in its original sense, is a word of the same import with wonder; but in its usual and more appropriate signification, it denotes "an effect contrary to the established constitution and course of things, or a sensible deviation from the known laws of nature."

That the visible world is governed by stated general rules, or that there is an order of causes and effects established in every part of the system of nature which falls under our observation, is a fact which cannot be controverted. If the Supreme Being, as some have supposed, be the only real agent in the universe, we have the evidence of experience, that, in the particular system to which we belong, he acts by stated rules. If he employs inferior agents to conduct the various motions from which the phenomena result, we have the same evidence that he has subjected ed those agents to certain fixed laws, commonly called the laws of nature. On either hypothesis, effects which are produced by the regular operation of these laws, or which are conformable to the established course of events, are properly called natural; and every contradiction to this constitution of the natural system, and the correspondent course of events in it, is called a miracle.

If this definition of a miracle be just, no event can be deemed miraculous merely because it is strange, or even to us unaccountable; since it may be nothing more than a regular effect of some unknown law of nature. In this country earthquakes are rare; and for monstrous births perhaps no particular and satisfactory account can be given: yet an earthquake is as regular an effect of the established laws of nature as any of those with which we are most intimately acquainted; and under circumstances in which there would always be the same kind of production, the monster is nature's genuine illuse. It is therefore necessary, before we can pronounce any effect to be a true miracle, that the circumstances under which it is produced be known, and that the common course of nature be in some degree understood; for in all those cases in which we are totally ignorant of nature, it is impossible to determine what is, or what is not, a deviation from its course. Miracles, therefore, are not, as some have represented them, appeals to our ignorance. They suppose some antecedent knowledge of the course of nature, without which no proper judgment can be formed concerning them; though with it their reality may be so apparent as to prevent all possibility of a dispute.

Thus, were a physician to cure a blind man of a cataract, by anointing his eyes with a chemical preparation which we had never before seen, and to the nature and effects of which we are absolute strangers, the cure would undoubtedly be wonderful; but we could not pronounce it miraculous, because, for anything known to us, it might be the natural effect of the operation of the unguent on the eye. But were he to recover his patient merely by commanding him to see, or by anointing his eyes with spittle, we should with the utmost confidence pronounce the cure to be a miracle; because we know perfectly that neither the human voice nor human spittle have, by the established constitution of things, any such power over the diseases of the eye. No one is now ignorant, that persons apparently dead are often restored to their families and friends, by being treated in the manner recommended by the Humane Society. To the vulgar, and sometimes even to men of science, these effects appear very wonderful; but as they are known to be produced by physical agency, they can never be considered as miraculous deviations from the laws of nature. On the other hand, no one could doubt of his having witnessed a real miracle who had seen a person that had been four days dead come alive out of his grave at the call of another, or who had even beheld a person exhibiting all the symptoms of death instantly resuscitated merely by being desired to live.

Thus easy is it, in all cases in which the course of nature is understood, to determine whether any particular event be really a miracle; whilst in circumstances where we know nothing of nature and its course, even a true miracle, were it performed, could not be admitted as such, or carry any conviction to the mind of a philosopher.

If miracles be effects contrary to the established constitution of things, we are certain that they will never be performed on trivial occasions. The constitution of things was established by the Creator and Governor of the universe, and is undoubtedly the offspring of infinite wisdom pursuing a plan for the best of purposes. From this plan no deviation can be made but by God himself, or by some powerful being acting with his permission. The plans devised by wisdom are steady in proportion to their perfection, and the plans of infinite wisdom must be absolutely perfect. From this consideration, some men have ventured to conclude, that no miracle was ever wrought, or can rationally be expected; but mature reflection must soon satisfy us that all such conclusions are hasty.

Man is unquestionably the principal creature in this world, and apparently the only one in it who is capable of being made acquainted with the relation in which he stands to his Creator. We cannot, therefore, doubt, but that such of the laws of nature as extend not their operation beyond the limits of this earth were established chiefly, if not solely, for the good of mankind; and if, in any particular circumstances, that good can be more effectually promoted by an occasional deviation from those laws, such a deviation may be reasonably expected. Were man, in the exercise of his mental and corporeal powers, subjected to the laws of physical necessity, the circumstances supposed would indeed never occur, and of course no miracle could be admitted. But such is not the nature of man.

Without repeating what has been said elsewhere (See Metaphysics, Part III. Chap. V.) of necessity and liberty, we shall here take it for granted, that the relation between motives and actions is different from that between cause and effect in physics; and that, mankind have such command over themselves, as that by their voluntary conduct, they can make themselves in a great degree either happy or miserable. We know likewise from history, that, by some means or other, almost all mankind were once sunk into the grossest ignorance of the most important truths; that they knew not the Being by whom they were created and supported; that they paid divine adoration to stocks, stones, and the vilest reptiles; and that they were slaves to the most injurious, cruel, and degrading superstitions.

From this depraved state it was surely not unworthy of the common "Father of all" to rescue his helpless creature, to enlighten their understandings that they might perceive what is right, and to present to them motives of sufficient force to engage them in the practice of it. But the understandings of ignorant barbarians cannot be enlightened by arguments; because of the force of such arguments as regard moral science they are not qualified to judge. The philosophers of Athens and Rome inculcated, indeed, many excellent moral precepts, and they sometimes ventured to expose the absurdities of the reigning superstition; but their lectures had no influence upon the multitude; and they had themselves imbibed such erroneous notions respecting the attributes of the Supreme Being, and the nature of the human soul, and converted those notions into first principles, of which they would not permit permit an examination, that even among them a thorough reformation was not to be expected from the powers of reasoning. It is likewise to be observed, that there are many truths of the utmost importance to mankind, which unassisted reason could never have discovered. Amongst these we may confidently reckon the immortality of the soul, the terms upon which God will be reconciled to sinners, and the manner in which that all-perfect Being may be acceptably worshipped; about all of which philosophers were in such uncertainty, that, according to Plato, "Whatever is set right, and as it should be, in the present evil state of the world, can be so only by the particular interposition of God (A).

An immediate revelation from Heaven, therefore, was the only method by which infinite wisdom and perfect goodness could reform a bewildered and vicious race. But this revelation, at whatever time we suppose it given, must have been made directly either to some chosen individuals commissioned to instruct others, or to every man and woman for whose benefit it was ultimately intended. Were every person instructed in the knowledge of his duty by immediate inspiration, and were the motives to practice it brought home to his mind by God himself, human nature would be wholly changed: men would not be masters of their own actions; they would not be moral agents, nor by consequence be capable either of reward or of punishment.

It remains, therefore, that if God has been graciously pleased to enlighten and reform mankind, without destroying that moral nature which is essential to virtue, he can have done it only by revealing his truth to certain chosen instruments, who were the immediate instructors of their contemporaries, and through them have been the instructors of succeeding ages.

Let us suppose this to have been actually the case, and consider how those inspired teachers could communicate to others every truth which had been revealed to themselves. They might easily, if it was part of their duty, deliver a sublime system of natural and moral science, and establish it upon the common basis of experiment and demonstration; but what foundation could they lay for those truths which unassisted reason cannot discover, and which, when they are revealed, appear to have no necessary relation to anything previously known? To a bare affirmation that they had been immediately received from God, no rational being could be expected to assent. The teachers might be men of known veracity, whose simple assertion would be admitted as sufficient evidence for any fact in conformity with the laws of nature; but as every man has the evidence of his own consciousness and experience that revelations from heaven are deviations from these laws, an assertion so apparently extravagant would be rejected as false, unless supported by some better proof than the mere affirmation of the teacher.

In this state of things, we can conceive no evidence sufficient to make such doctrines be received as the truths of God, but the power of working miracles committed to him who taught them. This would, indeed, be fully adequate to the purpose. For if there were nothing in the doctrines themselves impious, immoral, or contrary to truths already known, the only thing which could render the teacher's assertion incredible, would be its implying such an intimate communion with God as is contrary to the established course of things, by which men are left to acquire all their knowledge by the exercise of their own faculties.

Let us now suppose one of those inspired teachers to tell his countrymen, that he did not declare them, on his ipse dixit, to believe that he had any preternatural communion with the Deity, but that for the truth of his assertion he would give them the evidence of their own senses; and after this declaration let us suppose him immediately to raise a person from the dead in their presence, merely by calling upon him to come out of his grave. Would not the only possible objection to the man's veracity be removed by this miracle? and his assertions that he had received such and such doctrines from God be as fully credited, as if it related to the most common occurrence? Undoubtedly it would; for when so much preternatural power was visibly communicated to this person, no one could have reason to question his having received an equal portion of preternatural knowledge. A palpable deviation from the known laws of nature, in one instance, is a sensible proof that such a deviation is possible in another; and in such a case as this, it is the witness of God to the truth of a man.