent lessons for any officer who may attempt such an attack.

Sect. VII. Of Surprises and Stratagems for seizing Posts.

All the environs that have any relation to the place the enemy occupies must be known; on what side lie the avenues, morasses, rivers, bridges, heights, woods, and all covered places that are in the neighbourhood, without which it is scarce possible to regulate approaches prudently. It is equally necessary to know nearly the number and kind of troops with which he possesses the post, that you may not attack him with insufficient force. It is likewise necessary to know if the enemy is careful or remiss in carrying on his duty. The knowledge of these circumstances contributes infinitely to form a project of surprise well, and to conduct the whole expertly.

As to the manner of surprising a post, it is impossible to establish certain rules on the subject; because, among a thousand means which chance offers, there are rarely two alike. It must, however, be observed, that there are stratagems with which it is impossible to succeed without a proper force to sustain them. A town or village, for example, where we are introduced by a secret correspondence, cannot be carried unless we be well seconded. The only means of managing the surprise of posts well, is to divide your force instantly, to seize the castle, church, church-yard, or public squares. It has been said, that troops so divided can act but weakly, and run a risk of being defeated separately. But by making as many detachments as the enemy has posts, in the citadel caused by surprise, it is easy to carry these posts before they who defend them have time to dispute them or even look round them. The enemy being likewise obliged to divide, and not knowing what side to prefer, there is almost a moral certainty, that, flustered with the noise which they hear all round, they are ready to let their arms drop out of their hands; beside, the horrors of a dark night, and the dread that cannot fail to seize a party who are surprised, represent objects much greater than what they are, so that they imagine they have to do with a whole army.

The bad success of the affair at Cremona mentioned in Sect V. makes nothing against this opinion. If instead of stopping to make prisoners, a detachment had gone directly to the citadel, which should be the way in all such actions, it would have been impossible for these brave officers who drove out the Imperialists to have made so glorious a defense.

M. de Schower did otherwise when he surprised Benevento in Spain in 1768, and did not fail. He learnt that the Spaniards neglected the guard of an old castle which was at the entrance of the place; and marching in the night he took it, and detached several parties to attack the town. Surprised with such a visit, they fought for safety in flight, and ran to take shelter in the citadel, but were scarcely entered when they were made prisoners. The enemy did not think of the attack being begun where they were strongest; but it is the best way, as it is to be presumed they have divided their forces to be able to defend everywhere.

M. Menard, in his history of Nîmes, gives an account of the surprise of that town, which merits our attention. Nicholas Calviere, called Captain St Cofme, having resolved to make himself master of this place, engaged a miller whose mill was situated within the walls, at the side of the gate, to file the bars of a grate which shut up the entry of an aqueduct through which the water passed into the town, and to receive 100 men armed into his mill, while a considerable body of cavalry and infantry should arrive from different places to sustain the enterprise.

The day for the execution of his project being fixed for the 16th of November 1569, and proper orders given for the rendezvous of the troops, St Cofme came out of the mill with his party at three o'clock in the morning, and advancing to the guard at the gate, put them to the sword, and opening the gate let in 200 horsemen, with each a foot soldier behind him. These troops having entered the town, formed several detachments immediately; one of which went to block up the citadel; while the rest, scattering over the squares of the place, and sounding their trumpets, instantly made themselves masters of the town.

There are a number of circumstances mentioned in this surprise, which convey a great deal of useful instruction. Captain St Cofme knew how to profit by the negligence of the governor, who omitted to guard the entrance of the aqueduct; to make a proper choice of cavalry for advancing so readily with the infantry from different quarters; the judicious orders given the troops, which brought them 15 leagues from Nîmes at the hour and place appointed for the rendezvous; the precaution with which he invested the citadel, to prevent his having to do with the garrison in the streets; his attention in dividing his troops into the different quarters of the town, and making them sound their trumpets, that the inhabitants might imagine they were very numerous.

But the active corps of the partisan, without trusting to the stratagems that others have succeeded by, must find other resources than those against which people are so prepared now-a-days; and as the surprising of the enemy is the great business of the partisan in carrying on the Petite Guerre, he must see what can be effected by his hardihood and activity.

The expedient which appears to be the most proper for an officer who has 400 infantry under his command, and is certain that the garrison is only 200 (for surprises should be always attempted with a double force), is to choose very bad weather; the strong winds, for example, and fogs in winter; or the storms and tempests in summer, when, after excessive heats, violent winds rise suddenly, and agitate the air.

When you have meditated such a scheme, then is the time to put a part of your infantry in covered waggons, which should be kept ready for the purpose. The whole party ought to be provided with dog-skin covers for their gunlocks and cartouch-boxes, to take off readily when there is occasion; and the rest of the infantry to be mounted behind part of the cavalry. Both parties to assemble at some place a league distant from that which you would surprise, and there to stop; when, if you see the bad weather dissipating, you must retire till another occasion. If you renew it ten times, you need not despair; a strong place deserves this trouble, and success will overpay every fatigue.

But on the contrary, if the storm forms, and the wind increases, direct your approaches in such a manner, that you may always have the wind on your back; because if you have it in your face, the enemy's sentries can look forward and discover you; and likewise if it is in your face, your horses cannot be made to advance without a great deal of trouble. These precautions being taken, you advance more quickly as the storm increases, the horses and waggons going with great speed before the wind. You need be in no uneasiness about the enemy's sentries seeing you, or hearing the noise of your march; because the severity of the weather obliges them to enter their boxes, and turn their backs to the wind, to save their eyes from the dust and sharpness of the air.

At 200 paces from the place, the feet and part of the cavalry should dismount and fix their bayonets; the rest of the cavalry to remain with the wagons near some trees or houses, the wagons turned for a retreat. Divide your infantry into five detachments, and instantly run at a great rate, keeping your men as close as possible, and passing the barrier and gates, seize all the sentries and the guard without firing or making the least noise, which may be executed with an extreme quickness, to be acquired by practice. While the first detachment seizes the gate and all the sentries of its environs, the rest must run rapidly into the town. One must go quickly to seize the main guard; another to seize the governor or commanding officer; the fourth, which should be the strongest, should fly to the cafes or mens barracks, to seize their arms; the fifth to remain in the street near the gate for a corps de reserve.

Every detachment must be conducted by prisoners made at entering; and orders sent with all speed, to cause half the cavalry to advance and patrol the streets, as the infantry get forward.

As this kind of surprise can succeed only under favour of a storm, which rarely continues any time, it is evident that the march and execution must be conducted with inexplicable swiftness, and the orders be perfectly understood. It is true, that rain is inconvenient for the infantry, whose feet slip on clay-ground; but they must do their best, and frequently it is found that the roads which are most used are not therefore the most slippery.

If it happens that you are perceived in taking possession of the gate, and they take the alarm, you must quickly divide your party into two wings, mounting them on the rampart, the one to the right, the other to the left; and seizing the loaded cannon, turn them upon the town; and at the same time summon the garrison to surrender. If you happen to fail, and are obliged to retire, you do not risk much, as they will not care to molest your retreat.

There may be a reluctance in attempting such a surprise; it may appear to be hazardous and rash, and a conduct too nice not to despair of success; but Mr Jeney says that experience convinces him of the validity of the means proposed, and relates what happened to him upon two occasions, to prove that the cold east winds or storms are the most proper times for attempting surprises.

Being at the head of 30 hussars, says he, and willing to shun a storm which was gathering behind us, I pushed to get to a place which was well fortified and occupied by a numerous garrison: the wind was strong, and I passed the barrier and all the gates with my horses, which made a great noise, without any sentry either seeing or hearing; and though I called to the first guard to declare myself, no one perceived me. I crossed the whole town without seeing a soul in the street; and hurrying to an inn in the other suburbs, I went out at the gallop, and saw only the sentry at the last barrier, to whom I answered without our comprehending one another; nevertheless the rain had not begun to fall, but the wind was violent. I experienced the same during the winter, when the east wind was very proper to facilitate the surprise of a fortified town or post. On Christmas night 1757, I passed through the country of Hanover with 80 horse between two guards of the enemy without being perceived. I marched over the middle of a plain when the night was clear, with a violent east wind, which prevented any sentry from turning his head to look at me, and I went quietly to carry off horses in the rear of their army. The following night at my return, I passed two different posts of our army; the one guarded by a party of hussars, the other by a regiment of dragoons, without being seen but by one sentry in the middle of the dragoon post, who did not challenge, because it was no longer time, having passed the first guards.

You may likewise take the advantage of bad weather to scale all forts of posts surrounded with walls, as towns, abbeys, castles, &c., to do which, you must approach in the dark, and seize the moment of a great squall, or when a cold east wind obliges the garrison to take shelter from the rigour of the season; then there is no one upon the ramparts, and the sentries turn their backs to the wind, or remain in their boxes, while your people are warm with marching, and animated with the hopes of success. You need not be apprehensive of the enemy seeing you if you advance on the side next the wind to place your ladders, because the sentries will cover their faces, and bend down their heads to save them from cold.

The time of a thick fog is not less favourable for approaching and forcing an entrenched post. When the fog is low, the infantry should creep on all fours, the better to conceal them from the enemy's sentries. These sort of surprises are the least dangerous, you run scarcely any risk; but if you cause some false attacks, the garrison will not fail to run to arms, and sometimes make you pay dear for failing.

When you would surprise the enemy in a village, farm, monastery, or some place detached from the army, you should divide your party in two bodies, each composed of cavalry and infantry; the one to take the enemy in the rear, the other in front, taking care to cause some wagons to follow, which may carry off the wounded in case of need. You must calculate exactly the time it will take the first detachment to go round the enemy. The two commanders should agree on a word for rallying, and the time of making the attack, which should be in the night, especially if the post is so distant from the army that they can receive no assistance; for in that case the time is favourable till day-break. They must regulate their departure according to the distance they have to go; and the detachment which goes round the enemy, ought to take no more infantry than can be carried behind the horsemen. This detachment having got round, should form about a quarter of a league from the post, and 100 paces out of the road.

When the other detachment has arrived within a quarter of a league of the post, your cavalry should form out of the road with the wagons and drums near them, who are not to advance till ten minutes after the departure of the infantry, who must advance towards the fires of the enemy, swooping as much as possible. They must take care to conceal themselves from patrols, as has been directed; and when they see them passed or entered the post, the infantry must hurry on to gain the village, and clear the entry by which the cavalry must pass, in case it has been barricaded with wagons. You must run rapidly to the place where you see the fires lighted, and make as many detachments as you see fires, in order to surprise the whole at once.

The cavalry who followed slowly, must instantly join to the noise of your arms and cries their trumpets and drums, advancing with all speed, and leaving only a non-commissioned officer with some horsemen near the wagons. The detachment, which is advanced on the other side of the village to turn the enemy, on hearing the alarm, must immediately advance, sounding trumpets, beating drums, and attacking all who would save themselves on that side. You may rely on it as certain, that the enemy, seeing all his guards surrounded by your infantry scattered in the village, and hearing the march of different bodies of foot and horse who arrive on all sides, will not delay to surrender, or seek to save himself by a disorderly flight; it will be easy then for for your cavalry to fall upon the flying, and stop them. The party should be forbid to pursue the enemy more than a quarter of a league in the night; but no pursuit at all should be attempted, if it is in an inclosed country. The post being taken, the booty and prisoners should be sent off immediately under the care of the infantry, putting the wounded in waggons, or on the horses that are taken, the cavalry making both the front and rear-guard, and taking care to have the last the strongest.

There is no time more precious for a partisan, or that merits so much attention, as that of a battle, when every one is attentive to the great firing which they hear on all sides; to the manoeuvres of the armies that are engaging; to the decision of an affair of the greatest importance, upon which the fate of each depends. It is then that he can employ his skill to the greatest advantage; strike the severest blow that is possible; cause the ruin of the enemy; pillage the quarters of their generals; carry off their equipages; defeat their guards; set fire to their camp, and spread an alarm over all, which may contribute to the defeat of an army.

But measures must be taken to execute so great, so brilliant a project with success; and it should not be engaged in, till after having prudently regulated the design on three principal circumstances, viz. the situation of the enemy's camp; the means of approaching it; and the hour of engaging. When the enemy's camp is in the middle of a great plain, or on a height with an extensive view on all sides, it is certain that one cannot approach without being seen at a distance; and in that case, prudence will put a stop to zeal, and prevent rashness from attempting impossibilities; but when their position extends over a country covered with mountains, woods, or villages, the occasion is more favourable, and may almost ensure success.

It is then very advantageous for a partisan to be perfectly acquainted with the situation of places that are in front of his army; especially when he foresees that the enemy will sooner or later come to encamp there. What affluence would it not give for the direction of his project, if he knew how to take a plan of that part of the country which he proposes to invade beforehand? Then, without the weak and dangerous affluence of spies and deserters, he can by his own proper knowledge think of every means for executing a design, which ought to be regulated and conducted with imperceptible secrecy.

When he perceives by the motions of the armies that they are on the eve of an action, he must not delay to acquaint the general with his project. If he contents, he will regulate the rest, and the time of departure, according to the advices which he receives.

As these sort of expeditions cannot be made but by long circuits, they must take the time necessary for the march. In the campaign of 1757, the duke of Richelieu caused his army to advance near Zell to attack our army; and sent a partisan with 100 horse to the rear of the camp the day before, who, having made a march of 22 leagues, arrived without any accident; but the prudence of the prince of Brunswick defeated his design, and left him to admire his retreat; nevertheless, they picked up some stragglers, horses, and waggons.

Among the measures that ought to be taken to secure the blow, and strike it more effectually, it should not be forgot to distribute cockades like the enemy's to all the cavalry; and to give a stick of 6 feet long to 20 of each detachment, with a bit of torch fixed on the end, and covered with a little dry straw or hemp, to kindle instantly.

The whole party to set out from the camp A (fig. 1.), marching under the conduct of a good guide by covered ways, at a distance from the enemy. Being come to the place C, which ought to be in the environs, and as high as the field of battle, the infantry should be concealed out of the road far from the sight of passengers. This must be the centre of correspondence with the army; the rendezvous of the booty; and support the retreat of all the cavalry, of which there should be as many detachments formed as you purpose to make attacks. We shall suppose six of a hundred men each, and they must go secretly by particular routes to their respective post E, D, F, G, H, I. Neither trouble nor expense should be spared to procure good guides. Each detachment should lie in ambush half a league, if necessary, from the object of the attack, BKKKKK.

The noise of the musketry of the armies to be the signal for their irruption; and then bravery, intrepidity, and courage, will give wings to your project. The second detachment D will glance imperceptibly between the villages, and fall like thunder upon the camp B; and while 80 attack all whom they meet, the other 20 should light their torches at the fires that are to be found everywhere, and spread the flames rapidly to the straw of the tents. As they cannot fail to have the piquet of the camp soon at their heels, they must strike their blow with all possible quickness without stopping to plunder; being content with the glory of having excited a general alarm, capable of confounding the whole army, and contributing to the gaining of a battle.

At the same time that the detachment D attacks the camp B, the others E, F, G, H, must with equal violence attack the villages K, K, K, K, which they have in front, doing the same the first did in camp, except that they may plunder everything which they can easily carry off of the generals' equipages, with which these villages are commonly filled; seizing the best horses, hamstringing others with the stroke of a sword, and setting fire to all the places which contain the enemy's baggage. Each detachment should cause some horsemen to advance beyond the village, to observe the motion of the troops that will not fail to run to their affluence. As soon as they perceive them, they must make their retreat as fast as possible by the routes which the commanding officer has premeditated, and which are proposed to be represented by the coarser hatched lines. The fifth detachment I, in ambush on the side of the road leading from the camp, should remain there, to seize all the enemy who think of saving themselves by flight.

There is no danger to be apprehended in these expeditions, during the critical instant while the armies are engaged, and all the troops a great way in the front of the camp: you meet none but fuglers, servants, lame people, and some piquet guards scattered here and there, whom you may easily defeat as they advance. The commanding officer ought to have an eye over all; and as soon as he perceives some bodies of troops advancing upon him, he ought to retreat quickly, and at least gain the entrance of the wood in the neighbourhood of the enemy's camp; for without some such shelter enterprises like this can hardly be attempted.

Each detachment having rejoined the infantry, must there wait the fate of the battle; so that if it is decided in favour of their army, they may speedily regain the proper places for harassing the enemy on his retreat. These moments are the more favourable, as disorder, dread, and noise, render all defence impracticable. But all these sort of surprizes require places proper to cover approaches and retreats.

The great importance of skill in the language of the enemy is apparent from the following exploit of the prince (now reigning duke) of Brunswick in the campaign of 1760. That excellent partisan was situated at some distance from Zerenberg, at that time in the possession of the French; and being informed by two Hanoverian officers, who had been in the town disguised like peasants, that the garrison were very remiss in their duty, trifling to the vicinity of their army, and the distance of ours, the prince was resolved to surprise them; and after appointing a corps to sustain him, he advanced in the night with Major Maclean of the 88th regiment; and 200 Highlanders, with bayonets fixed and their arms not loaded, followed at a little distance. Upon the first sentry's challenging, the prince answered in French, and the sentry seeing but two persons advancing (whom he believed to be French), he had no distrust; so that the major getting up to him, stabbed him, and prevented his giving the alarm. The Highlanders immediately rushing in, attacked the guard with their bayonets, and carried the town, having killed or taken the whole garrison of 800 men.

The French officer who commanded at that time in Zerenberg conceived a scheme for being amply revenged, which failed only by a most trivial accident. When almost every house in Bremen was filled with corn, being the grand magazine and grand hospital of our army, this officer held a secret correspondence in the town, which informed him of the state of the garrison, and that there was a general order to let couriers going to the army pass out at all hours. He dispatched about 20 hussars to scamper over the country, who were all that were heard of his party, while he marched 15,000 infantry from Düsseldorf to Bremen (about 200 miles), concealing them in woods by day, and marching in the night. He arrived at the gate at the appointed hour; when a person on horseback blowing a horn came along the street, and desired to pass out to the army. The officer of the guard had the keys, and happened to be out of the way; and while a messenger went for him, the people without growing impatient, began to break down the outer barrier, which made the sentry fire at the place where he heard the noise; and the guard taking the alarm, got upon the rampart, and likewise fired at the same place: upon which the pretended courier galloped back; and the French, believing that they were discovered, relinquished their scheme, and retired.

This example proves that no distance is a security from surprises, and that very considerable parties may pass over a great extent of country without being discovered. The following instance of that preface of mind so much the happiness of all who possess it, and more particularly of a military man so exposed to surprises, deserves to be recorded.

In the month of February 1761, when Prince Ferdinand beat up the quarters of the French, they were obliged to retire a great way without being able to retake: However, when they came to collect their force, and to recoil upon our army, Sir William Erskine with the 15th regiment of light dragoons was in a village in our front. In a very foggy morning, soon after the patrols reported that all was well, Sir William was alarmed by his vedettes having seen a great body of cavalry coming to surprise him. He instantly mounted his horse, and fell back at the head of the picket of 50 men, leaving orders for the regiment to follow as fast as they could mount, without beating a drum or making any noise. He attacked their advance-guard in the cursory manner of the light cavalry, and continued to do so, while his men were joining him by tens and twenties, and the French cavalry forming to retake an attack, till he collected the whole, and then retired, the surgeon of the regiment (Mr Elliot) having in the mean time carried off the baggage.

Strokes of this kind display a superiority of genius, and to that alone was the preservation of the regiment owing. Had a drum beat to arms, the enemy must have known that they were unprepared, and probably would have rushed in and destroyed them; but the attack convinced them that they were discovered, and made them think only of their own preservation.

Among many instances in the course of the war, the success of this officer on another occasion, where he displayed the most singular address, likewise merits our attention: After a repulse, and a march of 72 miles in one day, where the men were fatigued and scarcely a horse able to trot, he saw a regiment of French infantry drawn up with a morale in their rear. He left his own corps, and advancing to the French, desired to speak with the commanding officer, whom he entreated to surrender to prevent their being cut to pieces by a large body of cavalry that were advancing. The French officer desired leave to consult with his officers, which having done, they refused to submit; but upon Sir William telling them that their blood must be on their own heads, and turning to move off to his own corps, they called to him, and laying down their arms surrendered to his half-raised troops.

Such stratagems overleap the bounds of instruction, and no author will presume to propose them for imitation. Here was the reaching out the hand to torture which Vigenus recommends: but there are few who have the requisite talents from nature; and we may as properly say of the soldier as of the poet, nafititur non fit.

Sect. VIII. Of Ambuscades from the Partisan.

An ambuscade may be formed in any place covered by art or nature in which a party may be concealed to surprise the enemy in passing; and the proper use of them is, of all the stratagems in war, the best calculated to display the genius, skill, spirit, and address of a partisan. They are easily carried into execution in woods, buildings, and hollow places; but require a more fertile imagination, and greater trouble, in a level country. Both ought to be regulated by the knowledge of the enemy's march, and the extraordinary means that may be employed to surprise them.

When a partisan has information that can be depended on of the march of some part of the enemy; whether a convoy of artillery, baggage, or provisions; a body of recruits, or horses to remount the cavalry; an escort of a general officer going to rejoin, or reconnoitre some country; he ought to apply directly to procure a sufficient knowledge of the route that the enemy is to take, the situation of the places he is to pass, and of the post he goes to. The better to cover his design, he must get information of the roads that lead to opposite places, which he must pretend to be attentive about, as has been mentioned in the section of Reconnoiting.

Having perfectly concerted his plan, he should set out at the head of his detachment if possible, and leaving his post on the side opposite to his true route, the better to conceal his design. If the place where he intends to plant his ambuscade is not distant, he should come into his true route about half way, and there place half his infantry in ambush to favour his retreat. But when the country where he proposes going is distant, and the march requires at least two nights, he must conduct his party by meandering from wood to wood, if there are any. He must not forget to provide necessary refreshments for the day, which must be passed in some concealed place where he may not be perceived, and must cause three rations of oats to be carried for each horse.

The first night you must make to some wood or other place proper for passing the day near some rivulet, and, if possible, on the road of your retreat to leave a part of your infantry... infantry in ambush; in case there is no other water to pass till you come to the place of your principal ambuscade; for when there is still a river or canal to pass, you must conduct the infantry to the passage, and choose the most convenient place to fix them in ambuscade.

If there is no bridge or ford, the cavalry must swim over, in which we suppose the horses are practised. When there is a ford, half the infantry should pass behind the cavalry, to go along with them. In case there is a bridge to pass near the village, the officer who is left in this post with some infantry, should be enjoined to allow no one peasant or soldier to leave the place; and for greater security, a small detachment of cavalry should remain with him, to stop any who may attempt to run away before the return of the whole corps, who ought not to delay long. If the enemy come in the interval to attack the bridge, it must be defended till the return of the party, that their retreat may not be cut off.

Every precaution being thus taken to guard the bridge, the commanding officer should be diligent to arrive at the place of ambuscade two hours before the enemy is to pass, and place the ambuscade on the side he would retire to; never on the other side, if possible, lest the advanced guard happen to discover you, and oblige you to repulse in flight of the corps, who, seeing your strength, may rush upon you, and drive you back.

The infantry A (fig. 2.) ought to be ambushed at least 600 paces behind the cavalry B, so that if they are pursued, they can fall back to A, and both afterwards to the guard at the bridge, or to the infantry that are in ambush at half way.

If the ambuscade is placed in a wood, an intelligent non-commissioned officer should be chosen to get upon a high tree C, from whence he can see the march of the enemy, and give notice of the most essential circumstances. There are three: the first is, the seeing the advanced guard; the second is, the approach of the corps; and the third is, the time when their front is advanced as far as the ambuscade B; for which the commanding officer should instruct the observer what signals he is to make from the top of the tree, to communicate the necessary information without speaking, which may be done by the means of a small cord D, of a brown or green colour, so as to be least perceptible. Let this cord be placed as in the plan, so that no branch interrupt it, with one end in the hand of the observer, and the other in the commanding officer's in the ambuscade B.

As soon as the advanced guard appears, the observer must pull the cord, and the commanding officer cause the party to mount and remain in deep silence. If by a stratagem, which is frequently practised for particular reasons, the advanced guard is immediately followed by the corps, which may easily be known by their being more numerous than ordinary, and not followed by any other corps, that you may not be deceived by the enemy, the cord should be drawn a second time, and a third time when their front is advanced as high as the ambuscade; upon which you must rush out, and pour furiously upon the flank of their centre in the following manner.

If the advanced guard E is formed only of an ordinary number, they should be let pass; and at the approach of the principal party or convoy F, the chief to be informed by the second pulling of the cord. At the moment the head of the convoy shall be advanced as high as B, the cord must be pulled the third and last time; at which signal the whole party must rush out without being perceived, and suddenly attack the centre upon the flank, engaging only with their swords, and making such a noise as to prevent the enemy from hearing the orders of their officers. They must disarm all whom their bravery or chance throws in their way, taking care not to scatter or pursue too far, unless you are sure that they are so far from their army or other parties that they cannot be assisted; for in either of these cases, they will not fail to run at the noise, and disturb your retreat.

In all secret expeditions you ought to be extremely circumcise that you may not be seen or betrayed. If the advanced guard discovers you before the blow is struck, abandon the enterprise immediately, and retire. When your guide, or some one of your party deserts, and you cannot catch him, think immediately of retreating, or placing your ambuscade somewheres else; therefore, to prevent such a misfortune, the officers should be charged to examine frequently if they have all their people.

You should never form an ambuscade for cutting off the enemy's retreat, as this manoeuvre will give him an idea of rallying, and attacking you in despair; but the case is different when you are well informed that you run no risk in stopping his whole force, either from the nature of the file where they cannot form, or from the smallness of the number which cannot resist.

It is equally difficult and dangerous to form several ambuscades at once: the greater number that are formed, the more they are exposed to be discovered, and less in a state to unite for a retreat. To this rule, however, there is one exception. When ambuscades are formed to seize foragers, it is very proper to have several, and to dispose them in such a manner that the sentries can see from one to another. These dispositions being made, they who chance to be next the foragers must strike the blow, while the others march to secure the retreat of their companions, as soon as they perceive it.

In all ambuscades, no sentries should be placed but officers, or non-commissioned officers. On downs, behind mountains, or in gullies, the sentries should lie with their bellies on the ground, and their feet towards the ambuscade, the body covered with a grey or green cloak, according to the colour of the ground, with their heads a little raised, and wrapped in a handkerchief of a straw-green colour, or white in time of snow, so as not to be perceived. The number of sentries cannot be determined; but should be disposed so as to watch on all sides of the ambuscade, and stop every one who from ignorance approaches too near. The sentries should give notice of what they discover by gestures, to which all the officers should be very attentive.

In countries where there are no woods, vineyards, or hedges, you may place an ambuscade in a field of hemp or corn, or some sort of grain, provided it be high enough to cover you, at least with the help of art. When the stalk of the corn, &c. is not high enough, you must get some of the infantry to work with spades and pick-axes, which they must have brought along with them.

The commanding officer must mark out the ground A (fig. 1.) which they are to prepare for an ambuscade, entering at the side B, and raising in the front and at the two flanks a kind of parapet C, made with an insensible slope outwards, covered with corn raised from the surface of the ambuscade in form of square turfs of a foot thick D. They should be ranged and placed one against the other till they have gained six feet and a half. If the grain is not more than three feet high, it is plain, that forming the slope imperceptibly to a foot and a half high, with the earth dug of the same depth, the grain which borders the ambuscade will be six feet and a half from the bottom, reckoning the thickness of the turf, which serves to show that such a work ought not to be declined in arable ground. so easily worked. When the soldiers have finished the work, a subaltern officer must lead them back to the place destined for the infantry.

The ambuscade being thus made at 100 paces from the road where the enemy are to pass, they should lead the horses into it one after another by the bridles, so as not to enlarge the entry; the horsemen to range themselves standing, and holding the bridles in their hands, with the reins slackened on the horses' necks. The officers should be continually employed in visiting the party, and waking those who sleep; and be equally careful to deface all traces of the entry, that none may appear near the ambuscade.

Ambuscades may be placed advantageously in hollow roads when they open obliquely behind that of the enemy, as the road K (fig. 2.) which enters by an acute angle upon the route F of the enemy; nor is there greater difficulty in concealing themselves in the gullies of some rivulet G, when the borders are of a sufficient height, or have shrubs that run parallel with the road of the enemy. It is extremely dangerous to fix there when the road of the enemy approaches towards, or crosses too near, the ambuscade, as they cannot fail to discover it.

As these gullies are not very large, it is necessary to have a number of ways to rush out quickly on the enemy: We suppose four, H, H, H, H, by which the cavalry can dart out suddenly upon the enemy at F.

It will be proper, before the placing the party, to cause the rivulet to be cut somewhat higher, to give it a new course I, so that the horses feet may be dry in the gullies, and make less noise; and the shorter way they have to go, they will more certainly succeed. The commanding officer will not fail to dispose them in such manner, that the whole can rush out at once by the four passages, and pour in great numbers upon the flank of the enemy.

In such fort of ambuscades, the commanding officer should himself be the sentry, leaning upon the edge, and covering himself, so that he may see everything without being perceived.

In deserted villages they may fix an ambuscade in the gardens G (fig. 1.), or in the barns H. The doors fronting DXXVII., the enemy must be shut up, and the passages which are marked by small dots made use of; for it is a general rule in all ambuscades, to fall forth in such manner as to take the enemy obliquely behind their front.

You ought never to employ infantry in the ambuscades we have been describing, where the cavalry acts, unless to favour their retreat; but when you go at hazard, seeking to draw the enemy into an ambuscade, then the infantry should have their turn. Neither woods, villages, nor any places which are much covered, are proper for them; however unskilled an enemy may be, he will not follow a party on the skirts of a forest, or in the neighbourhood of some covered place: for which reason, there are no places fitter for succeeding with ambuscades of infantry, than heaths, hilly countries, hollow roads, corn-fields, ditches at the side of great causeways; provided always that you do not plant them on roads that lead to your army, for then the enemy will take care how he pursues you too far.

When you would place an ambuscade on a heath, or in a country full of little hills, your infantry must lie down with their bellies on the ground. If there is some water near them, it may suggest to them to wet their clothes and cover them with dust, to give them the colour of the ground: but that this party to lay on the ground may not be crushed or trod upon by the enemy's horde when hurried along with violence, they must preserve the flank of the ambuscade I, next the enemy, with a bar K, which may be made in a hurry with some stakes drove in the ground, at ten feet from one another, and above five or six feet high, held together by cross pieces tied above five feet from the ground, which can be easily done in the neighbourhood of a wood. The time for the infantry to fire is, when the enemy's cavalry L, passing before the front, stretch their flank the whole length of the ambuscade; then your cavalry M must quickly face about and attack the enemy. Their defeat will be so much the more certain, as the fire of your infantry happens to have driven their squadrons into confusion.

To ambush in the ditch of a great causeway, you must choose the deepest place, and at the edge of a corn-field which is pretty high, and there place your people sitting or kneeling. You should collect as many small round bushes as possible, which are to be found in plenty in the country, which should be planted, as if naturally, along the side of the road in front of your party, and beyond the ambuscade on the side you expect the enemy, and here and there so open, that the enemy being accustomed to them may pass without distrust. You should then make the corn lean over to cover the ambuscade; but if there is none near enough the ditch, you must have as many squares cut in the manner directed above as will cover the edge of the ditch. Some of the corn to transplanted should be beat down, but to appear as if done by hail or wind.

Mr Jeney ambushed in this manner with 50 men, when under the command of Captain Palati, who advanced with his cavalry upon the causeway leading to Strasbourg; and as soon as he was perceived, 400 Bavarian dragoons advanced to attack him; he wheeled about, and the dragoons believing themselves masters of the booty, did not fail to pursue, and arrived before the ambuscade without suspecting. Mr Jeney let their front pass, and fired such a deadly fire upon their centre, that he brought to the ground 17 killed or wounded: at the same time, the cavalry who pretended to fly, faced about and attacked the enemy, and would have completed their defeat, if it had not been for the great support of cavalry and infantry hurrying out of Strasbourg to fulfill the dragoons; nevertheless, he carried off more than 50 horses.

An officer having placed his infantry in ambuscade, ought to send on the cavalry at day-break, a non-committed officer with five of the best mounted horsemen making the advanced guard: they should advance as far before the party as the commanding officer can see. At sight of the enemy, they should begin to retire slowly without firing, at least till the enemy comes to pursue with keenness: in that case, the advanced guard makes the rear-guard, and may drop a few shots at the enemy, to harass them and draw them on, or make pretended delays to excite them to pursue, till they fall by degrees into the ambuscade.

When you cannot place your infantry in ambush without having a village between them and the enemy, the cavalry should not be sent beyond the village, because the enemy will never expose themselves to cross it in following your party, for fear of falling into some snare: but instead of going beyond it, your cavalry should enter the village, and demand refreshment for 50 men, if the party are 100; then make three or four peasants carry orders to the magistrates of the villages that are towards the enemy, to come to you, and regulate the delivery of wagons and forage, or some other pretence. As the peasants will not fail to acquaint the enemy, and to describe your strength and situation according to what they have heard, the enemy will certainly come with superior force; and that they may come more speedily, they will bring no infantry.

As soon as the peasants are gone, you must be careful to let none of the inhabitants leave the place, and send continualy some strong patroles to the rear on the road of your retreat, and especially to the passages by which they can cut off your communication with the ambuscade. Every horseman holding his horse by the bridle must be ready to mount, so that upon the enemy's appearing you may retire quickly from the village, and fall back one after another upon your ambuscade.

When a partisan has no infantry, he may form an ambuscade with cavalry, which should be as near as possible to the enemy. In the night, he should find out two or three wagons covered with white linen, that they may be seen at a distance; care must be taken that the harness be in good order, so that no troublesome accident happens by the want of attention to it. Each carriage to have four horses mounted by two dragoons disguised like waggoneers, with their arms in the hands of two or four comrades concealed in each wagon, so that they may repulse any patrol they chance to fall in with.

The waggons should go slowly on some road parallel to the front of the enemy, and pausing at some distance from their post (for it is not necessary that they pass through them), and regulate their march so, that they may be within half a league of the ambuscade at day-break, and readily perceived by the enemy; then let them stop while one mounts a tree or some height to see round them. When they perceive the patrol of the enemy, they must move off, for the others will not fail to follow; but if the enemy appears not to be inclined to follow, which the non-committed officer must attend to, and make one of the drivers stop, as if something were the matter with his wagon, which will draw them on till they fall into the ambuscade.

Among the thousand opportunities that the different marches of the enemy offer for ambuscades, there is none more proper than the retreat of an army which decamps to fall back. When a partisan happens to get information of it on the eve by good spies, he ought to set out immediately with his whole party, making such a round as has been drawn in fig. 1, leaving his infantry in ambuscade at half-way.

The cavalry must be diligent to arrive at the place of ambuscade by day-break, which ought to be placed on the route that the enemy is to take, and two or three leagues in the rear of his camp.

To be more secure of his retreat, he should leave two or three detachments of cavalry between him and his infantry, at a good distance from one another; the remainder to line the road in several ranks parallel to it, and 300 or 400 paces behind one another, concealed from the view of passengers by the favour of hollows, woods, or hills.

The first line being near the road, must take care of sutlers, equipages, &c., which are the forerunners of an army, and the first to decamp when they are retiring. When they secure some wagons or mules, the first detachment should pass them to the second, and so on till they come to the infantry.

You must hasten to carry off what you can for a full quarter of an hour; after which you must press your retreat, expecting that the alarm will soon pass to the army, and the light troops be instantly at your heels.

Sect. X. Of the Retreat.

Every march in withdrawing from the enemy is called a retreat. That which is done in sight of the enemy, who pursues with a superior force, makes the present subject; and is, with reason, looked upon as the glory of the profession. It is a manoeuvre the most delicate, and the propriety to display the prudence, genius, courage, and address of an officer who commands.

The success of the retreat depends upon the knowledge of the country that is to be passed over, and the goodness of the disposition that is made for the troops to defend themselves. The first offers advantages, and contributes greatly to the seizing them; the second restrains the ardour of the enemy, and keeps up the force of a party to its highest pitch. Both deserve to be studied.

1stly, Every officer who commands a detachment ought to apply himself carefully to reconnoitre every step he takes, and examine perfectly every route that can conduct him from one place to another; he should observe attentively all the stratagems that can be employed for ambushing infantry, or posting cavalry; the course of rivers, their bridges and fords; the roads most covered with woods, hills, gullies, and villages; and, in a word, he should know all the advantages, as well as the dangers, that lie in his way. It will be easy for him to acquire a knowledge of all this, if he will use the method recommended in a former section. With the assistance of such a plan as is there described, he may regulate his retreat with ease, and put it in practice to advantage, profiting by every means proper for his defence, or surprising the enemy.

2ndly, The dispositions that ought to be made for a party, to sustain their retreat in the face of the enemy, depend upon the number and kind of troops in both corps; for they must be varied according as they happen to be of cavalry or infantry united, or of either singly.

Every forced retreat in consequence of an unfortunate action, would be almost impracticable, if it were not premeditated before you come in presence of the enemy, or when you are obliged to fly by unknown routes. That which can be made in a fog, or in the night, is easiest, when your rear is secured, as you can slip out of sight of the enemy without any difficulty, and they will be afraid of following you for fear of being surprised in the dark: we shall only therefore speak of that which is to be made in open day, and under the fire of the enemy.

To conduct it properly, you must absolutely know the strength of the enemy; for it is shameful to be the dupe of a false alarm, and to retreat precipitately from an ill founded fear at the approach of an inferior enemy. You must therefore be convinced of his great superiority, and know what his party consists of.

If they come with a strong cavalry, united to a more numerous infantry than yours, you must immediately render their acting useless, by hurrying your infantry as quick as possible to retreat to the first place where they can lie in ambush, and serve the cavalry advantageously, if they can draw on those of the enemy, as has been said in speaking of ambuscades.

To conceal from the enemy, and favour the departure of your infantry, you should cause your cavalry to advance, and pretend as if they were going to attack the enemy A (fig. 2.), your party forming into two divisions B and C, each drawn up in two lines, the second double the first, and disposed as in the plan.

The division C is to retire first 100 or 200 paces, and then fronting the enemy divide into two wings, leaving an interval for the passage of the division B, who, in retiring, must leave a rear-guard at 50 paces, which must be divided into several parties D, to scamper about the enemy's front; and in case they appear desirous to attack you, your small parties must keep a constant fire, particularly on the sides that advance the most; and continue this manoeuvre till they have joined the division C, which should immediately detach some small parties of the best mounted to serve for a rear-guard. guard, and to harass the enemy, till the division B is drawn up 100 paces in the rear, and divided into wings, leaving an interval for the division C to pass through in its turn; and continue to manoeuvre it in this manner, till you draw the enemy's cavalry under the fire of your infantry.

When the force of the enemy consists of cavalry alone, your infantry (marked in the plan by dotted right angles) should retire jointly with the cavalry, at least if the country does not expose you to be surrounded by some covered place; because in that case your infantry should go and occupy that place, and form an ambush.

The rest of the infantry should place themselves in the second line of each division. If the enemy approaches the first line too near, they should fall lightly back upon the two wings of the second, opening the centre quickly for the infantry to fire upon the enemy in platoons, at the same time that your cavalry detach several small parties to advance briskly to prevent the enemy's forming, who were thrown into confusion by the fire of the infantry. The division which retires will force its march, and go to a greater or less distance according to the pursuit of the enemy. The pursuing division must fall back afterwards till it has passed between the wings of the second division, who must then make the manoeuvre of the first, continuing it alternately till the enemy desists from the pursuit.

To facilitate the retreat of the infantry, and gain some way on the enemy, many have been of opinion that they ought to transport them in waggons. But when the enemy is at our heels, the time is very ill employed in collecting carriages and harnessing them; those moments are too precious; and should be employed in causing the infantry to move off quickly, by which they will not be exposed to a train of waggons taken in haste, which may soon break, or be put out of order, and may stop the whole line; which not only retards the infantry, but likewise the cavalry, when they find the route they were to have taken blocked up with broken carriages.

When there happens to be a wood in your rear, you need not enter it if the enemy follows you close, and is prevented by your strength: it is better to coast along it by the route marked G, for fear of his coming round you; but if you cannot avoid crossing it, the division C should pass quickly, and at getting out face to the two flanks of the wood. The division B is to remain at the entrance of it, till they judge that the enemy C is sufficiently advanced, and then fall back, leaving the infantry for a rear-guard during the whole passage through the wood: at which time the whole should resume their first disposition.

In all defiles, and passages of bridges, the same manoeuvre should be used as for woods: but the first division having passed, they should form facing the enemy; and the infantry likewise draw up on the other side, upon the edge of the river.

When the country through which you are to retire happens to be mountainous, the division which falls back should guard the heights by small detached parties, or, if possible, guard them themselves.

A body of cavalry retreating without infantry, ought to form in three lines at 200 paces behind one another; the two last extending their front, that they may appear more numerous, and draw up on the two sides out of the road. The first line being attacked, the second is to sustain it, the third to wait the retreat of the first, and to sustain the second, and continue to do so alternately.

If the enemy seem to quit the pursuit, the whole corps must resume the order of an ordinary march; with this precaution, that the rear-guard be reinforced, and the advanced guard weakened.

As to the retreat of a small detachment of cavalry, such as go to reconnoitre the enemy, to discover their march, to carry off some officer, or for some other commission, as they are not numerous enough to skirmish and retreat by rule, they have but two ways to choose; either to fly, or break through the enemy. They ought to determine for the latter, when their retreat is cut off on all sides, so that they have no other way to escape but by cutting their way through the enemy sword in hand: but flight is always less hazardous when it is practicable.

If the officer is certain of the fidelity of his men, and their attachment to him; and sees that they cannot get out of sight of the enemy, but are ready to fall into their hands; he ought to try one means still, which has been known frequently to succeed. He should disperse his party by two and two, by the favour of the first covered place, where they may be at liberty to take so many different routes. It is evident that two men may wind from right to left, and escape more easily than a party of 12 or 20, who cannot move so freely.

Mr Jeney made use of such an expedient successfully in Italy, when the Spaniards having advice of his detachment having slipped to the rear of their army, they cut off his retreat on all sides. The whole party being dispersed, he took two hussars with him, and was followed so close, that every instant he thought he must be taken; however, he saved himself by crossing a marshy pond. The enemy ran to turn him, but he got so far before them, that they could not take him. He got safe to his post, and in three days the whole detachment met without the loss of a man; which will prove, that in such a situation we need not despair, and that in extreme necessity the passage of a river or morass ought not to be declined.

### Part IV. Of Sieges

#### Sect. I. Of Attack.

§ 1. Maxims or Principles to be observed in the Attack of Places.

1. The approaches ought to be made, without being seen from the town, either directly, obliquely, or in flank.

2. No more works should be made than are necessary for approaching the place without being seen; that is, the besiegers ought to carry on their approaches the shortest way possible, consistent with being covered against the enemy's fire.

3. All the parts of the trenches should mutually support each other, and those which are farthest advanced ought not to be distant from those which are to defend them above 120 or 130 fathoms, that is, above musket-shot.

4. The parallels or places of arms the most distant from the town, ought to have a greater extent than those which are nearest, that the besiegers may be able to take the enemy in flank, should they resolve to attack the nearest parallels.

5. The trench should be opened or begun as near as possible to the place, without exposing the troops too much, in order to accelerate and diminish the operations of the siege. There is no such thing as giving any exact rule in regard to the distance which ought to be observed upon opening the trenches. On level ground this distance may be 800 or 900 fathoms; but if there should be a hollow way in the neighbourhood of the place, the besiegers are to take advantage of it, and open the trenches nearer. In general, they are to regulate themselves upon this head according to the nature of the ground, more or less favourable to the opening of the trenches.—We shall suppose, in the present work, that the opening ought to be made within 800 fathoms of the covert way; the first parallel within 300 fathoms, the second within 150, and the third at the foot of the place.

6. Care should be taken to join the attacks; that is, they ought to have communications, to the end that they may be able to support each other.

7. Never to advance a work, unless it be well supported; and for this reason, in the interval between the second and third place of arms, the besiegers should make, on both sides of the trenches, smaller places of arms, extending 40 or 50 fathoms in length, parallel to the others, and constructed in the same manner, which will serve to lodge the soldiers in who are to protect the works designed to reach the third place of arms.

8. Observe to place the batteries of cannon in the continuations of the faces of the pieces attacked, in order to silence their fire; and to the end that the approaches being protected, may advance with greater safety and expedition.

9. For this reason the besiegers should always embrace the whole front attacked, in order to have as much space as requisite to plant the batteries on the produced faces of the works attacked.

10. Do not begin the attack with works that lie close to one another, or with reentrant angles, which would expose the attack to the cross-fire of the enemy.

§ 2. Of Investing.

The first operation of a siege is investing. The body of troops investing a town ought at least to be as strong again as the garrison; they are to divide themselves into several parties, in order to take possession of all the avenues leading to the place. By day they should keep themselves out of the reach of cannon-shot; but as soon as it is dark they must approach much nearer, the better to be able to support each other.

The investing is generally made by cavalry; but when the country is cut with ravines or hollow ways, or when there are woods in the neighbourhood of the place, then there must be likewise a body of infantry to guard all the avenues, and even to stop up, by a kind of retrenchments, such as might be the easiest to penetrate.

A few days after the investing, the army arrives, and is disposed round the town, according to the ground taken up by the line of circumvallation, and assigned by the engineer who has the direction of the siege. As soon as the place is invested, they begin to trace the line of circumvallation, and afterwards they let about its construction.

§ 3. To trace out the line of Circumvallation.

Before a general begins the attack of a place, he must endeavour to have as exact a plan of it as possible, by which he forms a design of the circumvallation and the attacks. The plan is rectified after the investing as much as the vicinity of the enemy will permit; and thereby he may correct the design traced at first, as far as there may be occasion for correction. It is upon such a plan, so rectified, that we suppose a general to proceed. We shall therefore begin with explaining or tracing the operations of the siege. We shall exhibit the progress of these operations from the investing to the taking of the place, in the order they are really executed. The line of circumvallation being a fortification intended against the enemy from without, who should attempt to succour the town, its defences ought to be directed against that enemy; that is, they ought to be opposite to the town; and the besieging army should, as we have already observed, be encamped behind that line, that is, between it and the town. The camp should be, as much as possible, without the reach of cannon-shot; therefore, as the line of circumvallation should be at a greater distance from the place than the camp, the reason is still stronger for its being also out of the reach of the cannon-shot; which, whether fired horizontally, or at an angle of 10 or 12 degrees, may be reckoned about 1200 fathoms. As the rear of the camp should not be incommode by the cannon, this part ought to be above 1200 fathoms distant from the place; and we shall suppose that the distance ought to be fixed at 1400 fathoms from the covert way. The depth of the camp may be estimated at about 30 fathoms. From the front of the line of circumvallation there should be a space of 120 fathoms, to draw up the army in battalia behind the circumvallation; which space added to 30 fathoms, supposed for the depth of the camp, gives 150 fathoms; and this added to the distance from the covert-way to the rear of the camp, gives 1550 fathoms for the distance from the circumvallation to the covert-way.

This being laid down, if the place be a regular octagon, fortified according to M. Vauban's first method*, the radius thereof will be 234 fathoms. This distance being added to the 1550 fathoms, then we shall have 1784. Or we may make it a round number by adding 16 fathoms, which are here of no manner of consequence, and we shall have 1800 fathoms for the distance from the centre of the place to the line of circumvallation.

The radius of the circumvallation being thus settled, from the centre of the place, with the distance of 1800 fathoms, you are to describe the circumference of a circle round the place. The diameter being 3600 fathoms, the circumference will then take 11,314; then take the distance of 120 fathoms, which you are to carry to the circumference above described. This distance will be in this example 93 times, and something over, which differs very little from 120 fathoms; so that you may look upon the polygon of this circumvallation as a polygon of 94 sides, of 120 fathoms each.

The polygon of the circumvallation being traced, take on each of the extremities of its sides the lines BD and BE, each of 15 fathoms; and from the points D and E, taken for the centre and distance of 25 fathoms, describe two arcs which cut one another at the point F; from whence draw the lines FD, FE, for the faces of the redans of the line of circumvallation; thus it is we form the salient parts EFD of this line, which serve to flank it. Perform the same operation on every side of the circumvallation, and then you will have its principal line traced.

The parapet within must be six or eight feet deep; and without make a ditch parallel to all its parts, three or four fathoms in breadth. The parapet of the circumvallation will be seven feet and a half high, and the depth of the ditch equal to the height of the parapet.

To make the profile of the circumvallation, let AB fig. 2. be the line level with the country, and CD the scale of the profile. Let A be the side of the town, and B that of the country; take AE, of six feet; from the point E, raise the perpendicular EF, of three feet, and draw the line AF, which will be the talus of the banquette. Draw FG parallel to AB, three feet from F to G, and the line FG will be the breadth of the banquette. On the point G raise the perpendicular GH, upon the line FG, four feet and a half. Draw from the point H, HK, parallel to AB. Make HK seven feet and a half, HI a foot and a half; draw GI, which will be the inside of the parapet of circumvallation.

From the point K, let fall on the line AB the perpendicular KM; take KL a foot and a half, and draw IL, which will be the upper part of the parapet of the line of circumvallation. Take MN five feet, and from the point N draw the perpendicular NO, and set off seven feet and a half from N to O. Draw OR parallel to AB, making the difference three fathoms or 18 feet from O to R; draw the line LN and produce it to P, and LP will be the scarp, or the outside of the parapet of the line of circumvallation. From the point R raise RS, perpendicular to OR, or parallel to ON. Make QR equal to OP, and draw QS, which produce beyond S three feet to V; then take SX six feet, and draw VX, and the profile of the circumvallation will be completed.

This kind of glacis, VX, will serve to raise the enemy, and to expose them more to the fire of the line, should they attempt to make themselves masters of it, and to cover the parapet of the circumvallation, in the same manner almost as the glacis of a place covers the top of the rampart.

The dimensions above given may vary a little without inconvenience; but it would be to no manner of use to make the lines stronger; only you may reduce the ditch to ten or twelve feet in breadth at the top, and five or six feet in depth. A ditch of less breadth and depth, besides its not allowing ground enough to form a good parapet, would have the inconvenience of being too easy to pass over by the enemy. The lines may be fraised (see Frise); which is done when they are to last for some time, and the neighbouring country furnishes wood enough for the purpose.

Sometimes a fore-ditch is dug before the lines, 12 or 15 feet in breadth at the top, and fix or seven feet deep; it is made about 12 or 15 fathoms from the ditch of the line. The design of it is to stop the enemy when they attempt to attack the lines, and to make them lose both time and men in passing over it. As it is exposed to the fire of the lines, the time the enemy must necessarily spend in crossing will of course occasion their losing a great many men; and besides, the passage itself may throw them into such disorder, as shall prevent their attacking so advantageously as they would otherwise do, were it not for this obstruction. Between this fore-ditch and the ditch of circumvallation, at the siege of Philippsburg, in order to strengthen the defence of the circumvallation, there were likewise dug wells, which were ranged chequerwise, of about nine feet diameter at the mouth, and fix or seven feet deep. They were situated near to each other, to prevent the enemy from passing easily through the intervening spaces. The Spaniards practised something of this kind at the siege of Arras in 1654. Before the circumvallation, they dug a number of holes two feet diameter, and a foot and a half deep; in which they fastened stakes that were capable of greatly obstructing the passage of the cavalry. See Plate DXXIX.

A line of circumvallation requires a strong army to defend it. We have found the circumference of the line which we have been now tracing, namely, of 94 fides, each of 120 fathoms, to be 11,280 fathoms; out of this number the gorges of the redans are to be deducted, but then their faces are to be added. The gorges have 30 fathoms; and the two faces which have 50, give an overplus of 20 fathoms on each redan; that is, to the number above mentioned of 11,280 fathoms, add as many times 20 as there are redans, in order to have the entire circumference of the circumvallation. This circumference has 95 redans; therefore we must add 94 times 20, or 1880, which will make 13,160 fathoms for the whole circumference. This number being divided by 2282 (which is the number of fathoms contained in a French league) gives about five leagues and a half. Now it is clear, that to great an extent of ground requires a very numerous army to guard it. We may make a calculation pretty near, by supposing that every folder drawn up in a line occupies a space of three feet, that is, half a fathom; that the folders are four deep; and that the army is drawn up in two lines, which will give eight ranks of folders. Each rank containing 26,320 folders, the circumference of the circumvallation being 13,160 fathoms, the eight ranks will therefore make 210,560 men.

To these we should likewise add about 12,000 or 15,000 men for the works of the attack, which would form an army of about 225,000 men. And as it is not customary, at least in Europe, to send such strong armies into the field, from thence it follows, that the circumvallations, and the lines in general, when they are of a very great extent, are extremely difficult to guard. And indeed the most celebrated generals have been divided in their opinions upon this subject. They all agree that there are certain cases in which they may be of some advantage, especially when they are of a narrower compass, and the design of them is to flop up the entrance of a country of a small extent; but if they are very large, it is extremely difficult to defend them when attacked by a skilful enemy.

It was heretofore the custom to add great outworks to the lines, such as horn and crown works, tenailles, &c. All the circumvallations of the towns that were besieged during the wars between Spain and Holland, under the princes of Orange, were remarkable for this sort of works. These have been since laid aside, because we find that even a line, with its simple redans, is very difficult to guard; and such a number of outworks does but increase its circumference. The modern lines have only a few small half-moons A, before the gates of the circumvallation, placed, like those of the towns, against the middle of the curtains; the entrance is shut up by wooden barriers, and sometimes by chevaux-de-frise, and other contrivances, which will hinder the passage from being easily forced.

The lines having very little elevation, stand in no need of bastions to be flanked in all their parts, like those in the circuit of a town. Redans, which are of more simple and expeditious construction, are sufficient. The angle they make with the curtain is always very obtuse, to the end that the folder being placed on the face of the redan, may be the better able to defend its approach. It is customary indeed to make bastions in those parts where the lines form such angles as could not be sufficiently defended by redans. Yet, whenever it may be judged necessary, the line of circumvallation may be fortified with bastions. The greatest part of the lines at the siege of Philippsburg was flanked in this manner, as may be seen in Plate DXXIX. The bastions increase the circumference of the circumvallation; and probably the reason why they were used at the siege of Philippsburg, was because the circumvallation was of a very small extent.

At the point of the redans, batteries are erected to fire the cannon a barbette over the parapet; and the same is practised wherever the cannon are placed on the line of circumvallation.

Hitherto we have supposed that the circumvallation was regular; but even were it irregular, the construction of it would differ very little from that which we have just now given.

A general ought to possess himself of all places from which which the lines may be commanded, when it is possible to do it without carrying the circumvallation to too great a distance. He should likewise take all advantages arising from the nature of the ground, as precipices, eminences, rivers, brooks, marshes, and, generally speaking, whatever is capable of rendering the camp of difficult access. If there are any woods or bulwarks within its inclosure, it will be right to cover it in those parts by felling the trees, and therewith making a proper fence.

The tracing of the lines is a matter of no difficulty, if you have a good map of the adjacent country; since you have only to bring the several parts of the line nearly within 1800 fathoms of the centre of the place, and to take care that there shall be about 120 fathoms from the point of one redan to another.

Nor is there any difficulty in transferring this line to the ground; the operation is too easy to those who know a little of practical geometry, to lose any time in explaining it here.

When the garrison is numerous enough to disturb the besieging army, another line is traced in the rear of the camp, called the line of counter-vallation. As it is intended to oppose a far less considerable body of troops, it is never made so strong as the line of circumvallation; but it is constructed on the very same principles, as the figure will sufficiently show.

§ 4. Of the Park of Artillery.

The park of artillery is the place which contains the cannon, bombs, powder, and in general all military implements and machines that have any relation to the artillery. This park should be placed where there is least danger of being insulted by the enemy. It ought to be without the reach of cannon-shot, and inclosed within a particular spot, which should be fortified also by a line consisting of a ditch and a parapet, flanked with redans in the same manner as the circumvallation. Nothing should be neglected that is capable of securing it either from the attacks of the enemy, or from any other possible damage.

§ 5. Of the Trenches and Parallels.

While the line of circumvallation is finishing, all the materials necessary for the construction of the trenches are got ready, and the engineer, who has the direction of the siege, examines on the spot the most proper place for the attacks, and the figure they ought to have; and of these he makes a particular plan.

We have supposed that the place is regularly fortified, and on level ground; so that here it is indifferent on which side the attack is begun. It is sufficient to explain the rules that are to be there observed; and afterwards to apply them to irregular towns, and to uneven grounds. Let C (fig. 2.) be the place besieged, and A and B the bastions attacked. Begin with indefinitely producing towards the field the capitals of these two bastions; in like manner produce the capital of the half-moon opposite the curtain between these two bastions; set off 800 fathoms from the salient angles D and E of the covert-way to F and G. This done, take DH, and EI of 300 fathoms; and from the centre C, with the radius CH or CI, describe an arc, which produce beyond the points H and I; and on this arc III construct the first parallel. Then on the same lines, DF, EG, take the points M and N 140 fathoms distant from the points H and I; and through these points describe from the centre C another arc, on which the second parallel is constructed. This second arc will cut the produced capital of the half-moon in the point L, which is to be observed, in order to begin hence a trench, which shall extend to the salient angle of the covert-way before this of the half-moon. Lastly, through the points O and P, the distance of 20 or 25 fathoms from the angles D and E, describe from the centre C a third arc, on which the third parallel is constructed.

Terminate the first parallel by producing the faces a b, a b of the half-moons 1 and 2, collateral to the bastions A and B; but extend the parallel 15 or 20 fathoms beyond the intersection of this prolongation. The second parallel will be less extended than the first, by about 30 fathoms on each side; and the third also less extended than the second, by about 30 fathoms on each side.

This being done, you have a sketch of the trenches and the places of arms. The bulwarks now is to trace the trenches, or approaches, without being seen or enfiladed.

Take a long ruler, and lay it on the point G, so that it shall make, with the produced capital EG of the bastion B, an angle EGS, whose side GS being produced, shall meet no part of the covert-way, and shall be distant about 10 or 12 fathoms from the angles to which it approaches nearest. Take GS of an arbitrary extent, as of 200 or 200 fathoms, and put the ruler on the point S, so that it shall make with GS such an angle GST, as that the side ST produced shall not fall on any part of the covert-way, but be 10 or 12 fathoms distant from the most salient parts. Terminate this side in T, and there make also a new angle STI, whose side TI should terminate at the point I, where it meets the first parallel. Perform the like operation on FH, and it will give you the outline of the trenches as far as the first parallel.

At this part of the trenches you may make a greater number of turnings; you may likewise carry it in a direct line to the first parallel. The most important article is, to take care not to let it be enfiladed from any part of the covert-way; and the fewer angles and turnings it makes, the quicker it is constructed, which in transferring it to the ground is worthy of great attention. Take care also, that its extremity, I, do not fall far from the point where the produced capital of the bastion meets the first parallel.

By the same method trace the trenches between the first and second parallel, as may be seen in the figure; but as this part is nearer the place than the former, in order to avoid being raked, it must have a greater number of angles. All its sides ought to cut the prolongment of the capital of the bastion B, as appears by the figure. In like manner trace the trenches betwixt the second and third place of arms, by making as frequent turnings on the produced capital of the bastion B, as shall be necessary, in order to its defiling from the covert-way. By the same method trace the trenches on the capital of the bastion A; trace also a trench on the produced capital of the half-moon, between the second and third parallel, to reach the flanked angle of its covert-way.

When the garrison happens to be strong and enterprising, it will be proper, between the second and third parallel, to make parts of trenches V, V, &c., parallel to the places of arms; they are to be 30 or 40 fathoms long, and to communicate with the trench, as may be seen in the figure. These parts of the parallels are what we have distinguished by the name of half parallels or places of arms. At every angle of the trenches observe to produce the part of the trenches in those places, so that this prolongation shall cover that part of the trenches which it terminates.

This will be illustrated by an example.

Let ABCDFGMQ be a part of the trenches, and let A be one of the sides opposite to the enemy; produce AB, so that BE shall be five or six fathoms; and in FG take also five or six fathoms from I to L, which will give the the end of the trench BPLI, the use of which is to cover the branch IOMG, whereby the enemy will not know the place where it falls into the trench AB, and to make room for withdrawing those who are in this part of the trenches, and that the passage may be free at all the angles. In like manner produce the side GM from M to N, and the side JC from O to P, and you will have the end of the trench MNOP, which will cover the branch DCOQ. Do the same at all the angles of the trench.

The parapet of the trench being made to cover it, ought to change sides alternately. If, for instance, AE, in the preceding figure, is towards the place, it is evident that the side GN will be towards it also, and likewise the side CD; and therefore the parapet of the trench is successively con- structed from the right side to the left, and from the left to the right. In the plans of attacks, the side of the parapet of the trench, as also that of the parallels, are di- stinguished by a stronger line than any of the rest; but the latter admits of no difficulty, because we may easily con- ceive that, being parallel to the place, its parapet must ne- cessarily be on the side that faces it. Care has been like- wise taken to express, as we have already mentioned in the figure, the parapet of the branches, by a stronger line than the other lines of the attacks. The side of the trench op- posite to the parapet is called the reverse of the trench.

The trenches are generally no more than three feet deep; and their parapet, beginning from the bottom of the trench, is five feet and a half high, or thereabouts. The parallels have a parapet like the trench, and of the same height; but as they are intended for firing over, they are made with a kind of banquette, as may be seen Plate DXXXI. fig. 3. to raise the soldier, to the end that he may fire over the pa- rapet. On the parapet of the places of arms are put ba- kets, fascines, or sand-bags, ranged in such a manner that the troops may be able to fire without being too much seen by the enemy. The third parallel, or place of arms, is ge- nerally wider than the rest. Sometimes the inside of its parapet is likewise made with steps or banquettes, to the end that the soldiers may conveniently pass over it in case of an attack. See fig. 4.

There will never be any great difficulty in tracing the attacks, from an exact plan, by observing the method we have made use of to make its parts define properly. But the difficulty is to transfer the works from the plan to the field; for doing which the following plan has been recom- mended.

In the first place, the engineer must from all the angles of the branches of the trench, upon the plan, draw perpen- diculars to the produced capitals; observing the distance of each of these perpendiculars and their length. He is then to walk about the place in the daytime, at a sufficient dis- tance to be without the reach of musket-shot. It is not usual to fire cannon against a single man, because the shot is very uncertain, especially against a person who does not stand still for any time; therefore, without any great dan- ger, he may only keep himself out of musket-shot. It is easy to discover the flanked angle of the battlements against which he wants to direct the attacks, and the salient angle of the covert way opposite to them; which gives two points, and these the direction or the prolongation of the capitals of those battlements. Consequently he has only to plant some pickets on the direction of these points, in order to have the prolongation of the capitals of the battlements. These pickets can only be put out of the reach of musket- shot; but by daylight he may observe something of the ground lying in the direction of these pickets, and he may afterwards reconnoitre it in the evening, in order to place pickets there also. In this manner he may have the pro- longation of the capitals pretty exact.

In order to conduct the trench by these capitals, the fol- lowing method has been pointed out by Marshal Vauban.

Examine upon the plan of the attacks what distance there is from the beginning of the trench to the first perpendicu- lar; measure this perpendicular and the side or part of the branch corresponding to it; take cords of equal length with these lines, and fasten the extremities of the two cords, one representing the length of the line of direction, and the other that of the branch which makes an angle with it, to a picket at the point of the produced capital where the trench begins, and make two men walk, each of them hold- ing one end of these cords, viz. one in a direct line towards the place, the other also advancing towards the place and walking alongside of the former. When the first comes to the farther distance between the opening of the trench and the first perpendicular, he must plant a picket on this point, to which he is to fasten the cord which expresses the per- pendicular. He must take the other end of this perpendi- cular, and afterwards turn off to the right or to the left, according to the side where the perpendicular ought to be, till the part of the cord expressing the perpendicular is well stretched, and joined to that end of the cord of the trench carried by the other man; at their meeting they are to plant a picket, by means of which the triangle, thus trans- ferred to the ground, will be like that which was taken upon the plan; and this part will be traced on the ground in the same manner as on the plan. In like manner may every part be traced in the beginning, when the trench is yet at a distance from the place.

Let the trenches be traced upon the plan (fig. 2.), and Plate DXXX. let C be the place against which you are to direct the at- tacks, transferring the plan to the ground; let BG be like- wise equal to the line of direction of the plan; you are to plant along this line a sufficient number of pickets, with burning matches tied to them, in order to discover them the more easily.

To begin the tracing of the trenches, tie to the picket G a cord of the length GS, and to the same picket another cord of the length GX; let there be two men, and each take an end of these two cords, and let them walk, the one at a venture towards S, and the other directly to X towards the place along the line of direction BG; and having reach- ed the end of his cord, let him fasten it with a picket, after having drawn it very straight; and to this picket let him tie one of the ends of the cord, which is to mark the perpen- dicular XS. Let him take the other end, and walk to- wards S till his cord XS is stretched very tight, and then let him join the man who holds the end of the cord GS, and let them fasten a picket in S, where both the cords join. Let them afterwards take away the cord XS, the perpendi- cular which is of no use, and the cord GS which remains will mark the real tracing of the trenches. In order to have the line ST, you come to the picket X; to which you tie a cord of the length of XY, and another to the picket S of the length of ST. Let two men, as before, take each an end of these two cords, and let them walk, the first who holds the end of the cord XY directly towards B, and the other who holds the end of the cord ST obliquely towards T; he who holds the cord XY, having reached Y at the end of his cord, shall place a picket there; to which let him tie the end of the cord of the perpendicular YT, and let him walk towards T, holding the end of this cord, till he meets or joins the man who holds the end of the cord ST; and at the point T of their meeting let them place a pic- quet, to which let them tie the end T of the cord ST. Part IV.

Of Sieges. After this take away the cord of the perpendicular, and thus continue the same operation as long as you please, or are able, in order to trace all the other turnings or windings of the trenches.

This whole operation supposeth that you know exactly the distance of the point G, the extremity of the line of direction to the top E of the fallant angle of the covert-way. This distance may be found by the common rules of trigonometry, or by the following simple method pointed out by marshal Vauban: Let A (fig. 5.) be the vertex of the fallant angle of the covert-way, and AB the line of direction of the trench whose length you want to take. At the point B, draw BC perpendicular to AB, to which give what measure you please, as 80 or 100 fathoms, and at the point C draw CD perpendicular to BC: In CD take any point E, and in the line of direction between it and the angle A place a picquet G in the line BC. Measure GC and CE, and say, as GC : BG :: CE : AB.

When once you have found out by this, or such other methods as you may make use of, the length of the line of direction EG (Plate DXXX. fig. 2.), you will be always able to know the distance that remains to the fallant angle of the covert-way, and to the points I, N, P, through which the parallels or places of arms are to pass. These points being determined, it would be an easy matter from geometry to find out a method of describing the parallels that are to pass through them, if their situation admitted the engineers to perform the operation quietly by day-light; but they are to be traced in the dark, and under the fire of the place; so that there is no other way to trace them than by approximation, that is, to move as nearly parallel to the circuit of the place as you can by your judgment; and to plant picquets, with cords tied to them at proper intervals, the whole length of the line. But you can trace with cords only the first parallel; for the others are too near the place to permit you to perform this operation: you are therefore to proceed in tracing them almost in the same manner, as we shall observe when speaking of the sap, to which they belong, and which is carried on by that method.

§ 6. Observations on the properest Part for making the Attacks.

While the lines are perfecting, the necessary materials are to be got ready for the construction and operations of the attacks. The materials consist of fascines, picquets three feet long and about an inch or two in diameter, gabions, and picquets for gabions. There must likewise be a provision of the several instruments or tools necessary for these operations.

The engineer, who has the direction of the siege, will likewise make use of this time to examine into the parts most convenient for carrying on the attacks, and where they will be most simple and expeditious. There are few fortresses in Europe of which plans are not to be had; but as it is presumed that the enemy hath increased the fortifications of a town which is threatened with a siege, care should be taken to get intelligence thereof from some skilful person that has been in the place, and made all the observations possible in regard to the works lately raised, without giving any suspicion of his intentions. The danger of such an undertaking is very well known, so that the person employed cannot be too cautious in keeping himself concealed.

While the circumvallation is making, the engineers may at a distance, or, as we have already observed, out of musket-shot, examine some part of the out-works; and afterwards, from the report of the person sent into the place, and from what they know themselves, they may settle with the general the properest and fittest place for carrying on the attacks.

On this occasion there are many things to be observed, as well with regard to the ground as to the fortifications; but in a work of this nature, it is sufficient to consider the points of most importance.

First of all, the nature of the ground about the place must be well observed, whether there are any ditches or hollow ways, that may serve as a cover to guards of horse and foot against the cannon of the place; whether there are any parts that command the town, and may serve for the erecting of batteries; and whether the ground is fit for the works. The most favourable circumstance is to find a soil easy to dig; then the works advance with ease and less loss, because the folder is soon under cover, and the cannon does not do half the mischief as in stony places. If the ground about the place is a pure rock, or a morass, the operations are extremely difficult; and there will be occasion for a vast quantity of fascines, sand bags, wool-packs, &c., because the workmen are in much greater danger.

The rivers which run through the town, or in the neighbourhood, likewise deserve consideration; for they separate the attacks, and it may happen by some stoppage of the water, or other accident, that the bridges of communication being broke down, the separation of the attacks will expose the army of the besiegers to be defeated, by which means the place may be relieved. It is proper also to inquire, whether those rivers are not subject to inundations, which, if they were to happen during the siege, and to break in upon the attacks, would oblige the besiegers to abandon the trenches, and to raise the siege. In a word, whether the town can command any quantity of water so as to make an inundation round the place, and to lay the ground appointed for the attacks under water. All these points, and a great many others which we do not mention, deserve the most serious attention.

After choosing the properest ground for the attacks, a general is to consider the front which is least fortified and least covered with outworks. All other things being the same, it is evident, that the fewer outworks there are, the easier will be the attack. But if the place be situated in a morass, or upon an eminence, then he must necessarily make his attack on the accessible side, be its outworks what they will. In a word, the whole choice of the attacks consists in finding out the properest ground, and the weakest side; but as it is to be presumed that the enemy are acquainted with the nature of the ground about the place, and therefore have taken care to fortify more exactly those parts which are most favourable to an attack, the besiegers should not hesitate to make their approaches on that side; where, by the situation of the ground, they may gain, what the increase of the fortifications might otherwise make them lose.

§ 7. Of opening the Trenches.

Every thing being ready for opening the trenches, the ground pitched upon, the attacks settled and drawn upon a plan, and stores or magazines of all the materials necessary on the occasion being within reach of the place where the pioneers propose to work; the general having also settled the round of duty for the guard of the trenches, both of horse and foot, as likewise the number of horse for bringing the fascines, with the number of pioneers and troops to support them; and the chief director of the engineers having acquainted the rest of the corps with his plan of attack, and the manner they are to act; in a word, every thing being ready for execution, the troops designed for the service of the first night being prepared and drawn up in battalia at the place of rendezvous, and the pioneers provided with fascines, picquets, shovels, and pick-axes—in the dusk of the evening... evening they all begin to advance, every soldier being obliged to carry a fascine, together with his arms, in order to reach the place designed for opening the trenches. The guard of horse march at the same time to their assigned posts, to the right and left of the attacks, ready to support the troops for the guard of the trenches in case of any tally from the enemy. All this is to be done with the greatest silence possible, and nothing should be neglected to conceal the design from the enemy.

The pioneers are, according to marshal Vauban, divided into brigades of 50 men each, commanded by a captain, a lieutenant, and two sergeants. They advance four or six abreast, near the place where the trenches are to be opened; after which the rest of the troops that are to support them, being come up, the engineers charged with the tracing of the trenches, and who are to place the pioneers, make them come forward where the opening is to commence, while the battalions that support them are drawn up to the right and left in the places assigned them, where they unload their fascines, and silently wait for further orders. In the meanwhile the engineers trace the branches of the trenches, and the first parallel in the manner already described, and the work is advanced as fast as possible.

As much work is undertaken as the pioneers can be expected to perform this first night; and in proportion as the tracing goes on, the engineers place the pioneers, making them file off one by one, each carrying his fascine under the right arm; the place is on the right, or under the left if it is on the left, to the end that by the position of their fascines, which they lay on the ground along the tracing, and on the same side as they carry them, they may be enabled to distinguish the side of the place, that is, the side towards which they ought to throw up the ground in order to cover the trench from the fire of the town. As fast as they are placed, they are ordered silence, and made to lie down with their face on the fascines, and not to begin to work till commanded. The whole operation begins at the same time, that they may advance equally. When everything is ready, and the pioneers are all placed along the tracing which is purposed to be made this first night, orders are again given for them to work; and then they all set about it with all the diligence possible till daylight, that they may be covered against the fire of the place, which is still very dangerous in the morning, considering that the trench has not had time as yet to be rendered so perfect as it ought. The troops that are to support the pioneers are put under cover on the back of that part of the trench which is finished; that is, on the border of the trench opposite to that on which its parapet is raised; they are made to lie on their faces; after which the pioneers, who have been upon duty in the night, begin to file off, and others fill up their places. It is very difficult this first day to render the trench as complete as it should be; but no pains are spared to make it as complete as possible.

As the design cannot be now concealed from the enemy, the guard mounts the next day with drums beating about noon; and care is taken to continue the work of the trenches the second night, in the same manner as the first, that is, by placing the pioneers uncovered, because they are at such a distance from the town, that the fire is not yet dangerous enough to require their being placed otherwise; the work goes on quicker in this manner; but it must necessarily be altered as soon as the workmen come within musket-shot of the place.

The first night is the best adapted for advancing the works of the trenches, because of the distance from the place, which is too great to apprehend any danger from the enemy's fire. Sometimes it happens so, that the enemy is not apprised of these works; especially when all the necessary precautions have been taken to conceal them, and in that case the business is done in a manner without loss or danger. It is of importance to advance them with such expedition, that they may be fit to receive the troops, who are to support the pioneers, in order to cover them against the fire of the place; and as the first parallel is designed for this purpose, therefore it cannot be perfected too soon.

According to marshal Vauban, the first place of arms, though begun the first night, has need of a second and a third, before it can be completely finished and in condition to hold the troops that are to guard the trenches; but the works for perfecting this line will not hinder the besiegers from advancing to the second parallel, which ought not to be begun till the fourth night. It is to be observed, that the guard who mount the trenches are changed every day; they mount about noon, and they are to be as strong as shall be requisite for opposing the tallies which the garrison of the place may make against the workmen. They are generally equal to two-thirds of the garrison, because the enemy may fall upon the trenches with that number, reserving the other third to guard the town. But as it is possible that the besieged may think proper to fall forth with their whole force, and fall upon the workmen, together with the troops that support them; therefore, in order to guard against every accident of that sort, the troops in the trenches ought to be nearly equal to those of the place, especially in small towns, where a few are sufficient to guard the posts, or where the burgheers are well attached to the prince, that the commandant may depend upon their fidelity in guarding the town; because in that case he may make a general effort with his whole garrison against the troops in the trenches.

We have observed, that the second night the pioneers may still be placed uncovered; but the third it would be very dangerous to do it, because of the enemy's fire being too near. When the engineers are of this opinion, they take care not to expose the men any longer uncovered, and then the works are carried on by tap.

§ 8. Of the Sap.

Let ABC be the part of the trenches advanced to A, so near the town as to render it impossible, without evident danger, to work any longer at the approaches, unless the men have some cover against the fire of the place: and let the branch AD be traced by the engineer, not with a cord, as at the opening of the trenches, but with some picquets, which he has taken care to place in the direction this branch ought to have, to serve as a guide to the workmen. A cut is made in the parapet BA of the trenches; and then the men designed to work by tap, who are therefore called fappers, will move toward through the opening A, successively eight in number. The first is to roll before him a mantlet to cover him against musket-shot. He advances as far as is necessary to place a gabion on the line AD; and this gabion being set on its base, in the proper situation, with the picquets uppermost, the fapper makes a little trench behind, about five inches distant from the gabion, of a foot and a half in depth, and as many in breadth, and he empties the earth of this ditch into the gabion. This done, he places a second gabion near the first, in the same manner, and always under the cover of his mantlet; in like manner he makes a ditch behind, the earth of which serves to fill his gabion. Thus he places a certain number, till he grows tired of the operation.

The second fapper, who immediately follows him, widens the ditch made by the former by five inches, on the opposite side to where the gabions are placed, and makes it half a foot deeper. The earth he digs up serves to fill the gabions of Part IV.

Of sieges of the first sapper. The third sapper widens the ditch of the two first likewise half a foot, and he deepens it in the same proportion.

At length the fourth enlarges it also in the same proportion, in breadth and depth; and then the trench is three feet wide, and the same in depth, which is as much as it ought to be. The earth dug up on this occasion is sufficient, not only to fill the gabions placed by the lappers, but likewise to make a parapet of the rest, which is thrown up, and is strong enough to resist musket shot. The third and fourth sapper lay the fascines over the gabions, with their hooks, or otherwise; then they press them down, so that the flanks of the gabions shall keep them firm. As the sappers are ranged by brigades of eight each, while the first four are working at the tap, in the manner above described, the other four furnish them with gabions, fascines, and whatever other things they want. But when the first four are tired, the four last take their places, and work in the same manner; after which they are relieved by the first, and so alternately, till each has performed his part at the head of the tap.

When the first gabions are placed, and the tap is not as yet perfected, the part in which the gabions touch one another being less solid than the rest, their joints are filled up by sand-bags, which are taken away when the work is completed, or those interstices are filled up with small fascines called tap-faggots.

This is the nature of the tap; a work so much the more considerable, as it is performed by day as well as night. Several taps are carried on at the same time; and there is one to both sides of each of the attacks for the second and third parallel. There are likewise taps to each of the advanced parts, and to the half-places of arms or parallels.

We have supposed that the first sapper covered himself with a mantlet; this was the custom formerly, and an excellent custom; but now it is more usual to have a stuffed gabion. He rolls this gabion before him, and uses it in the same manner as he would the mantlet. Though care be taken to give a stuffed gabion to the directors of the taps, yet it happens sometimes that the sappers will not make use of them; for as the weight of this gabion renders it sometimes troublesome to roll, they choose to do without it; and are satisfied with rolling several gabions before them, near one another, and with working behind them. These gabions are indeed of little defence, but are sufficient to conceal them from the enemy, who cannot tell the gabion behind which the first sapper is. But as the preservation of these men is of great importance, they ought to be obliged to work behind the stuffed gabion: for the same reason, the first sappers should have a cuirass, and even a head-piece, musket-proof.

There are three sorts of tap; the simple, viz. that which we have been describing, the double, and the flying tap.

1. The simple tap, or the tap without any other appellation, is made on one side, or, which is the same thing, has only one parapet. 2. The double tap has a parapet on each side, and is carried on wherever its two sides are seen from the place. 3. The flying tap is that in which they do not give themselves the trouble of filling the gabions with earth; it is made where the workmen are not much exposed, and in order to accelerate the approaches.

As soon as the men have brought the tap to its proper perfection, the pioneers are ordered forward, and there make it of the same width as the other parts of the trenches; upon which it changes its name of tap to that of trench. It is called a trench, if it serves as a way to the town; and a place of arms, if it be parallel to it, and designed to lodge troops.

See Plate DXXXI. fig. 7, 8. DXXXII. fig. 1, 2. See also the upper compartment of Plate DXXXVIII. for figures of the different instruments used in this and other operations of a siege.

§ 9. Of Batteries.

Cannon is made use of at a siege for two different purposes; the first to drive away the enemy from their defences, and the second to dismount their guns.

To produce these two effects, the batteries should not be above the mean reach of cannon shot from the place; that is, above 300 fathoms. Therefore there is no possibility of constructing them till the first parallel is formed; and as the distance of this first parallel from the place is generally 300 fathoms, the batteries must be on this line, or beyond it, nearer the town. They must always be placed, when the ground will permit, on the produced faces of the works attacked, as we have mentioned in the maxims of attack.

Let Z be the centre of the place attacked, and the trenches, as well as the parallels, completed. To find a proper position for erecting batteries, produce the faces AD, AC, BE, BF of the two battalions attacked, till their prolongation cuts the first parallel. Produce also the two faces OM and OL of the half-moon MOL of the front attacked, and the faces HG and IK of the two collateral half-moons 1 and 2, to the first parallel, and erect batteries on the produced races, as you see in P, Q, R, S, T, U, X, and Y.

They are advanced beyond the first parallel 40 or 50 fathoms; and are parted from the trenches, to the end that they may be used with greater ease and convenience, and less trouble to the workmen.

§ 10. Of Sallies.

That we might not interrupt the making of the trenches, we conducted them to the foot of the glacis, without taking notice of sallies; that is, attacks which the garrison may make against the trenches, with a view of ruining or retarding the works. As it is not to be presumed that the enemy will suffer themselves to be straitened in the town without using some endeavours to prolong the siege, and as sallies seem to be one of the principal means they can employ, it is proper to point out the conduct to be observed, not only for preventing their effects, but likewise for rendering them disadvantageous to the enemy.

Sallies can be attended with no success, unless they are made at a time when unexpected. When the workmen are suddenly fallen upon, they are scattered, and obliged to fly; which must occasion confusion and disorder among the troops that are to support them; and it requires some time before they can be brought again together, and made to charge the enemy. In the meanwhile the latter avail themselves of the opportunity to fill up the trenches, and to do all the mischief possible: but when the troops are upon their guard against every design of the enemy, if the latter fail out of the place, they are suffered to advance; and care is taken to cut off their retreat, by means of the cavalry and the picquet, in case they should advance too far into the field; otherwise they are fired at from the places of arms, and other works within reach; and then they are briskly attacked by the grenadiers and the troops upon duty in the trenches. Care, however, must be taken not to pursue them too far, for fear of the fire of the place, which never fails to be extremely sharp when the enemy have got back to the covert-way.

In proportion as the works advance towards the town, sallies become more dangerous to the besiegers, because the enemy may fall upon the trenches more readily; for which Of Sieges, reason, double care should be taken to straiten them more closely, and to prevent their falling out with impunity.

As the works carried on beyond the second parallel are more exposed than the rest, because of their proximity to the covert-way, no part should be advanced without being well supported. Hence, as we have already taken notice, half-places of arms are formed, in order to support the head of the trenches, till they reach the third place of arms; which must be set about with the greatest care and expedition possible. When this is done in the manner it ought, there will hardly be any farther danger from the fallies.

Sallies are seldom made in the day-time but by a presumptuous enemy, who imagine they may safely attack and defy the troops on duty in the trenches; but they are easily repulsed, unless the besiegers are so weak as not to be able to furnish a sufficient guard for the trenches; in which case they ought not to continue the siege, lest they run a risk of being at length entirely defeated.

At the opening of the trenches, and when the besiegers are at a good distance from the place, there is little occasion to be afraid of any sallies in the day; for there would be full time enough to prepare to receive them before they reached the works. If the enemy are disposed then to issue forth, they will do it by night; but it will be an easy matter to get intelligence of any attempt they may make, by ordering parties of 10 or 12 men, headed by a sergeant, to range in the night between the trenches and the town.

These men may lie on their faces as near the place as possible; remaining in profound silence till they hear or perceive some motion in the covert-way; then they should send one of their own body immediately to acquaint the lieutenant-general who that day commands the trenches, and the rest should continue there as long as they can be concealed, to see which way the enemy direct their course. This caution is not only simple and easy, but sufficient to guard the besiegers against surprise, and to enable them to give a warm reception to the enemy.

When the works are advanced pretty near to the place, for instance, to the third parallel, if the enemy should then fall out and fall upon the workmen, the latter must be ordered to retire quickly to the back of the third place of arms, and let the guard fire briskly upon them, without minding the overturning of a dozen or two of gabions; for the galling fire of the small arms, to which the enemy are exposed during this expedition, will make them pay dearly for what little disorder they occasion.

§ 11. Of the Lodgments on the Glacis, and the taking of the Covert-way.

We left the works at the foot of the glacis, and at the third parallel; our business is now to make a lodgment there, and to go on with them till we have driven the enemy from the covert-way.

Our being then so near the covert-way, renders it impossible to desist from it; but in order to prevent the effect of enfilading, it is necessary to make the trenches much deeper in the glacis; the fire of the covert-way being very near, cannot plunge into those deep trenches, which renders it less dangerous to abide there than it would otherwise be were it not for this precaution; or they are made with traverses much in the same manner as in the covert-way, by which means the enfilading will be prevented in part, though not entirely.

In regard to the figure of the lodgment on the glacis, it varies according to the different circumstances or position of the works by which it is defended. The common way is to make several short turnings or zig-zags upon the ridge of the glacis, in the direction of the salient angle of the covert-way, and continued to this angle; or you begin with making two or three short turnings towards the foot of the glacis, from whence you ascend afterwards by a direct trench, or sap, in the following manner.

Two rappers roll each a mantlet, or stuffed gabion, before them on the ridge of the glacis; each making a sap, one on one side of the ridge, and the other on the other. The ditch is dug deeper than usual, in order to cover them the better against the fire of the place. This work, which advances on both sides at the same time, and both sides covered, each with a parapet, is what we called a double sap. In the middle they make traverses three fathoms thick, and of the same breadth as the trench. On each side (small passages are made like those overgrown in the traverse of the covert-way, to the end that the communication thereof be not interrupted.

These traverses are constructed so near to each other, as to be a sufficient cover, by their elevation and distance, against the fire of the place. In order to guard against the effect of the grenades, upon coming within their reach, that is, within 14 or 15 fathoms of the covert-way, care is then taken to cover this trench with blinds, or, which is the same thing, to cover the upper part of it. The first and second figures of Plate DXXXIII. will show this direct trench. The first exhibits the plan, and the second the profile, which passes over one of the traverses.

All this being done, and the third parallel finished in the manner we supposed, they advance from this parallel upon the glacis to each of the salient angles of the covert-way of the front attacked, and they begin with making two or three short turnings, as marked on Plate DXXXIII. fig. 6, along the ridge of the glacis, so as to occupy about one-third thereof. There are to be made as deep as is necessary, to be a shelter against the fire of the covert-way; afterwards they may proceed directly along the ridge of the glacis, by a deep ditch, to the salient angle of the covert-way. M. Vauban observes, that if we follow directly the ridge of the glacis, this trench is made without much danger; for the palisade which is placed at the salient angle of the covert-way, and the other two next it, do not present directly to the ridge, but only opposite to the faces; where at the most there is only room for one or two falchers to see the head of the trenches, and who are easily silenced by the fire of the third parallel, which ought to be well served, and likewise by that of the ricochet.

Upon coming to the middle, or two-thirds of the glacis, two new saps are made, &c., which embrace both sides of the covert-way, to which they are almost parallel. Their length is 18 or 20 fathoms, and about five in breadth. They are covered at the end with crochets and winding traverses, which prevent the fire of the covert-way from enfilading them easily.

The parapet of these saps is raised about eight or nine feet above the glacis; and by means of gabions, three banquettes are made, as may be seen Plate DXXXIV. fig. 5. The folder placed on the upper banquette is thereby raised high enough to plunge into the covert-way, as appears from the same figure. When this work, which Marshal Vauban calls the cavalier of the trench, is once finished, it is very difficult for the enemy to remain anywhere in the covert-way; for they would be too much exposed to the fire of the folder placed on these cavaliers. But these places of arms or cavaliers cannot be made without being protected by the ricochet batteries, which enfilade the covert-way.

These cavaliers being once finished, it is easy to carry on the direct trench, as far as the salient angle of the covert-way, Of siege, way; and to establish at the point of this angle and on the head of the glacis a small lodgment bounded by a circular arc; whence the enemy may be entirely driven from the salient place of arms of the covert-way. Afterwards this lodgment may be widened on branches of the covert-way, by digging into the upper part of the glacis, at the distance of three fathoms from the inner side of the covert-way; to the end that this thickness may serve as a parapet to the lodgment, and screen it from the cannon.

The operation we have been describing, to reach from the third parallel to the salient angle of the covert-way, is formed at the same time against all the salient angles of the front attacked; hence the enemy is obliged to abandon them almost all at the same time; and the lodgment on the glacis is afterwards advanced on both sides of these angles, towards the re-entering places of arms of the covert-way.

As it is impossible to make this lodgment defile from the works of the place, there is no other way to guard against the enemy's fire than by many traverses. The 5th figure of Plate DXXXIII. shows the plan of part of this lodgment with its traverses; which are made with chandeliers and gabions. If the enemy, notwithstanding the cannon and bomb-batteries à ricochet, and the fire of the cavaliers of the trenches, should obstinately continue in the re-entering places of arms of the covert-way; in order to compel them to remove, batteries for throwing of stones are raised over against those places of arms; and with this view, as soon as the lodgment of the glacis is brought within one half or two thirds of the branches of the covert-way, on both sides of the re-entering angle, a sap is carried on opposite to the place of arms; and on this sap batteries for throwing stones are erected, as may be seen in fig. Plate DXXXIII. fig. 6. These batteries being finished and ready to play, they discharge a shower of stones into the place of arms (fig. 6.), which will not suffer the enemy to maintain themselves there any longer. The lodgment continues to advance; and as soon as the enemy is driven from the place of arms, it is continued all round the faces thereof. This lodgment being properly finished, will hinder the enemy from venturing to return to the covert-way; and of course will secure the possession of it to the besiegers. These lodgments are made with gabions and rafines; the gabions are filled with earth, rafines are put over them, and the whole is covered with earth; they sink into the glacis as deep as is requisite to be covered against the fire of the place.

In the whole of this account we have not made use of mines; because we were willing that the description of the works, which are carried on from the third parallel, in order to become matters of the covert-way, should be as plain as possible. This omission we shall now supply, by making mention of the principal difficulties occasioned by mines, in endeavouring to drive the enemy from the covert-way.

Without mines the enemy would find it very difficult to retard the works we have been describing; because the ricochet batteries must gall them excessively, and break up their defences, so as to deprive them of all shelter; but they may have some resource left in works under ground, where their miners can proceed with more safety; while those of the besiegers, not having the same knowledge of the ground, can only grope in the dark; so that it is altogether a mere chance if they find out the enemy's galleries, and succeed so as to destroy them. If information is received that the glacis is countermined, there can be no manner of doubt but the enemy will avail themselves of their countermines, to carry branches forward into the field; and then to avoid, as much as possible, the mischief that may be done by those subterraneous fires, in the third parallel shafts or pits are sunk 18 or 20 feet deep, if the ground will permit, in order to get below the galleries of the besieged; and from thence galleries are carried on towards the covert-way, to meet with those of the enemy, by boring the earth with a long iron needle or augre, to find them out. If they are found underneath, an opening is made down into them, and shells are thrown in, to drive away the enemy and to ruin their gallery. If, on the contrary, they are found above them, a small mine must be forced to break them; but if none of the enemy's galleries can be found, in that case branches must be carried to the right and left; at the end of which are made small chambers, to shake the neighbouring ground, which can hardly miss destroying the galleries and chambers of the besieged.

Notwithstanding all the care that can be taken in this case, it is not to be presumed that the mines of the besieged under the glacis should be rendered absolutely ineffective; but as soon as any of them are sprung, workmen are immediately sent to make a lodgment in the pits. In some grounds, the mines of the besieged may be foiled, by letting in a brook or rivulet into the galleries; for which purpose you have only to dig pits in the nearest bourne, and let the water run in. The expedient was made use of at the siege of Turin in 1706, whereby a great many mines of the besieged were rendered useless.

The enemy should have mines placed, to hinder the lodgment on the head of the glacis, within four or five fathoms of the palisades of the covert-way; to the end that in springing them the palisades may not be hurt, but that they may be under the lodgment which the besiegers make there. When they have sprung the mines, they make lodgments in them; and the besiegers likewise on their part spring mines, with a view to destroy the palisades; but nothing that is not very general can be said on this fort of contests. They depend on the situation of the ground, and upon the capacity and understanding of those who attack, and those who defend the place.

Before we made mention of mines, we supposed, when treating of the lodgment on the top of the glacis, that the fire of the cavaliers of the trenches, together with the cannon and ricochet bomb-batteries, had obliged the enemy to quit the covert-way; but if, notwithstanding these fires, they should obstinately continue in the places of arms and behind the traverses, the way to drive them entirely from thence, and to make the lodgment we have been speaking of upon the glacis, is as follows.

Whether the enemy has sprung a mine near the salient angle of the covert-way, or the beleaguered have blown up some of the palisades near it, as soon as the mine is sprung, workmen must be sent to the excavation; where they are to cover themselves with all possible expedition, and afterwards to extend their lodgment in the covert-way on both sides of its salient angle.

The double trench, or the double sap on the ridge of the glacis, must be made to communicate with this lodgment, in order to be able to sustain it if there should be occasion, and to communicate with it more safely. Particular care must be taken to cover the extremities of it, that is, to make traverses everywhere, in order to be sheltered from the fire of the other parts of the covert-way, where the enemy still maintain themselves.

When this lodgment is extended to the first traverses of the covert-way, if the enemy keep their ground behind it, as there can be but few under cover there, considering the space they have to occupy, a company of grenadiers must make a brisk attack to drive them away; this done, some of those grenadiers should endeavour to find out in the part abandoned. Of Sieges abandoned by the enemy the entrance into the mine, and the Saucisson; and upon finding it, as there is great probability that they will, they are to cut it off, and thereby render the mine useless. Workmen may be likewise sent into the passage round the traverse, and there make a small lodgment, which will be the safest that can be contrived when the enemy is so very near. After this an entrance is to be dug in the covert-way opposite those traverses, and continued towards the bank of the ditch, under cover of the traverse; then a sap is to be made from each of the extremities of this passage, that is, near the border of the countercarp; which are to be carried along the rounding of the countercarp towards the middle, where they are to meet. This lodgment must be made very deep, that it may be no hinderance to that on the head of the glacis; and it is to be managed so as to leave between it and the border of the ditch a breadth of earth sufficient to resist the cannon of the flanks and the curtain. This lodgment must be also covered with blinds, to prevent the effect of the grenades; and it is of great use towards an opening into the ditch.

During the whole time that the besiegers are working upon this lodgment in the interior part of the covert-way, they are to continue the lodgment on the top of the glacis, as far as the re-entering places of arms; from whence the enemy may be driven by ordering a few companies of grenadiers to attack them, supposing they should be so obstinate as to continue there, notwithstanding the fire of the ricochet batteries, and of the sculls and stones. As soon as the enemy have entirely withdrawn themselves, a lodgment must be made there, as we have already mentioned.

§ 12. Attack of the Covert-way sword in hand.

There is another method of driving the enemy out of the covert-way, more expeditious indeed, but at the same time more bloody, more precarious, and infinitely less skilful. This consists in making a sudden attack on the whole front of the covert-way, in driving the enemy from thence by main force, and afterwards making good a lodgment.

There may be circumstances that shall absolutely require this method of attacking the covert-way; as when there is no possibility of erecting ricochet batteries to fire at its branches, nor at the faces of the works in the front of the attack; or when it is presumed that the enemy are not in a condition to withstand an attack of this sort; or, in fine, when it is thought expedient to run any hazard in order to be masters of the covert-way a few days sooner: on such occasions it is usual to take this method of attacking it, which is conducted thus:

When the resolution is taken to attack the covert-way sword in hand, the third parallel should be made to advance as near as possible to the glacis; and the more forward it is brought, the faster the attack. All along this parallel banquettes are to be made, step-fashion, to the top of its parapet, that the troops designed for the attack may pass over it with ease. At the back of this line, and in the very line itself, a great quantity of materials, as tools, gabions, falcons, land-bags, &c. must be got ready, that nothing may be wanting to make the lodgment with all expedition, after driving the enemy out of the covert-way. A strong party of grenadiers is ordered, and placed along the third parallel, four or five deep, and the workmen behind them on the back of this parallel with their tools, gabions, falcons, &c. Care, moreover, is taken, that all the other parts of the trenches be well furnished with troops to support the grenadiers, if there should be occasion; and to fire at the enemy's defences wherever they appear: the grenadiers must also be provided with hatchets, to cut down the palisades of the covert-way.

The guns and mortars must be ordered to be ready to support the attack with their whole fire.

A signal is to be agreed on for all the troops that are to commence the attack, to move at the same time, and to fall upon the enemy. This signal is to consist in firing a certain number of cannon, or a certain number of bombs, and at the last cannon-shot, or at the last bomb, the troops are to move.

The signal being given, all the troops of the third parallel are to move at the same time, and to pass quickly over the parapet of the parallel, and to march directly to the covert-way; which they enter either through the sally-ports or passages made by the guns, or else the grenadiers cut down the palisades with their hatchets. As soon as they have entered, they charge the enemy vigorously; and when they have obliged them to abandon some of the angles, the engineers set the workmen about making a lodgment on the ridge of the glacis, opposite to that part of the covert-way which the enemy have abandoned, and within three fathoms of the inside of it. This lodgment, as we have observed, is made with gabions, which workmen lay on the glacis on the side of one another. The joints are covered with sandbags, or with sap-faggots. These gabions are filled with earth and covered with falcons; and a-top of all you are to throw earth taken out of the glacis, by digging and widening the lodgment; and of this a parapet is raised to screen the troops as quick as possible from the direct fire of the place, and traverses are to be made everywhere to prevent the enfilades, as may be seen in Plate DXXXIII. fig. 5. While this is doing, the batteries of the trenches are to fire incessantly upon the defences of the place, in order to disturb the enemy, and to abate as much as possible the briskness of their fire upon the workmen and the lodgment.

When the troops employed in the attack have driven the enemy from the covert-way, or from their places of arms, they retire behind the lodgment, where they kneel down till it is in a condition to cover them. Sometimes it shall happen that the enemy, who was supposed to have been driven from the covert-way, will return to the charge, and oblige the besiegers to renew the attack, by overthrowing the lodgment and falling upon the troops unawares. This attack may be renewed several times, and vigorously disputed, when there happens to be a strong garrison. In this case the besiegers must exert their bravery, and resolutely encounter every obstacle raised by the enemy.

It must be allowed that this manner of attacking is very bloody; for the besiegers must move almost the whole breadth the glacis uncovered and exposed to the whole fire of the place. It is indeed in every respect inferior to the former, that, according to M. Vauban, it never should be attempted but for the most essential reasons. Night is the best time for it, because the besiegers are less seen from the place, and of course the fire of the besieged is less dangerous: yet there are generals who undertake it by day. There is nothing settled in regard to this article; they are at liberty to act as they judge most proper, according to the circumstances of time and place.

§ 13. Of the Batteries on the Covert-way.

When the enemy are entirely driven out of the covert-way, the next thing to be done is the erecting of batteries, in order to ruin the defences of the place, and to make a breach.

As it is necessary for the besiegers to make themselves masters of the half-moon C (Plate DXXXIII. fig. 6.) before they can come to the body of the place, which is flanked or defended by part of the faces of the bastions A and B opposite to its ditch; they must begin with erecting batteries Of Sieges, on the covert way opposite those parts. They are marked on the plan e, e. Batteries must be also erected to make a breach in the half-moon. But before they are erected, it will be proper to consider what part of the face of the half-moon is to be attacked; or, which is the same thing, what part the half-moon is to be entered. It must not be at its flanked angle, because an opening towards the point would not afford a sufficient space to make a lodgment able to withstand the enemy, and moreover the troops would be seen in their passage by the two faces of the bastions by which its flanked angle is defended. The most favourable passage is towards the third part of its face, reckoning from its flanked angle; because by battering at the same time the two faces near this part, the whole point of the half-moon may be destroyed, and a large opening made there easier than anywhere else. Thus the batteries for making a breach in the half-moon C will be placed in d and d, and will occupy almost the third part of each of the faces of the half-moon from its flanked angle. These batteries are each to consist of four or five pieces of cannon.

When the faces of the bastions A and B are well enfiladed by the ricochet batteries, there will be no occasion for the batteries e and e; for those which are to batter the half-moon in breach will be sufficient; and after it is taken, if there is any necessity for mining the faces of the bastions A and B, you may make use of the batteries d and d, by placing them in e, e. Batteries must also be erected to ruin the flanks of the demi-bastions in the front of the attack. It is evident that they cannot be placed but in i, i, on the covert-way opposite to them. They ought also to contain as great a number of guns as the space of ground will permit.

For the same reason that batteries have been erected to make a breach in the half-moon, opposite the third part of the face joining to its flanked angle, those also are to be erected which are to make a breach in the bastions; they are marked b, b, and are each of seven or eight pieces of cannon. Batteries are likewise erected to ruin the flanks of the demi-bastions bordering upon those of the front attacked, in order to favour the passage over the ditch which is made on the side, upon a supposition that the bastion is entered at both faces, as we suppose in this example. The attacking both faces of the bastion renders the taking of it more certain and easy; but, generally speaking, it is looked upon as sufficient to make only a breach in the face of the earth of the demi-bastions towards the front attacked.

Besides all these batteries, others are erected in the re-entering places of arms of the covert-way, as in k, and in k; they serve to batter the tenaille when there is one, the curtain, and the faces of the bastions, &c. Sometimes they are of mortars for throwing of stones.

All these batteries should have 24 pounders; sometimes larger pieces are used, especially when there is any work of extraordinary strength and solidity to be demolished.

They are all to be placed on the parapet of the covert-way; and the outside of their epaulement is to graze the inside of the covert way. It is in order to have room enough for this epaulement, that the lodgment is made on the ridge of the glacis at the distance of three fathoms from the inside of the covert-way.

The only essential thing to be observed in these batteries, is to open their embrasures, so that they shall perfectly discover every part of the place they are to batter, and have a sufficient sloping from the back to the fore part, to fire

(c) The revetement is a strong wall built on the outside of the rampart and parapet, to support the earth, and prevent it from rolling into the ditch. Of Sieges. the countercarp and the depth of the ditch: so that if the distance from the entrance of the gallery to the border of the countercarp is four times as much as the depth of the ditch; then for every four feet advanced horizontally towards the ditch, there must be one link perpendicularly, &c. When the ditch is not deep, as of 12 or 15 feet deep, instead of a gallery under ground, the descent is made by a lap only, which cuts the parapet of the covert-way, and links therein as deep as is necessary for the descent to terminate at the bottom of the ditch. This lap must begin at the lodgment on the ridge of the glacis; it is secured on both sides with blinds, to support the earth, and it must have a good emplacement on the side exposed to the place. Above it is covered with fascines and with earth, to avoid the shell-stones and grenades that may be thrown in by the enemy. Upon advancing to the foot of the countercarp, an entrance is made into the ditch. There are generally two or three descents made for the same passage of the ditch, near enough to support each other for greater safety.

It is in the passage of the dry ditch that the enemy has the advantage in making use of various artifices to retard it. In these they are chiefly assisted by their miners, who blow up the laps by means of small mines, and fall out at the same time, neglecting nothing that can delay the progress of the work. They may likewise order 12 soldiers to fall at once upon the head of the lap; this number is sufficient to drive away the fappers, and to do some damage to that work. A few companies of grenadiers should be placed near at hand, to attack these men as soon as they appear; and the cannon must be kept continually firing against every part, from whence the enemy may possibly fall out. As the batteries of the covert-way command all their communications, they may destroy them, or at least render them very dangerous.

In order to protect the lap at the bottom of the ditch, the besiegers may likewise make use of a kind of small galleries behind the countercarp, near the place where the entrance is effected; and they may pierce some loop-holes, from whence the enemy may be fired at, and a check put to their fallies, at least by day; and in regard to night, the besieged ought to be more circumpect than by day, since they can neither see the dispositions nor the troops that are ordered into the ditch to support the fappers; so that they can only raise a false alarm, without doing any great mischief. Yet we must observe, that this passage can be made only so far as it is protected by the battery placed on the ridge of the parapet of the covert-way opposite the ditch; for as the cannon of this battery keeps continually playing against the defences of this ditch, they must run them off course, and destroy their parapet, so that the enemy shall no longer be able to keep any cannon there; the consequence of which will be, that the besiegers have only to screen themselves from musket-shot, which is an easy matter.

The passage of the ditch is made on each side of the faces of the half-moon, as may be seen in m, m, fig. 6. Plate DXXXIII.

If the ditch is full of standing water, and the surface of it be raised to three, four, or five feet, below the upper border of the countercarp, the descent will be easier; because as the steps are to have but a very small slope, they may begin nearer the border of the ditch, as in the lodgment on the ridge of the glacis, and be directed in such a manner as to terminate at the surface of the water. They are to be covered on the side exposed to the place, and strongly secured with blinds, placed within five or six feet of each other. Blinds are likewise to be laid over the descent, which is to be covered with fascines, and these with earth, to prevent the enemy from setting them on fire.

In order to pass this ditch, a bridge must be made with fascines; for which end, after breaking the countercarp, a number of men, sufficient to occupy the whole length of the descent, are ranged at the distance of two feet from each other; these men must be covered by the parapet, and to forward the fascines from hand to hand, from the head of the passage to the opening into the ditch. The fapper in this part (for all these works relate to the tappers) will throw them into the ditch, in order to make an emplacement or covering on that side of the town which looks towards the passage.

As soon as he has flung in a sufficient number of fascines to shelter himself, and to advance a few paces into the ditch, he must throw a great number of them into the passage, in order to fill the ditch up entirely in that part. They are laid different ways, and ranged in different beds; which are covered with earth, in order to make them sink to the bottom. All these different beds of fascines must be fixed with long stakes, that they may keep closer together; and as the work advances, the parapet must be pushed forward, otherwise it would be impossible to effect the passage without the utmost danger.

When the passage is commanded, or fired into from the opposite parapet of the place, or from any other part, the foremost men must be covered with a great heap of fascines, or by some other contrivance; but whatever cover it be, in that case the passage of the ditch is extremely difficult and dangerous.

After what has been said concerning the passage of dry ditches, and those which are full of standing water, it remains to take notice of those which are full of running water, and those that are dry but may be filled at any time with water. These sorts of ditches are extremely difficult to pass, unless the current can be turned and made to take a different course from that which carries it to the town-ditches, or unless the besiegers can contrive to break down the sluices which keep up the water reserved by the enemy for filling the ditch.

A great deal might be said, were we to enter into the whole detail of the works necessary for passing these sorts of ditches; we shall only touch upon the subject.

Supposing the ditches to be filled with running water, or with a river, the channel of which can be diverted no other way, which is called draining the ditch, it will be requisite then, generally speaking, to throw into the ditch a large quantity of fascines, loaded with earth and stones, fastened together with long stakes; thus the passage is to be pushed on, till the ditch is contracted to the breadth of 20 or 30 feet; and then small beams may be laid across, to join the bridge of fascines to the rubbish of the breach. The filling up, and consequently the passage of the ditch, may be also forwarded, by ordering the miners to advance to the rubbish, and to spring a mine, in order to blow up part of the revetment of the work into the ditch.

Should the enemy happen to have reservoirs of water which they may open, and thereby destroy the lodgments in the ditch when they are no longer to make a stand there, the besiegers must endeavour during the siege to destroy the sluices, that is, the stone-work or timber that serves to keep up the water. This may be done by throwing a great number of bombs towards that part where the sluices are known to be situated; if they should be broken down by that means, then the water will have a free current; and after it has run off, the passage of the ditch must be attempted in the same manner as if it was standing water; if there remains only a very small current, a passage must be left to drain it, as was mentioned before.

This whole operation is very tedious, difficult, and dangerous; gerous; nay, it is impossible to be done at all without being protected by a very brisk firing, not only from all the cannon of the covert-way and the ricochet batteries, but moreover from the lodgments on the glacis and those on the covert-way.

Plates DXXXIV. and DXXXV. will illustrate all that we have been saying upon this head, concerning the descent and paillage over the ditch.

Plate DXXXIV. fig. 1. exhibits the plan of the descent under ground, and that of its opening into the dry ditch. Fig. 2. represents the profile of that descent; the opening of which is made at the lower part of the ditch. Fig. 3. is a perspective view of the opening of this descent, seen from the bottom of the glacis: and fig. 4. shows in perspective the opening of the same descent, seen from the top of the breach.

Plate DXXXV. fig. 1. is the plan of the paillage over a wet ditch in the open air; that is to say, the gallery of which is an open fap. A is the opening of it. You see in B, towards its opening, the blinds that are laid on its upper part, to support the fascines with which it is covered. On these blinds, at first, is laid a bed of fascines, ranged according to the length of the gallery: over this first bed is laid a second, wherein the fascines are ranged according to the breadth of the gallery, as you see in B and C. D is the epaulement of fascines, which covers the paillage against the fire of the place, by which it is flanked. E is part of the bridge of fascines; and F is an elevation also of fascines, intended to cover the head of the work, and to secure it from the immediate fire of the place. Fig. 2. represents the profile of this descent into the ditch. Fig. 3. gives its opening seen in perspective from the country; and fig. 4. its opening into the ditch, also in perspective, as it appears from the top of the breach.

§ 15. Of the attack of the Ravelin, or Half-moon.

The paillage over the ditch before the half-moon being effected on both sides, and a breach made 14 or 15 fathoms wide, preparations are made for the assault. For this purpose a large quantity of materials is collected from all the neighbouring lodgments. Endeavours are used to render the breach practicable, by making the slope easy. The cannon continue playing, in order to throw down the parts of the revetment that may be yet standing. Very good use may be also made of shells fired point blank; for they are easily buried in the breach, the earth of which has been already broken up and shaken by the cannon; and as they burst upon that earth, they produce the effect, as it were, of small mines. Howitzers may likewise be used with success on these occasions.

In order to render the breach more practicable, some miners, or a sergeant with a few grenadiers, are sent to level it with hooks. The fire from the lodgments and batteries will hinder the enemy from appearing on their defences; or if they should, they must do it with great circumspection, which renders their fire less dangerous.

If the enemy have made any galleries along the face of the half-moon, and opposite the breaches, the miners may go and discover them, in order to stop them up, or to cut off the match, or to drive away the enemy; if they cannot find them, they spring several mines; which being often repeated, must needs occasion some disorders in the galleries and mines belonging to the besieged. Everything being ready for making a lodgment in the half-moon, that is, for taking possession of the breach; the materials being at hand, in order to be removed hither with ease and expedition; the batteries and lodgments of the covert-way being in a condition to fire away briskly—a signal is agreed upon with the officers that command those batteries and lodgments, to give them notice to fire, and to leave off whenever it is thought proper. This signal is generally a flag raised in the former case, and lowered in the latter. All this being settled, and the breach, as we observed, made practicable, two or three sappers are sent to the extremity of the breach next to the place, there being generally a kind of small cover or cavity in this part; there they begin a lodgment for themselves, and for some more, who are sent after them; when there is room to receive them, they make them mount, and indefinably extend the lodgment upon the top of the breach; and thus they proceed till they make a lodgment towards the point, which is generally called a magpie's nest. While these sappers are at work, the fire of the batteries and the lodgments cease; but when the enemy attempts to attack the workmen in order to destroy their lodgments, they must retire as quick as possible; and then the colours being raised, the batteries fire upon them with the utmost vivacity, to oblige them to quit the upper part of the breach.—Upon this the colours are lowered, the fire ceases, the sappers return to repair the mischief that was done to their lodgment, and try to enlarge and strengthen it.

This way of proceeding must be continued till the lodgment is in a state of defence; that is, till it can hold a number of troops sufficient to awe the enemy, and to withstand any attack that may happen to be made against it. The besieged, before they entirely quit the half-moon, will spring what mines they have ready there. As soon as this is done, the besiegers should directly lodge themselves in the excavations made by those mines, or at least some defence should be made there, to hold a few sappers, and to forward the lodgments of the inside of the work.

The lodgment of the point is made in the form of a small arc, the concavity of which is turned towards the place. From each of its extremities a lodgment is carried along the faces of the half-moon, on the platform of its rampart, at the foot of its parapet. This lodgment is sunk deep in the earth of the rampart, to the end that the soldiers may be the better covered against the fire of the place; there must also be traverses to secure it from the enfilades, as was done in regard to the lodgment on the glacis. Within the half-moon lodgments are also made, which traverse the whole breadth thereof, as may be seen in the half-moon C, Plate DXXXIII. fig. 6. They serve to command the communication between the tenaille and the place; of course to render that communication more difficult, and to hold a sufficient number of troops to resist the enemy; should they have any design to return and repel themselves of the half-moon.

What we have been observing, in regard to the attack of the half-moon, is only when the besiegers intend to take it by the sap, or with pick-axe and spade: But sometimes they go about it in a more expeditious manner; for when the breach is made so as the troops may mount to enter the half-moon, they advance boldly to the assault, just as in the attack of the covert-way, sword in hand, and endeavour to come up with the enemy, and to drive them entirely out of the work. This attack is very dangerous, and may cost a great many men, when there happens to be a brave garrison, who will not easily yield their ground. But there are frequent cases in which it may be thought prudent to adopt this measure, in order to accelerate a few days the taking the half-moon. As soon as the besiegers are masters of the upper part of the breach, they make a lodgment there in a hurry with gabions and fascines; and while it is making, as also while they charge the enemy, and oblige them to abandon the upper part of the breach, some soldiers are sent to discover the mines, which the besieged are supposed to have made within Of Sieges within the rampart of the half-moon, and to cut off the saucifon. If they cannot find them, they must advance with great circumspection and take care not to keep all together, that the mine may have less effect. Oftentimes the enemy will suffer the besiegers to carry on their lodgment without making any great opposition, because it cannot be effected without a considerable loss of men; but when the lodgment is advanced, the enemy spring their mines, and return afterwards to the half-moon, in order to take it amidst the confusion which those subterranean fires must unavoidably occasion among the troops in the lodgment; in that case, it will be requisite to renew the charge most vigorously with fresh troops, which should be at hand to support those of the half-moon, to place themselves in the excavations made by the mines, to render the lodgment sufficiently strong, and to secure it with a proper number of soldiers, so as to be able to withstand any further attempt of the enemy.

This work can hardly be disputed in this manner, except when the half-moon has a redit (d), as it affords a shelter or retreat to the garrison, and enables them more easily to fall upon the half-moon. For if there should be no redit, and the enemy are driven out of the half-moon, they can scarce attempt to return, especially if the communication between the place and the half-moon is discovered by the batteries and lodgments of the covert way; because, if the ditch is filled with water, this communication can hardly be made but with boats, which may be easily seen from the lodgments of the covert way, and may be overlet by the cannon of the batteries; and if the ditch be dry, and there happens to be a caponier, the communication, though more safe, is not without danger, by reason of the fire that may plunge into it from the lodgments of the covert-way; so that it will be extremely difficult for the enemy to advance quick enough to repel themselves of the half-moon; besides, they want room to assemble in a large body, and fall all at once upon the lodgments of that work.

There is only one case in which they may do it; that is, when in the angle of the gorge of the half-moon they have made a space, nearly as large as the places of arms in the covert way. This space cannot be seen from the covert way, nor from its lodgments; and as there are generally steps to ascend from the bottom of the ditch to the half-moon, the enemy might take advantage thereof to try to enter it; but if the besiegers are upon their guard, they will find it easy to repulse them, even with loss.

The best time for attacking the half-moon sword in hand, is by night, for the enemy's fire is not so sure then as by day.

§ 16. The attack of the Bastions.

Whilst the besiegers endeavour to possess themselves of the half-moon, they work the same time at the defences into the ditch, which are made nearly towards the third part of the faces, reckoning from the flanked angle of the bastion. A defence may be effected at each face of the two bastions in the front of the attack, as in n, n, Plate DXXXIII., fig. 6. or, according to the more general custom, only opposite the faces in the front attacked. The manner of proceeding is much the same as in the defence and passage over the ditch of the half-moon, whether it be dry or wet; that is, if it be dry, a sap is carried into the ditch, from the opening of the defence to the foot of the breach, and strongly covered towards the opposite flank. If the ditch be full of water, it is passed over on a bridge of fascines, constructed in the same manner as in the passage over the ditch of the half-moon.

The batteries erected on the ridge of the glacis for making a breach in the face of the bastions, must fire against that part of the faces where the breach is to be effected, and fire all together, as was mentioned in the article of the attack of the half-moon; and when they have made a breach sufficient to attempt the attack in front, some of the guns must be kept to batter the upper part of the breach, and some must be removed to the back of the platform, and disposed in such a manner as to be able to annoy the enemy, whenever they present themselves towards the upper part of the breach. All this is done during the descent and passage over the ditch. Mines are also made use of to widen, and sometimes even to make the breach.

To fix the miner to the wall when the ditch is dry, a lodgment is made near the opening of the descent, to protect him from thence against the fallies of the besieged. Then the wall is broke with cannon, as near as possible to the bottom of the ditch, in order to get under the galleries which the besieged may have built within the bastion. An opening of five or six feet may be made with the cannon, to lodge the miner that removes the rubbish, and makes room for one or two of his comrades, who are to assist him to get rid of the earth in the gallery. When the ditch is dry, and the ground will admit of it, the miner sometimes gets under it by a subterraneous gallery, which leads him to the foot of the wall; but if the ditch be filled with water, it is not always the custom to wait for the completing of the passage over the ditch, before the miner is fixed to the face of the bastion. The wall is pierced with cannon, in the manner before mentioned, but a little above the surface of the water, to the end that the miner may not be accommoded in this gallery; and he is sent over in a little boat, to place himself in the hole. The miners relieve one another every two hours, to carry on their work with more speed; that is, to complete and finish their mine. At the same time, the enemy will use various artifices to obstruct them.

When the miner has pierced the wall, he makes behind it, on both sides of him, two small galleries, from 12 to 14 feet, at the end of which he places, on both sides the galleries, two mines, namely, one within the breadth of the wall, and the other sunk 15 feet under the rampart. A common train is given to these four chambers, which taking fire at one and the same time, will produce a very large and spacious breach.

When there are countermines under the rampart, and along its revetment, care must be taken to seize them, and to drive the miners from thence. For this purpose M. Goujon proposes to spring four fougattes near them, in order to bury them; when this is done, he is for entering it with 10 or 12 grenadiers, and as many soldiers, commanded by two sergeants; part of these grenadiers should have each four grenades, and the rest should carry four or five bombs, of which three only should be charged, the other two with fuses only. The two sergeants should begin with attacking the countermine sword and pistol in hand, and the grenadiers should follow them. If the besieged do not appear to defend their countermine, a lodgment is quickly made with land-bags. This lodgment consists of no more than a good traverse,

(d) The redit is a small half-moon constructed within the other. It usually consists of a single wall with loop-holes; but in Landau, Neufbrifac, and some other places, the redit is constructed with a rampart and parapet like the external half-moon. Of Sieges, traverfe, which entirely stops up the gallery of the counter- mine, towards the fide from whence the enemy may come. If they attempt to oppose this operation, the grenadiers should throw their three loaded shells, and retire quickly with their comrades, to prevent being hurt by the effect of these shells; for the smoke they make in bursting, together with the splinters, must unavoidably oblige the enemy to quit the gallery for some time: but as soon as they have produced their effect, the feirants and the grenadiers, with their comrades, must immediately return, and work as hard as possible upon the traverse, in order to stop up the gallery. If the besieged still persist in interrupting this work, the grenadiers must throw the two shells with fuses only, which will oblige the enemy to retire quickly; and as no harm is to be apprehended from them, which is more than the besieged can tell, the besiegers continue to finish the traverse. Even openings or loop-holes are made, in order to fire upon the enemy, in case they should appear again in the part of the gallery opposite the traverse.

When there is no gallery or countermine behind the walls, or when there is one which cannot easily be come at, the miner should leave no means untried to discover it; and at the same time he ought to use the utmost precaution to prevent being surprised himself by the enemy's miners, who will attempt to smother him in the gallery, and to destroy his works: therefore the business of a miner requires great art and cunning to avoid the snares of the enemy. "A miner (says M. de Vauban in his Memoirs) ought to listen frequently to discover whether there are any at work under him. He ought to found with his auger towards the place he hears the noise come from; but the enemy often make a noise on one side, while they are at work on the other." If their miner draws too near, a small mine must be made to stifle him in the gallery; which may be effected thus: A hole of five or six inches diameter, and six or seven deep, is made on that side of the gallery where the enemy is heard; a cartridge of the same size, containing about 10 or 12 pounds of powder, is put into it; the hole or opening towards the gallery is stopped close with a strong tampon, which is immediately applied to the cartridge, and supported by strong planks well buttressed: this powder is let on fire by a fusee, which passes through a hole made in the tampon, and communicates with the powder in the cartridge. If the gallery of the enemy's miner is within four or five feet of this powder, it will undoubtedly burst, and the miner will be either killed, or obliged by the smoke to retire.

Another way of buttling the gallery of the besieged, when it is at no great distance, is to put several shells on the side where the enemy's miner is at work, and to range them in such a manner that they shall have their effect. When the miners are at work in search of one another, they have great iron borers, with which they pierce the interval betwixt them, to find, as near as they can, their distance from one another. The miner must be very vigilant, and as soon as the borer is withdrawn, he should clap a paillet into the hole, which, when well directed, and fired by a man of resolution, seldom fails, as M. Vauban affirms, to kill the miner. The first shot ought to be followed by three or four more; then the hole should be cleaned with the borer, to prevent the enemy from stopping it up on their side; and this is a matter of importance, for it will hinder their miner from continuing his work in that spot, and oblige him entirely to abandon it. These and many other stratagems, which may be seen in the Memoirs of M. Vauban, plainly show that the business of a miner requires not only address and cunning, but likewise great courage and resolution, to guard against and remove the several obstacles that may be thrown in his way, with a view to prevent the progress of the works committed to his direction: he may easily guard against them when he is undermost; but if it be otherwise, his situation is extremely bad. In order to know for certain whether they are at work under the gallery, the miner generally makes use of a drum with something upon it, and then the shaking of the earth must occasion a kind of trembling, which will discover that they are at work underneath. Sometimes he listens with his ear to the ground; but the fluttering of the drum is the surest way.

While the miner is working upon the construction of his gallery, the besiegers must be employed in demolishing all the works of the enemy, and disabling them from defending or repairing the breach. With this view a continual fire is made against the breaches, which will hinder the besieged from flowing themselves in that part, and from advancing to see the works which may be made in the ditch or at the foot of the breaches. If there is a tenaille before the curtain, batteries are placed in the re-entering places of arms of the covert way of the half-moon, which plunge into the tenaille, and hinder the enemy from making use of it to disturb the palisage over the ditch. And in order to silence them farther, another battery of mortars may be erected, in the most advanced lodgment of the gorge of the half- moon; which battery being well served, will render it too dangerous and inconvenient for the besieged to abide there, so as to have the attention requisite for obstructing the palisage over the ditch.

But sometimes the enemy will make oblique embrasures in the curtain; and from thence they fire on the lodgments of the covert way, so as greatly to inconvenience both those lodgments and the opening of the descent into the ditch. The way to prevent the effect of those batteries, is to endeavour to destroy them with shells; and, when the ground will permit, to enfilade the curtain with ricochet firing. Four or five pieces may be also placed on the upper part of the flanked angle of the half-moon; in which position they can fire directly upon the curtain, and plunge into the tenaille and the potters, by which the enemy keep a communication with the ditch when it is dry.

Let us suppose that the palisages over the ditch are fortified, so as to be fit to walk over; that the cannon or the mines have made the breaches sufficiently wide for the assault; that the ascent is made smooth, and that the besiegers can easily mount to the top of the breach; then they may lodge themselves there, by following either of the two methods mentioned in the article of the half-moon.

If the enemy have made no retrenchments in the inside of the bastion, they will hardly venture to stand an assault, as this would only expose the place to be carried sword in hand, themselves to be taken prisoners of war, and the town to be plundered. Therefore every thing being ready for the assault, they will beat the chamade, that is, they will desire to surrender on certain terms.

When a resolution is taken to attack the bastions while the mines are making and charging, a considerable heap of materials is laid up in the lodgments nearest the breaches, that they may be handed readily for the construction of the lodgment, as soon as the enemy is driven away. Every thing being prepared to set fire to the mines, all the grenadiers of the army are ordered to march to the assault; and they are to be supported by a sufficient number of detachments, that the enemy may not be able to make a stand. These troops being ready, the mines are sprung; and as soon as the dust is a little laid, the grenadiers, commanded to march and to mount forthwith, move on to the foot of the breach; and when they get there, they mount immediately with their bayonets fixed, and are followed by Of sieges, the rest of the troops that are to support them. The enemy will not fail to make use of their mines, if they have any left; and will likewise throw all kinds of combustibles, to make the besiegers pay as dear as possible for the ground which the besieged will be obliged to yield in the upper part of the breach; for yield at length they must, and the superior numbers of the besiegers must surmount every obstacle.

As soon as they are beaten away, and have abandoned the upper part of the breach, the besiegers must set about making a lodgment; which will consist at first of a kind of arc of a circle, the convexity whereof is turned towards the enemy, if there is a breach in the faces of the two bastions, otherwise it will only be made on the upper part of the breach. The breaches are to be all stormed at the same time, by which means the resistance of the enemy will be divided. This whole time the batteries and lodgments are to fire with all the vivacity possible against the several defences of the enemy, and against every place they are in and that can be fired against, without annoying the troops that are storming the breaches.

The lodgment on the breach being made, the saps are carried on to the right and left towards the centre of the bastion, and disposed in the manner as in Plate DXXXV. fig. 5. bastion A. Cannon are brought upon the breach to batter the inner retrenchment, the ditch is paffed over here also, and a lodgment is made upon the breach in the manner mentioned in regard to the bastions.

If behind this first retrenchment there be a second, the enemy, after being forced to quit the former, retires to the latter to capitulate. There they are to be attacked as in the former retrenchment, and at length they will be forced to surrender. It is very rare to see a defence carried so far as we have here supposed; but it was incumbent upon us to make this supposition, in order to give an idea of what is proper to be done, should the enemy resolve to defend the place to the last extremity.

917. Attack of a place covered with Fore-ditches, Lunettes, and other Outworks, &c.

In order to give a more simple idea of the operations of a siege, we have explained and applied them to a place that had no other outworks than half-moons and a covert way; but a greater number of works will make no alteration in the principles here established; to take and keep possession of those works, the besiegers have only to follow the same rules; which we shall show in a few words.

Let us suppose a place surrounded by a fore-ditch, and a second covert way, strengthened with lunettes, and suppose the front by which it may be attacked is covered with a horn or crown work, &c.

First of all the trenches are to be opened as usual, in order to come to the foot of the glacis of the second covert way; the ricochet batteries are to be placed on the produce faces of the works attacked, and of their defences; the faces of the lunettes of the front attacked ought to be enfiladed by the ricochet batteries.

The second covert way is taken in the same manner as the common covert way; and then, if the fore-ditch is full of water, a good lodgment is to be secured along this ditch, and batteries are to be erected to make a breach in the lunettes, if the enemy do not think proper to quit them. It is very difficult for them to maintain themselves in those works, when their communication is seen; and they can hardly avoid being seen, when a lodgment is made all along the fore-ditch. Be that as it may, supposing that they are lined with stone-work, or only with turf, that they are fraised and pallisaded, and that the enemy are obstinate in their defence, a breach may be made in them, by placing some cannon opposite the middle of the faces, and the ditch may be palled over by filling it with fascines or some other materials. As it is a great deal smaller than that before the body of the place, it is much easier to pass.

When the besiegers have made themselves masters of the lunettes which cover the front attacked, they begin to think of palling the fore-ditch. This is a very difficult task, because it is performed under the grazing fire of the covert way; but this fire ought to be checked by the ricochet batteries, which should plunge into the covert way on every side. This ditch is crossed near the salient angles of the glacis. It is always to be understood, however, that there is no possibility of crossing any ditch without a good epaulement of fascines, to cover the passage on the side which is seen by the place, or by the works that defend it.

When the lodgment is entirely finished on the covert way, then the other attacks are carried on in the manner before explained.

There are places which, without any fore-ditch, have lunettes opposite to the salient and re-entering angles of the glacis, which are also enveloped by a second covert way; sometimes they are vaulted and bomb-proof, as at Luxembourg; and sometimes they have only a ditch, a parapet, and a covert way.

Those which are vaulted and bomb-proof are very difficult to take; because the ricochet firing and the bombs can do them no mischief. In that case they must either be turned, or be taken by mines.

A work is said to be turned, when the besiegers get between that work and the place, and to cut off their communication. Sometimes the lunettes have communications underground, and then there is hardly any other way of driving out the enemy but by mines. This is tedious work; but there is no remedy for it.

The lunettes and the ditch are always defended by branches of the covert way, with which they have also a communication, like those of the lunettes, A, A, Plate DXXXVI. fig. 1.

This plate, which represents part of Landau and its attacks in 1713, may serve to give an idea of the manner in which a work is turned. The advanced lunette B, as well as the work C, called a tenaille, are turned; that is, the trenches cut off the communication between them and the place.

When this communication cannot be cut off, there will be often a necessity for attacking the lunette and covert way at the same time; and the reason is, because though the enemy should be obliged to abandon the lunette, yet so long as they are masters of the covert way, they have it in their power to return and retake it. Therefore, the surest way of keeping possession of it is to drive the besieged out of the covert way, at the same time that they are forced to quit the lunette.

The garrison may avail themselves greatly of mines for the defence of these small outworks, so as to oblige the besiegers to pay very dear for their acquisition, and be a long while in making it. But they must pursue the same methods as the besieged; they must dig deep into the earth, they must endeavour to destroy the enemy's mines, to blow up their galleries, and to make themselves masters of the lower ground. This is an essential point, without which the enemy may blow up and destroy the lodgements several times. The celebrated M. de Valiere, in a Dissertation on Mines, at the end of the third volume of M. Folard's Commentary on Polybius, shows, that in a ground 25 or 30 feet deep, the enemy may be blown up twenty times. Therefore it is impossible to be too cautious in endeavouring to get under the gallery of the besieged, in order to prevent the mischief they may do by their great number of mines.

In the neighbourhood of some places there are a fort of small half-moons, called redoubts. When they are distant from the place, the enemy cannot maintain themselves there without exposing their troops to be taken prisoners of war; but when they are covered and defended as they ought to be, and judiciously situated, they are an object worth attention. Endeavours ought to be used to cut off the communication between them and the place, and to oblige the enemy to abandon them by throwing in shells; it may even be proper to assault them and drive them out sword in hand, provided they are not so near the place as to receive powerful succours, and be able to withstand the attack. It is a matter of consequence to get rid of these small outworks as soon as possible, because they may be of great hinderance to the progress of the attacks, by having a view of the trenches from the flanks, and enfolding them, &c.

In some cases, when the garrison are obstinate in their defence, small outworks are made at the foot of the salient and re-entering angles of the glacis; these consist only of a parapet raised at the foot of the glacis upon these angles, each side of which has about 10 or 12 fathoms. These small works are called arrows. They may be seen in A, A, A, Plate DXXXVI. fig. 2. They communicate with the covert way by a passage pierced on the ridge of the glacis, and palliaded on both sides. At the entrance of this passage is constructed a traverse B, generally called the tambour, which hinders the besiegers from being masters of the arrow, or discovering the inside of the place of arms belonging to the covert way.

To prevent the effect of these arrows, the best method is to ply them well with ricochet batteries, and with shells thrown in also a ricochet. Stone mortars may likewise be made use of, to annoy the enemy in their arrows; for as these works are but small, the stone mortars produce a very good effect. We have already taken notice of almost all the works the besiegers may meet with beyond the covert way; there remains, therefore, only to see the manner of conducting the attacks of the other outworks most commonly used in fortified towns.

§ 13. Attack of a Horn-work.

A horn-work is nothing more than the front of a fortification, which projects into the field, and is joined to the place by two long sides. It is placed opposite to the curtains, and sometimes also to the battions. The besiegers should endeavour, as much as possible, to avoid attacking the side covered by these works, because they are very difficult to take, and of course will greatly lengthen out the siege. But supposing there is an absolute necessity for attacking the place on the side covered by a horn-work opposite the bastion, and that this horn work has a half-moon opposite to its curtain; The trenches and parallels are to be made in the usual manner; the same method is to be used in regard to the ricochet batteries, which will also enfilade the branches of the horn-work. The taking of the covert-way of the half-moon, and of the half battions of the horn-work, is carried on in the same manner as the attack of the half-moon, and the two battions of the body of the place. There remains, therefore, only to show how the lodgments are to be made in this work. We will suppose that there are two retrenchments withinside, as in Plate DXXXV. fig. 5.

When the lodgments towards the point of the half battions are finished, some guns are to be planted there, in order to batter the face of the opposite bastion; and they are to be placed over-against the lodgments of the flanked angles of the half battions. These lodgments are to be extended on both sides towards the curtain, along which saps are carried on; as also towards the orillon of the half battions, if they are made with orillons: this will form a kind of small parallel, the fire of which will help to cover the lodgments in front, in case the enemy should make any failures to destroy them. In large fortifications, such as horn and crown works, the lodgments ought to be carried on with the greatest circumspection, in order to be able to support them against every attack of the enemy.

As all these lodgments are commanded by the bastion, it will be requisite to dig the saps sufficiently deep, so as to be secure against their fire; and likewise to make traverses near enough to each other for the same effect.

If the bastion can be battered in breach from the rampart of the half battions of the horn-work, the besiegers will for this purpose make use of batteries erected on these half-battions; and for the same end they will also plant a battery of six or eight guns towards the middle of the curtain.—Should it be impossible to sink sufficiently into these, so as to batter the lower part of the revetment of the bastion, still they might be usefully employed in playing against the enemy's defences, and driving them out of their retrenchments. When the lodgments are well secured withinside, it will be extremely difficult for the enemy to continue in the retrenchments, without running the risk of being made prisoners of war; because the communication between them and the place will become too difficult. They might indeed, by means of a bridge level with the water, retire into the collateral half-moons; but at the same time that the besiegers endeavour to make themselves masters of the horn-work, they will also strive to get possession of these half-moons; the taking of which must inevitably follow that of this work.

As soon as the enemy are entirely driven out of the horn-work, the besiegers must possess themselves of it by carrying on lodgments which shall occupy its whole extent; and if there be any occasion to erect batteries within, in order to batter the bastion in breach, they are to be erected along its counterflank, as may be seen in z (ibid).

Sometimes it shall happen, that the ground of the inside of the horn-work will not permit lodgments to be extended there, as they are ranged in this figure, because it may be too wet and marshy, or else too narrow a circumference. In that case there is no carrying on the lodgments but along the parapet of the front of this work, and along its branches, if the breadth of the platform of the rampart of these branches will permit. It must be made to defile by frequent zig-zags or turnings; but if it be too narrow, the only way for the besiegers is to sink very deep, in order to defile from the fire of the place, and to cover themselves by traverses made very near one another.

Explanation of Plate DXXXV. fig. 5.

a, Cavaliers of the trenches. b, Batteries of stone mortars. c, Batteries to breach the half-moon before the horn-work. d, Batteries against the defence of this half-moon. e, Passages over the ditch before this half-moon. f, Lodgments in it. g, Batteries against the flanks of the horn-work. h, Batteries to breach the half battions of the horn-work. i, Batteries against its curtain. j, Lodgments in the half battions and in the horn-work. k, Passages over the ditch before the retrenchments in the horn work. l, Lodgments in these retrenchments. m, Batteries against the defences of the collateral half-moons. n, Batteries to breach these half-moons. o, Batteries over the ditch before these works. p, Lodgments in the same. q, Batteries to breach the redouts of the half-moons. r, Passages over the ditch. WAR

Of sieges, ditch before the reduits. u, Lodgments in the reduits. x, Bridge of fascines, or a road to carry the cannon to the horn-work. y, Batteries against the defences of the bastion A. z, Batteries to breach this bastion. B, Passages over its ditch. C, Lodgments in the bastion A. D, Lodgments on the border of the ditch before the retrenchment of the bastion A. E, Passages over the ditch before this retrenchment.

Plate DXXXVII. represents the plan of the lodgments made in the horn and crown work of Philippsburg in 1734.

A great deal more might be said in regard to all these articles; but for the particulars, we refer the reader to the Memoirs of M. de Vauban, which display the whole extent of genius of that great man, and show how capable he was of finding out expedients for surmounting all obstacles arising either from soil, situation, or different manners of fortifying.

§ 19. To prevent succours from being thrown into a town besieged.

Not to interrupt the thread of the usual operations of a siege, we have supposed that the general had taken every necessary measure to guard against all the attempts of the enemy, and to secure success by the great superiority of his forces. Sometimes, however, it may happen, that an enemy who was looked upon as too weak to relieve the place, shall prepare to attack the army of the besiegers, either in consequence of drawing out most of the troops from the neighbouring garrisons, which are least exposed, or of having been reinforced from some other part. In such case, there are two ways to follow. The first is, to wait for the enemy in the lines, and to hinder them from breaking through: the second, to leave part of the army in the lines, in order to carry on the siege, and to oppose any failings of the garrison; with the other to go and meet the enemy, and fight them out of the lines.

Both these ways are supported by the opinion of different generals; but the latter seems to have the most general approbation.

The inconvenience of waiting for the enemy in the lines, is the uncertainty on which side he intends to direct the attack; for which reason the besiegers are obliged to be equally strong in all their points; and when the line is very extensive, the troops are at too great a distance from one another, to make any considerable resistance on the side where the enemy forms his attack. Most lines of circumvallation, that were ever attacked, have been forced; so that both reason and experience seem to establish it as a maxim, that it is preferable to go and meet the enemy, and not to let him come within reach of the lines.

Without pretending, however, to determine so important a matter, it seems, that when a line is not very extensive, it may be defended to an advantage. And, first, it is beyond all doubt, that if the troops behind the line know how to avail themselves of the several circumstances in their favour, their situation is in many respects preferable to that of the assailants. The latter are exposed to the fire of the line for a very considerable time before they can come up to the border of the ditch. This ditch must be filled up; and all the while they are exposed to the same fire, which must kill a great many of their men, and throw their troops into some confusion. And when they break into the line, they can make but a very narrow front; for which reason, they may be charged both in front and flank by the troops within; who, if they do their duty, must drive them into the ditch. For, suppose the first line of the defendant's infantry next the ditch should be obliged to give way, the horse that are behind them may and ought to fall upon the enemy's foot that have pierced through the line; and as of the latter cannot force their way but in some confusion, the former may easily drive them out again. We may therefore conclude, that if the troops are sensible of the many advantages of a good line, and are determined to defend it; if the several parts are likewise well supported, and all the necessary precautions have been taken to prevent being surprised; it will be extremely difficult for the enemy to force it.

Thus, at the siege of Philippsburg, in 1734, prince Eugene reconnoitred the lines of circumvallation, and found them so well disposed, that he never once attacked them. They formed a kind of irregular semicircle round the place, of which the Rhine might be considered as the diameter. They were defended by a kind of fore-ditch, and by wells between this fore-ditch and the lines, as may be seen in Plate DXXIX. If the prince had attempted to pass over this ditch and these wells, he would have lost a great number of men by the fire of the lines. The wells were in near to one another, that there was no possibility of passing between them: they must have been filled up, as well as the fore-ditch, with fascines; which would have been too tedious and dangerous an enterprise.

In such a situation, therefore, the besiegers may wait quietly in their lines; but if they should be of so great an extent, as not to admit of being equally guarded, then it seems to be the safest way to draw out the troops, and meet the enemy, as marshal Tallard did at Landau, in 1703. After he had defeated the army which was marching to the relief of the place, he returned and finished the siege. The duke of Vendome acted just in the same manner at the siege of Barcelona, in 1697. Having had intelligence that the marquis of Valezco, viceroy of Catalonia, was preparing to attack him, he went out to meet that general, gained a complete victory, and returned afterwards before the place, which was obliged to capitulate.

At the same time, we must allow that the safest way to conduct a siege, is to have a good army of observation advantageously posted so as to cover the siege, and be near enough to receive succours from the troops employed before the town, should the enemy come to a revolution of giving battle.

If the enemy do not think proper to attack the besieging army, they may probably try to throw in some small succours of troops and ammunition into the town. The way to prevent them is to make the circumvallation very exact, and not to leave an opening in it, under any pretext whatsoever.

The enemy may likewise attempt the raising of the siege, by making themselves masters of the spot, or place, from whence the besiegers draw their provisions and ammunition. But before a general lay siege to a town, he should take all the necessary precautions for securing his magazines, covering his convoys, and guarding the several points through which the enemy might march to attack him.

Another expedient the enemy may think of for raising the siege, is to attack some place of importance, which the besiegers have an interest in preserving; in order to engage them to march to its afflatus, and to abandon the siege they have in hand. But this expedient ought to have been foreseen, and every precaution taken to prevent it. However, should the enemy find means to engage in an enterprise of importance, and which requires an immediate relief, if a general thinks there is not time sufficient to take the place he has laid siege to, and at the same time to oppose the enemy's designs, in that case he may raise the siege; but for doing, there should be very cogent reasons. When king William laid siege to Namur, in 1695, marshal Villeroy, in order order to divert him from his purpose, sat down before Bruf- fels, thinking he should oblige that prince to march to its relief, and abandon his enterprise against Namur; but king William chose rather to suffer that city to be bombarded, than to relinquish a very important conquest, in which he was in a manner sure of succeeding.

Sect. II. Of Defence.

§ I. Of the Troops and Ammunition with which a fortified Town ought to be provided.

As the goodness of the works, when a place is well pro- vided with troops, ammunition, and provisions, is what en- ables it to hold out against the attack of an enemy; so the want of any one of these three articles will not permit all the advantage to be reaped that was proposed in fortifying a town. Men are properly the soul of a defence; and with- out them the best fortifications in the world are not able to make any great resistance against the enemy.

Therefore we must first of all lay down as a maxim, that a governor cannot make a good defence, unless he hath the number of troops necessary for defending the several posts, and obliging the enemy to pay dear for them. Immense sums are expended in fortifying a place, in order to stop a strong army with a small force; but what resistance can the place make without exerting a brisk fire; and what will those heaps of walls avail, if they are not defended? The garrison of a town besieged ought to have a reasonable stock of provisions, in order to support themselves under the fatigue of military duty; they ought also to have powder, arms, and generally every thing that is requisite to annoy the enemy, and to stop the progress of their ope- rations.

It is not very easy to settle the number of troops neces- sary to defend a town; the nature of the ground on which the place is situated, and the number of outworks, ought to determine the strength of the garrison. M. Vauban in his Me- moirs reckons, that in a place regularly fortified with good bastions, half-moons, and covert-ways, we should allow 500 or 600 men to each bastion: That if the town has horn- works, 600 men may be likewise assigned to each of these; and in proportion for the other outworks, according to the relation which their defence may require to that of the horn-work; and the horse should be the tenth part of the number of the infantry.

This being premised, suppose a place has six bastions, there must be a garrison of six times six hundred foot, which makes 3600, and the tenth part of that number in horse, which makes 360. Hence a sufficient garrison for such a place will be 3960 men.

In order to compute, as near as possible, the quantity of ammunition and provisions that may be required for such a garrison, we must calculate how many days they will be able to maintain a siege. The following are M. Vauban's re- marks on this subject.

For the inventing the place and the tracing the lines Days

For the opening of the trenches to the attack of the covert way

For the attack and taking of the covert-way, and making lodgments in it

For the descent and passage over the ditch before the half-moon

For fixing the miners, or for the batteries till the making of a reasonable breach

Carry over

Brought over

For taking and securing the interior part of the half-moon

For the pallage over the great ditch before the two bastions, supposed to be begun before the taking of the half-moon

For fixing the miners, or erecting batteries on the covert-way, to lay the place open and make a reasonable breach

For the defence and support of the breach after the place is laid open

For the mistakes which the enemy may happen to commit, and their neglect in their works

Total of the defence

In this defence it is plain we suppose a town to be forti- fied only with half moons and a covert-way; but if the half-moon had a redoubt with a revetment and rampart, it might hold out four days longer. If there were retrench- ments in the bastions, they might retard the taking of the place five or six days. If the ditch was strengthened with tenailles and caponiers, the pallage over it might be pro- tracted two or three days. If there was a good horn- work, or some other like fortification properly strengthened with a half-moon, a covert-way, and retrenchments within the work, the taking of it would cost about 12 or 14 days. If this work had tenailles, the pallage over its ditch would be later by two or three days. If there was a fore-ditch and a second covert-way, the progress of the attacks would still be less rapid, and we might reckon 10 or 12 days for the taking of this second covert-way and the pal- lage over its ditch. If there were redoubts near the place, they would still protract the taking of it for some days.

From this estimate, though not very exact, an idea may be formed of the duration of a siege: a point absolutely necessary for securing, at least, a sufficient quantity of am- munition during the time; we say at least, because it is always prudent, if possible, to have a greater quantity of ammunition than is supposed to be wanted. When once the number of the garrison, together with the duration of the siege, is fixed, it is then very easy to calculate the quan- tity of powder and ammunition with which the place is to be provided.

It is judged, that to be well provided with cannon, eight pieces should be allowed to each bastion. Therefore in a place of six bastions there ought to be 48 pieces.

As a town is never attacked on all sides, and there are seldom above two or three attacks at the most, the cannon belonging to those bastions that are not attacked, serve to strengthen the bastions attacked, and they are placed also in the outworks of the fronts attacked.

Among the cannon for the defence of the town there should be some of 24, of 16, of 12, of 8, and of 4 pounders, and even of 2 and 1. The latter are of very great service, because of their being so convenient to remove with ease, and with few men; from one place to another; for this disturbs the enemy, who find it difficult to destroy these small pieces. The largest serve to fire against their batteries and their works. The small ones are carried to the out- works, and to the covert-way, from whence they are fired en barlette. It is customary to make use of sea carriages for these small pieces.

Besides cannon, the town ought to be provided with a great number of wall guns, carbines, muskets, &c. We are to suppose that most of the ordinary arms will be broke in the service, and therefore care must be taken to provide new ones when wanted.

The number of mortars necessary may be estimated at Of Sieges, two to every bastion. They must be of different bores, of 12 and 8 inches diameter. There ought also to be several stone-mortars.

The garrison of a place of six battalions, consisting, as we have already observed, of 3600 foot, are to be employed or distributed in the following manner.

We should, first of all, reckon about 600 soldiers wounded and sick, in the first 12 or 15 days of the siege, and for the service of the batteries, the removing of ammunition, &c. And then there will remain 3000 for the defense of the place.

These are to be divided into three equal bodies; one for the guard, the other for the bivouac under arms, ready to march on the first notice where wanted, and the third to rest.

The horse are also divided into three bodies like the foot; that for the guard is chiefly placed on the right and left of the attack; that for the bivouac is generally quartered by brigades, in different parts of the town, where they may be of service, either to keep the inhabitants in awe, or to be ready to act in sallies. In regard to the third corps, who are to rest, their horses must be saddled in the day; and the horse or dragoons must be ready to mount instantly, should there be any occasion for their service.

The guard of infantry and the bivouac ought to be under arms, at the several posts assigned them in the works of the place; and for the corps at rest, they must be ready to support the troops on guard, in case these should have need of their assistance.

The guard of foot of 1000 men may be subdivided nearly into three equal bodies; two of which to defend the posts attacked, and the third the other posts not attacked. And in regard to the two first, they may be subdivided also into three equal bodies; two of which are to fire the first two hours of the night, the other is to relieve one of them at the end of that time, the next is relieved two hours after; and so on alternately, that there may be always two thirds of this guard in action, and the other third at rest.

There is no occasion for so brisk a firing by day as by night; because the besieged are more capable of seeing what the enemy are about, and of opposing their attempts; but in the night nothing but a strong cannonading can guard against their enterprises. By day the troops fire from between baskets, sand-bags, or gabions, placed on the upper part of the parapet, to the end that being under cover they may take better aim at the enemy.

As the most perfect fortifications cannot hold out long without the necessary ammunitions, too much care cannot be taken in regard to this article.

"The ancients, says Mr Folard, were accustomed to lay in a great store of provisions, when a place was threatened with a siege; a store sufficient not only for three or four months, but for three or four years at least. This they were induced to do for two reasons; the fear of being blockaded; and the inviolable law of defending themselves to the last extremity. The moderns take less precaution in respect to provisions, as well as to every thing else; they think it sufficient to lay in a stock for three or four months in towns of the greatest strength and importance; which is very wrong. I grant, indeed (continues Mr Folard), that the law of holding out to the very last extremity is looked upon as chimerical at present, and entirely left to the ancients; but it should be considered, that an enemy well acquainted with the state of things will measure the strength of the place by the quantity of provisions contained therein; and making a calculation of the loss of men in the attack, together with the expense of a long siege, they will choose, if they are wise (and certainly they will gain by it in the end), to take it rather by blockade than by a siege in form: at least they will be sure of becoming masters of it in three or four months through want of provisions; whereas a siege may last that time, if the garrison are obstinate. Such a town as Lille in Flanders, and as Bergues, both of which are out of the line of communication of our frontier, cannot be too well stocked with provisions. A wise and experienced minister will victual them at least for eighteen months, because they may be blockaded. It is much the same in regard to Strasbourg and to Landau. The latter was never victualled for more than three or four months; how imprudent, therefore, must it be to lay siege to it, when it may be taken by a blockade almost as soon as by a siege, which is attended moreover with an infinite loss of brave men, and a monstrous expense?"

These reflections of M. Folard are very solid; but circumstances will not always permit a place to be so well provided as one could wish.

When a governor finds that the enemy threatens to lay siege to a town under his care, and that the place is in want of the chief things necessary for a vigorous defense, he is to exert all his abilities, in order to remedy this inconvenience as much as possible. The greatest want of all is that of provisions; he must therefore endeavour to get a supply, both from the country and from the people of the town; which is to be distributed among the garrison with the greatest economy. The useless mouths should be all sent out, and an inquiry ought to be made after those who are suspected of having hoarded any corn; and upon paying them for it, or upon giving them security of payment, they should be obliged to deliver it up for the subsistence of the garrison.

Hitherto we have made no mention of the inhabitants; yet they may be rendered serviceable in contributing to ease the garrison. The governor should make use of such workmen who exercise handicraft trades for every thing relating to their respective branches; and those who are not artificers, should watch the fire that may be kindled by the shells and red-hot bullets; they ought likewise to transport the materials to the places assigned them; and even to work at the different retrenchments which the governor should think fit to order in the town, provided however that they be not too much exposed to the fire of the besiegers. An article of the greatest importance, in regard to the inhabitants, is to oblige them to lay in a stock of provisions for six months, and those that are able should be obliged to make still a greater provision, which will be a resource to the garrison when their own stock is exhausted.

§ 2. Necessary Preparations for maintaining a Siege.

When a town is threatened with a siege, the governor ought not only to take care to have a plentiful stock of ammunition and provisions, but moreover he should use all the precautions requisite for retarding the enemy's approaches, and rendering them more difficult and dangerous.

He ought therefore to leave nothing in the neighbourhood that may serve to cover the enemy; he should clear the adjacent country of all houses that are within reach of cannon-shot, and fill up, if possible, the caverns or hollow ways that may be concealed, or build some redoubts and other works under the protection of the place, by which they may be enfiladed. He ought to cut down all the trees; in a word, he should prevent the enemy's having any cover within reach of the cannon of the place; he should see that the fortifications be all in a good condition, and that the covert-way be well palisaded; in fine, he should cause arrows to be built on the salient angles of the glacis. Retrenchments may also be made in the re-entering place of arms of the covert-way, by raising a parapet within them, and parallel to their faces, with a small ditch before it. Nor should the galleries for the mines be forgotten; on the contrary, they ought to be begun betimes, and carried out into the country as far as the ground will permit: and chambers should be made under all the angles of the glacis. If there are any houses within the rampart which may obstruct the defence, the governor ought to see them demolished; and nothing should be left, either within or without, which can any way be of service to the besiegers. If there are new raised troops, care should be taken to discipline them well.

The governor should also see that the hospitals be in a good condition, that the sick and wounded be taken care of, nor think it beneath his character to visit them himself, and to let the soldiers see how greatly he has their preservation at heart. This is the surest way to gain their confidence and affection, and to engage them to do their utmost towards defending the place.

As it is now the custom to throw a great number of shells into a town besieged, it is necessary to have vaulted places underground bomb-proof, where part of the garrison not on duty may rest in safety. They are not so much wanted in large cities, where there are always different quarters secure from the enemy's shells; but a small town is in every part exposed to the bombs; so that some places underground are absolutely necessary for the garrison to take their rest, and to prevent the troops from being continually incommode. These subterranean caverns are generally made in the gorges of the bastions, and sometimes under the rampart behind the curtains.

Where there are none of those subterraneous places, it will be necessary, as soon as the town is invested, to erect defences to shelter the men from the bombs; these are made of strong pieces of timber, laid sloping against the parts least exposed, and they may be covered with thick planks laid in the same manner. The large houses should also be shored, that is, all the floors, from top to bottom, should be supported with strong upright timbers, and the upper floor covered with large beams laid across one another, and these again with earth, fascines, dung, &c. When they are thus fitted up, they may serve either for the accommodation of the troops or for hospitals, &c. But what deserves a more special care, is the powder-magazines. They ought to be bomb-proof; but as there are very few that can resist the shock of a great number of shells, they should therefore be covered with seven or eight feet thick of earth, and a layer of fascines, dung, and strong planks laid over them, so as to form a kind of roof. But if it should happen, either from their situation or height, that this cannot be done, then a range of large trees, well fastened together, must be laid over them, so as to diminish the shock of the shells. The windows of the powder-magazines should have no prospect towards the besiegers; and to prevent all accidents, nobody should be permitted to go in or out of the doors, but when the fire of the enemy is slackened.

When there are no powder-magazines in a town, it is very difficult to preserve the powder during a siege; all that can be done, is to distribute it in different places, as in cellars and caves made under the ramparts, or in gardens, &c., and to cover these places well with thick planks, earth, fascines, &c.

The mischief done by shells consists not only in demolishing the buildings on which they fall, but likewise in setting fire to most places they fall upon; and when they are followed by red-hot balls, it is very difficult to hinder the town from being burnt. In order to remedy this evil, timely precautions should be taken, and the inhabitants employed in extinguishing the fire.

First of all, a great number of casks, filled with water, should be placed in the streets; and the foldiers and inhabitants ought to be divided into companies, to prevent the spreading of the flames. It will be proper to divide these into small bodies, and to allot different quarters to each of them, for extinguishing any fire that may happen to particular houses. By these means each corps, or company, will become answerable, in some measure, for the houses entrusted to their care, and use the utmost endeavours to preserve them. The pavements must also be taken up, and dung laid in the streets, to prevent further mischief from the bursting of the shells.

§ 3. Of the Defence from the investing to the Attack of the Covert-way.

When the place is invested, and the besiegers begin to work upon the line of circumvallation, the governor ought not at first to fire upon the enemy's troops with the largest cannon, but with his small pieces only. For as the enemy ought to pitch their camp as near as possible to the place, provided they are out of reach of cannon-shot, they will think themselves at a sufficient distance when out of the reach of those small pieces; but as soon as they are encamped, the garrison are to give them a full volley with their great guns, which will oblige them to decamp once more, and make them lose time.

While the besiegers are constructing the lines, their engineers spare no pains to get an exact knowledge of the adjacent ground, and to reconnoitre the fortifications, that they may form the plan of attack, which they will be sure to make on the weakest side. To prevent this, M. Goulan proposes the following scheme.

As soon as the town is invested, the governor should send 200 or 300 men every night to that side which he knows to be the weakest, with orders to lie upon their faces, in the form of a semicircle, of which the palisades of the covert-way may be considered as the diameter. These men should be divided into small parties, of three or four men each, at the distance of 20 or 30 paces from one another, so as to occupy a large tract of ground. All these different parties ought to agree upon a signal, to give notice when any body passes by them, and they should remain there in silence till day, without stirring, unless somebody happens to pass by; in which case, the first that sees them should rise, and give the signal to the rest, who are to do the same; then all drawing close together, and advancing to the palisades, they will take those who passed, as it were in a net, without any possibility of relief from their efforts, who cannot be numerous enough to rescue them from the hands of 200 or 300 men, protected by the fire of the covert-way. If the men who advance to reconnoitre the place, instead of passing through the intervals, should fall in with some of these parties, and endeavour to get off, they must be fired upon; thus the enemy may be easily hindered from reconnoitering, and thereby acquiring a knowledge of the ground, or the side most proper to be attacked.

From the time the place is invested, the besieged should send every night small parties of eight or ten men, commanded by a sergeant, with orders to lie upon their faces all round the border of the glacis, and to listen carefully to everything that passes. Whatever care the besiegers may take to open the trenches in silence, still it will be very difficult for this operation to be made, without such a motion as must be heard or perceived from the neighbourhood of the glacis. These small parties may even advance a little further, Of Sieges further, observing silence, and taking care not to be surprised by the parties which the enemy also may find out on that side, to watch whether there are any troops of the garrison ready to fall upon the workmen.

When the side on which the enemy open their trenches is known, the great pieces of ordnance are mounted on the rampart of the town en barbette, and the small ones on the covert-way, from whence they are to fire briskly upon the trenches. And to point more exactly, fire-balls are thrown from the mortars, which will give light enough to discover the workmen. Just at this time, the besieged should make the greatest fire against the enemy, because it is then they are most uncovered, and consequently most exposed. As the besieged cannot have their batteries ready till the second or third day after the opening of the trenches, during that time the guns may continue to fire en barbette; but it will hardly be possible to fire in that manner when the enemy's batteries are once erected. Mortars should likewise be used for throwing shells on the workmen and those employed on the batteries; in short, the best use should be made of the artillery, before the enemy are in a condition to silence it.

It is customary to make two or three attacks in order to divide the attention of the garrison; and of these, generally speaking, there is only one real: they must therefore endeavour to find out this real attack, and to use the utmost diligence in making good retrenchments, as well in the outworks, which the enemy must take before they can come to the body of the place, as in the gorge of the bastion of the front attacked. But to render these retrenchments strong and firm, they should have been begun and even finished before the opening of the trenches. A governor, who has a proper knowledge of fortification, ought to judge on which side a town is most accessible, and to presume that here the enemy will commence their attack; consequently he ought to think of every method of defence, the best adapted to retard the approaches, and dilute every inch of ground.

The besieged should dilute their artillery at the beginning of a siege, as to enfilade the branches, and to direct their fire against the head of the trenches or the saps. This must be their principal effort; for it is by continually firing upon them that they may reasonably hope to retard the works.

When the enemy have erected their batteries, it is very difficult for the besieged to maintain theirs, especially if they are placed on the produced faces of the pieces attacked. For as the cannon are continually firing à ricochet against these faces, and it being difficult to guard against this firing, it will be very dangerous for the soldiers to remain there: all that can be done is to make some traverses, in order to diminish their effect; which is difficult indeed to compass, because the shot falling upon the traverses will bound between them. It is advisable not to persist in firing always from the same place against the enemy's batteries. By ceasing to fire from that part where the besiegers know there was a battery, they may be induced to think they have destroyed it, which will prevent their continuing to fire against it, and be a means of preserving the battery for future service. But in order to give them trouble, smaller guns may be placed in the outworks, on the faces of the bastions, from whence the trenches and batteries of the besiegers can be discovered; and they must often change place to perplex the enemy, who will find it very difficult to dismount those moving pieces. The besieged however must endeavour to repair the parapets destroyed by the enemy, and to take proper measures for firing again from thence, as soon as the besiegers have shifted their guns.

It is also advisable that the batteries of the besieged should not fire in salvo, or all at a time; for it is well known, that the besiegers place foldiers in the trenches to observe, through small loop-holes made with sand-bags in the parapet of the trench, when the batteries of the town are fired, and to give notice to those who are at work in the trenches, which way the guns are pointed, that they may put themselves under cover. If the besieged have only six pieces on a battery, and they fire them all at a time, the enemy have some moments of security to look over the parapet and to examine the ground where they intend to work and to conduct the trenches: but when the garrison vary their manner of firing, they give more uneasiness to those who are at work in the trenches, who will not be so ready to look over the parapet; which, though it be necessary, in order to view the situation of the ground towards which the works are to be directed, is ever dangerous, but especially when the trenches are brought within musket-shot of the place.

§ 4. Of Sallies.

A garrison that keeps within a place, without making sallies, is, as the chevalier de Ville says, like those who are not concerned when their neighbour's house is on fire, and will not stir to extinguish it till it has reached their own. And indeed, as the besiegers continually carry on their approaches towards the town, it is of the utmost importance to endeavour, in time, to stop their progress; to which end, the making of sallies is extremely conducive, especially when they are well conducted, otherwise they would rather accelerate than retard the taking of the place.

How great forever the advantage of sallies may be, they are proper only when a garrison is numerous. A small garrison, although well stocked with all the kinds of necessary ammunitions for making a defence, and for holding out, ought to be very careful how they venture to make a sally. But a numerous garrison, not so well provided, ought to fatigue the enemy as much as possible by frequent sallies. The same measure ought to be followed when a town is but ill fortified; the garrison should not shut themselves up so as to be obliged to surrender, as it were, without making much resistance. It is best in those cases to harass the enemy continually, to keep them at a distance as long as possible, and to use every stratagem and endeavour that may retard their approaching the glacis, and the taking of the covert-way. Thus it was that the marquis of Uxelles, afterwards marshal of France, behaved at the siege of Mentz in 1689. He defended that large and ill fortified town upwards of two months, with the help of a very brave garrison; but was obliged to capitulate for want of powder and ammunition, though he was still master of the covert-way, and even in some measure of the glacis.

When the besiegers are at a distance from the place, sallies are very dangerous, because the enemy may cut them off from the town with their horse: but when they have made their second parallel, and advanced the branches of the trenches towards the third parallel at the foot of the glacis, then is the time for the garrison to sally. They may even venture, though with great caution, when the besiegers are at work upon the second parallel, and before it is entirely finished; but the most favourable opportunity of sallying, is when the besiegers are come to the third parallel, and want to make a lodgment on the glacis. Then there is no danger of being cut off; and the enemy may be surprized the more easily, as the garrison have it in their power to fall upon them all at once, and to throw them into confusion, without giving them time to recover themselves.

Sallies may be either great or small; the former ought The intent of great fallies should be to destroy a considerable part of the works of the besiegers, in order to oblige them to begin again; to nail up their guns; to retake some post which had been abandoned; and lastly, to obstruct the enemy's works as much as possible, and thereby retard the taking of the place.

In regard to small fallies, they serve for no other end than to interrupt the workmen at the head of the trenches, so as to frighten them, and oblige them to run away. As it requires some time to bring them back, and to make them return to their work, this will occasion delay, and retard the approaches.

The best time for great fallies, is two hours before daylight, the troops being then fatigued and sleepy; therefore more easily surprised, and less capable of making a vigorous resistance. And when it has rained very hard in the night, so that the guard in the trenches may be unable to make use of their firearms, this is also a favourable circumstance: in short, no opportunity should be neglected to surprise the enemy; for fallies seldom prove advantageous any other way. The following is the order which M. Vauban proposes to be observed.

There should be a detachment of 90 men drawn up, 30 in front, and three deep; to which must be added a fourth rank of 30 grenadiers. The three first ranks of this detachment should be armed with cuirasses; each soldier should have a sword and pistol at his belt, and a partisan, or long iron fork with a hook, in his hand. This detachment is to be followed by another of 180 men, 30 in front, and six deep; the first rank of these is to be armed as the former, with cuirasses and long weapons, the rest as usual. The first rank in this detachment is to make up the rear in the retreat. After this second detachment 200 workmen are to follow with proper tools to destroy the enemy's works, and several of these with combustibles to burn what they cannot otherwise destroy. Some of them are to be provided with long nails of steel, and of different magnitude, to spike the cannon; there must be some of a very large size, because the touch-holes happen frequently to be too wide, so that common nails will not fill them up exactly.

Besides the two detachments and workmen above mentioned, another body of 300 or 400 men should be ordered to support them, and to follow them slowly as far as the head of the trenches; where, if they find that those who went before them have no need of assistance, they should halt to be ready to act if occasion requires it. If the guard of the trenches should make a vigorous attack upon the fallies, this detachment will support them, and jointly encounter the besiegers. If the latter are repulsed, which must be the case if the fallies are foreseen and expected, the workmen must set about demolishing the works, and filling up the trenches as fast as possible. These troops should also endeavour to penetrate as far as the batteries, in order to nail up the cannon, and to maintain themselves in the trenches long enough for the workmen to destroy great part of them. When they have done what they proposed, they retreat to the covert-way in good order; and if the enemy should be so imprudent as to pursue them as far as the glacis, they must be received with a brisk fire as well from the cannon of the ramparts as from the troops in the covert-way.

In fallies, and generally in all actions performed by night, the soldiers should put something in their hats, as a white paper or handkerchief, to know one another in the dark. The troops designed for this purpose are drawn up in the place of arms within the town, or in the ditch if it be dry, or else in the covert-way. When they are to march out by different gates, some signal should be agreed upon, that they may all move at the same time. If there are more attacks than one against the town, as generally is the case, then several fallies may be made at the same time upon these attacks. It might be proper to make a great noise on one side, in order to draw all the attention of the enemy that way; and while they are busy in the repulse, to act vigorously on the other side; for then they will meet with less resistance, and will be more capable of hurting the besiegers. However, as a fallie which has not all the success that might be expected, ought not to discourage the garrison from repeating the attempt; so one that has been crowned with success ought not to render them too confident, or inspire them with too great a contempt for the enemy. The mistakes the latter may have committed, will rouse their attention, and put them upon their guard. We ought ever to suppose, that they will do all that we should do, were we in their place, and that they will take proper measures to remove every obstacle that may oppose them.

Hitherto we have taken no notice of the use of cavalry in fallies; and yet on some occasions they may be of service, which is when the besiegers are at a distance from the place. In this case, two detachments of horse are ordered to the right and left to support the fallies, and to hinder the enemy's horse from falling upon them. These detachments serve also to protect their retreat, and to prevent their being cut off; but when the besiegers have finished their third parallel, the fallies are then made with foot only, and should, as we have above observed, be often repeated, provided the garrison is numerous enough to dispute every inch of ground with the enemy.

As soon as the troops are returned from the fallies, fireballs should be thrown into the trenches, to discover the workmen who are employed in repairing the mischief that has been done, and are at that time in some measure uncovered. The fire of the place well served at this juncture, must kill a great many of the enemy. So far relates to great fallies.

The small fallies, which are intended merely to disturb the besiegers without being able to do them much hurt, are conducted in the manner following. The governor orders out parties of 10, 15, or 20 stout men only, as hath been already observed, who are to advance softly to the head of the trenches, and to jump into them quickly, making a great noise, and throwing grenades; after which they are to retire with all expedition: the alarm which they will occasion is sufficient to make the workmen take to their heels, who desire nothing better than to have a specious pretence, as M. Goulon observes, to run away upon the least alarm; and it is impossible to prevent it, or to bring them back the same night; so that the besiegers must lose all this time. If, says the same author, the besiegers become accustomed to these little fallies, so as to grow secure and take no notice of them, the besieged observing this must make one in good earnest, which coming unexpectedly, will easily overturn the workmen and the troops that cover them: after which they may retire without fighting, lest they should draw the whole guard of the trenches upon their backs.

§ 5. Of the Defence of the Glacis and the Covert-way.

Besides the fallies which retard the lodgment of the besiegers on the glacis, mines may increase the difficulty of approaching. We have already taken notice of these in the section of Attack; we have only to observe here in general, that the besieged must make the best use of them possible, in order to blow up the enemy as often as the ground will permit; permit; this is the surest way to keep the besiegers in awe, and to oblige them to advance with the greatest circumspection.

Besides the galleries and mines which ought to be under the glacis, the besieged may also lay opposite to its angles large planks, stuck full of very long nails, with the points upwards, to inconvenience the enemy in passing over the glacis. These planks ought to be strongly fixed, to prevent their being easily taken away. The burying of caissons in the glacis is also productive of a good effect; but they ought never to be placed nearer than five or eight feet to the inside of the covert-way, lest they should do any damage to the troops that defend this post.

When the enemy endeavour to make a lodgment on the glacis, the garrison must repeat their sallies with greater vigour; which may be done without any inconvenience, because of the facility of retreating. When the troops are returned from the sally, fire is set to the chambers and caissons, which will greatly disconcert the besiegers. If the chambers are well defended, they must hurt their lodgments prodigiously; and as soon as they are sprung, the besieged may fall upon the enemy, this being a favourable opportunity for surprising them in disorder, and consequently of destroying part of their works. This manner of proceeding should be often repeated, in order to fatigue the besiegers, and to retard the taking of the covert-way.

When the enemy are ready to storm it, the garrison must prepare to give them a warm reception. The difficulty of making a lodgment in the covert-way may be increased by a double row of palisades; the second should be lower than the first, to the end that the enemy may not perceive them. These two rows ought to be at the distance of four or five feet from one another, to prevent the besiegers from jumping over them into the covert-way. Between them may be made a small ditch; into which most of the enemy's grenades will fall, and cause less mischief to the troops. Care must be taken to make strong retrenchments in the places of arms, either by raising a parapet withinside, and parallel to their faces, with a small ditch at the foot of it, or by simple rows of palisades, which will hinder the enemy from forcing their way so easily as they would otherwise be capable of doing. In each place of arms there should be one or two barrels of powder, with balls and small arms necessary for the defence of the covert-way.

All the batteries must be got ready to fire with the utmost briskness upon the enemy, when they are at work upon their lodgment. Every part of the place that looks into the covert-way ought to be lined with troops, who are to fire upon the besiegers; but there ought to be no troops in the parts opposite to the places of arms, that the troops posted there may not be hurt by the fire from the body of the place.

The garrison should endeavour to be informed by deserters at what time the enemy intend to make their attack; the motions of the latter may be also observed by persons posted on steeples; and as soon as the troops are perceived to make an extraordinary motion, and the trenches to be filled more than usual, this is a sign that they are going to attack. The vicinity of the enemy's works may also enable the besieged to judge of their forwardness; and all this together direct them to take such measures as are proper for giving a warm reception to the besiegers.

As soon as the garrison perceive that the enemy are marching out of their trenches, they should keep firing upon them continually with great and small arms from all the works facing the attack. This will destroy a great many of their men before they can reach the palisades: the two rows of which in the covert-way will prevent their jumping into it directly. They will be under a necessity of breaking them successively with hatchets; and while this is doing, a general discharge is to be made from the batteries of the town, which will do great execution. When, after a vigorous resistance, the garrison find themselves hard pressed by the enemy, they may abandon the covert-way, and retire into the places of arms; and while the besiegers are working upon their lodgment, they will be exposed to the fire of the place, which takes them in front; and to that of the places of arms, by which they are taken in flank; so that their loss must increase considerably. If they have mines ready, as we suppose they have, they must spring them, after having suffered the enemy to work for some time upon their lodgments; and after having kept firing against them continually with great and small arms, then immediately they should make a strong sally from the places of arms, and taking advantage of the disorder into which the besiegers must inevitably be thrown, they will oblige them to abandon the covert-way.

If there is no possibility of hindering the enemy from making lodgments on the crest of the covert-way, or, which is the same thing, on the ridge of the glacis, the besieged must endeavour to retard them, and to dispute as long as possible their taking possession of the places of arms. On this occasion fougasses are employed with success, and should be repeated several times if the ground will permit. When the besiegers have once completed their lodgment, and supported it in a proper manner, they want nothing further than a little time to extend themselves, and to become masters of the covert-way. The obstinacy of the besieged can only retard, but not absolutely hinder, the taking of this outwork.

Let us suppose that the enemy resolve to approach the covert-way by sap, and that they have raised cavaliers in the trenches to plunge into this outwork, the besieged must strive to retard this operation by every stratagem imaginable; for when the cavaliers are once constructed, it will be very dangerous to abide any longer in the covert way. They must stop the besiegers at every step with mines; they must harass them with a constant discharge of fire-arms, and dispute every inch of ground, defending themselves behind every traverse, and in the places of arms, as well as they can, without running too great a risk of having their retreat cut off.

§ 6. Of the Defence of the Passage over the Ditch before the Half-moon.

The enemy having made themselves masters of the covert-way, and perfected all their lodgments, will erect their batteries for making a breach, and prepare for the descent into the ditch. All this while the besieged must keep firing both with their great and small arms, in order to inconvenience the enemy in the construction of their batteries. If the ditch is dry, the soldiers may mount with ladders along the counterfarp, and from thence throw grenades into the enemy's works; and when they cover themselves in the covert way with sand-bags, gabions, &c., against the fire of the place, these very soldiers should, with great sap-hooks, pull down part of them, and afterwards jump nimbly into the ditch, leaving the enemy exposed to the fire of the town while they are putting their materials again into order. Mines may be likewise used here with great advantage; they furnish various means to harass the enemy, to obstruct their works, and to make them lose time and men.

The batteries of the besiegers being destroyed by mines made under them, must oblige them to lose a great deal of time in repairing them, and in endeavouring to make themselves masters of the mines, otherwise they can never be secure. When the besieged have blown up the batteries that were to open the breach, they must make good use of the time which the enemy will spend in repairing them, and strive to perfect the retrenchments, which should have been set about at the commencement of the siege, in the gorge of the half-moon, and in those of the battions of the front attacked.

The mines for blowing up the batteries of the covert-way may be disposed in such a manner as to tumble the guns into the ditch, as may be seen in the course of mathematics by M. Belidor, who performed it with success at the academy of La Fere.

It is certainly a great advantage thus to be able to become masters of the cannon of the besiegers, and to oblige them to erect new batteries, which must take them up a considerable time. A doubt here may arise, whether if these batteries are opposite to that part where the enemy intend to pass the ditch, this would not be helping to fill it up, should the besieged blow up the guns; but this inconvenience is of no great consequence, especially as it may easily be remedied, by clearing away the rubbish of the mine which tumbles into the ditch along with the battery.

As the besiegers work at the descent into the ditch at the same time that they are preparing their batteries, the besieged must think of retarding both these operations also at the same time. If the descent into the ditch is made underground, miners should be employed to interrupt the work; and if the ditch is dry, small detachments, as M. Goulon observes, of five or six men, may be placed near the counterforts, to watch the moment that the enemy break through it, and immediately to fire into the gallery; this discharge will either kill or frighten the miners; and at least will retard the works. Those who have fired, should retire on each side the opening to load their arms again, which may be repeated several times. Fire-balls and grenades may be likewise thrown into this opening, which will oblige the sappers to retreat.

If the ditch is filled with water, the same operations may likewise be performed with small boats made on purpose; and to cover these boats a kind of parapet should also be raised by means of strong boards, with holes to fire through upon the soldiers, who upon opening the gallery will throw fascines into the ditch. At the siege of Lille, marshal Boufflers contrived some boats of this kind to retard the passage over the ditch, before the grand lunettes or tenailles in the front attacked, and that before the half-moon.

When the enemy make their opening into the dry ditch, they must be opposed with a strong fire, as well from the face of the battalion which flanks the ditch before the half-moon, as from the place of arms or traverse, which ought to be constructed the whole breadth of the ditch, in order to strengthen the defence. By night small salutes should be made from this place of arms, with a view to interrupt the passage over the ditch, and to retard, as much as possible, the fixing of the miner.

There are two ways of passing the dry ditch, and of bringing the miner to the foot of the revetment which he is to enter. The first consists in making a gallery six feet wide, with a double row of barrels. These must be filled with sand-bags, and so must the spaces between them, in order to render the passage of the gallery more safe; and that there may be a shelter from fire-works, strong planks are laid over it, and these again are covered with raw hides, or with earth and dung. This gallery is continued within three or four feet of the revetment; and in this space a good epaulette is raised with sand-bags to cover the miner on the side exposed to the place. In regard to the other side, it is of no use to stop it up; nay, it serves for an opening to fill the ditch with the earth dug out of the galleries, which the miners are making in the rampart of the work attacked. It is easy to oppose the progress of this gallery with a continual fire, and with several lesser works constructed within the ditch.

The other way, which, as we have already seen in treating of the attack, consists only in getting to the foot of the breach by sea, with an epaulette on the side exposed to the place, may be covered, in order to protect the passage from the fire-works and grenades of the besieged. But this may be retarded by salutes; the besieged may likewise steal away the earth by night from the epaulettes, and endeavour with hooks, &c. to displace the gabions and fascines.

If the ditch is filled with water, the besieged must interrupt the enemy's bridge with a continual fire from their great and small guns, as well as with grenades and shells, if they are in a condition to fire upon the bridge and its epaulette. If the water has strong currents, they must open sluices in order to break down the bridge, or at least to carry away the fascines. They should also attempt to set fire to it with artificial works prepared for this purpose. They may likewise approach the epaulette in the night, and draw away the fascines with hooks. They may even throw anchors upon it; and by means of capsizes placed in those parts which flank the ditch, they may draw these anchors with cords fastened to them, and tumble part of the epaulette into the ditch. In short, every expedient must be tried that may possibly retard the enemy's approaches; for when once they have perfected their bridge, they will soon be masters of the outwork to which that bridge leads, whatever precaution the garrison may take to defend the breach; because, as the besiegers can always pour in fresh men to supply the room of those that are lost in the attack, they must at length surmount all opposition.

§ 7. Of the Defence of the Half-moon.

While the enemy are effecting the passage over the ditch, besides the difficulties that are raised to retard the work, all proper precautions should be used to defend the breach, and prevent the taking of the half-moon. For this purpose guns are placed in all the works from which the breach may be seen; and they should be placed on carriages or on pieces of wood, as the garrison find most commodious, of least hindrance to the defence, and productive of the best effect.

If the half-moon has no redoubt, as here we suppose it has none, the retrenchments, which ought to have been made there, must be put into good condition; a row of palisades must be placed before it, in order to stop the first fury of the enemy after they have made themselves masters of the breach; in a word, the besieged must prepare to dispute every inch of ground, and to retire from the half-moon into the town, when they find themselves hard pressed and no longer able to maintain that post.

When the enemy present themselves at the foot of the breach, a great number of grenades, and sacks filled with powder, are thrown among them, with a view to fling them into disorder. Glass or earthen bottles filled with powder, and burning matches twisted round them, are capable of doing them a deal of mischief. A great quantity of loose powder may be scattered about the breach when the enemy are ready to mount to the assault; and when they are mounted, lighted matches or burning coals may be thrown among the powder to set it on fire; which will burn and disable a number of those who are in the breach. It will be proper also to throw into the breach a quantity of harrows, stuck full of large nails with the points upwards; and to prevent Of sieges, the enemy from removing them, they must be fastened with chains, or with great cords. It is advisable to be provided with crows-feet, and to spread them about; as also with chevaux-de-frize, and with heriffons, that shall extend the whole width of the breach (see Herisson). Shells also fastened to the ends of chains, in order to confine them to that part where they may do most damage to the enemy, are an excellent contrivance. Their fuses are made shorter than usual, to the end that they may produce their effect more readily. Falsines smeared over with tar, and, in short, every stratagem ought to be tried to hinder the enemy from lodging themselves in the breach.

When the besiegers have surmounted all these obstacles, and at last have got possession of the breach, the mines are sprung in order to blow them up, and chevaux-de-frize are placed along the whole breadth of the breach. The troops post themselves behind, and continue to make a vigorous fire upon the besiegers while they are using their utmost endeavours to penetrate into the half-moon; and when they begin to force their way, the first rank of men that defend it, being armed with partisans or halberts, and supported by the other troops, ought to fall upon the enemy, and cut them in pieces. But if the besiegers at length by dint of numbers should drive the garrison from the breach, the latter ought to retire into the retrenchment, and from thence make a very brisk firing; and when they find that this is also upon the point of being forced, then they are to withdraw their cannon, and whatever ammunition they may have, into the place; and last of all, if they have any mines under that spot, they must spring them as they retire, in order to do all the mischief and to create all the confusion they can to the besiegers.

Sometimes it shall happen that the enemy, after having made themselves masters of the half-moon, omit to leave a sufficient number of troops to guard the lodgment, upon a presumption that the besieged will not attempt to retake it. Whenever they show a confidence of this kind, a strong body of the garrison should return in the night and storm this work, either by the gorge, or by some other part. There are great odds, but such a vigorous and sudden surprise will be productive of a very good effect; at least there is no great risk in trying, if the strength of the garrison will permit; and should they succeed, the taking of the town will be retarded several days.

Here we have supposed that the enemy are resolved to storm the half-moon; but if they should attempt to get possession of it by means of saps, in that case the workmen must be continually harassed by blowing up mines, and kept as long as possible from the breach by means of fire-works of all kinds. When they begin to make a lodgment in the breach, then the besieged should fall upon them briskly, and destroy the lodgment; in short, every artifice imaginable should be used to retard their progress.

This last method is less bloody than the other; but on the other hand, it may be very tedious, when the besieged spare no pains to disturb the enemy's sappers and miners.

One thing that greatly deserves attention, and may render it very difficult for the besiegers to mount to the assault, or to lodge themselves in the breach by means of saps, is to clear away the rubbish in the breach. In a dry ditch this may be easily done; but in a wet one, the thing is more difficult; on the other hand, in the latter case the breach is more easy to defend than in the former; because as the enemy cannot come to the foot of it but by the bridge of falsines, which is made in the ditch, and is seldom above 10 or 12 feet wide, they cannot of course present themselves with so large a front before the breach as in a dry ditch; consequently the garrison must find it much easier to repel them.

§ 8. Of the Defence of the Passage over the Ditch before the Bastion.

At the same time that the enemy are carrying on the attacks of the half-moon, they work at the passage over the ditch before the bastion. What has been laid in regard to the defence of the ditch before the half-moon, may be applied on this occasion; we have only to add, that when this ditch is dry, the caponier will be of great use to fire upon the enemy in their passage over the ditch, and to fall from thence in order to destroy their works. If the ditch be wet, it must be defended in the same manner as that before the half-moon; here only we shall add, that if there is a tenaille opposite to the curtain of the front attacked, the fire from thence will greatly annoy those who are employed in filling up the ditch. Besides, the boats by which we observed that the enemy might be inclosed in the passage over the ditch, the besieged may likewise have recourse to a kind of floats, made with double joists, at the end of which are fastened empty barrels, to prevent their sinking too deep in the water; and these floats should be loaded with shells, barrels of gunpowder, falsines, pitch and tar; and in short, with all sorts of combustibles proper for setting fire to the bridge, and to the enemy's epaulette: these are brought forward and fastened to the epaulette, and afterwards they are set on fire with a match, or with tow laid amidst the combustibles.

When there are dikes or sluices, by means of which the ditch may be filled with water at any time, every art must be tried to defend it while it is dry; and when all the defences are exhausted, then the water is let in, and the enemy will be obliged to begin their work again.

§ 9. Of the Defence of the Bastions in the Front attacked.

Here the reader must recollect what has been said in regard to the defence of the breach in the half-moon. The defence of the bastions is more easy, because it is not so difficult to retreat from thence, by means of the retrenchment; and this retrenchment should be larger and more spacious than that of the half-moon, and more difficult to force.

Besides all the precautions we have been mentioning, as mines under the breaches, within the bastions, &c. the besieged should also mount several pieces of cannon on the breach, charged with cartridge-shot, and pointed downwards, so as to be able to sweep the whole surface of the ground on which the enemy must form in order to march to the assault. Care must also be taken, lest the enemy, discouraged with the difficulty of storming the breach, attempt to scale the bastion, as hath been practised several times, and particularly by the duke de Noailles, marshal of France, at the siege of Gironne, in 1712. The way to guard against this attempt, is to place along the parapet of the works that may be insulted, large pieces of timber, which are to be tumbled upon the ladders as soon as the enemy offer to mount. They should also have loaded shells all along the rampart, fastened to chains, and to let down towards the middle of the ladders, where they will burst and kill those who are mounted. They should likewise be provided with combustibles of different kinds, to throw upon the besiegers, and to keep them off from the foot of the revetment. When the garrison are well prepared against this attempt, it will be very difficult for the enemy to succeed.

The entrance of the bastion may likewise be defended, by making a ditch in the upper part of the breach, and filling it with all sorts of combustible matter. This will form an impregnable barrier against the enemy, at least for some days; which time is to be employed in strengthening the retrenchments, and throwing up others, one behind another, if the ground will permit, and it be resolved to defend the place to the last extremity. Though it is usual for the enemy to force their way into the town by the bastion, and therefore the principal retrenchments for defending the entrance of the place should be raised in this part; yet it is proper not to neglect the curtain. The enemy may be apprised of these retrenchments, and as it is not the practice to make any behind the curtain, they may take it into their heads to batter it in breach, and to construct a bridge in the ditch before it, in order to penetrate into the town. Thus did prince Eugene act at Lisle; as the back part of the curtain was open, the place was obliged to capitulate. The breaches may likewise be defended by repairing them with large trees laid across one another, the branches pointed towards the enemy. Cannon will make no great impression on this kind of wall; which was the principal defence of the ancients when a breach was made.

When the besiegers have triumphed over all these obstacles, so as to be masters of the breach, and to extend their lodgments on the bastion; then it is no longer possible to defer capitulating, unless there are several retrenchments one behind the other. In that case, indeed, the besieged, if they think proper, may defend themselves to the very last; but this desperate defence is very rare, because every wise governor chooses to preserve the garrison, and to save the town from being plundered, which would be the case, according to the laws of war, if it was taken by storm.

§ 10. Of Precautions to be used against the Surprising of Towns, Scalades, Sudden Attacks, &c.

The right way to prevent surprizes, is to think that the enemy have a design upon the town, and to use all the precautions possible in order to frustrate their designs. With this view a governor should put the fortifications into a good state of defense, should see that the several posts, whether accessible or inaccessible, be well guarded, that parties be sent to range in all the principal avenues of the place; in a word, he should most exactly observe whatever is prescribed in the military ordinances concerning the guard of towns, the opening and shutting of gates, &c. We shall make no mention of any of these particulars, because a very short stay in a garrison is sufficient for learning every thing that may relate to the daily and customary duty, as well for the safety of the town, as for the preserving peace and good order among the inhabitants, and for preventing any strangers or suspected persons from entering the place, &c.

We shall only observe, that when a fortress is situated upon a river, care should be taken to have boats in the night, filled with soldiers, both above and below the town, to hinder any body from getting in that way undiscovered. If the ditches are filled with water, in frosty weather the ice should be broke every day; in short, nothing should be neglected that tends to secure the place against any enterprise either from within or without.

But chiefly on fair or market days this vigilance should be exerted; the guards ought to be doubled at all the gates, and the garrison should be disposed in such a manner as to be ready to fly to their arms upon the first beat of drum: care should be also taken to make the cavalry mount on horseback, ready to act in all events. By using these precautions, it will be very difficult for the enemy to surprise the town; nay, the consequence may be, that hearing of the exact discipline observed by the garrison, they will relinquish their design; for surprizes seldom succeed, except through neglect of military duty, and too great security in the governor.

With regard to precautions against escalades, they consist in having small parties continually about the avenues of the place, in order to be better informed of the enemy's motions, and to keep a patrol all night, to see that nobody shall enter the ditch unperceived. A cuvett (f) may be likewise dug within the ditch, and palisades planted within some distance of the wall, to hinder the enemy from fixing their ladders to it; the flanks of the bastions should be furnished with cannon, charged with cartridge-shot, with balls of a quarter of a pound weight, or with pieces of old iron, to fire upon those who should attempt to scale the place opposite the curtains; in the corps de gardes, within reach of the rampart, a provision should be made of halberts, with all other offensive weapons fit for repelling the enemy when they appear on the top of the ladder, and for driving them into the ditch; the ramparts should be stocked with a great quantity of cylindrical timber, to roll down upon the ladders, and those that are upon them; and if the garrison are not so numerous as to be able to cover the whole ramparts, they should fix chevaux-de-frize, or something else, to the upper part of the parapet, which will hinder the enemy from getting over, in order to jump upon the rampart. There ought also to be a stock of shells and grenades all loaded upon the walls, in order to roll them down into the ditch upon the enemy. There should likewise be fire-works ready to throw upon them, as fagins done over with pitch and tar, powder-barrels, fire-pots, &c.; a great number of fire-balls should be also flung into the ditch in order to give light, and that the cannon of the place may do good execution upon those who are got into it; the ditch should likewise be filled with crows feet, or little holes dug and covered with hurdles and earth, so that the enemy shall not perceive them, but tumble into them; in the middle of these little ditches there should be a palisade, or some long iron-spikes, ranged in such a manner as to run those through that shall fall upon them. Neither are the gates to be neglected; the enemy will not fail to try to fix a petard to them, while the troops are endeavouring to make themselves masters of the rampart. Soldiers must be placed in a convenient situation for firing on the person that fixes the petard; in all events the gates must be strengthened withinside, and large trees must be got ready to debarr the enemy from entering the town, should they be able to break open the gate.

At the first alarm of an attack, all the troops ought to run to the place assigned them, in order to be led from thence to the ramparts. With regard to the cavalry, they ought also to mount on horseback, and to divide themselves into several small bodies, which are to be at the foot of the rampart, ready at all events to charge the enemy, should they find means to penetrate by some way or other into the town.

If the enemy make several attacks at the same time, it will not be proper to quit those parts where they do not show themselves; this perhaps is a feint only to draw the troops from the side which they really intend to attack; therefore the garrison should be equally on their guard on all sides, and leave no posts naked, unless the enemy have forced their way into the town: then indeed the bu-

(f) A cuvett is a small ditch dug in the middle of the large one. Of Sieges, fines is to charge them vigorously, in order to oblige them to retire.

Upon the whole, it is easy to withstand a scalade when there is no surprise; and therefore it rarely happens that a governor, who takes the necessary precautions against any such accidents, will lose a town by this kind of attack.

A scalade may be attempted in the day as well as by night; the latter indeed is more favourable to the assailants, yet they will not succeed a whit the better, if they find that the garrison are prepared to receive them, agreeable to what we have already mentioned.

There remains only to mention a word or two in regard to accelerated sieges; which is, that a governor will not be exposed to this sort of siege, if he takes the proper precautions to be informed of the steps and approaches of the besiegers.

If the enemy pretend to carry on a siege in form, and at the same time accelerate their approaches on one side of the place, the garrison must fall vigorously upon them, and spare no pains to drive them out of what works they have seized upon. One may suspect their design, if it appears that they do not make their attack on the side of the town where naturally they ought to make it, that they want to become masters of the place with greater ease; and then the besieged should double their guard on that side. In general, there should be a constant attention to all the fronts of the place, and they should be all equally guarded, till it appears clearly by the enemy's works on which side they form their attack, and which way they direct their works; neither are the other sides to be even then neglected, lest the enemy should lay hold of this opportunity to attack them. It is always to be supposed that they are informed of everything that passes within the town, either by their spies, or by defectors; or which reason the point that seems least accessible ought not to be neglected.

§ II. Of Capitulations.

The capitulation being the last transaction, both in the attack and defence of a town, this seems to be the most natural place for speaking of it, as it seems to be the most proper subject for terminating this article.

When the governor, who defends a town, finds himself reduced to the last extremity, or is ordered by his court to surrender, with a view of obtaining better conditions of the enemy, both for the town and garrison, he orders the chama de to be beat. For this purpose one or more drummers are directed to beat their drums on the rampart, on the side next to the attack, to give notice to the besiegers that the governor has something to propose to them; one or more white colours are likewise hung out for the same purpose, and one of them remains either on the rampart or on the breach during the time of negotiation. The same is practised in demanding a suspension of arms, after a very violent attack, to bury the dead, carry off the wounded, &c.

As soon as the chama de is beat, the firing ceases on both sides, and the governor sends some officers of distinction to the general who commands the siege, with the conditions on which it is proposed to surrender. As a security, or as hostages for those officers, the besiegers send at the same time the same number into the town; if the governor's proposals are not agreeable to the commander of the besieging army, he rejects them, and mentions what terms he is willing to grant. Generally speaking, he threatens the governor to allow him no conditions at all, if he does not determine to surrender quickly; for instance, when the passage over the ditch of the place is finished, or batteries are erected opposite the flanks, &c. If the besieged find the conditions too hard, the hostages are restored, and the drums are beat again upon the rampart, to make every body withdraw before hostilities are renewed, which is done very soon after. It is to be observed, that during the negotiation they ought to be quiet on both sides, and by no means should go on with the operations of the siege. The governor ought during this time to be upon his guard, for fear of being surprised by stratagem; which might expose him to the discretion of the besieger.

Suppose that the terms of capitulation are agreed upon, two or three of the principal officers of the garrison are sent as hostages to the enemy; and the general of the besieging army sends back the same number, and of equal degree, as a security for fulfilling the capitulation.

The conditions inflicted upon by the besieged must vary according to the different circumstances and situations in which they find themselves. But when the capitulation is entirely settled, an officer of artillery from the besiegers enters the town, to take an inventory of all the artillery and ammunition remaining in the place, in conjunction with an officer of artillery from the garrison. A commissary of stores enters likewise to take an account of the provisions.

When a governor finds that he must surrender, and that there are considerable magazines of ammunition and provisions, he should destroy most of them before he offers to surrender, to the end that there may remain no more in the place than what is necessary for a capitulation, and that the enemy may reap no advantage from thence. If he should not, before he enters into a capitulation, burn or destroy those magazines, the enemy might insist on their being preserved; but they can think nothing of it when those precautions are taken beforehand.

As soon as the besieged have delivered up a gate of the town to the enemy, the first regiment of the army enters, and mounts guard.

When the day is come that the garrison are to leave the place, the besieging army is drawn up in two files of battalions and squadrons, and the garrison are to pass between them. The hour for their marching out being arrived, the general and the principal officers put themselves at the head of the troops, to see the garrison desile before them.

The governor puts himself at the head, followed by the principal officers; and he makes the garrison march in the best order possible. The oldest regiments move commonly in the van and the rear, and the others in the centre with their baggage. When there is any cavalry, it is divided in the same manner into three corps, for the van, the centre, and the rear. Small detachments of horse and foot are made to march along with the baggage, and to take care of its not being rifled.

The artillery granted by the capitulation marches after the first battalion. When the garrison arrive at the place agreed upon, they deliver up the hostages of the besiegers to the escort; and when the latter have rejoined the army, they send back the hostages which the besieged left for the security of the escort, with the waggons, and other things granted by the besieging army for escorting the garrison.

When the garrison are made prisoners of war, they are likewise escorted to the town agreed upon by the terms of the capitulation.

Every thing settled in the capitulation ought to be sacred and inviolable, and should be understood in its genuine and most natural sense: yet as this is not always practised, the governor should take the utmost precaution to have no word inserted that shall be in the least equivocal, or liable to different interpretations. There are a great many examples which prove the necessity of this precaution. When the garrison of a town capitulate in order to retire to the citadel, there are some particular conditions to be observed; such as follow.

That the citadel shall not be attacked on the side next the town; that the sick and wounded, who cannot be removed, shall stay in their present lodgings; and when they are recovered, they shall be provided with carriages and transports to retire in safety to the place agreed on in the capitulation. None should be suffered to enter the citadel, but those who may be of use in defending it; the rest, who are called useless mouths, by no means ought to be admitted. Mention should be made in the capitulation, that those people shall be conducted to some neighbouring place in the dominions of their sovereign, which should be named. A certain time ought also to be allowed for the whole garrison to enter the citadel; and it should be expressly mentioned, that during this time the besiegers shall construct no works that are necessary for the reduction of the citadel.

A maritime town requires also some particular attention, in regard to the ships that may be in the harbour. It should be stipulated, that they shall quit the harbour the same day as the garrison march out of the town, or when the weather permits to sail to the port agreed upon. They should preserve their artillery, rigging, ammunition and provisions, &c. If they should be obliged by stress of weather to put into any harbour of the besiegers by the way, it ought to be mentioned in the capitulation, that they shall be received there, and supplied with necessaries for continuing their voyage; they ought also to be provided with passports, and, in a word, to have every kind of security, that they shall not be insulted by the enemy's ships, but suffered without the least obstacle to steer to the port agreed upon.

WAR

Man of War Bird. See Pelicanus.

WAR-Cry was formerly customary in the armies of most nations, when just upon the point of engaging. Sometimes they were only tumultuous shouts, or horrid yells, uttered with an intent to strike terror into their adversaries; such as is now used by the Indians in America, called the warwhoop.