in Ancient Geography, a town of Chamane, a district of Cappadocia, of unknown situation.—Another Zama, of Mefopotamia, on the Saocoras, to the south of Nisibis.—A third, of Numidia, distant five days journey to the west of Carthage: it was the other royal residence of the kings of Numidia, hence called Zama Regia. It flood in a plain; was stronger by art than nature; richly supplied with every necessary; and abounding in men, and every weapon both of defence and annoyance.

The last of these is remarkable for the decisive battle fought between the two greatest commanders in the world, Hannibal the Carthaginian and Scipio Africanus. Of this engagement, the most important perhaps that ever was fought, Mr Hooke gives the following account.

"Scipio drew up his army after the Roman manner, except that he placed the cohorts of the Principes directly behind those of the Hastati, so as to leave sufficient space for the enemy's elephants to pass through from front to rear. C. Laelius was posted on the left wing with the Italian horse, and Mafinissa with his Numidians on the right. The intervals of the first line Scipio filled up with his Velites, or light-armed troops, ordering them, upon a signal given, to begin the battle; and, in case they were repelled, or broke by the elephants, to run back through the lanes before mentioned, and continue on their flight till they were got behind the Triarii. Those that were wounded, or in danger of being overtaken, were to turn off to the right and left through the spaces between the lines, and that way escape to the rear.

"The army thus drawn up, Scipio went from rank to rank, urging his soldiers to consider the consequences of a defeat and the rewards of victory: on the one hand, certain death or slavery (for they had no town in Africa strong enough to protect them); on the other, not only a lasting superiority over Carthage, but the empire of the rest of the world.

"Hannibal ranged all his elephants, to the number of above 82, in one front. Behind these he placed his mercenaries, consisting of 12,000 men, Ligurians, Gauls, Baleares, and Mauritanians.

"The new levies of Carthaginians and other Africans, together with 4000 Macedonians, under a general named Sopater, composed the second line. And in the rear of all, at the distance of about a furlong, he posted his Italian troops, in whom he chiefly confided. The Carthaginian horse formed his right wing, the Numidians his left.

"He ordered their several leaders to exhort their troops not to be discouraged by their own weakness, but to place the hope of victory in him and his Italian army; and particularly directed the captains of the Carthaginians to represent to them what would be the fate of their wives and children if the event of this battle should not prove successful. The general himself, walking through the ranks of his Italian troops, called upon them to be mindful of the 17 campaigns in which they had been fellow-soldiers with him; and of that constant series of victories by which they had extinguished in the Romans all hope of ever being conquerors. He urged them to remember, above all, the battles of Trebia, Thrasymenus, and Cannae; with any of which the approaching battle was in no wise to be compared, either with respect to the bravery or the number of the enemy.

'The Romans were yet unfoiled, and in the height of their strength, when you first met them in the field; nevertheless you vanquished them. The soldiers now before us are either the children of the vanquished, or the remains of those whom you have often put to flight in Italy. Maintain therefore your general's glory and your own, and establish to yourselves the name of invincible, by which you are become famous throughout the world.'

"When the Numidians of the two armies had skirmished a while, Hannibal ordered the managers of the elephants to drive them upon the enemy. Some of the beasts, frightened at the noise of the trumpets and other instruments of war which sounded on all sides, immediately ran back amongst the Numidians of the Carthaginian left wing, and put them into confusion; which Mafinissa taking advantage of, entirely routed them. Great destruction was made of the Velites by the rest of the elephants, till these also being terrified, some of them ran through the void spaces of the Roman army which Scipio had left for that purpose; others falling in among the cavalry of the enemy's right wing, gave Laelius the same opportunity against the Carthaginian horse as had been given to Mafinissa against the Numidian, and of which the Roman did not fail to make the same use. After this the infantry of the foremost lines joined battle. Hannibal's mercenaries had the advantage in the beginning of the conflict; but the Roman Hafati, followed and encouraged by the Principes, who exhorted them to fight manfully, and showed themselves ready to assist them, bravely sustained the attack, and at length gained ground upon the enemy. The mercenaries not being reasonably supported by their second line, and therefore thinking themselves betrayed, they in their retreat fell furiously upon the Africans; so that these, the Hafati coming up, were obliged to fight for some time both against their own mercenaries and the enemy. When the two Carthaginian lines had ceased their mutual rage, they joined their strength; and though now but a mere throng of men, broke the Hafati; but then the Principes advancing to the assistance of the latter, restored the battle; and most of the Africans and mercenaries were here cut off. Hannibal did not advance to their relief, the Roman Triarii not having yet engaged, and the Principes being still in good order; and left the routed Africans and mercenaries should break the ranks of his Italian soldiers, he commanded these to present their spears at those who fled to them for protection, which obliged the runaways to move off to the right and left.

"The ground over which the Romans must march before they could attack Hannibal being firewood with heaps of dead bodies and weapons, and being slippery with blood, Scipio feared that the order of his battalions would be broke, should he pass it hastily. To avoid this mischief, he commanded the Hafati to give over the pursuit, and halt where they were, opposite to the enemy's centre: after which, having sent all his wounded to the rear, he advanced leisurely with the Principes and Triarii, and placed them on the wings of the Hafati. Then followed a sharp engagement, in which victory was long and eagerly disputed. It would seem that the Romans, though superior in number, were once upon the point of losing the day; for Polybius tells us, that Mafinissa and Laelius came very seasonably, and as if sent from heaven, to their assistance. These generals being returned from the pursuit of the cavalry, fell suddenly upon the rear of Hannibal's men, most of whom were cut off in their ranks; and of those that fled, very few escaped the horse, the country all around being a plain.

"There died of the Carthaginians in the fight above 20,000, and almost the like number were taken prisoners. The loss on the side of the Romans amounted to about 2000 men. Hannibal escaped with a few horse to Adrumentum, having performed everything in the engagement which could be expected from a great general. His army (says Polybius) could not have been more skilfully drawn up. For as the order of the Roman battalions makes it extremely difficult to break them, the Carthaginian wisely placed his elephants in the front, that they might put the enemy in confusion before the armies should engage. In his first line he placed the mercenaries; men bold and active, but not well well disciplined, that by their impetuosity he might give a check to the ardour of the Romans. The Africans and Carthaginians, whose courage he doubted, he posted in the middle between the mercenaries and his Italian soldiers, that they might be forced to fight, or at least that the Romans, by slaughtering them, might fatigue themselves and blunt their weapons. Last of all, he drew up the troops he had disciplined himself, and in whom he chiefly confided, at a good distance from the second line, that they might not be broken by the route of the Africans and mercenaries, and kept them in reserve for a vigorous attack upon a tired and weakened enemy."