in Law, signifies a complete feudal property. Hence, where the bare fiefment of any feudal subject is meant to be conveyed to A, and the absolute property to B, that meaning is expressed thus; "to A in fiefment, and to B in fee." See LAW, No. lxix. cclxv.

Fees are commonly divided into absolute, otherwise called fees-simple; and limited, one species of which we usually call fee-tail.

I. Tenant in fee-simple (or as he is frequently styled, tenant in fee), is he that hath lands, tenements, or hereditaments, to hold to him and his heirs for ever; generally, absolutely and simply; without mentioning what heirs, but referring that to his own pleasure, or to the disposition of the law. The true meaning of the word fee (feodum) is the same with that of feud or See Feodal fief, and in its original sense it is taken in contradiction to allodium; which latter the writers on this subject define to be every man's own land, which he possesseth merely in his own right, without owing any rent or service to any superior. This is property in its highest degree; and the owner thereof hath absolutum et directum dominium, and therefore is said to be seized thereof absolutely in dominium seu, in his own demesne. But feodum or fee, is that which is held of some superior, on condition of rendering him services; in which superior the ultimate property of the land resides. And therefore Sir Henry Spelman defines a feud or fee to be, The right which the vassal or tenant hath in lands to use the same and take the profits thereof to him and his heirs, rendering to the lord his due services; the mere allodial property of the foil always remaining in the lord. This allodial property no subject in Britain has; it being a received and now undeniable principle in the law, that all the lands are holden immediately or immediately of the king. The king therefore only hath absolutum et directum dominium; but all subjects lands are in the nature of feodum or fee, whether derived to them by descent from their ancestors, or purchased for a valuable consideration; for they cannot come to any man by either of those ways, unless accompanied with those feudal clogs which were laid upon the first feudatory when it was originally granted.

A subject therefore hath only the usufruct, and not the absolute property, of the soil; or, as Sir Edward Coke expresses it, he hath dominium utile, but not dominium directum. And hence it is, that, in the most solemn acts of law, we express the strongest and highest estate that any subject can have, by these words, "he is seised thereof in his demesne, as of fee." It is a man's demesne, dominium, or property, since it belongs to him and his heirs for ever: yet this dominium, property, or demesne, is strictly not absolute or allodial, but qualified or feudal: it is of his demesne, as of fee; that is, it is not purely and simply his own, since it is held of a superior lord, in whom the ultimate property resides.

This is the primary sense and acceptation of the word fee. But (as Sir Martin Wight very justly observes) the doctrine, "that all lands are holden," having been for so many ages a fixed and undeniable axiom, the English lawyers do very rarely (of late years especially) use the word fee in this its primary original sense, in contradistinction to allodium or absolute property, with which they have no concern; but generally use it to express the continuance or quantity of estate. A fee therefore, in general, signifies an estate of inheritance; being the highest and most extensive interest that a man can have in a feud: and when the term is used simply, without any other adjunct, or has the adjunct of simple annexed to it (as, a fee, or a fee-simple), it is used in contradistinction to a fee-conditional at the common law, or a fee-tail by the statute; importing an absolute inheritance, clear of any condition, limitation, or restrictions to particular heirs, but descendable to the heirs-general, whether male or female, lineal, or collateral. And in no other sense than this is the king said to be seised in fee, he being the feudatory of no man.

Taking therefore fee in this its secondary sense, as a state of inheritance, it is applicable to, and may be had in, any kind of hereditaments either corporeal or incorporeal. But there is this distinction between the two species of hereditaments; that of a corporeal inheritance a man shall be said to be seised in his demesne, as of fee; of an incorporeal one he shall only be said to be seised as of fee, and not in his demesne. For as incorporeal hereditaments are in their nature collateral to, and issue out of, lands and houses, their owner hath no property, dominium, or demesne, in the thing itself, but hath only something derived out of it; resembling the servitutes, or services, of the civil law. The dominium, or property, is frequently in one man, while the appendage or service is in another. Thus Gaius may be seised as of fee, of a way going over the land, of which Titius is seised in his demesne as of fee.

The fee-simple or inheritance of lands and tenements is generally vested and resides in some person or other; though divers inferior estates may be carved out of it. As if one grants a lease for 21 years, or for one or two lives, the fee-simple remains vested in him and his heirs; and after the determination of those years or lives, the land reverts to the grantor or his heirs, who shall hold it again in fee-simple. Yet sometimes the fee may be in abeyance, that is (as the word signifies) in expectation, remembrance, and contemplation in law; there being no person in esse, in whom it can vest and abide, though... though the law considers it as always potentially existing, and ready to vest whenever a proper owner appears. Thus, in a grant to John for life, and afterwards to the heirs of Richard, the inheritance is plainly neither granted to John nor Richard, nor can it vest in the heirs of Richard till his death, nam nemo est heres viventis; it remains therefore in waiting, or abeyance, during the life of Richard. This is likewise always the case of a parson of a church, who hath only an estate therein for the term of his life; and the inheritance remains in abeyance. And not only the fee, but the freehold also, may be in abeyance; as, when a parson dies, the freehold of his glebe is in abeyance until a successor be named, and then it vests in the successor.

The word heirs is necessary in the grant or donation, in order to make a fee or inheritance. For if land be given to a man for ever, or to him and his assigns for ever, this vests in him but an estate for life. This very great nicety about the insertion of the word heirs in all feoffments and grants, in order to vest a fee, is plainly a relic of the feudal strictness: by which it was required, that the form of the donation should be punctually pursued: or that, as Craig expresses it, in the words of Baldus, donationes sunt stricti juris, ne quis plus donatife praefumatur quam in donatione expresserit. And therefore, as the personal abilities of the donee were originally supposed to be the only inducements to the gift, the donee's estate in the land extended only to his own person, and subsisted no longer than his life; unless the donor, by an express provision in the grant, gave it a longer continuance, and extended it also to his heirs. But this rule is now softened by many exceptions.

For, 1. It does not extend to devises by will; in which, as they were introduced at the time when the feudal rigour was apace wearing out, a more liberal construction is allowed; and therefore by a devise to a man for ever, or to one and his assigns for ever, or to one in fee-simple, the devisee hath an estate of inheritance; for the intention of the deviser is sufficiently plain from the words of perpetuity annexed, though he hath omitted the legal words of inheritance. But if the devise be to a man and his assigns, without annexing words of perpetuity, there the devisee shall take only an estate for life; for it does not appear that the deviser intended any more. 2. Neither does this rule extend to fines or recoveries, considered as a species of conveyance; for thereby an estate in fee passes by act and operation of law without the word heirs: as it does also for particular reasons, by certain other methods of conveyance, which have relation to a former grant or estate, wherein the word heirs was expressed. 3. In creations of nobility by writ, the peer so created hath an inheritance in his title, without expressing the word heirs; for they are implied in the creation, unless it be otherwise specially provided: but in creations by patent, which are stricti juris, the word heirs must be inserted, otherwise there is no inheritance. 4. In grants of lands to sole corporations and their successors, the word successors supplies the place of heirs; for as heirs take from the ancestor, so doth the successor from the predecessor. Nay, in a grant to a bishop, or other sole spiritual corporation, in frankalmogin, the word frankalmogin supplies the place of successors (as the word successors supplies the place of heirs) ex vi termini; and in all these cases a fee-simple vests in such sole corporation. But, in a grant of lands to a corporation aggregate, the word successors is not necessary, though usually inserted: for, albeit such simple grant be strictly only an estate for life, yet as that corporation never dies, such estate for life is perpetual, or equivalent to a fee-simple, and therefore the law allows it to be one. Lastly, In the case of the king, a fee-simple will vest in him, without the words heirs or successors in the grant; partly from prerogative royal, and partly from a reason similar to the last, because the king, in judgment of law, never dies. But the general rule is, that the word heirs is necessary to create an estate of inheritance.

II. We are next to consider limited fees, or such estates of inheritance as are clogged and confined with conditions or qualifications of any sort. And these we may divide into two sorts: 1. Qualified or base fees; and, 2. Fees conditional, so called at the common law; and afterwards fees-tail, in consequence of the statute de donis.

1. A base or qualified fee, is such a one as has a qualification subjoined thereto, and which must be determined whenever the qualification annexed to it is at an end. As, in the case of a grant to A and his heirs, tenants in the manor of Dale; in this instance, whenever the heirs of A cease to be tenants of that manor, the grant is entirely defeated. So, when Henry VI. granted to John Talbot, lord of the manor of Kingston Lisle in Berks, that he and his heirs, lords of the said manor, should be peers of the realm, by the title of Barons of Lisle; here John Talbot had a base or qualified fee in that dignity; and the instant he or his heirs quitted the seigniory of this manor, the dignity was at an end. This estate is a fee, because by possibility it may endure for ever in a man and his heirs; yet as that duration depends upon the concurrence of collateral circumstances, which qualify and debase the purity of the donation, it is therefore a qualified or base fee.

2. As to fees-conditional, or fee-tail, see the article TAIL.