in a general sense, the act of accomplishing, finishing, or achieving anything.

in Law, the completing or finishing some act, as of judgment, deed, &c. and it usually signifies the obtaining possession of any thing recovered by judgment of law.

Sir Edward Coke observes, that there are two sorts of executions: the one final; and the other a quoique, that tends to an end. An execution final is that which makes money of the defendant's goods, or extends to his lands and delivers them to the plaintiff, who accepts the same in satisfaction; and this is the end of the suit, and the whole that the king's writ requires to be done. The writ of execution with a quoique, though it tends to an end, yet is not final, as in the case capas ad satisfac. where the defendant's body is to be taken, in order that the plaintiff may be satisfied for his debt. See CAPTAS.

Executions are either in personal, real, or mixed actions. In a personal action, the execution may be made three ways, viz. by the writs of capas ad satisfaciendam, against the body of the defendant; fieri facias, against his goods; or elegit, against his lands. See FIERI Facias and ELEGIT.

In a real and mixed action, the execution is by writ of habere facias satisfaciam, and habere possessionem*. Writs of execution bind the property of goods only from the time of delivery of the writ to the sheriff; but the land is bound from the day of the judgment obtained; and here the sale of any goods for valuable consideration, after a judgment, and before the execution awarded, will be good. It is otherwise as to lands, of which execution may be made, even on a purchase after the judgment, though the defendant fell such land before execution. Likewise, sheriffs may deliver in execution all the lands whereof others shall be seized in trust for him against whom execution is had on a judgment, &c.

When any judgment is signed, the execution may be taken out immediately thereon; but if it be not inflicted within a year and a day after, where there is no fault Execution, fault in the defendant, as in the case of an injunction, writ of error, &c., there must be a *seire facias*, to revive the judgment; though, if the plaintiff files out any writ of execution within the year, he may continue it after the year is expired. After judgment against the defendant, in an action wherein special bail is given, the plaintiff is at liberty to have execution against such defendant, or against his bail: but this is understood where the defendant does not render himself, according to law, in safeguard of the bail; and execution may not regularly be sued forth against a bail, till a default is returned against the principal: also if the plaintiff takes the bail, he shall never take the principal.

It is held that an execution may be executed after the death of the defendant: for his executor, being privy thereto, is liable, as well as the testator. The executor is an entire thing, so that he who begins must end it; therefore, a new sheriff may distrain an old one, to sell the goods seized on a distressing, and to bring the money into court.

**Execution**, in criminal cases, the completion of human punishment. This follows judgment†; and must in all cases, capital as well as otherwise, be performed, by the legal officer, the sheriff or his deputy; whose warrant for so doing was anciently by precept under the hand and seal of the judges, as it is still practised in the court of the lord high steward, upon the execution of a peer: though, in the court of the peers in parliament, it is done by writ from the king. Afterwards it was established, that in case of life, the judge may command execution to be done without any writ. And now the usage is, for the judge to sign the calendar or list of all the prisoners names, with their separate judgments in the margin, which is left with the sheriff. As, for a capital felony, it is written opposite to the prisoner's name, "let him be hanged by the neck;" formerly in the days of Latin and abbreviation, "suf. per col." for "suspendatur per collum."

And this is the only warrant that the sheriff has for so material an act as taking away the life of another. It may certainly afford matter of speculation, that in civil causes there should be such a variety of writs of execution to recover a trifling debt, issued in the king's name, and under the seal of the court, without which the sheriff cannot legally stir one step; and yet that the execution of a man, the most important and terrible task of any, should depend upon a marginal note.

The sheriff, upon receipt of his warrant, is to do execution within a convenient time: which in the country is also left at large. In London, indeed, a more solemn and becoming exactness is used, both as to the warrant of execution and the time of executing thereof: for the recorder, after reporting to the king in person the case of the several prisoners, and receiving his royal pleasure, that the law must take its course, issues his warrant to the sheriffs, directing them to do execution on the day and at the place assigned. And in the court of king's bench, if the prisoner be tried at the bar, or brought there by habeas corpus, a rule is made for his execution; either specifying the time and place, or leaving it to the discretion of the sheriff.

And, throughout the kingdom, by statute 25 Geo. II. c. 37, it is enacted that, in case of murder, the judge shall in his sentence direct execution to be performed on the next day but one after sentence passed. But, otherwise, the time and place of execution are by law no part of the judgment. It has been well observed, that it is of great importance that the punishment should follow the crime as early as possible; that the prospect of gratification or advantage, which tempts a man to commit the crime, should instantly awake the attendant idea of punishment. Delay of execution serves only to separate these ideas; and then the execution itself affects the minds of the spectators rather as a terrible sight, than as the necessary consequence of transgression.

The sheriff cannot alter the manner of the execution, by substituting one death for another, without being guilty of felony himself.† It is held also by Sir Edward Coke and Sir Matthew Hale, that even the king cannot change the punishment of the law, by altering the hanging or burning into beheading; though, when beheading is part of the sentence, the king may remit the rest. And, notwithstanding some examples to the contrary, Sir Edward Coke strongly maintains, that *judicandum est legibus, non exemptis*. But others have thought, and more justly, that this prerogative, being founded in mercy, and immemorially exercised by the crown, is part of the common law. For hitherto, in every instance, all these exchanges have been for more merciful kinds of death; and how far this may also fall within the king's power of granting conditional pardons (viz. by remitting a severe kind of death, on condition that the criminal submits to a milder) is a matter that may bear consideration. It is observable, that when Lord Stafford was executed for the popish plot in the reign of King Charles II, the then sheriffs of London, having received the king's writ for beheading him, petitioned the house of lords, for a command or order from their lordships, how the said judgment should be executed: for, he being prosecuted by impeachment, they entertained a notion (which is said to have been countenanced by Lord Ruffell), that the king could not pardon any part of the sentence. The lords resolved, that the scruples of the sheriffs were unnecessary; and declared, that the king's writ ought to be obeyed. Disappointed of raising a flame in that assembly, they immediately signified to the house of commons by one of the members, that they were not satisfied as to the power of the said writ. That house took two days to consider of it; and then fully resolved, that the house was content that the sheriff do execute Lord Stafford by severing his head from his body. It is farther related, that when afterwards the same Lord Ruffell was condemned for high treason upon indictment, the king, while he remitted the ignominious part of the sentence, observed, "That his lordship would now find he was possessed of that prerogative, which in the case of Lord Stafford he had denied him." One can hardly determine (at this distance from those turbulent times), which most to disapprove of, the indecent and languid zeal of the subject, or the cool and cruel sarcasm of the sovereign.

To conclude: It is clear, that if, upon judgment to be hanged by the neck till he is dead, the criminal be not thoroughly killed, but revives, the sheriff must hang him again. For the former hanging was no execution of the sentence; and, if a false tenderness were to be indulged in such cases, a multitude of collusions might ensue. Nay, even while abjurations were in force, such Execution, in the law of Scotland. See Law Index.

the French music, is used to denote the manner of fingering, or of the performance of a fong. "As to the manner of fingering, called in France execution, no nation may, with any probability dispute it with the French. If the French, by their commerce with the Italians have gained a bolder composition, the Italians have made their advantage of the French, in learning of them a more polite, moving, and exquisite execution." St Evremond.