a large number of soldiers, consisting of horse and foot, completely armed, and provided with artillery, ammunition, provisions, &c. under the command of one general, having lieutenant-generals, major-generals, brigadiers, and other officers under him. An army is composed of squadrons and battalions; and is usually divided into three corps, and formed in three lines: the first line is called the van-guard, the second the main-body, and the third the rear-guard, or body of reserve. The middle of each line is protected by the foot; the cavalry form the right and left wing of each line; and sometimes they place squadrons of horse in the intervals between the battalions. When the army is drawn up in order of battle, the horse are placed at five feet distance from each other, and the foot at three. In each line the battalions are distant from each other 180 feet, which is nearly equal to the extent of their front; and the same holds of the squadrons, which are about 300 feet distant, the extent of their own front. These intervals are left for the squadrons and battalions of the second line to range themselves against the intervals of the first, that both may more readily march through these spaces to the enemy: the first line is usually 300 feet distant from the second, and the second from the third, that there may be sufficient room to rally when the squadrons and battalions are broken. See the article War.

This is to be understood of a land army only. A naval or sea army is a number of ships of war, equipped and manned with sailors and marines, under the command of an admiral, with other inferior officers under him. See War, Part II.

It has been observed, that in Europe a prince with a million of subjects cannot keep an army of above 10,000 men, without ruining himself. It was otherwise wife in the ancient republics; the proportion of soldiers to the rest of the people, which is now as about one to 100, might then be as about one to eight. The reason seems owing to that equal partition of lands which the ancient founders of commonwealths made among their subjects; so that every man had a considerable property to defend, and means to defend it with; whereas, among us, the lands and riches of a nation being shared among a few, the rest have no way of subsisting but by trades, arts, and the like; and have neither any free property to defend, nor means to enable them to go to war in defense of it, without starving their families. A large part of our people are either artisans or servants, and so only minister to the luxury and effeminacy of the great. While the equality of lands subsisted, Rome, though only a little state, being refused the succours which the Latins were obliged to furnish after the taking of the city in the consulship of Camillus, presently raised ten legions within its own walls; which was more, Livy assures us, than they were able to do in his time, though matters of the greatest part of the world. A full proof, adds the historian, that we are not grown stronger; and that what swells our city is only luxury, and the means and effects of it.

Our armies antiently were a sort of militia, composed chiefly of the vassals and tenants of the lords. When each company had served the number of days or months enjoined by their tenure, or the customs of the fees they held, they returned home. The armies of the empire consist of divers bodies of troops furnished by the several circles. The gos of the French armies under the Merovingian race, consisted of infantry. Under Pepin and Charlemagne, the armies consisted almost equally of cavalry and foot: but since the declension of the Carolingian line, the fees being become hereditary, the national armies, says Le Gendre, are chiefly cavalry.

A well regulated standing army is greatly superior to a militia; although a militia, it is to be observed, after serving two or three campaigns, may become equal to a standing army, and in every respect a match for veteran troops. See MILITIA.

One of the first standing armies of which we have a distinct account, in any well authenticated history, is that of Philip of Macedon. His frequent wars with the Thracians, Illyrians, Thessalians, and some of the Greek cities in the neighborhood of Macedon, gradually formed his troops, which in the beginning were probably militia, to the exact discipline of a standing army. When he was at peace, which was very seldom, and never for any long time together, he was careful not to disband that army. It vanquished and subdued, after a long and violent struggle, indeed, the gallant and well exercised militias of the principal republics of ancient Greece; and afterwards, with very little struggle, the effeminate and ill exercised militia of the great Persian empire. The fall of the Greek republics and of the Persian empire, was the effect of the irresistible superiority which a standing army has over every sort of militia. It is the first great revolution in the affairs of mankind of which history has preserved any distinct or circumstantial account.

The fall of Carthage, and the consequent elevation of Rome, is the second. All the varieties in the fortune of those two famous republics may very well be accounted for from the same cause.

From the end of the first to the beginning of the second Carthaginian war, the armies of Carthage were continually in the field, and employed under three great generals, who succeeded one another in the command; Hamilcar, his son-in-law Asdrubal, and his son Hannibal; first in chastising their own rebellious slaves, afterwards in subduing the revolted nations of Africa, and, lastly, in conquering the great kingdom of Spain. The army which Hannibal led from Spain into Italy must necessarily, in those different wars, have been gradually formed to the exact discipline of a standing army. The Romans, in the mean time, though they had not been altogether at peace, yet they had not during this period, been engaged in any war of very great consequence; and their military discipline, it is generally said, was a good deal relaxed. The Roman armies which Hannibal encountered at Trebia, Thrasymenus, and Cannae, were militia opposed to a standing army. This circumstance, it is probable, contributed more than any other to determine the fate of those battles.

The standing army which Hannibal left behind him in Spain, had the like superiority over the militia which the Romans sent to oppose it, and in a few years, under the command of his brother the younger Asdrubal, expelled them almost entirely from that country.

Hannibal was ill supplied from home. The Roman militia, being continually in the field, became in the progress of the war a well disciplined and well exercised standing army; and the superiority of Hannibal grew every day less and less. Asdrubal judged it necessary to lead the whole, or almost the whole, of the standing army which he commanded in Spain, to the assistance of his brother in Italy. In this march he is said to have been misled by his guides; and in a country which he did not know, was surprised and attacked by another standing army, in every respect equal or superior to his own, and was entirely defeated.

When Asdrubal had left Spain, the great Scipio found nothing to oppose him but a militia inferior to his own. He conquered and subdued that militia; and in the course of the war, his own militia necessarily became a well disciplined and well exercised standing army. That standing army was afterwards carried to Africa, where it found nothing but a militia to oppose it. In order to defend Carthage, it became necessary to recall the standing army of Hannibal. The disheartened and frequently defeated African militia joined it, and at the battle of Zama composed the greater part of the troops of Hannibal. The event of that day determined the fate of the two rival republics.

From the end of the second Carthaginian war till the fall of the Roman republic, the armies of Rome were in every respect standing armies. The standing army of Macedon made some resistance to their arms. In the height of their grandeur it cost them two great wars and three great battles, to subdue that little kingdom; of which the conquest would probably have been still more difficult, had it not been for the cowardice of its last king. The militias of all the civilized nations of the ancient world, of Greece, of Syria, and of Egypt, made but a feeble resistance to the standing armies of Rome. The militias of some barbarous nations defended themselves much better. The Scythian or Tartar militia, which Mithridates drew from the countries north of the Euxine and Caspian seas, were the most formidable enemies whom the Romans had to encounter after the second Carthaginian war. The Parthian and German militias too were always respectable, and upon several occasions gained very considerable advantages over the Roman armies. In general, however, and when the Roman armies were well commanded, they appear to have been very much superior.

Many different causes contributed to relax the discipline of the Roman armies. Its extreme severity was, perhaps, one of those causes. In the days of their grandeur, when no enemy appeared capable of opposing them, their heavy armour was laid aside as unnecessarily burdensome, their laborious exercises were neglected as unnecessarily toilsome. Under the Roman emperors, besides, the standing armies of Rome, those particularly which guarded the German and Pannonian frontiers, became dangerous to their masters, against whom they used frequently to set up their own generals. In order to render them less formidable, according to some authors Diocletian, according to others Constantine, first withdrew them from the frontiers, where they had always before been encamped in great bodies, generally of two or three legions each, and dispersed them in small bodies through the different provincial towns, from whence they were scarce ever removed, but when it became necessary to repel an invasion. Small bodies of soldiers quartered in trading and manufacturing towns, and seldom removed from these quarters, became themselves tradesmen, artificers, and manufacturers. The civil came to predominate over the military character; and the standing armies of Rome gradually degenerated into a corrupt, neglected, and undisciplined militia, incapable of resisting the attack of the German and Scythian militias, which soon afterwards invaded the western empire. It was only by hiring the militia of some of those nations to oppose to that of others, that the emperors were for some time able to defend themselves. The fall of the western empire is the third great revolution in the affairs of mankind, of which ancient history has preserved any distinct or circumstantial account. It was brought about by the irresistible superiority which the militia of a barbarous has over that of a civilized nation; which the militia of a nation of shepherds has over that of a nation of husbandmen, artificers, and manufacturers. The victories which have been gained by militias have generally been not over standing armies, but over other militias in exercise and discipline inferior to themselves. Such were the victories which the Greek militia gained over that of the Persian empire; and such too were those which in later times the Swiss militia gained over that of the Austrians and Burgundians.

The military force of the German and Scythian nations, who established themselves upon the ruins of the western empire, continued for some time to be of the same kind in their new settlements as it had been in their original country. It was a militia of shepherds and husbandmen, which in time of war took the field under the command of the same chieftains whom it was accustomed to obey in peace. It was therefore tolerably well exercised and tolerably well disciplined. As arts and industry advanced, however, the authority of the chieftains gradually decayed, and the great body of the people had less time to spare for military exercises. Both the discipline and the exercise of the feudal militia, therefore, went gradually to ruin, and standing armies were gradually introduced to supply the place of it. When the expedient of a standing army, besides, had once been adopted by one civilized nation, it became necessary that all its neighbours should follow the example. They soon found that their safety depended upon their doing so, and that their own militia was altogether incapable of resisting the attack of such an army.

The soldiers of a standing army, though they may never have seen an enemy, yet have frequently appeared to possess all the courage of veteran troops, and the very moment that they took the field, to have been fit to face the hardiest and most experienced veterans. In a long peace the generals perhaps may sometimes forget their skill; but where a well regulated standing army has been kept up, the soldiers seem never to forget their valour.

When a civilized nation depends for its defence upon a militia, it is at all times exposed to be conquered by any barbarous nation which happens to be in its neighbourhood. The frequent conquests of all the civilized countries in Asia by the Tartars, sufficiently demonstrates the natural superiority which the militia of a barbarous has over that of a civilized nation. A well regulated standing army is superior to every militia. Such an army, as it can best be maintained by an opulent and civilized nation, so it can alone defend such a nation against the invasion of a poor and barbarous neighbour. It is only by means of a standing army, therefore, that the civilization of any country can be perpetuated, or even preserved for any considerable time.

As it is only by means of a well regulated standing army that a civilized country can be defended, so it is only by means of it that a barbarous country can be suddenly and tolerably civilized. A standing army establishes, with an irresistible force, the law of the sovereign through the remotest provinces of the empire, and maintains some degree of regular government in countries which could not otherwise admit of any. Whoever examines with attention the improvements which Peter the Great introduced into the Russian empire, will find that they almost all resolve themselves into the establishment of a well regulated standing army. It is the instrument which executes and maintains all his other regulations. That degree of order and internal peace which that empire has ever since enjoyed, is altogether owing to the influence of that army.

Men of republican principles have been jealous of a standing army as dangerous to liberty. It certainly is so, wherever the interest of the general and that of the principal officers are not necessarily connected with the support of the constitution of the state. The standing army of Caesar destroyed the Roman republic; the standing army of Cromwell turned the long parliament out of doors. But where the sovereign is himself the general, general, and the principal nobility and gentry of the country the chief officers of the army; where the military force is placed under the command of those who have the greatest interest in the support of the civil authority, because they have themselves the greatest share of that authority; a standing army can never be dangerous to liberty: on the contrary it may, in some cases, be favourable to liberty. The security which it gives to the sovereign renders unnecessary that troublesome jealousy which in some modern republics seems to watch over the minutest actions, and to be at all times ready to disturb the peace of every citizen. Where the security of the magistrate, though supported by the principal people of the country, is endangered by every popular discontent; where a small tumult is capable of bringing about in a few hours a great revolution; the whole authority of government must be employed to suppress and punish every murmur and complaint against it. To the sovereign, on the contrary, who feels himself supported not only by the natural aristocracy of the country, but by a well regulated standing army, the rudest, the most groundless, and the most licentious representations, can give little disturbance. He can safely pardon or neglect them, and his consciousness of his own superiority naturally disposes him to do so. That degree of liberty which approaches to licentiousness can be tolerated only in countries where the sovereign is secured by a well regulated standing army. It is in such countries only that the public safety does not require that the sovereign should be trusted with any discretionary power for suppressing even the impertinent wantonness of this licentious liberty.