eans credit, honour, or the character of good; and since we are destined to live in society, is necessary and useful more or less to every human being. There is no man, except one who is overgrown with pride and self-conceit, or whose actions are bad, but pays attention to his reputation, and wishes to possess the good opinion of his neighbours or the world. The love of reputation and of fame are most powerful springs of action; but though they proceed from the same principle, the means of attaining them, and the effects of them, are not altogether the same.

Many means indeed serve equally to support the reputation, and to increase the fame, differing only in degrees; others, however, belong peculiarly either to the one or to the other. An honest reputation is within the reach of the bulk of mankind; it is obtained by the social virtues and the constant practice of the common duties of life. This kind of reputation indeed is neither extensive nor brilliant, but it is often the most useful in point of happiness. Wit, talents, and genius, are the necessary requisites for fame; but those advantages are perhaps less real in their consequence than those arising from a good reputation. What is of real use costs little; things rare and splendid require the greatest labour to procure, and yield perhaps a more ideal happiness.

Fame can be possessed, comparatively speaking, but by few individuals; as it requires either very superior abilities, supported by great efforts, or very fortunate circumstances. It is constituted by the applause of mankind, or at least by that of a single nation; whilst reputation is of much less extent, and arises from different circumstances. That reputation which is founded on deceit and artifice is never solid; and the most honourable will always be found to be the most useful. Everyone may safely, and indeed ought to, aspire to the consideration and praise due to his condition and merit; but he who aspires to more, or who seeks it by dishonest means, will at length meet with contempt.