ATTUS,** a Latin poet in the reign of Nero, celebrated for his satires. He was born, according to some, at Volterra in Tuscany; and according to others, at Tigula, in the gulf Della Specia, in the year 34. He was educated till 12 years old at Volterra; and afterwards continued his studies at Rome under Palaeemon the grammarian, Virginius the rhetorician, and Cornutus the Stoic philosopher, who contracted a friendship for him. Persius consulted that illustrious friend in the composition of his verses. Lucian also studied with him under Cornutus; and appeared so charmed with his verses, that he was incessantly breaking out into exclamations at the beautiful passages in his satires: an example rarely seen in poets of equal rank. He was a steady friend, a good son, an affectionate brother and parent. He was chaste, meek, and modest: which shows how wrong it is to judge of a man's morals by his writings; for the satires of Persius are not only licentious, but sharp and full of bitterness. He wrote seldom; and it was some time before he applied himself regularly to it.

Persius was of a weak constitution, and troubled with a bad stomack, which was the cause of his death in the 36th year of his age. Six of his satires remain; in their judgements of which the critics have been much divided, excepting as to their obliquity, Persius being indeed the most obscure of all the Latin poets. As a poet, he is certainly inferior to Horace and Juvenal; and all the labours of Isaac Casaubon, who has written a most learned and elaborate commentary upon him, cannot make him equal to either of them as a satirist, though in virtue and learning he exceeded them both. He was a professed imitator of Horace; yet had little of Horace's wit, ease, and talent at ridicule. His style is grand, figurative, poetical, and suitable to the dignity of the Stoic philosophy: and hence he shines most in recommending virtue and integrity: here it is that satire becomes him. He was too grave to court the muses with success; but he had a great soul, susceptible of noble sentiments, which give a grace but to indifferent poetry. His contemporaries thought highly of him. Quintilian allows, that Persius, although he wrote but one book of satires, acquired a great deal of true glory, Multum et serva gloria quaerens uno libro Persius meruit: and Martial says much the same thing, Sepius in libro memoratur Persius uno, &c.

**PERSON,** an individual substance of a rational intelligent nature. Thus we say, an ambassador represents the person of his prince; and that, in law, the father and son are reputed the same person.

The word person, persona, is thought to be borrowed à perfomando, from performing or counterfeiting; and is supposed to have first signified a mask: because, as Boethius informs us, in larva concursa fons volvatur: and hence the actors who appeared masked on the stage were sometimes called larvati and sometimes personati. He likewise says, that as the several actors represented each a single individual person, viz. Oedipus, or Chremes, or or Hecuba, or Medea; for this reason, other people, who were at the same time distinguished by something in their form, character, &c. whereby they might be known, came likewise to be called by the Latins persona, and by the Greeks προσωπα. Again, as actors rarely represented any but great and illustrious characters, the word came at length to import the mind, as being that whose dispositions constitute the character. And thus men, angels, and even God himself, were called persons. Things merely corporeal, as a stone, a plant, or a horse, were called hypophytales or hypophita, but never persons. Hence the learned suppose, that the same name person came to be used to signify some dignity, whereby a person is distinguished from another; as a father, husband, judge, magistrate, &c. In this sense we are to understand that of Cicero: "Cæsar never speaks of Pompey, but in terms of honour and respect: he does many hard and injurious things, however, against his person."

Person we have already defined to mean an individual substance of a reasonable nature. Now a thing may be individual two ways: 1. Logically, because it cannot be predicated of any other; as Cicero, Plato, &c. 2. Physically; in which sense a drop of water, separated from the ocean, may be called an individual. Person is an individual nature in each of these senses; logically, according to Boethius, because person is not spoken of universals, but only of singulars and individuals; we do not say the person of an animal or a man, but of Cicero and Plato; and physically, since Socrates's hand or foot are never considered as persons. This last kind of individual is denominated two ways: positively, when the person is said to be the whole principle of action; for whatever thing action is attributed, that the philosophers call a person; and negatively, as when we say, with the Thomists, &c., that a person consists in this, that it does not exist in another as a more perfect being. Thus a man, though he consists of two different things, viz. body and spirit, is not two persons; because neither part of itself is a complete principle of action, but one person, since the manner of his consisting of body and spirit is such as constitutes one whole principle of action; nor does he exist in any other as a more perfect being; as, for example, Socrates's foot does in Socrates, or a drop of water in the ocean.