the grand assembly of the three estates of this kingdom, summoned together by the king's authority, to consider of matters relating to the public welfare, and particularly to enact and repeal laws.

The original or first institution of parliament is one of those matters which lie so far hidden in the dark ages certainly of antiquity, that the tracing of it out is a thing equally known difficult and uncertain. The word parliament itself (or colloquium, as some of our historians translate it) is, comparatively, of modern date; derived from the French, and signifying "the place where they met and conferred together." It was first applied to general assemblies of the states under Lewis VII. in France, about the middle of the 12th century. But it is certain, that long before the introduction of the Norman language into England, all matters of importance were debated and settled in the great councils of the realm. A practice which seems to have been universal among the northern nations, particularly the Germans; and carried by them into all the countries of Europe, which they overran at the dissolution of the Roman empire. Relicks of which constitution, under various modifications and changes, are still to be met with in the diets of Poland, Germany, and Sweden, and lately in the assembly of the estates in France: for what is there now called the parliament, is only the supreme court of justice, consisting of the peers, certain dignified ecclesiastics, and judges; which neither is in practice, nor is supposed to be in theory, a general council of the realm.

In England, however, this general council hath been Antiquity held immemorially, under the several names of michel-of-lynth, or "great council;" michel-gemote, or "great meeting;" and more frequently wittena-gemote, or "the meeting of wise men." It was also styled in Latin, commune concilium regni, magnum concilium regis, curia magna, conventus magnatum vel procurorum, aysta generalis, and sometimes communitas regni Anglie. We have instances of its meeting to order the affairs of the kingdom, to make new laws, and to amend the old, or, as Fleta expresses it, novis injuriis emeritis nova consilu remedia, to so early as the reign of Ina king of the West Saxons, Offa king of the Mercians, and Ethelbert king of Kent, in the several realms of the heptarchy. And after their union, the Mirror informs us, that King Alfred ordained for a perpetual usage, that these couns Parliament. cils should meet twice in the year, or oftener, if need be, to treat of the government of God's people; how they should keep themselves from sin, should live in quiet, and should receive right. Our succeeding Saxon and Danish monarchs held frequent councils of this sort, as appears from their respective codes of laws; the titles whereof usually speak them to be enacted, either by the king with the advice of his wittene-geneate, or wise men, as, Hec sunt instituta, quae Edgarus rex confilio sapientium suorum instituit; or to be enacted by those lages with the advice of the king: as Hec sunt judicia, quae sapientes confilio regis Ethelstam instituerunt; or, lastly, To be enacted by them both together, as Hae sunt institutiones, quas rex Edmundus et episcopi sui cum sapientibus suis instituerunt.

There is also no doubt but these great councils were occasionally held under the first princes of the Norman line. Glanvil, who wrote in the reign of Henry II. speaking of the particular amount of an amercement in the sheriff's court, says, it had never yet been ascertained by the general assize or assizes, but was left to the custom of particular counties. Here the general assize is spoken of as a meeting well known, and its statutes or decisions are put in a manifest contradiction to custom, or to the common law. And in Edward III.'s time, an act of parliament, made in the reign of William the Conqueror, was pleaded in the case of the abbey of St Edmund's Bury, and judicially allowed by the court.

Hence it indubitably appears, that parliaments, or general councils, are coeval with the kingdom itself. How those parliaments were constituted and composed, is another question, which has been matter of great dispute among our learned antiquarians; and particularly, whether the commons were summoned at all; or, if summoned, at what period they began to form a distinct assembly. But without entering into controversies of this fort, it may be sufficient to observe, that it is generally agreed, that in the main the constitution of parliament, as it now stands, was marked out so long ago as the 17th year of King John, A.D. 1215, in the great charter granted by that prince; wherein he promises to summon all archbishops, bishops, abbots, earls, and greater barons, personally; and all other tenants in chief under the crown, by the sheriff and bailiffs; to meet at a certain place, with 40 days notice, to assess aids and scutages when necessary. And this constitution has subsisted in fact at least from the year 1266, 49 Henry III. there being still extant writs of that date, to summon knights, citizens, and burgesses, to parliament. We proceed therefore to inquire wherein consists this constitution of parliament, as it now stands, and has stood, for the space of at least 500 years. And in the prosecution of this inquiry, we shall consider, first, The manner and time of its assembling: Secondly, Its constituent parts: Thirdly, The laws and customs relating to parliament: Fourthly, The methods of proceeding, and of making statutes, in both houses: And, lastly, The manner of the parliament's adjournment: prorogation, and dissolution.

I. As to the manner and time of assembling. The parliament is regularly to be summoned by the king's writ or letter, issued out of chancery by advice of the privy council, at least 40 days before it begins to sit. It is a branch of the royal prerogative, that no parliament can be convened by its own authority, or by the authority of any except the king alone. And this prerogative is founded upon very good reason. For, supposing it had a right to meet spontaneously, without being called together, it is impossible to conceive that all the members, and each of the houses, would agree unanimously upon the proper time and place of meeting; and if half of the members met, and half absented themselves, who shall determine which is really the legislative body, the part assembled, or that which flies away? It is therefore necessary, that the parliament should be called together at a determinate time and place; and, highly becoming its dignity and independence, that it should be called together by none but one of its own constituent parts: and, of the three constituent parts, this office can only appertain to the king; as he is a single person, whose will may be uniform and steady; the first person in the nation, being superior to both houses in dignity; and the only branch of the legislature that has a separate existence, and is capable of performing any act at a time when no parliament is in being. Nor is it an exception to this rule, that, by some modern statutes, on the demise of a king or queen, if there be then no parliament in being, the last parliament revives, and is to sit again for six months, unless dissolved by the successor: for this revived parliament must have been originally summoned by the crown.

It is true, that the convention parliament which re-constituted King Charles II. met above a month before his return; the lords, by their own authority, and the commons in pursuance of writs issued in the name of the keepers of the liberty of England by authority of parliament, and that the said parliament sat till the 29th of December, full seven months after the Restoration; and enacted many laws, several of which are still in force. But this was for the necessity of the thing, which supercedes all law; for if they had not so met, it was morally impossible that the kingdom should have been settled in peace. And the first thing done after the king's return was, to pass an act declaring this to be a good parliament, notwithstanding the defect of the king's writ. So that as the royal prerogative was chiefly wounded by their so meeting, and as the king himself, who alone had a right to object, consented to waive the objection, this cannot be drawn into an example in prejudice of the rights of the crown. Besides, we should also remember, that it was at that time a great doubt among the lawyers, whether even this healing act made it a good parliament, and held by very many in the negative; though it seems to have been too nice a scruple. And yet, out of abundant caution, it was thought necessary to confirm its acts in the next parliament, by statute 13 Car. II. c. 7. and c. 14.

It is likewise true, at the time of the Revolution nor that of A.D. 1688, the lords and commons by their own authority, and upon the summons of the prince of Orange, (afterwards King William), met in a convention, and therein disposed of the crown and kingdom. But it must be remembered, that this assembling was upon a like principle of necessity as at the Restoration; that is, upon a full conviction that King James II. had abdicated the government, and that the throne was thereby vacant; which supposition of the individual members was confirmed by their concurrent resolution, when they actually came together. And in such a case as the palpable vacancy of a throne, it follows, ex necessitate rei, that the form Parliament, form of the royal writs must be laid aside, otherwise no parliament can ever meet again. For let us put another possible case, and suppose, for the sake of argument, that the whole royal line should at any time fail, and become extinct, which would indisputably vacate the throne: in this situation it seems reasonable to presume, that the body of the nation, consisting of lords and commons, would have a right to meet and settle the government at all. And upon this and no other principle did the convention in 1688 assemble. The vacancy of the throne was precedent to their meeting without any royal summons, not a consequence of it. They did not assemble without writ, and then make the throne vacant; but, the throne being previously vacant by the king's abdication, they assembled without writ, as they must do if they assembled at all. Had the throne been full, their meeting would not have been regular: but, as it was really empty, such meeting became absolutely necessary. And accordingly, it is declared by statute 1 W. & M. Stat. I. c. I. that this convention was really the two houses of parliament, notwithstanding the want of writs or other defects of form. So that, notwithstanding these two capital exceptions, which were justifiable only on a principle of necessity (and each of which, by the way, induced a revolution in the government), the rule laid down is in general certain, that the king only can convolve a parliament.

The king is obliged to call a new parliament every year; but only to permit a parliament to sit annually for the redress of grievances, and despatch of business, if need be. These last words are so loose and vague, that such of our monarchs as were inclined to govern without parliaments, neglected the convoking them, sometimes for a very considerable period, under pretence that there was not need of them. But, to remedy this, by the statute 16 Car. II. c. I. it is enacted, that the sitting and holding of parliaments shall not be interrupted above three years at the most. And by the statute 1 W. and M. st. 2. c. 2. it is declared to be one of the rights of the people, that for redress of all grievances, and for the amending, strengthening, and preserving, the laws, parliaments ought to be held frequently. And this indefinite frequency is again reduced to a certainty by statute 6 W. & M. c. 2. which enacts, as the statute of Charles II. has done before, that a new parliament shall be called within three years after the determination of the former.

II. The constituent parts of a parliament are, the king's majesty, sitting there in his royal political capacity, and the three estates of the realm; the lords spiritual, the lords temporal (who fit together with the king in one house), and the commons, who fit by themselves in another. And the king and these three estates together form the greater corporation or body politic of the kingdom, of which the king is said to be coput, principium, et finis. For upon their coming together the king meets them, either in person or by representation; without which there can be no beginning of a parliament; and he also has alone the power of dissolving them.

It is highly necessary for preserving the balance of the constitution, that the executive power should be a branch, though not the whole, of the legislature. The Parliament, total union of them, we have seen, would be productive of tyranny: the total disjunction of them for the present, would in the end produce the same effects, by causing the people against which it seems to provide. The le-necesity of the king's gift would soon become tyrannical, by making continual encroachments, and gradually assuming to itself the rights of the executive power. Thus the long parliament of Charles I. while it acted in a constitutional manner, with the royal concurrence, redressed many heavy grievances and established many salutary laws. But when the two houses assumed the power of legislation, in exclusion of the royal authority, they soon after assumed likewise the reins of administration; and, in consequence of these united powers, overturned both church and state, and established a worse oppression than any they pretended to remedy. To hinder therefore any such encroachments, the king is himself a part of the parliament; and as this is the reason of his being fo, very properly therefore the share of legislation which the constitution has placed in the crown, consists in the power of rejecting, rather than resolving; this being sufficient to answer the end proposed. For we may apply to the royal negative, in this instance, what Cicero observes of the negative of the Roman tribunes, that the crown has not any power of doing wrong, but merely of preventing wrong from being done. The crown cannot begin of itself any alterations in the present established law; but it may approve or disapprove of the alterations suggested and consented to by the two houses. The legislature therefore cannot abridge the executive power of any rights which it now has by law, without its own consent; since the law must perpetually stand as it now does, unless all the powers will agree to alter it. And herein indeed consists the true excellence of the British government, that all the parts of it form a mutual check upon each other. In the legislature, the people are a check upon the nobility, and the nobility a check upon the people, by the mutual privilege of rejecting what the other has resolved; while the king is a check upon both, which preserves the executive power from encroachments. And this very executive power is again checked and kept within due bounds by the two houses, through the privilege they have of inquiring into, impeaching, and punishing the conduct (not indeed of the king, which would destroy his constitutional independence; but which is more beneficial to the public) of his evil and pernicious counsellors. Thus every branch of our civil polity supports and is supported, regulates and is regulated, by the rest: for the two houses naturally drawing in two directions of opposite interest, and the prerogative in another still different from them both, they mutually keep each other from exceeding their proper limits; while the whole is prevented from separation, and artificially connected together by the mixed nature of the crown, which is a part of the legislative, and the sole executive magistrate. Like three distinct powers in mechanics, they jointly impel the machine of government in a direction different from what either, acting by itself, would have done; but at the same time in a direction partaking of each, and formed out of all; a direction which constitutes the true line of the liberty and happiness of the community.

Having already considered these constituent parts of the Parliament: the sovereign power, or parliament, each in a separate view, under the articles King, Lords, and Commons, to which the reader is referred, we proceed,

III. To examine the laws and customs relating to parliament, united together and considered as one aggregate body. The power and jurisdiction of parliament, says Sir Edward Coke, is transcendent and absolute, that it cannot be confined either for causes or persons within any bounds. And of this high court he adds, it may be truly said, Si antiquitatem spectes, eft vetustiffima; si dignitatem, eft honoriffima; si jurisdic- tionem, eft capaciffima. It hath sovereign and uncontrollable authority in making, confirming, enlarging, restraining, abrogating, repealing, reviving, and expounding laws, concerning matters of all possible denominations, ecclesiastical or temporal, civil, military, maritime, or criminal: this being the place where that absolute despotic power, which must in all governments reside somewhere, is intrusted by the constitution of these kingdoms. All mischiefs and grievances, operations and remedies, that transcend the ordinary course of the laws, are within the reach of this extraordinary tribunal. It can regulate or new-model the succession to the crown; as was done in the reigns of Henry VIII. and William III. It can alter the established religion of the land; as was done in a variety of instances in the reigns of King Henry VIII. and his three children. It can change and create afresh even the constitution of the kingdom and of parliaments themselves; as was done by the act of Union, and the several statutes for triennial and septennial elections. It can, in short, do every thing that is not naturally impossible; and therefore some have not scrupled to call its power, by a figure rather too bold, the omnipotence of parliament. True it is, that what the parliament doth, no authority upon earth can undo. So that it is a matter most essential to the liberties of this kingdom, that such members be delegated to this important trust as are most eminent for their probity, their fortitude, and their knowledge; for it was a known apophthegm of the great lord treasurer Burleigh, "That England could never be ruined but by a parliament;" and, as Sir Matthew Hale observes, this being the highest and greatest court, over which none other can have jurisdiction in the kingdom, if by any means a misgovernment should anyway fall upon it, the subjects of this kingdom are left without all manner of remedy. To the fame purpose the President Montefquieu, though we trust too hastily, prefaces, that as Rome, Sparta, and Carthage, have lost their liberty and perished; so the constitution of England will in time lose its liberty, will perish: it will perish whenever the legislative power shall become more corrupt than the executive.

It must be owned, that Mr. Locke, and other theoretical writers, have held, that "there remains still inherent in the people a supreme power to remove or alter the legislature, when they find the legislature act contrary to the trust reposed in them:" for when such trust is abused, it is thereby forfeited, and devolves to those who gave it. But however just this conclusion may be in theory, we cannot adopt it, or argue from it, under any dispensation of government at present actually existing. For this devolution of power, to the people at large, includes in it a dissolution of the whole form of government established by that people; reduces all the members to their original state of equality; and by annihilating the sovereign power, repeals all positive laws whatsoever before enacted. No human laws will therefore suppose a case, which at once must destroy all law, and compel men to build afresh upon a new foundation; nor will they make provision for so desperate an event, as must render all legal provisions ineffectual. So long therefore as the English constitution lasts, we may venture to affirm, that the power of parliament is absolute and without controul.

In order to prevent the mischiefs that might arise, by placing this extensive authority in hands that are either incapable or else improper to manage it, it is provided by the custom and law of parliament, that no one shall fit or vote in either house, unless he be 21 years of age. This is also expressly declared by statute 7 & 8 W. III. c. 25.: with regard to the house of commons, doubts have arisen, from some contradictory adjudications, whether or not a minor was incapacitated from fitting in that house. It is also enacted by statute 7 Jac. I. c. 6. that no member be permitted to enter the house of commons till he hath taken the oath of allegiance before the lord steward or his deputy: and by 30 Car. II. st. 2. and 1 Geo. I. c. 13., that no member shall vote or sit in either house, till he hath, in the presence of the house, taken the oaths of allegiance, supremacy, and abjuration, and subscribed and repeated the declaration against transubstantiation, and invocation of saints, and the sacrifice of the mass. Aliens, unless naturalized, were likewise by the law of parliament incapable to serve therein: and now it is enacted, by statute 12 & 13 W. III. c. 2. that no alien, even though he be naturalized, shall be capable of being a member of either house of parliament. And there are not only these standing incapacities; but if any person is made a peer by the king, or elected to serve in the house of commons by the people, yet may the respective houses, upon complaint of any crime in such person, and proof thereof, adjudge him disabled and incapable to sit as a member: and this by the law and custom of parliament.

For as every court of justice hath laws and customs for its direction, some the civil and canon, some the forms of common law, others their own peculiar laws and customs; so the high court of parliament hath also its own peculiar law, called the lex et consuetudo parlamenti; a law which Sir Edward Coke obserues is ab omnibus quærenda, à multis ignorata, à paucis cognita. It will not therefore be expected that we should enter into the examination of this law with any degree of minuteness; since, as the same learned author assures us, it is much better to be learned out of the rolls of parliament and other records, and by precedents and continual experience, than can be expressed by any one man. It will be sufficient to observe, that the whole of the law and custom of parliament has its original from this one maxim, "That whatever matter arises concerning either house of parliament, ought to be examined, discussed, and adjudged in that house to which it relates, and not elsewhere." Hence, for instance, the lords will not suffer the commons to interfere in the settling the election of a peer in Scotland; the commons will not allow the lords to judge of the election of a burges; nor will either house permit the subordinate courts of law to examine the merits of either case. But the maxims Parliament: upon which they proceed, together with the method of proceeding, rest entirely in the breast of the parliament itself; and are not defined and ascertained by any particular stated laws.

Its extensive privileges.

The privileges of parliament are likewise very large and indefinite; and therefore, when in 31st Hen. VI. the house of lords propounded a question to the judges concerning them, the chief justice, Sir John Fortecue, in the name of his brethren, declared, "That they ought not to make answer to that question; for it hath not been used aforetime, that the justices should in any wise determine the privileges of the high court of parliament; for it is so high and mighty in its nature, that it may make law; and that which is law, it may make no law; and the determination and knowledge of that privilege belong to the lords of parliament, and not to the justices." Privileges of parliament was principally established, in order to protect its members not only from being molested by their fellow-subjects, but also more especially from being oppressed by the power of the crown. If therefore all the privileges of parliament were once to be set down and ascertained, and no privilege to be allowed but what was so defined and determined, it were easy for the executive power to devise some new case, not within the line of privilege, and under pretence thereof to harass any refractory member, and violate the freedom of parliament. The dignity and independence of the two houses are therefore in great measure preserved by keeping their privileges indefinite. Some, however, of the more notorious privileges of the members of either house are, privileges of speech, of person, of their domestics, and of their lands and goods. As to the first, privilege of speech, it is declared by the statute 1 W. and M. ft. 2. c. 2. as one of the liberties of the people, "That the freedom of speech, and debates, and proceedings in parliament, ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of parliament." And this freedom of speech is particularly demanded of the king in person, by the speaker of the house of commons, at the opening of every new parliament. So likewise are the other privileges, of person, servants, lands, and goods; which are immunities as ancient as Edward the Confessor: in whose laws we find this precept, ad synodos vententibus, fave summoniti fini, fave per se quid agendum habuerint, sit summa pax; and so too in the old Gothic constitutions, Extenditur hec pax et securitas ad quattuordecim dies, convocato regni senatu. This included formerly not only privilege from illegal violence, but also from legal arrests and seizures by process from the courts of law. And still to assault by violence a member of either house, or his menial servants, is a high contempt of parliament, and there punished with the utmost severity. It has likewise peculiar penalties annexed to it in the courts of law by the statutes 5 Hen. IV. c. 6. and 11 Hen. VI. c. 11. Neither can any member of either house be arrested and taken into custody without a breach of the privilege of parliament.

But all other privileges which derogate from the common law are now at an end, save only as to the freedom of the member's person; which in a peer (by the privilege of peerage) is for ever sacred and inviolable; and in a commoner (by the privilege of parliament) for forty days after every prorogation, and forty days before the next appointed meeting; which is now in effect as long as the parliament subsists, it seldom being prorogued for more than 80 days at a time. As to all other privileges which obstruct the ordinary course of justice, they were restrained by the statutes 12 W. III. c. 3. 2 and 3 Ann. c. 18. and 11 Geo. II. c. 24. and are now totally abolished by statute 10 G. III. c. 50.; which enacts, that any suit may at any time be brought against any peer or member of parliament, their servants, or any other person entitled to privilege of parliament; which shall not be impeached or delayed by pretence of any such privilege, except that the person of a member of the house of commons shall not thereby be subjected to any arrest or imprisonment. Likewise, for the benefit of commerce, it is provided by statute 4 Geo. III. c. 33. that any trader, having privilege of parliament, may be served with legal process for any just debt (to the amount of 100l.) and uncles he makes satisfaction within two months, it shall be deemed an act of bankruptcy; and that commissions of bankruptcy may be issued against such privileged traders in like manner as against any other.

The only way by which courts of justice could sufficiently take cognizance of privilege of parliament was by writ of privilege, in the nature of a superfluous, to deliver the party out of custody when arrested in a civil suit. For when a letter was written by the speaker to the judges, to stay proceedings against a privileged person, they rejected it as contrary to their oath of office. But since the statute 12 Will. III. c. 3. which enacts, that no privileged person shall be subject to arrest or imprisonment, it hath been held, that such arrest is irregular ab initio, and that the party may be discharged upon motion. It is to be observed, that there is no precedent of any such writ of privilege, but only in civil suits; and that the statute of 1 Jac. I. c. 13. and that of King William (which remedy some inconveniences arising from privilege of parliament), speak only of civil actions. And therefore the claim of privilege hath been usually guarded with an exception as to the case of indictable crimes; or, as it hath been frequently expressed, of treason, felony, and breach (or forfeiture) of the peace. Whereby it seems to have been understood, that no privilege was allowable to the members, their families, or servants, in any crime, whatsoever; for all crimes are treated by the law as being contra pacem domini regis. And instances have not been wanting, wherein privileged persons have been convicted of misdemeanors, and committed, or prosecuted to outlawry, even in the middle of a session; which proceeding has afterwards received the sanction and approbation of parliament. To which may be added, that a few years ago, the case of writing and publishing seditious libels was resolved by both houses not to be entitled to privilege; and that the reasons upon which that case proceeded, extended equally to every indictable offence. So that the chief, if not the only, privilege of parliament in such cases, seems to be the right of receiving immediate information of the imprisonment or detention of any member, with the reason for which he is detained: a practice that is daily used upon the slightest military accusations, preparatory to a trial by a court martial; and which is recognized by the several temporary statutes for suspending the habeas corpus act: whereby it is provided, that no member of either house shall be detained, till the matter of which he stands suspected be first communicated to the house of which he is a member, and the content of the said Parliament said house obtained for his commitment or detaining. But yet the usage has uniformly been, ever since the Revolution, that the communication has been subsequent to the arrest.

These are the general heads of the laws and customs relating to parliament, considered as one aggregate body. The laws and customs relating to each branch in particular being explained under the articles already referred to, viz. King, Lords, and Commons, we should proceed, IV. To the method of making laws; which is much the same in both houses. But for this, too, we have to refer the reader to the article Bill; and shall only observe in this place, that, for dispatch of business, each house of parliament has its speaker. The speaker of the house of lords, whose office it is to preside there, and manage the formality of business, is the lord chancellor, or keeper of the king's great seal, or any other appointed by the king's commission: and if none be appointed, the house of lords (it is said) may elect.—The speaker of the house of commons is chosen by the house; but must be approved by the king. And herein the usage of the two houses differs, that the speaker of the house of commons cannot give his opinion or argue any question in the house; but the speaker of the house of lords, if a lord of parliament, may. In each house, the act of the majority binds the whole; and this majority is declared by votes openly and publicly given; not, as at Venice, and many other senatorial assemblies, privately, or by ballot. This latter method may be serviceable, to prevent intrigues and unconstitutional combinations; but it is impossible to be practised with us, at least in the house of commons, where every member's conduct is subject to the future censure of his constituents, and therefore should be openly submitted to their inspection.

V. There remains only, in the last place, to add a word or two concerning the manner in which parliament may be adjourned, prorogued, or dissolved.

An adjournment is no more than a continuance of the session from one day to another; as the word itself signifies; and this is done by the authority of each house separately every day; and sometimes for a fortnight or a month together, as at Christmas or Easter, or upon other particular occasions. But the adjournment of one house is no adjournment of the other. It hath also been usual, when his majesty hath signified his pleasure, that both or either of the houses should adjourn themselves to a certain day, to obey the king's pleasure so signified, and to adjourn accordingly.—Otherwise, besides the indecency of a refusal, a prorogation would affluently follow; which would often be very inconvenient to both public and private business. For prorogation puts an end to the session; and then such bills as are only begun, and not perfected, must be resumed de novo (if at all) in a subsequent session; whereas, after an adjournment, all things continue in the same state as at the time of the adjournment made, and may be proceeded on without any fresh commencement.

A prorogation is the continuance of the parliament from one session to another; as an adjournment is a continuation of the session from day to day. This is done by the royal authority, expressed either by the lord chancellor in his majesty's presence, or by commission from the crown, or frequently by proclamation. Both houses are necessarily prorogued at the same time; it not being a prorogation of the house of lords or commons, but of Parliament, the parliament. The session is never understood to be at an end until a prorogation; though, unless some act be passed, or some judgment given in parliament, it is in truth no session at all. And formerly the usage was, for the king to give the royal assent to all such bills as he approved at the end of every session, and then to prorogue the parliament, though sometimes only for a day or two; after which all business then depending in the house was to be begun again. Which custom obtained so strongly, that it once became a question, Whether giving the royal assent to a single bill did not of course put an end to the session? And though it was then resolved in the negative, yet the notion was so deeply rooted, that the statute 1 Car. I. c. 7. was passed to declare, that the king's assent to that and some other acts should not put an end to the session; and even so late as the reign of Charles II. we find a proviso frequently tacked to a bill, that his majesty's assent thereto should not determine the session of parliament. But it now seems to be allowed, that a prorogation must be expressly made, in order to determine the session. And if at the time of an actual rebellion, or imminent danger of invasion, the parliament shall be separated by adjournment or prorogation, the king is empowered to call them together by proclamation, with 14 days notice of the time appointed for their reassembling.

A dissolution is the civil death of the parliament; and this may be effected three ways: 1. By the king's will, expressed either in person or by representation. For as by the king has the sole right of convening the parliament, king's will, to alo it is a branch of the royal prerogative, that he may (whenever he pleases) prorogue the parliament for a time, or put a final period to its existence. If nothing had a right to prorogue or dissolve a parliament but itself, it might happen to become perpetual. And this would be extremely dangerous, if at any time it should attempt to encroach upon the executive power, as was fatally experienced by the unfortunate King Charles I.; who, having unadvisedly passed an act to continue the parliament then in being till such time as it should please to dissolve itself; at last fell a sacrifice to that inordinate power which he himself had consented to give them. It is therefore extremely necessary that the crown should be empowered to regulate the duration of these assemblies, under the limitations which the English constitution has prescribed: so that, on the one hand, they may frequently and regularly come together for the dispatch of business and redress of grievances; and may not, on the other, even with the consent of the crown, be continued to an inconvenient or unconstitutional length.

2. A parliament may be dissolved by the demise of the crown. This dissolution formerly happened immediately upon the death of the reigning sovereign: for he being considered in law as the head of the parliament, (caput, principium, et finis), that failing, the whole body was held to be extinct. But the calling a new parliament immediately on the inauguration of the successor being found inconvenient, and dangers being apprehended from having no parliament in being in case of a disputed succession, it was enacted by the statutes 7 and 8 Wm. III. c. 15. and 6 Ann. c. 7. that the parliament in being shall continue for six months after the death of any king or queen, unless sooner prorogued or dissol- ved by the successor; that if the parliament be, at the time of the king's death, separated, by adjournment or prorogation, it shall notwithstanding assemble immediately: and that if no parliament is then in being, the members of the last parliament shall assemble and be again a parliament.

3. Lastly, A parliament may be dissolved or expire by length of time. For if either the legislative body were perpetual, or might last for the life of the prince who convened them as formerly, and were so to be supplied, by occasionally filling the vacancies with new representatives; in these cases, if it were once corrupted, the evil would be past all remedy; but when different bodies succeed each other, if the people see cause to disapprove of the present, they may rectify its faults in the next. A legislative assembly also, which is sure to be separated again, (whereby its members will themselves become private men, and subject to the full extent of the laws which they have enacted for others,) will think themselves bound, in interest as well as duty, to make only such laws as are good. The utmost extent of time that the same parliament was allowed to sit, by the statute 6 W. and M. c. 3. was three years: after the expiration of which, reckoning from the return of the first summons, the parliament was to have no longer continuance. But by the statute 1 Geo. I. stat. 2. c. 38. (in order, professedly, to prevent the great and continued expences of frequent elections, and the violent heats and animosities consequent thereupon, and for the peace and security of the government then just recovering from the late rebellion), this term was prolonged to seven years; and, what alone is an instance of the vast authority of parliament, the very same house that was chosen for three years, enacted its own continuance for seven. So that, as our constitution now stands, the parliament must expire, or die a natural death, at the end of every seventh year, if not sooner dissolved by the royal prerogative.

We shall conclude this article with an account of some general forms not taken notice of under any of the above heads.

In the house of lords, the princes of the blood fit by themselves on the sides of the throne; at the wall, on the king's right hand, the two archbishops fit by themselves on a form. Below them, the bishops of London, Durham, and Winchester, and all the other bishops, fit according to the priority of their consecration. On the king's left hand the lord treasurer, lord president, and lord privy seal, fit upon forms above all dukes, except the royal blood; then the dukes, marquises, and earls, according to their creation. Across the room are wool sacks, continued from an ancient custom; and the chancellor, or keeper, being of course the speaker of the house of lords, fits on the first wool sack before the throne, with the great seal or mace lying by him; below these are forms for the viscounts and barons. On the other wool sacks are seated the judges, masters in chancery, and king's council, who are only to give their advice in points of law; but they all stand up till the king gives them leave to fit.

The commons fit promiscuously; only the speaker has a chair at the upper end of the house, and the clerk and his affiant fit at a table near him.

When a member of the house of commons speaks, he stands up uncovered, and directs his speech to the speaker only. If what he says be answered by another, he is not allowed to reply the same day, unless personal reflections have been cast upon him: but when the commons, in order to have a greater freedom of debate, have resolved themselves into a committee of the whole house, every member may speak to a question as often as he thinks necessary. In the house of lords they vote, beginning at the puifine or lowest baron, and so up orderly to the highest, every one answering Content or Not content. In the house of commons they vote by years and nays; and if it be dubious which are the greater number, the house divides. If the question be about bringing any thing into the house, the years go out, but if it be about any thing the house already has, the nays go out. In all divisions the speaker appoints four tellers, two of each opinion. In a committee of the whole house, they divide by changing sides, the years taking the right and the nays the left of the chair; and then there are but two tellers. If a bill palls one house, and the other demur to it, a conference is demanded in the painted chamber, where certain members are deputed from each house; and here the lords fit covered, and the commons stand bare, and debate the case. If they disagree, the affair is null; but if they agree, this, with the other bills that have passed both houses, is brought down to the king in the house of lords, who comes thither clothed in his royal robes; before him the clerk of the parliament reads the title of each bill, and as he reads, the clerk of the crown pronounces the royal assent or dissent. If it be a public bill, the royal assent is given in these words, Le roy le veut, "The King will have it so;" if private, Soit fait comme il est defret, "Let the request be complied with;" if the king refusest to fes the bill, the answer is, Le roy s'avisera, "The King will think of it;" and if it be a money bill, the answer is, Le roy remetce ses loyaux sujets, accepte leur benevolence, et aussi le veut; "The King thanks his loyal subjects, accepts their benevolence, and therefore grants his consent."

High Court of PARLIAMENT, is the supreme court in the kingdom, not only for the making, but also for the execution of laws; by the trial of great and enormous offenders, whether lords or commoners, in the method of parliamentary impeachment. As for acts of parliament to attain particular persons of treason or felony, or to inflict pains and penalties, beyond or contrary to the common law, to serve a special purpose, we speak not of them; being to all intents and purposes new laws, made pro re nata, and by no means an execution of such as are already in being. But an impeachment before the lords by the commons of Great Britain, in parliament, is a prosecution of the already known and established law, and has been frequently put in practice; being a preliment to the most high and supreme court of criminal jurisdiction by the most solemn grand inquest of the whole kingdom. A commoner cannot, however, be impeached before the lords for any capital offence, but only for high misdemeanors; a peer may be impeached for any crime. And they usually (in case of an impeachment of a peer for treason) address the crown to appoint a lord high steward, for the greater dignity and regularity of their proceedings; which high steward was formerly elected by the peers themselves, though he was generally commissioned by the king; but it hath of late years been strenuously maintained, that the appointment ment of a high steward in such cases is not indispensably necessary, but that the house may proceed without one. The articles of impeachment are a kind of bills of indictment, found by the house of commons, and afterwards tried by the lords; who are in cases of misdemeanors considered not only as their own peers, but as the peers of the whole nation. This is a custom derived to us from the constitution of the ancient Germans; who in their great councils sometimes tried capital accusations relating to the public: Licet apud concilium accusare quoque, et differentem capitis intendere. And it has a peculiar propriety in the English constitution; which has much improved upon the ancient model imported hither from the continent. For though in general the union of the legislative and judicial powers ought to be most carefully avoided, yet it may happen that a subject, intrusted with the administration of public affairs, may infringe the rights of the people, and be guilty of such crimes as the ordinary magistrate either dares not or cannot punish. Of these the representatives of the people, or house of commons, cannot properly judge; because their constituents are the parties injured, and can therefore only impeach. But before what court shall this impeachment be tried? Not before the ordinary tribunals, which would naturally be swayed by the authority of so powerful an accuser. Reason therefore will suggest, that this branch of the legislature, which represents the people, must bring its charge before the other branch, which consists of the nobility, who have neither the same interests, nor the same passions, as popular assemblies. This is a vast superiority which the constitution of this island enjoys over those of the Grecian or Roman republics; where the people were at the same time both judges and accusers. It is proper that the nobility should judge, to ensure justice to the accused; as it is proper that the people should accuse, to ensure justice to the commonwealth. And therefore, among other extraordinary circumstances attending the authority of this court, there is one of a very singular nature, which was insisted on by the house of commons in the case of the earl of Danby in the reign of Chas. II. and is now enacted by statute 12 and 13 W. III. c. 2. that no pardon under the great seal shall be pleadable to an impeachment by the commons of Great Britain in parliament.

Such is the nature of a British parliament, and in theory at least we should presume it were nearly perfect; but some of our fellow countrymen, more zealous perhaps than wise, see prodigious faults in it, such indeed as they think must inevitably prove fatal. The consequence of this persuasion, has been a loud and incessant call for parliamentary reform. That abuses ought to be reformed, is certain; and that few institutions are so perfect as not to need amendment, is a fact equally indisputable. We shall even suppose that there are many abuses in our parliament which would require to be amended; but, granting all this, and something more if it were necessary, we would recommend in the mean time to the serious consideration of those who call themselves the Friends of the People, whose sincerity in their professions it would be unpolicite to question, the example of France, and that they would allow it to be a warning to Britain. France wanted reform indeed, and that which was first proposed had the countenance of the coolest and the best of men; but the consequences have been dreadful; and if ever a free and stable government Parliament, take place in it, which we sincerely wish may be soon, Parma. it will have been purchased at an immense price, by enormities which will disgrace it whilst the remembrance of them lasts.

The former PARLIAMENTS of France were sovereign courts established by the king, finally to determine all disputes between particular persons, and to pronounce on appeals from sentences given by inferior judges.—There were ten of these parliaments in France, of which that of Paris was the chief, its privileges and jurisdiction being of the greatest extent. It consisted of eight chambers: the grand chamber, where causes of audience were pleaded; the chamber of written law; the chamber of council; the Tournelle criminelle, for judging criminal affairs; the Tournelle civile, in aid of the grand chamber; and three chambers of inquests, where processses were adjudged in writing: besides these, there were also the chamber of vacations, and those of requests. In 1771 the king thought fit to branch the parliament of Paris into fix different parliaments, under the denomination of superior courts, each parliament having similar jurisdiction. Under their second race of kings, this parliament, like that of England, was the king's council; it gave audience to ambassadors, and consulted of the affairs of war and government. The king, like ours, at that time presided in them, without being at all master of their resolutions. But in after times their authority was abridged; as the kings reserved the decision of the grand affairs of the public to their own councils; leaving none but private ones to the parliaments. The parliament of Paris also enjoyed the privileges of verifying and registering the king's arrears or edicts, without which those edicts were of little or no value.

PARLIAMENT of Sweden, consists of four estates, with the king at their head. These estates are, 1. The nobility and representatives of the gentry; with whom the colonels, lieutenant colonels, majors, and captains of every regiment, sit and vote. 2. The clergy; one of which body is elected from every rural deanery of ten parishes; who, with the bishops and superintendents, amount to about 200. 3. The burghers, elected by the magistrates and council of every corporation as their representatives, of whom there are four for Stockholm, and two for every other town, amounting in the whole to about 150. 4. The peasants, chosen by the peasants out of every district; who choose one of their own rank, and not a gentleman, to represent them: these amount to about 250.

All these generally meet at Stockholm: and after the state affairs have been represented to them from the throne, they separate, and sit in four several chambers or houses, in each of which affairs are carried on by majority of votes; and every chamber has a negative in the passing any law.