an individual substance of a rational intelligent nature. Thus we say, an ambassador represents the person of his prince; and that, in law, the father and son are reputed the same person.
The word person, persona, is thought to be borrowed from personando, from personating or counterfeiting; and is supposed to have first signified a mask: because, as Boethius informs us, in larva concava somnum volatior; and hence the actors who appeared masked on the stage were sometimes called larvati and sometimes personati. He likewise says, that as the several actors represented each a single individual person, viz. Oedipus, or Cremeres, or Hecuba, or Medea; for this reason, other people, who were at the same time distinguished by something in their form, character, &c. whereby they might be known, came likewise to be called by the Latins persona, and by the Greeks προσωπα. Again, as actors rarely represented any but great and illustrious characters, the word came at length to import the mind, as being that whose dispositions constitute the character. And thus men, angels, and even God himself, were called persons. Things merely corporeal, as a stone, a plant, or a horse, were called hypostases or supposita, but never persons. Hence the learned suppose, that the same name person came to be used to signify some dignity, whereby a person is distinguished from another; as a father, husband, judge, magistrate, &c. In this sense we are to understand that of Cicero: "Cæsar never speaks of Pompey, but in terms of honour and respect: he does many hard and injurious things, however, against his person."
Person we have already defined to mean an individual substance of a reasonable nature. Now a thing may be individual two ways: 1. Logically, because it cannot be predicated of any other; as Cicero, Plato, &c. 2. Physically; in which sense a drop of water, separated from the ocean, may be called an individual. Person is an individual nature in each of these senses; logically, according to Boethius, because person is not spoken of universals, but only of singulars and individuals; we do not say the person of an animal or a man, but of Cicero and Plato; and physically, since Socrates's hand or foot are never considered as persons. This last kind of individual is denominated two ways: positively, when the person is said to be the whole principle of acting; for whatever thing action is attributed, that the philosophers call a person; and negatively, as when we say, with the Thomists, &c. that a person consists in this, that it does not exist in another as a more perfect being. Thus a man, though he consists of two different things, viz. body and spirit, is not two persons; because neither part of itself is a complete principle of action, but one person, since the manner of his consisting of body and spirit is such as constitutes one whole principle of action; nor does he exist in any other as a more perfect being; as, for example, Socrates's foot does in Socrates, or a drop of water in the ocean.
Grammar, a term applied to such nouns or pronouns as, being either prefixed or understood, are the nominatives in all inflections of a verb; or it is the agent or patient in all finite or personal verbs. See Grammar.
Personal, any thing that concerns, or is restrained to, the person: thus it is a maxim in ethics, that all faults are personal.
Personal Action, in Law, is an action levied directly and solely against the person, in opposition to a real or mixed action. See Action.
Personal Goods, or Chattels, in Law, signifies any moveable thing belonging to a person, whether alive or dead. See Chattels.
Personal Identity. See Metaphysics, Part III. Chap. iii.
Personal Verb, in Grammar, a verb conjugated in all the three persons; thus called in opposition to an impersonal verb, or that which has the third person only.
Vol. XVI. Part I.