in Jewish antiquity, certain supreme magistrates who governed the Israelites from the time of Joshua till the reign of Saul. These judges resembled the Athenian archons or Roman dictators. The dignity JUDGES

nity of judge was for life, but not always in uninterrupted succession. God himself, by some express declaration of his will, regularly appointed the judges; But the Israelites did not always wait for his appointment, but sometimes chose themselves a judge in times of danger. The power of the judges extended to affairs of peace and war. They were protectors of the laws, defenders of religion, avengers of all crimes; but they could make no laws, nor impose any new burdens upon the people. They lived without pomp or retinue, unless their own fortunes enabled them to do it; for the revenues of their office consisted in voluntary presents from the people. They continued from the death of Joshua till the beginning of the reign of Saul, being a space of about 339 years.

Judges, for ordinary affairs, civil and religious, were appointed by Moses in every city to terminate differences; in affairs of greater consequence, the differences were referred to the priests of Aaron's family, and the judge of the people or prince at that time established. Moses likewise set up two courts in all the cities, one consisting of priests and Levites, to determine points concerning the law and religion; the other consisting of heads of families, to decide in civil matters.

Book of Judges, a canonical book of the Old Testament, so called from its relating the state of the Israelites under the administration of many illustrious persons who were called judges, from being both the civil and military governors of the people, and who were raised up by God upon special occasions, after the death of Joshua, till the time of their making a king. In the time of this peculiar polity, there were several remarkable occurrences, which are recorded in this book. It acquaints us with the gross impiety of a new generation which sprung up after the death of Joshua; and gives us a short view of the dispensations of heaven towards this people, sometimes relieving and delivering them, and at others severely chastising them by the hands of their enemies.

Select Judges (Judices selecti), in Antiquity, were persons summoned by the praetor to give their verdict in criminal matters in the Roman courts, as juries do in ours. No person could be regularly admitted into this number till he was 25 years of age. The Sortitio Judicum, or impanelling the jury, was the office of the Judex Questuarius, and was performed after both parties were come into court, for each had a right to reject or challenge whom they pleaded, others being substituted in their room. The number of the Judices selecti varied, according to the nature of the charge. When the proper number appeared, they were sworn, took their places in the subsellia, and heard the trial.

Judgement, among logicians, a faculty or rather act of the human soul, whereby it compares its ideas, and perceives their agreement or disagreement. See Metaphysics; Logic, Part II.

Judgement, in Law, is the sentence pronounced by the court upon the matter contained in the record. Judgements are of four sorts. First, where the facts are confessed by the parties, and the law determined by the court; as in case of judgement upon demurrer; secondly, where the law is admitted by the parties, and the facts disputed; as in the case of judgement on verdict; thirdly, where both the fact and the law arising thereon are admitted by the defendant; which is the judgement of judgements by confession or default; or, lastly, where the plaintiff is convinced that either fact, or law, or both, are insufficient to support his action, and therefore abandons or withdraws his prosecution; which is the case in judgements upon a nonjust or retraxit.

The judgement, though pronounced or awarded by the judges, is not their determination or sentence, but the determination and sentence of the law. It is the conclusion that naturally and regularly follows from the premises of law and fact, which stands thus: Against him who hath rode over my corn, I may recover damages by law; but A hath rode over my corn; therefore I shall recover damages against A. If the major proposition be denied, this is a demurrer in law; if the minor, it is then an issue of fact; but if both be confessed or determined to be right, the conclusion or judgement of the court cannot but follow. Which judgement or conclusion depends not therefore on the arbitrary caprice of the judge, but on the settled and invariable principles of justice. The judgement, in short, is the remedy prescribed by law for the redress of injuries; and the suit or action is the vehicle or means of administering it. What that remedy may be, is indeed the result of deliberation and study to point out; and therefore the style of the judgement is, not that it is decreed or resolved by the court, for then the judgement might appear to be their own; but, "it is considered," conferendum est per curiam, that the plaintiff do recover his damages, his debt, his possession, and the like; which implies that the judgement is none of their own; but the act of law, pronounced and declared by the court, after due deliberation and inquiry. See Blackfriars Comment, iii. 396.

Judgement, in criminal cases, is the next stage of prosecution, after trial and conviction are past, in such crimes and misdemeanors as are either too high or too low to be included within the benefit of clergy. For when, upon a capital charge, the jury have brought in their verdict guilty in the presence of the prisoner; he is either immediately, or at a convenient time soon after, asked by the court, if he has anything to offer why judgement should not be awarded against him? And in case the defendant be found guilty of a misdemeanor, (the trial of which may, and does usually, happen in his absence, after he has once appeared), a capias is awarded and issued, to bring him in to receive his judgement; and if he absconds, he may be prosecuted even to outlawry. But whenever he appears in person, upon either a capital or inferior conviction, he may at this period, as well as at his arraignment, offer any exceptions to the indictment, in arrest or stay of judgement: as for want of sufficient certainty in setting forth either the person, the time, the place, or the offence. And if the objections be valid, the whole proceedings shall be let aside; but the party may be indicted again. And we may take notice, 1. That none of the statutes of jeofails, for amendment of errors, extend to indictments or proceedings in criminal cases; and therefore a defective indictment is not aided by a verdict, as defective pleadings in civil cases are. 2. That, in favour of life, great strictness has at all times been observed, in every point of an indictment. Sir Matthew Hale indeed complains, "that this strict- Judgement, nefs is grown to be a blemish and inconvenience in the law, and the administration thereof: for that more offenders escape by the over-easy ear given to exceptions in indictments, than by their own innocence; and many times grofs murders, burglaries, robberies, and other heinous and crying offences, remain unpunished by these unseemly niceties: to the reproach of the law, to the shame of the government, to the encouragement of villany, and to the dishonour of God.” And yet, notwithstanding this laudable zeal, no man was more tender of life than this truly excellent judge.

A pardon also may be pleaded in arrest of judgement; and it has the same advantage when pleaded here as when pleaded upon arraignment; viz. the having the attainder, and, of course, the corruption of blood: which nothing can restore but parliament, when a pardon is not pleaded till after sentence. And certainly, upon all accounts, when a man hath obtained a pardon, he is in the right to plead it as soon as possible. See Pardon.

Praying the benefit of clergy may also be ranked among the motions in arrest of judgement. See Benefit of Clergy.

If all the resources fail, the court must pronounce that judgement which the law hath annexed to the crime. Of these some are capital, which extend to the life of the offender, and consist generally in being hanged by the neck till dead; though in very atrocious crimes other circumstances of terror, pain, or disgrace, are superadded: as, in treasons of all kinds, being drawn or dragged to the place of execution; in high treason affecting the king’s person or government, embowelling alive, beheading, and quartering; and in murder, a public dissection. And in case of any treason committed by a female, the judgement is, to be burned alive. But the humanity of the English nation has authorized, by a tacit consent, an almost general mitigation of such parts of these judgements as favour of torture or cruelty: a fledge or hurdle being usually allowed to such traitors as are condemned to be drawn; and there being very few instances (and those accidental or by negligence) of any person’s being embowelled or burned, till previously deprived of sensation by strangling. Some punishments consist in exile or banishment, by abjuration of the realm, or transportation beyond the seas: others, in loss of liberty, by perpetual or temporary imprisonment. Some extend to confiscation, by forfeiture of lands, or moveables, or both, or of the profits of lands for life: others induce a disability of holding offices or employments, being heirs, executors, and the like. Some, though rarely, occasion a mutilation or dismembering, by cutting off the hand or ears: others fix a lasting stigma on the offender, by slitting the nostrils or branding in the hand or face. Some are merely pecuniary, by fitted or discretionary fines: and, lastly, there are others that consist principally in their ignominy, though most of them are mixed with some degree of corporeal pain; and these are inflicted chiefly for such crimes as either arise from indigence, or render even opulence disgraceful. Such as whipping, hard labour in the house of correction, the pillory, the stocks, and the ducking-stool.

Disgusting as this catalogue may seem, it will afford pleasure to a British reader, and do honour to the British laws, to compare it with that shocking apparatus of death and torment to be met with in the criminal codes of almost every other nation in Europe. And it is moreover one of the glories of our law, that the nature, though not always the quantity or degree, of punishment is ascertained for every offence; and that it is not left in the breast of any judge, nor even of a jury, to alter that judgement which the law has beforehand ordained for every subject alike, without respect of persons. For if judgements were to be the private opinions of the judge, men would then be slaves to their magistrates; and would live in society, without knowing exactly the conditions and obligations which it lays them under. And, besides, as this prevents oppression on the one hand; so, on the other, it stifles all hopes of impunity or mitigation, with which an offender might flatter himself if his punishment depended on the humour and discretion of the court. Whereas, where an established penalty is annexed to crimes, the criminal may read their certain consequence in that law, which ought to be the unvaried rule, as it is the inflexible judge, of his actions.