The terms congruity and propriety are not applicable to any single object: they imply a plurality, and obviously signify a particular relation between different objects. Thus we currently say, that a decent garb is suitable or proper for a judge; modest behaviour for a young woman; and a lofty style for an epic poem: and on the other hand, that it is unsuitable or incongruous to see a little woman sunk in an overgrown farthingale, a coat richly embroidered covering coarse and dirty linen, a mean subject in an elevated style, an elevated subject in a mean style, a first minister darning his wife's stocking, or a reverend prelate in lawn sleeves dancing a hornpipe.

The perception we have of this relation, which seems peculiar to man, cannot proceed from any other cause, but from a sense of congruity or propriety; for, supposing us destitute of that sense, the terms would be to us unintelligible.

It is a matter of experience, that congruity or propriety, wherever perceived, is agreeable; and that incongruity, or impropriety, wherever perceived, is disagreeable. The only difficulty is, to ascertain what are the particular objects that in conjunction suggest these relations; for there are many objects that do not: the sea, for example, viewed in conjunction with a picture, or a man viewed in conjunction with a mountain, suggest not either congruity or incongruity. It seems natural to infer, what will be found true by induction, that we never perceive congruity or incongruity but among things that are connected together by some relation; such as a man and his actions, a principal and his accessories, a subject and its ornaments. We are indeed so framed by nature, as, among things so connected, to require a certain suitability or correspondence, termed congruity or propriety; and to be displeased when we find the opposite relation of incongruity or impropriety.

If things connected be the subject of congruity, it is reasonable before hand to expect, that a degree of congruity should be required proportioned to the degree of the connexion. And upon examination we find this to hold in fact: where the relation is intimate, as between a cause and its effect, a whole and its parts, we require the strictest congruity; but where the relation is slight, or accidental, as among things jumbled together in the same place, we require little or no congruity: the strictest propriety is required in behaviour and manner of living; because a man is connected with these by the relation of cause and effect: the relation between an edifice and the ground it stands upon, is of the most intimate kind: and therefore the situation of a great house ought to be lofty; its relation to neighbouring hills, rivers, plains, being that of propinquity only, demands but a small share of congruity; among members of the same club, congruity ought to be considerable, as well as among things placed for show in the same niche; among passengers in a stage coach, we require very little congruity; and less still at a public spectacle.

Congruity is so nearly allied to beauty, as commonly to be held a species of it; and yet they differ essentially as never to coincide: beauty, like colour, is placed upon a single subject; congruity upon a plurality: further, a thing beautiful in itself, may, with relation to other things, produce the strongest sense of incongruity.

Congruity and propriety are commonly reckoned synonymous terms; but they are distinguishable, and the precise meaning of each must be ascertained. Congruity is the genus of which propriety is a species; for we call nothing propriety, but that congruity or suitability which ought to subsist between sensible beings and their thoughts, words, and actions.

In order to give a full view of these secondary relations, we shall trace them through some of the most considerable primary relations. The relation of a part to the whole, being extremely intimate, demands the utmost degree of congruity; even the slightest deviation is disagreeable.

Examples of congruity and incongruity are furnished in plenty by the relation between a subject and its ornaments. A literary performance intended merely for amusement, is susceptible of much ornament, as well as a music-room or a play-house; for in gaiety, the mind hath a peculiar relish for show and decoration. The most gorgeous apparel, however improper in tragedy, is not unsuitable to opera-actors; the truth is, an opera, in its present form, is a mighty fine thing; but as it deviates from nature in its capital circumstances, we look not for nature or propriety in those which are accessory. On the other hand, a serious and important subject admits not much ornament: nor a subject that of itself is extremely beautiful: and a subject that fills the mind with its loitines and grandeur, appears best in a dress altogether plain.

To a person of a mean appearance, gorgeous apparel is unsuitable; which, besides the incongruity, has a bad effect; for by contrast it shows the meanness of appearance in the strongest light. Sweetness of look and manner requires simplicity of dress, joined with the greatest elegance. A stately and majestic air requires sumptuous apparel, which ought not to be gaudy, nor crowded with little ornaments. A woman of consummate beauty can bear to be highly adorned, and yet shows best in a plain dress:

For loveliness Needs not the foreign aid of ornament, But is, when unadorn'd, adorn'd the most.

Thomson's Autumn, 208.

Congruity regulates not only the quantity of ornament, but also the kind. The ornaments that embellish a dancing room ought to be all of them gay. No picture is proper for a church but what has religion for its subject. All the ornaments upon a shield ought to relate to war; and Virgil, with great judgment, confines the carvings upon the shield of Æneas to the military history of the Romans: but this beauty is overlooked by Homer; for the bulk of the sculpture Congruity upon the shield of Achilles, is of the arts of peace in general, and of joy and festivity in particular; the author of Telemachus betrays the same inattention, in describing that young hero.

In judging of propriety with regard to ornaments, we must attend, not only to the nature of the subject that is to be adorned, but also to the circumstances in which it is placed; the ornaments that are proper for a ball, will appear not altogether so decent at public worship; and the same person ought to dress differently for a marriage feast and for a burial.

Nothing is more intimately related to a man, than his sentiments, words, and actions; and therefore we require here the strictest conformity. When we find what we thus require, we have a lively sense of propriety; when we find the contrary, our sense of impropriety is not less lively. Hence the universal difference of affectation, which consists in making a show of greater delicacy and refinement than is suited either to the character or circumstance of the person.

Congruity and propriety, wherever perceived, appear agreeable; and every agreeable object produces in the mind a pleasant emotion; incongruity and impropriety, on the other hand, are disagreeable; and of course produce painful emotions. These emotions, whether pleasant or painful, sometimes vanish without any consequence; but more frequently occasion other emotions, which we proceed to exemplify.

When any flight incongruity is perceived in an accidental combination of persons or things, as of passengers in a stage-coach, or of individuals dining at an ordinary; the painful emotion of incongruity, after a momentary existence, vanishes without producing any effect. But this is not the case of propriety and impropriety: voluntary acts, whether words or deeds, are imputed to the author; when proper, we reward him with our esteem; when improper, we punish him with our contempt. Let us suppose, for example, a generous action suited to the character of the author, which raises him in and every spectator the pleasant emotion of propriety; this emotion generates in the author both self-esteem and joy, the former when he considers his relation to the action, and the latter when he considers the good opinion that others will entertain of him: the same emotion of propriety produces in the spectators esteem for the author of the action; and when they think of themselves, it also produces, by means of contrast, an emotion of humility. To discover the effects of an unfitting action, we must invert each of these circumstances: the painful emotion of impropriety generates in the author of the action both humility and shame; the former when he considers his relation to the action, and the latter when he considers what others will think of him: the same emotion of impropriety produces in the spectators contempt for the author of the action; and it also produces, by means of contrast, when they think of themselves, an emotion of self-esteem. Here then are many different emotions, derived from the same action, considered in different views by different persons; a machine provided with many springs, and not a little complicated. Propriety of action, it would seem, is a chief favourite of nature, when such care and solicitude is bestowed upon it. It is not left to our own choice; but, like justice, is required at our hands; and, like justice, is enforced by natural rewards and punishments: a man cannot, with impunity, do anything unbecoming or improper; he suffers the chastisement of contempt inflicted by others, and of shame inflicted by himself. An apparatus so complicated, and so singular, ought to rouse our attention; for nature doth nothing in vain; and we may conclude with great certainty, that this curious branch of the human constitution is intended for some valuable purpose.

A gross impropriety is punished with contempt and indignation, which are vented against the offender by corresponding external expressions; nor is even the slightest impropriety suffered to pass without some degree of contempt. But there are improprieties, of the lighter kind, that provoke laughter: of which we have examples without end, in the blunders and absurdities of our own species: such improprieties receive a different punishment, as will appear by what follows. The emotions of contempt and of laughter occasioned by an impropriety of this kind, uniting intimately in the mind of the spectator, are expressed externally by a peculiar sort of laugh, termed a laugh of derision or scorn. An impropriety that thus moves not only contempt, but laughter, is distinguished by the epithet of ridiculous; and a laugh of derision or scorn is the punishment provided for it by nature. Nor ought it to escape observation, that we are so fond of inflicting this punishment, as sometimes to exert it even against creatures of an inferior species; witness a turkey-cock swelling with pride, and strutting with displayed feathers; a ridiculous object, which in a gay mood is apt to provoke a laugh of derision.

We must not expect, that these different improprieties are separated by distinct boundaries; for of improprieties, from the slightest to the most gross, from the most trifling to the most serious, there are degrees without end. Hence it is, that in viewing some unbecoming actions, too trifling for anger, and too serious for derision, the spectator feels a sort of mixed emotion, partaking both of derision and of anger; which accounts for an expression, common with respect to the impropriety of some actions, that we know not whether to laugh or be angry.

It cannot fail to be observed, that in the case of a trifling impropriety, which is always slight, the contempt we have for the offender is extremely faint, though derision, its gratification, is extremely pleasant. This disproportion between a passion and its gratification, seems not conformable to the analogy of nature. In looking about for a solution, we must reflect upon what is laid down above, that an improper action not only moves our contempt for the author, but also, by means of contrast, swells the good opinion we have of ourselves. This contributes, more than any other article, to the pleasure we have in ridiculing follies and absurdities; and accordingly, it is well known, that they who put the greatest value upon themselves are the most prone to laugh at others. Pride, which is a vivid passion, pleasant in itself, and not less so in its gratification, would singly be sufficient to account for the pleasure of ridicule, without borrowing any aid from contempt. Hence appears the reason of a noted observation, That we are the most disposed to ridicule the Congruity, the blunders and absurdities of others, when we are in high spirits; for in high spirits, self-conceit displays itself with more than ordinary vigour.

With regard to the final causes of congruity and impropriety; one regarding congruity, is pretty obvious, that the sense of congruity, as one principle of the fine arts, contributes in a remarkable degree to our entertainment. Congruity, indeed, with respect to quantity coincides with proportion: when the parts of a building are nicely adjusted to each other, it may be said indifferently, that it is agreeable by the congruity of its parts, or by the proportion of its parts. But propriety, which regards voluntary agents only, can never be the same with proportion, a very long nose is disproportionate, but cannot be termed improper. In some instances, it is true, impropriety coincides with disproportion in the same subject, but never in the same respect; for example, a very little man buckled to a long toledo: considering the man and the sword with respect to size, we perceive a disproportion; considering the sword as the choice of the man, we perceive an impropriety.

The sense of impropriety with respect to mistakes, blunders, and absurdities, is happily contrived for the good of mankind. In the spectators, it is productive of mirth and laughter, excellent recreation in an interval from business. But this is a trifle in respect of what follows. It is painful to be the subject of ridicule; and to punish with ridicule the man who is guilty of an absurdity, tends to put him more upon his guard in time coming. Thus even the most innocent blunder is not committed with impunity; because, were errors licensed where they do not hurt, inattention would grow into a habit, and be the occasion of much hurt.

The final cause of propriety as to moral duties, is of all the most illustrious. To have a just notion of it, the moral duties that respect others must be distinguished from those that respect ourselves. Fidelity, gratitude, and the forbearing injury, are examples of the first sort; temperance, modesty, firmness of mind, are examples of the other: the former are made duties by the sense of justice; the latter by the sense of propriety. Here is a final cause of the sense of propriety, that must rouse our attention. It is undoubtedly the interest of every man, to suit his behaviour to the dignity of his nature, and to the station allotted him by Providence; for such rational conduct contributes in every respect to happiness, by preserving health, by procuring plenty, by gaining the esteem of others, and, which of all is the greatest blessing, by gaining a justly-founded self-esteem. But in a matter so essential to our well-being, even self-interest is not relied on: the powerful authority of duty is superadded to the motive of interest. The God of nature, in all things essential to our happiness, hath observed one uniform method; to keep us steady in our conduct, he hath fortified us with natural laws and principles, congruity which prevent many aberrations, that would daily happen were we totally surrendered to so fallible a guide as human reason. Propriety cannot rightly be considered in another light, than as the natural law that regulates our conduct with respect to ourselves; as justice is the natural law that regulates our conduct with respect to others. We call propriety a law, not less than justice; because both are equally rules of conduct that ought to be obeyed: propriety includes this obligation; for to say an action is proper, is, in other words, to say, that it ought to be performed; and to say it is improper, is, in other words, to say that it ought to be borne. It is this very character of ought and should that makes justice a law to us; and the same character is applicable to propriety, though perhaps more faintly than to justice: but the difference is in degree only, not in kind; and we ought, without hesitation or reluctance, to submit equally to the government of both.

But it must, in the next place, be observed, that to the sense of propriety, as well as of justice, are annexed the sanctions of rewards and punishments; which evidently prove the one to be a law as well as the other. The satisfaction a man hath in doing his duty, joined with the esteem and good will of others, is the reward that belongs to both equally. The punishments also, though not the same, are nearly allied; and differ in degree more than in quality. Disobedience to the law of justice, is punished with remorse; disobedience to the law of propriety, with shame, which is remorse in a lower degree. Every transgression of the law of justice raises indignation in the beholder; and so doth every flagrant transgression of the law of propriety. Slighter improprieties receive a milder punishment: they are always rebuked with some degree of contempt, and frequently with derision. In general, it is true, that the rewards and punishments annexed to the sense of propriety, are slighter in degree than those annexed to the sense of justice: which is wisely ordered, because duty to others is still more essential to society than duty to ourselves; for society could not subsist a moment were individuals not protected from the headstrong and turbulent passion of their neighbours.