INTRODUCTION.

IN treating the subject of war, we may consider it first in a political and moral point of view, as one of those powerful engines employed by civil governments, to bring about some ends which they deem beneficial to the community over which they preside; and secondly, in a theoretical and practical point of view, as a science or an art, which the necessities or the follies of mankind have rendered an important object of consideration, not only to certain individuals, but in some measure to society at large.

VOL. XX. Part II.

From the numerous calamities incident to war, it should be presumed that no wise or good government would have recourse to means so dangerous and expensive, till after all other means of producing the ends they have in view had failed of success. The offensive objects for which a nation or community engages in a war, are usually, to prevent or repel the assaults, encroachments, or invasions of its neighbours; to revenge some insult or injury which the community, its allies, or dependents, may have sustained; to compel some other nation or community to respect what are called the law of nations, and the rights of civil society; or to preserve preserve that due and equable balance of power among neighbouring states, which has of late been considered as an essential point in the political economy of civilized nations. We say that these are usually the offenible objects of war; for though it will scarcely be denied that ambition, avarice, religious bigotry, a desire of dominion, and a thirst of military fame, have been the real causes of many of those long and bloody wars which have defoliated the face of nature, and heaped misery and wretchedness on millions of human beings, we believe few heroes and conquerors, either of ancient or modern times, have had the honesty or effrontery to avow these as the real motives of their military expeditions. Yet, if we examine the pages of history, we shall scarcely find a war, from the Battle of the Kings recorded by the sacred historian, to the present contest which has for 17 years involved all Europe in confusion and bloodshed, and reduced many of its fairest states and provinces under the subjection of a single monarch, in which one or other of these latter motives has not, at least to one party, been a principal inducement.

Among the political objects of war, we must not omit to mention one which, though perhaps less openly avowed than any other, has, in monarchical and aristocratical governments, always formed a material part of the state policy,—we mean the object of preventing tumults and commotions among the people, by engaging them in a foreign war. It was long ago observed by a good judge of human nature*, "that no body can be healthful without exercise, neither natural body nor politic;" and that "to a kingdom or a state, a just and honourable war is the true exercise." That politicians have often acted on these principles, is certain. On the justice of the principles themselves, we presume not to decide, though we may safely express a doubt whether the remedy be not worse than the disease, and whether these popular commotions might not be prevented with equal ease, and with more advantage to the nation, by employing the populace in such works of improvement as may advance the manufactures, commerce, or internal comforts of the state.

An able and ingenious writer considers a redundancy of population as one of the chief primary causes of war. "One of its first causes and most powerful impulses, was undoubtedly an insufficiency of room and food; and, greatly as the circumstances of mankind have changed since it first began, the same cause still continues to operate, and to produce, though in a smaller degree, the same effects. The ambition of princes would want instruments of destruction, if the distresses of the lower classes did not drive them under their standards. A recruiting sergeant always prays for a bad harvest, and a want of employment, or, in other words, a redundant population†." This redundancy he proposes to obviate, and thus to counteract one of the principal causes of war, by throwing obstacles in the way of marriage. Without calling in question the justness of his position, we do not see the necessity of the remedy which he proposes. We must acknowledge ourselves such friends to the increase of population as to think that every encouragement ought to be given to it, instead of throwing obstacles in its way. There are few countries so populous, or so completely cultivated, as to render it necessary to plunge them into wars, in order to diminish the number of inhabitants, which might be abundantly supported, were agriculture encouraged, and gluttony repressed.

Whatever may be the objects for which a nation goes to war; whatever the causes which have induced her to have recourse to such an expedient, we may venture, from history and experience, to affirm that she will gain little solid advantage by the contest. She may drive an invading enemy from her dominions, and pursue him to his own; she may acquire plunder and territory, and may raise her name among the neighbouring states by her victories and prowess; but all these, except the first, will scarcely compensate for the blood and treasure which she has expended, and for the check given to her agriculture, manufactures and commerce, by drawing off many of the labouring part of the community to supply the fleets and armies of the state. These are the inevitable consequences even of a successful war; and should it prove otherwise, the calamities and distresses of the vanquished may readily be conceived. Even to the established government of a state, war, while it appears to strengthen their hands and increase their influence, is fraught with difficulty and danger. No situation of affairs is so well calculated to show the abilities or insufficiency of a cabinet as this, and melancholy is the fate of that nation whose administration is then conducted by a weak, inexperienced, or profligate ministry; but be they ever so able or so upright, till the want of success, or a reverse of fortune, will lower them in the opinion of the people, and will compel them at last to conclude a disadvantageous, perhaps a dishonourable peace, or quit their posts and leave the task to a more popular or successful administration.

The evils of war do not terminate on the return of peace. Many of the burdens which it had imposed on the people must still continue, to discharge the debt contracted by the state; while the sudden disbanding of the fleets and armies pours into the community numbers of idle and dissipated men, averse to labour, and accustomed to scenes of confusion, slaughter and rapine. At no time are robberies, murders, or seditions so frequent as on the termination of a long protracted war; at none are the internal peace and quiet of a nation in so much danger.

On the moral evils of war we surely need not enlarge. In itself, when undertaken without necessity, it is an act of the most criminal and atrocious nature; and the aggressors are accountable for all the horrid consequences which may attend it. "The pomp and circumstances of glorious war" may form a desirable subject for the poet and the historian; but the Christian and the philosopher must regard it with horror and detestation, as the greatest evil with which providence has been pleased to arm the hands of its ministers to punish and afflict mankind. A late amiable and learned prelate has laboured to prove that "the frequency, duration, and cruelty of wars (in Christendom) are less now than in ancient times;"* but we think that neither his reasoning nor his examples are capable of establishing the first part of this position. If we take the last 700 years, and compare it with an equal period of ancient history; if we recollect the crusades, the almost continual struggles between France and Britain, the civil diffusions in both these mighty empires, the wars between the Russians and their neighbours, the Turks, the Poles, and the Swedes; if we advert to the reigns of Edward Edward III. of England, Charles V. and Philip II. of Spain, Louis XIV. of France, Gustavus Adolphus and Charles XII. of Sweden, Frederick II. of Prussia, and Catherine II. of Russia; and lastly, if we turn our attention to the long and ruinous contests which distinguish our own times, we shall find little cause to boast of having profited by the pacific lessons of our Saviour, whose great object was to promote "peace on earth," and good will and brotherly love among the children of men.

There is indeed one consolatory circumstance with respect to the modern system of warfare, that our wars are now less sanguinary than those of ancient times. The immense slaughter which attended some of the battles in the Greek and Roman wars, where the greater part of the vanquished army was frequently put to the sword, is familiar to our classical readers; but in modern warfare, even of the large armies that have appeared in the field on the continent of Europe, we seldom find so many as 30,000 killed and wounded on both sides, a number vastly inferior to what fell of the Romans at Cannae, and by no means equal to the loss of the Carthaginians at the battle of Zama. This diminished slaughter is attributed, and we believe with justice, to the use of fire-arms; and it is computed that in this mode of fighting not more than one musket ball in 40 takes effect, and not more than one in 400 proves fatal. The introduction of these weapons, therefore, however it may be declaimed against by theorists, must be considered as a real improvement in the art of war; and it is sincerely to be regretted that the use of them should be laid aside. If, however, the present practice of deciding battles by the bayonet and the sabre be continued, it is to be feared that we shall soon rival the ancients as much in the sanguinary nature of our wars as in their frequency.

After what we have said on the impolicy of war, and the moral evils which attend it, it will scarcely be expected that we should allow it to be justifiable, except in cases of necessity. Indeed we think that war can be justified only on the principles of self-defence. When a nation is invaded, or attacked in relation to her undoubted rights and principles, it is then, and then only, that she has a pretence for war. We will not, indeed, go so far as to assert, that the ought to await the attack. While she takes the best methods for defending her territories at home, it is doubtless proper, especially for a maritime state, to meet the enemy half-way, and by a timely and spirited resistance, endeavour to avert those greater evils which would attend a system of pusillanimity and neglect.

In the present state of human nature, war must be regarded as a necessary evil, and as it is sometimes unavoidable, the principles and practice of it must be studied by those who are to superintend or to conduct its operations. It is this necessity that has given occasion to the art of war, the practice of which is to form the subject of the present article.

Before we enter on the immediate object of this essay, however, it may not be improper to enumerate those branches of knowledge which constitute the principles of the military art, and of which no officer who expects to have a principal command in military operations should be ignorant. We shall first mention those sciences which should form a part of the education of every commanding officer, whether military or naval; and we shall then distinguish between those which are most applicable to the land and the sea service.

Among the first branches of a military education must be enumerated the modern languages of French and German; geography, by which we would understand, not merely the description of countries, states, and kingdoms, but a knowledge of their political constitution, resources, and productions, and of the manners, customs, and character of their inhabitants; history, especially that of modern Europe, and of the Greeks and Romans. Among particular histories we would recommend those of Polybius, Xenophon, Tacitus, with the Commentaries of Caesar, in ancient history; and Davila's account of the civil wars of France, Guicciardini's history of the Italian wars, the history of the seven years war by Frederick the Great, with a particular attention to the best histories of his own country, and of the wars in which he has been engaged. After these preliminary branches follow the rudiments of mathematics, including common and logarithmic arithmetic, the elements of theoretical and practical geometry, plane and spherical trigonometry, the principles of surveying, conic sections, and their application to projectiles; certain parts of natural philosophy, especially mechanics; and the principles of drawing plans, maps, and charts.

Besides these, a military officer should be instructed in fortification and gunnery, the nature of military exercises, and the duties of the various officers attached to an army; while the naval officer should particularly attend to astronomy, hydrodynamics, navigation, the principles of seamanship, and of ship-building.

There is perhaps no art or profession, in the practice of which the superiority of example over precept is more apparent than in war, insomuch that we may lay it down as an axiom, that no man can be a soldier or a sailor from theory alone. It is not from books that we are to learn the art of war, though there is no doubt that they may greatly assist and improve the skill and experience acquired in the field or on the ocean. In these active scenes have been formed the great commanders, whose lives and actions are perused with so much avidity; and the only method of successfully imitating their exploits, and emulating their fame, is to encounter the dangers and the hardships to which they were exposed, and to learn how to command, by first learning to obey. A considerable share of the mechanical part of war may be acquired in a well-regulated military or naval school; but the experience necessary for a commander is to be gained only in actual service.

The practical part of war is usually divided into military tactics, and naval tactics; a division which we shall here adopt, though we have thought proper to bring the whole under one article. As the space, which we had originally allotted to these subjects, has unavoidably been reduced one half, we shall be able to give little more than a general outline, especially of military tactics, referring the fuller discussion for naval tactics, which, to a nation whose chief dependence is on her fleets, must be the most useful and the most interesting part of the subject.

It would be vain for us to attempt any historical account count of the progressive improvements that have been made in the art of war. Indeed this would be to repeat much of what has already been detailed under the principal historical articles of this work; for the history of nations, as it is commonly treated, is little more than a history of their wars. We might, no doubt, bring forwards much curious information respecting the offensive and defensive weapons of different ages and countries, and the character and organization of their armies; but for those and other matters of a similar nature, we may refer our readers to the following respectable authorities: Vegetius De re militari; Polybius's History, with the Commentaries of Florid; Salmasius De re militari Romanorum; Tacitus's Vita Agricolae; Rollin's Ancient History; Potter's Grecian Antiquities; Kennet's and Adam's Roman Antiquities; Goguet's Origin of Laws, Arts, &c.; Daniel Histoire de la Milice Françoise; Gough's Sepulchral Monuments; Ashcan's Toxophilus, and Grose's History of the English Army, and Essay on Ancient Armour.

At a period like the present, when the two greatest powers of Europe are struggling for glory and dominion, it will not be thought uninteresting, or irrelevant to the subject of the present article, if we offer a comparative statement of the present military and naval establishments of these two mighty empires, with a sketch of the military character of their armies; and with these we shall conclude our preliminary observations.

According to a statement made to the French government at the commencement of 1803, the grand total of the French armies consisted of 579,964 men; viz., infantry of the line, 341,412; light infantry, 100,130; cavalry, 77,488; artillery, 46,489; engineers, 5445. Since that time, more than 100,000 have been added, and, according to the best authority, the present total does not fall short of 700,000 men*. This vast body is divided into companies for both cavalry and infantry; a certain number of companies forming a battalion of infantry, or a squadron of cavalry. The denomination of regiment is appropriated to the cavalry and artillery, while a similar body of infantry is called a half brigade. The commanding officer of a regiment is called colonel; but the commander of a large body of infantry is called chief of brigade. The names of lieutenant-colonel and major are changed for those of chief of a battalion and chief of a squadron. Those general officers which in other armies are called major-generals, are, in the French service, denominated generals of brigade, and lieutenant-generals are there generals of division.

The corps of engineers has for its officers 8 inspectors general, 34 directors, 124 captains of the first class, 117 captains of the second class, 33 lieutenants of the first class, 21 of the second class, and 20 pupils under the lieutenants. Attached to this corps are 6 companies of miners, commanded by a chief of battalion. Each company is officered by a captain-commandant, a second captain, first and second lieutenant. Twelve battalions of miners; each battalion, containing 8 companies, forming in all 1606 men, including officers. The battalion staff is composed of a chief of battalion, an adjutant major, and an adjutant. Each company is officered by a captain, a lieutenant, and lieutenant.

To raise and recruit this great military force, the French government has, since the year 1798, had recourse to one of the most tyrannical measures which was ever adopted by a despotic monarchy, we mean that of conscription, by which every man within a certain age, is made liable, under circumstances of the greatest rigour, to serve in the armies of the state. This system of conscription is exceedingly complex; but we are enabled, from a respectable periodical publication, to present such a summary of it as will be readily understood. France is divided into about 30 military governments, subject to a general of division and his staff, to which commissaries are attached as executive officers. The civil division consists of 122 departments; 24 of which have been acquired since the overthrow of the monarchy, exclusive of Tuscany, not included in any part of this statement. The departments are divided into districts or arrondissements, from three to five in number; the arrondissements into cantons, and the cantons into municipalities, amounting to about 55,000. Each department is governed by a prefect and his council, composed of a commissary of police, a mayor, and certain inspectors, denominated counsellors of prefecture; the district or arrondissement, by a subprefect and his council, of a similar formation. The cantons and municipalities are under the supervision of an administration, composed of the civil authorities, with a president at their head. A mayor, a commissary of police, and two officers of the government, styled adjoints, are allotted to each division having a population above 5000 souls. These several authorities are in strict subordination to each other, and at the controul of the prefects and subprefects, who, themselves, are charged with a weighty and inflexible responsibility as to the military levies.

By the code de la conscription, all Frenchmen, between the ages of 20 and 25, are liable to serve. They are divided into five classes, from which the municipal administration draws up the lists for the ballot. These are transmitted to the prefects, by whom they are sent to the war minister, and when properly adjusted, the subprefect proceeds to the drawing of the quota imposed on each district. The conscripts drawn are formed into three divisions, the first called conscripts for actual service, the second the reserve, and the third supplementary conscripts. They are marched in companies of 100 men, to the places which are established as depots, where they are furnished with their arms and clothes. After this they are trained and exercised, so as to be inured to unremitting labour and fatigue.

What gives peculiar energy to the French military system, is the circumstance that their officers rise by merit and experience, and not by interest. By a law of the directory, no person (with the exception of engineers) could become officers, who had not served three years in a subordinate capacity. The revolution naturally opened the way to merit; and, seconded by this admirable policy, has filled all the posts of their army with men, who unite in themselves the qualities of the soldier, with the excellencies that qualify for command. It is not hazarding too much to assert, that nine-tenths of the present French officers have sprung from the ranks. Educated in distant camps, they know no other country, and, habituated by long devotion to the trade of war, it has become their element and their passion. Their whole fortune is staked on the sword; and their attachment is therefore necessarily secured, under the auspicious auspicious influence of a leader, whose indefatigable ambition occupies them in their favourite pursuits, and whose liberal impartiality feeds the hope of preferment, and divides the fruits of conquest. To their credit and example is due much of that spirit, which, notwithstanding the causes of alienation hitherto observed, seems to animate the whole frame of the army; and no small share of that potentates success which has attended the course of the French arms. Of the eighteen marechaux d'empire, fourteen have either emerged from the ranks, or ascended from the lowest employments. Most of the generals of division, and others who hold the principal commands, have the same origin, and sufficiently prove, that war is an experimental science, and that military renown is not the prerogative of birth, but the harvest of toil, or the bounty of fortune*.

We have no certain means of ascertaining the present naval establishment of the French empire, though, as it may be said to have the command of the navies of Holland, Russia, and the remains of that of Denmark, it must still be regarded as of no trifling strength. The principal fleets are indeed kept blockaded up by those of Britain, in the harbours of Brest, Rochefort, Toulon, the Scheldt, and the Texel; but the escape of any of these might be the means of conveying a considerable military force to the remaining colonies, or to the less powerful allies of France. In 1791, the French fleet consisted of 73 ships of the line, 67 frigates, 19 corvettes, and 67 small craft, making a total of 226. Since that time, however, have taken place the great naval victories of Howe, St Vincent, Duncan, and Nelson, by which the greater part of that navy has been carried into British ports.

In estimating the military establishment of Britain, we shall, for the sake of more accurate comparison, first take the same period of 1805. The British land forces then consisted of 21,223 cavalry, 124,878 infantry (including 20,747 men for limited service, and 21,268 belonging to foreign and provincial corps in British pay), 89,809 militia, 8,559 artillery, besides about 430,000 volunteers, making a total of 674,469. To these must be added the royal artillery, the horse brigade, the brigade of gunners and drivers, and companies of foreign artillery, amounting to 16,670, and the corps of artificers and labourers, including 794 men. Thus the whole military force of Britain, in 1805, amounted to 691,843 †.

Since the passing of Mr Windham's act, this number is somewhat diminished, though our military force is now probably more effective. At the end of 1808 it stood as follows. Two regiments of life-guards, one regiment of royal horse guards, 7 of dragoon guards, 25 of dragoons, 3 battalions of riflemen, 7 battalions of foot-guards, 5 of light infantry, 176 battalions of infantry, a corps of royal horse artillery, a regiment of royal foot artillery, a corps of royal engineers, a brigade of artillery drivers, and a wagon train. The dragoons, independent of the royal life and horse guards, amounted to 19,200; the battalions of riflemen and light infantry to 8000; the infantry of the line to 149,600; the king's German legion to about 20,000; exclusive of about 96,000 regular militia, 250,000 local militia, and about 50,000 volunteers; making an effective force of about 580,000 men.

Each regiment of not more than 500 men is officered by a colonel, a lieutenant-colonel, a major, 10 captains, 10 lieutenants, 8 ensigns, an adjutant, quartermaster, paymaster, a surgeon and assistant surgeon; a sergeant-major, a quartermaster-sergeant, with 30 ordinary sergeants, 30 corporals, a drum-major and 20 drummers. If the regiment amount to 750 men, it has usually an addition of second lieutenant-colonel, a second major, 10 sergeants, and 10 corporals.

The gradation of rank among the officers of the British army is as follows. Under the king, who commands the whole as captain-general, is the commander-in-chief, then follow the field-marshals, generals, lieutenant-generals, major-generals, brigadier-generals, colonels, lieutenant-colonels, majors, captains, and subalterns. The different departments of the army are under the superintendence of an adjutant-general, a quartermaster-general, a barrack-master-general, a commissary-general, a paymaster-general, a board of ordnance, and a medical board. See ADJUTANT, QUARTERMASTER, &c.

The army of the line is recruited by enlistment; the recruits receive a bounty, and are engaged to serve for a limited period, or for life. The militia is filled up by ballot, in the several counties to which it belongs, and also receives recruits by enlistment or by proxy. Hence the British soldier, while he considers himself as the servant of the king and the state, justly boasts of partaking in the general liberty of the subject. He is protected by fixed and definite laws, against the discretionary power of his commanding officer, and is encouraged to perform his duty by the liberality of his country; and not, as in France, compelled to it by the fear of punishment. His discipline indeed is strict; but he feels none of that severe and tyrannical coercion which seems to be the first principle of motion in the armies of Napoleon.

In its naval establishment, Britain justly boasts of being superior to every nation in the world. The number of her fleets, and the courage and discipline of her seamen, have given her the unrivalled dominion of the seas, of which it would be difficult for the whole combined navy of Europe to deprive her. In 1809, the naval force of Britain consisted of 157 ships of the line, 19 from 50 to 44, 184 frigates, 181 sloops, 308 brigs, making a total of 849 in commission; besides 56 of the line, 12 50's, 56 frigates, 44 sloops, 24 brigs, total 192 in ordinary and refitting; and 50 ships of the line, 20 frigates, 20 sloops, 10 brigs, total 100, building: making a grand total of 1141.

The progressive advance of our navy will appear by attending to the following recital of its tonnage at different periods, from the reign of Henry VIII. to the present time.

<table> <tr> <th></th> <th>Year.</th> <th>Tons about</th> </tr> <tr> <td>At the death of Henry VIII.</td> <td>1547</td> <td>12,400</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Edward VI.</td> <td>1553</td> <td>11,000</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Mary,</td> <td>1558</td> <td>7000</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Elizabeth,</td> <td>1603</td> <td>17,000</td> </tr> <tr> <td>James I.</td> <td>1625</td> <td>19,000</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Rebellion,</td> <td>1641</td> <td>22,400</td> </tr> <tr> <td>At the death of Charles I.</td> <td>1649</td> <td>uncertain.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>At the Restoration,</td> <td>1660</td> <td>57,460</td> </tr> <tr> <td>At the death of Charles II.</td> <td>1685</td> <td>103,558</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Abdication of James II.</td> <td>1688</td> <td>101,900</td> </tr> </table> At the death of William III. Year. Tons about Anne, 1714 167,170 George I. 1727 179,860 George II. 1760 321,200 31st December, 1788 413,665 1806 776,000 1809 800,000

It appears, however, that notwithstanding the vast increase of our navy, not a single dockyard has been added to it since the reign of William III. about 109 years ago, at which time the tonnage of the naval force of this kingdom amounted to nearly 160,000 tons; it is now nearly 800,900 tons, or about five times as large*.

In sketching the military character of the French and British armies at the commencement of the 19th century, we shall avail ourselves of the observations of an anonymous, but able and apparently impartial publication, which appeared soon after the peace of Amiens, entitled The Military Character of the European Armies at the Peace of Amiens.

The astonishing success which has attended the French arms on the continent of Europe, is to be attributed partly to the regular organization and severe discipline established by the Code de la Conscription, but it is still more to be ascribed to the skill, experience, and activity of their officers. The French generals early discovered the advantages resulting from dispatch. The alertness of the soldiers, the lightness of their baggage, and their inattention to regularity in time of action, enabled them to execute their movements with a celerity which has frequently ensured success. In an open country, lines could not be preserved without difficulty. The French armies were therefore formed in columns. Brigade succeeded brigade, and when one division was repulsed, and fell back on the columns in the rear, those in their turn attacked the enemy, or sustained his flock, and fresh troops perpetually came forward, to supply the place of those which had been defeated.

The French battalions have no field-pieces attached to them; but this want is amply compensated by their flying artillery, which is composed of the flower of the French soldiers, and by its boldness and rapidity of movement, supplies the place of that large train of artillery with which the other European armies are usually burdened. It is a constant maxim in the French armies to have a body of reserve, composed of their best troops, and under the command of an able general. If the main body should be beaten, the reserve covers their retreat, and on more than one occasion it has snatched the victory from the hands of the enemy.

The French generals, like rich and bold gamesters, are incessantly tempting fortune. They look upon their losses as nothing, provided they succeed in the end. The little value at which they estimate their men, the certainty of being able to replace them, the personal ambition of their chief, and the customary superiority of their numbers, afford them an advantage which cannot be counteracted but by great skill, conduct and activity.

The soldiers of Britain are as intrepid by land as her sailors by sea. Their want of success on the continent cannot be ascribed to their want of bravery, but rather of the organization of the British armies, their inferiority of numbers, or the inexperience of the officers by whom they are commanded. Most of their commanding officers, instead of conforming to general regulations, follow their own particular plans and ideas, according to their several geniuses, acquirements, and prejudices. In a nation, which from the spirit of its constitution and the habits of its people, is formed rather for naval than military operations, a ministry, however enlightened, scarcely possesses that authority which is necessary to give uniformity to the different departments of the army, to constitute a regular and corresponding whole, and to surmount those obstacles which are thrown in the way of all uniformity of military system, by the distance and distribution of the troops. The small numbers in which British troops are generally compelled to act on the continent, and their mixture with those of other nations, to which they are sometimes even subervient, are circumstances extremely disadvantageous.

In a military life, good faith, honour, and courage, are the principal qualifications, and these are eminently conspicuous in the British army. Their military ardour is greater than what is seen in any other service, but this is in a great measure dampened among the officers by the difficulty of promotion. Interest with ministers, and the necessity of raising money to defray the expenses of the different departments of the state, though far from being the most equitable, are here unhappily among the first means of military promotion.

The soldiers of the British army are possessed of elements to enable them, under a commander of abilities and officers of experience, to be the best troops in the world. They require neither brandy nor self-conceit to make them brave; their courage is innate; it is a national instinct. Their officers too usually possess much greater information on general topics than those of all other European nations, as education is more cultivated in Britain than elsewhere. They are attached to their profession, and follow it rather from generous motives and military spirit, than like mercenaries from a view of interest and profit.

On the political and moral principles of war, see Cicero De Officiis, Grotius De Jure Belli et Pacis, Puffendorf's Law of Nature and Nations, and Machiavel's Discorsi; and on the principles of war considered as a science, see a memoir by Maizeroy, in the 40th volume of Histoire de l'Academie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres, and Folard's Commentaries on Polybius.

PART I. MILITARY TACTICS.

Some writers on the military art distinguish tactics from what they call strategy; understanding by the latter the science of military movements when not in fight of the enemy, or at least out of the range of their shot; while they describe the former to be the science of military movements in sight of an enemy, or within the range of cannon shot. We do not see the necessity of this distinction; and under the head of military tactics we shall consider whatever relates to military operations on land.

It is not possible for us, within the very scanty limits to which we are now reduced, to give any thing like a regular treatise on the military art. We shall therefore endeavour to select the most useful and interesting topics, and supply the place of disquisition by numerous plates with appropriate explanations.

The science of military tactics comprehends the disposition and arrangement of troops, whether on marches, in camps, or in line of battle; the attack and defence of posts; the construction and superintendence of the works by which they are to be defended; the conducting of sieges; and the defence of besieged places. These are the principal operations of a soldier, and these we shall briefly consider nearly in the order in which we have enumerated them,

To direct the march of an army is not one of the least difficult parts of a general's duty. To do this with ability, he must be well acquainted with the nature of the country through which his troops are to pass, with the obstacles which are likely to oppose them in their progress, and with the disposition of the inhabitants. Our business here is only with the first of these considerations. There are three descriptions of countries which may become the theatre of war; an open country intersected by rivers, a mountainous, and a woody country. The march of an army through the first, as far as respects the face of the country alone, is seldom difficult, except in the passage of rivers, which we shall consider by and bye; and the last description of country is now so uncommon in Europe, that we need not dwell on it. A mountainous country, however, presents numerous difficulties to call forth the abilities and experience of a commander, as in such a country, not only are the roads winding and difficult of access, but the unevenness of the ground, and the intervals between the hills, render it very easy for an enemy, with a small force, to oppose and defeat a numerous army.

The plan in Plate DXLIV. is intended to illustrate the march of an army through a mountainous country. At A is shown the position of the army previous to its march, with the artillery and baggage P, drawn up under their proper escorts, in front of the camp. At B are parties of hussars constituting the advanced guard of the army on its march; and at C are parties of infantry forming the advanced guard of the columns in which the army is disposed. D represents the infantry forming the head of the columns; E the park of artillery and waggons attached to it; F, battalions of artillery, G the cavalry, H the baggage of the army, and I their escort. At K are parties of hussars, and at L parties of dragoons. M represents the infantry of the reserve forming the rear guard, and N platoons of infantry sent forward upon the heights, to cover the flanks of the principal columns. At O are villages in front of the position where the army is to encamp, and which have been taken possession of by the light infantry.

The number of columns into which the marching army is to be divided, will depend on the number of roads or accessible approaches that lead to the position which it is to take up. In the present case there are only two principal roads, each leading across the river; and winding through the valleys to the principal heights, so that the army must march in two divisions. The usual disposition of the columns is as follows. Four or five brigades of infantry, according to the number which composes the army, should be placed at the head of each column; the same partition should be made with regard to the artillery, which must follow the infantry; the cavalry must march next, and the baggage of each column, well escorted by infantry, must follow the cavalry, then the rest of the corps of light horse which are not detached; and the dragoons are placed the last, in order to dismount, and sustain the rear-guard in case it shall be attacked.

An army seldom proceeds far without encountering Of the pat- a river in its march, and as it commonly happens in a stage of ri- country which has become the seat of war, that the bridges are destroyed or rendered impassable, the army must cross the river, either by swimming, at some ford, or by temporary bridges thrown over for the purpose. It is most advantageous to cross a river at some part where the stream is divided by small islands, unless the river be so shallow that it may be easily forded. If it be necessary to construct a bridge, this is best done by means of boats or pontoons, and all the necessary apparatus should be ready at the place of crossing at an appointed hour, and every measure should be taken to avoid confusion, and to be prepared for the enemy, who will probably dispute the passage. The two heads of the bridge when constructed should be entrenched, and well furnished with troops, and, if possible, the islands in the neighbourhood should be fortified by proper works, to prevent the enemy from destroying the bridge, or in- commodating the labourers employed in its construction.

If the river be narrow, it is best to cross at some place where it makes an angle, especially if, as commonly happens, one of its banks be higher than the opposite bank, so that the higher ground may be de- fended by a battery. If the river be fordable by infantry, care should be taken beforehand to clear the bed at the ford, and render the banks easy of access.

The lower figure of Plate DXLV. illustrates the pas- sage of a river. AAA represent bridges of boats; B, redoubts by which the bridges are protected; C, a bat- tery, under cover of which the infantry work at the construction of the redoubts; D, a battery, to prevent the enemy from annoying the army on its march; E, the march of the army; F, the artillery distributed among the brigades of infantry; G, infantry forming in columns to open on the opposite side through the inter- vals of the redoubts; H, march of the columns in the front of the redoubts, where they halt to give time for a part of the cavalry to form upon its flanks; I, a battery erected to facilitate the forming of the cavalry; K, ca- valry, which, in gaining the opposite shore, forms in order of battle, and posts itself upon the flanks of the infantry; L, eight battalions in column upon the right wing of the army, to go and examine the village, and attack the enemy in it, in case he should be possessed of it; M, hussars and dragoons, who have taken possession of the height which is on the left wing of the army; N, a brigade of infantry posted next the height, covering the left wing of the cavalry; O, the disposition of the army marching up to the enemy.

It is in general a very difficult task to defend the pas- fage of a river against an army that is determined on crossing it. Indeed, if the river be of such a nature as to present several points by which an enemy can cross, and if the defending army be not of such strength as to meet their opponents in the field, such a defence will be almost impracticable. Where it can be attempted, however, and where sufficient notice can be procured of the enemy's approach, all the boats and barks found on the river should be removed or destroyed, to prevent the enemy from using them in constructing his bridges. Both banks of the river should be carefully reconnoitred, that the fords and other accessible points of passage may be sufficiently obstructed; and the ground which might protect the enemy's passage, should in particular be attended to. Roads sufficiently wide to admit of many columns, should be made along the side of the river to be defended, that a great number of troops may be advantageously disposed. It must be confessed, however, that if the accessible points extend along a considerable tract of country, and if the bank of the river next the enemy overhang that on the opposite side, a defence will be nearly impolible.

The upper figure of Plate DXLVI. shews the manner of disposing the troops to defend the passage of the river. A, the march of the main army in three parts to defend the river; B, the camp of the light horse, infantry, and dragoons, on the wings of the army; C, castle and village, guarded by light infantry; D, a town occupied by the infantry belonging to the army; E, bridge broken down; F, islands occupied by infantry; G, posts of infantry distributed along the side of the river; H, batteries established along the side of the river; I, posts of cavalry, to keep the communication between the camps; K, bridges constructed to preserve the communication of the islands; L, bridges for the communication of the camps.

Modern warfare is distinguished from that of the ancients, not more with respect to the arms which it employs, than the multitude of stores, ammunition, and provisions necessary for a campaign. The number of horses now employed for drawing the artillery, and the ammunition waggons, as well as to mount the great increase of cavalry, considerably adds to the quantity of military stores required by the troops. This has produced the necessity for magazines, established in such number, and at such distances from each other, as may most expedite the operations of the campaign; and these magazines require not only to be fortified themselves, but to be strengthened by forts or redoubts in their vicinity. To these magazines modern writers on the art of war have appropriated the term of basis of military operations, and the roads by which an army receives its subsistence from the magazines, are called lines of operation. The situation of the principal magazine, and the length and direction of the lines of operation, are considered as of the highest importance. With respect to the first and second of these, we must refer to Templehoff's History of the Seven Years War, where the question is considered with great minuteness and scientific accuracy. The direction of a line of operations may be illustrated by the first seven figures of Plate DXLVI. Fig. 1. represents a line of operation forming the segment of a circle, having a line of posts ACB towards the enemy's country, and two principal fortresses DE within the segment. As this circular segment is supposed to surround a part of the enemy's territory, and is strengthened by the two fortresses A.B, at the extremities of the basi, it is esteemed the most advantageous form. On the other hand, if the segment had its circumference directed towards the enemy, as in fig. 2. it Fig. 2. would form the worst possible direction for a basis; for here the fortresses CD, placed in the circumference, are very much exposed, and might be easily taken by detachments from the columns E and F. The only way of preventing this would be to detach troops from A and B laterally, to incommode the columns E and F, and to take up a strong position either at g or h. The more the segment approaches to the elliptical form, as in fig. 3. Fig. 3. it is the less susceptible of defence, as is evident from the relative position of the three fortresses A, C, and B.

The line of operation represented by fig. 4. consisting fig. 4. of salient and obtuse angles, such as A c B, B d G, constitutes an excellent form, as it resembles the outworks of a fortres, and it is as impracticable for an enemy to enter into the interior of this basis, as to carry a curtain between two flanks. The two fortreses c d are not nearly so much exposed as C in fig. 3. as if one of them were attacked, it would be easy to make a diversion from the other into the enemy's country. If the points which terminate the basis advance as in fig. 5. it will be a favourable circumstance, especially if the most advanced post were bounded by the sea, or by a large river.

The basis which we have been considering consists of curved or angular lines. Now, let us suppose two bases, the one A h B, fig. 6. forming merely a straight line, while the other c e g d f, has two of its lines e c and d f advanced towards the enemy. This latter is the more advantageous, as it exposes so much more of the enemy's country. In general, it is a good rule to construct fortreses opposite to those of the enemy, as here the fortres g, if moderately strong, is capable of protecting the whole line from e to d, against the three opposite forts A h B. It is a great fault for any part of a basis to recede, as d c from the line of the enemy A.B, fig. 7. to Fig. 7. form an angle with it, as here all the country between A and c is exposed to the hostile attacks of A and B; but, if the line were parallel to that of the enemy, as d e, it would be a good position.

Next to the establishing of magazines, and providing earthen walls for their security, and that of the lines by which they are connected, it is of the highest importance for a general when he takes the field, to select the proper positions where he may encamp his army, so as to be readily defended against the attacks of a superior enemy, and have an easy communication with his own posts. In selecting such a situation he must be guided partly by the nature of the country, and partly by the situation of the enemy; but if possible, he should choose a position which is rather elevated, and which may be protected on the flanks or rear, either by the natural situation of the ground, or by works thrown up for that purpose. It should not be too near the bank of a river, though it may be of advantage to have such an object in front. The encampment of an army in such a situation is pointed out by Plate DXLVII.; where A is the camp of the main body of the army; B, an advanced camp, composed of dragoons and hussars, in order to cover the right of the army, to guard the passes by which the enemy might make incursions upon the flanks and rear of the army, molest the convoys, and cut off the communications nations; C, villages and bridges, guarded by the light infantry; D, posts of dismounted dragoons in the front of their camp; E, posts of dragoons on horseback, to secure the communication between their camp and that of the main body of the army; F, bridges built to keep up the communication between the grand and the advanced camp; G, bridges and villages guarded by detachments of infantry; H, grand guards of horse; I, guards of infantry; K, bridge, village, and mill, guarded by the infantry belonging to the army; L, camp of dragoons and hussars, covering the left of the army, and supporting the light infantry; M, villages and bridges guarded by the light infantry; N, posts of dismounted dragoons in the front and on the flanks of their camp; O, posts of dragoons on horseback; P, posts and detachments of hussars, to patrol in front and on the flanks of the army and their camp.

It often becomes necessary, either from an inferiority of numbers, or from the nature of the ground, to intrench or fortify a camp. In general this is done by digging deep ditches round the most defenceless part; driving palliades in front of this ditch; forming an embankment of felled trees, with their unlopped branches pointing towards the enemy; or, where there is time for such an operation, and where the proper materials can be obtained, constructing redoubts or regular outworks, capable of being defended by artillery.

Plate DXLVIII. represents a camp intrenched in an open country, without any peculiar advantages of defence. A, the main body of the army encamped behind its intrenchments; B, the camp of the troops of reserve; C, camp of the dragoons, to secure the rear of the army; D, camp of hussars, to cover the ground on the right of the army; E, villages and redoubts guarded by the light infantry, to secure the camp of the hussars; F, bridges built to secure the communication of the army with the ground on the right, and to favour the retreat of the troops posted on the opposite side; G, brigades of artillery distributed on the flanks, and along the whole front of the army; H, the park of artillery; I, a bridge intrenched, to secure the communication between the army and the ground on the left; K, villages and farm houses, guarded by detachments of hussars and light infantry, to patrol in front of the army.

In Plate DXLIX. are shown other methods of intrenching a camp in the neighbourhood of a town or village, and in situations where the camp can be protected by inundations. Fig. 1. represents an intrenched camp in the neighbourhood of a town. A, a deep marshy valley, with an unfordable rivulet across it. B, a redoubt constructed on a mountain, by which the right wing is appuyed. C, a small wood in front of the mountain. D, a line which connects two fleches together at the foot of the mountain, where the village of Weilheim is situated. E, a rivulet, over which are thrown bridges of communication, to facilitate an intercourse between the camp and the redoubt on the hill. F, an eminence with a gentle declivity, at the foot of which is the village of Mansfeld, surrounded by defiles and hollow roads. G, defiles and hollow roads. H, lines which run along the circumference of the heights about Weilheim, forming a retrenchment. I, close works. L, a redoubt which marks the entrance into Stemmern. M, a small wood, cut down in order to have a full view in front of Stemmern. N, a thick wood which covers some high mountains by which the left wing is supported. O, an abattis which is made across the wood for greater security. P, infantry pickets. Q, a redoubt on a small eminence, constructed for the purpose of covering the opening behind the left wing of the camp. R, a line of communication from the last redoubt to the left of the intrenchment. S, several passages 30 feet broad and closed in by chevaux-de-frize, to afford an opportunity for the cavalry to advance, should the enemy be foiled in his attack against any part of the works. T, the infantry and cavalry encamped behind the retrenchments; the infantry in the first line, and the cavalry in the second. U, X, Y, Z, four roads behind the camp to facilitate the retreat of the army, should it be pressed.

Fig. 2. and 3. represent an intrenched camp with inundations in front. Fig. 1. a b, two dykes 40 paces long, 5 broad, and as many high. CD two rows of stakes from 4 to 5 inches thick. E, the coffin formed by means of stakes filled up. It is 8 feet broad. F, the adjacent country, inundated by the rivulet being forced out of its current by the last dyke and by a and b. G and H, the outlets which the rivulet seeks, to continue its course. I, small creeks or ends of ditches dug about the ground. Fig. 3. represents the current of a rivulet, with a dyke to occasion inundations. Camp, with the several dykes in front, which are calculated to produce inundations. The spaces between these dykes are called coffins, viz. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

We have mentioned the works by which field posts are fortified, and which are usually called redoubts. As the construction of redoubts is generally a work of the moment, and falls within the province of the commanding officer of a detachment, it is proper that we should here describe the most useful and expeditious methods of raising such works. These methods are illustrated by the plans in the upper part of Plate DL.

Fig. 1. shows the plan of the ordinary square redoubt which is constructed in the following manner: When a proper spot has been chosen, a line a AE is drawn of a sufficient length, and at one extremity a is drawn a C perpendicular to it. Then from a towards C and E are set off the dimensions proposed for each side of the parapet within the fort, allowing 2 or 2½ fathoms for 30 men, 4 fathoms for 50, and so in proportion for a greater number. These lines being ascertained, a picket is placed at C, with a cord attached to it, and with the length a C is described an arch, and from the point E, with the same distance, another arch is described, intersecting the former in F. Then joining EF and CF, the square forming the inner parapet is completed. Within this square, at the distance of 2 or 3 feet, is described another square, I, L, M, N, having its sides parallel to those of the former. This marks the breadth of the banquette, where the men are to be drawn up. Again, on the outside of the first square at about 8 or 9 feet distance is drawn a third square O, P, Q, R, determining the outer side and thickness of the parapet. This thickness is only calculated to resist musket balls; as, if it is to stand against cannon, it should be at least 18 feet. Lastly, at rather a greater distance from this third square is drawn a fourth S, T, V, X, marking the breadth of a ditch that is to surround the redoubt. The lines being finished, fascines or faggots of brushwood are to be laid between the two innermost squares, as a foundation to support the earth of the banquette; a second range is laid on the lines AB, GH, to support the inside of the parapet, and a third on the square O, P, Q, R, to strengthen the outside of the parapet, leaving a space through all the fascines to the ditch, on the side least exposed to the enemy, as at B, for an entrance. It is sometimes convenient to make this entrance take a winding direction, as is shown at T, fig. 2.

Fig. 3. exhibits a section of these works, where AB is the breadth of the ditch at the top; MN its breadth at the bottom; FN its slope, on a line with the outside of the parapet, called the scarp, and GM its slope towards the open country, called the counter-scarp. AL and ID represent the fascines forming the outer and inner slopes of the parapet, the interval between them being filled with earth trodden down hard. At E is the banquette. DC is the thickness of the parapet below, and IL its thickness above, which forms a slope for the more convenient firing of musketry.

In this square redoubt it is evident that the men must fire straight forward in lines perpendicular to the sides of the squares, as in fig. 4. As it is often of great consequence that the directions of firing should cross each other, the better to flank the enemy, the banquette is sometimes formed with angles, as in fig. 5, so that the men may stand two together in little redans. As, however, such a construction takes up too much time and labour for ordinary occasions, M. Le Cointe prefers a circular redoubt, such as is represented at fig. 6, where the men may fire from every part of the circumference. The construction of such a redoubt is extremely simple, and differs only in its first step, viz. describing the concentric circles, which is done with a cord fastened at one end by a picket at a central point C.

The strength of the redoubt will be much increased, if the ditch can be filled with water, as by turning into it the stream of a rivulet. See Q, fig. 7. If the ground be uneven, so that the water will not run equally into every part of the ditch, dams must be raised, as C, to keep up the water in the higher parts, whence it may run to the lower, after the former are full.

Fig. 7. represents a plan of the square redoubt, with a wet ditch, when completed. A, the inner ground of the redoubt; B, the bottom of the ditch; CDE, the dam of earth; F a dam of boards, planks or fascines; G the upper part of the redoubt, made with fascines or with earth thrown out of the ditch; H, the lower part of the redoubt cut into the earth; I, the berme or space left at the outer bottom of the parapet, to keep up the earth; L, the entrance of the redoubt; M, the inside of the parapet; N, the outside of the parapet; O, the banquette; P, the glacis; Q, the river introduced to fill the ditch with water.

The attack and defence of posts are among the most important departments of what the French call la petite-guerre, and in a country where fortified towns are rare, constitute a considerable part of field operations. We shall consider them rather more at large than we have the preceding parts of military tactics.

When an officer is detached either to attack or to guard a post, he should provide himself with a cord regularly divided, for the purpose of describing lines, and raising temporary works, and should procure a skilful and confidential guide, from whom he may derive the requisite information respecting the nature of the country, and the breadth and goodness of the roads. He should dispose his party in such a manner that an advanced guard of cavalry, as A, fig. 8. Plate DL, should set out first, preceded by a small detachment of about six horsemen, headed by a corporal, as B, C, C; two horsemen in the middle, and two on each side. While the main body is moving along the principal road, as from H to F, a detachment of about 8 or 12 horsemen, according to the strength of the corps, should be sent about 50 paces on each side, by way of wings, as DD; and from each of these wings 2 men should keep 50 paces farther out, as at EE, by which means the country will be properly examined, and surprises from the enemy prevented. On coming near a wood, as at NN, the cavalry should spread, the better to scour the outskirts and the wood itself. When the corps is numerous, the cavalry should be formed into squadrons, as G, G, G, and the infantry into platoons, as F, F, F, marching alternately along the road.

If, on the march, the advanced guard come to a cross road, or the entrance of a hollow way, as at I, I, where it is likely they may be met by a party of the enemy, they should immediately prepare for an attack; and if the commander of the main body observe his advanced guard in action, he should immediately draw off his platoons of infantry, and form them on the side of the road, as at L, L, L, or on some neighbouring height, as at M, M, that they may be out of the way of the enemy's cavalry, and ready to engage if occasion should require it.

On the march the party should carefully avoid villages, and rather halt or refresh his men in a wood, or some other concealed spot.

The commander of a detached party must take the safest and most effectual methods to reconnoitre the country through which he is to pass, without being observed or suspected by the enemy. The method of doing this recommended by M. Jeney will frequently succeed, and is as follows: He supposes himself with his party at Soest in Westphalia A (fig. 2. Plate DLI), and the enemy posted at Berwick B, two leagues from him. To know the situation of this place without stirring from Soest, he takes the map of the country; and from Soest as the centre, he draws a circle, whose circumference passes half a league beyond Berwick. He draws a circle of the same size upon a leaf of paper, to make his plan, as in fig. 2, and then places Soest in the centre A, and marks all the villages which he finds in the map near the circumference upon his plan, with the distances and bearings as they are represented in the map, making use of a pencil to mark the places DDD, so as to correct the errors more easily which the map may have led him to make.

Having thus formed his plan, with a scale of two leagues, he goes to the burgomaster of the town of Soest, where he caules some of the most intelligent inhabitants to come, and speaking to them freely and openly, induces them to communicate all the information for which he has occasion.

The better to conceal his designs, he begins his reconnoitring by Brockhusen, a village distant from the enemy. He asks the distance from Soest to Brockhusen; fen; if they say it is a league and three-fourths, he corrects the distance of his plan, which made it two leagues; then he informs himself of all that is to be found on the road from Soest to Brockhufen, chapels, houses, woods, fields, orchards, rivers, rivulets, bridges, mills, &c. If they say that a league from Soest they pass the village of Kinderking, he marks that place upon his plan. He asks if the road from Soest to Kinderking be crossed by any other road; if there be any morass or heath; if the road be inclosed, paved, or straight; if there be any bridges to pass, and at what distance. He takes care to mark every thing on his plan, forgetting nothing, even to mills, bushes, gibbets, gullies, fords, and every thing that can be got from their information; which will probably be perfect, because one always knows more than another. He continues his questions from Kinderking to Brockhufen, and advancing by little and little, observes the same method on the roads of the other villages round, marked DDD. In this manner he cannot fail to acquire an entire knowledge of all the places; besides, he finds himself imperceptibly instructed in the position of the enemy, by seeing the different routes by which he can approach with the greatest security.

For the attack of an enemy's post, such men should be selected as are brave, cool, and experienced; or if the affair require a considerable number, the detachment should be divided into platoons, some composed of picked men for the real attack, and others of ordinary soldiers for feints. The men should be provided, besides their arms, with such instruments as may be necessary for pulling down or scaling the enemy's works, such as shovels and pickaxes for falcine parapets; ladders for pallisadoes or chevaux de frize, and scaling ladders for stone or brick work. Having made the proper disposition for his attack, and procured the necessary guides, the commander of the detachment should set out in the night, so as to be at the place of attack two or three hours before daybreak, taking care to march with as little noise or parade as possible.

If the post to be attacked be an ordinary redoubt, such as we have described in No 25, on hearing the signal previously agreed on, all the divisions are to rise at once from the place where they should have lain concealed; the first ranks should leap into the ditch, and soon after the second should follow, and both together assist in undermining the angles of the scarp, or cutting away the stakes which may impede their progress. If the parapet be faced with stone or brick work, care should be taken that the ladders be not too short, and great expedition should be used in mounting them, and especially in following the leading men in the assault, if they should be knocked down by the fire of the enemy.

Should the ditch be filled with water, and too deep to be waded, it may be crossed on temporary bridges made of planks, supported on empty casks, or the ditch may be filled up with casks full of earth. If, as often happens, the ground be obstructed with caltrops, these must be swept away by dragging trees with their leaves and branches over the ground (A).

In attacking posts of considerable magnitude, such as villages, it is best to divide the attack, and to make a feint on those parts which seem best defended, while the true attacks are reserved for those situations which seem most difficult of access, and where consequently, the enemy is least upon his guard. As soon as part of the village has been carried, some divisions of the detachment should hafsten to strengthen their position, by posting themselves of some church, or high ground, from which they annoy the enemy.

When a post is once occupied, if it be thought of sufficient consequence to retain it, the best methods should immediately be taken to protect it against an attack of the enemy. The infantry to remain under arms in the middle of the place, the cavalry to patrol without, while the commanding officer, escorted by a dozen horsemen, goes to examine the environs to make his arrangements; having sent several small detachments before, to cover him in time of reconnoitring.

Having remarked the places proper for his guard, defence, and retreat, as well as the dangerous ones by which the enemy can make approaches secretly to surprise him, he should choose the most convenient in the front of his post to fix his grand guard D, (fig. 1. Plate DLII.), which must face the enemy. He must mark the heights for this guard to place their vedettes EEEE, and regulate the number according to the exigencies of the situation. In a covered country you must not be sparing of them, and must reinforce every guard. At 50 paces from the front of the grand guard a non-commissioned officer with eight horsemen should be always ready to set out at K, to go and reconnoitre, when the vedettes have observed any party.

If the post to be defended be merely a redoubt, it will be proper to keep in readiness a number of trees cut down with their branches, to stop up any breaches made by the enemy's shot. The men employed in the defence should stand in three ranks, the front and centre ranks with fixed bayonets, and the third rank provided with long pikes, so as to project as far as the bayonets of the front rank. On the enemy's approach, the men should reserve their fire till the enemy come up to the glacis, and the rear rank should be furnished with hand grenades, or lighted faggots, to throw among the enemy, when they attempt to scale the parapet.

In the defence of a village or small town, guards should be posted at the entrance of the principal streets; trenches should be cut across the streets, and cannon planted behind them, while a detachment of cavalry should occupy the market-place, or broadest street, to attack the enemy, if they force an entrance. If the advanced guards are driven in, they should retire with coolness and deliberation, defending their posts from house to house, till proper support can be given them from the body of the detachment.

If there be any dangerous place capable of covering the approaches of the enemy in the environs of the post,

(A) The principal engines employed in the attack of posts, are represented in Plate DLV. to which we shall presently refer. and out of the circuit of the patrols, there should be a guard placed there, more or less strong according to the importance of the place, and care should be taken to preserve the communication. The guards and pickets being placed, the detachment that was sent out on the roads must be called in, and then go to work to lodge the party in the gardens that open upon the country, and the commanding officer's quarters; beating down hedges, filling up ditches, and levelling a piece of ground large enough to draw up the whole corps. The horses to be put under cover in barns contiguous to the gardens; but in case there are no barns, they may substitute sheds open on one side, that the horses may go out together in case of an alarm. The officers should occupy the houses in the neighbourhood of the sheds, and one of each company remain day and night with the company, to prevent any of the men from entering the village without leave, upon any pretence. The commanding officer must acquaint the officers of his having chosen the place M for the rendezvous in case of a retreat; which ought to be at some distance from the village, and on the side he judges most convenient for retiring to the army. At sunset the grand guard are to return to the post and join the picket, the half of each to mount alternately till daybreak, and then the grand guard to return to the place which they possessed the day before. The sentries and vedettes should be doubled, and all the passages shut up with waggons placed in two rows, except one for falling out at in case of a retreat, made wide enough for the passage of the patrols or the whole cavalry.

The corporals of the ordinary guard should lead the relief of the vedettes every hour, setting off together; but when they come to the passage of the post A, they must separate into two parties, the one to the right to relieve the vedettes BBB, the other to the left for the vedettes CCC; then each of them, with the parties they have relieved, should go on at their head a quarter of a league by the two routes pointed out in the plan, to examine the environs, supposing an hour to each. Besides this reconnoitring, the captain of the grand guard should send two patrols in the night. To fill up the intervals, they should set one about half an hour after the corporals, and make the same round.

In defensive operations in an open country, the fortifying of a village or a church-yard may often prove of importance, as such posts well defended may obstruct the movements of the enemy, and give time for a sufficient force to collect to meet them in the field. We shall therefore describe the most approved mode of strengthening these positions.

When it is proposed to fortify a village, inquiry should first be made respecting the surrounding country, whether there are woods, hills, or rivers near the village, whether the roads be accessible, whether provisions can be easily obtained, &c. If the village is to be occupied as a post of defence merely, the woods, rivers, ravines, or heights, may afford advantageous outposts or situations for batteries or ambuscades; but if it is to be possessed as an advanced post on the eve of a battle, the woods next the army should be cut down, the hollows filled up, and every thing removed which may obstruct the freest communication between the village and the main army; while on the side of the enemy, every obstruction by works, trees, &c. should be thrown in the way of his approach. The roads should be broken up or intersected with deep ditches.

If there be good hedges or deep roads parallel to the village, or in such a situation as to front the enemy, these will serve as breastworks, and for shelter. The hedges should be cut down to within four feet of the bottom, their tops sloping towards the country, and deep ditches should be dug in front. If the roads are deep, banquettes or saps must be thrown up next the hedge to raise the men to the proper height for firing. For want of such natural means of defence, it will be necessary to throw up intrenchments on the side next the enemy and on the flanks.

Fig. 1. Plate DLII. will explain the method of doing this in a village, under ordinary circumstances. The village stands in a plain, and in front of the army, which is distant from it about 600 paces, a. The front of the intrenchment consists of three fleeces or arrows, b, c, d, joined together by lines. There are wolf-holes before the works that cover the left flank e: the line g, which crosses some swampy grounds, is broken in several places i; and the grove of wood l, is cut down, to prevent the enemy from approaching under cover of it. As the right flank, consisting of a level plain, is more exposed than any other quarter, in addition to the works made of earth, which are thrown up at m, trees are collected, and heaped up in the form of an abattis, n. These are defended by a discharge of musquetry from the intrenchments, whose lines are raised as high as possible behind the growing hedges o, which inclose the gardens. It has however been judged necessary to throw the works up in a forward position p, and to have an interval between them and the hedges, lest the houses should be set on fire by the enemy, and the troops be exposed to it. Everything is left clear and open at the back of the village, in order to secure a free intercourse with head-quarters.

Other measures, however, must be adopted in the fortifying of villages which lie at so great a distance from the camp, that the enemy might surprise and take possession of them before any succours could be sent; for in that case, intrenchments must be thrown up throughout the whole of their circumference. If, on the contrary, one of the wings of the army should be supported by such a post, it would be more judicious to put the flank in a state of defence, and to lengthen the works in that quarter, to prevent the enemy from turning it.

If it should be judged expedient, under the circumstances of the army being cantoned, to fortify a village which lies in a plain, other means must be used; for in that case there would not be troops enough to defend it. Should there be a sufficiency of men, intrenchments must be thrown up in the manner we have described, and fleeces must be adopted to cover them behind, with lines to connect the vacant intervals; but if there be a scarcity of soldiers, nothing but what is absolutely necessary must be done; for it is highly impolitic to attempt more than can be easily defended. Under these circumstances you must be satisfied with erecting small works, or using barricadoes to mask the entrances; here and there likewise fleeces must be constructed, whose communication will be kept up by the garden hedges. If the village should stand on an eminence, it may be fortified with more facility, and many things may be omitted, as the natural situation is itself a respectable post.

Should there be a very great disproportion between the extent of the village, and the number of men intended for its defence, and the latter should be too small, a part only must be fortified, and the remainder of the houses must be secured by lines. Sometimes indeed it is found necessary to burn or destroy them, to prevent the enemy from approaching the fortified parts, under cover of the buildings.

But if the garrison should not be sufficiently strong even to defend a part of the village, you must be contented with fortifying the church and church-yard, or the castle if there be one. If any of these posts be thought defensible, troops must occupy them on the first alarm; but this must be done in perfect safety, and without the soldiers being exposed to be cut off on their march. This precaution is above all others necessary where villages are so long and open that the cavalry may enter them at every opening. On this account the ordinary roads and avenues must not only be obstructed, but the garden hedges must be repaired, and every opening must be closed, which may be easily done by driving stakes into the earth, and nailing boards across them, which will prevent any sudden irruption of the cavalry, from which alone any danger is to be apprehended on occasions of this sort; for the infantry would fearlessly advance, except by surprise, before the garrison could occupy its station. If any apprehensions are formed of an attack, the soldiers must not be absent from their post, either in the dusk of the evening, or at night; they must, on the contrary, be assembled in the intrenchments during that period, to be ready in the neighbouring houses, always clothed and accoutred.

A church and church-yard afford an admirable post of defence, especially if, as usually happens, they are seated on an elevation. In fortifying such a post, we should first block up every road and bye way leading to it, by means of waggons or carts, with their wheels taken off and loaded with dung or earth; trees laid across, or chavaux de frize. The narrow paths may be barricadoed with rails, with their points standing upwards, and a little outwards, having behind them thick branches of trees, or logs of wood, with a ditch in front. These previous precautions being taken, the doors of the church should be pierced in several places, about eight feet from the bottom, with holes large enough to admit the muzzle of the musket, and platforms should be raised with steps within for the men to fire from. Other loop holes should be made at the bottom of the doors, just above the level of the ground, and a ditch must be dug within, about three feet deep, so as to admit of men firing from thence through these lower loop-holes. See fig. 2. The doors must also be secured by barricades, consisting of pallisades driven several feet into the ground, and set extremely thick, some being deeper than others, so as to leave spaces between them and the top for loop-holes. See a, a, fig. 3. This barricade is technically called tambour. The walls of the church must also be pierced in various places as directed for the doors, see fig. 3, and ditches must be dug within them, and scaffolding erected as before.

Again, on the outside of the church, a ditch is to be dug as close to the walls as is consistent with safety to the foundation, about 12 feet in breadth at the top, and four in depth; and from the further side of this ditch the ground should be gradually sloped towards the open country. Through the main door of the church an opening should be made about two feet above the ground, sufficiently large to admit of one man passing through without much difficulty, so that when the church-yard becomes untenable, the garrison may retreat into the church.

It must not be forgotten to secure the means of a cross fire. If the church be built in the form of a cross, cross firings may be easily procured through the proper loop-holes; but when this is not the case, loop-holes should be made through every salient angle of the building, or tambours, such as represented in fig. 3, must be formed wherever it can be conveniently done.

Men must be distributed in the upper part of the building. These men will take out the tiles or slates in different places, in order to observe the approaches of the enemy, and to fire upon him when he comes within musket-shot. The lower windows of the tower or steeple must likewise be barricadoed, and have loopholes made in them. The pavement of the church must be taken up, and the stones or bricks be carried to the top of the building, to enable the besieged to let them drop upon the enemy, when he gets sufficiently near. In order to render the defence as practicable as possible, you must also collect some large barrels or tubs, and keep them constantly at hand filled with water, for the purpose of extinguishing any fire which might break out in the church, or be effected by the enemy's shells.

Fig. 4. shows a plan of the church and church-yard thus fortified. a, a, a, a, the wall of the church-yard; b, e, tambour work in the front of the entrances; d, the church; e, f, tambour work constructed opposite the doors; g, the sacristy or vestry.

Connected with the attack and defence of posts is the subject of ambuscades, which we must now briefly consider.

Ambuscades may be formed in any place where a party may lie concealed, to surprise the enemy in passing. They are easily carried into execution in woods, hollow places, and large deserted buildings; but the placing of an ambuscade in any situation requires previous accurate information with respect to the movements of the enemy. When the commander of a party has been directed to form an ambuscade, to surprise a convoy of artillery, baggage, or provisions, or a body of recruits going to reinforce the enemy, he should first make every necessary inquiry respecting the route which the enemy is to take; the situation of the places near which he is to pass, and the post to which he is about to march. He must also inquire with seeming anxiety about the roads which lead in an opposite direction, on which he should seem more intent than on his main object. Having concerted his plan, he should set out at the head of his detachment if possible, and leaving his post on the side opposite to his true route, the better to conceal his design. If the place where he intends to plant his ambuscade be not far distant, he should come into his true route about half way, and there place half his infantry in ambush to favour his retreat. But when the country where he proposes going is distant, and the march march requires at least two nights, he must conduct his party by meandering from wood to wood, if there be any. He must not forget to provide necessary refreshments for the day, which must be passed in some concealed place where he may not be perceived, and must cause three rations of oats to be carried for each horse.

Proper precautions having been taken to guard any cross road or bridge that may lie near the place of ambuscade, the commanding officer should take care to be at least two hours before the enemy, and to place the ambuscade on that side, by which, if worsted, he may retire with the greatest safety.

Plate DLIII. fig. 2. will illustrate the proper method of laying an ambuscade. A represents the infantry of the surprising party, which ought to be placed at least 600 paces behind B, the cavalry, so that, if pursued, they may both fall back to A, and make good their retreat to the guard at the bridge or cross road; or to another party of infantry placed in ambush half way. If the ambuscade be placed in a wood, an intelligent non-commissioned officer should be chosen to get upon a high tree C, from which he can see the march of the enemy, and give notice of the most essential circumstances. The first of these is the seeing the advanced guard; the second is the approach of the corps, and the third is the time when their front is advanced as far as the ambuscade B; for which the commanding officer should instruct the observer what signals he is to make from the top of the tree, to communicate the necessary information without speaking, which may be done by means of a small cord D, of a brown or green colour, so as to be least perceptible. Let this cord be placed as in the plan, so that no branch interrupt it, with one end in the hand of the observer, and the other in the commanding officer's hand in the ambuscade B.

As soon as the advanced guard appears, the observer must pull the cord, and the commanding officer cause the party to mount and remain in deep silence. If by a stratagem, which is practised for particular reasons, the advanced guard is immediately followed, by the corps, which may be easily known by their being more numerous than ordinary, and not followed by any other corps, that the commander may not be deceived by the enemy, the cord should be drawn a second time, and a third time when their front is advanced as high as the ambuscade. At that instant the party must rush out, and furiously attack the flanks of their centre in the following manner.

If the advanced guard E is formed only of an ordinary number, they should be allowed to pass; and at the approach of the principal part or convoy F, the chief to be informed by the second pulling of the cord. At the moment the head of the convoy shall be advanced as high as B, the cord must be pulled the third and last time; and at this signal the party must rush out without being perceived, and suddenly attack the centre on the flank, engaging only with their words, and making such a noise as to prevent the enemy from hearing the orders of their officers. They must disarm all whom their bravery shall throw in their way, taking care not to scatter or pursue too far, unless it be certain that they are so far from their army or parties, on account of which they cannot be affected; for in either of these cases they will not fail to run at the noise, and disturb the retreat.

In all secret expeditions, great circumpection should be used, that the party be not seen or betrayed; as if they be discovered by the advanced guard before the blow be struck, the enterprise must be immediately abandoned, and the party retire. When the guide, or any one of the party deserts, and cannot be caught, a retreat must immediately be thought of, or the ambuscade must be placed somewhere else; but to prevent such a misfortune, the officers should be charged to examine frequently whether they have all their men.

An ambuscade should never be formed for cutting off the enemy's retreat, as this will drive him to despair, and make him rally and attack the party with desperate resolution. There may be an exception to this, when it is pretty certain that the whole party of the enemy may be cut off or taken prisoners, either from the smallness of their number, or from the peculiar situation of the place of ambuscade.

Several ambuscades should not be formed at once, except for the purpose of seizing foragers, in which case they should be disposed so that the sentinels may see from one to another. Then the first guard which fees the foragers, should commence the attack, and can soon be assisted by the rest of the party.

In all ambuscades, no sentries should be placed but officers or non-commissioned officers. On downs, behind mountains, or in gullies, the sentries should lie with their bellies on the ground, and their feet towards the ambuscade, the body covered with a gray or green cloak, according to the colour of the ground, with their heads a little raised and wrapped in a handkerchief of straw green colour, or white in time of snow, so as not to be easily perceived. The number of sentinels cannot be determined, but they should be disposed so as to watch on all sides of the ambuscade, and stop every one who may inadvertently approach too near. The sentries should give notice of what they discover by gestures, to which all the officers should be very attentive. In countries where there are no woods, vineyards, or hedges, an ambuscade may be placed in a field of hemp or corn, or some sort of grain, provided it be high enough to cover the men, at least with the help of art. When the stalk of the corn is not high enough, some of the infantry must be set to work with spades and pickaxes, which they must have brought along with them, for the purpose of digging holes in the field deep enough to make up for the defective height of the corn.

An ambuscade often forms part of a stratagem for bringing on an action with a party of the enemy which would be superior, were it not for some advantage of this kind, as in the following case. See Plate DLIII. fig. 1. Suppose the whole party to set out from A, marching under the conduct of a trusty guide by covered ways at a distance from the enemy. Being come to the place C, which ought to be in the environs, and as high as the field of battle, the infantry should be concealed out of the road far from the sight of passengers. This must be the centre of correspondence with the army, the rendezvous of the booty, and support the retreat of all the cavalry, of which there should be as many detachments as there are attacks proposed to be made. We shall suppose fix of 100 men each, and they must go secretly by particular routes to their respective polls, E, D, F, G, H, I. Neither trouble nor expense should be spared to procure good guides. Each detachment should lie in ambush half a league, if necessary, from the object of the attack BKKKK.

The noise of the musketry in the armies is to be the signal for their irruption; and then bravery, intrepidity, and courage will give wings to the people. The second detachment D will glance imperceptibly between the villages, and fall like thunder on the camp B; and while 80 attack all whom they meet, the other 20 should light their torches at the fires that are to be found everywhere, and spread the flames rapidly to the straw of the tents. As they cannot fail to have the picket of the camp soon at their heels, they must strike their blow with all possible expedition, without stopping to plunder, being content with the glory of having excited a general alarm, capable of confounding the whole army, and contributing to the gaining of a battle.

At the same time that the detachment D attacks the camp B, the others, E, F, G, H, must with equal violence attack the villages K, K, K, K, which they have in front, doing the fame the first did in camp, except that they may seize as plunder every thing which they can conveniently carry off, with which these villages are commonly filled, seizing the best horses, hamstringming others with the stroke of a sword, and setting fire to all the places which contain the enemy's baggage. Each detachment should cause some horsemen to advance beyond the village, to observe the motion of the troops, who will not fail to run to their assistance. As soon as they perceive them, they must make their retreat as fast as possible by the routes which the commanding officer has preconcerted, and which are represented in the plate by the coarse lines. The sixth detachment I, in ambush on the side of the road leading from the camp, should remain there, to seize all the enemy who think of saving themselves by flight.

When the commander of a detachment finds himself obliged to abandon a post, or that it is not worth defending, it becomes necessary for him to prepare for his retreat. This is often a difficult and dangerous affair, and requires much prudence as well as bravery on the part both of officers and men. If possible, he should retreat on that side which forms a communication with the general basis or line of posts occupied by his party. The following observations on lines of retreat, connected with the lines of operation described in No 22, will be found of importance.

A retreat on a single line is a fault of the utmost magnitude, for it is evident that if the army C (fig. 8. Plate DXLVI.) retire from it towards B, along the line AB, the enemy may send besides, two corps a, d, against the flanks of this army, which would separate it at the point B, and in this case it would be surrounded. Nor is this the only disadvantage, for all the country situated to the right and left of the line AB, would fall into the hands of the enemy; while, in a retreat, it is always a rule to cover as much of the country as possible.

A concentric retreat is of such a nature, that in an extensive position they fall back to one more confined, so that the two lines of operation at the extremities AB, (fig. 9.) unite at the object of retreat C, forming an acute angle, or as at fig. 10. an obtuse angle; such a retreat would have no better issue than the former. The same disadvantages which result from retreats on a single line would likewise attend this. There is one circumstance which might induce a general to retreat in this manner, and that is, with the view of covering any important place, a capital, for example, by taking an advantageous position, which is indicated by C, in the figures; the important place required to be covered would probably be at D. But nevertheless this measure would be ineffectual if the enemy were at all versant in the art of war, and operated on the flanks of the army they were pursuing. The best method of covering a country, which is in our rear, is to proceed against the flanks of the enemy which is advancing; and by this intrepid and bold movement, to change our defensive operations into those of an attack.

A retreat conducted in parallel lines, as the basis AB, Fig. 11. in four corps, 1, 2, 3, 4, or the lines AC, EG, FH, BD, is doubtless better than the concentric retreats which we have just considered. In the first place, the country is better covered by means of the parallel lines; secondly, the enemy cannot so easily insult the flanks of the retreating army, provided that this is in a condition to perform the same maneuver with regard to them, and thus obstruct their progress; lastly, they would be afraid of advancing with too much precipitation, from the moment their attention is divided by the attempt which may be made against them. But there might be something still better attending it, viz. to retire in an eccentric direction, as we shall show presently.

The excellence of parallel retreats is maintained from the idea that they cover a country better, and likewise stop the progress of an enemy, when opposed in a direct line. Certainly this appears evident to the eye; but the sight is often the medium only of error. It is the ignis fatuus, which leads us into the mire, and the present instance is a proof of it. This opinion was not indeed well founded among our predecessors, and still less is it so among the moderns. We do not now arrest the progress of the enemy, by presenting ourselves to their strongest part, viz. their front; but on the contrary, by intercepting their flanks, which are the weakest parts; by harassing their rear; by menacing their provisions and their communication with the sources of their vigour and power. It follows from hence, that eccentric retreats are the best. An army (fig. 12.) who retires from a, b, c, d, e, towards f, g, h, i, k, runs no risk of seeing the enemy advance in the segment f, k; for he would, by such a movement, be in danger of being surrounded.

We may lay it down as a rule, that it is essentially necessary, in all retreats, to divide into different columns, in order to divert the attention of the enemy; and it is fully demonstrated that there is not in war a more important maxim. We might shew that this method of attracting the attention of the enemy to many different points at once is, properly speaking, exciting a degree of apprehension with regard to his flanks and rear. But it naturally results from all that has been said relative to the inutility of diverging offensive operations, as well as those which are directed by a single line, or by an acute angle, that eccentric retreats are of all others the most preferable. Since concentric operations are the most advantageous in attacking, eccentric ones must necessarily possess the same advantages in defence; every thing. thing should be in opposition, in two different kinds of warfare, which are in their nature and interests contradictory.

In conducting a retreat, as in all other field operations, an army should assume, as the principal object, its own magazines, and the safety of its lines of convoy, rather than the army of the enemy; and it should never take a position opposite the enemy, but rather on one side of him.

We have hitherto considered military operations in the field, as they are subservient, or preparatory to, that most important consequence of war, a battle. We must now examine what are the causes which should induce a general to hazard or avoid a battle; and if he determine on a general action, what are the best methods of disposing the troops under his command.

At present, actions in the field are distinguished into two kinds, according as they are more or less general. When the whole of the adverse armies are engaged, it is called a battle; but where only a part of each is concerned, a combat. The latter of these, however desperate, does not in general involve such important consequences as the former; but as in a general engagement, the vanquished party usually lose the greater part of their artillery and baggage, and are compelled to retire and leave the country behind them at the mercy of the victors, a prudent general never hazards such losses without important reasons.

When an army is superior to its opponents in number or discipline; when discord prevails among the chiefs of the adverse army; when a neglect of the ordinary precautions in marching, encamping, or other obvious duties, demonstrate their incapacity; when it is necessary to relieve a considerable town or post that is besieged by the enemy; when it is apprehended that the army will be dispersed or ruined, without a general engagement; when intelligence has been received that reinforcements are approaching to the enemy, which will render him superior; when the enemy has received, in some preceding action, a considerable check which he has not yet recovered, or when the army whose general is thus canvassing the advantages and disadvantages of a battle, is in such a state, that every thing ought to be hazarded for its relief, the commander is warranted in giving battle to the enemy.

On the contrary, when less is to be hoped for from a victory than feared from a defeat; when the army is inferior either in number, courage, or discipline, to the enemy; when it is in expectation of being reinforced by a strong detachment of fresh troops; when the enemy is so advantageously posted that it would be impossible to bring him to an engagement on equal terms, or to force his entrenchments; or when there is a prospect, by temporising and declining battle, of ruining the army of the enemy by disease, famine, or desertion, it would be wrong to place the fortune of the campaign on the issue of a battle.

When a general engagement has been resolved on, the general is to devise the means of carrying it into execution, so as to have the strongest presumption of success. He is to arrange, with the officers of his staff, the manner in which the troops are to be divided and disposed, or what is called the order of battle; he should assign to his several officers their respective posts, and see that copies of the order of battle be given to those that have a separate command. The proper officers should take care that the troops under their command be properly armed and equipped, and that they are allowed time to rest and refresh themselves before the engagement. The heavy baggage, and every thing that might encumber the operations of the troops, should be removed, and placed at a distance under a proper guard. A reserve should be formed near the park of artillery, consisting of some of the bravest and best disciplined troops, headed by the most experienced officers.

In time of action, the commander in chief should be situated as to be able to issue his orders with the least difficulty, and to observe as far as possible the operations of his troops, and more especially the effects of the first attack. Every other general officer must keep his own station, to direct the charge of the troops, or to rally and re-form those which have been routed and dispersed. When the action becomes general, and is obstinately contested, the commander-in-chief should direct the principal efforts of his troops against that part of the enemy's line which makes the greatest resistance, and should himself hasten to this spot, to animate his men to greater activity and exertion by his presence and exhortations.

The artillery of the army should accompany the first line, and the remainder of the troops should follow the movements of those before them, so as to preserve the proper distance between the lines, and march with the least possible disorder and confusion. If the first line give way, the second should march up to its relief, and either charge the enemy, or keep him employed till the first line has time to rally and re-form. If, however, as often happens, the other lines are struck with a panic on observing the repulse of their predecessors, the reserve should be brought up, and it is probable that their courage and resolution will reanimate the scattered troops, and turn the fortune of the day.

In forming the order of battle, regard must be paid to the nature and situation of the place where the battle is to be fought; to the number and quality of the troops engaged, and to the mode of fighting which is most likely to take place during the action, or to decide the victory. There are two principal methods of forming troops in order of battle, the column and the line. The former of these was most in use among the ancients, has been greatly recommended by Polard in his commentaries on Polybius, and practised with the most brilliant success by the French armies since their portentous revolution. This order of battle is adapted chiefly to cases where the activity of the troops can be relied on, and where much firing with musketry or artillery is not expected to take place, and where of course the affair is to be decided principally by the pike or the bayonet. It is also well calculated for a body of infantry who are to resist the attack of cavalry. It is obvious that from the close arrangement of troops in column, this disposition must expose them more to the fire of a line, and must endanger their being flanked or surrounded by an enemy whose front is more extended. The relative advantages and disadvantages of the column and the line, will be more readily perceived by attending to the following principles.

From the order of battle as a basis are deduced many instructive instructive principles relating to what are called lines of marching and lines of firing, which constitute a considerable part of the elements of modern tactics.

There are as many lines of marching arising from the order of battle, as there are soldiers in the first rank of the line or column, and as the soldiers approach towards the enemy, these lines of marching, at least in the infantry, produce lines of firing. It is the nature and relative advantages of different lines of marching and firing that we now propose to consider.

Let us suppose two lines of troops, A and B, fig. 13, extended opposite to each other, of which A is considerably longer than B at each extremity, or, as it is termed, outflanks it. It is evident that B may be surrounded by A, as from the superior numbers of A, B may be attacked in flank and rear. It is therefore evident that when the numbers are unequal, and the contest is to be decided by firing, the greater number must prevail, if both are arranged in lines.

Again, the line AB (fig. 14.) being attacked by the line c d, the flank B cannot extend itself parallel to c d, if this line advances always in front towards A. The line attacked is surrounded, and even so pressed upon, that they must all take flight towards A. If any troops by chance should endeavour to form upon the line e f, they would not have time; taken in front and in flank by the enemy's fire, they could never resist such an attack. The cavalry would experience the same disadvantages in a similar case. Horsemen attacked to the right, to the left, and in front, could not defend themselves; the celerity of the horses, no doubt, would enable them to deploy quicker than the infantry; but, by the same reasoning, the enemy's cavalry, which is advanced upon their flank, would likewise advance the quicker from the point B, towards the opposite wing A, which a corps of infantry could not possibly do. Thus it would be equally difficult to form the line e f; every thing would be overthrown, and they must retire in the greatest disorder towards A. It is hence clear that every effort should be made by an army in line of battle, to turn the enemy's flanks with its front.

Concentric lines of marching and firing well executed, are exceedingly important. Hence it is that a fortress must yield when it is besieged, as the fire from the fortres is eccentric, while that of the besiegers is concentric. Hence, too, forties from a garrison rarely succeed, because they are eccentric operations.

When an army is much weaker than its opponent, if the former be compelled to an action, it should throw itself on the enemies flanks; and to do this with effect, the enemy's front should be kept occupied, so as to draw off his attention from his flanks. If the line were long, he would have time to convey all that part opposite to the side attacked, as A (fig. 15.) into the line e f, before the attacking army e d could entirely overthrow and repulse the flank B, which would be the object of their efforts. In this case, things would again be equal; for an engagement in front would take place, the issue of which is always doubtful. If, however, they occupy the line AB, by corps sent for that purpose, as g and h, while, with a greater force, they attack in flank, then it would be impossible for any part of AB to throw themselves into the line e f, before having beaten g h; and the time would probably be too short for this operation, if c d pushed in front in a vigorous manner. From this it follows that the army AB, though the stronger, can do nothing better at this time than quit the field of battle, as it will otherwise be surrounded. Now, the attacking army have nothing to do but to effect an eccentric retreat; namely, to fall back with the left wing upon i k, and with the right upon l m, provided CD do not obstruct the passage; for in that case, the retreat of the right wing, or of that part of the army nearest the flank B, would be on n, in order to create in the enemy e a some solicitude for his left flank d. It is by such eccentric retreats that the pursuit of the enemy is prevented. They dare not venture it, if they do not wish to be taken in flank themselves, and to become in their turn exposed to an escalade and a concentric fire, and consequently a terrible havoc. Eccentric retreats in tactics are equally as advantageous as in strategy. The latter kind alarm the enemy with regard to his lines of operation, and consequently prevent him from advancing; the former make him afraid of exposing his flanks and rear, and hinder him from pursuing.

From these considerations it appears that it is no great misfortune for an army to be attacked in its centre, and divided. If the army be divided in two at the centre, it will retire eccentrically on e and f (fig. 16.). Fig. 16. By this movement it will throw an obstacle in the way of all farther progress on the part of the enemy, who has divided in the middle the dotted line AB. It is impossible for the enemy c d to advance in front between e and f; they would take him in flank on both sides: he must therefore advance in front towards e and f, both at the same time. In this position e and f might detach forces to the rear of c d, and operate at once on its provisions and in its country. It would be sufficient for that to send some corps from their flanks to the points A, B. It is likewise possible for them to advance entirely to the left and right, if they have any magazines at g and h, which nevertheless would not be exposed by the marching of the flanks towards A and B, and would always be sheltered from the enterprises of c d. A third combination likewise would be to attack immediately c d, which, from its position, would be exposed on both its flanks. In this last case, c d would have no other resource than to operate on that part of the flanks e and f, which are opposite to the points A, B, to compel e f to retreat, and replace its front in the direction of A, B.

It does not require a great body of men to occupy the front of the enemy, while the rest of the army attacks the flanks. It is best done by means of a scattered troop, or what the French call tirailleurs, consisting of light infantry, which are usually intrusted in the following manner. The troop, formed into two ranks, divides in such a manner that there may be a space between the two, as indicated in fig. 17. The second Fig. 17. rank, placed behind the intervals left by the first, secures its flanks. When they attack, the second rank, C D, passing through the intervals of the first AB, advances to the line E F, and fires. The great advantage arising from this, is that of forming a more extensive front than when they are wedged in elbow to elbow; secondly, they keep up a more fatal fire with their musketry, because each soldier, being unmolested by the one next to him, aims better, and continues his firing without interruption; thirdly, a less number of men is lost, because many of the enemy's balls fall in the intervals, and are consequently harmless; but in the following method all these advantages are united in a more eminent degree.

Here the dispersed foldiers do not move in right lines, but circularly, as represented in fig. 18. When the first rank has fired, the men make a little turn to the left, and run to the place occupied by the second rank, the men of which advance rapidly in front to the place which the former had quitted, and fire, while the other rank is charging. Thus, each rank alternately advancing and retiring in circles, a constant fire is kept up on the enemy, with little hazard to the men. It must be allowed, however, that this method will succeed only when the enemy stand firm; for if they fly, the former method is to be preferred.

If the attacking army be forced to retire, the tirailleurs that succeed them should stop at No 2. fig. 19, instead of proceeding as far as No 1.; while those that are already at No 1. in retiring fall back farther than No 2. thus each rank successively falling farther and farther back, contesting every inch of ground.

It may perhaps be maintained, that it is better in attack to adopt close order, because the lines of firing being more approximate, they can keep a better fire; but it may be replied, that if they are once on the flanks of the enemy, and sufficiently near to use the musket, it is then of little importance whether they attack with close ranks, or en tirailleurs, because in either case the enemy must be beaten if they charge with vigour. In such a position, it would be difficult to throw one's self in the line ef (fig. 20.), particularly if it be occupied in front, as it ought to be, and it is necessary that the cavalry should be near, in order to sustain this attack.

The retreats of the infantry intended to occupy the front AB (fig. 21.), need not be either eccentric or in flank, the principal object being to direct the attention of the army AB from his flanks, which it is intended to attack; but these retrograde movements must be conducted directly upon f. If the retreat be serious, and it be really intended to abandon the front AB, and to prevent the pursuit by creating in the enemy a solicitude for his flanks, then the retreat should be executed eccentrically up gh.

Suppose an army collected in an oblique position, as at CD, fig. 22, and suppose it is to make an attack on another army AB, coming round upon its flank. This manoeuvre has been recommended by Folard, and was practised long ago by Epaminondas, and in modern times by Frederick the Great. It is however generally considered as inferior to the mode of attack illustrated in fig. 15. and AB might easily avoid the danger by moving along in line towards f, or taking the position A.g. Indeed AB is itself, by its right wing, A, in some degree enabled to act on the offensive against the left wing of CD, by moving round in the columns h.i.

The consequence of this mutual manoeuvring would be, that CD takes AB on its flank B, while it is itself taken by AB on its own flank C; the two parts attacked will be probably beaten by the attacking army, and after the combat they will both remain opposite to each other, though a little obliquely with respect to their former front.

It is not always necessary to re-form the ranks. Suppose AB (fig. 23.) is attacked by the line CD, the left wing might run dispersed towards ef, and there make a little turn to the right at a certain signal, return quickly, attack the left flank D, and give it a rolling fire from three files, before D, in order to defend himself, could take the form of an axe (d'une hache) D.g. But, in order for such an attack to succeed, the enemy's cavalry must not be near. In case there be any to be apprehended, the precaution to be adopted would be to form into columns. If, therefore, attacks and retreats take place in this manner, and, above all, if care has not been taken to sustain and cover them with a numerous cavalry, the greater part of the tactical evolutions of the infantry are rendered useless. It is, however, indispensably necessary that the troops should always know how to deploy from a column into a line of battle.

Captain Röch, a Prussian officer, has discovered a method of deploying, which appears to be by far the easiest and the best yet known. During the march, the divisions proceeding on the line AB (fig. 24.) observe the necessary distances. As soon as the division I enters into the line of direction AB, it is commanded to the right or left, according to the side which they wish to face; the following division arrives, without changing its step, to the very place where the preceding one has made its quart de conversion, and performs a similar one; the third, the fourth, and all the rest follow the example. Each division having thus traversed its distance, reaches the line of direction, when that which marches directly in front has already made room.

This method is a step further towards the perfection of deploying, which is to advance in front, for the division I is obliged to make a quart de conversion to the left, before presenting in front to the line, whilst, according to the method of Captain Röch, this line is formed merely by a halt-front. At the same time, a conversion is a movement which always requires many paces, because it is performed in the segment of a circle.

In the two methods of deploying represented at fig. 24. and 25., the divisions traverse the two smallest sides Fig. 25. of a right-angled triangle (see fig. 25.). The Prussians have introduced a method, in which only the hypothenuse is described: it is called the adjutant's step. The adjutants, who know from experience the length of the front of their battalions, measure with the gallop of their horses on the line of direction, the space necessary for appearing in battle (fig. 26.). Each battalion separates from the column, and marches by the nearest road to where their adjutants stand, at the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, as intermediate points on the line of direction AB. As soon as the first division arrives at the adjutant, it immediately deploys according to the method already described. If the officers who measure the front do not make any great mistake, the march in front must be executed much more quickly than by the preceding method.

Let us now examine the best method of throwing back a wing into a line, so that it may not be turned. Suppose an oblique line at c d (fig. 27.) with a crochet Fig. 27. d.e formed to prevent being taken by the flank d; and at the same time, to have a line ready to repulse every attack which the enemy AB, might attempt on the left against this flank. Such is the first modification which this kind of position offers to our examination. After this line, en crochet, has dispersed every thing which op- posed its progress, it turns, till it arrive at the prolongation of the oblique front CD, and then takes the enemy in flank.

At the battle of Lissa*, some battalions of grenadiers were placed at the extremity of the right wing of the cavalry; they overthrew the troops of Württemberg, and performed other essential services. But such a position has this defect, that it offers a flank to the enemy, which can be enfiladed by his cannon. This would happen to c d (fig. 28.), as well as d e, if the line AB extended beyond, and turned the oblique front c d. It would be possible, by means of a square battalion, as d, e, f, g, to cover the flank which is attacking in the oblique order, but two sides of this square would be enfiladed by the cannon of the enemy. The defence of a parallelogram is therefore much weaker than that of a perfect square.

Fig. 29. represents what the Prussians call a cromaillière, a form extremely complicated, and liable to be enfiladed by the enemy. Another and still more complicated form of this order of battle is seen at fig. 30.

Figs. 31. and 32. represent the order of battle in a square, a form which is well adapted both to strength and convenience. When it is intended to reinforce the square battalion against cavalry, the third rank separates from the two others, and forms by itself a lesser square, within that formed by the front and centre ranks. When this is done, if the enemy's cavalry should penetrate into one of the angles of the first square, the inner square forms a falient angle by conversions to the right and left, as represented by the dotted lines fig. 32, so as by a cross fire to drive the enemy back again.

Many have proposed to conduct retreats in various square battalions; but it is necessary that they should be small squares, composed at the utmost of two or three battalions; and it is requisite, that, during the march, whether by angles or squares, they should observe between each other such a position, that the fire of the one flank should reach to the sides of the other in order to protect it (fig. 33. N° 1, 2, 3.). This last battalion 3 reaches the front 1, which last performs the same service to the rear of 3, and to the front of 2; 2, on its side, protects the rear both of 1 and 3. It would be difficult in the field, for these different squares to preserve such a compelled position, and they would be in danger of wounding or killing each other by their cross firing. Men well experienced in war have, however, preferred retreats of infantry in square battalions, having the cannon in the centre or on the flanks, as represented in fig. 34. In executing this movement, however, the distances are scarcely ever preserved, especially when it is necessary for a wing to deploy by a conversion during a retreat, see fig. 35. in order to prevent the pursuit of the enemy. In every other respect these retreats being eccentric, are founded on good principles. See No 33.

When, after a discharge of musketry, an army has to retire, this movement cannot be expected to be executed in order. In this case a flight always takes place, for otherwise there would be no reason for quitting the field of battle. In this situation it is necessary to have a line of cavalry behind the infantry, to sustain them; and then it is not so bad as is generally imagined, to fly hastily into the midst of the cavalry. It is only necessary that this scattered infantry should reform immediately in the most convenient place, in a wood, or on an elevation; and if they return quickly to the charge, they will display more courage than in falling back, step by step, and losing a number of men; for in the first instance it is a real and useful intrepidity, but in the second it is nothing. If there be no cavalry to sustain them in an open place, they must then remain united, or otherwise be cut in pieces.

When it is possible to effect a regular retreat, the best and easiest method is to make a half-turn to the right with the whole line, and to march thus, progressively falling back; by this means they will sooner escape from the fire of the enemy than in any other manner, and the order is much more easily kept, which is of importance, and deserves to be properly appreciated. There is not a more pitiable object than a square battalion surrounded by iraillleurs, (fig. 36.). All their shot are concentric, and consequently eminently effective, while those of the squares are eccentric, which renders them almost nugatory. The ranks of this unhappy square would soon be thinned by a well-directed fire, which could not miss its aim; and a battalion, in this position, would find it impossible to escape destruction.

The most celebrated modification of the oblique front, is that made by Frederick the Great, viz. the oblique attack in rounds. Experience has not yet proved what there is peculiarly excellent in this manner of attacking; and Captain Rösch has shewn that it is not tenable in theory. He demonstrates that each échelon would be received by the enemy with a superior fire; for the one c d (fig. 37.) if it approach the line AB, within musket shot, would be caught in its flank c; which being turned, and exposed to a side fire, would insensibly describe an arch in its rear, to have its adversary in front. The division of the line AB, which in this case would pour upon the flank c of the échelon, c d, such a fatal fire, would be in no way hindered by the second e f, which is too far off to fire; and, besides, the first two divisions of the wing f dare not fire, at least not with safety, if the échelon were 300 paces distant, for fear of reaching them in the flank c. Thus, the two divisions of the line AB, which are opposite to the échelon, c d, would continue their fire upon the fatal rank c, without the least interruption. If they be not more than 50 or 100 paces distant, these inconveniences will not take place; but at the same time, the advantages which were expected to result from an attack en échelon will be lost. These advantages are, that, by dividing the front, only one part is liable to be beaten, as the others would be neglected; while on the contrary, in an oblique line, without any interruption, the disorder rapidly spreads through its whole extent. It would be possible, in order to derive every advantage from this manoeuvre, to augment considerably the fire of the first échelon, as well as the one immediately subsequent, by doubling their lines, and leaving the others weaker. Hence it is evident, that this mode of attack is eligible only when we are a-head of an enemy stronger than ourselves; for if we have a superior force, it is certain that the most energetic method would be to attack at once the adversary in front and both flanks.

There is scarcely an instance previous to the battle of Marengo, in which a second line of infantry has renewed the combat, by taking the place of the first which has been beaten. If the combat be continued with bayonets, it would be sufficient for a division of the line AB to make a conversion on the flank of the échelon c d, while they are fighting in front, and overthrow it before e f, 300 paces distant, or even the second line of the échelon, could come up to afford it any assistance. Thus, according to all appearances, the line AB would conquer all the échelons successively, and this the more easily as they would be taken in flank as soon as c d is obliged to fly.

The most useful, and in fact the only process for reinforcing an attack, is to have a second line of cavalry behind a first of infantry; in case of bad success they secure and cover their retreat, and complete the disorder of the enemy's infantry, if they come to an engagement.

When the infantry is ranged en échiquier, a first line when beaten, may retreat by files through the lines in the rear, without creating any disorder in the second, on account of the extensive spaces; but it is not the same with the long phalanx in open order. The cavalry, placed immediately behind the infantry, protects an attack much better than if there were between them a second line of infantry; for in the first instance, there would be no hindrance to their hasting to the succour of the runaways, and receiving them in their bosom. Hence there should be only two lines, one of infantry, and one of cavalry; and this is the more important, because the two lines of infantry cannot be useful, except in as far as they are beyond the shot of the cannon; it is evident, therefore, that they should be considered rather as a reserve of fresh troops than as a second line of combatants. Hence, the superadded strength which is supposed to be given to the échelons, by double lines of infantry, is quite illusory.

Cannons which fire concentrically, assist greatly the efficacy of an attack; but this measure may be employed as well for right lines as for the échelons: in an attack of the latter kind, the batteries should not be placed before the division c d, but before e f, to enfilade that part of the line A B, which would attempt to fall back to make a conversion, in case it were attacked in flank by c d.

It is impossible to take the enemy in flank by the diagonal or side-step, executed during the march, if, previous to commencing their march, they are not already considerably by their wings; for they would completely frustrate that scheme, if they made directly with their flanks a movement to the side. During the same time they would pass over a more considerable extent of ground than with an oblique step, because they move in a direct line, and in front, and obliquely, both at the same time, which would considerably shorten their distance; and likewise because they march on one of the sides and you on the hypotenuse, which is longer. It is therefore impossible to succeed in stretching beyond the wings of the enemy, while they are advancing in front in the order of battle, if they know how to conduct themselves.

There is, however, one advantage to be noticed, which the échelons possess over the uninterrupted oblique front, which is, not exposing the flank to the enemy advancing in front. The échelons naturally possess this advantage, while the oblique front cannot obtain it without being much more extensive than the enemy's front; for the oblique line, formed into échelons, changes into a number of parallel lines by a conversion (fig. 38.), and they may, by this movement, defend their flanks against the enemy. But still the best way is to attack him in his own flanks, whilst his front is amused with detached corps, and the columns should be prepared for the principal attack out of sight of the enemy, in the same manner as an admiral adopts at a considerable distance, his measures for gaining the windward of the enemy. No manoeuvres within cannon-shot can possibly be attended with success, if the enemy be skilful.

Much useful military instruction may be derived from Lift of re- perusing the accounts of the most celebrated battles, de- tailed by writers of ancient and modern history; and we could here enumerate a long list of these engagements, many of which have been described in the historical articles of this work. A few, however, must suffice. Of ancient battles we may notice those of Marathon* in 490 B. C.; Platea, 479; Leuctra*, See the 371; the Granicus*, 334; Arbela*, 331; the articles Thrasyalume Lake†, 217; Cannae*, 216; Zama*, See Car- 222; Magnesia†, 190; Nephers, 147; Pharsalia*, 115, 48; and Philippi*, 42. Of modern battles, the most important are those of Hastings*, A. D. 1066; the See Gas- Indus†, 1221; Bannockburn†, 1314; Cressy*, 1346*; Poitiers*, 1356; Agincourt*, 1415; Bolsworth*; See Set- 1485; Flodden §, 1513; Pavia, 1525; Narva††, 192, and 1700; Blenheim*, 1704; Ramillies*, 1706; Pol- 495; tava††, 1709; Malplaquet*, 1709; Fontenoy ‡‡, *see 1745; Prague and Colin †††, 1757; Lilla or Leu England, then †††, 1757; Minden, 1759; Freyburg, 1762; Je- No 437 See Ruff- mappe, 1792; Tirlentom, 1793; Fleurus, 1794; Lodi, No 1796; Zurich, 1799; Ulm, 1800; Marengo, 1800*; and Austerlitz, 1805; and Wagram, in 1809.

By way of illustrating the modern French tactics and more fully explaining what has been said on the order of battle, we shall here give a detail of the battle of Jemappes, in which Dumourier entirely defeated General Clairfayt, by enticing him from a situation where he was impregnable.

In the beginning of November 1792, when Dumou- rier arrived with his army in the vicinity of Mons, he found the Austrian general Clairfayt occupying a strong position on the heights near the village of Jemappes, where he had entrenched himself, and was defended by nearly 100 pieces of cannon. The position of the Au- strians was extremely formidable. Their right extended to the village of Jemappes, and formed a square with their front and left, which stretched to the caucway of Valenciennes. They were posted on a woody mountain, where they had erected, in an amphitheatre, three tiers of redoubts. Their whole force amounted to about 16,000 infantry, and 3000 cavalry.

The army of Dumourier was much more numerous than that of Clairfayt, but not so well supplied with artil- lery. The elevation of the Austrian batteries, too, gave them such an advantage, that the French cannon could produce but little effect.

On the 5th of November, Dumourier had fully reconnoitred the Austrian camp, and, by way of feint, made an attack with his infantry on the village of Car- rignon, while he kept up a brisk cannonade on their left. Towards evening the French army encamped op- posite to Jemappes, with its left wing extending to Hoorne, and its right to Fremery. As Dumourier re- solved to make a decisive attack on the heights of Jemappes the next morning, he ordered his troops to abandon the village of Carrignon which was commanded by the enemy's cannon.

On the morning of the 6th, he ordered his artillery to be advanced and disposed along the front of the line. It was soon found, however, that little was to be done with artillery, and that the great object was, to entice the Austrian general from his strong position, and draw him to the plain. For this purpose, at noon of the 6th, the French infantry formed in columns, and advanced with the greatest spirit and rapidity to the Austrian intrenchments. The lower tier of redoubts was instantly carried; but, as the centre of the French became endangered, and the Austrian cavalry appeared descending from the heights, and preparing to enter the plain, with an evident intention of flanking the French columns, Dumourier despatched the duke of Orleans to lead those columns against the second tier of redoubts, while a detachment of chasseurs and hussars flew to check the progress of the Austrian cavalry. Some smart skirmishing between the cavalry on both sides now ensued, and while this diversion was taking place, the left division of the French army possessed themselves of the village of Jemappes, while its centre obtained entire possession of the second tier of redoubts. In the mean time the whole of the Austrian cavalry had quitted the heights, and engaged the French on the plain below Jemappes. This was the point to which Dumourier had wished to bring them, and now the superior numbers and activity of the French quickly decided the fortune of the day. The Austrians were routed at every point, and forced to abandon the field of battle, leaving 5000 of their dead, with the greater part of their artillery. The loss of the French, however, was considerably greater, and is, on good authority, estimated at 14,000; but this loss appeared trifling to Dumourier, as by this victory he acquired possession of the whole of the Austrian Netherlands.

The positions of the French and Austrian forces in this battle are represented in Plate DLIV. 1, The centre of the Austrian army, commanded by Clairfayt. 2, A part of this army commanded by General Lilien. 3, Another part under the command of General Beaulieu. 4, Redoubts on the heights of Jemappes. 5, Austrian intrenchments. 6, French columns advancing to attack the intrenchments. 7, A battery. 8, Columns of cavalry. 9, Columns attacking the eminences above Mons. 10, Battery on the height of Fremery. 11, The wood of Frefnee. 12, The plain on which the French and Austrian cavalry were engaged. 13, Austrian detachment.

The columns No. 9, were first engaged; and No. 6, having obtained some advantage, Dumourier ordered the battery, No. 7, to be erected, by which the redoubts, No. 4, were silenced. In the mean time the French advanced against the intrenchments, 5, and attacked in front. From the left of the French army, as far as the centre, the cavalry fought hand to hand, in the plain, 12, with the Austrian horse, which was dreadfully cut up in the wood of Du Frefnee, 11. The right of the Austrians, being totally routed, gave way and fell back on Mons. The superiority of the French in numbers is evident from inspecting the columns in the plan.

After having dwelt so long on that part of military tactics which relates to operations in the field, we must be extremely brief with respect to the attack and defence of fortified towns. Indeed our principal object in this part will be to explain the nature of a siege, and of sieges, the various circumstances that may occur, both on the part of the besiegers, and on that of the besieged, rather than to lay down a system of instructions for either party. With this view, we shall first enumerate the principal instruments and engines employed in the attack or defence of a fortrefs, and explain the nature and construction of the works constructed by the besiegers, either for the purpose of making their approaches to the place, or for undermining its walls or outworks.

In Plate DLV. are represented the principal instruments employed in sieges. Fig. 1. is a fascine for the construction of redoubts or temporary defence of a detachment. Figs. 2, 3, and 4. exhibit various views of what are called gabions, or cylindrical cases of wicker work, open at both ends, for filling into the ground, as seen at fig. 4. when they are filled with earth, and fascines, &c, laid on them. Fig. 2. is a section of the gabion; fig. 3. shews its hollow inside, and fig. 4. is its elevation. Fig. 5. and 6. represent bags for holding sand, the former empty, the latter full; and fig. 7. represents the manner in which they are usually disposed for the protection of the men. Fig. 8. is a fascicule, or very long close fagget, for laying over gabions. Fig. 9. is the outline of a blind, which is stuck into the earth by the sharp stakes at its extremity, and hides the workmen from the besieged. Fig. 10. represents what is called a chandelier, and fig. 11. two of these with fascines piled up across them. Fig. 12. is a cheval de frize; fig. 13. 14. 15. exhibit various views of a mantlet, or moveable blind placed on two wheels, used both to protect and conceal the workmen of the besiegers. Fig. 13. is a plan of the mantlet; fig. 14. a side view of it, and fig. 15. a view of its front next the enemy. Fig. 16. is a madrier or foreen with two leaves, moveable on wheels; and fig. 17. represents a gate with orgues or lattice work on one side, and a portcullis on the other. Fig. 18. is a hook, and fig. 19. a fork used in fapping. Fig. 20. represents three caltrops or crow feet, used to scatter over the ground, to prevent the approach of cavalry, by laming their horses feet. For a fuller explanation of these instruments, see the several articles in the general alphabet.

When a town is about to be besieged, it is first invested; that is, a considerable body of troops, usually calling valy, encamp in its neighbourhood, and take possession of all the avenues till the army arrive, which is to carry on the regular operations of the siege.

When the army has sat down before the place, its first object is, to ascertain the lines or direction of the circumvallation works to be thrown up for the attack of the place. These are called lines of circumvallation, and their direction is to be determined by the plan of the fortification about to be besieged. After ascertaining, in the manner explained under FORTIFICATION, the number of sides of which the polygon of the place consists, and the length of each, as well as the radius of a circle to be drawn round the place, concentric with its works, the polygon of the circumvallation is easily described. This being traced, the engineer takes on each of the extremities of its sides the lines BD and BE, fig. 21. Fig. 21. each of 15 fathoms, and from the points D and E, taken taken for the centre and distance of 25 fathoms, he describes two arcs cutting each other at F, whence are drawn the lines FD, FE, for the faces of the redans of the line of circumvallation; thus are formed the salient parts EFD of this line, which serve to flank it. The same operation is performed on every side of the circumvallation, and then the principal line is traced. The parapet within must be fix or eight feet deep, and without is made a ditch parallel to all its parts, three or four fathoms in breadth. The parapet of the circumvallation will be 7 1/2 feet high, and the depth of the ditch equal to the height of the parapet.

To make the profile of the circumvallation, let AB, fig. 22. be a line level with the country, and CD the scale of the profile. Let A be the side of the town, and B that of the country; take AE of fix feet; from the point E, raise the perpendicular EF, of three feet, and draw the line AF, which will be the talus or slope of the banquette.

Draw FG parallel to AB, three feet from F to G, and the line FG will be the breadth of the banquette. On the point G raise the perpendicular GH, on the line FG, 4 1/2 feet. Draw from the point H, HK parallel to AB; make HK 7 1/2 feet, HI, 1 1/2 foot; draw GI, which will be the inside of the parapet of circumvallation.

From the point K, let fall on the line AB the perpendicular KM; take KL 1 1/2 foot, and draw IL, which will be the upper part of the parapet of the line of circumvallation. Take MN equal to five feet, and from the point N draw the perpendicular NO, and set off 7 1/2 feet from N to O. Draw OR parallel to AB, making the distance equal to 18 feet from O to R; draw LN, and produce it to P, and LP will be the scarp. From the point R raise RS, perpendicular to OR, or parallel to ON. Make QR=OP, and draw QS, which produce beyond S, three feet to V; then take SX equal to fix feet, and draw VX, and the profile of the circumvallation is completed; VQ being the counterescarp, and VX the glacis.

At A and A (fig. 21.) are small half moons before the gates of the circumvallation in the middle of the curtains.

In Plate DLVI. at fig. 1. is represented the manner in which the lines of circumvallation were drawn at the siege of Philippsburg in 1734. In these lines regular bastions were constructed, as seen in fig. 2.

Fig. 4. and 5. of the same plate represent another line of circumvallation drawn round the city of Arras, when it was besieged by the Spaniards in 1654. Before the circumvallation were dug a great number of holes, two feet in diameter, and 1 1/2 foot deep, in which were fastened stakes for obstructing the approach of cavalry.

While the lines of circumvallation, which are intended to protect the besiegers from the enemy without, are constructed, all materials necessary for the trenches are got ready, and the figure and direction of these are determined. If the place be regularly fortified, and stand on level ground, it is indifferent on which side the besiegers commence their attack. Suppose C, fig. 2. Plate DLVII. to be the place besieged, and A and B two bastions to be attacked. The besiegers begin with indefinitely producing towards the field the capitals of these two bastions; in like manner the capital of the half moon opposite the curtain between these two battalions is produced. Eight hundred fathoms are set off from the salient angles D and E of the covert-way of F and G. This done, the lines DH and DI are drawn, each equal to 300 fathoms, and about the centre C with the radius CH or CI, is described an arch produced beyond H and I, and on this arch HI is constructed the first parallel. Then on the same lines DF, EG, are taken the points M and N, each 140 fathoms distant from H and I; and through these points M and N, about the centre C, is described another arch, on which is constructed the second parallel. This second arch will cut the produced capital of the half-moon in the point L, which is to be observed, in order to begin from hence a trench which may extend to the salient angle of the covert-way before this half-moon. Lastly, through the points O and P, the distance of 20 or 25 fathoms from the angles D and E, a third arch is described from the centre C, on which the third parallel is constructed. The first parallel is terminated by producing the faces a b, a b, of the half-moons 1 and 2, collateral to the bastions A and B; but the parallel is extended 15 or 20 fathoms beyond the intersection of this prolongation. The second parallel will be less extended than the first, by about 30 fathoms on each side, and the third less than the second by the same distance.

The trenches or approaches are now to be traced. For this purpose, the engineer takes a long ruler, and lays it on the point G, so that it may make with the produced capital EG of the bastion B, an angle EGS, whose side GS being produced, shall meet no part of the covert-way, and shall be distant about 10 or 12 fathoms from the angles to which it approaches nearest. GS is taken of any extent, and the ruler is put on the point S; so that it shall make with GS such an angle GST, as that the side ST produced shall not fall on any part of the covert-way, but be 10 or 12 fathoms distant from the most salient parts. This side is terminated in T; and now the angle STI is made, whose side TI should terminate at the point I, where it meets the first parallel. The same operation being performed on FH, the outline of the trenches is completed as far as the first parallel.

Fig. 1. of this plate illustrates the method of constructing what are called lines of countervallation. These are drawn nearer the town than the lines of circumvallation, but are constructed on the same principles. They are employed chiefly when the garrison of the place is so strong as to disturb the operations of the besieging army by fallies.

In sieges where the garrison is strong, it is often necessary to cut parts of trenches, as VV (fig. 2.) between the second and third parallels, so as to communicate with the main trench. These parts of parallels are denominated half parallels, or places of arms, and are constructed in the following manner. Let ABCDFGMQ (fig. 1. Plate DLVIII.) be a part of the trenches, and let AB be one of the sides opposite to the enemy; produce AB, so that BE shall be five or fix fathoms, and in FG take also five or fix fathoms from I to L, which will give the ends of the trench BFIL, the use of which is to cover the bayace or branch IOMG, whereby the enemy will not know the place where it falls into the trench AB, and to make room for withdrawing those who are in this part of the trench, es, and that the parapet may be free at all the angles. In like manner produce the side GM from M to N, and the side IC from O to P, and this will give the end of the trench MNOP, which will cover the branch DCOQ. The same is to be done at all the angles of the trench. The parapet of the trench being made to cover it, ought to change sides alternately. If, for instance, AE, in the preceding figure, be towards the place, it is evident that the side GN will be towards it also, and likewise the side CD; and therefore the parapet of the trench is successively constructed from the right side to the left, and from the left to the right.

Figs. 2, 3, 4. of this plate represent profiles of the regular trenches and the places of arms, and require no particular explanation.

In tracing the trenches, it is of the greatest consequence to ascertain the distance of the extremity of the line of direction to the top of the salient angle of the covert-way. The following simple method of doing this is given by Vauban. Let A (fig. 5.) be the vertex of the salient angle of the covert-way, and AB the line of direction of the trench whose length is required. At the point B, draw BC perpendicular to AB, to which give any measure, and at the point C draw CD perpendicular to BC. In CD take any point E, and in the line of direction between it and the angle A place a piquet G in the line BC. Measure GC and CE, and say, as GC : BG :: CE : AB.

When in carrying on the trenches towards the town, the workmen begin to be much annoyed by the fire of the besieged, recourse is had to what is called Japping, which may be thus explained. Let ABC be the part of the trenches advanced to A (fig. 6. Plate DLVIII.), so near the town as to render it impossible, without evident danger, to work any longer at the approaches, unless the men have some cover against the fire of the place; and let the branch AD be traced by the engineer, not with a cord, as at the opening of the trenches, but with some pickets, which he has taken care to place in the direction this branch ought to have, to serve as a guide to the workmen. A cut is made in the parapet BA of the trenches, and then the men designed to work by sap, who are therefore called fappers, will move forward through the opening A successively, eight in number. Fig. 7. of Plate DLVIII. and fig. 1. of Plate DLIX. will illustrate the mode of operation. The first rapper rolls a mantlet before him, and places a gabion on the line AD, fig. 6. He then makes a small excavation about six inches from the gabion, of about one foot and a half in depth, and as much in breadth, emptying the earth which he digs up into the gabion. He then pushes forward his mantlet, fixes another gabion, and continues his trench as long as he is able. He is followed by a second, who widens the trench six inches in breadth away from the gabion, and fix in depth. The rest follow this second, till the trench is made three feet wide, and as many deep, and as soon as the gabions are filled with earth, fascines or saucifions are placed on their top, and the superfluous earth is thrown over them, and on the opposite side, by way of parapet.

Cannon are made use of at a siege for two different purposes; the first to drive away the enemy from their defences, and the second to dismount their guns. To produce these two effects, the batteries should not be above the mean reach of cannon-shot from the place; that is, above 300 fathoms. Therefore there is no possibility of constructing them till the first parallel be formed; and as the distance of this first parallel from the place is generally 300 fathoms, the batteries must be on this line, or beyond it, nearer the town. They must always be placed, when the ground will permit, on the produced faces of the works attacked. Let Z be the centre of the place attacked (fig. 3. Plate DLIX.), and the trenches as well as the parallels completed. To find a proper position for erecting batteries, produce the faces AD, AC, BE, BF, of the two bastions attacked, till their prolongation cuts the first parallel. Produce also the two faces OM and OL of the half-moon MOL of the front attacked, and the faces HG and IK of the two collateral half-moons 1 and 2, to the first parallel, and erect batteries on those produced faces, as is seen in P, Q, R, S, T, U, X, and Y. They are advanced beyond the first parallel 40 or 50 fathoms; and are parted from the trenches, that they may be used with greater ease and convenience, and less trouble to the workmen.

When the works of the besiegers approach the glacis, they are continued in a zig-zag direction, by short an-vertices, regular trenches, but from the foot of the glacis they are continued in the following manner. Two sets of sappers, protected by their mantlets, make a sap on each side of the ridge of the glacis, with a deeper ditch than usual, and a parapet on each side. This is called a double sap, and has across it traverses or banks three fathoms thick (see Plate DLX. fig. 1.), with small passages on one side (see fig. 4.) to preserve the communication. These traverses are constructed so near to each other, as to be a sufficient cover, by their elevation and distance, against the fire of the place. In order to guard against the effect of grenades, on coming within their reach, or within 14 or 15 fathoms of the covert-way, care must be taken to cover this trench with blinds, or to cover the upper part of it. Fig. 1. and 2. of Plate DLX. shew this direct trench. The first exhibits the plan, and the second the profile, which passes over one of the traverses. This being done, and the third parallel finished in the manner supposed, they advance from this parallel on the glacis to each of the salient angles of the covert-way of the front attacked, and begin with making two or three short turnings, as marked on Plate DLX. fig. 6. along the ridge of the glacis, so as to occupy about one-third of it. These are to be made as deep as is necessary, to be a shelter against the fire of the covert-way; afterwards they may proceed directly along the ridge of the glacis by a deep ditch, to the salient angle of the covert-way. M. Vauban observes, that if we follow directly the ridge of the glacis, this trench is made without much danger; for the palisade which is placed at the salient angle of the covert-way, and the other two next it, do not present directly to the ridge, but only opposite to the faces, where at most there is only room for one or two fusiliers to see the head of the trenches, and who are easily silenced by the fire of the third parallel, which ought to be well served, and likewise by that of the ricochet. On coming to the middle, or two-thirds of the glacis, two new saps are made, b b, ibid. which embrace both sides of the covert-way, to which they are almost parallel. Their length is 18 or 20 fathoms, and about five broad. broad. They are covered at the end with crochets and winding traverses, which prevent the fire of the covert-way from enfilading them easily.

In this way is gradually effected a lodgement on the covert-way, as is represented in fig. 5, where AAAA, is the trench, with BBBBB its traverses.

Plate DLXI. fig. 5, represents a profile of these works, with three banquettes next the trench, by which the parapet is raised, so that the soldiers may fire over into the covert-way. This work is called by Vauban, the cavalier of the trench.

When the besieged are entirely driven out of the covert-way, the next thing to be done is the erecting of batteries, in order to ruin the defences of the place, and to make a breach. As it is necessary for the besiegers to make themselves masters of the half-moon C, (Plate DLX. fig. 6.) before they can come to the body of the place, which is defended by part of the faces of the battions A and B opposite to its ditch, they must begin with erecting batteries on the covert-way opposite to these parts. They are marked on the plan ee. Batteries must also be erected to make a breach on the half-moon. But, before they are erected, it will be proper to consider what part of the face of the half-moon is to be attacked, or what part of the half-moon is to be entered. It must not be at its flanked angle, because an opening towards the point would not afford a sufficient space to make a lodgement able to withstand the enemy, and the troops would be seen in their passage by the two faces of the bastions by which its flanked angle is defended. The most favourable passage is towards the third part of its face, reckoning from its flanked angle, because by battering at the same time the two faces near this part, the whole point of the half-moon may be destroyed, and a large opening made there easier than anywhere else. Thus the batteries for making a breach in the half-moon C will be placed in d and b, and will occupy almost one-third of each of the faces of the half-moon from its flanked angle. These batteries are each to consist of four or five pieces of cannon. When the faces of the bastions A and B are well enfiladed by ricochet batteries, there will be no farther occasion for the batteries e, e, and when the half-moon is taken, the faces of the bastions A and B may be destroyed, by niling the batteries d, d, placing them in the situation of e, e. Batteries must also be erected to destroy the flanks of the demibastions in the front of the attack; and it is evident that they can be placed nowhere but at i, i, on the covert-way. Besides these batteries, others are erected in the re-entering places of arms of the covert-way, as in k; and in k they serve to batter the tenaille when there is one, the curtain, and the faces of the bastions. Sometimes they are of mortars for throwing stones.

While the workmen are employed in erecting batteries on the covert-way, preparations are made for passing the ditch of the half-moon. This is often a difficult and dangerous undertaking, as this ditch is commonly very deep, is well defended, and either filled with water, or in general capable of being so filled. The descent into the ditch is commonly effected by subterraneous passages or galleries, made like those of miners, and erected in such a manner, that its opening into the ditch may be opposite to the breach where it is intended to make the assault. These galleries are sloping, and in general there are several for the same passage. The passage is made on each side of the faces of the half moon. See mm, fig. 6. Plate DLXI.

As the buildings of forming these galleries is liable to be obstructed by mines from the besieged, the workmen are protected by a guard of grenadiers. At fig. 1. Plate DLXI. is seen a plan of the descent under ground, and of its opening into the dry ditch; and fig. 2. gives fig. 1. a profile of the same passage; fig. 3. gives a perspective view of the opening of this descent, seen from the bottom of the glacis, and fig. 4. a similar view of the opening of the same descent, seen from the top of the breach.

At Plate DLXII. fig. 1. is seen the plan of the passage over a wet ditch in the open air; that is to say, the gallery of which is an open sap. A is the opening of it; at B, towards its opening, are seen the blinds laid on its upper part, to support the fascines with which it is covered. On these blinds, at first, is laid a bed of fascines, ranged according to the length of the gallery: over this first bed a second is laid, whereon the fascines are ranged according to the breadth of the gallery, as is seen at B and C. D is the epaulment of fascines, which covers the passage against the fire of the place by which it is flanked. E is part of the bridge of fascines; and F is an elevation also of fascines, intended to cover the head of the work, and to secure it from the immediate fire of the place. Fig. 2. represents the profile of this descent into the ditch. Fig. 3. gives its opening seen in perspective from the country; and fig. 4. its opening into the ditch, also in perspective, as it appears from the top of the breach.

The following references will explain fig. 5. of Plate Fig. 5. DLXII. a, cavaliers of the trenches. b, batteries of stone mortars. c, batteries to breach the half-moon before the hornwork. d, batteries against the defence of this half-moon. e, passages over the ditch before this half-moon. f, lodgement in it. g, batteries against the flanks of the hornwork. h, batteries to breach the half bastions of the hornwork. i, batteries against its curtain. l, lodgements in the half bastions, and in the hornwork. m, passages over the ditch before the retrenchments in the hornwork. n, lodgements in these retrenchments. o, batteries against the defences of the collateral half-moons. p, batteries to breach those half-moons. q, passages over the ditch before these works. r, lodgements in the same. s, batteries to breach the redoubts of the half-moon. t, passages over the ditch before the redoubts. u, lodgements in the redoubts. x, bridge of fascines. y, batteries against the defences of the bastion A. z, batteries to breach this bastion. B, passages over its ditch. C, lodgements in the bastion A. D, lodgements on the border of the ditch before the retrenchment of the bastion A. E, passages over the ditch before this retrenchment.

There are places which, without any fore-ditch, have lunettes opposite to the salient and re-entering angles of the glacis, which are also enveloped by a second covert-way: sometimes they are vaulted and bomb-proof, as at Luxemburg; and sometimes they have only a ditch, a parapet, and covert-way. Those which are vaulted and bomb-proof are not easily taken, because the ricochet firing and the bombs can do them no mischief. In that case they must either be turned, or be taken by mines. A work is said to be turned, when the befege gers get between that work and the place, and so cut off their communication. Sometimes the lunettes have communication under ground, and then there is scarcely any other way of driving out the enemy but by mines. This is tedious, but there is no other remedy. The lunettes of the ditch are always defended by branches of the covert-way, with which they have also a communication like those of the lunettes, A, A, Plate DLXIII. fig. 1. This plate, which represents part of Landau and its attacks in 1713, may serve to give an idea of the manner in which a work is turned. The advanced lunette B, as well as the work C, called a tenaille, is turned; that is, the trenches cut off the communication betwixt them and the place.

We shall conclude this subject of the attack of fortified places, with the following principles to be observed by the besieging army.

The approaches ought to be made, without being seen from the town, either directly, obliquely, or in flank.

No more works should be made than are necessary for approaching the place without being seen; that is, the besiegers ought to carry on their approaches the shortest way possible, consistently with being covered against the enemy's fire.

All the parts of the trenches should mutually support each other, and those which are furthest advanced ought not to be distant from those which are to defend them above 120 or 130 fathoms.

The parallels or places of arms the most distant from the town, ought to have a greater extent than those which are nearest, that the besiegers may be able to take the enemy in flank, should they resolve to attack the nearest parallels.

The trench should be opened or begun as near as possible to the place, without exposing the troops too much, in order to accelerate and diminish the operations of the siege.

There is no such thing as giving any exact rule in regard to the distance which ought to be observed on opening the trenches. On level ground, this distance may be 800 or 900 fathoms; but if there should be a hollow way in the vicinity of the place, the besiegers are to take advantage of it, and open the trenches nearer. In general, they are to regulate themselves according to the nature of the ground, more or less favourable to the opening of the trenches. We shall suppose in the present work, that the opening ought to be made within 800 fathoms of the covert-way; the first parallel within 300 fathoms, the second within 150, and the third at the foot of the glacis.

Care must be taken to join the attacks, that they may be able to support each other.

Never to advance a work unless it be well supported; and for this reason, in the interval between the second and third places of arms, the besiegers should make, on both sides of the trenches, smaller places of arms, extending 40 or 50 fathoms in length, parallel to the others, and constructed in the same manner, which will serve to lodge the soldiers who are to protect the works designed to reach the third place of arms.

The batteries of cannon must be placed in the continuations of the faces of the pieces attacked, to silence their fire, and that the approaches being protected, may advance with greater safety and expedition.

For this reason the besiegers should always embrace the whole front attacked, to have as much space as is requisite to plant the batteries on the produced faces of the works attacked.

The attack must not be commenced with works that lie close to each other, or with re-entrant angles, which would expose the attack to the cross fire of the enemy.

Many circumstances respecting the defence of fortified towns have already been anticipated, or may be collected from what has been said respecting the operations of the besieging army. It is evident that the success or duration of the defence will depend in a great measure on the nature and strength of the works which form the fortification. Much, however, will also depend on the number, resolution, and resources of the garrison, and on the movements of the friendly army by which the besiegers may be opposed. It is estimated by M. Vauban, that the operations for a regular siege of a well fortified town, will take up about 41 days, before the place can be carried by assault. Hence is deduced a computation of the quantity of provisions, ammunition, and stores which ought to be collected for maintaining the siege. The same celebrated engineer calculates that the garrison ought to consist of 600 times as many men as there are bastions in the fortification, allowing 600 men to each bastion. Besides the necessary defence of the works by the cannon on the ramparts, and the musketry of the soldiers, the garrison must make occasional sallies; if weak, to disturb the operations of the besiegers, and if very strong, to engage them in the field. As the siege advances, and the attacking army approaches the glacis, mines should be sprung, and subterraneous passages excavated, to destroy the enemy's works, or cut off a part of their men.

Towards supplying the unavoidable deficiencies in the above sketch of military tactics, we may refer our readers to Clairac's Field Engineer, translated by Muller; Le Cointe, Science des Postes Militaires, or the English translation; Jeney's work entitled Le Partisan, also translated into English; O'Rourke's Treatise on the Art of War; Essai General de Tactique; Tielke on the Art of War, and his Field Engineer; Dunlap's Principles of Military Movements; Landmann's Elements of Tactics; Maizeroy's Système de Tactique; Archives Militaires; Feuquieres's Memoires; Bland on Military Discipline; Military Instructions for Officers detached in the Field; and the articles Battalion and Battle in Rees's Cyclopaedia.

PART II. NAVAL TACTICS.

BY naval tactics is understood the art of arranging fleets or squadrons in such an order or disposition as may be most convenient for attacking the enemy, defending themselves, or of retreating with the greatest advantage. Naval tactics are founded on those principles which time and experience have enabled us to deduce from the improved state of modern naval warfare, which has occasioned, not only a difference in the mode of constructing and working ships, but even in the total disposition and regulation of fleets and squadrons.

In the present part we propose to lay down the general principles of naval tactics, and to describe as briefly as is consistent with perspicuity, the most improved systems which are now adopted in the French and British navy. As we have elsewhere (see Navigation and Seamanship) detailed the methods of working single ships, as they are unconnected with military operations, we shall presume that our readers are already acquainted with these ordinary movements.

Fleets are generally divided into three squadrons, the van, centre, and rear, each under the command of a flag officer. The admiral of the fleet, or chief in command, leads the centre division, while the van is usually commanded by a vice-admiral, and the rear by a rear-admiral. Each squadron is distinguished by the position of the colours in the ships of which it is composed. Thus, the ships of the centre squadron carry their pendants at the main-top-gallant mast-head; while those of the van division have their pendants at the fore-top gallant mast-head, and those of the rear at the mizen-top-mast head. Each squadron, as far as possible, consists of the same number of ships, and as nearly as may be of the same force. In large fleets, the squadrons are sometimes again divided in a similar manner; the van and rear of the squadron being headed by rear-admirals, or senior captains, called commodores. In the usual mode of forming the lines, each commanding admiral arranges his ship in the centre of his own squadron, and thus the admiral of the fleet is in the centre of the line. When no enemy is in sight, the sloops, flote-ships, fire-ships, and other small vessels, are dispersed to windward of the fleet, that they may be more easily supported, and more readily answer signals. The frigates lie to windward of the van and rear of the convoy, thus keeping a good look-out, and keeping the small vessels in their proper station. When sailing in three columns, the centre still keeps in the middle, while the van and rear form the starboard or the larboard column, according to circumstances. These arrangements are called orders of sailing, and will be better understood from the following definitions.

The starboard line of bearing, is that line on which the arranged ships of a fleet bear from each other, on a close-hauled line, whatever course they may be steering, so that when the ships haul their wind, or tack together, they may be on a line close hauled upon the starboard tack. The larboard line of bearing is that line on which the ships when hauling their wind, or tacking together, may be formed on a line close hauled on the larboard tack. The ships of a fleet are said to be on a line abreast, when their keels are parallel to each other, and their mainmasts lie in the same straight line. Ships are said to lie in a line on the bow or quarter, when they are arranged in a straight line, cutting their keels obliquely in the same angle, so that reckoning from any intermediate ship, the ships towards one extremity of the line will be on the bow of that ship, while those towards the other extremity will be on her quarter. When several ships in the same line steer the same course, while that course is different from the line of failing, they are said to sail chequerwise.

When the ships of a fleet arranged in any of the orders of sailing, and on the same line, perform successively the same manoeuvre, as each gets into the wake of the ship that leads the van of the line or squadron, tacking or veering, bearing away or coming to the wind in the same point of the wake of the leading ship, they are said to maneuver in succession.

There are usually reckoned five orders of sailing, exclusive of the line of battle, the order of retreat, &c. In the first order (see Plate DLXIV, fig. 1. and 2.) the fleet is arranged on the starboard or larboard line of bearing, all the ships steering the same course. In DLX these cases the fleet, by hauling the wind when in the starboard line, as in fig. 1. will be ready to form the line on the starboard tack; and when ranged on the larboard line of bearing, as in fig. 2. it will, by tacking, be ready to form the line on the larboard tack. N. B. The arrows annexed to the diagrams on the plates, mark the direction of the wind, as in ordinary charts.

This first order of sailing is now seldom employed, except in passing through a narrow strait. In the second order of sailing, the fleet steering any proper course, is ranged in a line perpendicular to the direction of the wind, as in fig. 3. This second order, besides being equally defective with the former, is subject to the additional disadvantage of rendering it extremely difficult for the ships to tack, without each ship falling on board that next a-stern.

In the third order of sailing, the whole fleet is close hauled, and ranged on the two lines of bearing, so as to form an angle of 12 points, having the admiral's ship (A fig. 4.) in the angular point, and the whole fleet steering the same course. Thus, supposing, as in the plate, the wind at north, the starboard division of the fleet will bear W. N. W. of the admiral, and the larboard E. N. E. This order in small fleets or squadrons, is superior to either of the former; but when the fleet is numerous, the line will be too much extended.

In the fourth order, the fleet is divided into fix or more columns, and is thus more concentrated. The commanders, ranged on the two lines of bearing, have their squadrons astern of them on two lines parallel to the direction of the wind; the first ships of each column being, with respect to the commander of the squadron, the one on his starboard, and the other on his larboard quarter. The distance between the columns should be such that the fleet may readily be reduced to the third order of sailing, and from that to the order of battle. This order is adapted for fleets or convoys crossing the ocean, and is represented in fig. 5. But as it requires much time to reduce a fleet from this order to that of battle, it is defective when in presence of an enemy.

In the fifth order, the fleet, close hauled, is arranged in three columns parallel to each other; the van commonly forming the weather, and the rear the lee column. See fig. 6. Fig. 7. represents the same order, except that each column is here subdivided into two, with the ship bearing the commander of each squadron in the centre of each subdivision.

In forming the order or line of battle, the ships of the fleet are drawn up in a line nearly close hauled, battle standing standing under easy sail, so that each ship may be at a certain distance from the ship immediately a-head, as a cable's length, or half that distance. The firehips and frigates a-head and atern, form a line parallel to the former, and to the windward of it, if the enemy be to the leeward; but to the leeward if the enemy be to windward. This order is denoted by fig. 8. where the fleet is sailing on the starboard tack, with the wind at north.

When a fleet is compelled to retreat before a superior force, it is usually arranged in an order, the reverse of the third order of sailing; the divisions of the fleet being ranged in the two lines of bearing, so as to form an angle of 135° or 12 points, the admiral's ship being in the angular point, and the frigates, transports, &c. included within the wings to leeward. See fig. 9, where the fleet is sailing right before the wind. Though any other direction may be taken, the two lines still form the same angle.

The order of convoy is that in which the ships are all in each others wake, steering in the same point of the compass, and forming a right line. If the fleet is numerous, it may be divided into three columns, which are to be ranged parallel to each other, that of the admiral occupying the centre, and all steering the same course.

Having thus described the ordinary positions of a fleet, we must explain the manoeuvres by which they are produced, and we shall begin with the orders of sailing.

To form a fleet in the first order of sailing, supposing the ships to be in no particular order, that ship which is to lead on the proposed line of bearing for the order of sailing, runs to leeward of the greater part of the fleet, and then hauls her wind under an easy sail. Each of the other ships then proceeds to take the proper station, by chasing the ship, which is to be a-head of her, and when in the wake of the leading ship, adjusts her quantity of canvas so as to preserve the proper distance. The ships thus arranged astern of each other, are in the line of battle, and from this the first order of sailing is formed, by each ship bearing away at the same time, and all steering the proposed course.

In forming the second order of sailing, the leading ship runs to leeward of so many of the fleet as that each ship may readily fetch her wake, and then steers a course eight points from the wind, under an easy sail. The line is formed by each ship in the same manner as in the first order, except that before bearing away, the line is perpendicular to the direction of the wind, or each ship has the wind on her beam.

As, in the third order of sailing, the admiral's ship is in the centre; to produce this position, the fleet being formed in a line on one of the lines of bearing, and the ships steering in each others wake, ten points from the wind, the leading or leewardmost ship first hauls her wind. The second ship does the same as soon as she gets into the wake of the former, and this is done by each ship till the admirals ships haul their wind, when they reach the wake of the leading ship. At the same time that the admiral's ship hauls her wind, the sternmost half of the fleet does the same. The ships are now in the third order of sailing, from which the fleet can be formed in the line of battle on either tack.

To form the fourth order of sailing (see No 58.), the commanding admirals range themselves on the two lines of bearing, at a proper distance from each other, steering the proposed course, and the ships of the several columns take each their respective places, parallel to each other, and forming lines in the direction of the der. wind.

To form the fifth order, the three leading ships of fifth orders the divisions take their posts abreast and to leeward of each other, keeping their wind under an easy sail; then the ships of each squadron make sail, and take their respective stations at the proper distance astern of their leaders, while the commanders of each division, and the corresponding ships of each, keep mutually abreast of each other.

In forming from the first order of sailing, if the ships are running large on the tack that answers to the line of bearing on which they sail, and if the line is to be formed on the same tack, all the ships haul their wind at once, or as quickly as possible after the next to windward; but if they be on the other tack, with respect to the line of bearing, they all haul their wind and tack or veer together. If the line of battle is to be formed on the other line of bearing, the ship most to leewards veers or tacks, and hauls her wind, while the rest of the fleet veer or tack at the same time, and steer with the wind four points free, and each ship hauls her wind as soon as she gets within the wake of the leader. See fig. 10. Plate DLXIV. and fig. 1. Plate DLXV.

Suppose the fleet running before the wind in the second order of sailing; to form the line from this position, all the ships haul up together on the proper tack, presenting their heads eight points from the wind at the line on which they are arranged; the leading ship then hauls her wind, immediately making fail, or shortening sail, so as to close or open the order, and the same is done successively by all the rest (see fig. 2.).

In a fleet running large in the third order, the line of battle is formed by the wing which is in the line of bearing corresponding to the tack on which the line is to be formed, and the ship at the angle hauling their wind together, while the ships of the other wing haul up together eight points from the wind. Each ship moving in this direction, till the reach the wake of the other wing, when the hauls close up (see fig. 3.).

In forming the line of battle on the same tack from the fifth order of sailing (as the fourth is not calculated for forming a line of battle), the centre brings to, so as only to keep steerage way; the weather column bears away two points, and when it gets a-head of the centre, hauls its wind, while the ship of the lee column tack together, and crowd fail to gain the wake of the centre, when they retrack together, and complete the line (see fig. 4.); or, the weather column brings to, while the centre and lee tack together, and bear away two points free. When the ships of the centre column have gained the wake of the van, they retrack together, and bring to; and when those of the lee have gained the rear line, they retrack together, and all stand on; or lastly, the lee column brings to, the centre runs under easy sail two points free, to get a-head of the rear squadron, while the rear bears away under a prels of fail two points free, to get a-head of the centre division.

2. Suppose the weather and centre columns to interchange. To form the line under these circumstances; the centre stands on, while the weather column bears away eight points, points, and having reached the wake of the centre, which now forms the van, hauls up; the ships of the lee column tack together, and run under a press of sail, within two points free, so as just to gain the rear of the line; when they retack together (see fig. 5.), or the lee column brings to, while the centre squadron bears away three points under easy sail; and having reached the wake of the van, hauls up, to form the centre division.

3. Suppose the centre and lee columns to interchange. The lee column stands on close hauled under an easy sail, the weather column bears away two points under a press of sail, till it reach the head of the line, when it hauls up, and the centre bears away eight points, and when in the wake of the lee, now the centre, hauls its wind. (See fig. 6.).

4. If the weather and lee columns interchange; the lee column stands on under a press of sail close hauled, while the centre, under easy sail, bears away two points, and when it reaches the wake of the now van squadron, hauls its wind, and the weather column bears away eight points, hauling up when in the wake of the centre. (See fig. 7.).

5. Suppose the centre column to form the van, and the weather the rear division. Here the lee column brings to, while the centre bears away two points, forming the line a-head of the former, now the centre, and the weather column veers away seven points on the other tack, forming the rear squadron. (See fig. 1. Plate DLXVI.).

6. To form the line so that the lee column may form the van, and the centre the rear. The lee column is to stand on under a press of sail, while the weather bears away three points under easy sail, and the centre bears away eight points, the ships of each column hauling their wind, when in the wake of the now van division. (See fig. 2.).

7. If the line of battle is to be formed on the other tack, so that the weather shall form the van division, as in the first case, the ships of the weather column first tack successively, while those of the centre and lee stand on, the former under easy sail, and the latter shortening sail, the leading ships tacking when in the wake of the now van, taking great care that the ships of the centre and lee draw not too near to the sternmost ships of the van, or to each other. (See fig. 3.).

8. To form the line on the other tack, when the centre and weather columns interchange. The weather column brings to, while the centre column stands on, till the leading ship be fully able to clear the weather column, when the ships of the centre tack successively as they reach the wake of the van. The lee column stands on, tacking successively, as the ships get into the wake of the van, under moderate sail. (See fig. 4.).

9. In forming the line on the other tack, when the centre and lee interchange. The centre brings to, while the ships of the weather tack under shortened sail, and the lee under a press of sail stands on, the leading ship having gained the wake of the line, tacks, and is followed in succession by her division. The centre column fills and stands on, when the first ship of that column, and the last of the lee, bear from each other in a direction perpendicular to that of the wind. (See fig. 5.).

10. To form on this same tack, so that the weather and lee may interchange. The weather and centre bring to, while the lee crowds sail, till it can pass a-head of the weather column, when the ships tack in succession. As soon as the leading ship of the centre, and the last of the lee bear from each other in a line perpendicular to the wind, the centre fills, and tacks in succession when in the wake of the now van, and the ships of the weather column do the same when their leading ship and the last of the centre are under similar circumstances. (See fig. 6.).

11. Suppose the centre is to form the van, and the weather the rear, in forming the line on the other tack. The weather brings to, while the other columns make sail, till they can pass a-head of the former on the other tack, when they tack successively. The weather column, when the others have passed it, fills, and tacks to form the rear. (See fig. 7.).

12. Suppose now the lee column is to form the van. The weather and centre bring to, while the lee crowds fail, and tacks when it can pass a-head of the weather column. When the last ship of the now van has passed to windward of the former weather column, the van shortens sail, to give time for the other columns to form, and the weather and centre fill at the same time, to gain the wake of the van, when they tack in succession. (See fig. 8.).

We must now shew how a fleet may be disposed in the principal orders of sailing, from the line of battle; and here, as before, we have several varieties.

1. To form the first order of sailing from the line of battle on the same tack. All the ships are to bear battle, away together as many points as the admiral may direct, keeping in the line of bearing for the proper tack. The sternmost first bears away, and the others follow in quick succession to prevent running foul of each other.

2. If they are to form on the other tack; the leading ship bears away four points to leeward, and the rest follow in succession. The sternmost ship having bore away, the whole haul up, and will be in bearing for the line on the other tack. (See fig. 9.).

3. To form the second order of sailing from the line of battle, the whole fleet is to bear away together ten points, so that when the headmost ship, which first presses sail, shall come abreast of the second ship, the second ship adapts her sail to keep in this bearing, and so in succession, each taking care to keep the preceding ship in a line with herself, perpendicular to the direction of the wind. The whole fleet will now be before the wind. (See fig. 10.).

4. To form the third order, the whole fleet is to bear away together ten points, the headmost half, including the centre ship, carrying a degree of sail to preserve their line of bearing, while each of the remaining ships is successively to shorten sail, so as to form the other line of bearing with respect to that on which they were before arranged. (See fig. 1. Plate DLXVII.).

5. To change from the line of battle to the fifth order on the same tack. Of this evolution there are several varieties, but we shall mention only two; first, when the van is to form the weather, and the rear the lee column, and the fleet to keep as much as possible to windward.—In this case the van and centre tack together, and run close hauled in bow and quarter line, while the rear proceeds in its former course under easy sail. When each ship of the centre is abreast of the corresponding ship of the rear, the centre retacks, while the van stands on, till the centre and rear come up, when it also retacks, and all the columns regulate their distances. (See fig. 2.). Secondly, when the van is to form the lee, and the rear the weather column.—The van bears away under easy sail, and goes at right angles with the line a-head, while the centre runs two points free, each ship steering for that ship of the van which is to be a-breathe of her when in column. The distance must be determined by the leader of the van, who is not to haul up with her division, till the and the sternmost ship of the centre column are in a line at right angles with the wind, when both stand on under easy sail, while the rear crowds sail to pass to windward of both. (See fig. 3.).

6. To form the fifth order of sailing from the line of battle on the other tack—of which there are also several varieties; but we shall confine ourselves to two: First, when the van is to form the weather, and the rear the lee column; the van tacks in succession, while the leading ship of the centre is to tack when the leader of the van passes him exactly to windward, in which the is followed by her division, and the rear manoeuvres in the same manner with respect to the centre. (See fig. 4.). Secondly, when the rear-is to form the weather and the van the lee column ; the van tacks in succession, and when about, either shortens fail, or brings to, to allow the other columns time to form. The centre and rear then crowd fail, and tack in succession, the former tacking when its leader has the centre of the lee column in a line at right angles with the wind, or when its centre passes a-tern of the lee column. When the centre has tacked, it regulates its rate of sailing by the lee, and both wait for the rear to pass to windward. The rear tacks when the leader has the first ship of the lee in a line at right angles with the wind, or when its centre ship passes a-tern of the centre column. (See fig. 5.).

7. Fig. 6. represents the order of retreat formed from the line of battle, the whole fleet going four points free. This evolution is so seldom required in a British fleet, that we need not dwell on it.

There are various evolutions or manoeuvres performed by a fleet when in line of battle, some of which we must here describe.

Sometimes the fleet has to form the line on the other tack, by tacking in succession. To do this, the leading ship of the fleet tacks first, after making more fail, or after the second has shortened fail, to increase the interval between them. When the first ship is about, either the second makes more fail, or the third shortens fail, and as soon as the second gets into the wake of the leader, she tacks, putting down the helm just as she opens the weather quarter of the first ship, already on the other tack. In the same manner, each of the other ships tacks when in the wake of the leader; and the ships already about must preserve their proper distances, by shortening fail, if necessary, till the whole fleet be on the other tack. If a ship should miss stays, she must immediately fill again on the same tack, and make fail with all possible expedition, taking care not to fall to leeward. Thus will he get a-head, and to windward of the following ships, which will successively perform their evolutions in the wake of the ships that are already on the other tack, standing on rather further than if the ship a-head had not missed stays. (See fig. 7.).

But suppose the ships are not to tack in succession. To form the line on the other tack, the whole fleet veers together; the rear ship hauls her wind on the other tack, and stands on, while the rest go two points free on the other tack, and haul up as they successively gain the wake of the leading ship. (See fig. 8.).

If the line is to veer in succession, the van ship veers, and stands four points free on the other tack, hauling her wind when clear of the sternmost ship, and the rest follow and haul up in succession. (See fig. 9.).

Sometimes the fleet has to turn to windward while in line of battle. The best way to do this, when there is good sea-room, is for all the ships to tack together, when the fleet will be in line of battle on the one board, and in bow and quarter line on the other. If, however, the fleet be turning to windward in a narrow channel, it is best for the ships to tack in succession, as, were they all to tack together, the van would be soon in with the land on one side, while the stern ship, soon after the fleet had retacked, would be too near the land on the other side.

If the van and centre are to interchange; the van is to bear away a little, and then bring to, while the centre passes on to windward, edging a little, to get a-head of the former van on the same line ; the rear, coming on under an easy fail, edges away likewise, to gain the wake of the now centre squadron. (See fig. 10.).

If the van and rear are to interchange; the van and centre are to bear away a little, and then bring to, so that the van may bear away a little more to the leeward than the centre. The rear stands on to gain the head of the line; and when a-breathe of the former van, the centre fills, and both standing on, form a-head of the now rear, by edging down till they are in a line with it. (See fig. 11.).

If the centre and rear are to interchange; the van stands on under an easy fail, while the centre bears away a little, and brings to, and the rear at the same time carries a pres of fail to pass the centre to windward, and get into the wake of the van. The van and centre then edge away to gain the line, with the now rear squadron, which then fills. (See fig. 12.).

Several evolutions are required while a fleet is in the fifth order of sailing, and of these we shall notice some of the more important.

When the columns are to tack in succession, the ships of the lee must tack first, as they have most distance to run, and when the leader of the centre comes a-breathe of the leader to leeward, or at right angles with the close-hauled line on the other tack on which the leader of the lee is now moving, the tacks and is followed successively by the ships of her division. The weather column manoeuvres in the same manner, paying the same regard to the centre. Here the weather column is still to windward, and should the columns have closed too much, or be too far astern, the order may be recovered, either by the lee or windward column bearing away, so as to make an angle equal to that proposed between any column, and a line joining the leader of that column, and the sternmost ship of the next. (See fig. 13.).

When all the columns are to tack together; the sternmost ships put in stays together; and when in stays, their seconds a-head put down their helms, and so on through the whole fleet. Each column will then be in bow and quarter line. (See fig. 14.). When the columns are to veer in succession; the leader of the lee column must steer four points free on the other tack; followed by the ships of that division, and when she is clear of the sternmost ships of that division, she hauls up. The same evolution is performed by the centre and weather ships successively, standing on till they bring the point at which the lee column began to veer to bear in a right line to leeward of them. They likewise successively spring their luffs when the point at which the lee column hauled its wind, bears right to leeward. (See fig. 15.)

Suppose the fleet, when in the fifth order of sailing is to turn to windward; let the ships be so arranged that the leaders and corresponding ships may be in the direction of the wind. The van ships must tack together, which are followed in succession, each by the remaining ships of the division, when they reach the wake of their leaders, or the same point when they tacked; so that there will always be three ships in stays at once, till the whole fleet is on the other tack. The fleet then stands on to any proposed distance, and retacks as before. (See fig. 1. Plate DLXVIII.).

When the weather and centre columns interchange; the weather and lee lie to, or only keep steerage way. The centre column tacks together, and forming a bow and quarter line, goes close hauled to gain the wake of the weather column; it then tacks together, and stands on, while the weather column bears away to its new station in the centre, and the lee column fills. (See fig. 2.).

When the weather and lee columns are to interchange; the centre column must bring to; while the lee stands on under a press of sail; and when its sternmost ship can pass to windward of the van of the centre column, that is, when the centre ship of the lee is in a perpendicular line to the direction of the wind with the van of the centre column, the lee column then tacks together, and stands on close hauled till it comes in a line with the centre column, when it goes large two points to get into the situation which the weather column left; and then veers together, hauling the wind for the other tack. At the beginning of the evolution the weather column bears away together under little sail, and goes large fix points on the other tack, to get into the wake of the centre column; it then hauls to the former tack, going two points large, till it comes abreast of the centre column, when it brings to, and waits for the now weather column. (See fig. 3.).

Suppose the weather column is to pass to leeward; the weather column is to stand on under easy sail, while the centre and lee tack together, carrying a press of sail till they reach the wake of the weather column, when they retack, and crowd sail till they come up with it. The weather column, when the others have gained its wake, bears away two points, to gain its station to leeward, when it brings to, till the other columns, now the weather and centre, come up. (See fig. 4.).

Suppose the lee column is to pass to windward. The weather and centre columns bring to, while the lee column carries sail and tacks in succession as soon as the leading ship can weather the headmost ship of the weather column; and when arrived on the line on which the weather column is formed, it retacks in succession, forms on the same line, and either brings to or stands on under easy sail. If it brings to, the other two columns bear away together two points, to put themselves abreast of the column now to windward; but if the now weather column stood on under an easy sail, they may bear away only one point, to gain their proper stations. (See fig. 5.).

It is of the greatest importance that each ship of a fleet or squadron preserve her proper station and distance with respect to the rest. These may be regulated in two ways, either by observation with the quadrant, or by what is called the naval square. This square is usually constructed in the following manner.

On some convenient place in the middle of the quarter-deck is described the square ABCD, fig. 6, having the sides AD and BC parallel to the keel of the ship, and through the centre G, the line EF is drawn parallel to AD or BC, and the diagonals AC and BD are drawn. The angles EGD, EGC are bisected by the straight lines GH, GI, and thus the naval square is completed. Now the angles FGD, FGC are = 4 points each, being each half a right angle, therefore the angles EGD, EGC, the complements of these angles, are each = 12 points, and consequently the angles EGH, EGI are each = 6 points, being each half of the last angles. Now, if a ship be running close hauled on the starboard tack, in the direction FE, the direction of the wind will be IG, and her close-hauled course on the other tack will be GC; but if she be running close hauled on the larboard tack in the same direction, her direction when close hauled on the starboard tack will be GI.

Now, to apply the naval square to the keeping of ships in their respective stations, suppose the fleet formed on the fifth order of sailing, close hauled, the corresponding ships of the columns coinciding with the direction of the wind, in order to run to windward with greater facility. The corresponding ships in the column must be kept in the direction of GH, or GI, according to the direction of the wind and the tack they are on, while all the ships of the same column must be in the direction of EF. (See fig. 7.).

Again, suppose the ships arranged in three columns on one of the lines of bearing, and close hauled on the other tack. The ships of each column will be in the direction of one of the diagonals, while the corresponding ships of the other columns will be in the direction of the other diagonal. (See fig. 8.).

Sometimes the line of battle is disordered on the wind's shifting, and requires to be restored. Of this there are several cases, a few of which we shall notice.

1. When the wind comes forward less than 6 points. In this case the whole fleet except the leader brings to wind. The leading ship, that the same distances between the ships may be preserved on restoring the line, steers a course as a b (fig. 9.), so as to be at right angles with the middle point between the former and present direction of the wind. His required course may be known by adding half the number of points the wind has shifted to eight points, and applying this sum to the former close-hauled course. When the leader has arrived at the new close-hauled line with respect to the second ship a-head, this ship immediately fills, and bears away as many points as the leader; and when both these have reached the close-hauled line with respect to the third ship, she also fills, and bears away; and thus with the rest in succession; and when they have got into the close-hauled cloe-hauled line b c with the sternmost ship, they all haul their wind together, and the sternmost ship fills and stands on cloe hauled.

This may be expeditiously performed, if the whole fleet fall off as soon as the wind shifts, the same number of points, and the leader bear away eight points from the middle between the former and present directions of the wind, or when the wind shifts nearly fix points, if the leader bear away eight points from the present direction of the wind, and hauls her wind as soon as the sternmost ship bears from her in the cloe-hauled line, while the second ship bears away when she reaches the wake of the leader, and hauls her wind when she has again gained his wake. The third, fourth, &c. ships bear away, and all' haul their wind in succession, till the sternmost and the whole line be formed again. (See fig. 10.)

2. Suppose the wind comes forward less than fix points, and the order of battle is to be re-formed on the other tack. In this case all the ships are to veer round till their heads come to the requisite point with respect to their former course, when the rear ship, now become the van, hauls cloe by the wind, followed successively by the other ships. Should the wind come a-head more than fix points, but less than twelve, the fleet is to manoeuvre as before, but if it shift exactly twelve points a-head, the tack must be changed.

3. Lastly, suppose the wind to shift oft—if less than two points, the leader hauls her wind, while the fleet stands on as before, each successively hauling her wind as she gains the wake of her leader. If the tack is to be changed, the whole fleet tack together, and the sternmost ship, now the leader, hauls up, while the rest bear down and haul up in succession.

Should the wind change 16 points, all the ships immediately brace about for the other tack, by which means the fleet will be going four points large; then the ships instantly tacking or veering together, the order of battle will be restored or formed again on the same tack as before the wind changed.

It is inconsistent with the nature of our plan to be more minute on the various evolutions of a fleet, when not in action with the enemy. Our nautical readers will find abundant information of this kind in the usual works on naval tactics, especially the Elements and Practice of Rigging, Seaman'ship, Naval Tactics, &c., of which the latest edition is in 4 vols 8vo.; and The System of Naval Tactics, with coloured figures, both published by Steel.

Having described and illustrated the principal evolutions which are performed by fleets or squadrons under ordinary circumstances, we are prepared to consider the nature and consequences of a naval engagement.

In forming a fleet for battle, it is proper to consider the size and number of the ships of which it is composed, and the distance at which they are to be placed with respect to each other. In the present system of naval warfare, it is generally deemed of advantage to have the ships that are to form the principal line as large as possible; for though large ships are not so easily and expeditiously worked as those of a smaller size, they are most serviceable during the action, both as carrying a greater weight of metal, and as being less exposed to material injury, either from the enemy's shot, or from the weather. In boarding too, a large ship must have greatly the superiority over a smaller, both from her greater height, and from the number of hands which she contains. With respect to the number of ships, it is of advantage that they be not too numerous, as if the line be too extensive, the signals from the centre are with difficulty observed.

In arranging a fleet in line of battle, it is proper to regulate the distance so that the ships shall be sufficiently near to support each other, but not so close as that a disabled ship may not readily be got out of the line without disturbing the rest of the fleet.

It has long been deemed a point of great consequence with the commander of a fleet to gain the weather gage, or to get to windward of the enemy, before coming to action. In deciding on the propriety of this, much will depend on the relative strength of each fleet, and on the state of the weather at the time. We shall state the advantages and disadvantages of the weather gage, as they are commonly laid down by writers on naval tactics, though we may observe by the way, that if a fleet be much superior to its opponent, it is seldom of consequence whether it engages to windward or to leeward.

A fleet to windward of the enemy is thought to possess the following advantages. It may approach the leeward fleet at pleasure, and can of course accelerate or delay the beginning of the engagement. If more numerous, it may send down a detachment on the rear of the enemy, and thus throw him into confusion. It may also readily send down firehips on the enemy's fleet, when thrown into confusion or disabled. It may board at any time, and is scarcely incommodeed by the smoke of the enemy. The reverse of these circumstances, of course, act against a leeward fleet.

The disadvantages of being to windward of the enemy respect chiefly the circumstances attending a retreat, should this be necessary. The windward fleet can seldom retire without passing through the enemy's line; and if in attempting to retreat, the windward ships tack together, those of the leeward fleet may do the same, rake the weather ships in stays, and follow them on the other tack, having now the advantage of the wind. In stormy weather, the windward ships can seldom open their lower deck ports, and the lee guns are not easily managed after firing. Again, any disabled ships cannot easily quit the line without disordering the rest of the fleet, and exposing either that or themselves to be raked by the enemy to leeward. A leeward fleet has the advantages of serving their lower deck guns in all weathers; of being able to retreat at pleasure; of drawing off without difficulty their disabled ships; of forming with more readiness the order of retreat; or of continuing the action as long as convenient; of having it in their power when superior in number, to double the enemy, and of cannonading with great effect the windward ships as they bear down for the attack.

As an engagement between two adverse ships is in some measure an epitome of an engagement between two fleets, we shall first briefly describe the former, as it takes place under ordinary circumstances, and shall then notice the usual manner of conducting a general engagement.

A naval engagement may be divided into three stages, the preparation, the action, and the repair. When an enemy's ship heaves in sight, and it is thought advisable to bring her to an engagement, orders are first given to clear for action, which is begun by the boatswain and his mates piping up the hammocks, in order to clear the space between decks, for the more easy management of the guns, as well as to afford the men on the quarter-deck, &c. a better protection against the enemy's shot, the hammocks being stowed in the nettings above the gunwale and bulwarks. After this, the boatswain's mates go to work to secure the yards, which is done by fastening them with strong chains or ropes in addition to those by which they are suspended. They likewise get ready such materials as may be necessary for repairing the rigging, if it should be cut away, or otherwise damaged by the enemy's shot. In the mean time the carpenter and his mates prepare shot plugs and mauls, to stop any dangerous shot holes that may be made in the hull near the surface of the water, and provide the necessary iron work for fitting the chain-pumps, if their machinery should be injured during the engagement; while the gunner and his mates, and the quarter gunners, examine the guns, to see that their charges are dry, and provide every thing that may be required for supplying the great guns and small arms with ammunition. The master and master's mates see that the sails are properly trimmed, according to the situation of the ship, and increase or reduce them as may be found necessary; and the lieutenants visit the different decks, to see that all is clear, and to take care that the inferior officers do their duty.

When the hostile ships have approached within a proper distance of each other, the drums beat to arms; the boatswain and his mates pipe all hands to quarters! All the men who are to manage the great guns repair immediately to their respective stations. The crows, handspikes, rammers, sponges, powder-horns, matches, and train tackles, are placed in order by the side of the guns: the hatches are immediately closed, to prevent seamen from getting below; the marines are drawn up on the quarter-deck, &c. the lashings of the guns are cast loose, and the tampions withdrawn. The whole artillery, above and below, is run out at the ports, and levelled to the point-blank range, ready for firing.

When these necessary preparations are completed, and the officers and crew ready at their respective stations, and when the two ships are sufficiently near each other, in a proper relative situation for the shot to take full effect, the action commences with a vigorous cannonade from the great guns, accompanied by the whole efforts of the swivels and small arms. The firing is seldom performed in volleys, as that would shake the ship too much, but the guns are loaded and fired one after another, with as much dispatch and as little confusion as possible, care being taken to fire only when each gun is properly directed to its object. During the firing, the lieutenants traverse the decks, to see that the battle is prosecuted with vivacity, and that the men do their duty, while the midshipmen second their injunctions, and give the necessary assistance where required, at the guns committed to their charge. The youngest of these inferior officers are generally employed to carry orders from the captain. The gunners are all this time employed in the magazines, filling cartridges, which are carried along the decks in boxes by the boys of the ship. When the action has continued so long, or has produced such an effect, that one of the ships must yield or retreat, if the vanquished ship cannot get off, she acknowledges her inferiority by striking, or hauling down her colours, when she is, as soon as possible, taken possession of by the victor, the commander of which sends a part of his own crew into the captured ship, and brings away most of her officers and men on board his own ship, as prisoners of war.

The engagement being concluded, they begin to re-repair pair; the guns are secured by their breechings and tackles, with all convenient expedition. Whatever sails have been rendered unserviceable are unbent, and the wounded masts and yards struck upon deck, to be filled or replaced by others. The standing rigging is knotted, and the running rigging spliced where necessary. Proper sails are bent in the room of those which have been displaced as useless. The carpenter and his mates are employed in repairing the breaches made in the ship's hull, by shot plugs, pieces of plank, and sheet lead. The gunner and his assistants are busied in replenishing the allotted number of charged cartridges, to supply the place of those which have been expanded, and in refitting whatever furniture of the guns may have been damaged by the action.

A general engagement between two adverse fleets of course involves a greater variety of circumstances, and requires greater judgment, and more comprehensive skill in the commanding officer.

When the commander of a fleet has discovered an enemy's fleet, his principal object, if he be sufficiently strong, is to bring it to action as soon as possible. Every inferior consideration gives way to this important object, and all necessary preparations are immediately made to prepare for such an event. The state of the wind and situation of the enemy will in general regulate his conduct with regard to the disposition of his ships on that occasion. To facilitate the execution of the admiral's orders, the whole fleet is disposed in three squadrons, and each of these clasped into three divisions, under the command of different officers. Before the action begins, the adverse fleets are drawn up in two lines, as formerly described. As soon as the admiral displays the signal for the line of battle, the several divisions separate from the columns in which they were disposed in the usual order in sailing, and every ship crowds sail to get into its station in the wake of the next ahead; and a proper distance from each other is regularly observed from the van to the rear. The admiral, however, occasionally contracts or extends his line, so as to regulate the length of his line by that of his adversary. This is more particularly necessary to prevent his being doubled, by which his van and rear would be thrown into disorder. When the hostile fleets approach each other, the courses are commonly hauled upon the brails, and the top-gallant sails and stay sails furled. The movement of each ship is regulated chiefly by the main and fore-top sails and the jib: the mizen-top sail being reserved to hasten or retard the course of the ship; and by filling or backing, hoisting or lowering it, to determine her velocity. The signal for a general engagement is usually displayed when the fleets are sufficiently near each other, to be within the range of point-blank shot, so that the guns may be levelled with some certainty of execution. After the battle has commenced, it is carried on much in the same manner as between two ships, except that each vessel vessel of the fleet, besides attending to her own movements, has to observe the signals made by the commanding officer, and repeated by the frigates on the van and rear. The chief object of the admiral is to keep his line as complete as possible, by ordering ships from those in reserve to supply the place of such as may have been disabled, and to annoy the enemy as much as possible, both by strengthening the feeble parts of his own line, and, if circumstances admit of it, by fending down fire-ships upon that of the enemy. When the engagement draws near a close, either by the defeat of the enemy, or by the disabled state of either fleet, signals are made from the admiral to take possession of such of the enemy's ships as have struck, to tow his own disabled ships into a place of security, and either to chase the remainder of the enemy's squadron, or, if that be impracticable, to draw off his own ships to be refitted.*

Such are the general incidents attending an engagement at sea, modified of course by numerous circumstances, of which a general description can convey no idea. There are, however, various movements and evolutions connected with a naval engagement, which it will be necessary for us to notice.

Where the weather-gage is deemed of sufficient importance, it is often an object with two fleets to dispute it with each other. When the enemy is to windward, and it is wished to gain the weather-gage of him, the fleet to leeward should avoid extending itself the length of the enemy's line, in order to oblige them to edge down upon theirs, if they intend to attack them; which will be a mean, if they still persist in doing so, of losing the advantage of the wind. It is impossible for a fleet to leeward to gain to windward, so long as the enemy keep the wind, unless a change happens in their favour; therefore all that a fleet to leeward can do must be to wait with patience for such a change, of which they will undoubtedly avail themselves, as well as of any inadvertency the enemy may commit in the mean time. And as long as the fleet to leeward does not extend its line the length of the enemy's, it will be impossible for the latter to bring them to action without running the hazard, by bearing down, of losing the advantage of the wind, which both fleets will be so desirous of preserving. That an admiral may take advantage of such shifts of wind as occasionally happen, he must endeavour to get his ships into such situations where these shifts most frequently take place. It is well known to experienced naval officers, that particular winds reign most on certain coasts, or off certain headlands. Here, therefore, the admiral should await the approach of the enemy; and though by this plan he may sometimes be unsuccessful, he will more frequently gain a material advantage. The disposition of projecting headlands, and the setting of tides and currents, often contribute materially towards gaining the wind of the enemy. The fleet to windward should keep that to leeward as much as possible abreast of it; and thus, unless the wind changes considerably, they will preserve the advantage they have gained. They should also force them to keep their wind, unless they think it prudent not to engage, in which case it would be better to keep altogether out of sight.

When the enemy appears desirous of avoiding an action, there are various methods of attempting to force him to engage; as first, when he has the weather gage. In this case the lee fleet, which is desirous of bringing on an engagement, must keep always on the same tack with the enemy to windward, taking care to keep their own ships so exactly abreast of the enemy, as to prevent losing sight of them; and hence be ready to take advantage of the first favourable shift of wind to make the attack. An alteration of the course may be best attempted in the night. The lee fleet must have frigates on the look-out, and these must continually give notice by signal of the manoeuvres and course of the retreating fleet to windward. Thus the weather fleet is always exposed to pursuit, without being able to get off unseen; hence must sooner or later be compelled to an engagement, unless they can get into some friendly port, or should be favoured by a gale of wind sufficient to disperse both fleets, and thus prevent the possibility of a general engagement.

Secondly, when the enemy is to leeward.—If the lee fleet keep close to the wind in the order of battle, the fleet to windward is to stand on in the same manner till it be abreast of the enemy, ship to ship, and at the same time to bear away, and steer so as to bring their respective opponents on the same point of the compass with themselves. Thus the adverse fleets will be sufficiently near each other to begin the action, by each ship's presenting her bow to the ship abreast of her in the order of failing, which may be easily changed for the order of battle, by all the ships hauling together close to the wind, in the moment which precedes the action. If the fleet to leeward appear inclined to engage, it may bring to, to prevent losing time, and after this they will fill as soon as the action commences, because it is of advantage to a lee line to be advancing a-head. As the lee fleet fills and stands in close by the wind, the weather line should keep a-brest, before it bears away, to come within the requisite distance, that the van ship of the weather fleet may always keep to windward of the leading ship of the lee line, and be guarded against any shift of wind a-head.

If the lee fleet bear away four points to move their order of battle on the other tack, and avoid the action, filling off in succession in the wake of the van ship, the weather line, by bearing away all together eight points, cannot fail, as both fleets are supposed to sail equally, to pass through the middle of their line, and force them to fight with disadvantage, if their extent be double the distance between the two fleets. If the extent of the fleet be less than the above limitation, then the weather fleet will divide the lee fleet more unequally; and if the distance between the fleets be considerable, the weather fleet will be able to break through the line. If the lee fleet bear away four points all together, being of equal extent with the fleet to windward, and their distance from each other equal to that of the length of one of the lines; should the weather fleet bear away at the same time eight points, they will approach very near the sternmost of the retreating fleet; but they will not have it in their power to cut off any part of that fleet, even with an equality of failing; so that the only advantage gained by this movement will be an ability of attacking the rear, and bringing it to action.

If the van ship and the rest of the weather fleet had a sufficient velocity to keep the centre ship of the lee line on the same point of bearing; in that case, the leading ship may break through the enemy's line about the middle ship of the centre division; for, supposing the fleets in the order of battle, on the starboard tack, fleering east, with the wind at south south-east, being at two leagues distance from each other, both the lines being four leagues in extent; then the lee line bearing away all together four points, will run north-east; while the fleet to windward, bearing away all together eight points, will fleer north; the van ship of which will keep the centre division of the lee line in the point of bearing north-west. As she is supposed to be able to continue in this position, it follows, that the van of the weather line must close the centre of the flying line to leeward, after having run four leagues. The time and distance necessary to cut off a retreating fleet may always be known according to the last supposition. If the lee fleet should get on the other tack, and run large, still in the order of battle, they will be sooner forced to action by the weather fleet, who have only to bear away eight or nine points on the same tack, or run right before the wind.

As in forcing a fleet to action, there are two principal cases in which a fleet may avoid an action, where circumstances are not sufficiently favourable; first, when the enemy is to windward, and secondly, when he is to leeward. In the former case the lee fleet should form the order of retreat, if the enemy are in view, and run on the same tack as their leading ship; but if he is still out of sight, and they have received intelligence of his approach, by their frigates on the look-out, they may bear away large, without confining themselves to keep the wind directly off, unless when in the order of retreat. In the second case, it seldom happens that the weather fleet can be forced to an engagement, because it can always stand on that tack which increases its distance from the enemy; that is, by standing on one tack while the enemy is on the other. The windward fleet must of course not keep too near the enemy, and take all possible means of avoiding being abreast of him.

It is often of advantage to double the enemy; that is, to bring a part of the fleet round upon his van or rear, so as to place him between two fires. This manoeuvre also resolves itself into two principal cases: first, when the enemy is to windward; secondly, when he is to leeward. In the first case, the lee fleet that attempts to double the enemy, should extend itself abreast of him, so that its van or rear may extend beyond his line, in order to overreach him, by tacking in succession, so that the extended part of the line may get up to windward. If this manoeuvre be properly executed, it will be impossible for the ships of the weather line long to maintain their stations, for no vessel closely attacked by two others of equal force can long resist.

It is of some consequence to determine whether the attempt to double should be made on the van or the rear of the enemy, as on the propriety of adopting the one or the other of these measures, may in a great measure depend the issue of the battle. In the present case, it is most easy to double the van of the enemy, because if they are engaged by the ships abreast of them, those which are advanced ahead will be able, by making all fail, to get in the perpendicular to the direction of the wind with the van of the enemy, and tack in succession to gain the wind of them on the other board, thus keeping them to leeward; and when they are come sufficient- ly to windward, they are again to go about, in order to keep the two headmost ships of the enemy's line continually under their fire. If there be two or three ships to tack in succession and gain the wind of the enemy, they may edge down on the van of the water line at pleasure, keeping themselves a little to windward of it; and as that van is already engaged by the other ships abreast on the other side, the must necessarily be soon disabled. If they bear away, they must drop upon the line with which they are engaged to leeward, while the ships to windward still continue to cannonade them. If they attempt going about, in order to attack more closely the ships to windward, they will be raked, while in flays, by their opponents to leeward and to windward, who enfolding them with whole broadsides, which they cannot return, must complete their disorder. If they make fail, in order to frustrate the design of the ships inclined to double, those with which they are engaged abreast to leeward have only to perform the same manœuvre, and keep them under their fire; while the others, after having harassed them as much as possible, will do their best to perform the same manœuvre on the succeeding ships.

If any of the ships in the van of the weather line are disabled in the masts or yards, they will drop astern, and run foul of the next succeeding ship, and these again on the next astern. Thus, the enemy's order of battle will be broken, while on the other hand the lee line is preserved; and those ships which have gained the wind of the enemy will, without engaging more ships than they can manage, contribute to increase the confusion.

When the enemy is to leeward, and the weather fleet attempts to double, the ships of the weather line must extend their van beyond that of the enemy, and then veer in order to bring the headmost ships of the lee line between two fires. It must not, however, be concealed, that it is much more dangerous to the ships engaged in this service to attempt doubling a fleet to leeward, than one to windward, as if disabled, or separated too far from their own fleet, they cannot so easily extricate themselves, and rejoin the fleet.

When one fleet attempts to double another, this latter will of course do all in their power to avoid the impending danger; and this they will the more readily do, according to their number, or their situation. If the fleet thus threatened be to windward, one of the methods proposed to avoid being doubled, is to extend the line towards the point threatened, so as to leave a greater space between the ships; but in doing this, there is a risk of having the line broken by the superior enemy. Another method suggested is, for the flag ships of the windward fleet to oppose themselves to those of the lee line, which is supposed to render several of the enemy's ships in the intervals of little use; but one great inconvenience of this manœuvre is, that it leaves the van and rear most exposed to the enemy's fire, and that the rear division in particular is in great danger of being doubled. To remedy these defects, the largest ships should be placed in the van and rear of each division, and the fleet must regulate its sailing in such a manner that its rear shall never be astern of the rear of the enemy.

When the enemy is to leeward, the weather fleet is to keep astern of the enemy, so that the van of the weather fleet, may be opposed to, and attack the enemy's centre. Hence the enemy's van will become useless for some time; and should it attempt to tack and double on the weather fleet, much time will be lost in performing that evolution; and it also runs the risk of being separated by the calm which often happens in the course of an engagement, occasioned by the discharge of the guns. A considerable interval might also be left between the centre and van, if necessary precautions be taken to prevent the van from being cut off.

There are several circumstances of importance to be considered in the subject of chasing, i.e. when one ship or fleet pursues another, called the chase, either to bring her or them to action, or to oblige them to surrender.

When a single ship chases another, it is to be presumed in general, that one of them is the better failer, though this is not always the case, and still by proper manoeuvring the chasing ship, or chaser, may gain on the chase. In the following observations, however, we shall suppose the chaser to fail faster than the chase. The manoeuvres of the chaser will depend on her being to windward or leeward of the chase.

When the chase is to windward, it is evident that as soon as she perceives a strange ship which she takes for an enemy, she will haul her wind, in order to prolong the chase, as otherwise her retreat would soon be cut off. The chaser then stands on also nearly close hauled, till she has the chase on her beam; then tacks, and stands on close hauled till the chase is again on her beam, and then retacks. In this manner she continues tacking every time she brings the chase perpendicular to her course on either board; and by thus manoeuvring, it is certain that the chaser will, by the superiority only of her sailing, join the other in the shortest time. For since the chaser tacks always as soon as the chase is perpendicular to her course, she is then at the shortest distance possible on that board; and since the chaser is supposed to be the fastest sailer, these shortest distances will decrease every time the chaser tacks. It is therefore of advantage to the chase to keep constantly on the same course, without losing her time in going about, as tacking cannot be so favourable to her as to her adversary, whose failing is superior. If the captain of the chaser should to little understand his profession as to stand on a long way, and tack in the wake of the chase, the best thing he can do is to heave in stays, and pass to windward of him on the other tack, except she should find herself likely gaining advantage by going large; for if the chaser persists in tacking in the wake of the other ship, the pursuit will be very much prolonged.

When the chase is to leeward, the chaser is to steer that course by which she thinks the will gain most on the chase. If, after having run a short time, the chase is found to draw more aft, the chaser should then bear away a little more; but if the chase draw a-head, the chaser should haul up a little, and thus the course may be so regulated that the chase may always bear on the same point, and then the chaser will get up with the chase in the shortest time possible; for if any other course were steered, the chaser would be either too far a-head or too far aftern, and hence the pursuit would be prolonged. The chase should run on that course which will carry her directly from the chaser, and should consider which is her best trim with respect to the wind, that she may move with the greatest possible rapidity from the chaser; for some ships have more advantage in going large, others with the wind right aft, and others when close hauled.

Another method has been proposed for chasing a ship to leeward, that is, by constantly steering directly for the chase: in this case, the track described by the chaser purist, is called the line or curve of pursuit. To illustrate this, let A (fig. 11. Plate DLXVIII.) represent the chaser, and B the chase directly to leeward of her, and running with less velocity than the pursuer, in the direction BC, perpendicular to that of the wind. Now, to construct this curve, let Bb be the distance run by the chase in any short interval of time; join Ab and make Ar equal the distance run by the chaser in the same time. Again, make bc, cd, de, ef, &c. each equal to Bb; join 1c, and make 1, 2 = Ar; join 2d, and make 2, 3 equal to Ar; proceed in like manner till the two distances carried forward meet as at C, and a curve described through the points A, 1, 2, 3, &c. will represent nearly the curve of pursuit; and the less the interval Ar is taken, the more accurately will the curve be formed. In this particular case, the length of the distance BC may be found as follows, provided the distance AB and the proportional velocities of the two ships be known.

Let the velocity of the chaser be denoted by a fraction, that of the chaser being unity. Multiply the given distance AB by this fraction, and divide the product by the complement of the square of the same fraction, and the quotient will be the distance run by the chase B. Suppose AB, the distance of the chase directly to leeward of the chaser, be taken at 12 miles, and suppose the velocity of the chase three-fourths of that of the chaser; what will be the distance run by the chase before she is overtaken? Now \( \frac{12 \times 4}{1 - \left( \frac{3}{4} \right)^2} = \frac{9}{\frac{7}{16}} = 9 \times \frac{16}{7} = 20 \frac{4}{7} \) miles; and since the velocity of the chaser to that of the chase is as 4 to 3, hence the distance run by the chaser will be \( 20 \frac{2}{7} \times \frac{3}{4} = 27 \frac{3}{7} \) miles. As the chaser alters her course at every point, and probably fails better with the wind in one direction with respect to her course than when the wind is in another direction, her velocity will be different at different points of the course. Thus, suppose her to fail faster when the wind is on the quarter, her velocity will constantly increase to a certain point, and will then diminish. Hence in real practice the curve of pursuit will not be exactly what is laid down in the above problem, and of course the measure of BC will differ a little from what we have there laid down. See RESISTANCE of Fluids and SEAMANSHIP.

If the whole fleet is to give chase, the admiral will in the case make the proper signal, and then each ship will instantly make all the sail possible. If the retreating fleet is not much inferior to the other, a few of the fastest failing vessels only are to be detached from the superior fleet, in order to pick up any stragglers, or those ships which may have fallen astern; and the remaining part of the fleet will keep in the same line or order of falling as the retreating fleet, so that they may, if possible, force them to action. But if the retreating fleet is much inferior, the admiral of the superior fleet will make the signal for a general chase, and then each ship will immediately crowd all the sail possible after the retreating fleet; or, if the chase be still less numerous, the admiral will detach one of the squadrons of his fleet, by hoisting the proper signal for that purpose, and he will follow with the remainder of the fleet. The squadron that chases, should be very careful not to engage too far in the chase, for fear of being overpowered; but at the same time to endeavour to satisfy themselves with regard to the object of their chase. They must pay great attention to the admiral's signals at all times; and in order to prevent separation, they should collect themselves before night, especially if there be any appearance of foggy weather coming on, and endeavour to join the fleet again. The ships are diligently to observe when the admiral makes the signal to give over chase; that each regarding the admiral's ship as a fixed point, is to work back into her station, to form the order of line again as quickly as the nature of the chase and the distance will permit.

When a fleet is obliged to run from an enemy who is in flight, it is usual to draw up the ships in that form or order, called the order of retreat; and the admiral, when hard pursued, without any probability of escaping, ought, if practicable, to run his ships ashore, rather than suffer them to be taken afloat, and thereby give additional strength to the enemy. In short, nothing should be neglected that may contribute to the preservation of his fleet, or prevent any part of it from falling into the hands of the conqueror.

We have now gone through the principal evolutions of fleets and squadrons, nearly as they are described in the Elements of rigging, seamanship, and naval tactics, and other approved publications on similar subjects. We have indeed omitted the method of forcing an enemy's line, and of avoiding being forced, because the former will be readily understood from what we have to add on the improved method of tactics of M. Grenier, and Mr Clerk of Eldin.

Various defects have been observed in the tactics usually employed at sea, especially in a line of battle, and in the mode of bringing an enemy to action. The usual order of battle first introduced by the duke of York, afterwards James II. of England, is defective from its length. Its great extent makes it difficult for the admiral to judge what orders are proper to be issued, to the ships stationed at the extremities, while his signals, however distinctly made, are liable to be mistaken by the commanders of these ships. Besides, the extremities of a long line, especially if it be to leeward, are necessarily defenceless, as the enemy may throw himself with a superior force on the van or rear, and cut either of these off before it can be properly supported by the other squadrons. Viscount de Grenier, who was, we believe, one of the first to notice these defects, proposed to remedy them by introducing a new order of battle.

The leading principles of De Grenier's tactics are founded on the following considerations. It is evident that each ship of a fleet must at all times occupy the centre of a certain horizon. This horizon De Grenier divides into two unequal parts, calling the greater the direct and graduated space, and the less, the indirect, crossed, and ungraded space. The reason of these appellations is, that on the greater segment of the horizontal circle there are 20 different points, which may be marked by degrees from one of the close-hauled lines to the other, and to which a ship may sail from the centre by so many direct courses without tacking; whereas from the other 12 points, including that from which the wind blows, she cannot arrive but by steering cross courses, which must necessarily delay her progress. Suppose now a fleet to leeward, so disposed that only a part of it can fight with another equally numerous, and ranged to windward in a single line, and let the lee fleet be ranged on three sides of a lozenge a b, c d, e f, (fig. 12.) The squadron a b, which is most to windward, being drawn up in line of battle, cannot be fought but by an equal number AB, CD, EF. All the rest of that fleet therefore must remain inactive, unless the ships which are not engaged should try to pass to leeward of the fleet a b, c d, e f. But should the ships of the weather fleet, which are placed between B and F i, bear away as they appear in the figure between C i and F i, the ships between A and B, which are fighting to windward, cannot bear away with them. Suppose now that the ships between C i and F i have passed to leeward, the squadrons c d, e f, which are ranged according to De Grenier's system, and have not yet been engaged, should come to windward and join with their friends a b against that squadron of the enemy AB which is still to windward and engaged; it is almost impossible but that the squadron AB must be destroyed by so great a superiority, before it could receive assistance from the ships to leeward between C i and F i.

De Grenier proposes only three orders of sailing, one His ord when a fleet is to pass a strait; a second when it fleers of fall in open sea, on the look-out for an enemy, or with a view to avoid him; and a third when on an extensive cruise disposed so that it cannot be easily surprised or broken. Of these three orders, only the second and third differ from the usual orders of sailing. The former of these is represented by fig. 1. Plate DLXIX. where the columns a b, c d, e f, are disposed on three sides of a regular lozenge, on the two close-hauled lines. The fig. 1. ships of the two divisions c d, e f, sometimes to wind- ward (as in fig. 2.) and sometimes to leeward (as in fig. 1.) of the third division a b, are to be formed on two parallels of one of the close-hauled lines in the wakes of their respective headmost ships; while the third division a b is to be ranged ahead or astern of the others on the other close-hauled line, steering chequer-wise the same course as the other divisions.

When a b is to windward of c d and e f (fig. 1.), De Grenier calls that the windward primitive order of sailing, and when to leeward (fig. 2.), the fleet is said to be in the leeward primitive order of sailing. These are the two principal positions in almost every case, and with very little variety, may become the order of battle, of chafing, &c.

His third order is illustrated by fig. 3. where the divisions a b and e f, are supposed at the distance of about fix leagues from each other; c d and e f resting on the extremities of the base of a triangle STV, while the centre ship of the division a b rests on its summit T; none of the divisions could be cut off by an enemy, however formidable, seen from its centre ship at the distance of fix leagues. For if, on the proper signal, the division a b should steer from T toward X, on the course opposite opposite to the close-hauled line it steered before, and the two divisions c d and e f steer from V and S towards X likewise, it is plain that each of these divisions would have only three leagues to run to join the other two, while the enemy which was first perceived at the distance of fix leagues, must run nine before he can come up with the nearest of these squadrons.

To form De Grenier's order of battle represented in fig. 4. and 5. it will be sufficient for the ships of the three divisions ranged in the windward primitive order and of sailing (see No. 90.) to heave in stays all together, and get on the other tack on the opposite line of bearing (fig. 4.); or for the ships in the leeward primitive order at once to haul the wind on the same tack as they steer; and they will find themselves in order of battle, fig. 5. When the two columns c d and e f, are to leeward of the third division a b, ranged in order of battle, this is called the natural order of battle, and when c d and e f are to windward of a b, this is the inverted order of battle. The former of these is calculated for a fleet combating to leeward, and the latter for a fleet which must fight to windward.

To explain the advantages of these dispositions, let us suppose the line AB, CD, EF, fig. 6. to represent an enemy's fleet to windward in the usual order of battle, on the close-hauled line, and on the starboard tack, and let a b be one of the divisions of a fleet disposed according to the now natural order, on the starboard tack, while the line c d, e f, represent the other two divisions standing on chequerwise on the same tack, but formed on the opposite close-hauled line. When the enemy comes to attack this latter fleet on a supposition that it is inferior to their own, their divisions AB and EF, in order to attack the ships a or b, must bear away. Now, to prevent the attack, each of the divisions c d, e f, must make the following evolutions according to their respective situations, and the manoeuvres of the enemy.

1. The ships of the division ab are to slacken as much as possible their headway, and form a very close line, till the enemy makes a movement to attack the headmost or sternmost ship of that division. 2. The ships of the division c d are to make sail till they come under the second or third ship of the rear of the line of battle a b, when they will take the same sail as the ships of that division, to preserve that position until the hostile ships make their evolution to attack the rear ships of that division. In this situation the ships of the division c d will be able to observe the maneuvers of the enemy, in order to change tack, and form themselves in order of battle on the opposite board as soon as the hostile ships shall have run over a certain space; because the ships of the division c d, steering afterwards close hauled in the wake of the sternmost ship of the division a b, will be able to cover the rear ships of that division, and get the weather-gage of the hostile divisions which are bearing away; rake their ships; run along side of them; double their rear-guard, and put it between two fires, if those hostile ships are following in the wake of each other; divide it, if they bear away chequerwise; or gain to windward, and put between two fires the enemy's division CD, while engaged with the division a b. 3. The division e f may abandon their port, and run chequerwise under a press of sail as soon as the enemy falls a-head of a b; that if the enemy's division AB attempts to fall on e f, or on the van of a b, they may, by going about,

steer in order of battle close hauled on the opposite line, and cover the ship a, double the hostile division CD a-head, or divide AB which is running chequerwise on the opposite tack.

Fig. 7. marks another method of manoeuvring by the Fig. 7. divisions c d, e f, when the enemy's ships are arranged in a single line not well formed.

Figs. 8. and 9. illustrate De Grenier's method of De Grenier's placing the admiral's ship, and the frigates and transports attached to a fleet. A, fig. 8. is the admiral bringing the placed a-head of the fleet, at a short distance from the admiral's headmost of the second division, and in the same direction of the wind as the headmost ship of the first division; gates and ff are two frigates observing the same rule and position with respect to the van ship of the third, and rear of the first division. When the fleet is in order of battle, as in fig. 9. the admiral's ship A is in the centre of the lozenge, and two of the frigates, ff, on the fourth side of the lozenge. The transports and store-ships, when the fleet is in order of sailing or convoy, occupy the space circumscribed by the lozenge, but in order of battle they are disposed in a line opposite to that of the enemy.

We cannot enter on a more minute or satisfactory account of this system; for a full exposition of which we must refer to the original work entitled L'Art de Guerre en Mer, ou Tactique Navale, &c. par M. le Viscount de Grenier, or the extracts from it contained in the Elements and Practice of Rigging and Seamanship.

We must now turn our attention to the improvements Mr Clerk's in tactics suggested by our countryman Mr Clerk — tactics. improvements which have received the approbation of several distinguished officers of the British navy, and to hints derived from which we are in a great measure indebted for some of the most signal victories which have heaped additional honour on the naval power of Britain.

Before entering on an explanation of Mr Clerk's tactics, we must briefly state his objections to the usual method of bringing ships to action, by the weather ship method of fleet steering directly down upon the enemy. By attack doing this, the enemy to leeward often has an opportunity of completely disabling the ships making the attack, as the former can use all their guns on one side, while the latter can only use their bow chases. Suppose B, fig. 10. Plate DLXIX. to represent a ship of 80 guns to windward, in sight of an enemy's ship of equal force F, to leeward. Now, if B bears down directly upon F, the latter, by lying to, as in fig. 11. will present a broadside of 40 guns, all bearing for a considerable time on B, while the latter coming down headwise, can only bring the two light guns of her forecastle to bear on F, not to mention that F, by lying broadside to, will have her masts and rigging little exposed to the enemy's shot, while B standing head on, is exposed to be raked by every shot from F, and in particular her rigging is in the utmost danger.

Instead of this objectionable mode of attack, Mr Clerk proposes that B having the wind, should run down astern as in the dotted line at fig. 12. till she gets into the course of F, near her wake, or in such a position as will bring her parallel to F's course, and within a proper distance, when she can run up close along side of F, and engage on equal terms; or, that she should shoot a-head, then veer, and run down on the weather bow of F, as in fig. 13. till she can force the chase to bear away to leeward, keeping close by her, on equal terms, taking care in both cases not to put it in the power of F to bring her broadside to bear on her without retaliation.

Fig. 14. is employed by Mr Clerk to illustrate the different procedure of a French and British man of war in firing, the former at the rigging, and the latter at the hull of the enemy, with their effects. Let F represent a large ship desirous of avoiding a close engagement, but lying to, to receive with advantage an enemy's ship B, of equal force. Suppose that F, by firing at the rigging of B, may have carried away some of the principal stays, several of the windward shrouds, a fore-topmast, or other rigging of less consequence, without having wounded a single man; and suppose a second ship comfort to F, receiving an enemy's ship like B, but firing only at her hull, so as to kill 30 or 40 men, without damaging her rigging. Now, when F and her comfort with to avoid a close engagement, it is evident that that ship B, which has lost part of her rigging, is much more disabled from coming to close action than her comfort whose rigging is entire, though she may have lost a great number of her men.

By the scheme at fig. 15. it is intended to illustrate the impossibility of one ship being exposed to the fire of many ships at one time. Let I, H, F, H, I, represent five ships in line of battle a-head, about a cable's length, or 240 yards asunder, and suppose the length of each ship to be 40 yards, so that the whole space between the head of one ship and the head of that next adjacent equals 280 yards. Let the perpendicular line FK, extending from the beam of F fix cables lengths or 1440 yards, be divided into six equal parts. It is evident that any ship stationed at E in the line FK, 720 yards distant, cannot long be exposed to the fire of more than the centre ship F of this squadron. For if we suppose that H and K a-head and a-stern of F, can bring their broadsides to bear on E; by putting themselves in positions for that purpose, they will not only disorder their own line, but one will leave her head and the other her stern exposed to a raking fire from the opposite ships BB in the enemy's line. If B can suffer little from the two ships H, H, at the distance of 720 yards, it is evident that she will suffer still less from these ships as she approaches nearer the enemy's line. Again, if instead of a cable's length asunder, we suppose the ships I, F, I, two cables length asunder, to bear on the ship B. It is evident from the figure that in this case B will not be more exposed to the fire of I and I at the distance of 1440 yards than she was to that of H and H at half that distance; and so in similar cases.

In explaining the principles on which we are to judge of the advantages or defects of different modes of bringing ships to action, Mr Clerk supposes a fleet of 10, 20, or more ships of 80 guns each, drawn up in line of battle to leeward, as at F, fig. 16. and lying to with an intention to avoid an action; while another fleet, as B, of equal number and force, also drawn up in line of battle, three or four miles to windward, wishes to make an attack, and come to close quarters on equal terms. The fleets being thus disposed, should the fleet at B attempt running down to attack the fleet at F, each ship standing head on to the opposite ship in the leeward line, it is to be expected, from what we have already stated, that the attacking ships will be disabled, at least in their rigging, before they can come to close action; but suppose that the commander of the weather fleet, though his ships have been disabled in their rigging during their course a.a.a to leeward, fig. 17. has made them bring to at a great distance, but sufficiently near to injure F. This latter fleet, which has been endeavouring to avoid an action, will now bear away with little injury to a new station, as G, and there remain out of the reach of B's shot, and this fleet must repair its rigging before it can make another attack.

Again, suppose that the fleet B, instead of standing head on, were to run down in an angular course, as at fig. 18. It is plain that if any ship in this angular line Fig. 11. should be crippled, her defect in failing will occasion a confusion of several of the other ships in that line. It may be said that the stoppage of one ship a-head will not necessarily produce a stoppage of every ship a-stern of her, because they may run to leeward of the disabled ship; but we must observe that by this time the ships a-head in the van A may be engaged, and consequently not having much head way, are nearly stationary, so that each ship a-stern, in attempting to bear down as at D, D, must be confined to a certain course, and must run the risk of being raked in coming down before the wind, and consequently of being disabled before coming up with the enemy.

Thirdly, the van of the fleet B having attained their station at A, a-breadth of the van of F, fig. 19. and having begun the action, the van ships of F, with a view to retreat, may throw in a broadside on the van of B, and then bear away in succession, as at H, followed by the rest of the fleet F, which, after exchanging broadsides with the van of B, may draw up in a new line two or three miles to leeward at I I, fig. 20.

Suppose again, for further illustration, that B, fig. 1. Plate DLXX. represents a fleet putting before the wind, each ship intending, when brought to at a determined distance at A, to take up her particular antagonists in the line of the enemy F to leeward; and let F be supposed at rest, without any motion a-head. It is easy to conceive that while the alternate ships of F's line, under cover of the smoke, withdraw from battle to GGG, the intermediate ships left behind them in the line will be sufficient to amuse even the whole of B's fleet, till the ships G shall form a new line HH as a support from the leeward. In such case B, after being disabled, and not having foreseen the manoeuvre, will neither be able to prevent the intermediate ships with which he is engaged from bearing away to join their friends, nor, were he able, would it be advisable to follow them, for the same manoeuvre with equal success can again and again be repeated.

To explain the relative motion of these two fleets, let F, fig. 2. represent a fleet of 12 ships in line of battle; a cable's length asunder, and suppose the length of each ship from the end of the jib-boom to the stern to be 36½ fathoms. The whole fleet will occupy a space of two English miles; and if it be supposed to sail in the direction FG, at the rate of four knots an hour, it will in an hour have moved to G, four miles from its former position.

Now, let there be an opposite fleet B, also 12 ships, situated four miles to windward, and let the point A be a quarter of a mile right to windward of the point G. Then, if B by bearing away in the direction BA, gain the the point A at the same time that the leeward fleet F has arrived at G, B will have moved nearly at the rate of 5½ miles an hour, and the angle contained between the direction of its line of bearing and its present course will be nearly four points.

Secondly, in fig. 3. if F, by carrying more sail, move at the rate of fix miles an hour, from F to G, then B, with a more slanting course, will have more difficulty in keeping the line a-breat while coming down to the attack, owing to the additional obstruction which will attend each succeeding ship in such a slanting course. Again, if the leeward fleet shall lie up one point higher, as FG, fig. 4. the rears of the two fleets will be removed to a much greater distance, and the van A must be sooner up with the enemy's van, and of course so much farther from support, while F bringing up his ships in succession, may disable the van of A, and afterwards bear away at pleasure with little injury, as at H. Now B being supposed disabled, and having his rear D dis- tracted, will be unable to prevent F from escaping.

From these considerations it appears that a fleet to windward, by extending its line of battle with a view to stop and attack the whole line of an enemy's fleet to leeward, must labour under considerable disadvantages, and will scarcely succeed in the attempt.

On these principles Mr Clerk explains the reason why, before the commencement of the present contest between Britain and France, the French fleets so repeatedly escaped from the British, without any serious defeat or loss, viz. by avoiding a general engagement, and disabling the British van as it bore down to attack them. He therefore recommends a different mode of attack from the windward, which we shall proceed to illustrate by proper diagrams.

Let F (fig. 5.) represent a fleet in line of battle, under easy sail, willing to avoid an action, but ready to receive an attack in the usual way, from another fleet B, three or four miles to windward, arranged in three columns. How shall B make the attack on F, so as, without aiming at the improbable advantage of taking or destroying the greater part of this fleet, they may secure three or four of the sternmost ships? Mr Clerk advises, that a sufficient strength be detached to secure these ships, while the admiral keeps aloof with the rest of his fleet, disposed as in the figure, ready to make the necessary observations and give the requisite support to the detached ships. If F continues to avoid an action by standing on in line, the detachment, coming into the position BA, will secure the three ships at I; and if the headmost ships of F were to tack, and be followed by the rest in succession as at fig. 6. not only the three ships at I will be left at the mercy of the ships detached from B, but two more, as G, will be exposed to an attack from another squadron of B at C. If all the ships of F tack together, as in fig. 7. the delay, and probably the confusion, consequent on this movement, will still more endanger the sternmost ships, or will bring on a general and close action. Again, if F attempts to haul off, beginning with his sternmost ship G, and then runs to leeward, as at fig. 8. he will expose his ships to a raking fire from B, and still endanger his sternmost ships by getting too far to leeward for their support; or if the headmost ships at H, fig. 9. veer first, to be followed by the rest after, the danger would be still greater. Thus it appears that in every assignable case, a fleet to leeward, avoiding an attack from an equal or superior windward, as here advised, by preserving the line, will risk the loss of three or more of their sternmost ships.

Now, let us suppose that F, while standing on a Fig. 10, 11. line on the larboard tack, when threatened with an at- tack on his rear from B, veers and passes on opposite tacks to leeward (see fig. 10.). The consequence of this will be, that his headmost ships will be forced to leeward by B, and compelled to engage under disadvan- tageous circumstances, and the disadvantage to F will be much the same, whether he again veers and re- sumes his former position, as at G, fig. 11. or stands on before the wind, as at P, fig. 12.

We have hitherto supposed that the wind has been fixed in one point; but let us suppose it to shift, and let us inquire what will be the effect of such a circum- stance on the two lines F and B. While the fleets are in the former position, F in line, and B in four divi- sions, B, B, B, A. steering E, with the wind at N, fig. 13. let the wind shift to the west. The only conse- quence of this will be, that F will be thrown still far- ther to leeward, to its greater disadvantage. But let the wind shift to E, so as to be a-beat, as in figs. 14. Figs. 14. and 15. Still if the admiral of B manages properly, and carefully watches the motions of F, this change will produce no advantage to the latter. For B has nothing to do but veer as the wind comes round, so as to bring his ships to windward of the three sternmost ships of F, and to leeward of the rest of his line, so as to cut off the three sternmost ships.

If the wind should be supposed to veer from point to point all round the compass, so that the fleet F, main- taining the weather-gage of B, shall make a circuit round B to leeward; still if B act cautiously, F will lose the three threatened ships.

Lastly, suppose the wind should instantly shift to a Fig. 16. point opposite to what it was at the commencement of the attack, as from N. to S. Before it can be ascer- tained whether such a change will be to the advantage or disadvantage of F, the relative situations of the two fleets must be considered. Suppose that the van and centre be separated at some distance from his rear, and that in consequence this fleet shall have taken such a position as is shown at fig. 16. Though in this case he Fig. 16. will have got to windward, his three ships can never be regained or preserved from the attack of B. The most favourable situation for F would be when the fleets were in the position denoted by fig. 13. as then he could not only support his three ships with advantage, but even threaten, and cut off a part of B's detachment. In attempting this, however, he incurs the risk of com- ing to a close engagement, which we have supposed him to be sedulously avoiding.

Besides this method of attack from the windward by From the detachments from the main fleet, Mr Clerk shows how a successful attack may be made by a fleet to leeward, by its breaking the enemy's line, and this either near the rear, near the centre, or not far from the van, of which cases the two former will be most likely to prove successful. The enemy's line can only be cut when the two hostile fleets veer on opposite tacks. The most simple method of effecting this is for the van ship of the attacking squadron, instead of ranging parallel to that of the enemy, and to leeward of him, to pass through the first interval that offers, followed by the rest of the line, which is thus led across that of the enemy. In consequence of this manoeuvre, the van of the leeward fleet will be to windward of the enemy's rear, and thus the attacking squadron will have its line entire, while that of its adversary is divided. Again, the ships of the rear division, having their progress obstructed, will probably crowd on each other, get into confusion, and be driven to leeward. We cannot detail the different cases mentioned by Mr Clerk; but for these and many other valuable suggestions on the subject of naval tactics, we must refer to his useful and ingenious Essay*.

The above is a very faint and meagre outline of Mr Clerk's tactics, but it is all which our limits enable us to give. It will afford general readers some idea of the nature of the proposed improvements, and professional men will naturally consult the original essay.

On these or similar principles is founded the method of breaking through the enemy's line, and thus cutting off a part of his fleet, so successfully adopted by the British admirals in the great naval actions that have distinguished the late and present wars with France. We cannot better illustrate the principles above laid down, than by giving a short detail of the last of these memorable engagements, the Battle of Trafalgar. With this we shall conclude our sketch of naval tactics, and our practical observations on the art of War.

After having been long blocked up in the harbour of Cadiz, the combined French and Spanish fleet effected their escape, while the British fleet, under the command of Lord Nelson, was at a considerable distance. On the 19th of October 1805, the ships which had been left to watch the motions of the enemy, communicated to the commander in chief the agreeable intelligence, that the combined fleet had put to sea, and was sailing with light winds in a westerly direction. Lord Nelson concluding that their destination must be the Mediterranean, immediately made all sail with his ships for the entrance of the straits. Here he was informed by Captain Blackwood, that the enemy had not yet passed the straits.

On the 21st of October, at daylight, Cape Trafalgar bearing east by south about seven leagues distant, the combined fleet was discovered about six or seven miles to the eastward. The wind was about west, and very light. As Lord Nelson had long expected to fall in with the enemy's fleet, he had concerted with his officers the best and most expeditious measures for bringing them to a speedy and decisive action. As soon, therefore, as they hove in sight, he immediately made the signal for the British fleet to bear up in two columns, as they formed in order of sailing. The combined fleet was drawn up in line of battle, with their heads to the northward, and had formed the line with great celerity and correctness. It consisted of 33 ships of the line, 18 French, and 15 Spanish, under Admiral Villeneuve, as commander in chief, who occupied the centre in the Bucentaure, while the Spanish admiral, Gravina, led the rear in the Prince of Asturias. The British fleet consisted of 27 ships, including three sixty-fours. Lord Nelson headed the van in the Victory, having under him the Temeraire, Neptune, Conqueror, Leviathan, Ajax, Orion, Agamemnon, Minotaur, Spartan, Britannia, Africa, with the Euryalus, Sirius, Phebe, and Naiad frigates, Pickle schooner, and Entrepreneure cutter; while the rear, consisting of the Royal Sovereign, Mars, Belleisle, Tonant, Bellerophon, Colossus, Achilles, Polyphemus, Revenge, Swiftsure, Defence, Thunderer, Defiance, Prince, and Dreadnought, was led by Vice-admiral Collingwood in the Royal Sovereign.

As the mode of attack adopted by the British was unusual, the combined fleet was obliged to draw up their line in a new manner. It formed a crescent, with its convexity to leeward, so that in leading down to their centre, the rear division of the British had both their van and rear abaft the beam. Before the action commenced, every alternate ship was about a cable's length to windward of her second ahead and astern, thus forming a kind of double line, and appearing, when on their beam, to leave a small interval between them without crowding their ships. The French and Spaniards were not formed in separate divisions, but intermixed without any apparent regard to order of national squadrons. As the British commander had previously communicated to his flag-officers and captains his preconcerted mode of attack, few signals were necessary, and none were made on approaching the enemy, except to direct close order as the lines bore down.

The action commenced at noon, by the leading ships of both columns breaking through the enemy's line, the Victory about the tenth ship from the van, and the Royal Sovereign about the twelfth from the rear; the succeeding ships breaking through in every part after of their leaders, and engaging the enemy at the very muzzles of their guns. By this manoeuvre the van of the enemy was unengaged, and thus the inferiority of the British, in point of number, was of less consequence, while the superior skill and bravery of British seamen soon acquired a decided advantage. The conflict was severe, as the enemy's ships were fought with a gallantry highly honourable to their commanders. The British attack, however, was irresistible. About three P.M. many of the enemy's ships had struck their colours, and their line had given way. Ten ships of the line, and the frigates, under Admiral Gravina, made their escape, and stood to leeward towards Cadiz. The five headmost ships of their van tacked, and, standing to the southward, to windward of the British line, were brought to action, and the sternmost of them taken. Nineteen ships of the line, with three flag-officers, including the commander in chief, remained in the hands of the British. Never was there a victory more glorious or more decisive; never was the pre-eminence of the British flag more triumphantly conspicuous.

The events subsequent to this memorable battle, and the losses sustained on either side, having little connection with the subject of the present article, need not be here detailed. They are fresh in the memory of our readers, and Britain still laments the loss of her immortal Nelson*. VENTILATOR.

PLATE DXLIV.

Fig. 1. Fig. 2. Fig. 3.

WAR.

PLATE DXLV.

PLAN OF THE POSITION OF AN ARMY FOR THE DEFENCE OF A RIVER.

I.

Scale of 1 League

100 400 600 800 Ft.

PLAN OF THE PASSAGE OF A RIVER

II.

The Enemy's Army Drawn Out in Order of Battle

Scale of 1 League

50 300 600 1200 Ft.

Engraved by W. & D. Lith. Edin. Fig. 1. Fig. 2. Fig. 3. Fig. 4. Fig. 5. Fig. 6. Fig. 7. Fig. 8. Fig. 9. Fig. 10. Fig. 11. Fig. 12. Fig. 13. Fig. 14. Fig. 15. Fig. 16. Fig. 17. Fig. 18. Fig. 19. Fig. 20. Fig. 21. Fig. 22. Fig. 23. Fig. 24. Fig. 25. Fig. 26. Fig. 27. Fig. 28. Fig. 29. Fig. 30. Fig. 31. Fig. 32. Fig. 33. Fig. 34. Fig. 35. Fig. 36. Fig. 37. Fig. 38. E. Mitchell Sculp. PLATE DXLVI.

PLAN OF THE POSITION OF AN ARMY IN ITS CAMP. PLATE DXLIII.

PLAN OF AN ENTRENCHED CAMP.

Scale of 1/2 a League


Fig. 1.

An Entrenched ARMY in the Neighbourhood of a TOWN.

An Entrenched CAMP with Imoundations in front.

PLATE DL.

Fig. 1. Fig. 2. Fig. 3. Fig. 4. Fig. 5. Fig. 6. Fig. 7. Fig. 8.

Engd by W. & D. Lizars Edin.

Fig. 1.

Fig. 2.

E. Mitchell sculp. Fig. 1.

Fig. 2.

Fig. 3.

Fig. 4. Fig. 1. Field of Battle

Fig. 2. River of the Enemy PLATE DLIY

W. Davis Sculpf.

PLATE DLV.

Fig. 1. Fig. 2. Fig. 4. Fig. 3. Fig. 6. Fig. 5. Fig. 7. Fig. 9. Fig. 11. Fig. 10. Fig. 8. Fig. 12. Fig. 15. Fig. 13. Fig. 14. Fig. 16. Fig. 17. Fig. 18. Fig. 19. Fig. 20. Fig. 21. Fig. 22.

W. Archibald sc.

PLATE DLVI.

PLAN OF THE CIRCUMVALLATION AND ATTACKS OF PHILIPSBURG in 1734.

PLAN OF PART OF THE CIRCUMVALLATION OF PHILIPSBURG IN 1732.

PARAPET

PROFILE OF Dº

DITCH WELL WELL WELL DITCH of the Counterscarp

Scale of the Plan

PLAN OF PART OF A LINE OF CIRCUMVALLATION OF ARRAS IN 1654.

PROFILE OF Dº

Scale of the Plan

Engraved by W.A. D. Leary, Edinburgh.

PLATE DLVII.

Side of the Town Line of Countervallation Camp Line of Circumvallation Scale of 100 Fathoms Plan of the Works of a Regular Fortification built upon level ground and within 200 Rods of the Coverd way. Scale of Fathoms Line of Communication of the Marches E. Mitchell fecit.

PLATE LVIII.

ATTACK OF FORTIFIED PLACES.

Fig.1. PROFILE OF THE TRENCHES.

Fig.2.

PROFILE OF A PLACE OF ARMS.

Fig.3.

PROFILE OF THE THIRD PLACE OF ARMS, WITH BANQUETTES TO PASS OVER ITS PARAPET.

Scale of Fig. 2..3..8 4.

Fig.5.

Fig.6.

Fig.7. PLAN OF A SAP.

4.Sapper 3.Sapper 2.Sapper 1.Sapper

Fig.8. PLAN OF A FINISHED SAP.

PLATE DLIX.

Fig. 1. Back of a sap.

Fig. 2. Profile representing the excavation of 4 Sappers.

Scale of Feet.

Fig. 3. Plan showing the disposition of the Batteries.

North & East

E. Mitchell sculp

Attack of Fortified Places.

PLATE DLX.

Profile of the direct Trench intersected according to the line AB.

Fig. 1. Trench Traverse.

Fig. 2. Scale of Fig. 2. Port of a Trench with its Traverse to prevent enveloping.

Fig. 3. Place of Arms of the Covert way.

A. Lodgement of the Covert way over the top of the glacis. B. Traverse.

Plan showing the disposition of the Lodgments and Batteries of the covert way.

Fig. 6.

PLATE DLXI.

ATTACK OF FORTIFIED PLACES.

Fig. 1.

Fig. 2.

Entrance into the descent of a dry Ditch viewed from the top of the Breech. Fig. 4.

Opening of the descent into the dry Ditch viewed from the Country. Fig. 3.

Fig. 5.

Port of the Ditch Covert Way Cavalier of the Trenches Fathoms 9 6 3 2 1

W. Archibald Roulpaix

Attack of Fortified Places. PLATE DLXII.

Fig. 1.

Fig. 2. Opening of the descent into a wet ditch viewed from the Glacis. Entrance into the descent of the wet ditch viewed from the Breach.

Fig. 3.

Fig. 4.

Fig. 5. Scale of Fathoms.

PLATE DLXIII.

ATTACK OF FORTIFIED PLACES

PLAN OF THE ATTACKS OF LANDAU IN 1713. Scale of Fathoms

MINES SPRUNG BY THE BRIGADE

Fig. 2.

Fig. 3.

Engraved by W. D. Lidzey, Edin. Fig. 1.

Fig. 2.

Fig. 3.

Fig. 4.

Fig. 5.

Fig. 6.

Fig. 7.

Fig. 8. Transports &c. Frigates & Frigatips Ships of the Line

Fig. 9.

Fig. 10.

W. Train Sculpt

PLATE DLXV.

Fig. 1. Fig. 2. Fig. 3. Fig. 4. Fig. 5. Fig. 6. Fig. 7.

W. Train Sculp*

PLATE DLXVI.

Fig. 1 Fig. 2 Fig. 3 Fig. 4 Fig. 5 Fig. 6 Fig. 7 Fig. 8 Fig. 9 Fig. 10

W Train Sculp!

PLATE DLXVII.

Fig. 1. Fig. 2. Fig. 3. Fig. 4. Fig. 5. Fig. 6. Fig. 7. Fig. 8. Fig. 9. Fig. 10. Fig. 11. Fig. 12. Fig. 13. Fig. 14.

W. Train Sculpt.

PLATE DLXVIII.

Fig. 1. Fig. 2. Fig. 4. Fig. 3. Fig. 5. Fig. 6. Fig. 7. Fig. 8. Fig. 9. Fig. 10. Fig. 11. Fig. 12.

W. Train Sculp. Fig. 3. WAR. PLATE DLXIX.

A Scale of 6 Leagues.

Fig. 4. Fig. 5. Fig. 6. Fig. 7. Fig. 8. Fig. 9. Fig. 10. Fig. 11. Fig. 12. Fig. 13. Fig. 14. Fig. 15. Fig. 16. Fig. 17. Fig. 18. Fig. 19. Fig. 20.

W. Yerain Sculpf.

PLATE DLXX.

Fig. 1. Fig. 2. Fig. 3. Fig. 4. Fig. 5. Fig. 6. Fig. 7. Fig. 8. Fig. 9. Fig. 10. Fig. 11. Fig. 12. Fig. 13. Fig. 14. Fig. 15. Fig. 16.

W. F. Cain Sculpt War Man-of-WAR Bird. See PELICANUS, ORNITHOLOGY Index.

WAR-Cry was formerly customary in the armies of most nations, when just upon the point of engaging. Sometimes they were only tumultuous shouts, or horrid yells, uttered with an intent to strike terror into their adversaries; such as is now used by the Indians in America, called the war-whoop.