something belonging to the soldiery or militia.

MILITARY Discipline, the training of soldiers, and the due enforcement of the laws and regulations instituted by authority for their conduct.

Next to the forming of troops, military discipline is the first object that presents itself to our notice; it is the soul of all armies; and unless it be established amongst them with great prudence, and supported with unflinching resolution, they are no better than so many contemptible heaps of rabble, which are more dangerous to the very state that maintains them than even its declared enemies.

MILITARY Execution, the ravaging or destroying of a country, or town, that refuses to pay the contribution inflicted upon them.

MILITARY Exercise. See Exercise and Words of Command.

MILITARY State, in British polity, one of the three divisions of the laity. See Laity.

This state includes the whole of the soldiery, or such persons as are peculiarly appointed among the rest of the people for the safeguard and defence of the realm.

In a land of liberty, it is extremely dangerous to make a distinct order of the profession of arms. In absolute monarchies, this is necessary for the safety of the prince; and arises from the main principle of their constitution, which is that of governing by fear; but, in free states, the profession of a soldier, taken singly and merely as a profession, is justly an object of jealousy. In these no man should take up arms but with a view to defend his country and its laws; he puts not off the citizen when he enters the camp; but it is because he is a citizen, and would wish to continue so, that he makes himself for a while a soldier. The laws therefore, and constitution of these kingdoms, know no such state as that of a perpetual standing soldiery, bred up to no other profession than that of war; and it was not till the reign of Henry VII. that the kings of England had so much as a guard about their persons.

In the time of the Anglo-Saxons, as appears from Edward the Confessor's laws, the military force of England was in the hands of the dukes or heretochs, who were constituted through every province and county in the kingdom; being taken out of the principal nobility, and such as were most remarkable for being... Military ing sapientes, fideles, et animosi. Their duty was to lead and regulate the English armies with a very unlimited power; prout eis visum fuerit, ad honorem coronae et utilitatem regni. And because of this great power they were elected by the people in their full assembly, or folkmote, in the same manner as sheriffs were elected: following still that old fundamental maxim of the Saxon constitution, that where any officer was entrusted with such power, as, if abused, might tend to the oppression of the people, that power was delegated to him by the vote of the people themselves. So too, among the ancient Germans, the ancestors of our Saxon forefathers, they had their dukes, as well as kings, with an independent power over the military, as the kings had over the civil state. The dukes were elective, the kings hereditary: for so only can be confidently underlaid that passage of Tacitus, Reges ex nobilitate, duces ex virtute sumunt. In constituting their kings, the family or blood royal was regarded; in choosing their dukes or leaders, warlike merit: just as Caesar relates of their ancestors in his time, that whenever they went to war, by way either of attack or defence, they elected leaders to command them. This large share of power, thus conferred by the people, though intended to preserve the liberty of the subject, was perhaps unreasonably detrimental to the prerogative of the crown: and accordingly we find a very ill use made of it by Edric duke of Mercia, in the reign of King Edmund Ironside; who, by his office of duke or heretoch, was entitled to a large command in the king's army, and by his repeated treacheries at last transferred the crown to Canute the Dane.

It seems universally agreed by all historians, that King Alfred first settled a national militia in this kingdom, and by his prudent discipline made all the subjects of his dominions soldiers: but we are unfortunately left in the dark as to the particulars of this his so celebrated regulation; though, from what was last observed, the dukes seem to have been left in possession of too large and independent a power: which enabled Duke Harold, on the death of Edward the Confessor, though a stranger to the royal blood, to mount for a short space the throne of this kingdom, in prejudice of Edgar Etheling the rightful heir.

Upon the Norman conquest, the feudal law was introduced here in all its rigour, the whole of which is built on a military plan. In consequence thereof, all the lands in the kingdom were divided into what were called knight's fees, in number above 60,000; and for every knight's fee, a knight or folder, miles, was bound to attend the king in his wars, for 40 days in a year; in which space of time, before war was reduced to a science, the campaign was generally finished, and a kingdom either conquered or victorious. By this means the king had, without any expense, an army of 60,000 men always ready at his command. And accordingly we find one, among the laws of William the Conqueror, which in the king's name commands and firmly enjoins the personal attendance of all knights and others; quod habeant et teneant se semper in armis et equis, ut decet et oportet: et quod semper sint prompti et parati ad servitium suum integrum nobis explendum et peragendum, cum opus adferatur, secundum quod debent de feudis et tenementis suis de jure nobis facere. This personal service in process of time degenerated into pecuniary commutations or aids; and at last the military part of the feudal system was abolished at the Restoration, by stat. 12 Car. II. c. 24. See Feudal System.

In the mean time, we are not to imagine that the kingdom was left wholly without defence in case of domestic insurrections, or the prospect of foreign invasions. Besides those who by their military tenures were bound to perform 40 days service in the field, with the assize of arms, enacted 27 Hen. II. and afterwards the statute of Winchester, under Edward I. obliged every man, according to his estate and degree, to provide a determinate quantity of such arms as were then in use, in order to keep the peace; and constables were appointed in all hundreds by the latter statute, to see that such arms were provided. These weapons were changed, by the statute 4 and 5 Ph. and M. c. 2, into others of more modern service; but both this and the former provisions were repealed in the reign of James I. While these continued in force, it was usual from time to time for our princes to issue commissions of array, and send into every county officers in whom they could confide, to muster and array (or let in military order) the inhabitants of every district; and the form of the commission of array was settled in parliament in the 5 Hen. IV. But at the same time it was provided, that no man should be compelled to go out of the kingdom at any rate, nor out of his shire, but in cases of urgent necessity; nor should provide folders unless by consent of parliament. About the reign of King Henry VIII., and his children, lord-lieutenants began to be introduced, as standing representatives of the crown, to keep the counties in military order; for we find them mentioned as known officers in the statute 4 and 5 Ph. and M. c. 3, though they had not been then long in use; for Camden speaks of them in the time of Queen Elizabeth as extraordinary magistrates, constituted only in times of difficulty and danger.

In this state things continued till the repeal of the statutes of armour in the reign of King James I.; after which, when King Charles I. had, during his northern expeditions, issued commissions of lieutenancy, and exerted some military powers which, having been long exercised, were thought to belong to the crown, it became a question in the long parliament, how far the power of the militia did inherently reside in the king; being now unsupported by any statute, and founded only upon immemorial usage. This question, long agitated with great heat and resentment on both sides, became at length the immediate cause of the fatal rupture between the king and his parliament: the two houses not only denying this prerogative of the crown, the legality of which claim perhaps might be somewhat doubtful; but also seizing into their hands the entire power of the militia, the illegality of which step could never be any doubt at all.

Soon after the restoration of King Charles II. when the military tenures were abolished, it was thought proper to ascertain the power of the militia, to recognize the sole right of the crown to govern and command them, and to put the whole into a more regular method of military subordination: and the order in which the militia now stands by law, is principally built upon the statutes which were then enacted. It is true, the two last of them are apparently repealed; but many of their provisions provisions are re-enacted, with the addition of some new regulations, by the present militia laws; the general scheme of which is to discipline a certain number of the inhabitants of every county, chosen by lot for three years, and officered by the lord-lieutenant, the deputy lieutenants, and other principal landholders, under a commission from the crown. They are not compelled to march out of their counties, unless in case of invasion or actual rebellion, nor in any case compelled to march out of the kingdom. They are to be exercised at stated times; and their discipline in general is liberal and easy; but, when drawn out into actual service, they are subject to the rigours of martial law, as necessary to keep them in order. This is the constitutional security which our laws have provided for the public peace, and for protecting the realm against foreign or domestic violence; and which the statutes declare as essentially necessary to the safety and prosperity of the kingdom.

When the nation was engaged in war, more veteran troops and more regular discipline were esteemed to be necessary, than could be expected from a mere militia; and therefore at such times more rigorous methods were put in use for the raising of armies and the due regulation and discipline of the soldiery, which are to be looked upon only as temporary excesses bred out of the distemper of the state, and not as any part of the permanent and perpetual laws of the kingdom. For martial law, which is built upon no settled principles, but is entirely arbitrary in its decisions, is, as Sir Matthew Hale observes, in truth and reality no law, but something indulged rather than allowed as a law. The necessity of order and discipline in an army is the only thing which can give it countenance; and therefore it ought not to be permitted in time of peace, when the king's courts are open for all persons to receive justice according to the laws of the land. Wherefore, Thomas earl of Lancaster being convicted at Pontefract, Edward II. by martial law, his attainder was reversed Edward III. because it was done in time of peace. And it is laid down, that if a lieutenant, or other, that hath commission of martial authority, doth in time of peace hang or otherwise execute any man by colour of martial law, this is murder; for it is against magna charta. And the petition of right enacts, that no soldier shall be quartered on the subject without his own consent; and that no commission shall issue to proceed within this land according to martial law. And whereas, after the Restoration, King Charles II. kept up about 5000 regular troops, by his own authority, for guards and garrisons, which King James II. by degrees increased to no less than 30,000, all paid from his own civil list; it was made one of the articles of the bill of rights, that the raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with consent of parliament, is against law.

But as the fashion of keeping standing armies (which was first introduced by Charles VII. in France 1447) has of late years universally prevailed over Europe (though some of its potentates, being unable themselves to maintain them, are obliged to have recourse to richer powers, and receive subsidiary pensions for that purpose), it has also for many years past been annually judged necessary by our legislature for the safety of the kingdom, the defence of the possessions of the crown of Great Britain, and the preservation of the balance of military power in Europe, to maintain even in time of peace a standing body of troops, under the command of the crown; who are however ipso facto disbanded at the expiration of every year, unless continued by parliament. And it was enacted by statute 10 William III. c. i. that not more than 12,000 regular forces should be kept on foot in Ireland, though paid at the charge of that kingdom: which permission is extended by statute 8 Geo. III. c. 13. to 10,235 men in time of peace.

To prevent the executive power from being able to oppress, says Baron Montesquieu, it is requisite that the armies with which it is intrusted should consist of the people, and have the same spirit with the people: as was the case at Rome, till Marius new-modelled the legions by enlisting the rabble of Italy, and laid the foundation of all the military tyranny that ensued. Nothing then, according to these principles, ought to be more guarded against in a free state, than making the military power, when such a one is necessary to be kept on foot, a body too distinct from the people. Like ours, therefore, it should wholly be composed of natural subjects; it ought only to be enlisted for a short and limited time; the soldiers also should live intermixed with the people; no separate camp, no barracks, no inland fortresses should be allowed. And perhaps it might be still better, if, by dismilling a stated number, and enlisting others at every renewal of their term, a circulation could be kept up between the army and the people, and the citizen and the soldiery be more intimately connected together.

To keep this body of troops in order, an annual act of parliament likewise passes, "to punish mutiny and defection, and for the better payment of the army and their quarters." This regulates the manner in which they are to be dispersed among the several inn-keepers and victuallers throughout the kingdom; and establishes a law martial for their government. By this, among other things, it is enacted, that if any officer or soldier shall excite, or join any mutiny, or, knowing of it, shall not give notice to the commanding officer, or shall defect, or lift in any other regiment, or sleep upon his post, or leave it before he is relieved, or hold correspondence with a rebel or enemy, or strike or use violence to his superior officer, or shall disobey his lawful commands; such offender shall suffer such punishment as a court martial shall inflict, though it extend to death itself.

However expedient the most strict regulations may be in time of actual war, yet in times of profound peace, a little relaxation of military rigour would not, one would hope, be productive of much inconvenience. And, upon this principle, though by our standing laws (still remaining in force, though not attended to) defection in time of war is made felony without benefit of clergy, and the offence is triable by a jury, and before the judges of the common law; yet, by our militia laws before mentioned, a much lighter punishment is inflicted for defection in time of peace. So, by the Roman law also, defection in time of war was punished with death, but more mildly in time of tranquillity. But our mutiny act makes no such distinction; for any of the faults above mentioned are, equally at all times, punishable with death itself, if a court martial shall think proper. This discretionary power of Military, the court martial is indeed to be guided by the directions of the crown; which, with regard to military offences, has almost an absolute legislative power. "His Majesty (says the act) may form articles of war, and constitute courts martial, with power to try any crime by such articles, and inflict such penalties as the articles direct." A vast and most important trust! An unlimited power to create crimes, and annex to them any punishments not extending to life or limb! These are indeed forbidden to be inflicted, except for crimes declared to be so punishable by this act; which crimes we have just enumerated, and among which, we may observe, that any disobedience to lawful commands is one. Perhaps in some future revision of this act, which is in many respects hastily penned, it may be thought worthy the wisdom of parliament to ascertain the limits of military subjection, and to enact express articles of war for the government of the army, as is done for the government of the navy; especially as, by our present constitution, the nobility and gentry of the kingdom, who serve their country as militia officers, are annually subjected to the same arbitrary rule during their time of exercise.

One of the greatest advantages of our law is, that not only the crimes themselves which it punishes, but also the penalties which it inflicts, are ascertained and notorious: nothing is left to arbitrary discretion: the king by his judges dispenses what the law has previously ordained, but is not himself the legislator. How much, therefore, is it to be regretted, that a set of men, whose bravery has so often preserved the liberties of their country, should be reduced to a state of servitude in the midst of a nation of freemen; for Sir Edward Coke will inform us, that it is one of the genuine marks of servitude, to have the law, which is our rule of action, either concealed or precarious; Misera est servitio, ubi jus est vagum aut incognitum. Nor is this state of servitude quite consistent with the maxims of sound policy observed by other free nations. For the greater the general liberty is which any state enjoys, the more cautious has it usually been in introducing slavery in any particular order or profession. These men, as Baron Montesquieu observes, seeing the liberty which others possess, and which they themselves are excluded from, are apt (like eunuchs in the eastern fagadie) to live in a state of perpetual envy and hatred towards the rest of the community, and indulge a malignant pleasure in contributing to destroy those privileges to which they can never be admitted. Hence have many free states, by departing from this rule, been endangered by the revolt of their slaves; while, in absolute and despotic governments, where no real liberty exists, and consequently no inviolable comparisons can be formed, such incidents are extremely rare. Two precautions are therefore advised to be observed in all prudent and free governments: 1. To prevent the introduction of slavery at all; or, 2. If it be already introduced, not to intrust those slaves with arms who will then find themselves an overmatch for the freemen. Much less ought the soldiery to be an exception to the people in general, and the only state of servitude in the nation.

But as soldiers, by this annual act, are thus put in a worse condition than any other subjects; so, by the humanity of our standing laws, they are in some cases put in a much better. By statute 43 Eliz. c. 3, a weekly allowance is to be raised in every county for the relief of soldiers that are sick, hurt, and maimed: not forgetting the royal hospital at Chelsea for such as are worn out in their duty. Officers and soldiers, that have been in the king's service, are by several statutes, enacted at the close of several wars, at liberty to use any trade or occupation they are fit for, in any town in the kingdom (except the two universities), notwithstanding any statute, custom, or charter to the contrary. And soldiers in actual military service may make noncupative wills, and dispose of their goods, wages, and other personal chattels, without these forms, solemnities, and expenses, which the law requires in other cases. Our law does not indeed extend this privilege so far as the civil law, which carried it to an extreme that borders upon the ridiculous: for if a soldier, in the article of death, wrote anything in bloody letters on his shield, or in the dust of the field with his sword, it was a very good military testament.

MILITARY Court. See CHIVALRY, Court of.

MILITARY Tenures. See TENURE, FEUDAL SYSTEM, and KNIGHT.

MILITARY Ways (via militares), are the large Roman roads which Agrippa procured to be made through the empire in the time of Augustus, for the more convenient marching of troops and conveyance of carriages. N. Bergier has written the history of the origin, progress, and amazing extent, of these military roads, which were paved from the gates of Rome to the extreme parts of the empire. See WAY.