Libertinus, among the Romans, a freedman, or a person set free from a legal servitude.

These still retained some mark of their ancient state: he who made a slave free having a right of patronage over the libertus: so that if the latter failed of showing due respect to his patron, he was restored to his servitude; and if the libertus died without children, his patron was his heir. See Slave.

In the beginning of the republic, libertinus denoted the son of a libertus or freedman; but afterwards, before the time of Cicero, and under the emperors, the terms libertus and libertinus, as Suetonius has remarked, were used as synonymous.

Liberty, denotes a state of freedom, in contrast to slavery or restraint; and may be considered as either natural or civil.

The absolute rights of man, considered as a free agent, endowed with discernment to know good from evil, and with power of choosing those measures which appear to him to be most desirable, are usually summed up in one general appellation, and denominated the natural liberty of mankind. This natural liberty consists properly in a power of acting as one thinks fit, without any restraint or control, unless by the law of nature; being a right inherent in us by birth, and one of the gifts of God to man at his creation, when he endued him with the faculty of free-will. But every man, when he enters into society, gives up a part of his natural liberty, as the price of so valuable a purchase; and, in consideration of receiving the advantages of mutual commerce, obliges himself to conform to those laws which the community has thought proper to establish. And this species of legal obedience and conformity is infinitely more desirable than that wild and savage liberty which is sacrificed to obtain it. For no man, that considers a moment, would wish to retain the absolute and uncontrolled power of doing whatever he pleases: the consequence of which is, that every other man would also have the same power; and then there would be no security to individuals in any of the enjoyments of life.

Political, therefore, or civil liberty, which is that of a member of society, is no other than natural liberty, so far restrained by human laws (and no farther) as is necessary and expedient for the general advantage of the public. Hence we may collect, that the law, which restrains a man from doing mischief to his fellow-citizens, though it diminishes the natural, increases the civil liberty of mankind: but every wanton and causeless restraint of the will of the subject, whether practised by a monarch, a nobility, or a popular assembly, is a degree of tyranny. Nay, that even laws themselves, whether made with or without our consent, if they regulate and constrain our conduct in matters of mere indifference, without any good end in view, are laws destructive of liberty: whereas, if any public advantage can arise from observing such precepts, the control of our private inclinations, in one or two particular points, will conduces to preserve our general freedom in others of more importance, by supporting that state of society which alone can secure our independence. Thus the statute of King Edward IV. which forbade the fine gentlemen of those times (under the degree of a lord) to wear pikes upon their shoes or boots of more than two inches in length, was a law that savoured of oppression; because, however ridiculous the fashion then in use might appear, the restraining it by pecuniary penalties could serve no purpose of common utility. But the statute of King Charles II. which prescribes a thing seemingly as indifferent, viz. a dress for the dead, who were all ordered to be buried in woollen, is a law consistent with public liberty; for it encourages the staple trade, on which in great measure depends the universal good of the nation. So that laws, when prudently framed, are by no means subversive, but rather introductive, of liberty; for (as Mr Locke has well observed) where there is no law there Liberty, there is no freedom. But then, on the other hand, that constitution or frame of government, that system of laws, is alone calculated to maintain civil liberty, which leaves the subject entire master of his own conduct, except in those points wherein the public good requires some direction or restraint.

The idea and practice of this political or civil liberty, flourish in their highest vigour in these kingdoms, where it falls little short of perfection, and can only be lost or destroyed by the folly or demerits of its owner; the legislature, and of course the laws of Britain, being peculiarly adapted to the preservation of this inestimable blessing even in the meanest subject. Very different from the modern constitutions of other states on the continent of Europe, and from the genius of the imperial law; which in general are calculated to vest an arbitrary and despotic power, of controlling the actions of the subject, in the prince, or in a few grantees. And this spirit of liberty is so deeply implanted in our constitution, and rooted even in our very soil, that a slave or a negro, the moment he lands in Britain, falls under the protection of the laws, and so far becomes a freeman; though his master's right to his service may possibly still continue.

The absolute rights of every Briton (which, taken in a political and extensive sense, are usually called their liberties), as they are founded on nature and reason, so they are coeval with our form of government; though subject at times to fluctuate and change, their establishment (excellent as it is) being still human. At some times we have seen them depressed by overbearing and tyrannical princes; at others, so luxuriant as even to tend to anarchy, a worse state than tyranny itself, as any government is better than none at all. But the vigour of our free constitution has always delivered the nation from these embarrassments; and, as soon as the convulsions consequent on the struggle have been over, the balance of our rights and liberties has settled to its proper level; and their fundamental articles have been from time to time asserted in parliament, as often as they were thought to be in danger:

First, By the great charter of liberties, which was obtained, sword in hand, from King John, and afterwards, with some alterations, confirmed in parliament by King Henry III. his son. Which charter contained very few new grants; but, as Sir Edward Coke observes, was for the most part declaratory of the principal grounds of the fundamental laws of England. Afterwards, by the statute called confirmatio chartarum, whereby the great charter is directed to be allowed as the common law; all judgments contrary to it are declared void; copies of it are ordered to be sent to all cathedral churches, and read twice a-year to the people; and sentence of excommunication is directed to be as constantly denounced against all those that by word, deed, or counsel, act contrary thereto, or in any degree infringe it. Next, By a multitude of subsequent corroborating statutes (Sir Edward Coke reckons 32), from the first Edward to Henry IV. Then, after a long interval, by the petition of right; which was a parliamentary declaration of the liberties of the people, assented to by King Charles I. in the beginning of his reign. Which was closely followed by the still more ample concessions made by that unhappy prince to his parliament, before the fatal rupture between them; and by the many salutary laws, particularly the habeas corpus act, passed under Charles II. To these succeeded the bill of rights, or declaration delivered by the lords and commons to the prince and princess of Orange, 13th February 1688; and afterwards enacted in parliament, when they became king and queen: which declaration concludes in these remarkable words; "and they do claim, demand, and insist upon, all and singular the premises, as their undoubted rights and liberties." And the act of parliament itself recognises "all and singular the rights and liberties asserted and claimed in the said declaration to be the true, ancient, and indubitable rights of the people of this kingdom."

Lastly, These liberties were again asserted at the commencement of the last century, in the act of settlement, whereby the crown was limited to his present majesty's illustrious house; and some new provisions were added, at the same fortunate era, for better securing our religion, laws, and liberties; which the statute declares to be "the birthright of the people of England," according to the ancient doctrine of the common law.

Thus much for the declaration of our rights and liberties. The rights themselves, thus defined by these several statutes, consist in a number of private immunities; which will appear, from what has been promised, to be indeed no other, than either that residuum of natural liberty, which is not required by the laws of society to be sacrificed to public convenience; or else those civil privileges, which society hath engaged to provide, in lieu of the natural liberties so given up by individuals. These therefore were formerly, either by inheritance or purchase, the rights of all mankind; but, in most other countries of the world, being now more or less debased and destroyed, they at present may be said to remain, in a peculiar and emphatical manner, the rights of the people of Britain. And these may be reduced to three principal or primary articles; the right of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and the right of private property: because, as there is no other known method of compulsion, or of abridging man's natural free-will, but by an infringement or diminution of one or other of these important rights, the preservation of these inviolate may justly be said to include the preservation of our civil immunities in their largest and most extensive sense. See the article RIGHTS.

In vain, however, would these rights be declared, ascertained, and protected by the dead letter of the laws, if the constitution had provided no other method to secure their actual enjoyment. It has therefore established certain other auxiliary subordinate rights of the subject, which serve principally as barriers to protect and maintain inviolate the three great and primary rights, of personal security, personal liberty, and private property. These are,

1. The constitution, powers, and privileges of parliament; for which see PARLIAMENT.

2. The limitation of the king's prerogative, by bounds so certain and notorious, that it is impossible he should exceed them without the consent of the people; as to which, see PREROGATIVE. The former of these keeps the legislative power in due health and vigour, so as to make it improbable that laws should be Liberty, be enacted destructive of general liberty: the latter is a guard upon the executive power, by restraining it from acting either beyond or in contradiction to the laws that are framed and established by the other.

3. A third subordinate right of every Briton is that of applying to the courts of justice for redress of injuries. Since the law is, in this realm, the supreme arbiter of every man's life, liberty, and property, courts of justice must at all times be open to the subject, and the law be duly administered therein. The emphatical words of magna charta, spoken in the person of the king, who in judgment of law (says Sir Edward Coke) is ever present and repeating them in all his courts, are these: *Nulli vendemus, nulli negabimus, aut differemus rectum vel justitiam*; "and therefore every subject (continues the same learned author), for injury done to him in bonis, in terris, vel persona, by any other subject, be he ecclesiastical or temporal, without any exception, may take his remedy by the course of the law, and have justice and right for the injury done to him, freely without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without delay." It were endless to enumerate all the affirmative acts of parliament, where-in justice is directed to be done according to the law of the land: and what the law is, every subject knows, or may know if he pleases: for it depends not upon the arbitrary will of any judge; but is permanent, fixed, and unchangeable, unless by authority of parliament. We shall however just mention a few negative statutes, whereby abuses, preversions, or delays of justice, especially by the prerogative, are restrained. It is ordained by magna charta, that no freeman shall be outlawed, that is, put out of the protection and benefit of the laws, but according to the law of the land. By 2 Edw. III. c. 8. and 11 Ric. II. c. 10. it is enacted, that no commands or letters shall be sent under the great seal, or the little seal, the signet or privy seal, in disturbance of the law; or to disturb or delay common right: and, though such commandments should come, the judges shall not cease to do right; which is also made a part of their oath by statute 18 Edw. III. stat. 4. And by 1 W. and M. st. 2. c. 2. it is declared, that the pretended power of suspending or dispensing with laws, or the execution of laws, by regal authority without consent of parliament, is illegal.

Not only the substantial part, or judicial decisions, of the law, but also the formal part, or method of proceeding, cannot be altered but by parliament: for, if once those outworks were demolished, there would be an inlet to all manner of innovation in the body of the law itself. The king, it is true, may erect new courts of justice: but then they must proceed according to the old established forms of the common law. For which reason it is declared in the statute 16 Car. I. c. 10. upon the dissolution of the court of star-chamber, that neither his majesty, nor his privy-council, have any jurisdiction, power, or authority, by English bill, petition, articles, libel, (which were the course of proceeding in the star-chamber, borrowed from the civil law), or by any other arbitrary way whatsoever, to examine, or draw into question, determine, or dispose of the lands or goods of any subjects of this kingdom; but that the same ought to be tried and deter-

mined in the ordinary courts of justice, and by course of law.

4. If there should happen any uncommon injury, or infringement of the rights before mentioned, which the ordinary course of law is too defective to reach, there still remains a fourth subordinate right, appertaining to every individual, namely, the right of petitioning the king, or either house of parliament, for the redress of grievances. In Russia we are told that the czar Peter established a law, that no subject might petition the throne till he had first petitioned two different ministers of state. In case he obtained justice from neither, he might then present a third petition to the prince; but upon pain of death, if found to be in the wrong. The consequence of which was, that no one dared to offer such third petition; and grievances seldom falling under the notice of the sovereign, he had little opportunity to redress them. The restrictions, for some there are, which are laid upon petitioning in Britain, are of a nature extremely different; and while they promote the spirit of peace, they are no check upon that of liberty. Care only must be taken, lest, under the pretence of petitioning, the subject be guilty of any riot or tumult; as happened in the opening of the memorable parliament in 1640; and, to prevent this, it is provided by the statute 13 Car. II. st. 1. c. 5. that no petition to the king, or either house of parliament, for any alteration in church or state, shall be signed by above 20 persons, unless the matter thereof be approved by three justices of the peace, or the major part of the grand-jury, in the country; and in London, by the lord mayor, aldermen, and common-council; nor shall any petition be presented by more than ten persons at a time. But, under these regulations, it is declared by the statute 1 W. and M. st. 2. c. 2. that the subject hath a right to petition; and that all commitments and prosecutions for such petitioning are illegal.

5. The fifth and last auxiliary right of the subject, that we shall at present mention, is that of having arms for their defence, suitable to their condition and degree, and such as are allowed by law. Which is also declared by the same statute 1 W. and M. st. 2. c. 2. and is indeed a public allowance, under due restrictions, of the natural right of resistance and self-preservation, when the sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression.

In these several articles consist the rights, or, as they are frequently termed, the liberties of Britons: liberties more generally talked of than thoroughly understood; and yet highly necessary to be perfectly known and considered by every man of rank or property, lest his ignorance of the points wherein they are founded should hurry him into faction and licentiousness on the one hand, or a pusillanimous indifference and criminal submission on the other. And we have seen that these rights consist, primarily, in the free enjoyment of personal security, of personal liberty, and of private property. So long as these remain inviolate, the subject is perfectly free; for every species of compulsive tyranny and oppression must act in opposition to one or other of these rights, having no other object upon which it can possibly be employed. Liberty. To preserve these from violation, it is necessary that the constitution of parliaments be supported in its full vigour; and limits, certainly known, be set to the royal prerogative. And, lastly, To vindicate these rights, when actually violated or attacked, the subjects of Britain are entitled, in the first place, to the regular administration and free course of justice in the courts of law; next, to the right of petitioning the king and parliament for redress of grievances; and, lastly, to the right of having and using arms for self-preservation and defence. And all these rights and liberties it is our birthright to enjoy entire; unless where the laws of our country have laid them under necessary restraints: Restraints in themselves so gentle and moderate, as will appear upon farther inquiry, that no man of sense or probity would wish to see them slackened. For all of us have it in our choice to do everything that a good man would desire to do; and are restrained from nothing, but what would be pernicious either to ourselves or our fellow-citizens. So that this review of our situation may fully justify the observations of a learned French author, who indeed generally both thought and wrote in the spirit of genuine freedom; and who hath not scrupled to profess, even in the very bosom of his native country, that the British is the only nation in the world where political or civil liberty is the direct end of its constitution. Recommending, therefore, to the student in our laws a farther and more accurate search into this extensive and important title, we shall close our remarks upon it with the expiring wish of the famous Father Paul to his country, "ESTO PERPETUA!"

Liberty and Necessity. See Metaphysics.

Liberty of the Press. The art of printing, soon after its introduction, was looked upon in England, as well as in other countries, as merely a matter of state, and subject to the coercion of the crown. It was therefore regulated with us by the king's proclamations, prohibitions, charters of privilege and license, and finally by the decrees of the court of star-chamber, which limited the number of printers, and of presses which each should employ, and prohibited new publications unless previously approved by proper licensers. On the demolition of this odious jurisdiction in 1647, the long parliament of Charles I. after their rupture with that prince, assumed the same powers as the star-chamber had exercised with respect to the licensing of books: and in 1643, 1647, 1649, and 1652 (Soc. Bell. i. 44, 134, ii. 88, 230.) issued their ordinances for that purpose, founded principally on the star-chamber decree of 1637. In 1662 was passed the statute 13 and 14 Car. II. c. 33. which, with some few alterations, was copied from the parliamentary ordinances. This act expired in 1679; but was revived by statute 1 Jac. II. c. 17. and continued till 1692. It was then continued for two years longer by statute 4 W. and M. c. 24. but though frequent attempts were made by the government to revive it in the subsequent part of that reign, (Com. Journ. 11 Feb. 1694, 26 Nov. 1695, 22 Oct. 1696, 9 Feb. 1697, 31 Jan. 1698,) yet the parliament resisted it so strongly, that it finally expired, and the press became properly free in 1694, and has continued so ever since.

The liberty of the press, however, so essential to the nature of a free state, consists not in freedom from censure for any criminal matter that may be published, but in laying no previous restraints upon publications. Every freeman has undoubtedly a right to lay what sentiment he pleases before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press: but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must take the consequence of his own temerity. To subject the press to the restrictive power of a licenser in the manner above mentioned, is to subject all freedom of sentiment to the prejudices of one man, and make him the arbitrary and infallible judge of all controverted points in learning, religion, and government. But to punish (as the law does at present) any dangerous or offensive writings which, when published, shall, on a fair and impartial trial, be adjudged of a pernicious tendency, is necessary for the preservation of peace and good order, of government and religion, the only solid foundations of civil liberty. Thus the will of individuals is still left free; the abuse only of that free will is the object of legal punishment. Neither is any restraint hereby laid upon freedom of thought or inquiry; liberty of private sentiment is still left; the disseminating or making public of bad sentiments, destructive of the ends of society, is the crime which society corrects. A man (says a fine writer on this subject) may be allowed to keep poisons in his closet, but not publicly to vend them as cordials. And to this we may add, that the only plausible argument heretofore used for restraining the just freedom of the press, "that it was necessary to prevent the daily abuse of it," will entirely lose its force, when it is shown (by a seasonable exertion of the laws) that the press cannot be abused to any bad purpose without incurring a suitable punishment: whereas it can never be used to any good one when under the control of an inspector. So true will it be found, that to ensure the licentiousness, is to maintain the liberty of the press.