in Logic, a specious argument having the appearance of truth, but leading to falsehood. So- phisms are reduced by Aristotle into eight classes, an ar- rangement so just and comprehensive, that it is equally proper in present as in former times. 1. Ignoratio elenchi, in which the sophist seems to determine the question, while he does it only in appearance. Thus the question, "Whether the excess of wine be hurtful?" seems to be determined by proving, that wine revives the spirits and gives a man courage: but the principal point is here kept out of sight; for still it may be hurtful to health, to for- tune, and reputation. 2. Petitio principii, a begging of the question, or taking for granted that which remains to be proved, as if any one should undertake to prove that the soul is extended through all the parts of the body, because it resides in every member. This is af- firming the same thing in different words. 3. Reasoning in a circle; as when the Roman Catholics prove the Scriptures to be the word of God by the authority of the church, and the authority of the church from the Scriptures. 4. Non caus/a pro caus/a, or the assigning of a false cause to any effect. Thus the supposed prin- ciple, that nature abhors a vacuum, was applied to ex- plain the rising of water in a pump before Galileo discovered that it was owing to the pressure of the atmosphere. In this way the vulgar ascribe accidents to divine vengeance, and the heresies and infidelity of modern times are said to be owing to learning. 5. Fallacia accidentis, in which the sophist represents what is merely accidental as essential to the nature of the subject. This is nearly allied to the former, and is committed by the Mahometans and Roman Catholics. The Mahometans forbid wine, because it is sometimes the occasion of drunkenness and quarrels; and the Ro- man Catholics prohibit the reading of the Bible, be- cause it has sometimes promoted heresies. 6. By deduc- ing an universal assertion from what is true only in par- ticular circumstances, and the reverse: thus some men argue, "transcribers have committed many errors in copying the Scriptures, therefore they are not to be de- pended on." 7. By asserting anything in a compound sense which is only true in a divided sense; so when the Scriptures assure us, that the worst of sinners may be saved, it does not mean that they shall be saved while they remain sinners, but that if they repent they may be saved. 8. By an abuse of the ambiguity of words. Thus Mr Hume reasons in his Essay on Miracles: "Experience is our only guide in reasoning concerning matters of fact; now we know from experience, that the laws of nature are fixed and invariable. On the other hand, testimony is variable and often false; there- fore since our evidence for the reality of miracles rests solely on testimony which is variable, and our evidence for the uniformity of the laws of nature is invariable, miracles are not to be believed." The sophistry of this reasoning depends on the ambiguity of the word expe- rience, which in the first proposition signifies the max- ims which we form from our own observation and re- flection; in the second it is confounded with testimo- ny; for it is by the testimony of others, as well as our own observation, that we learn whether the laws of na- ture are variable or invariable. The Essay on Miracles may be recommended to those who wish to see more ex- amples of sophistry; as we believe most of the eight species of sophisms which we have mentioned are well illustrated by examples in that essay.