an affirmation or promise, accompanied with an invocation of God to witness what we say; and with an imprecation of his vengeance, or a renunciation of his favour, if what we affirm be false, or what we promise be not performed (A).

The laws of all civilized states have required the security of an oath for evidence given in a court of justice, and on other occasions of high importance (B); and the Christian religion utterly prohibits swearing, except when oaths are required by legal authority. Indeed no serious and reflecting theft, whether he admit the truth of revelation or not, can look upon swearing on trivial occasions as any thing else than a sin of a very heinous nature. To call upon that infinite and omnipresent Being, who created and sustains the universe, to witness all the impertinence of idle conversation, of which great part is commonly uttered at random, betrays a spirit so profane, that nothing short of experience could make us believe it possible for a creature endowed with reason and reflection to be habitually guilty of a practice so impious. No man can plead in extenuation of this crime, that he is tempted to swear by the opportunity of any appetite or passion implanted in the human breast: for the utterance of a profane oath communicates no pleasure and removes no uneasiness: it neither elevates the speaker nor depresses the hearer.

Quakers and Moravians, swayed by these considerations, and by the sense which they put upon certain texts of Scripture, refuse to swear upon any occasion, even at the requisition of a magistrate, and in a court of justice. These scruples are groundless; and seem to proceed from an incapacity to distinguish between the proper use and abuse of swearing. It is unquestionably impious to call upon God to witness impertinences, or to use his tremendous name as a mere expletive in conversation; but it by no means follows, that we may not piously call upon him to witness truths of importance, or invoke his name with reverence and solemnity. No individual could, without gross profaneness, pray for a thousand times more wealth than he may ever have occasion to use; but it was never thought profane to pray "day by day for our daily bread, for rain from heaven, and fruitful seasons." If it be lawful to ask of God these earthly blessings, because he alone can bestow them; it cannot surely be unlawful, where the lives or properties of our

(a) The word oath is a corruption of the Saxon eoth. (b) The various oaths required by different nations at different times, and the various forms, &c. of imposing them, is a subject of very considerable extent and curiosity: An account of them does not fall within the plan of the present article; it would indeed extend it to an undue length; we cannot, however, omit observing, what is doubtless very remarkable, that the grand impostor Mahomet taught the Molems, that their oaths might be diffolved. This wonderful doctrine is contained in the 66th chapter of the Koran; which, to free himself from his promise and oath to Hafa his spouse, he pretended was revealed. What the use of oaths is in such circumstances, or what security they afford for performance, it is difficult to ascertain.

It is also very remarkable, that an oath respecting marriages was the cause of the first divorce at Rome. The circumstance happened about the year of the city 525, Pothumius Albinus and Spurius Carvilius being consul. The censors of this year observing the population declining, and imagining it proceeded from interestless marriages and promiscuous cohabitation, obliged all the citizens to swear, that they would not marry with any other view than that of peopling the republic. It raised, however, many scruples, and occasioned many domestic ruptures. Among the rest, one Carvilius Ruga, a man of distinction, imagined that he was bound by his oath to divorce his wife, whom he passionately loved, because she was barren, which was the first instance of a divorce at Rome from its foundation, though the marriage laws of the kings allowed it; it afterwards, however, became shamefully frequent. This is also a striking instance of the great attention paid to oaths among the Romans; it is remarked indeed by all writers, that they paid a most profound respect to them; and on that we know they founded their hopes of success in war. our neighbours, or the security of government is concerned, to invoke him with reverence to witness the truth of our assertions, or the sincerity of our intentions; because of our truth in many cases, and of our sincerity in all, none but he can be the witness.

The text of Scripture upon which the Quakers chiefly rest their argument for the unlawfulness of all swearing under the gospel, is our Saviour's prohibition (Mat. v. 34): "I say unto you, swear not at all." But whoever shall take the trouble of turning over his Bible, and looking at the context, will perceive, that it is only in ordinary conversation, and by no means in courts of justice, that our Lord prohibits his followers from swearing at all. There is no evidence whatever, that swearing by heaven, by the earth, by Jerusalem, or by their own heads, was the form of a judicial oath in use among the Jews. On the contrary, we are told by Maimonides*, that "if any man swear by heaven or by earth, yet this is not an oath;" which surely he could not have said, had such been the forms of judicial swearing. Indeed they could not have admitted such forms into their courts without expressly violating the law of Moses, who commands them to "Fear the Lord (Jehovah) their God, to serve him, and to swear by his name." But the Jews, as every one knows, had such a reverence for the name Jehovah, that they would not pronounce it on slight occasions, and therefore could not swear by that name in common conversation. Hence, to gratify their propensity to common swearing, they invented such oaths as, by heaven, by earth, by Jerusalem, by the life of thy head, &c. and by this contrivance they thought to avoid the guilt of profaning the name. Jehovah. These, however, being appeals to insensible objects, either had no meaning, or were in fact, as our Saviour justly argues, oaths by that God whose creatures they were; so that the Jew who swore them was still guilty of profaneness towards the very Jehovah whose name his superstition would not permit him to pronounce. But what puts it beyond all doubt that the use of judicial oaths is not wholly prohibited in the gospel, is the conduct of our Saviour himself as well as of his apostle St Paul. When Jesus was simply asked by the high priest, what it was which certain false witnesses testified against him? we are told by the evangelists, that "he held his peace;" but being adjured by the living God to declare whether he was the Christ, the Son of God, or not, he immediately answered the high priest, without objecting to the oath (for such it was) upon which he was examined. "St Paul, in his Epistle to the Romans†, says, 'God is my witness, that, without ceasing, I make mention of you in my prayers;' and to the Corinthians, still more strongly, 'I call God for a record upon my soul, that, to spare you, I came not as yet to Corinth.' Both these expressions are of the nature of oaths; and the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews speaks of the custom of swearing judicially without any mark of censure or disapprobation: 'Men verily swear by the greater; and an oath, for confirmation, is to them an end of all strife.'"

But though a nation has an undoubted right to require the security of an oath upon occasions of real importance, we do not hesitate to say, that, in our opinion, it is something worse than bad policy to multiply oaths, and to hold out to the people temptations to perjure themselves. The security which an oath affords, depends entirely upon the reverence which attaches to it in the mind of him by whom it is given; but that reverence is much weakened by the frequency of oaths, and by the careless manner in which they are too often administered. An excellent moralist ‡ observes, with Mr Paley's Moral Philosophy. truth, that "the levity and frequency with which oaths are administered, has brought about a general inadversity to the obligation of them, which both in a religious and political view is much to be lamented; and it merits (continues he) public consideration, whether the requiring of oaths on so many frivolous occasions, especially in the customs, and in the qualification for petty offices, has any other effect than to make them cheap in the minds of the people. A pound of tea cannot travel regularly from the ship to the consumer without cutting half a dozen oaths at least; and the same security for the due discharge of his office, namely that of an oath, is required from a church warden and an archbishop, from a petty constable and the chief justice of England. Let the law continue its own functions, if they be thought requisite; but let it spare the solemnity of an oath: and where it is necessary, from the want of something better to depend upon, to accept a man's own word or own account, let it annex to prevarication penalties proportioned to the public consequence of the offence."

That these pernicious consequences of frequent oaths are not felt only in England, we have the evidence of another respectable writer, whose acuteness well qualified him to observe, whilst his station in society furnished him with the best opportunities of observing, the effects of repeated swearing upon the morals of Scotchmen. "Customhouse oaths (says Lord Kames §) have become so familiar among us, as to be swallowed with the History of Man. sketcher out a wry face; and is it certain that bribery and perjury in electing parliament members are not approaching to the fame cool state? men creep on to vice by degrees. Perjury, in order to support a friend, has become customary of late years; witness fictitious qualifications in the electors of parliament-men, which are made effectual by perjury: yet such is the degeneracy of the present times, that no man is the worse thought of upon that account. We must not flatter ourselves, that the peison will reach no farther: a man who boggles not at perjury to serve a friend, will in time become such an adept, as to commit perjury in order to ruin a friend when he becomes an enemy."

Besides the frequency of oaths, we have mentioned the irreverent manner in which they are too often administered as one of the causes which make them cheap in the estimation of the people. In this view, the form of the oath, and the ceremonies with which it is required to be taken, are of considerable importance. "The forms of oaths in Christian countries (says Mr Paley) are very different; but in none I believe worse contrived either to convey the meaning or to impress the obligation of an oath, than in England. In that country the juror, after repeating the promise or affirmation which the oath is intended to confirm, adds, 'to help me God;' or more frequently the substance of the oath is repeated to the juror by the officer or magistrate who administers it; adding in the conclusion, 'to help you God.' The energy of the sentence resides in the particle particle fo; fo, i.e. hac lege, 'upon condition of my speaking the truth, or performing this promise, may God help me, and not otherwise.' The juror, whilst he hears or repeats the words of the oath, holds his right hand upon a Bible, or other book containing the four gospels. The conclusion of the oath sometimes runs, 'ita me Deus adjuravit, et haec sancta evangelia,' or 'to help me God, and the contents of this book;' which last clause forms a connexion between the words and action of the juror, which before was wanting. The juror then kisseth the book."

This obscure and elliptical form, the excellent author justly observes, is ill calculated to impress the juror with reverence: and he seems to think great preference due to the form of judicial oaths in Scotland. In that country the juror holds up his right hand towards heaven, and swears by Almighty God, and as he shall answer to God at the great day of judgment, "that he will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so far as he knows, or it shall be asked of him." This, if administered with dignity and reverence, is an oath sufficiently solemn and well calculated to have the proper effect upon the mind of the juror, as it brings immediately into his view the Author of his being, and the awful day of final retribution when every man shall receive the things done in his body according to that he hath done, whether it be good or evil. But when the magistrate, as is too often the case, repeats this solemn invocation without rising from his seat at the name of the Supreme Being, and in a tone of carelessness which may convey to the ignorant juror an opinion that he has himself no serious belief that there ever will be a great day of judgment, the form, however excellent, makes not its full impression.

But let us suppose the oath to be administered with the greatest dignity and reverence, the words of the promise itself appear to us by no means unexceptionable. In a trial on life and death, we should be glad to know what this oath binds the witness to declare. Is he to tell all that he knows touching the matter in question? or only all that shall be asked of him? If he be obliged, in virtue of his oath, to tell all that he knows, the clause—"or it shall be asked of you" is superfluous, and calculated to mislead. If he be bound to tell nothing more of the truth than what shall be asked of him, the word or should be changed into and; he should swear "to tell the truth, &c. so far as he knows, and it shall be asked of him." The court, we believe, considers the witness as bound to declare every thing which he knows touching the matter in question. The greater part of witnesses, on the other hand, consider themselves as bound no farther by their oath than to give true answers to such questions as shall be asked of them. They would do well, however, to remember, that as oaths are designed for the security of the public, they must be interpreted in the sense in which the public intends them, otherwise they afford no security. But the sense of the public is the law; and as it belongs to the court to declare what the mind of the law is, the witness, who has any doubt concerning the extent of the obligation imposed on him by the words of this oath, should apply to the court for a solution of that doubt, which will be a safe guide to him respecting the evidence which he is to give. Should the court, in resolving the doubts of a witness, give an opinion concerning the sense of any other part of the oath contrary to what he apprehends to be the design of the law in imposing it, he is bound to disregar'd such opinion; because it is only where he himself is doubtful that the court has a right to interfere, and because in all moral questions men must be finally determined by their own judgment and conscience.

There is one case, and but one, in which, whatever sense be put upon the words of the oath, no witness is obliged to declare the whole truth. It is when such declaration would tend to accuse himself of some legal crime; for as the laws of Scotland and England constrain no man to become his own accuser, they must be considered as imposing the oath of testimony with this tacit reservation. "The exception, however," Paley's must be confined to legal crimes. A point of honour, Moral Philosophy, delicacy, or reputation, may make a witness backward to disclose some circumstance with which he is acquainted; but is no excuse for concealment, unless it could be shewn, that the law which imposes the oath, intended to allow this indulgence to such motives. The exception is also withdrawn by compact between the magistrate and the witness, when an accomplice is admitted to give evidence against the partners of his crime." But these are a fort of witnesses to whom a sensible jury will always listen with a very cautious ear.

Oaths are either affortory or promiffory. Affortory oaths are required both to confirm our veracity in evidence, and to give security to the public that we believe certain propositions conceived to be of public importance. An oath in evidence binds the juror to declare what he knows to be true, and nothing but what he knows to be true. An oath required to assure the public of our belief in the truth of any proposition, cannot, without the guilt of perjury, be taken by any man, who, at the time of swearing, has the slightest doubt whether the proposition be really true. Such an oath, however, though it unquestionably requires the sincerity of the juror's belief at the time when it is given, cannot oblige him to continue in that belief as long as he may live; for belief is not in any man's power: it is the necessary consequence of evidence, which compels the assent of the mind according as it appears to preponderate on the one side or on the other. No man, therefore, can be justly accused of perjury for holding opinions contrary to those which he may formerly have sworn to believe; because his belief at the time of emitting his oath may have been the necessary result of the evidence which then appeared before him; and his change of opinion may have resulted with the same necessity from superior evidence which had been since thrown into the opposite scale, and made it preponderate. On this account, we cannot help thinking, that all affortory oaths, except such as are necessary to confirm testimony respecting facts, ought either to be abolished or expressed with great caution. Of truths intuitively certain or capable of rigid demonstration, no man of common sense can entertain a doubt; and therefore the public never requires from individuals the solemnity of an oath as an assurance of their believing such truths. But with respect to the truth of propositions which admit of nothing superior to moral evidence on either side, a man of the most steady steady virtue may think differently at different periods of his life; and in such cases, the effect of an oath, if it have any effect, can only be either, to shut the man's eyes against the light, or to make his integrity be carelessly questioned by those who shall observe his change of belief.

Promissory oaths cannot, without the guilt of perjury, be given by him, who, at the time of swearing, knows that it will not be in his power to fulfil the promise, or who does not seriously intend to fulfil it. A promissory oath cannot, without great guilt, be given by any man, who at the time of swearing believes the object of the promise to be in itself unlawful; for if he seriously mean to fulfil his oath, he calls upon Almighty God to witness his intention to commit a crime. Promissory oaths give to the public greater security than a simple promise; because the juror having the thoughts of God and of religion more upon his mind at the one time than at the other, offends with a higher hand, and in more open contempt of the divine power, knowledge, and justice, when he violates an oath, than when he breaks a promise. Yet it is certain that promissory oaths, though more solemn and sacred, cannot be binding, when the promise without an oath would not be so in an inferior degree; for the several cases of which, see Promise and Allegiance.

Coronation OATH. See King.