Historical Sketch of the Corn Laws.
It has been the fault of all governments, in every age of the world, to interfere too much with the affairs of their subjects. The idea that certain branches of commerce were particularly advantageous to society, though they might be ruinous to an individual who should attempt to carry them on; and that other branches, which might be profitable to individuals, were not unfrequently inconsistent with the general advantage, has been almost universally prevalent. On a first view, this opinion, though essentially erroneous, seems sufficiently plausible. Many of the pursuits of individuals apparently conduce very little, and may sometimes even seem hostile, to the interest of the whole; and hence we are naturally enough led to infer, that the general advantage would be best consulted by prohibiting such pursuits or employments. In nothing, however, has this notion of the propriety of restricting and directing the operations of industry and the investment of capital been so apparent, as in the regulations framed respecting the trade in corn. This, indeed, is only what might have been expected. To secure an adequate supply of food, and to avoid the pressure of famine and scarcity, must always be an object of the first importance with the legislators of every country; and while the efficacy of the restrictive system is unquestioned, it is here it will be chiefly called into action.
But, when legislators abandon the principle of free competition, and imagine they can factitiously give a more advantageous direction to the national industry, their accustomed habits, and their situation in life, will have a very powerful effect in determining the nature of the regulations they adopt. Agriculturists raise corn for sale as well as for their domestic consumption; and as it is natural that landlords and farmers should endeavour to obtain a high price for their produce, where their voice predominates in the legislature of a country placed under the restrictive system, it is but reasonable to presume, that the regulations respecting the corn trade will be framed rather with a design to enhance than to lower its price. Whether they have had that effect is an entirely different, and often a very delicate inquiry; but unless there is pretty explicit evidence to the contrary, it is not easy to imagine, that agriculturists, or those supported by agriculture, would give their consent to any law which they conceived had for its object to lower the exchangeable value of agricultural produce. On the other hand, where the legislature of a country is either principally composed of merchants, manufacturers, or of capitalists depending on the profits of stock, as was formerly the case in Holland; or, where the legislature is chiefly influenced by them, it is nearly certain it will not intentionally adopt any measure which may have for its object to raise the value of the produce of the farmer. When the value of agricultural produce is low, a manufacturer will be able to exchange his commodities for a comparatively larger quantity than he could possibly do after its value had been enhanced by legislative enactments. How then is it to be expected he should ever consent to any measure, if he judged it had the least tendency to raise prices?
Throughout the principal Continental States, the regulations affecting the corn trade have been framed chiefly with a view to keep down the price of corn. This fact, however, is perfectly consistent with the principles we have just laid down. After the feudal system had lost its energy, and after the power of the great barons had been weakened by the rise of cities, and the consolidation of the royal authority, monarchs were enabled to take such measures as appeared best calculated to benefit the lower classes of their subjects, which it was then their object to exalt, by reducing the exchangeable value of raw produce. Of these measures, none seems more natural, nor better calculated to effect its object, than the imposing of restrictions on exportation. If a nation raises more corn than is required for its home consumption, the first consequence of a prohibition against its export will undoubtedly be to lower its value. It is certain, indeed, that this effect will very soon cease; but, in early ages, men seldom attend to prospective considerations, and it is not a very easy matter, even now, to convince the bulk of mankind, that the granting liberty to send abroad the necessaries of life really lowers their price in the home market. To be able satisfactorily to demonstrate this principle, requires a considerable acquaintance with political economy,—a science altogether unknown, when the laws regulating the corn trade were first framed in the European commonwealth. With a view still farther to reduce the price of corn, a perfect freedom of importation was very generally allowed; and, in periods of scarcity, bounties, or premiums, over and above the market price, were sometimes given by the state to the importer.
In this country, an opposite course has been pursued. The progress of society and government has been such, that the Lords and Commons, the first depending entirely, and the latter principally, on agriculture, have attained great power and influence; and we cannot be surprised at their having generally exerted it to increase, not to lower, the price of corn.
Restrictions on exportation, without being in the least advantageous to the consumers of raw produce, are eminently hurtful to agriculturists. While they exist, no market can be found for that excess of produce which an agricultural country generally has to dispose of in favourable seasons. Farmers are not, therefore, stimulated to exertion, because, in a coun- try thus situated, a luxuriant crop, by its causing a great fall of price, is nearly as prejudicial to them as a scarcity; which, indeed, by its lessening the quantity sown next year, it seldom fails to induce.
In most countries, however, these very simple considerations have been overlooked, and the export of corn, unless in years of extreme plenty, has been forbidden under the severest penalties. In the reigns immediately succeeding the conquest, this was the case in England; but, in 1436, in the reign of Henry VI., an act was passed permitting export without licence, whenever the price of wheat did not exceed 6s. 8d. (equal in amount of pure silver to 12s. 10½d. present money) per quarter, and barley 3s. 4d. In this act it is stated, that the previous regulations had obliged farmers to sell their corn at low prices, to the great prejudice of the whole kingdom. But, in addition to the reason here assigned for this important measure, we may observe, that, for a considerable time posterior to the conquest, rents were paid in kind, and the high or low price of raw produce could not, therefore, be reckoned a matter of so much importance to landlords, as it became after money rents were generally introduced. In Henry I.'s time, the rents of the Crown lands were paid in corn and other consumable commodities, and were only converted into pecuniary payments, in consequence of the great complaints made by the tenants of the inconveniences they suffered in bringing necessaries for the king's household from distant parts of the kingdom. (Eden's Inquiry into the State of the Poor, Vol. I. p. 55.) The same causes would doubtless affect, though in a less degree, the tenants of the great barons; and, when once money rents had been introduced, it was for the advantage of the proprietors that the obstacles tending to keep the price of corn from rising should be removed. A more favourable opportunity could not have been found to break down these restraints. Henry, weak and irresolute, with a disputed title to the throne, and a powerful competitor, could not, had he been so disposed, have made any effectual opposition to the change of the system on which the corn trade had previously been conducted.
At the time when this act was passed, the prices of corn were exposed to fluctuations of which we can now form a very inadequate conception; and hence it is not easy to determine whether the exportation price of 6s. 8d. was above or below the medium price. While the trade of corn merchants and corn factors was unknown, or while it laboured under degrading restrictions, very little providence was exercised in the distribution of the crops, and the superfluous produce of one year scarcely ever compensated for a deficiency in the crop of the next. "Purchasers," says Sir F. M. Eden, "who only looked to their immediate wants, having corn cheap, were naturally wasteful and improvident in the consumption; the price, therefore, almost invariably rose as the year advanced, and was frequently at an enormous height just before harvest; and, before a fresh supply could be obtained, the stock of the preceding year was often entirely exhausted." (Inquiry into the State of the Poor, Vol. I. p. 18.) Of this Sir Frederick has collected many instances; and he conjectures, seemingly with great probability, that the enthusiastic joy with which the rustic feast of harvest-home was anciently celebrated, arose chiefly from the almost constant fall that then took place in the price of corn.
That the act of 1436 contributed to the advantage of the English agriculturists cannot be doubted; and having experienced the benefit of legislative interference in one instance, they were not slow in again having recourse to it. Not satisfied with this liberty of exporting, in the following reign (1463), they procured the enactment of a law prohibiting the importation of corn from abroad, until the home price exceeded the price at which exportation ceased. If the uncertain and fluctuating policy of the times had permitted the proper execution of these laws, the restrictive system would thus early have been perfected, and, with the exception of the bounty, all the refinements of modern policy would have been in full operation. In practice, however, they were almost inoperative, and a long period elapsed ere the agriculturists succeeded in obtaining a real monopoly of the home market. (Dixon's Inquiry, p. 34.)
Until the reign of Elizabeth, these acts nominally regulated the prices at which the export and import of corn might take place. In that period, however, the coin had not only been greatly degraded, but in the latter part of the 15th and in the 16th centuries, the value of silver, owing to the discovery of the American mines, was rapidly falling throughout Europe. The consequent rise of prices, as it could not, in a nearly stationary state of society, and when capital was but slowly accumulating, be speedily followed by a corresponding rise of wages, must necessarily have been productive of much general distress. But neither the government nor the people seem to have been at all aware of this being the real cause of the rise of money prices, and of the extraordinary increase of pauperism in this interval.* It was not yet known that silver may fall in value,
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* In 1436 the pound Sterling contained as much pure silver as is now contained in L.1, 18s. 9d. In 1464 the value of the pound Sterling was reduced to L.1, 11s. present money, at which sum it remained stationary until 1527, when it was reduced to L.1, 7s. 6½d. present money. In 1543 the previous value of the coin was again reduced about one-seventh part, or to L.1, 3s. 8½d. present money. In the ten years subsequent to this era, the process of degradation advanced with unparalleled rapidity; the weight of the coin was not only diminished, but the standard purity of the metal itself was debased, so that in 1551 the pound Sterling only contained as much silver as is now contained in 4s. 7½d. In 1552, the last year of the reign of Edward VI., the standard was again restored to its former purity; but the weight of the coin, and consequently the quantity of pure silver which it contained, was at the same time reduced about one-seventh below its weight in 1543, and hence the value of a pound Sterling in 1552 corresponded to L.1, 0s. 6½d. and that this fall must always be attended by a proportionate rise in the money price of the commodities for which it is exchanged. Instead, therefore, of ascribing the enhancement of prices to the degradation of the coin, or to the greater plenty of gold and silver, it was universally affirmed to be owing to the decay of tillage, and to the improper practices of corn-mERCHANTS; and many now obsolete statutes for the improvement of tillage, and the laws against engrossing, forestalling, &c. owe their origin to the absurd attempts then made to lower the price of corn.
That the complaints respecting the decay of tillage were very ill-founded, appears pretty evident. The great foreign demand for English wool, the export of which was not then prohibited, had caused the consolidation of some small farms and the more general introduction of enclosures. But this fact, so far from being any proof of this decay, affords satisfactory evidence of the accumulation of capital, and shows that some improvement had already taken place in agriculture.* The increase in the size of farms is, no doubt, always disagreeable to the lower classes; and being then attended with a great rise of prices, raised the popular indignation to such a pitch, that, in the reign of Edward VI. the greater part of the inclosures were violently demolished. As might have been foreseen, the statutes directing the extension of tillage effected nothing; unfortunately, however, the statutes against engrossing were not quite so inefficient.
By the statute 5th and 6th of Edward VI. cap. 14, it was enacted, That whoever should buy any corn or grain, with intent to sell it again, should be reputed an unlawful engrosser, and should, for the first fault, suffer two months imprisonment, and forfeit the value of the corn; for the second suffer six months imprisonment, and forfeit double the value; and for the third, be set in the pillory, suffer imprisonment during the King's pleasure, and forfeit all his goods and chattels. And by the same law no person could transport corn from one part to another, without a licence, ascertaining his qualifications as a man of probity and fair dealing. Neither could corn be purchased to be laid up in granaries for home sale, until the quarter of wheat was at or under 6s. 8d. and oats at 2s. money of the time. By the same statute, the authority of three Justices of the Peace was necessary in order to grant a licence; and even this restraint, not being thought sufficient, by a statute of Elizabeth, the privilege of granting it was confined to the quarter-sessions.
That very little opposition should have been made by the landed interest to the laws restricting the freedom of the internal corn trade, does not appear very surprising. Before the principles of trade were properly understood, it was extremely natural for landlords and farmers to conclude, that they would be able to sell their produce directly to the consumers, on fully more advantageous terms than if they transacted with them through the medium of a third party. Forgetting that these profits were but a fair remuneration for the capital which had been invested in the most important of all employments, that of distributing the supply of food equally throughout the year, and according to the effective demand, the farmers considered the whole of the profits of the corn-merchants to have been acquired from the consumers at their expense; and of course could not feel any great repugnance to the virtual annihilation of the trade of the dealer.
But, as society improved, and as the principles of commerce were better understood, the bad effects of these laws became apparent. The statute of 1548 was considerably modified in 1624, and at last, by the 15th of Charles II. cap. 7, the engrossing or buying of corn, in order to sell it again, as long as present money. Since that period the standard has undergone almost no variation, either as to weight or purity.
It therefore appears, that between 1527 and 1552, the value of the pound Sterling was reduced from L. 1. 7s. 6½d. to L. 1. 0s. 6½d. or about one-fourth part; and this degradation of the value of the coin, accompanied as it was by an extraordinary fall in the value of the precious metals themselves, leaves us at no loss to account for the distress with which the people of England were then assailed, and for the universal complaints of a rise of prices. The dissolution of the monasteries by Henry VIII. in 1536 and 1538 has commonly been considered as the cause of the institution of a legal provision for the support of the poor in England; but that this was really a consequence of the misery of the lower classes, caused by a degradation and fall in the value of money, seems abundantly certain. "The principal real grievance at this time," says Mr John Smith (Memoirs of Wool, 8vo ed. Vol. I. p. 88), when adverting to some riots and complaints caused by the high prices in 1550, "of the poorer manufacturers, they do not appear to have been sensible of, and historians have since overlooked it, was the state of the coin." The debasement of the coin, which was now of several years standing, had undoubtedly given a nominal advance to all things vendible; and, though perhaps to wages too, yet probably nothing near in proportion to the difference of the coin. And, as the money in which they were paid, not containing as much silver as it did before, would not purchase the same quantity of the necessaries of life it was wont to do; that, in course, must have bore hard upon the lower sort of people especially, who had every thing to buy and nothing to sell, except their labour." This idea has been borrowed, and illustrated in an article of considerable merit, published in the 22d volume of the Edinburgh Review.
* In 1553 an act was passed, restraining the number of sheep to be kept in one flock to 2000. It is mentioned in that act, that some proprietors had then flocks of 24,000 sheep. Anderson states, that in 1551 no fewer than 60 ships sailed from Southampton for the Netherlands, loaded with wool. History of Commerce, Vol. II. p. 89. the price of wheat did not exceed 4s. the quarter, was declared lawful to all persons, not being fore- stallers, that is, not selling again in the same mar- ket within three months; an act, as Dr Smith has justly observed, which, with all its imperfections, has contributed more, both to the plentiful supply of the home market, and to the increase of tillage, than any other law in the statute book.
The act of Henry VI. regulating the export prices of corn was again renewed, but without any varia- tion in the rates, in the reign of Philip and Mary. As the coin, however, had, in the interim, been greatly degraded, of course exportation could not now take place, until the price had really fallen much lower than the price of 1436. This act, like that against engrossing, was no doubt framed with a view of reducing the rising money price of corn, and of quieting the discontent then prevalent among the labouring classes; although, by shackling and dis- couraging cultivation, its real effects must have been extremely different.
In 1562 the prices at which exportation might take place, were extended to 10s. per quarter for wheat, and 6s. 8d. for barley and malt. This scale, however, was soon after abandoned; and in 1570 it was enacted, That corn might be exported from particular districts; wheat paying a duty of 1s. and other grain of 8d. per quarter, whenever no prohibition to the contrary had been issued by go- vernment: And that the Lord Presidents, and coun- cils for shires, and the Justices of Assize, at their different sessions, should consult with the respectable inhabitants of the counties, and determine whether any exportation could with propriety be allowed.
The curious provisions of this act, whereby corn might be exported from one part of the country, at the same time that its exportation was prohibited in another, arose from the extreme inequality of the then prices. At this era roads were scarcely form- ed; and as there hardly existed any communication between distant parts of the kingdom, the prices in the different counties bore no proportion to each other, or to the price in London. England was then in the same situation as Spain in the present day. A particular province might be afflicted with scarcity, without being able to derive any assistance from the superfluous produce of its neighbours. But the complex nature of the regulations prevented their being properly executed; and they were again su- perseded by a fresh law (33rd Eliz. c. 7), permitting export, on paying a duty of 2s. for wheat, and 1s. 4d. on all other species of corn, whenever the price of wheat did not exceed 20s. per quarter, and barley and malt 12s. This act did considerable service to agriculture, by repealing several absurd statutes for the promoting of tillage, and against the enlarge- ment of farms.
It deserves to be remarked, that the check given Origin of to cultivation by the injudicious imposition of heavy the Poor duties on the export of corn, and still more, the ra- pid depreciation of the value of money in the reign of Elizabeth, caused an astonishing rise in the price of commodities. A contemporary author, quoted by Mr Hume, estimates this rise in the 20 or 30 years previous to 1581, at no less than 50 per cent.; but as wages could not increase in proportion, pauperism became very general; and this circumstance, com- bined with the excessively high prices of 1596, 1597, and 1598, occasioned the enactment of the famous statute of 1601, which has served as a basis to the whole of the present English system for sup- porting and managing the poor.*
* The contemporary author quoted by Mr Hume (Hist. of England, Vol. V. p. 485), and by Sir F. M. Eden (State of the Poor, Vol. I. p. 119), says, that, in 1581, it required L. 200 to keep as good a house as might have been kept 16 years before for 200 merks, or L. 133, 6s. 8d.—"Can you remember," says he, "that within these 30 years I could, in this town, buy the best pig or goose I could lay my hands on for 4d., which now costeth 12d.: a good capon for 3d. or 4d.; a chicken for a 1d.; a hen for 2d., &c. Now a payre of shoes costs 12d.; yet in my time I have bought a better for 6d."—Latimer, in his Sermons, ascribes this increase of price to landlords raising their rents. "Notwithstanding," says he, "God doth send us plentifully the fruits of the earth mercifully according to our deserts, these rich men causeth such dearth, that poore men, which live of their labour, cannot with the sweat of their face have a living, all kinde of victuals is so dear."—A variety of passages to the same import may be found in other con- temporary authors quoted by Sir F. M. Eden, and by Mr Smith in his Memoirs of Wool.
This extraordinary advance of prices, caused partly by the degradation of the coin, but more by the fall of the exchangeable value of the precious metals themselves, as it must have very far exceeded the rate at which capital, and consequently the demand for labour, was then increasing, would, even on the supposi- tion that wages had been left to find their own level, and to be adjusted on the principles of fair competi- tion, have been attended with a very great deterioration in the circumstances of the labouring classes. But positive enactments were framed to prevent their increase; and while the money price of all sorts of commodities was advancing with unprecedented rapidity, wages were violently kept down to very near their former level.
By the statute 11th Henry VII. c. 22, regulating the wages of labour, a common labourer was allowed 4d. per diem, from Easter to Michaelmas; and taking the average prices of wheat, rye, and barley at that period at 6s. 8d. 4s. and 3s. per quarter, respectively, it will follow that a labourer who had 4d. a day, could earn a quarter of wheat by twenty days labour, a quarter of rye by twelve days labour, and a quarter of barley by nine days labour.
But in the latter part of the reign of Queen Elizabeth, the labourer's situation was very different. The prices of corn may be supposed to have nearly corresponded with the rates at which exportation was al- No alteration was made in the amount of the duties payable on the export of corn, during the pacific reign of James I.; but the prices at which exportation might take place, were, after some trifling alteration in 1604, fixed in 1623 at the high rate of 32s. the quarter for wheat, and 16s. the quarter for malt and barley. In this and the preceding reigns, and for a considerable time afterwards, the importation of corn continued unrestricted; and notwithstanding the improvement of agriculture, the nation was then partially dependent for supplies of food on the trade with the Baltic and other countries.
During the agitations of the civil wars, the people of England, intensely occupied in endeavouring to throw off, or at least to restrict and modify the royal authority, paid no regard to the corn trade. But this inattention does not seem to have been attended with any bad effects. The high prices of that turbulent period, if they were not altogether caused by a fall in the value of the coin, which, previous to the recoinage under Cromwell, had been very much clipped and debased, were most probably owing to the interruptions then thrown in the way of agricultural labour.
On the restoration of Charles II., in 1660, an act was passed, permitting the export of corn on the same terms with other commodities on which duties were payable, whenever the price of wheat did not exceed 40s. per quarter, barley and malt 20s. and oats 16s. But as by this law a duty of 20s. was exigible from every quarter of wheat exported, and from other grain in proportion, it really amounted to a prohibition; and neither the agriculturists nor the revenue derived any advantage from the extent to which exportation was permitted, although both must have been somewhat benefited by the high duties it imposed on importation.
Mr Dirom's opinion that the prohibitory duties on exportation were the chief causes of the high prices of this and the two following seasons, seems
lowed by statute 35th Eliz. c. 7, that is, wheat probably averaged 20s. a quarter, rye 13s. 4d. and barley 12s. It appears, however, from the determination of the Justices of the East Riding of Yorkshire, in the same year, that the wages of a common labourer, without meat or drink, were limited to five pence a day from the 1st March to the Feast of all Saints. Consequently, a common labourer could not, in the latter part of the reign of Queen Elizabeth, earn a quarter of wheat by less than 48 days labour, a quarter of rye in less than 32 days, nor a quarter of barley in less than 28½ days. If barley was his common sustenance, he could have earned three times as much in 1495 as in 1593; of rye 2½ as much; and of wheat 2½. As far, therefore, as the necessaries of life were concerned, the situation of the labourer was not one half so advantageous in 1593 as it had been in 1495. (Edinburgh Review, Vol. XXII. p. 195.)
This extraordinary rise in the price of provisions, attended as it was by no proportional rise in the price of labour, was the real cause of the instituting of poor-rates. In the long interval between 1579 and 1530, it does not appear that any statute was passed which had a direct reference to the maintenance of vagrants or beggars. At the latter era, however, when the prices of all sorts of commodities began suddenly to rise, pauperism became very prevalent, and engaged a considerable portion of the attention of the legislature.
The following extract from Dr Burn's Justice of Peace (Vol. III. p. 608), shows, in a very distinct manner, the various steps by which the compulsory maintenance was established in England: "By 22d Henry VIII. c. 12, the Justices were to distribute themselves into several divisions; within which divisions respectively they might license persons to beg. By 27th Henry VIII. c. 25, the several hundreds, towns corporate, parishes, or hamlets, were required to sustain the poor with such charitable voluntary alms, as that none of them might, of necessity, be compelled to go openly in begging, on pain that every person making default should forfeit 20s. a month. And the church-wardens, or other substantial inhabitants, were to make collections for them with boxes on Sundays; and otherwise by their discretions. And the minister was to take all opportunities to stir up and exhort the people to be liberal and bountiful. By the 1st Edward VI. c. 3, houses were to be provided for them by the devotion of good people, and materials to set them at work; and the minister, after the gospel every Sunday, was specially to exhort the parishioners to a liberal contribution. By the 5th and 6th Edward VI. c. 2, the collectors of the poor, on a certain Sunday in every year, immediately after divine service, were to take down in writing what every person was willing to give weekly, for the ensuing year; and if any should be obstinate and refuse to give, the minister was gently to exhort him; if he still refused, the minister was to certify such refusal to the bishop of the diocese, and the bishop was to send for him, to induce and persuade him by charitable ways and means, and so according to his discretion to take order for the reformation thereof. By the 5th Elizabeth, c. 3, if he stood out against the bishop's exhortation, the bishop was to certify the same to the Justices in sessions, and bind him over to appear there; and the Justices at the said sessions were again gently to move and persuade him; and, finally, if he would not be persuaded, then they were to assess him in what they thought reasonable towards the relief of the poor; and, in case of refusal, were to commit him till paid. By 14th Elizabeth, c. 5, power was given to the Justices to lay a general assessment, and this hath continued ever since; for the statute of the 43d Elizabeth, c. 2, is only a re-enacting of former provisions, with some additional alterations."
In a tract published in 1611, the author dwells with great earnestness on the extreme dearth of victuals. They were grown more dear in price, he affirms, in the six years foregoing, than in the twenty years before.—See Memoirs of Wool, Vol. I. p. 128. The fall in the value of gold and silver, caused by the discovery of the American mines, seems to have ceased about 1630 or 1640. entirely destitute of foundation. The law against exportation could not certainly raise the prices of the year in which it was framed, and this high price, as far as it was not caused by a deficiency in the crop, or by any fluctuation in the value of the coin, was unquestionably owing, not to the duties on exportation, but to the exorbitancy of those on imperiation, which had really secured a monopoly of the home market to the agriculturists.
This view of the matter appears to have been the same with that which had occurred to Parliament; and in 1663 the high duties on importation were again taken off, and an ad valorem duty of 9 per cent. imposed in their stead. At the same time, the exportation price of wheat was extended to 48s. per quarter, chargeable with a duty of 5s. 4d. and other grain in proportion.
This act, however, by permitting the import of foreign grain on paying a moderate duty, not being reckoned sufficiently advantageous to the landholders, a more decided step was subsequently taken, and in 1670 exportation prices were extended to 53s. 4d. per quarter for wheat, and other grain in proportion, while import duties, amounting to a complete prohibition, were imposed on foreign wheat till the home price reached 53s. 4d. and between that price and 80s. a duty of 8s. was exigible. But this law, though extremely favourable to the agriculturists, by whom indeed it had been framed, did not perfectly correspond with their wishes. The necessities of the Crown had still caused the continuance of the impolitic duties on exportation, and the prohibition of importation was rendered to a certain extent nugatory, by the want of any proper and settled method for ascertaining prices. Groundless complaints of the decay of agriculture, and of the evils of foreign competition, were therefore continued, and gave occasion to the act of 1685, designed more effectually to check the import of corn from abroad, by securing correct returns of the prices.
We have now reached a period no less memorable in the economical, than in the political history of Great Britain. The era of the granting of a bounty on the export of corn, and of the establishment of our civil liberties, is the same. The Prince of Orange could not, had he been so inclined, have opposed any obstacles to the wishes of the landed interest, who then constituted the immense majority of Parliament, on this particular subject. Whether or not the court really approved of this measure, cannot now be ascertained; but whatever might have been William's private sentiments, it was necessary for him to give way to the inclinations of the men who had so lately raised him to a throne, and on whose assistance he was chiefly to depend, in prosecuting his war against France. The bounty payable under the act 1st William and Mary, c. 12, amounted to 5s. for every quarter of wheat exported, while the price continued at or below 48s.; 2s. 6d. for every quarter of barley or malt, while their price did not exceed 24s.; and 3s. 6d. for every quarter of rye, when the price did not exceed 32s.
A still more essential advantage was shortly after conferred on agriculture, by the act 11th and 12th William III. cap. 20, which repealed all the previous duties on corn exported, and prevented the operation of the bounty from being in the slightest degree counteracted.
No alteration having been made in the prices and duties regulating the importation of foreign corn, as fixed by the act of 1670; and the duties being rigorously exacted, the act repealing the duties on exportation completed the restrictive system. Every part of this complex machine was now in operation; and while no foreigner was allowed to contend with our own home growers, the liberality of the state enabled them to contend with foreigners, even when the price of corn in Great Britain was considerably higher than its price abroad!
The policy adopted in Scotland, respecting the Scottish trade in corn, had been nearly the same with that of England. Previous to 1663, the importation of corn into this kingdom was permitted without limitation or duties (Dirom, p. 61); but in that year it was loaded with an ad valorem duty of about 40 per cent.; while its free export was allowed, on payment of a trifling duty, until the prices exceeded those mentioned below.* This duty was afterwards relinquished, and a bounty granted by the statute William, Par. I. c. 32. At length, by the Treaty of Union, the corn laws of both kingdoms were incorporated, and it was settled, that "the allowances, encouragements, and drawbacks, prohibitions, restrictions, and regulations of trade, and the customs and duties on import and export, settled in England when the union commences, shall, from and after the union, take place throughout the whole United Kingdom." Oats not having been mentioned in the English statute granting the bounty, it was here declared, that whenever oats did not exceed the price of 15s. sterling per quarter, there should be paid a bounty of 2s. 6d. for every quarter of oatmeal imported.
Whatever may have been the ultimate consequences of the bounty act, there can be no doubt it was the Bounty Act framed with a view to enhance the value of corn. In the preamble to this celebrated statute, it is stated, "that the exportation of corn and grain into foreign parts, when the price thereof is at a low rate in this kingdom, hath been a great advantage, not only to the owners of land, but to the trade of this kingdom in general." It would, indeed, be extremely absurd to suppose that the landed interest should have unanimously and earnestly urged the enactment of a law, if it had been imagined to have any tendency to lower the exchangeable value of agricultural produce.
That the bounty had in fact no such tendency, we shall afterwards endeavour to show, but at present we shall only offer a few observations, explana-
* Wheat L. 12 Scots per boll; bear and barley L. 8 do.; oats and pease 8 merks. History of the fall in the price of corn, posterior to the Corn Laws, which has, as it appears to us, without any sufficient reason, been ascribed to the operation of the bounty.
It is obvious, that no certain conclusions can ever be drawn as to whether the real value, that is to say, the expense of production of any commodity is diminished, merely from the fact of its money price having declined. In order to be able to form any accurate conclusions, as to the rise or fall of the real price of commodities, from the variations in their money price, it is essential to know, not only the state of the coin, as to purity or weight, but also, whether the value of bullion is itself stationary. A fall of money price will be as effectually produced by a rise in the value of gold and silver, as by a diminution of the cost of production; and the real price of a commodity may be increasing at the very time its nominal or money price is falling. To produce this effect it is only required, that the real price of bullion should increase still faster than the real price of the commodity with which it is compared.
That the real value of gold and silver rose in the early part of last century, has been maintained by Dr Smith, apparently on pretty good grounds. As no remarkable improvements in agriculture were then made, either in the continent or in England, the expense of producing corn may be reckoned to have remained nearly the same, or rather to have increased, as the general increase of population, however slow, would certainly cause recourse to be had to inferior soils. But, during this period, the money price of corn fell not only in this country, where a bounty was given on exportation, but in those continental kingdoms where exportation was prohibited. Conclusive evidence of this fact, as far as regards France, will be found in the table of the prices of wheat, at the Paris or Rosoy market, annexed to the very valuable work of Dupré de St Maur, entitled *Essai sur les Monnaies, ou Réflexions sur le Rapport entre l'Argent et les Denrees*. Paris, 1746. And the table of the price of wheat at Seville, from 1675 to 1764 inclusive, published in the appendix to the *Bullion Report*, strongly confirms the reasoning of Dr Smith, and shows that prices had considerably declined in Spain, in the first 50 years of the last century.
The moral impulse imparted to this country by the revolution,—the abolition of all oppressive and arbitrary exactions,—and the number of intelligent and wealthy foreigners who then sought refuge in England, from the persecution of intolerant and bigoted governments, coupled with the revival of trade and the establishment of the Bank in 1694, caused an extension of commerce, and a considerable accumulation of capital in England, subsequently to the treaty of Ryswick. The wars of Queen Anne counteracted this progress; but during the long and pacific administration of Sir Robert Walpole, the increase of capital, and the improvement of every species of industry, though not so great as they afterwards became, continued uninterupted. The rise of the money price of labour in Great Britain during that interval, is not therefore inconsistent with the fact of an advance in the value of the precious metals, but, as Dr Smith has stated, is a natural consequence of the improving state of the country, and of the increasing demand for labour. In France, which had been completely exhausted by the ruinous enterprises of Louis XIV., and where of course the demand for labour remained nearly stationary, wages fell as the price of corn declined. (*Wealth of Nations*, I. 313.)
But whatever weight may be attached to these conclusions, respecting a general rise in the real value of gold and silver in the early part of last century, there can be no question as to the fact of a local rise having taken place in the value of the coin of this country, in consequence of the recoinage in the latter part of King William's reign. Silver, at that period, constituted the English standard of value; and to such an extent had this currency been debased by clipping, filing, &c., that, in 1695, the common price of silver bullion was 6s. 5d. per ounce, or 1s. 3d. above the mint price. A guinea then passed current for about 30s.; and the nominal exchange between London, and Holland, and Hamburg, was rather more than 25 per cent. to the prejudice of the former. (*Wealth of Nations*, I. 304.) That this degraded state of the coin must have had the effect of raising the nominal price of every other commodity as well as bullion, would have been indisputably certain, although no direct evidence of the fact had been transmitted to us. Mr Lowndes, however, in his Report on the then state of the silver coin, particularly mentions its degradation as "one great cause of the raising the price not only of all merchandises, but of every article necessary for the sustenance of the common people to their great grievance." (*Liverpool on Coin*, p. 70.) And Mr Locke, in his celebrated answer to Mr Lowndes' proposal for lowering the standard of the coin, confirms this statement, and asserts, that the nominal "price of all sorts of provisions and commodities had risen excessively." (*Ibid.*)
The medium rise in the nominal price of the undepreciated gold coin, and of silver bullion, when compared with the clipped and degraded coin, appears, from the statements of Messrs Locke and Lowndes, to have rather exceeded 30 per cent. And it is of importance to remark, that, in 1700, the year in which the new coin came into general circulation, the market price of corn, which had previously been rising, declined to very near the same extent. That this fall may, in some degree, have been owing to a luxuriant crop, is not improbable; but that the increased value of the circulating medium would of itself have speedily lowered the nominal price of corn, and every other commodity, is quite certain.
Mr Charles Smith, Mr Malthus, and other writers, who contend that a bounty on the exportation of corn has a tendency to lower its price, admit that the bounty granted in 1688 had no such effect anterior to 1700! This fact ought certainly to have stimulated these gentlemen to inquire, whether nothing peculiar belonged to that year. They should have recollected, that a fall of nominal prices will be as effectually brought about by a rise in the value of the currency, as by a fall in the value of the commodities for which it is exchanged. If they had kept this principle in view, and adverted to the circumstances under which the recoinage of 1695, 1697, and 1698 took place, perhaps they would not have made their assertions respecting the effects of the bounty in so very confident a manner; and, at all events, they would not have adduced the fall of prices in 1700, and subsequently, as any proof of their correctness.
We do not certainly mean to affirm that the whole rise of price, from 1692 to 1698 inclusive, is to be ascribed to the depreciation of the currency. Undoubtedly the bounty, and perhaps, too, bad seasons, contributed to produce this rise; and, had there been no bounty, prices would, in all probability, have fallen still lower after the recoinage.
In considering the effects of the bounty, it ought always to be recollected, that prices had been gradually falling previously to its being granted.
From 1649 to 1658, the average price of the Winchester quarter of middling wheat was:
- From 1659 to 1668: L. 2 7 0 - From 1669 to 1678: L. 2 6 8 - From 1679 to 1688: L. 2 3 4
The bounty was given with the avowed intention of checking this fall, and was, in our opinion, well calculated to accomplish its object. But, whatever may have been its effects, it can never be assigned as any cause of the fall of prices between 1700 and 1746, when that very fall had begun thirty years before it was granted, and when prices rose in the first ten years of its existence.
Perhaps part of the fall of corn in England, subsequent to 1640, may be justly ascribed to the prohibition of the export of wool, which, after several previous attempts, was carried into full effect by the act of 1660. The wool formerly raised in Great Britain having much exceeded what was required for our manufactures, its price declined as soon as its export was put an end to; and, of course, some portion of the soil employed in rearing sheep would be brought under tillage, and a greater quantity of good land, besides an additional capital, would be turned to the raising of corn.
Although the mint price of gold had been reduced by King William, it was still rated too high as compared with silver; and, consequently, the currency again became deranged. The deficiency of new silver coin, caused by the inducement to melt it down, could not be immediately experienced, but towards the latter part of Queen Anne's reign, a want of silver, and a considerable difficulty in making payments, were universally felt and complained of. As might have been expected, prices rose, and from 1709 to 1717, both inclusive, were much above the average of the eight preceding or of the following years. That this could not be an effect of deficient crops is evident, from the fact of a considerable exportation, forced, no doubt, to a certain extent, by the bounty, having then taken place. The government did not indeed entertain any such opinion, but having wisely adopted the suggestion of Sir Isaac Newton, and reduced the mint value of the guinea, the melting and hoarding of silver ceased, and prices, as in 1700, fell to their former level.
In accounting for the low price of corn in the reigns of George I. and George II., after allowing for the increased value of the coin, the effects of the relaxation of the laws against forestallers and engrossers must not be forgotten. Large capitals were now engaged in the corn trade, and extraordinary fluctuations in its price were thereby avoided. The home demand was rendered more steady and equal; while the perfect security of property, and the greater political influence attached to landed possessions, naturally attracted a more than ordinary portion of the accumulating capital of the country towards agriculture.
The bounty, by extending the foreign market, no doubt contributed materially to the extension of cultivation, although, by forcing recourse to be had to worse soils in order to obtain the additional supplies of corn, it must have raised prices. In the period from 1740 to 1751, the cheapest in last century, the bounties paid on exportation amounted in all to L. 1,515,000; and in 1749 alone they somewhat exceeded L. 324,000. The bounty, however, had by this time been much too long in operation to permit the growers or exporters to realize any but the common and ordinary profits of stock; and, therefore, if it had never been granted, not only the quantity of corn exported, but the home price, which must have been regulated by the expense necessary to produce the increased supply required by the bounty on the poorest soils in cultivation, would have been reduced. We shall afterwards elucidate this principle at greater length; but it is of importance to remark how much this forced exportation must have raised the real price of corn, at the very time when it is supposed to have reduced it.
But notwithstanding the factitious stimulus thus given to exportation, the quantity of exported corn, of all sorts, rapidly diminished; and the gradual increase of the home demand, in the last ten years of the reign of George II. accompanied as it was by a rise of prices, reduced the annual average exportation, at the accession of his present Majesty, to about 600,000 quarters. After the peace of Paris, in 1763, the national improvement was prodigiously accelerated. The extension of industry caused by the acquisition of new branches of commerce, by the increase of our colonial possessions, and perhaps, more than all the rest, by the introduction of improved machinery into the cotton manufacture, was followed by a sudden increase of the population, and, as importation was prohibited, by a corresponding rise of prices.
* See Table of Prices of Wheat at Eton College, annexed to this Article. † Jennies were invented in 1766, by Richard Hargreaves, Weaver in Lancashire, who, to the disgrace of his age and nation, was suffered to pass his days in obscurity and poverty. The admirers of the restrictive system have generally reasoned, as if this rise of price and the cessation of exportation had been a consequence of the alteration made in the corn laws in 1773. But it should be carefully observed, that this very alteration was an avowed, and a necessary consequence of the previous rise. In 1765, before any suspension of the restrictive system had taken place, the balance on the side of wheat exported, only amounted to 77,000 quarters, and the home price in this and the two preceding years had risen to an unusual height. The very general and growing dissatisfaction at continuing the prohibition against importing, in these circumstances, produced a suspension of the high duties in 1766; and by temporary enactments, this suspension (accompanied occasionally with restrictions on exportation) was continued to 1773, when a permanent act was framed, by which foreign wheat was allowed to be imported, on paying a nominal duty of 6d. whenever the home price reached 48s. a quarter; and the bounty and exportation were together to cease when the price reached 44s. This statute also permitted the importation of corn at any price, in order to be again exported, duty free, provided it was, in the meantime, lodged under the joint locks of the King and the importer.
The prices, when exportation was to cease, seem here to have been fixed too low; and, as Dr Smith has observed, there appears a good deal of impropriety in prohibiting exportation altogether at the precise prices at which that bounty which was given, in order to force it, is withdrawn; yet with all these defects, the act of 1773 was a most material improvement on the former system, and ought not to have been altered unless to render the trade perfectly free.
The idea that this law must, when enacted, have been injurious to the farmers, seems altogether illusory. The permission to import foreign grain, when the home prices rose to a certain rate, certainly prevented their realizing exorbitant profits at the expense of the other classes, and prevented an unnatural proportion of the capital of the country being turned towards agriculture. But as this rate was fixed very considerably higher than the average price in the reign of George II, it cannot be maintained that it had any tendency to lower previous prices, which alone could discourage agriculture; and in fact no such reduction took place.
It is indeed true, that, but for this act, we should not have imported so much foreign grain in the interval between 1773 and 1791. This importation, however, was no consequence of the declining state of our agriculture, for it is universally admitted that every department of rural economy was more improved in that period than in the whole course of the preceding century; but arose entirely from a still more rapid increase of the manufacturing population, and hence of the effective demand for corn.
By referring to the tables of exports and imports annexed to this article, it will be seen, that, in 1772, the balance on the side of wheat imported, amounted to 18,515 quarters; and in 1773, 1774, and 1775, all years of great prosperity, this balance was very much increased. The loss, however, of a great part of our colonial possessions, and the general stagnation of commerce, occasioned by the American contest, having diminished the consumption, the balance was high on the side of exportation in 1778, 1779, and 1780. In 1783 and 1784, the crop was unusually deficient, and considerable importations took place, but in 1785, 1786, and 1787, the exports again exceeded the imports; and it was not till 1788, when the country had fully recovered from the effects of the war, and when manufacturing improvements were carrying on with extraordinary spirit, that the imports permanently overbalanced the exports.
The growing wealth and commercial prosperity of the country had thus, by increasing the population, and enabling individuals to consume additional quantities of food, caused the home supply of corn to fall somewhat short of the demand; but it must not therefore be concluded, that agriculture had not at the same time been very greatly ameliorated.
"The average annual produce of wheat," says Mr Comber, "at the beginning of the reign of his present Majesty, was about 3,800,000 quarters, of which about 300,000 had been sent out of the kingdom, leaving about three and a half millions for home consumption. In 1773, the produce of wheat was stated to the House of Commons to be four millions of quarters, of which the whole, and above 100,000 imported, were consumed in the kingdom. In 1796, the consumption was stated in the House of Commons, by Lord Hawkesbury, to be 500,000 quarters per month, or six millions annually, of which about 180,000 were imported, showing an increased produce, in about 20 years, of 1,820,000 quarters. It is evident, therefore, not only that no defalcation of produce had taken place, in consequence of the cessation of exportation, as has been too lightly assumed, from the occasional necessity of importation; but that it had increased with the augmentation of our commerce and manufactures." (Comber on National Subsistence, p. 180.)
These estimates are, no doubt, very loose and unsatisfactory, but the fact of an increase of produce is unquestionable. In the Report of the House of Commons on the state of the waste lands, drawn up in 1797, the number of acts passed for enclosing, and the number of acres enclosed, in the following reigns, are thus stated: In Queen Anne's reign, 2 1,439 In George I. 16 17,600 In George II. 226 318,778 In George III. to 1797, 1,532 2,804,197.*
It deserves particular notice, that, from 1771 to 1791, both inclusive, the period in which these great agricultural improvements were carrying on, there was no rise of prices.
The landholders, however, could not but consider the liberty of importation granted by the act of 1773 as injurious to their interests, insomuch as it prevented prices from rising with the increased demand. A clamour, therefore, was raised against that law; and, in addition to this interested feeling, a dread of becoming habitually dependent on foreigners for supplies of corn operated with many, and produced a pretty general acquiescence in the act of 1791; by which the price, when importation could take place from abroad, at the low duty of 6d., was raised to 54s., under 54s., and above 50s., a middle duty of 2s. 6d., and under 50s. a prohibitory duty of 24s. 3d. was exigible. The bounty continued as before, and exportation without bounty was allowed to 40s.
It was also enacted, that foreign wheat might be imported, stored under the King's locks, and again exported free of duty; but, if sold for home consumption in the kingdom, it became liable to a warehouse-duty of 2s. 6d. in addition to the ordinary duties payable at the time of sale.
Mr Comber has justly blamed this imposition of duties on the warehousing of foreign corn; but the deficient crops of 1795 and 1797, followed, as they were, by a great rise of prices, superseded these provisions, and even caused the granting of high bounties on importation.
In 1797 the Bank had been restricted from paying in specie, and the consequent facility of obtaining discounts and getting a command of capital, gave a fresh stimulus to agriculture; the efficacy of which was most powerfully assisted by the great scarcity and high prices of 1800 and 1801. An agricultural mania had now seized the nation, and as the prices of 1802 and 1803 would not have permitted the cultivation of the poor soils which had lately been broken up, a new corn law was loudly called for by the farmers, and passed in 1804. This act went directly to the point. It imposed a prohibitory duty of 24s. 3d. per quarter on all wheat imported when the home price was at or below 63s.; between 63s. and 66s. a middle duty of 2s. 6d. was paid; and above 66s. the nominal duty of 6d. The price at which bounty was allowed on exportation was extended to 40s. and importation without bounty to 54s. By the act of 1791, the maritime counties of England had been divided into 12 districts, and importation and exportation had been regulated by the particular prices of each; but, by the act of 1804, they were regulated in England by the aggregate average of the 12 maritime districts, and in Scotland by the aggregate average of the four maritime districts. The averages, as at present, were taken at four periods in the year, and the ports could not remain open or shut for less than three months. This method of ascertaining prices was, however, modified in the following season, and it was then fixed that the importation both in England and Scotland should be regulated by the average price of the whole twelve maritime districts.
To prohibit the importation of the necessaries of life into any country where the supply is short of the demand, till prices rise to a certain height, has a direct tendency to raise them still higher. British merchants would not at present (June 1818) order foreign grain, if the home price was steady at about 80s. It could not, in fact, be imported to any extent, unless the price was considerably higher, because it is certain that the dreaded effect of a large importation would of itself suffice to sink the market price, and would consequently put a stop to the influx. In 1805 the crop was very considerably deficient, and the average price of that year was about 22s. above the price at which importation was allowed by the act of 1804. The depreciation of paper compared
* The following is a statement of the Acts of Parliament passed for local improvements, commencing with 1785, and ending with 1816.
| Total of Eight Years, ending 1792 | Total of Eight Years, ending 1800 | Total of Eight Years, ending 1808 | 1810 | 1811 | 1812 | 1813 | 1814 | 1815 | 1816 | Total of Seven Years, ending 1816 | |----------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|--------------------------------| | For roads and bridges | 302 | 341 | 419 | 52 | 58 | 53 | 47 | 53 | 44 | 34 | 341 | | For canals, harbours, &c. | 64 | 132 | 127 | 9 | 15 | 13 | 7 | 6 | 10 | 4 | 64 | | For dividing, enclosing, and draining | 245 | 589 | 757 | 114 | 134 | 123 | 117 | 119 | 82 | 49 | 738 | | For parochial and city improvements | 139 | 62 | 141 | 25 | 17 | 24 | 20 | 21 | 26 | 22 | 115 | | Totals | 750 | 1,124 | 1,444 | 200 | 222 | 213 | 191 | 199 | 162 | 109 | 1,298 | History of the Corn Laws and Trade.
The high price of that year must have been owing to the operation of the new corn law preventing any importation of foreign grain till the home price was high, and then cramping mercantile operations; and to the war rendering the cost of importation unusually great. In 1806, 1807, and 1808, the depreciation of paper, compared with bullion, continued at nearly four per cent.; and the price of wheat in these years being generally from 60s. to 75s., a small importation only took place. From autumn 1808 to spring 1814, the depreciation of our currency was rapid beyond all former example; and several crops in that interval being likewise deficient, the money price of corn, influenced by both causes, rose to a surprising height. The following is a statement of the money or paper price, and the bullion price of corn, from 1809 to 1814 both inclusive:
| Paper Price per Quarter | Bullion Price per Quarter | |-------------------------|--------------------------| | 1809 | 92s. 7d. | | 1810 | 106s. | | 1811 | 94s. | | 1812 | 125s. 6d. | | 1813 | 100s. 9d. | | 1814 | 74s. | | | | | 1809 | 81s. | | 1810 | 88s. 6d. | | 1811 | 74s. | | 1812 | 98s. 6d. | | 1813 | 73s. | | 1814 | 56s. 6d. |
The crops of 1809 and 1810 were much below an average, and the bullion price of these years is a good deal higher than the importation price of 1804. This excess is to be ascribed partly to that law, and partly to the extraordinary difficulties then thrown in the way of importing grain. At that time no vessel could be loaded in any Continental port for England, without purchasing a licence; and the freight and insurance were at least four times as high as during peace. The same causes operated in 1812; but, in the autumn of 1813, the destruction of Bonaparte's anti-commercial system having increased the facilities of importation, a large quantity of corn was poured into the kingdom; and, in 1814, its bullion price was reduced below the point at which importation was allowed.
Before this fall of price, a committee of the House of Commons had been appointed to inquire into the state of the laws affecting the corn trade; and their Report (dated 11th May 1813) recommended a very great extension of the rates at which exportation was formerly allowable, and when importation free of duty could take place. The recommendation of this committee was not adopted by the House; but the fact of its having been made when the home price was at least 112s. per quarter, displays a surprising solicitude to exclude foreigners from all competition with the home growers.
The lessening of the dependence of the country on foreign supplies formed the sole ostensible ground on which this committee had proposed any alteration in the act of 1804. But after the fall of price in autumn 1813, and in the early part of 1814, it became obvious, on comparing our former prices with those of the continent, that, without an alteration of the existing law, this dependence would be considerably increased; that a good deal of the poor lands, which the previous high prices had forced into cultivation, would be again thrown into pastureage, and that a corresponding reduction of rent would be experienced. These consequences alarmed the landlords and landholders, and, in the early part of the session 1814, a new set of resolutions were voted by the House, declaring that it was expedient to repeal the bounty, and to permit the free exportation of corn, whatever might be the home price, and to impose a graduated scale of duties on the importation of foreign corn. Thus, foreign wheat imported when the home price was at or under 64s. was to pay a duty of 24s.; when at or under 65s. a duty of 23s. and so on, till the home price should reach 86s. when the duty was reduced to 1s., at which sum it became stationary. Corn imported from Quebec, or from the other British colonies in North America, was to pay only half the duties on other corn. As soon as these resolutions had been agreed to, two bills founded on them, one for regulating the importation of foreign corn, and another for the repeal of the bounty, and for permitting unrestricted exportation, were introduced. Very little attention was paid to the last of these bills, but the one imposing fresh duties on importation encountered a very keen opposition. The manufacturers, and every class not directly supported by agriculture, stigmatized it as an unjustifiable attempt fictitiously to keep up the price of food, and to secure excessive rents, and large profits to the landlords and farmers, at the expense of the consumers. Meetings were very generally held and resolutions entered into, strongly expressive of this sentiment, and dwelling on the fatal consequences, that a continuance of the high prices would have on our manufactures, in a season of peace, when we could no longer exclusively monopolize the commerce of the world. This determined opposition, coupled with the indecision of ministers, and perhaps, too, with an expectation, on the part of some of the landlords, that prices would again rise, without any legislative interference, caused the miscarriage of this bill: The other was passed into a law.
Committees of both Houses of Parliament had been appointed in 1814, to examine evidence and the report on the state of the corn trade, and a great number of the most eminent agriculturists in the kingdom were examined. The witnesses were unanimous in this only, that the protecting prices, fixed in 1804, were insufficient to enable the farmers to make good the engagements into which they had subsequently entered, and to continue the cultivation of the inferior lands, lately brought under tillage. Some of them thought 120s. ought to be fixed as the price when the importation of wheat free of duty should be allowed; others varied from 90s. to 100s.; from 80s. to 90s.; and a few from 70s. to 80s. The general opinion, however, seemed to be, that 80s. would answer; and, as prices continued to decline, a set of resolutions, founded on this assumption, were submitted to the House of Commons by Mr Robin. Resolutions respecting the Corn Trade, submitted to the House of Commons, February 17, 1815.
1st, That it is the opinion of this Committee, that any sort of foreign corn, meal, or flour, which may by law be imported into the United Kingdom, shall at all times be allowed to be brought to the United Kingdom, and to be warehoused there, without payment of any duty whatever.
2d, That such corn, meal, and flour, so warehoused, may at all times be taken out of the warehouse, and be exported, without payment of any duty whatever.
3d, That such corn, meal, or flour, so warehoused, may be taken out of the warehouse, and be entered for home consumption in the United Kingdom, without payment of any duty whatever, whenever foreign corn, meal, or flour, of the same sort shall be admissible into the United Kingdom for home consumption.
4th, That such foreign corn, meal, or flour, shall be permitted to be imported into the United Kingdom, for home consumption, without payment of any duty, whenever the average prices of the several sorts of British corn, made up and published in the manner now by law required, shall be at or above the prices hereafter specified, viz.
| Item | Price per Quarter | |---------------|-------------------| | Wheat | 80s. | | Rye, peas, and beans | 53s. | | Barley, here, or bigg | 40s. | | Oats | 26s. |
But that whenever the average prices of British corn shall, respectively, be below the prices above stated, no foreign corn, or meal, or flour, made from any of the respective sorts of foreign corn above enumerated, shall be allowed to be imported or taken out of warehouse for home consumption, nor shall any foreign flour be at any time importable into Ireland.
5th, That the average prices of the several sorts of British corn, by which the importation of foreign corn, meal, or flour, into the United Kingdom is to be regulated and governed, shall continue to be made up and published in the manner now required by law; but that hereafter, if it shall at any time appear that the average prices of British corn, in the six weeks immediately succeeding the 15th February, 15th May, 15th August, and 15th November in each year, shall have fallen below the prices at which foreign corn, meal, or flour, are by law allowed to be imported for home consumption, no such foreign corn, meal, or flour, shall be allowed to be imported into the United Kingdom, for home consumption, from any place between the rivers Eyder and Garrone, both inclusive, until a new average shall be made up and published in the London Gazette, for regulating the importation into the United Kingdom for the succeeding quarter.
6th, That such corn, meal, or flour, being the produce of any British colony or plantation in North America, as may now by law be imported into the United Kingdom, may hereafter be imported for home consumption without payment of any duty, whenever the average prices of British corn, made up and published as by law required, shall be at or above the prices hereafter specified, viz.
| Item | Price per Quarter | |---------------|-------------------| | Wheat | 67s. | | Rye, peas, and beans | 44s. | | Barley, here, or bigg | 33s. | | Oats | 22s. |
But that whenever the prices of British corn respectively shall be below the prices above specified, corn, or meal, or flour, made from any of the respective sorts of corn above enumerated, the produce of any British colony or plantation in North America, shall no longer be allowed to be imported into the United Kingdom for home consumption.
7th, That such corn, meal, or flour, the produce of any British colony or plantation in North America, as may now by law be imported into the United Kingdom, shall at all times be permitted to be brought there and warehoused, without payment of any duty whatever.
8th, That such corn, meal, or flour, so warehoused, may at all times be taken out of the warehouse and exported, without payment of any duty whatever.
9th, That such corn, meal, or flour, so warehoused, may be taken out of warehouse, and entered for home consumption in the United Kingdom, whenever corn, meal, or flour, of the like description, imported direct from any such colony or plantation, shall be admissible for home consumption, but not otherwise. The policy on which the corn trade of Ireland has been conducted during the last century, is not materially different in its principles from that followed in Great Britain. In 1707, the Irish Parliament, by a statute framed in imitation of the English bounty act of 1689, granted a bounty of 1s. 6d. per quarter on every quarter of wheat exported, when the price was at or under 14s.; of 1s. on the quarter of barley, bere, or bigg, when at or under 10s.; and of 1s. on the quarter of oats when at or under 9s. This act, however, did not, by any means, place the Irish agriculturists on the same footing with those of Great Britain. The bounty scarcely exceeded one-fourth part of what had been granted in this country; and Mr Newenham has shown, that the prices, when it became payable, were fixed much below the average rate at the time. (Natural and Political Circumstances of Ireland, p. 124.)
Although we are very far, indeed, from imagining, that Ireland lost any thing by this different treatment, it at least shows the spirit which then influenced the English Government in its conduct towards that country. If bounties were really beneficial, as they were then supposed to be, Ireland surely had a right to every advantage that could have been derived from them. We had just succeeded in putting a stop to her rising progress in the woollen manufactures; and if the government of England, and its dependents in the Irish Parliament, had not been actuated by a mean and illiberal jealousy of the advancement of Irish agriculture, as well as of Irish manufactures, the same encouragements to cultivation would doubtless have been held forth in both countries.
The bounty continued to be regulated by the act of 1707 till 1755, when its mode of payment was changed; but the amount remained nearly the same. In the reign of his present Majesty, however, a different policy was adopted, and several consecutive laws (5th Geo. III. c. 19, 13th and 14th Geo. III. c. 11, 19th and 20th Geo. III. c. 17) were enacted, by which the bounties were greatly enlarged. At last, in 1784, the celebrated statute, 23rd and 24th Geo. III. c. 19, was passed, by which a bounty of 3s. 4d. was granted on every barrel of wheat weighing 20 stone exported, when the home price was at or under 27s.; of 1s. 7d. on the barrel of barley, bere, and bigg, weighing 16 stone, when at or under 13s. 6d.; and of 1s. 5d. on the barrel of oats, weighing 14 stone, when at or under 10s. These high bounties, coupled with the prohibitory duties imposed at the same time on importation, amounting to 10s. the barrel on wheat, when the home price was at or under 30s.; on barley 10s. when at or under 14s. 6d.; and on oats 5s. when at or under 11s.; gave an extraordinary stimulus to cultivation, and soon caused a very great increase of tillage, and in the exports of corn from Ireland.
It is extremely doubtful, however, notwithstanding the encomiums which have been lavished on the act of 1784 by Mr Newenham and others, whether this increase of tillage has not been really prejudicial. The nature of the soil, and the humidity of the climate, render Ireland much better fitted for pasturage than for cropping. Mr Young, who is certainly a very competent judge of such matters, asserts, that wheat, and other kinds of grain raised in that country, are decidedly inferior in quality to those of Britain; that the crops too, even under the best management, are full of grass and weeds; and that the harvests are generally wet and tedious. Now, surely the mere extension of tillage under such circumstances, and this has really been the whole effect of the bounty, could not possibly be advantageous. If the agriculture of Ireland had been improved, if more produce had now been obtained with less labour than formerly, and if the cottage system, the bane and curse of that kingdom, had been losing ground,—it might have been justly contended, that the immediate effects of the bounty had been beneficial. But it has not had, and could not rationally be expected to have, any such consequences. "Perhaps," says Mr Wakefield, "I shall be told that Ireland, under the present system, is improving; and that rents, of late years, have considerably risen. Rents will rise by an extension, as well as by an improvement of tillage; they will rise from an increase in the price of produce, and it is well known that they have risen in consequence of an enlargement of circulating medium. To these causes I ascribe the latter circumstance, the truth of which I fully admit, though I absolutely deny the former. If any one will show me farming buildings of a late erection, or point out a single plough of a proper construction, in the hands of an Irish farmer, whose only means of support is the cultivation of the soil, I will allow that some improvement has taken place. Is any competent judge prepared to say, that fewer acres, in proportion to the whole tillage land, are cultivated with the spade, than there were twenty years ago? Some, perhaps, may consider this system as beneficial, by affording employment to the people; but, it might be observed on the other hand, that to count the grams of wheat in every barrel, would furnish them employment also. In every case of this kind we ought to look to the result; for employment is useful only as it becomes productive." (Account of Ireland, Statistical and Political, Vol. I. p. 582.)
It appears much more reasonable to ascribe any real improvement which may have taken place in Ireland since 1784, to the comparative degree of freedom then conferred on that country,—to the abolition of various restrictions previously imposed on its industry,—and, above all, to the political privileges conferred on the Catholics,—rather than to the mere granting a bounty on the export of corn.
* Such improvements in agriculture as enable a greater quantity of produce to be procured with the same expenditure of capital and labour, instead of increasing, lower rent. It is by the investment of capital, with a diminished return, and by the bringing of poorer lands under cultivation, that rent is really raised. A great proportion of the people were formerly a degraded sect, viewed with jealousy and aversion by the ruling few, and deprived of all political power; and it was natural to expect that a very marked improvement in their circumstances should take place, after they had been in some measure restored to the enjoyment of their natural rights; and after they had become really interested in the improvement of their country. This, in our opinion, is the chief source of the recent improvement of Ireland, which, instead of being accelerated, has been kept back by the bounty. By suddenly raising prices, that measure certainly stimulated the cultivation of the soil; but the want of capital, and the consequent difficulty of finding farmers capable of taking large farms, coupled with the general predilection of the people in favour of small ones, have conspired to cause a still more minute division of property, and to give a factitious stimulus to the production of an overabundant and morbid population. It is not, it must be recollected, by the mere fact of an increase in the numbers of a people (and it is on this that Mr Newenham principally relies, when contending for the favourable effects of the bounty) that we can determine as to whether it has been really beneficial. If it were possible, and we trust it is not, to give the English and Scottish peasants the same habits as those of Ireland,—to render them satisfied with potatoes, with mud cottages, and with rags and wretchedness,—their numbers would rapidly increase; but it would, at the same time, be indisputable that their situation would be altered very much to the worse. In the same way, if we could inspire the people of Ireland with the same taste for superior comforts, for cleanliness, and for good living, which so eminently and honourably distinguishes the same class in England, their number would perhaps be diminished, but their social condition would certainly be rendered much more enviable than at present. More happiness, more independent feeling, more, in short, of every thing that is either desirable or praiseworthy, will be found in a country possessed of 100,000 well fed, well clothed, and well educated inhabitants; than are to be found in a nation peopled with multitudes of human beings pressing against the limits of subsistence, and sunk in poverty and ignorance.
The endeavouring to impress on the minds of the lower classes the propriety of being contented with the simplest and cheapest fare, is extremely pernicious to the best interests of mankind. Encouragements ought not to be bestowed on those who are contented with mere necessaries. On the contrary, such indifference ought to be held disgraceful. A taste for the comforts, the enjoyments, and even the luxuries of life, should be as widely diffused as possible, and if possible interwoven with the national character and prejudices. This, as it appears to us, is the best mode of attempting the amelioration of the condition of the lower classes. Luxurious, and, if you will have it so, even wasteful habits, are incomparably better than that cold, sluggish apathy, which would content itself with what can barely continue mere animal existence. "In those countries," Mr Ricardo judiciously observes, "where the labouring classes have the fewest wants, and are contented with the cheapest food, the people are exposed to the greatest vicissitudes and miseries. They have no place of refuge from calamity; they cannot seek safety in a lower station; they are already so low, that they can fall no lower. On any deficiency of the chief article of their subsistence, there are few substitutes of which they can avail themselves, and dearth to them is attended with almost all the evils of famine."
The corn law of 1804, the first framed subsequently to the Union, extended to Ireland, and the price at which the bounty became payable on the exportation of wheat from that country, was raised to 29s. 4d. per barrel, and of rye to 20s. 4d.; the price at which the bounty was given on the exportation of oats remained the same, and almost no alteration was made on the amount of the bounties themselves.
But the shackles which an absurd policy had, at Act of 1806, different times (See 33rd Geo. III. c. 65, 42nd Geo. III. establishing c. 55, 44th Geo. III. c. 65, &c.), imposed on the free importation and exportation of corn between Great Britain and Ireland, were not removed by the act of twelfth 1804. These impolitic restraints were, however, abolished very soon after; and the act of 1806 (46th Geo. III. c. 97), which established a perfect freedom in the corn-trade between the two great divisions of the empire, has, perhaps, contributed more to its general advantage and prosperity, than any other enactment framed in this reign.
The provisions of the late act regulating export and import, are the same in Ireland as in Great Britain. The averages, however, by which the opening and shutting of the ports are regulated, are framed with reference to the price of British corn only; and as prices are always lower in Ireland than in this country, the restriction on importation will there operate most efficaciously.
II. PRINCIPLES OF THE CORN LAWS.
Having completed this sketch of the History of the Corn Laws, we shall now briefly examine the Principles on which they have been founded: And as there exists no difference of opinion respecting the propriety of giving an unbounded freedom of exportation, we shall confine our inquiries to the policy of encouraging this exportation by means of a bounty, and of laying restrictions on importation.
That this subject may be properly understood, it is necessary to premise, that the value of corn, like that of every other commodity, is regulated, in every stage of society, solely by the greater or less quantity of labour necessary to its production under the most
* Our readers will find a very ample and instructive discussion respecting the effects of the inland bounty on the importation of corn into Dublin, in the Appendix to Mr Young's Tour in Ireland. unfavourable circumstances. A bushel of wheat might be obtained from the rich soil in the Carse of Gowrie, at a half or a third of the expense necessary to produce it in less favoured situations, and might therefore be sold for a half or a third of the price of the other. But, if the demand is such as requires the cultivation of inferior lands, the price of the produce of the richer lands must be elevated to such a height as will admit of the ordinary profits of stock being realized on the poorest. If it were not raised to this height, the cultivation of the inferior lands would be abandoned, and the necessary supplies of food would no longer be obtained.
In the earlier stages of society, and whenever the population is very limited, the best lands only will be cultivated; and as they will yield a large produce with comparatively little labour, its relative or exchangeable value will be proportionably low. But, as society advances, and as the population becomes more numerous, recourse must be had to inferior soils. A greater expenditure of capital and labour will then be required to produce the same quantity of corn; and, of course, the value of corn, compared with other commodities, in the production of which no additional quantity of labour had been required, must be increased.
The raising of raw produce is, therefore, extremely different from every other species of industry. In manufactures, the worst machinery is first set in motion, and every day its powers are improved; and it is rendered capable of yielding a greater amount of produce with the same expense. The discovery of a new machine, or of a more expeditious and less expensive mode of manufacturing, very soon supersedes the older and clumsier machinery previously in use; while the consequent competition never fails to reduce the price of commodities to the sum which the least expensive method of production, necessarily requires for their manufacture.
In agriculture, on the contrary, the best machinery, that is, the best soils, are first brought under cultivation, and recourse is afterwards had to inferior soils, requiring a greater expenditure of capital and labour to produce the same supplies. The improvements made in the construction of farming implements, and the ameliorations of agricultural management which occasionally occur in the progress of society, really reduce the price of raw produce; and, operating like the improvements made in manufacturing machinery, so far assimilate the two species of industry. Any fall, however, which may take place in the real price of raw produce, as it will enable every class of society to procure a greater quantity of it than before, in exchange for their manufactured commodities, or for their labour, must raise the profits of stock; and, of course, must lead to an increased accumulation of capital. But the industry of a nation being always in proportion to the amount of its capital, "this accumulation necessarily leads to a greater demand for labour, to higher wages, to an increased population, and consequently to a further demand for raw produce, and to an increased cultivation." (Ricardo, Principles, &c., p. 70.) Agricultural improvements check, for a time, the necessity of having recourse to inferior soils, but the check can only be temporary. The stimulus which they, at the same time, apply to population, soon equalizes the demand with the supply, and, by a re-action of a different kind, raises prices, and forces the cultivation of poor lands.
The exchangeable value of raw produce, therefore (though improvements in agriculture, and other circumstances, may occasionally reduce it), has a natural and constant tendency to rise as society advances. As it becomes more difficult to raise food, it necessarily exchanges for a greater quantity of other produce. Not merely its nominal, but its real price is increased; and no person can have the same command over it as before, without making a proportionably greater sacrifice of labour, or of some other equivalent.
It is this circumstance, and not the accumulation of capital, which, in all old settled and populous countries, by raising wages, reduces the profits of stock, and checks, or at least retards, their future progress. The exchangeable value of a commodity not being regulated by the price at which the labour necessary to its production is paid, but by the quantity of that labour, it is obvious that every increase in the wages of workmen must lessen that share of the commodity they manufacture, which belongs to the capitalist, or, what is the same thing, must lessen the profits of stock.
Supposing the value of money to be invariable, and the quantity of labour necessary to produce L.1000 worth of gloves to remain the same, the gloves would continue to sell for that sum, whether the wages of the labour necessary to their production amounted to L.600, to L.800, or to L.900. The rise of wages, it must be remembered, is supposed to be quite general; and hence, if the L.1000 worth of gloves had freely exchanged before wages rose for a certain quantity of boots, stockings, coats, &c., they will do the same thing afterwards, unless the labour necessary for the manufacture of these other commodities has been increased or diminished; for, it is evident that a rise of wages which equally affects different commodities leaves their relative values unaltered.
If the rise of wages was not universal, and if the glove manufacturer alone had to pay, say 10 per cent. additional on the wages of his workmen, while the manufacturer of boots, stockings, coats, &c., paid the only former rate of wages, he would either have to obtain a greater quantity of these commodities in exchange for his gloves, or he would be forced to abandon his trade altogether. But such a state of things could not possibly continue. There would immediately be an influx of labourers into the glove manufactory; and their increase in one department of
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* For a complete demonstration of this most important and fundamental principle, see Mr Ricardo's excellent work on the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation.
As soon, however, as this adjustment had taken place, the relative or exchangeable values of these different commodities would be precisely the same as before the rise of wages. The glove manufacturer could not say to the stocking manufacturer that he must now have a greater quantity of stockings in exchange for his gloves, because he paid a higher rate of wages, for the other would have it in his power to answer that the same rise affected him to exactly the same extent. Commodities would, therefore, continue to sell after the rise for the very same price as before, but the proceeds would be differently divided. A greater share would belong to the labourer, and a less to the capitalist, or, what is the same thing, the profits of stock would be diminished.
The fluctuations in the value of money obscure, but do not in the smallest degree affect the relation between profits and wages. A rise or fall in the real wages of labour, the only one we are here considering, results entirely from a greater or less proportion of its produce belonging to the different classes of workmen and capitalists. When a greater share is assigned to the workman at one period than another, his wages are really augmented, and when a smaller share, they are as really diminished, whatever may be the state of money wages.
It has, indeed, been contended, that the price of labour has no connection with the price of food, and that the former being regulated solely by the state of the supply and the demand, the enhancing of the price of corn does not necessarily cause any increase in the wages of labour, and consequently does not tend to reduce the profits of stock. But the cost of rearing and maintaining labourers, independent of all other considerations, determines the very lowest limit to which the prices of labour can permanently fall. In a manufacturing country the rate of wages is, no doubt, exposed to great fluctuations, and a stagnation may take place in trade at the same time that corn is rising, and the labouring class may at once experience an increase in the price of provisions and a fall of wages. But, if this rise in the price of corn be of a permanent nature, and if manufacturers do not allow a corresponding rise in the price of labour, the principle of population will begin to operate, and, by lessening the supply of workmen, will ultimately raise wages to their proper level.
It may perhaps be objected, that this is too rigorous a view of the matter, and that in countries where labour has been well rewarded, and where not more than one-third or two-fifths of the wages of workmen have been directly expended in the purchase of corn, an increase in the price of bread and meal would rather serve as an inducement to retrench from what was not essentially necessary, than to lessen the supply of hands. Few, however, if any, of the countries of Europe are in this situation; and, as labourers constitute by far the greatest portion of every society, certainly no system of policy can be recommended which has any tendency to diminish their hard-earned comforts. The experience of all ages has shown that a needy starving populace lose a just sense of their dignity and rights as men, and become depraved and enslaved. It is in vain to expect industry where it does not meet with a suitable reward; men will not submit to privations and labour, but in the hope of securing corresponding comforts.
According to Mr Young, to whose meritorious exertions we are indebted for much valuable and accurate information respecting political and rural economy, the mean price of agricultural labour in 1767, 1768, and 1770, was about 7s. 6d. per week, or 1s. 3d. per day. Mr Young further states the mean price of labour in 1810 and 1811 at 14s. 6d. per week, or 2s. 5d. per day, being a rise of nearly cent. per cent. on the former period. But he estimates the average rise on bread, meat, butter, and cheese, during the same interval, at 135 per cent.; and, consequently, wages were really higher in 1770 than in 1810, by the difference, or 35 per cent. Since 1813 the price of corn has fallen, but it is still double its price in 1770; and the average price of labour being now less than its then price, the situation of the independent poor is evidently altered, very much indeed to the worse.
It may perhaps be thought, that this fact contradicts the arguments by which we have endeavoured to establish the ultimate equality of prices and wages. But the increased price of commodities in this country during the war, was prevented from having its full effect in raising wages, by the operation of the poor laws. Labourers were not deterred from marrying, as they knew that a fund was by law set aside for their support; and as they were certain, that, if the wages of labour would not suffice to rear a family, the deficiency would be made up by the parish. The comparative cheapness of labour has not, therefore, redounded, in the smallest degree, to the advantage of the employers of workmen. What they have saved as wages, they have paid as poor rates: And, as Mr Birkbeck has justly observed, the expense of labour in England is so much the greater, as it always costs more to maintain a pauper than to preserve an industrious man from poverty.
If, therefore, a bounty on exportation, or restrictions on importation, raise the exchangeable value, or the real price of corn, they will also raise the rate of wages. But, as the exchangeable value of manufactured commodities is not enhanced by a rise in the price of labour, it is evident, that the profits of stock, and the power of accumulating capital, must be diminished proportionably to the fictitious increase in the price of corn.
By extending the market for corn, when a bounty is first granted, the money price of raw produce is raised, and agricultural profits being elevated above... Principles of the general level, there is an influx of capital from other departments, until they are again reduced. Thus far a bounty accomplishes its object, and gives at least a temporary stimulus to cultivation. If the newly employed capital rendered the same returns as the capital previously invested in raising corn, its real price would not be increased. But, as we have already observed, this cannot be the case long. Discoveries in agriculture may, for a while, prevent recourse being had to poor soils, but the constant increase of population will, in the end, force their cultivation. Now, the bounty has, in this respect, precisely the same effects as an increase of population. Both extend the demand for corn; and as, by this extension of the demand, we are at length forced to employ inferior machinery, or worse land, in order to raise the additional supplies, their value must be augmented.
Thus, if the prices of corn in Britain and Spain were nearly on a level, no exportation from the one to the other would take place. But if, when prices are in this situation, a bounty, say of 10s. per quarter, is granted by our government, corn would be immediately poured from England into Spain. Limits would, it is true, be soon set to this exportation and importation. The competition which takes place among exporters, as among every other class of traders, prevents their realizing more than the common and ordinary profits of stock, and hence grain would be exported from England to Spain, not with the expectation of realizing the whole of the bounty as profits, but with the view merely of securing the ordinary rate of profits on the capital employed in its transfer. A rise of prices, though not to the whole extent of the bounty, would therefore be immediately felt in this country, and a corresponding fall in Spain. Nor would this rise and fall of price be temporary. Corn would be permanently reduced in Spain, because the unusual cheapness of the foreign supplies would throw the poorest lands out of tillage; and it would be permanently raised in England, because the increased demand would stimulate the bringing of them under cultivation. A bounty, to the extent we have supposed, would perhaps depress prices 5s. per quarter in Spain, and raise them as much in Britain. To the Spanish nation it would be extremely advantageous, as it would enable them to purchase the most indispensable necessary of life at so much less than they could otherwise have done; in Britain, however, its effects would be directly opposite. A few more of our heaths and of our bogs would indeed be cultivated, but every class of persons in the kingdom, landlords alone excepted, would find it more difficult to procure food than before. The higher price of our corn, supposing it not to raise wages and diminish the profits of stock, which it would most unquestionably do, would obviously be of no advantage, and could not enrich the public, since it would in the end be exactly apportioned to the greater difficulty experienced in raising the additional quantity.
Every bounty is objectionable as producing an unnatural and fictitious distribution of the national capital; but a bounty on any manufactured commodity would not increase the quantity of labour necessary to its production, and, of course, would not raise its exchangeable value. In this respect, a bounty which has for its object to stimulate the raising of raw produce, is the most impolitic of any, inasmuch as it not only occasions a faulty distribution of capital, but also raises the cost of production, and, consequently, the real price of the articles produced.
The argument that Dr Smith has brought forward against granting a bounty is, therefore, untenable. The nature of things has not, as this great political economist imagined, stamped upon corn a real and unalterable value. The variations in its exchangeable value, including the effect of scarcity, and of extraordinarily luxuriant crops, though somewhat slow, are extremely perceptible at distant periods. The wheat which is raised at an immense expense from a worthless bog or morass, must surely have a greater value than that which, in an earlier stage of society, was raised almost spontaneously from rich alluvial lands. "It is natural," as Dr Smith has himself observed, "that what is usually the produce of two days' or two hours' labour, should be worth double of what is usually the produce of one day's or one hour's labour."
"If good land existed in a quantity much more abundant than the production of food for an increasing population required, or if capital could be indefinitely employed without a diminished return on the old land, there could be no rise of rent; for rent invariably proceeds from the employment of an additional quantity of labour, with a proportionally less return." (Ricardo, Principles of Political Economy, p. 58.) Now, as bounties force us to have recourse to poor soils, and, consequently, diminish the productive power of fresh capital when applied to land, they must powerfully contribute to raise rent, and are, therefore, essentially beneficial to the landlords. To every other class of society, however, their effects are diametrically opposite. They are not merely burdened with the tax necessary to pay the bounty, and compelled to pay an additional price for their most indispensable necessaries, but the returns derived from capital are universally diminished. Farmers may, indeed, derive, during the currency of their leases, some advantage from a bounty, but it cannot be permanent. An increase in the cost of raising raw produce reduces the profits of agricultural as well as of every other stock. At the expiration of the farmer's lease his rent is raised, and he will be obliged to employ an additional number of labourers, and to pay them higher wages, while the rise in the price of his produce, as it can only be proportioned to the rise of his rent, or to the additional number of his labourers, will not compensate him for the rise in the rate of wages.
In as far, therefore, as bounties on exportation, or restrictions on the importation of corn, tend to raise its real price, or to prevent it from falling, they must also tend to diminish the general profits of stock, or to prevent their rising to what they would otherwise be, if no restrictions on importation existed. But bounties in every case, and restrictions on importation where, as in Britain, they are effectual, not only tend to lessen the profits of stock, and to check the accumulation of capital, but they stimulate its transference to other countries. The love of country, the thousand ties of society and friendship, the ignorance of foreign languages, and the desire of having one's funds employed under their own inspection, will, no doubt, in many cases, induce capitalists to put up with a less rate of profit in their own, than they might receive by employing their funds in other countries. But the love of country has its limits. The love of gain is a no less powerful and constantly operating principle, and if capitalists are once assured that their stock can be laid out with equal security, and with considerably greater advantage in foreign states, a transference to a greater or less degree will unquestionably take place.
In the fifth edition of his Essay on Population (Vol. II. p. 246), Mr Malthus has dwelt at considerable length on the superior advantages enjoyed by a manufacturing country possessing great resources in land. He conceives, that such a country "would go on increasing in riches and strength, although surrounded by Bishop Berkeley's wall of brass." When manufacturing capital became redundant, and manufactured commodities too cheap, it would have no occasion to wait for the increasing raw produce of its neighbours. Its own redundant manufacturing capital would be transferred to land; and, on the same principle, when the price of raw produce fell too low, the capital employed in raising it would be consigned to manufactures. In this way, the national prosperity might, in Mr Malthus's opinion, be indefinitely prolonged.
If this able apologist of the restrictive system had extended this reasoning to the world at large, or at least to the commercial part of it, it would have been quite unexceptionable. But unless this particular country were actually surrounded by a wall of brass, capital would be withdrawn from it as soon as the increase of population had forced the cultivation of poorer soils than those in its immediate vicinity, or as soon as the real price of its raw produce had become comparatively high. Mr Malthus would readily admit, that no capitalist would rest satisfied with a less rate of profit in Devonshire, and would not continue to pay his labourers at a higher rate in that county, than in Yorkshire; but would affirm, with every other economist, that either the profits of stock must be increased, and the rate of wages reduced in Devonshire, or that a transference of capital would take place. And if he had recollected, that the laws which regulate the distribution of capital, between different provinces of the same kingdom, are the same with those which ultimately regulate its distribution among different and independent kingdoms, he could not have failed to perceive the extreme erroneousness of his conclusions, when applied to the case of a nation having any intercourse with its neighbours.
This is the worst view that can be taken of the system of bounties and restrictions. To establish their impolicy, it is sufficient to show, that they necessarily check the accumulation or the increase of that fund, which can alone support labour and set it in motion, and by whose extent, the extent of the industry of the country must always be regulated. But if they do not merely check the accumulation of capital, but also force it abroad, we must be satisfied that they are among the very worst expedients to which, in order to secure some temporary advantage, or to remedy some temporary difficulty, a short-sighted policy can have recourse.
It has, however, been contended, that although the first effect of the bounty is to raise prices, yet have no that, by attracting an unusually great capital to land, it ultimately causes a glut of the market, and a fall of price. That this statement may to a certain extent be consistent with fact, and that a glut of the market, sufficient to cause a temporary depression of prices, may be produced by a bounty, we do not mean to deny; but such depression cannot last for any length of time, unless the real price of corn, that is to say, unless the labour necessary for its production, has also been diminished.
When an unusual demand has been at any time experienced for corn, and when capital is in consequence moving from manufactures to land, whether there shall be subsequently any permanent rise or fall of price, depends entirely on the circumstance of equal quantities of this newly employed capital being less or more productive, than the capital previously engaged in agriculture. This fresh capital cannot, however, be more productive, except from an improvement in the manner of working land, or from a saving of labour, which it is evident might equally take place without any bounty, and cannot be occasioned by it; and if it is expended, unaccompanied by any such improvement, it must either raise prices, or be in a great measure lost to the proprietors; for if the poorest soils in tillage do not yield the ordinary rate of profit, their cultivation must be abandoned.
In reference to the idea of a bounty glutting the home market, it may be observed, that that circumstance will very seldom happen, except in seasons when there is an extraordinarily luxuriant crop, and of course very low prices, in the country in which the grain exported by means of the bounty is usually sold. If Great Britain were regularly in the habit of exporting corn, either by a bounty or otherwise, to Spain, the average prices of both kingdoms would ere long become nearly stationary, at a rate such, that the cost of a quarter of wheat in Spain would exceed that of a quarter in England, by the cost of transporting it from the one to the other, including in that cost the profits of the capital employed in the carrying trade, insurance, &c. If such, however, was the case in ordinary years, it would be very different when there was any great diversity in the crops. When prices suddenly fell in Spain, exportation from England would as suddenly cease, and would not be again renewed until the fall in this country, caused by the cessation of the foreign demand, had been as great as in Spain. A nation which exports corn, is liable to fluctuations Principles of price, not merely from the state of its own harvests, but also from those of its customers, and inasmuch as a bounty gives a factitious extension to exportation, it must also tend to render prices less steady.
But supposing the accuracy of this statement to be admitted, it may still be contended, that a nation which exports an extra quantity of corn by means of a bounty, has, at least, a greater resource in years of scarcity than a nation in a different situation. This idea, however, though extremely plausible, and to a certain extent correct, is, in the main, fallacious. If the deficiency of the crop did not exceed the ordinary quantity of corn exported, there would not certainly be any considerable rise of price, but if the deficiency exceeds that quantity, the situation of an exporting country must evidently be a great deal worse than that of a regularly importing one. In the latter, a slight rise of prices would induce a much greater importation, but in an exporting country, prices must not only be raised by the whole cost of the carriage from foreign ports, but by an additional sum, sufficient to determine importation into new channels.
Thus, a deficiency of the crop in Poland, which did not exceed the quantity of corn ordinarily exported from that country, would not have any material effect on prices; but, in order to cause an importation to make up for a deficiency of a greater extent, prices would have to rise, not merely higher than ordinary, but decidedly higher than the prices of those countries to which Poland had previously been in the habit of exporting.
Again, in seasons when there is a luxuriant crop in a country exporting by means of a bounty, it operates with double effect, and very little of the surplus is stored up to answer the home consumption in case of future exigencies. By forcing exportation, it hinders, as Dr Smith has observed, the plenty of one year from relieving the distresses of another, and therefore occasions, in years of scarcity, a greater importation than would otherwise have been necessary.
These conclusions do not depend on theory only. If we compare the prices from 1688 to 1766, the period of the operation of the bounty, and when the exports almost always exceeded the imports, with the prices of the period from 1765 to 1792, when the corn trade enjoyed a tolerable degree of freedom, and when importation and exportation were regulated nearly by the state of the supply and the demand, we shall find that prices varied a great deal more in the former period than in the latter. Keeping out of view the years in which the coin was degraded or its value fluctuating, in 1724 the price of the Winchester quarter of middling wheat was 32s. 10½d. and in the following year it had risen to 43s. 13½d.; in 1727 it fell to 37s. 4d. and, in 1728, it rose to 48s. 6d. The average price of 1740 and 1741 was 43s. 4d. and of 1743 and 1744 only 22s. 1d. a fall of almost cent. per cent. And, again, in 1754 and 1755, the average price was 30s. 5d. and in 1756, 1757, and 1758, it was as high as 46s. 8d. The greatest difference of price from 1711 to 1765, is that between the price of 1744, or 22s. 1d. and that of 1757, or 53s. 4d. amounting to no less than 14½ per cent. On the other hand, the lowest price of the period from 1765 to 1792, is that of 1779, or 36s. 2d. and the highest that of 1773, or 59s. 2d. a difference of about 86 per cent. So much for the bounty steadying prices.
We hope we have now said enough to show the impolicy and pernicious tendency of the bounty. With our present comparatively high prices, we are indeed secured against its operation, should it be attempted again to renew it, as nothing but the granting an extremely large bounty, or, what is just the same thing, the imposing an extremely heavy tax on the country, could render our corn, in ordinary years, sufficiently cheap for the foreign market. Corn.
The few following remarks shall, therefore, be directed solely to the propriety of restricting importation. And as we have already shown that the restrictive system, whenever it prevents purchasing in the cheapest market, and thereby fictitiously keeps up the price of corn, must, as well as the bounty, be exposed to the fundamental objection of diminishing the profits of capital and forcing it abroad; we shall now content ourselves with adverting to the security which the restrictive system is supposed to afford, of furnishing an independent and ample supply of provisions.
In the first place, it may be observed, that where one nation has been, for a series of years, in the habit of importing corn from another, it must have exported some more acceptable produce as an equivalent. The farmers of the corn growing country will, after this commerce is established, calculate as much upon the demand of the importing country, as on that of their own citizens. They will cultivate an additional quantity of land, raise larger crops, and consequently pay higher rents, solely because they are assured of this vent for their produce. The benefits of this intercourse are, therefore, reciprocal, and the corn growers, as much as the corn buyers, are interested in a continuance of the traffic, and would suffer as much by its cessation. "When we consider," says Mr Ricardo, "the value of even a few weeks consumption of corn in England, no interruption could be given to the export trade, if the Continent supplied us with any considerable quantity of corn, without the most extensively ruinous commercial distress,—distress which no sovereign, or combination of sovereigns, would be willing to inflict on their people; and, though willing, it would be a measure, to which, probably, no people would submit. It was the endeavour of Bonaparte to prevent the exportation of the raw produce of Russia, more than any other cause, which produced the astonishing efforts of the people of that country against the most powerful force, perhaps, ever assembled to subjugate a nation." (Essay on the Profits of Stock, p. 29.)
But, when a nation adopts a policy like that on which we are now acting, and refuses to admit any foreign corn, except when the home price reaches a height indicating scarcity, she must then, it is obvious, contend in a market to which no corn has been brought, with a view to answer her demand. The difficulties we have experienced in importing have principles of been greatly exaggerated; but they result, in fact, from the nature of our own policy respecting it. Perpetually fluctuating between bounties, restrictions, and prohibitions, no foreign country can ever calculate on our continuing to import their corn. We may buy a million of quarters to-day, but we shall, perhaps, buy no more for a couple of twelvemonths. If our demand was steady, if we regularly imported, additional supplies would be raised for our market; foreign rents would be raised, and not merely farmers, but landlords, would be interested in procuring us whatever quantity of corn we might require. But, in the present state of our corn trade, we only enter the foreign market as strangers. Our orders may be expected, but they cannot be reckoned on; and hence, whatever supplies we may procure, being withdrawn from the ordinary stock, foreign prices are speedily raised, exportation checked, and the home price allowed to reach an excessive height.
Most foreign states have indeed fixed a statutory price at which exportation shall always cease. But this price is much higher than the average; and although our corn trade were unrestricted, the importations into this country would not have much effect in raising prices abroad, as a greater production would universally take place; and foreign powers, becoming sensible of the advantages of a perfectly free trade, would soon repeal this limitation.
When a merely temporary liberty is granted to import, the operations and the enterprise of merchants are alike cramped. They cannot order corn from distant countries, lest the price should have fallen before it arrives, and the ports be shut. They are compelled to have recourse to countries in our immediate vicinity; their orders must be given on the spur of the moment; and all that consideration and combination, necessary to ensure the success of every complex transaction, are unavoidably excluded.
The corn law of 1815 has indeed given liberty at any time to import and warehouse foreign grain duty free, to be again re-exported, or used for home consumption when the price reaches 80s.; but this liberty does not seem to be of much consequence. Corn is at once a bulky and a perishable commodity; and no capitalist would choose to employ his funds in importing it, unless there was a strong probability, that prices would very soon attain the limit when it might be sold. Corn will at all times be stored up for a market such as that of Amsterdam, because it may there be disposed of at the pleasure of the holder, and its sale is not regulated by any contingent circumstance. In this country, the case is very different. An unforeseen change of weather will often check the rise of prices, at the very time a further rise was confidently expected; and even the warehousing of any considerable quantity of foreign grain, would of itself have a similar, though a much less effect. By giving no freedom to mercantile operations, and by preventing the importer from disposing of his commodity when he thinks proper, this system, in ordinary years, must put an end to the warehousing trade altogether.
"Never," says an intelligent writer, "could there have been a greater inducement to warehouse than in the past year (1816). The season was unpropitious from the beginning, and all Europe seemed likely to suffer with ourselves, and yet not only was this warehousing carried to a very small extent, but our wheat was sent out of the country when it could have been procured for less than 50s. the quarter."
In the second place, the wider the surface from which a country derives its supplies of food, the less will it be exposed to fluctuations of price, arising from favourable or unfavourable seasons. A general failure of the crops of an extensive kingdom is a calamity that but seldom occurs. The weather that is unfavourable to vegetation in one species of soil is frequently advantageous to it in another. If moist clayey lands suffer from a wet summer, the crops are rendered more luxuriant in dry rocky districts. The excess of produce in one province compensates for its deficiency in another; and, except in anomalous cases, the total supply is nearly the same. But, if this be true of a single nation, it is always true in reference to the world at large. No one instance of universal scarcity blackens the history of mankind; but it is constantly found, that when the crops of one country fail, plenty reigns in some other quarter. A freedom of trade is alone wanted to guarantee a country like Britain, abounding in all the varied products of industry, in merchandise suited to the wants of every society, from the possibility of a scarcity. The nations of the earth are not condemned to throw the dice to determine which of them shall submit to famine. There is always abundance of food in the world. To enjoy a constant plenty, we have only to lay aside our prohibitions and restrictions, and to cease to counteract the benevolent wisdom of Providence.
The case of Holland strongly corroborates the truth of all we have stated. In the days of her greatest prosperity, she was chiefly fed with imported corn, and the prices there were extremely moderate; and, what is of infinite consequence, were steadier than in any country of Europe. Even during the convulsions of the last twenty years, and when her former commercial connections had been almost all dissolved, prices fluctuated very little.
A nation circumstanced like Great Britain, with prices infinitely higher than in surrounding nations, and growing nearly its own average supplies of corn, cannot fail to experience a very great and sudden fall of price when the market is glutted by a more than ordinarily luxuriant crop. If a year of unusual abundance should chance to follow a year in which prices had been rather higher than ordinary, and when a considerable quantity of foreign grain had been engrossed into our disposable produce, it is almost certain we should experience a glut. There can, however, be no steady and continued exertion of agricultural industry, where prices are exposed to great revulsions. Agriculture can only flourish where they are steady, or where they are progressively advancing. It does not seem possible, however, to guard against such fluctuations under our present system. While it is persevered in, an unusually luxuriant crop will be nearly as prejudicial to the farmers, as a deficient one is injurious to the consum- Before any part of our surplus produce can be exported to almost any foreign market, it must decline 30s. or 40s. per quarter below what has been reckoned its growing price, or 80s.
Perhaps the most imposing of all the arguments which Mr Malthus has urged against the policy of allowing an unrestricted corn trade, proceeds on the assumption, that ultimately every agricultural nation will manufacture for itself, and will cease purchasing from abroad. But surely Mr Malthus does not mean to insinuate, that, in the progress of society, there will be no interchange of manufactured commodities for raw produce carried on between different countries! It is evidently impossible such a state of things can ever be brought about until the cost of raising raw produce in all the different commercial countries of the world shall be the same. America may, and it is highly probable will, very soon manufacture cotton goods for her own consumption; but while the cost of raising wheat is less in that republic than in England, it will be exported to us in return for some species of our produce. Nothing but the having recourse to the enactments of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and prohibiting exportation altogether, can possibly prevent corn being sold where its exchangeable value is greatest.
That the profits of stock are diminished by the accumulation of capital, is supposed in every part of Mr Malthus' observations on the corn laws. This opinion is, however, fundamentally erroneous. Commodities being, in every case, bought with commodities, their multiplication cannot occasion any fall of the exchangeable value of one another. If, under any given circumstances, ten pairs of gloves exchanged for ten pairs of stockings, and ten quarters of wheat for ten pairs of boots, they will, in the same circumstances, continue, provided they are all increased in the same relative proportions, to preserve precisely the same exchangeable value, one with another, to whatever extent their quantities may be augmented. Thus, supposing the capital engaged in the different branches of trade and industry, to be adjusted in such a manner, that, all things considered, every branch yielded nearly the same rate of profit, it is evident that any amount of additional capital which was invested in them all, according to the same ratio of distribution, would not sink the price of any one article—each would sell for precisely the same sum it sold for before, and if wages remained stationary, the profits of stock would neither be increased nor diminished. If too much of one commodity, as of cotton for example, is manufactured, its relative value will fall, and the profits of the stock employed in the cotton trade will be reduced, but such an effect can only be temporary. Some other department must, at the same time, be understocked, and, yielding larger profits, will attract the surplus capital employed in the cotton manufacture. We have, therefore, no reason to be alarmed at the effects of competition in any department. The manufacture of one commodity opens up a market for the exchange, that is, for the sale of some other commodity, and no commercial nation has anything to fear from the progress of its neighbours. What it has really to fear is, that the average profits of its capital do not fall lower than the average rate of profit in the surrounding nations. If this is the case, its future progress will be clogged and retarded, and it will ultimately languish and decline. Neither the skill, industry, and perseverance of artisans, nor the most improved machinery, can permanently bear up against a constantly diminishing rate of profits. And such a comparative diminution of profit, let it be recollected, is always produced by a fictitious enhancement of the price of corn.
The most popular defence of the corn laws, and perhaps the only additional one we shall notice, rests on the ground, that as exclusive advantages are granted to different manufactures, agriculture ought, in strict justice, to be placed in the same favoured situation. But it was long ago demonstrated, that it cannot possibly be the interest of any state to manufacture at home, what it might purchase cheaper abroad. If, therefore, any of our manufactures, as that of silk, could not exist if a free trade were allowed, it would be for the general advantage that they were given up, and the capital vested in them employed in some other species of industry. The manufacturers of Gloucestershire, in their excellent resolutions against the late corn bill, expressed, in the strongest manner, their acquiescence in the doctrine of a free trade, and stated their perfect willingness to sacrifice any exclusive privileges they might enjoy, to the attaining that desirable object. It is, indeed, beyond all question, that a free trade would be very much for the advantage of those manufactures, part of which are at present exported. The fall that would then take place in the price of provisions and of labour, would much more than compensate any disadvantage the woollen manufacturers might experience, from a rise in the raw material; and in the cotton manufacture, the advantages would not be counterbalanced in the slightest degree.
"Because," says Mr Ricardo, referring to this argument, "the cost of production, and, therefore, the prices of various manufactured commodities, are raised by one error in legislation, the country has been called upon, on the plea of justice, quietly to submit to fresh exactions. Because we all pay an additional price for our linen, muslin, and cottons, it is thought just that we should pay also an additional price for our corn. Because, in the general distribution of the labour of the world, we have prevented the greatest amount of productions from being obtained by that labour in manufactured commodities; we should further punish ourselves by diminishing the productive powers of the general labour in the supply of raw produce. It would be much wiser to acknowledge the errors which a mistaken policy has induced us to adopt, and immediately to commence a gradual recurrence to the sound principles of an universal free trade." (Principles of Political Economy, &c. p. 444.)
The fact that, in ordinary years, the price of wheat at Dantzig scarcely ever exceeds 32s. and that its medium price in France and the Netherlands is below 40s., renders it certain, that if the late corn law had not been enacted, a considerable portion of the capital which has been expended in Principles of manuring and cultivating inferior lands, in the period from 1800 to 1814, would have been rendered comparatively unproductive. This, however, is the whole extent of the loss that would have been experienced. The rent of the superior and yet cultivated land would have no doubt been reduced also; but its produce, and consequently the general wealth, would not, on that account, have been in the least diminished. Hard, therefore, as the case may appear, it would certainly have been much better that the fixed capital which could not have been withdrawn from poor soils had been sacrificed, than that the profits of every kind of stock in the kingdom, and the real wealth of all the other classes, should have been permanently reduced, in order to save a few landlords and farmers from the consequences of their own improvident speculations. It was not contended when the steam-engine, or when Sir R. Arkwright's cotton-mill was introduced, that they should not be employed, because the old clumsy machinery would thereby be superseded, and the capital vested in it lost. No such ridiculous opinion as this was ever entertained; but in what respect would it have been more absurd, than to persist in raising produce from a poor soil at an immense expense, when we might purchase plentiful supplies, and at a much cheaper rate, elsewhere? Why should not the best machinery be employed in raising corn as well as in spinning cotton? If an expenditure of L1,000 would suffice to manufacture cottons or hardware at Glasgow or Birmingham, that would exchange for 400 or 500 quarters of Polish or American corn; and if the same sum, applied directly to the raising of corn, would not in this country yield more than 250 or 300 quarters; what folly can be greater than to continue such a comparatively disadvantageous production, and not to buy corn from foreigners with our manufactured goods? If private interests are not, in such cases, to give way to the general good, the improvement of society must at once come to a close, and mere sluggish routine must take the place of genius and invention.
"Certainly," says Mr Malthus, who is by far the ablest defender of the restrictive system, "the legislature has nothing to do with securing to any class of its subjects a particular rate of profits in their different trades. This is not the province of a Government; and it is unfortunate that any language should have been used which may convey such an impression, and make people believe that their rulers ought to listen to the accounts of their gains and losses."
The unparalleled weight of our taxation, and the comparatively high wages of labour in this country, furnish no apology for the restrictive system. Taxation equally affects every part of the community, and does not fall heavier on the agriculturists than on any of the other classes. If this was not really the case, if every tax did not in the end fall entirely on the consumers, and on the different employers of workmen, what would be the situation of the French cultivators, who pay as "contribution fonciere" about one-fourth part of the produce of the soil directly to the state? Instead of being weakened, the power of the country to bear the oppressive weight of its burdens, would certainly be increased by the abolition of the corn laws. We should at least purchase food cheaper after the ports had been thrown open than at present; and surely that circumstance would enable us to make good our other payments with less difficulty. The high rate of wages, in as far as it is not ascribable to taxation, is, as we have already shown, an effect of our restrictive system; and its reduction would be one of the happiest consequences of a free trade.
It should never be forgotten, that restrictions on importation and high prices can only be of service to the landlords (for the farmers have, in fact, an opposite interest in the matter), where the consumers are rich enough to pay the high prices. If, however, we have been successful in showing that every enhancement of the price of corn lessens the accumulation of capital; and, stimulating its transfer abroad, necessarily diminishes that very fund which supports labourers, and consequently, consumers, it must be obvious, that this system aims a deadly blow at the real prosperity of agriculture itself, as well as of every other species of industry. Whatever advantage the landlords may derive from the corn laws, can only be fleeting and illusory. It must arise from the corresponding depression and suffering of those classes, with whose welfare their own is intimately and inseparably connected. It is precisely the same with the relief a patient derives from a medicine which expels a curable, to leave an incurable disease in its room.
At the time when the late corn law was enacted, the revulsion and derangement, which must always attend a sudden fall of prices, were nearly over. Rents were generally reduced,—a considerable portion of the inferior lands had been sown down with grass seeds,—and wages were already on the decline. To have thrown the ports open would, in these circumstances, have been attended with very little inconvenience. Occurrences, beyond the reach of control, had paved the way for the introduction of a liberal system of policy, and it must ever be lamented that the opportunity was not embraced. If we shall, at any future period, think of retracing our steps, in order to give time to withdraw capital from the cultivation of poor soils, and to invest it in more lucrative employments, a gradually diminishing scale of duties may be adopted. The price at which foreign grain should be admitted duty free, may be made to decrease from 80s. its present limit, by 4s. or 5s. per quarter annually, till it reaches 50s., when the ports could safely be thrown open, and the restrictive system be for ever abolished.
When this happy event shall have taken place, it will be no longer necessary to force nature. The capital and enterprise of the country will be turned into those departments of industry in which our physical situation, national character, or political institutions, fit us to excel. The corn of Poland, and the raw cotton of Carolina, will be exchanged for the wares of Birmingham, and the muslins of Glasgow. The genuine commercial spirit, that which permanently secures the prosperity of nations, is altogether inconsistent with the dark and shallow policy of monopoly. The nations of the earth are like provinces of the same kingdom,—a free and unfettered intercourse is alike productive of general and of local advantage. III. Present State of the Corn Trade.
Respecting the present state of the corn trade, as to consumption and supply, it is not easy to arrive at any perfectly satisfactory conclusions. On referring to the tables of export and import, annexed to this article, it will be seen, that, in 1811, the total value of the corn exported to foreign countries from Great Britain and Ireland amounted to L. 1,518,152; and of foreign corn imported to L. 1,103,165; and in 1812 the exports amounted to L. 1,559,737, and the imports to L. 1,232,027. In both these years, therefore, we raised more corn than was sufficient for home consumption; but, as the greater part of the excess of exports was sent to the peninsula as provision for British troops, we can only consider the growth of corn in the united kingdom to have then been commensurate with the total demand.
The paper prices of English wheat in 1811 and 1812 were 94s. and 125s. respectively; the bullion prices for the same period being 74s. and 98s., or 86s. on a medium. The prices of 1809 and 1810 were about as high; and, as farmers did not then realize any unusual profits, it may be concluded, that such a supply cannot, in ordinary years—without some decided improvement in agriculture, or without such a change in the political circumstances of the country, as will admit the poorest lands under tillage to be cultivated at a cheaper rate,—be obtained from our own soil at less than 80s. per quarter. Whether, however, the demand for corn has continued the same as in 1811 and 1812; for certainly it has not increased; or whether it has diminished, so that any considerable quantity of poor land has been thrown out of cultivation, and the exchangeable value of raw produce reduced, are questions which we have as yet no accurate data to determine.
It is extremely difficult to form any tolerably correct conclusions respecting the quantity of corn raised in an extensive kingdom, from calculations founded on the number of acres in tillage, and on the average produce per acre. No accurate estimate can possibly be framed of the extent of the lands under cultivation. It is perpetually changing from year to year; and the amount of produce varies not only with the differences in the seasons, but also with every improvement of agriculture. This method, therefore, has been very generally abandoned, and economists now attempt to estimate the growth of corn by its consumption. But, although this is certainly the preferable mode, still the conclusions to which it leads are necessarily very loose. The consumption varies considerably from one year to another, according as the power of the consumers to make purchases happens to be greater or less. But, supposing this power to remain the same, the average quantity of corn consumed by each person, and the species, can only be ascertained by approximation.
Mr Charles Smith bestowed a very great deal of attention on this important investigation (Tracts on the Corn Trade); and, as his estimate of our aggregate produce forms the groundwork of almost all those which have been subsequently framed, it deserves particular attention. Having taken the population of England and Wales, in 1765, at 6,000,000, Mr Smith reckoned the consumers of each kind of grain, the quantity consumed by each individual, and hence the whole consumed by man, as follows:
| Estimated Population of England and Wales | Average Consumption of each Person | Consumed by Man | |------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------| | 3,750,000 consumers of wheat, at 1 qr. each | 3,750,000 | | | 739,000 ditto of barley, at 1½ ditto | 1,016,125 | | | 888,000 ditto of rye, at 1½ ditto | 999,000 | | | 623,000 ditto of oats, at 2½ ditto | 1,791,225 | |
Consumed by man, 7,556,350
In addition to this Mr Smith estimated the wheat distilled, made into starch, &c. 90,000 Barley used in malting, &c. 3,417,000 Rye for hogs, &c. 31,000 Oats for horses, &c. 2,461,500 Total of home consumption, 13,555,850 Add excess of exports over imports, 398,624 13,954,474 Add seed, one tenth, 1,395,447 Total growth of all kinds of grain in England and Wales in 1765, 15,349,921
This estimate, it will be observed, does not include either Scotland or Ireland, and later inquiries have rendered it probable that Mr Smith had underrated the population of England and Wales by nearly one million. The allowance for seed is also too small.
Mr Chalmers, availing himself of the information respecting the subsistence of the people, furnished under the population act of 1800, estimated the total consumption of all the different kinds of grain in Great Britain at that epoch at 27,185,300 quarters, whereof wheat constituted 7,676,100 quarters: The crops of 1800 and of 1801 being unusually deficient, the importation in these years was proportionably great; but excluding these scarcities, the total average excess of all sorts of grain imported from Ireland and foreign countries into Great Britain over the exports, had previously amounted to about one million of quarters, which, deducted from 27,185,300, leaves 26,185,300, to which, if we add one-eighth as seed, we shall have 29,458,462 quarters as the average growth of Great Britain in 1800.
Although the population of Ireland has not been exactly ascertained, the authorities adduced by Messrs Newenham and Wakefield will not permit us to estimate it at less than five millions: The greatest portion of its inhabitants are, it is true, supported by the potatoe, and seldom or never taste bread; but we shall probably be within the mark if we estimate the number of those fed by the various kinds of corn at two millions, and the average quantity consumed by each individual at two quarters: This would give 4,000,000 of quarters as the total consumption of Ireland; which, being added to Mr Chalmers's estimate of the consumption of Great Bri- The population has, however, increased very considerably since 1800, and both Mr Western and Dr Colquhoun concur in estimating the average consumption of the whole empire in 1812 and 1814, at about 35 millions of quarters.
The following is Dr Colquhoun's estimate:
| SPECIES OF GRAIN | Estimated Average of the Population of Great Britain and Ireland | Each Person averaged | Consumed by Man | Consumed by Animals | Used in Beer and Spirits | Used in various Manufactures | Total of Quarters | |------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|----------------|-------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|------------------| | Wheat | 9,000,000 | 1 | 9,000,000 | 170,000 | | | 9,170,000 | | Barley | 1,500,000 | 1 1/4 | 1,875,000 | 210,000 | 4,250,000 | | 6,335,000 | | Oats | 4,500,000 | 1 1/4 | 6,750,000 | 10,200,000 | | | 16,950,000 | | Rye | 500,000 | 1 1/4 | 625,000 | 59,000 | | 1,000 | 685,000 | | Beans and Pease | 500,000 | 1 | 500,000 | 1,360,000 | | | 1,860,000 | | Totals | 16,000,000 | 18,750,000 | 11,829,000 | 4,250,000 | 171,000 | | 35,000,000 |
**Progressive Consumption**
| Duration | Wheat | Other Grain | Total | |----------------|-------|-------------|-------| | One year | 9,170,000 | 25,830,000 | 35,000,000 | | Six months | 4,585,000 | 12,915,000 | 17,500,000 | | Three months | 2,292,500 | 6,457,000 | 8,750,000 | | Six weeks | 1,146,250 | 3,228,750 | 4,350,000 | | One month | 764,166 | 2,152,500 | 2,916,666 | | Two weeks | 382,083 | 1,076,250 | 1,458,333 | | One week | 191,041 | 538,125 | 729,166 | | One day | 27,291 | 76,875 | 104,166 |
As the exports in 1812 rather exceeded the imports, if we add one eighth as seed to Dr Colquhoun's estimate of the consumption at that period, we shall have about forty millions of quarters, as the total quantity of the different kinds of grain produced in Great Britain and Ireland.
The deficit in our home supplies of corn has been chiefly made up by importations from Prussia, and the other countries on the Baltic, and from America. In Prussia the corn trade is not regulated by any fixed principles, and the duties on exportation are continually varying. They are sure to be increased when there is any very unusual foreign demand; and in 1800 and 1801, when we imported immense quantities of corn from Dantzic, Koningsberg, &c. they must have yielded a very large revenue.
The following table of the export of wheat from Dantzic, the principal corn market in the north of Europe, to England and other countries, from 1793 to 1803, both inclusive, is extracted from Oddy's European Commerce, p. 263:
| Year | To England in Lasts | To other parts | Total | |------|---------------------|---------------|-------| | 1793 | 9,541 | 5,963 | 15,414| | 1794 | 6,244 | 12,529 | 18,773| | 1795 | 4,283 | 9,401 | 13,774| | 1796 | 20,407 | 6,474 | 26,881|
* This is certainly too small an allowance: It ought, at least, to have been two quarters.
Wheat, - 4,055,907 Rye, - 5,604,422 Barley, - 1,004,144 Oats, - 206,056 Other corn, - 99,754 Wheat and rye flour, - 157,809 Spirits made from native corn, - 368,153
Total value in roubles, 11,496,245
The following is the British Customhouse statement of the quantity of wheat and flour imported into Great Britain from the United States, from 1803 to 1812, both inclusive:
| Year | Wheat Quarters | Flour Carts | |------|----------------|------------| | 1803 | 22,995 | 301,474 | | 1804 | | 14,907 | | 1805 | 12 | 47,044 | | 1806 | 8,987 | 243,587 | | 1807 | 108,596 | 493,910 | | 1808 | 8,925 | 13,691 | | 1809 | 36,537 | 471,101 | | 1810 | 34,829 | 210,210 | | 1811 | 10,716 | 25,533 | | 1812 | 180 | 37,161 |
The following is the American Custom-house statement of the total quantity of wheat and wheat flour exported from the United States, from 1801 to 1814, both inclusive, with their aggregate value in dollars.
| Year | Wheat | Flour | Value of both | |------|-------|-------|---------------| | | Bushels | Barrels | Dollars | | 1801 | 239,929 | 1,102,444 | - | | 1802 | 280,281 | 1,156,248 | - | | 1803 | 686,415 | 1,311,853 | 9,310,000 | | 1804 | 127,024 | 810,008 | 7,100,000 | | 1805 | 18,041 | 777,513 | 8,325,000 | | 1806 | 86,784 | 782,724 | 6,867,000 | | 1807 | 766,814 | 1,249,819 | 10,753,000 | | 1808 | 87,330 | 263,813 | 1,936,000 | | 1809 | 393,889 | 846,247 | 5,944,000 | | 1810 | 325,924 | 798,431 | 6,846,000 | | 1811 | 216,833 | 1,445,012 | 14,662,000 | | 1812 | 53,832 | 1,443,492 | 13,687,000 | | 1813 | 288,535 | 1,260,943 | 13,591,000 | | 1814 | | 193,274 | 1,734,000 |
The general average price of wheat per bushel in the United States, in different years, has been as under:
| Year | Doll. Cents | |------|-------------| | 1785 | 0 60 | | 1790 | 0 75 | | 1795 | 1 20 | | 1800 | 2 0 | | 1805 | 1 80 | | 1806 | 1 33 | | 1807 | 1 25 | | 1808 | 1 25 | | 1809 | 1 25 | | 1810 | 1 50 | | 1811 | 1 75 | | 1812 | 1 94 | | 1813 | 1 75* |
* The prices of the five first mentioned years are taken from a Statistical Manual of the United States, published in 1806; and those of the last-eight are taken from Mr Pitkin's late valuable work on the Commerce of that Republic.
In 1787, a year of a fair average crop, M. Ar-Corn Trade would estimated the value of the grain exported from France at 6,559,000 francs, and of that imported at 8,116,000 francs. Since that period the agriculture of that country has been very much improved; but as the population has also been augmented, we may perhaps conclude, that France now raises about as much grain as is necessary for her own consumption. If, however, a free corn trade were established between this country and France, we should, even under these circumstances, be able to import very considerable quantities of corn. There is always an excess of produce in the northern provinces of France, ready for the foreign market; for the southern provinces, where the crops are deficient, are more easily supplied by importations from Italy, Barbary, Odessa, &c.
The following is a table of the price of the septier of the best wheat, blé de tête, weighing 240 lbs. mark the septier, at the Rosoy, or Paris market, for 146 years, ending with 1788:
| Liv. So. Den. | |---------------| | From 1643 to 1652 | 35 14 1 | | 1653 1662 | 32 12 2 | | 1663 1672 | 23 6 11 | | 1673 1682 | 25 13 8 | | 1683 1692 | 22 0 4 | | 1693 1702 | 31 16 1 | | 1703 1712 | 23 17 1 | | 1713 1715 | 33 1 6 | | 1716 1725 | 17 10 9 | | 1726 1736 | 16 19 4 | | 1736 1745 | 18 15 7 | | 1746 1755 | 18 10 11 | | 1756 1765 | 17 9 1 | | 1766 1775 | 28 7 9 | | 1776 1785 | 22 4 7 | | 1786 | 20 12 6 | | 1787 | 22 2 6 | | 1788 | 24 0 0 |
General average of the 146 years, 24 liv. 1 so. 4 den.
The Revolution, by distracting the attention of the cultivators, rendered the crops deficient; and, since that era, there have been a few seasons of scarcity, but there has not been any general rise of prices. In 1800, the mean price of wheat in the Paris market was exactly 14 fr. 19 cents, the hectolitre, equal to 21 fr. 28 cents, the septier. In the following year, the mean price of the septier, in the eleven departments, forming the district of the north, which comprises Paris, reached 29 fr. 40 cents; but the price was then reckoned very high.—(Statistique Elementaire de la France, p. 291.) Peuchet gives us a table of the price of wheat in the different departments of France, in the month of February 1805, and the mean price of the hectolitre, in the above-mentioned district, is 16 fr. 55 cents, equal to 24 fr. 60 cents, the septier. (Idem, p. 456.) From Trade this period up to 1812, when there was a slight deficiency in the crops, prices continued to decline. In July 1814, Mr Birkbeck states the price of wheat in the market of Rouen, one of the most populous manufacturing towns in France, as being equal to 34s. our quarter.—(Tour in France, p. 12.) And, in October of that year, Mr Malthus states, that the average price of the hectolitre in 14 different markets of Normandy, was 16 fr. 21 cents, being 24 fr. 31 cents the septier, or 36s. 8d. the Winchester quarter; and it is of importance to observe, that this average was taken after riots had occurred both at Havre and Dieppe on account of the rise of prices, and the quantity of wheat exported. Mr Malthus adds, that, according to all the information he had obtained, average prices had not been higher in France during the last ten years. (Grounds of an Opinion, &c. p. 13.)
The law of 1814, authorizing the export of corn from France, ordered that it should cease whenever the home price reached to about 48s. or 49s. the Winchester quarter; and as the object of this law was to conciliate the landed interest, and to encourage and promote cultivation, it is pretty certain, that 48s. or 49s. had been reckoned rather a high price. But in 1764, exportation free of duty was allowed till the home price reached 30 livres the septier, or 48s. the Winchester quarter; a fact which, of itself, sufficiently shows that, the ordinary price of corn, previous to 1814, was not higher than it had been previous to 1764.
The Winchester quarter is equal to 1\(\frac{3}{4}\) of a septier, or to 1\(\frac{7}{8}\) very nearly; and the franc is equal to 1 liv. 0 so. 3. den.
The mean of the different estimates framed by Vauban, Quesnay, Expilly, Lavoisier, and Arthur Young, gives 61,519,672 septiers (Statistique Elementaire de la France, p. 290), or 32,810,000 quarters very nearly, as the total average growth of the different kinds of grain in France. But this estimate is unquestionably a great deal too low. The peasantry of France eat much more bread than the peasantry of Great Britain or Ireland; and although there is not a proportionable consumption for horses, distilleries, &c. in that kingdom, we may reckon this excess as at least partially balanced by the other. But, independent of this circumstance, if Dr Colquhoun's estimate of 18,750,000 quarters, as the quantity of the different kinds of corn consumed by man in this empire, which has only about 12,000,000 of inhabitants who can be considered as consumers, be not very much overrated, the consumption of France, with a population of about 27,000,000, who are all chiefly supported on corn, cannot be taken at less than 42,190,000 quarters; and, adding one-eighth for seed, the total growth of corn in that country, will be about 47,500,000 quarters. Even this estimate, we are persuaded, is still too low.
Notwithstanding the extraordinary fertility of Spain, the various abuses under which that country labours, combined with the want of all freedom in its internal corn trade, and with the numberless restrictions imposed on exportation, prevents its producing, in ordinary years, an adequate supply for home consumption. Catalonia, Valencia, &c. draw a considerable part of their supplies from Barbary; while Andalusia, Biscay, &c. occasionally enter into competition with us in the markets of the North, and in those of the United States.
The following is a statement of the medium price of the fanega of wheat, in the month of May each year, at the market of Medina de Rio Seco, in Leon, from 1793 to 1804, both inclusive:
| Year | Reals Vellon | |------|-------------| | 1793 | 32 | | 1794 | 39 | | 1795 | 44 | | 1796 | 28 | | 1797 | 37 | | 1798 | 62 |
| Year | Reals Vellon | |------|-------------| | 1799 | 36 | | 1800 | 29 | | 1801 | 43 | | 1802 | 65 | | 1803 | 61 | | 1804 | 155 |
The Castile fanega is used at Medina de Rio Seco; and 100 fanegas Castellanas make 152 Winchester bushels. The real vellon is equal to \(\frac{1}{20}\) of a dollar. (App. Bullion Report, No. 32.)
Bourgoing informs us, that the year 1804 was anomalous in the annals of Spain—contagious diseases, the inclemency of the heavens, and famine, laid waste the whole country. Above nine millions of fanegas of wheat were imported from abroad, and the price of corn rose to six or seven times its mean price. (Bourgoing, Tom. II. p. 162.) Extraordinary fluctuations in the price of corn are, however, very frequent in Spain. In 1652, wheat sold in Seville at 15s. 3d. a bushel, and, in 1657, so low as 1s. 4d. (Townsend's Travels in Spain, II. p. 220.) Owing to the shackles on the internal corn trade, there is often a very great difference in the prices of corn in the different provinces.
Italy, in ordinary years, does not, at present, export much grain; but Sicily, under an enlightened government, might easily be made to produce immense supplies.
The extreme fertility of the Russian territory bordering on the Black Sea, has, since the free navigation of the Dardanelles was secured to that power, led to a very great exportation of grain from Odessa, Taganrock, &c. This exportation may be indefinitely extended, and supplies to any amount may be derived from this newly opened market.
The following tables, extracted from official documents, will, it is presumed, contain all the additional facts necessary to be known respecting the British and Irish corn trade, up to a very late period. No. I.—ACCOUNT of the Prices of Middling or Mealing Wheat per Quarter at Windsor Market, as ascertained by the Audit-Books of Eton College.
| YEARS | Prices of Wheat at Windsor, 9 Gallons | Prices of Wheat reduced to the Winchester Bushel of 8 Gallons | Average of 10 Years according to the Winchester Bushel of 8 Gallons | |-------|-------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------| | 1646 | £2 8 0 | £2 2 8 | | | 1647 | £3 13 8 | £3 5 5 | | | 1648 | £4 5 0 | £3 15 6 | | | 1649 | £4 0 0 | £3 11 1 | | | 1650 | £3 16 8 | £3 8 1 | | | 1651 | £3 13 4 | £3 5 2 | | | 1652 | £2 9 6 | £2 4 0 | | | 1653 | £1 15 6 | £1 11 6 | | | 1654 | £1 6 0 | £1 3 1 | | | 1655 | £1 13 4 | £1 9 7 | 2 11 7 | | 1656 | £2 3 0 | £1 18 2 | | | 1657 | £2 6 8 | £2 1 5 | | | 1658 | £3 5 0 | £2 7 9 | | | 1659 | £3 6 0 | £2 18 8 | | | 1660 | £2 16 6 | £2 10 2 | | | 1661 | £3 10 0 | £3 2 2 | | | 1662 | £3 14 0 | £3 5 9 | | | 1663 | £2 17 0 | £2 10 8 | | | 1664 | £2 0 6 | £1 16 0 | | | 1665 | £2 9 4 | £2 3 10 | 2 10 5 | | 1666 | £1 16 0 | £1 12 0 | | | 1667 | £1 16 0 | £1 12 0 | | | 1668 | £2 0 0 | £1 15 6 | | | 1669 | £2 4 4 | £1 19 5 | | | 1670 | £2 1 8 | £1 17 0 | | | 1671 | £2 2 0 | £1 17 4 | | | 1672 | £2 1 0 | £1 16 5 | | | 1673 | £2 6 8 | £2 1 5 | | | 1674 | £3 8 8 | £3 1 0 | | | 1675 | £3 4 8 | £2 17 5 | 2 0 11 | | 1676 | £1 18 0 | £1 13 9 | | | 1677 | £2 2 0 | £1 17 4 | | | 1678 | £2 19 0 | £2 12 5 | | | 1679 | £3 0 0 | £2 13 4 | | | 1680 | £2 5 0 | £2 0 0 | | | 1681 | £2 6 8 | £2 1 5 | | | 1682 | £2 4 0 | £1 19 1 | | | 1683 | £2 0 0 | £1 15 6 | | | 1684 | £2 4 0 | £1 19 1 | | | 1685 | £2 6 8 | £2 1 5 | 2 1 4 | | 1686 | £1 14 0 | £1 10 2 | | | 1687 | £1 5 2 | £1 2 4 | | | 1688 | £2 6 0 | £2 0 10 | | | 1689 | £1 10 0 | £1 6 8 | | | 1690 | £1 14 8 | £1 10 9 | | | 1691 | £1 14 0 | £1 10 2 | | | 1692 | £2 6 8 | £2 1 5 | | | 1693 | £3 7 8 | £3 0 1 | | | 1694 | £3 4 0 | £2 16 10 | | | 1695 | £2 13 0 | £2 7 1 | 1 19 6 | | 1696 | £3 11 0 | £3 3 1 | | | 1697 | £3 0 0 | £2 13 4 | | | 1698 | £3 8 4 | £3 0 9 | | | 1699 | £3 4 0 | £2 16 10 | | | 1700 | £2 0 0 | £1 15 6 | |
| YEARS | Prices of Wheat at Windsor, 9 Gallons | Prices of Wheat reduced to the Winchester Bushel of 8 Gallons | Average of 10 Years according to the Winchester Bushel of 8 Gallons | |-------|-------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------| | 1701 | £1 17 8 | £1 13 5 | | | 1702 | £1 9 6 | £1 16 2 | | | 1703 | £1 16 0 | £1 12 0 | | | 1704 | £2 6 6 | £2 1 4 | | | 1705 | £1 10 0 | £1 6 8 | 2 2 11 | | 1706 | £1 6 0 | £1 3 14 | | | 1707 | £1 8 6 | £1 5 4 | | | 1708 | £2 1 6 | £1 16 10 | | | 1709 | £3 18 6 | £3 9 9 | | | 1710 | £3 18 0 | £3 9 4 | | | 1711 | £2 14 0 | £2 8 0 | | | 1712 | £2 6 4 | £2 1 2 | | | 1713 | £2 11 0 | £2 5 4 | | | 1714 | £2 10 4 | £2 4 9 | | | 1715 | £2 3 0 | £1 18 2 | 2 4 2 | | 1716 | £2 8 0 | £2 2 8 | | | 1717 | £2 5 8 | £2 0 7 | | | 1718 | £1 18 10 | £1 14 6 | | | 1719 | £1 15 0 | £1 11 1 | | | 1720 | £1 17 0 | £1 12 10 | | | 1721 | £1 17 6 | £1 13 4 | | | 1722 | £1 16 0 | £1 12 0 | | | 1723 | £1 14 8 | £1 10 10 | | | 1724 | £1 17 0 | £1 12 10 | | | 1725 | £2 8 6 | £2 3 1 | 1 15 4 | | 1726 | £2 6 0 | £2 0 10 | | | 1727 | £2 2 0 | £1 17 4 | | | 1728 | £2 14 6 | £2 8 5 | | | 1729 | £2 6 10 | £2 1 7 | | | 1730 | £1 16 6 | £1 12 5 | | | 1731 | £1 12 10 | £1 9 2 | | | 1732 | £1 6 8 | £1 3 8 | | | 1733 | £1 8 4 | £1 5 2 | | | 1734 | £1 18 10 | £1 14 6 | | | 1735 | £2 3 0 | £1 18 2 | 1 15 2 | | 1736 | £2 0 4 | £1 15 10 | | | 1737 | £1 18 0 | £1 13 9 | | | 1738 | £1 15 6 | £1 11 6 | | | 1739 | £1 18 6 | £1 14 2 | | | 1740 | £2 10 8 | £2 5 1 | | | 1741 | £2 6 8 | £2 1 5 | | | 1742 | £1 14 0 | £1 10 2 | | | 1743 | £1 4 10 | £1 2 1 | | | 1744 | £1 4 10 | £1 2 1 | | | 1745 | £1 7 6 | £1 4 5 | 1 12 1 | | 1746 | £1 19 0 | £1 14 8 | | | 1747 | £1 14 10 | £1 10 11 | | | 1748 | £1 17 0 | £1 12 10 | | | 1749 | £1 17 0 | £1 12 10 | | | 1750 | £1 12 6 | £1 8 10 | | | 1751 | £1 18 6 | £1 14 2 | | | 1752 | £2 1 10 | £1 17 2 | | | 1753 | £2 4 8 | £1 19 8 | | | 1754 | £1 14 8 | £1 10 9 | | | 1755 | £1 13 10 | £1 10 1 | 1 1 2 | ### CORN LAWS AND TRADE.
| YEARS | Prices of Wheat at Windsor, 9 Gallons to the Bushel | Prices of Wheat reduced to the Winchester Bushel of 8 Gallons | Average of 10 Years according to the Winchester Bushel of 8 Gallons | |-------|-----------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------| | | £ s. d. | £ s. d. | £ s. d. | | 1756 | 2 5 2 | 2 0 13 4 | 2 8 0 | | 1757 | 3 0 0 | 2 13 4 | 2 7 8 | | 1758 | 2 10 0 | 2 4 5 4 | 2 5 9 | | 1759 | 1 19 8 | 1 15 3 | 2 9 4 | | 1760 | 1 16 6 | 1 12 5 | 2 16 1 | | 1761 | 1 10 2 | 1 6 9 | 2 16 1 | | 1762 | 1 19 0 | 1 14 8 | 2 9 4 | | 1763 | 2 0 8 | 1 16 15 | 2 13 0 | | 1764 | 2 6 8 | 2 1 5 | 2 15 8 | | 1765 | 2 14 0 | 2 8 0 | 2 14 0 | | 1766 | 2 8 6 | 2 3 1 | 2 14 0 | | 1767 | 3 4 6 | 2 17 4 | 2 14 0 | | 1768 | 3 0 6 | 2 13 9 | 2 14 0 | | 1769 | 2 5 8 | 2 0 7 | 2 14 0 | | 1770 | 2 9 0 | 2 3 6 | 2 14 0 | | 1771 | 2 17 0 | 2 10 8 | 2 14 0 | | 1772 | 3 6 0 | 2 18 8 | 2 14 0 | | 1773 | 3 6 6 | 2 19 11 | 2 14 0 | | 1774 | 3 2 0 | 2 15 1 | 2 14 0 | | 1775 | 2 17 8 | 2 11 3 | 2 14 0 | | 1776 | 2 8 0 | 2 2 8 | 2 14 0 | | 1777 | 2 15 0 | 2 8 10 | 2 14 0 | | 1778 | 2 9 6 | 2 4 0 | 2 14 0 | | 1779 | 2 0 8 | 1 16 13 | 2 14 0 | | 1780 | 2 8 6 | 2 3 1 | 2 14 0 | | 1781 | 2 19 0 | 2 12 5 | 2 14 0 | | 1782 | 3 0 6 | 2 13 9 | 2 14 0 | | 1783 | 3 1 0 | 2 14 2 | 2 14 0 | | 1784 | 3 0 6 | 2 13 9 | 2 14 0 |
† The Eton Account of Prices commenced in 1595; the accuracy of the returns in the first years cannot, however, be so implicitly relied on, as those we have here quoted.—Bishop Fleetwood and Sir F. M. Eden have collected, with great industry, almost all the existing information respecting the state of prices in England during the last six hundred years.
No. II.—ACCOUNT of the Average Prices of British Corn per Quarter, and of Oatmeal per Boll, of 140 lbs. Avoirdupois, in England and Wales, since 1792, as ascertained by the Receiver of Corn Returns:
| YEARS | Wheat | Rye | Barley | Oats | Beans | Peas | Oatmeal | |-------|-------|-----|--------|------|-------|------|---------| | | £ s. d. | £ s. d. | £ s. d. | £ s. d. | £ s. d. | £ s. d. | £ s. d. | | 1792 | 2 2 11 | 1 10 8 | 1 6 9 | 0 17 10 | 1 11 7 | 1 12 8 | 1 13 0 | | 1793 | 2 8 11 | 1 15 11 | 1 11 9 | 1 1 3 | 1 17 8 | 1 18 4 | 1 18 11 | | 1794 | 2 11 8 | 1 17 9 | 1 12 10 | 1 2 0 | 2 2 6 | 2 6 8 | 1 18 1 | | 1795 | 3 14 2 | 2 8 5 | 1 17 8 | 1 4 9 | 2 6 8 | 2 13 4 | 2 3 6 | | 1796 | 3 17 1 | 2 7 0 | 1 15 7 | 1 1 9 | 1 18 10 | 2 3 6 | 2 2 9 | | 1797 | 2 13 1 | 1 11 11 | 1 7 9 | 0 16 9 | 1 7 6 | 1 13 5 | 1 13 10 | | 1798 | 2 10 3 | 1 10 11 | 1 9 1 | 0 19 10 | 1 10 1 | 1 13 11 | 1 16 8 | | 1799 | 3 7 6 | 2 3 9 | 1 16 0 | 1 7 7 2 | 4 7 2 | 5 2 5 | 0 | | 1800 | 5 13 7 | 3 16 11 | 3 0 0 | 1 19 10 | 3 9 3 | 3 7 5 | 3 12 1 | | 1801 | 5 18 3 | 3 19 9 | 3 7 9 | 1 16 6 | 3 2 8 | 3 7 8 | 3 10 0 | | 1802 | 3 7 5 | 2 3 3 | 1 13 1 | 1 0 7 | 1 16 4 | 1 19 6 | 1 19 3 | | 1803 | 2 16 6 | 1 16 11 | 1 4 10 | 1 1 3 | 1 14 8 | 1 18 6 | 1 18 7 | | 1804 | 3 0 1 | 1 17 1 | 1 10 4 | 1 3 9 | 1 18 7 | 2 0 10 | 2 0 8 | | 1805 | 4 7 10 | 2 14 4 | 2 4 8 | 1 8 0 | 2 7 5 | 2 8 4 | 2 3 8 | | 1806 | 3 19 0 | 2 7 4 | 1 18 6 | 1 5 8 | 2 3 9 | 2 3 6 | 2 4 2 | | 1807 | 3 13 3 | 2 7 6 | 1 18 4 | 1 8 1 | 2 7 3 | 2 15 11 | 2 4 3 | | 1808 | 3 19 0 | 2 12 4 | 2 2 1 | 1 13 8 | 3 0 8 | 3 6 7 | 2 8 9 |
Average of 8 Years † ### No. III.—ACCOUNT of the Average Prices of British Corn per Quarter, and of Oatmeal per Boll, of 140 lbs Avoirdupois, in Scotland since 1792, as ascertained by the Receiver of Corn Returns:
| YEARS | Wheat | Rye | Barley | Oats | Beans | Pease | Oatmeal | |-------|-------|-----|--------|------|-------|-------|---------| | | L. s. d. | L. s. d. | L. s. d. | L. s. d. | L. s. d. | L. s. d. | L. s. d. | | 1792 | 1 19 4 | 1 4 11 | 3 1 | 0 16 6 | 1 7 1 | 1 6 10 | 0 14 6 | | 1793 | 2 3 7 | 1 6 7 | 1 5 6 | 0 18 6 | 1 12 8 | 1 12 9 | 0 16 10 | | 1794 | 2 5 4 | 1 7 5 | 1 5 0 | 0 18 10 | 1 12 5 | 1 12 7 | 0 16 11 | | 1795 | 3 6 4 | 1 6 7 | 1 9 6 | 1 0 6 | 1 14 0 | 1 13 9 | 0 17 1 | | 1796 | 3 11 5 | 1 10 9 | 1 9 11 | 1 2 0 | 1 18 2 | 1 17 9 | 0 19 6 | | 1797 | 2 6 0 | 1 6 7 | 1 3 4 | 0 16 6 | 1 8 3 | 1 8 1 | 0 14 6 | | 1798 | 2 3 5 | 1 6 9 | 1 2 3 | 0 17 7 | 1 9 8 | 1 10 1 | 0 15 9 | | 1799 | 2 18 1 | 1 10 10 | 1 8 9 | 1 3 7 | 1 16 9 | 1 15 11 | 1 0 1 | | 1800 | 4 11 2 | 2 18 3 | 2 11 4 | 2 2 5 | 3 13 7 | 3 14 11 | 1 18 9 | | 1801 | 5 1 8 | 3 6 2 | 2 12 10 | 1 18 4 | 3 6 3 | 3 7 1 | 1 13 9 | | 1802 | 3 4 6 | 1 13 10 | 1 9 6 | 0 19 5 | 1 13 3 | 1 13 2 | 0 16 10 | | 1803 | 2 10 4 | 1 13 4 | 1 4 3 | 0 19 10 | 1 14 9 | 1 15 1 | 0 18 0 | | 1804 | 2 13 3 | 1 18 8 | 1 7 4 | 1 2 3 | 1 16 1 | 1 15 9 | 0 19 2 | | 1805 | 2 13 7 | 1 18 7 | 1 6 8 | 1 2 4 | 1 15 3 | 1 14 6 | 0 19 3 | | 1806 | 3 16 4 | 1 14 4 | 1 17 0 | 1 4 0 | 1 16 5 | 1 16 2 | 1 0 0 | | 1807 | 3 6 5 | 1 15 6 | 1 11 6 | 1 4 3 | 1 17 0 | 1 16 8 | 1 0 4 | | 1808 | 3 6 7 | 1 19 0 | 1 14 7 | 1 7 1 | 2 7 9 | 2 7 1 | 1 2 11 | | 1809 | 3 11 7 | 2 13 5 | 2 1 0 | 1 13 10 | 3 1 7 | 3 2 8 | 1 9 0 | | 1810 | 4 5 6 | 2 11 6 | 2 0 1 | 1 12 1 | 2 15 8 | 2 16 6 | 1 8 7 | | 1811 | 3 18 10 | 2 1 10 | 2 0 0 | 1 8 5 | 2 9 8 | 2 10 5 | 1 4 6 | | 1812 | 3 11 9 | 2 0 10 | 1 16 6 | 1 4 6 | 2 1 7 | 2 2 2 | 1 1 0 | | 1813 | 5 7 10 | 2 16 11 | 2 13 6 | 2 0 7 | 3 7 11 | 3 8 10 | 1 13 1 | | 1814 | 4 16 2 | 3 6 6 | 2 12 8 | 1 17 9 | 3 2 10 | 3 4 6 | 1 12 4 | | 1815 | 3 2 5 | 2 0 9 | 1 18 2 | 1 5 10 | 1 19 5 | 1 19 9 | 1 1 0 | | 1816 | 2 13 6 | 1 19 2 | 1 7 8 | 1 2 9 | 1 13 2 | 1 13 0 | 0 18 6 | | 1817 | 3 8 3 | 1 18 4 | 1 9 8 | 1 3 8 | 1 15 5 | 1 15 8 | 0 18 11 |
(Signed) Wm. Dowding, Receiver of Corn Returns.
London, 14th August 1818.
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### No. IV.—ACCOUNT of the Average Prices of Irish Wheat per Quarter since 1792.
| YEARS | Wheat | |-------|-------| | 1792 | L.1 17 5 | | 1793 | 2 4 11 | | 1794 | 2 11 9 | | 1795 | 3 1 0 | | 1796 | 3 0 8 | | 1797 | 2 2 7 | | 1798 | 2 5 2 | | 1799 | 3 1 4 | | 1800 | 4 19 2 | | 1801 | 4 8 1 | | 1802 | 2 12 1 |
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### No. V.—TOTAL VALUE, at the Average Market Prices, of all the CORN and GRAIN Imported into Ireland from Foreign Countries, from 1792 to 1812, both inclusive:
| YEARS | Value | |-------|-------| | 1792 | L. 7,936 | | 1793 | 2,904 | | 1794 | 1174 | | 1795 | 58,862 | | 1796 | 912 | | 1797 | 4,531 | | 1798 | 21,015 | | 1799 | 5,036 | | 1800 | 27,046 | | 1801 | 320,092 | | 1802 | 383,819 |
| YEARS | Value | |-------|-------| | 1803 | L. 20,057 | | 1804 | 4,104 | | 1805 | 7,940 | | 1806 | 6,634 | | 1807 | 19,210 | | 1808 | 3,195 | | 1809 | 53,984 | | 1810 | 13,723 | | 1811 | 10,361 | | 1812 | 18,177 |
| YEARS | Value | |-------|-------| | 1802 | 12,701 | ### CORN LAWS AND TRADE.
No. VI.—An ACCOUNT of the Quantity of Wheat and Wheat Flour Exported; and of Foreign Wheat and Wheat Flour Imported,—in the following Years:
| YEARS | Wheat and Flour Exported | Foreign Wheat and Flour Imported | |-------|--------------------------|----------------------------------| | | Quarters | Quarters | | ENGLAND - 1697 | 14,699 | 400 | | 1698 | 6,857 | 845 | | 1699 | 557 | 486 | | 1700 | 49,056 | 5 | | 1701 | 98,324 | 1 | | 1702 | 90,290 | — | | 1703 | 166,615 | 50 | | 1704 | 90,313 | 2 | | 1705 | 96,185 | — | | 1706 | 188,332 | 77 | | 1707 | 74,155 | — | | 1708 | 83,406 | 86 | | 1709 | 169,680 | 1,552 | | 1710 | 13,924 | 400 | | 1711 | 76,949 | — | | 1712 | 145,191 | — | | 1713 | 176,227 | — | | 1714 | 174,821 | 16 | | 1715 | 166,490 | — | | 1716 | 74,926 | — | | 1717 | 22,954 | — | | 1718 | 71,800 | — | | 1719 | 127,762 | 20 | | 1720 | 83,084 | — | | 1721 | 81,633 | — | | 1722 | 178,880 | — | | 1723 | 157,720 | — | | 1724 | 245,865 | 148 | | 1725 | 204,419 | 12 | | 1726 | 142,183 | — | | 1727 | 30,315 | — | | 1728 | 3,817 | 74,574 | | 1729 | 18,993 | 40,315 | | 1730 | 93,971 | 76 | | 1731 | 130,025 | 4 | | 1732 | 202,058 | — | | 1733 | 427,199 | 7 | | 1734 | 498,196 | 6 | | 1735 | 153,343 | 9 | | 1736 | 118,170 | 16 | | 1737 | 461,602 | 32 | | 1738 | 580,596 | 2 | | 1739 | 279,542 | 5,423 | | 1740 | 54,390 | 7,568 | | 1741 | 45,417 | 40 | | 1742 | 293,260 | 1 | | 1743 | 371,431 | 2 | | 1744 | 231,984 | 2 | | 1745 | 324,839 | 6 | | 1746 | 130,646 | — | | 1747 | 266,907 | — | | 1748 | 543,387 | 385 | | 1749 | 629,049 | 382 | | 1750 | 947,602 | 279 | | 1751 | 661,416 | 3 | | 1752 | 429,279 | — | | 1753 | 299,609 | — | | 1754 | 356,270 | 201 |
| YEARS | Wheat and Flour Exported | Foreign Wheat and Flour Imported | |-------|--------------------------|----------------------------------| | Gt. BRITAIN 1755 | 237,466 | — | | 1756 | 102,752 | 5 | | 1757 | 11,545 | 141,562 | | 1758 | 9,234 | 20,353 | | 1759 | 227,641 | 162 | | 1760 | 393,614 | 3 | | 1761 | 441,956 | — | | 1762 | 295,385 | 56 | | 1763 | 429,538 | 72 | | 1764 | 396,857 | 1 | | 1765 | 167,126 | 104,547 | | 1766 | 164,939 | 11,020 | | 1767 | 5,071 | 497,905 | | 1768 | 7,433 | 349,268 | | 1769 | 49,892 | 4,378 | | 1770 | 75,449 | 34 | | 1771 | 10,089 | 2,510 | | 1772 | 6,959 | 25,474 | | 1773 | 7,637 | 56,857 | | 1774 | 15,928 | 289,149 | | 1775 | 91,037 | 560,988 | | 1776 | 210,664 | 20,578 | | 1777 | 87,686 | 233,323 | | 1778 | 141,070 | 106,394 | | 1779 | 222,261 | 5,039 | | 1780 | 224,059 | 3,915 | | 1781 | 103,021 | 159,866 | | 1782 | 145,152 | 80,695 | | 1783 | 51,943 | 584,183 | | 1784 | 89,288 | 216,947 | | 1785 | 132,685 | 110,863 | | 1786 | 205,466 | 51,463 | | 1787 | 120,536 | 59,339 | | 1788 | 82,971 | 148,710 | | 1789 | 140,014 | 112,656 | | 1790 | 30,892 | 222,557 | | 1791 | 70,626 | 469,056 | | 1792 | 300,278 | 32,417 | | 1793 | 76,869 | 490,398 | | 1794 | 155,048 | 327,902 | | 1795 | 18,839 | 313,793 | | 1796 | 24,679 | 879,200 | | 1797 | 54,525 | 461,767 | | 1798 | 59,782 | 396,721 | | 1799 | 39,362 | 463,185 | | 1800 | 22,013 | 1,264,520 | | 1801 | 28,406 | 1,424,766 | | 1802 | 149,304 | 647,664 | | 1803 | 76,580 | 373,725 | | 1804 | 63,073 | 461,140 | | 1805 | 77,955 | 920,834 | | 1806 | 29,566 | 310,342 | | 1807 | 24,365 | 400,759 | | 1808 | 77,567 | 81,466 | | 1809 | 31,278 | 448,487 | | 1810 | 75,785 | 1,530,691 | | 1811 | 97,765 | 292,038 | | 1812 | 46,325 | 246,376 | No. VII.—ACCOUNT of the Quantity of Wheat and Wheat Flour, and of Corn, Rice, and all other kinds of Grain Imported into Great Britain from Foreign countries, from 1792 to 1812, both inclusive, with their Total Value at the Average Market Prices:
| YEARS | Wheat | Wheat Flour | Total Quantity Imported | Total Value at the Average Market Price | |-------|-------|-------------|-------------------------|----------------------------------------| | | Quarters | Cwts. | Quarters | Cwts. | Quarters | Cwts. | Quarters | Cwts. | £ | | 1792 | 18,931 | 7,757 | 642,598 | 7,757 | 234,025 | 856,095 | | 1793 | 415,376 | 211,588 | 1,088,781 | 211,588 | 193,680 | 2,021,993 | | 1794 | 316,086 | 9,308 | 1,066,248 | 13,013 | 86,576 | 1,768,811 | | 1795 | 274,522 | 86,726 | 463,939 | 124,329 | 145,500 | 1,461,622 | | 1796 | 320,381 | 205,855 | 1,570,377 | 238,132 | 407,048 | 4,487,116 | | 1797 | 420,414 | 2,769 | 789,824 | 2,785 | 118,241 | 1,455,722 | | 1798 | 378,740 | 1,734 | 894,019 | 1,734 | 203,447 | 1,569,757 | | 1799 | 430,274 | 61,584 | 653,934 | 64,234 | 93,570 | 1,765,840 | | 1800 | 1,174,523| 312,367 | 2,037,765 | 343,870 | 315,649 | 8,755,995 | | 1801 | 1,186,237| 833,016 | 2,087,614 | 1,128,714 | 310,609 | 10,149,098 | | 1802 | 470,698 | 236,061 | 751,004 | 252,736 | 432,800 | 2,155,794 | | 1803 | 224,055 | 309,409 | 507,484 | 309,569 | 113,999 | 1,164,592 | | 1804 | 386,194 | 17,060 | 925,755 | 17,072 | 60,402 | 1,855,333 | | 1805 | 821,164 | 54,539 | 1,165,272 | 54,566 | 78,925 | 3,754,831 | | 1806 | 136,763 | 248,907 | 324,256 | 248,927 | 147,722 | 1,106,540 | | 1807 | 215,776 | 504,209 | 667,899 | 504,213 | 97,733 | 1,878,521 | | 1808 | 35,780 | 19,642 | 106,751 | 19,939 | 46,659 | 336,460 | | 1809 | 245,774 | 497,314 | 631,236 | 498,747 | 356,218 | 2,705,496 | | 1810 | 1,504,577| 472,633 | 1,553,229 | 475,978 | 272,370 | 7,077,865 | | 1811 | 179,645 | 31,215 | 265,613 | 32,581 | 124,802 | 1,092,804 | | 1812 | 115,811 | 49,194 | 243,833 | 53,038 | 78,862 | 1,213,850 |
No. VIII.—ACCOUNT of the Quantity of Oats and Oatmeal, of Wheat and Wheat Flour, and of all the other kinds of Grain Imported into Great Britain from Ireland, from 1792 to 1812, both inclusive, with their Total Value at the Average Market Prices:
| YEARS | Oats | Oatmeal | Wheat | Wheat Flour | Total Quantity Imported | Total Value at the Average Market Price | |-------|------|---------|-------|-------------|-------------------------|----------------------------------------| | | Quarters | Cwts. | Quarters | Cwts. | Quarters | Cwts. | Quarters | Cwts. | £ | | 1792 | 483,931 | 116,039 | 1,270 | — | 492,994 | 116,039 | 598,370 | | 1793 | 269,465 | 36,250 | 13,974 | 2,080 | 291,066 | 38,330 | 391,460 | | 1794 | 361,653 | 26,646 | 8,551 | 2,121 | 389,663 | 28,767 | 495,004 | | 1795 | 335,920 | 30,304 | 13,408 | 3,796 | 351,312 | 34,100 | 526,808 | | 1796 | 280,416 | 95,881 | — | 11 | 281,295 | 95,892 | 470,628 | | 1797 | 289,253 | 71,304 | 36,489 | 14,257 | 338,597 | 85,561 | 464,234 | | 1798 | 310,579 | 81,651 | 16,667 | 2,864 | 380,864 | 84,515 | 549,848 | | 1799 | 324,857 | 54,135 | 14,773 | 1,898 | 341,344 | 56,033 | 600,920 | | 1800 | 640 | 2,782 | 131 | 2,164 | 849 | 4,946 | 13,785 | | 1801 | 366 | 14 | — | 1,834 | 366 | 1,848 | 3,804 | | 1802 | 275,088 | 105,040 | 86,939 | 79,032 | 373,496 | 184,072 | 839,507 | | 1803 | 230,917 | 55,695 | 48,228 | 45,638 | 295,065 | 101,333 | 525,860 | | 1804 | 198,758 | 64,845 | 65,890 | 14,635 | 271,513 | 79,480 | 564,321 | | 1805 | 186,144 | 26,969 | 78,692 | 18,884 | 284,370 | 45,853 | 721,304 | | 1806 | 326,814 | 47,558 | 91,343 | 38,918 | 425,563 | 86,476 | 925,183 | | 1807 | 307,957 | 31,702 | 38,784 | 7,487 | 371,043 | 39,293 | 687,996 | | 1808 | 436,854 | 67,587 | 39,436 | 2,234 | 506,342 | 71,130 | 1,091,709 | | 1809 | 782,622 | 64,899 | 57,680 | 10,301 | 857,947 | 75,200 | 1,732,155 | | 1810 | 417,697 | 41,531 | 82,280 | 30,790 | 511,942 | 72,742 | 1,205,511 | | 1811 | 207,255 | 23,080 | 93,062 | 36,444 | 306,397 | 59,524 | 836,926 | | 1812 | 303,535 | 54,786 | 97,195 | 67,603 | 440,473 | 123,019 | 1,641,583 | No. IX.—ACCOUNT of the Aggregate Quantity of CORN, and Grain of all sorts, Exported from Great Britain from 1792 to 1812, both inclusive, with their Total Value at the Average Market Prices:
| YEARS | Total Quantities Exported | Total Value at the Average Market Price | |-------|--------------------------|----------------------------------------| | | Corn and Grain | Meal and Flour | Rice | £ | | 1792 | 357,489 | 174,729 | 174,959 | 1,063,753 | | 1793 | 79,430 | 115,740 | 96,172 | 361,053 | | 1794 | 153,265 | 139,909 | 79,336 | 579,487 | | 1795 | 17,643 | 66,444 | 25,809 | 149,393 | | 1796 | 38,018 | 87,101 | 76,692 | 236,171 | | 1797 | 72,916 | 121,720 | 69,730 | 310,909 | | 1798 | 81,581 | 137,528 | 73,532 | 344,340 | | 1799 | 88,538 | 85,395 | 44,626 | 365,607 | | 1800 | 32,184 | 54,914 | 6,422 | 234,378 | | 1801 | 28,617 | 94,814 | 20,947 | 297,094 | | 1802 | 144,745 | 160,813 | 210,899 | 807,060 | | 1803 | 114,006 | 105,233 | 57,163 | 393,560 | | 1804 | 188,019 | 120,179 | 50,292 | 536,092 | | 1805 | 94,884 | 86,714 | 41,734 | 505,102 | | 1806 | 71,541 | 99,911 | 49,371 | 337,222 | | 1807 | 49,553 | 89,677 | 30,810 | 259,892 | | 1808 | 54,376 | 252,739 | 15,359 | 484,231 | | 1809 | 37,987 | 100,061 | 28,738 | 298,669 | | 1810 | 114,271 | 62,718 | 139,054 | 716,923 | | 1811 | 218,537 | 94,913 | 83,698 | 893,469 | | 1812 | 137,530 | 83,195 | 32,141 | 760,130 |
No. X.—ACCOUNT of the Quantity of CORN, and Corn Trade. Grain of all sorts, Exported from Ireland to Great Britain, from 1792 to 1812, both inclusive, with their Total Value at the Average Market Prices:
| YEARS | Total Quantities Exported | Total Value at the Average Market Price | |-------|--------------------------|----------------------------------------| | | Barrels | Cuts | Cuts | £ | | 1792 | 642,202 | 90,009 | — | 265,750 | | 1793 | 572,857 | 20,507 | — | 885,099 | | 1794 | 683,110 | 39,269 | — | 458,125 | | 1795 | 157,058 | 33,418 | 468 | 129,165 | | 1796 | 646,745 | 108,288 | 26 | 471,511 | | 1797 | 673,401 | 90,812 | 826 | 453,529 | | 1798 | 687,225 | 95,479 | 821 | 501,074 | | 1799 | 156,100 | 25,719 | 180 | 191,245 | | 1800 | — | 1,010 | 2,759 | 7,674 | | 1801 | — | 254 | — | 394 | | 1802 | 654,100 | 209,272 | — | 766,279 | | 1803 | 519,042 | 119,877 | 209 | 549,176 | | 1804 | 508,549 | 85,523 | 53 | 605,040 | | 1805 | 487,306 | 54,467 | 293 | 638,020 | | 1806 | 635,153 | 76,905 | 933 | 800,967 | | 1807 | 844,618 | 49,777 | — | 829,933 | | 1808 | 1,072,309 | 75,465 | 106 | 1,235,315 | | 1809 | 1,462,364 | 105,431 | 3,256 | 1,591,559 | | 1810 | 890,131 | 139,019 | 3,413 | 1,200,773 | | 1811 | 702,864 | 120,931 | 1,744 | 1,092,916 | | 1812 | 1,054,720 | 138,134 | 563 | 2,138,573 |
No. XI.—ACCOUNT of the Total Quantity of OATS and OATMEAL, of WHEAT and WHEAT FLOUR, and of all other kinds of Grain, Exported from Ireland to Great Britain and other Countries, from 1792 to 1812, both inclusive, with their Total Value at the Average Market Prices:
| YEARS | Oats | Oatmeal | Wheat | Wheat Flour | Total Quantity Exported | Total Value at the Average Market Price | |-------|------|---------|-------|------------|------------------------|----------------------------------------| | | Barrels | Cuts | Barrels | Cuts | Barrels | Cuts | Cuts | £ | | 1792 | 637,277 | 96,552 | 92,788 | 34,156 | 732,835 | 130,724 | 256 | 493,649 | | 1793 | 512,952 | 24,427 | 36,701 | 4,239 | 595,061 | 28,668 | — | 416,969 | | 1794 | 644,504 | 36,576 | 31,231 | 5,411 | 683,856 | 41,988 | 122 | 460,619 | | 1795 | 152,541 | 37,503 | — | 1,366 | 157,065 | 38,871 | 468 | 133,349 | | 1796 | 648,596 | 112,464 | 15 | 2,562 | 648,636 | 115,026 | 152 | 503,725 | | 1797 | 557,736 | 79,535 | 67,526 | 18,051 | 678,287 | 97,586 | 892 | 462,284 | | 1798 | 594,972 | 93,148 | 46,925 | 5,602 | 695,459 | 98,757 | 1,116 | 511,906 | | 1799 | 157,938 | 27,066 | 345 | 261 | 159,669 | 27,327 | 2,457 | 138,899 | | 1800 | — | 640 | — | 1,157 | — | 1,797 | 2,759 | 8,915 | | 1801 | — | 200 | 1,276 | 457 | 202 | 2,981 | — | 4,084 | | 1802 | 475,066 | 108,189 | 168,957 | 91,759 | 665,328 | 215,592 | 140 | 782,308 | | 1803 | 391,102 | 76,619 | 102,037 | 43,383 | 530,840 | 121,658 | 213 | 562,179 | | 1804 | 372,780 | 67,293 | 153,088 | 21,593 | 550,625 | 88,826 | 53 | 681,208 | | 1805 | 316,244 | 34,297 | 196,638 | 22,774 | 521,799 | 57,071 | 293 | 699,923 | | 1806 | 461,700 | 43,451 | 153,214 | 37,350 | 641,610 | 80,805 | 992 | 814,698 | | 1807 | 724,347 | 46,772 | 71,475 | 7,021 | 871,832 | 53,801 | 120 | 863,405 | | 1808 | 935,850 | 72,088 | 79,509 | 8,060 | 1,081,621 | 80,160 | 106 | 1,252,468 | | 1809 | 1,285,028 | 90,610 | 141,695 | 18,603 | 1,478,097 | 110,220 | 5,890 | 1,616,338 | | 1810 | 756,254 | 57,299 | 194,621 | 91,469 | 1,052,469 | 149,131 | 3,548 | 1,429,725 | | 1811 | 565,581 | 42,114 | 364,752 | 125,984 | 1,119,982 | 168,098 | 2,087 | 1,717,599 | | 1812 | 824,883 | 45,818 | 339,094 | 127,526 | 1,397,469 | 173,344 | 594 | 2,988,180 | CORNWALL is the most westerly county in England, and stretches also farthest to the south. It is bounded on all sides by the sea, except on the east, where it meets Devonshire in a few places, and is separated from it, for the most part, by the river Tamar. From this last boundary, its breadth is diminished till it terminates on the west at the Land's End, in west longitude 6°, and, on the south, at the Lizard Point, in north latitude 49° 57' 30", assuming somewhat of the form of a cornucopia; its boundaries, the Bristol Channel on the north, and the English Channel on the south, meeting in a point at the promontory on the west. It is situated in the diocese of Exeter, belongs to the western circuit, extends over 758,484 acres, or a little more than 1185 square miles, and contains nine hundreds, 201 parishes, twenty-three market towns, and, in 1811, 216,667 inhabitants, nearly 183 to the square mile, or about one individual for every three acres and a half. The waste lands are about one-fifth of the whole. The surface is very irregular, ascending and descending in rapid succession. The interior is high and generally unfertile, consisting for the most part of rugged heaths and moors; yet Brown Willy, the highest hill, is only 1368 feet above the level of the sea at low water. Some beautifully picturesque vallies intervene, richly diversified with corn, woods, coppices, orchards, rivulets, and verdant meadows. The stupendous rocks which form the great barriers against the ocean, particularly about the Land's End and the Lizard, are fitted to inspire the mind with the most sublime conceptions; while the remains of an early age, military, civil, and religious, dispersed over the county, present, in striking contrast, the small scale on which the works of man are conducted, and the instability of human affairs. Throughout the higher lands, the soil is a light black earth, intermixed with gravel, the detritus of the granite, or groan, as it is here called; a light loam, mixed with slaty matter, is the most prevalent on the gentle declivities and lower grounds. Clay is found in different places of various quality. One kind is made into bricks, which are in request for furnaces, and another is much valued when formed into moulds for casting metals. For nine months in the year, the wind blows from points between the west and south, bringing with it from the Atlantic vast bodies of clouds, which, being broken by the narrow ridge-like hills of the county, descend in frequent showers. Storms are more frequent and violent than in the inland parts of England, particularly from the northwest; but from this quarter the wind is generally dry and brings fair weather. The climate is healthy, and there are numerous instances of longevity. Snow seldom lies for a few days. The myrtle, the balm of Gilead, and many other tender plants and shrubs, live and thrive in the open air; yet the most hardy trees on the sea coast sustain much injury from the violence of the westerly wind, and the sea spray which it drives with great force before it. The only shrub which seems to bear the sea air is the tamarisk, which grows to the height of ten or twelve feet in seven years, in situations most exposed to the sea, forming an admirable shelter, and, as it bears cutting, might be useful also as a fence; yet it is destroyed by severe frosts. The cuttings by which it is propagated take root without difficulty. Till Cornwall, within these few years, the attempt to raise plantations was scarcely ever successful; but, latterly, the pineaster being first planted as a shelter to the more tender trees, their appearance is more promising.
The principal rivers are the Tamar, the Lynher, the Rivers Looe, the Fawy, the Camel or Alan, and the Fal. The Tamar is the most considerable. It rises on the summit of a moor in the parish of Morvinstow, the most northern in the county, and, taking a southerly direction, falls, along with several tributary streams, into the spacious basin called the Hamoaze, and issuing thence between Mount Edgcumbe and the Devil's Point, unites with the waters of the Plym; and the conflux of these rivers with the sea forms the noble road for shipping named Plymouth Sound.
The landed property of Cornwall is very much divided, few estates producing a rent of more than £3000, exclusive of the underground revenues, which are continually fluctuating. What are called the Duchy lands are far more extensive. The income derived from them, and from the duty on the Lands coinage of tin, are the only parts unalienated of the immense hereditary revenues which formerly constituted an independent provision for the heir-apparent to the Crown. This provision was originally made by Edward III. for his eldest son, Edward the Black Prince, whom he created Duke of Cornwall, with special limitation to the first begotten sons of him and his sons, Kings of England, for ever. The occupiers of these estates are lessees under the Duke of Cornwall, and generally purchase an interest in the land during three lives, the consideration being a fine paid at the time of the grant, and also a reserved rent during the lease. A lease for three lives is common on church-lands, and formerly was not unfrequent also on private estates. Leases at rackrent seldom exceed fourteen years. The farms are, in general, very small, the rents, even in the most fertile parts, being only from £30 to £50, and, in the western and mining districts, they are chiefly cottage holdings. Agriculture, being but a subordinate concern here, is not generally pursued with much spirit and success; and the fines paid for their long leases, deprive the farmers of that capital which should be invested in the improvement of the soil from year to year. Their best cattle are of the North Devon breed, and much employed in labour. The native sheep of the county, now nearly extinct, was one of the worst descriptions in Britain. A great many different breeds have been introduced from other districts. The backs of horses or mules are used more frequently than carts or waggons as the means of transport. Barley, oats, and potatoes, are grown beyond the consumpt, though the course of cropping is generally most exhausting; but a large quantity of wheat or flour is imported for the mining districts. In the neighbourhood of Penzance, two crops of potatoes are commonly obtained every year. Sea-sand, sea-weed, and damaged pilchards, are used to a considerable extent as manure.
Cornwall has long been distinguished by its mineral treasures, of which the most considerable are tin and copper. The strata in which these metals are found extend from the Land's End, in a direction from west to east, to the Dartmoor Hills in Devonshire, and consist chiefly of granite and a variety of the gruawacke, here called killas. The chief seat of the mines now lies in the neighbourhood and to the westward of St Austel; from which place to the Land's End the principal mines are to be found, extending along the northern coast, and keeping a breadth of about seven miles. These metals are commonly found in veins or fissures called lodes, of which the sides or walls do not always consist of the same substance, nor are they equally hard; for, though one side of the fissure may be a dense stone, the other is sometimes as soft as clay. Many lesser veins branch from the great lodes like the boughs of a tree, and at last terminate in threads. The indications of a vein of metal are various, such as scattered fragments of ore, called shades, and the metallic taste of springs. Many rich lodes have been discovered by working drifts across the county, in the directions of north and south. From the course of the metals being from west to east, the lode will thus be cut at right angles. See the article Mining in this Supplement.
Tin, the most important mineral of this county, is found collected and fixed, and also in a loose and dispersed form. In the former state, it is either in a lode, or a floor which is a horizontal layer of the ore; or interspersed in grains and small masses in the natural rock. The same lode that has continued perpendicular for several fathoms, is sometimes found to extend suddenly into a floor. In its dispersed form it is met with either in a pulverized state, in separate stones called shades, or in a continued course of stones called a stream. These streams are of different breadths, seldom less than a fathom, and often scattered, though in different quantities, over the whole tract in which they are found. When several streams meet they frequently make a very rich floor. The principal stream work is at Carnon, between Truro and Penryn.
The most common state in which tin is found in this county is the calciform, the greater part of the ore being indurated or glass-like, and its most prevalent matrix is either an argillaceous or a silicious substance, or a stone composed of both, called, by the miners, caple. None of the calcareous genus ever appear contiguous to the ore, except the fluors. The oxides of iron and arsenic are those with which the tin is most frequently blended. When raised from the mine it is divided into as many shares or doles as there are lords and adventurers. Every mine possesses the privilege of having the ore distributed on the adjacent fields. It is generally pounded or stamped on the spot, and when it is small enough to pass through the holes of an iron grate fixed in one end of the box where the lifters work, it is carried by a small stream into pits, from which it is transferred into a large vat, washed, and rendered sufficiently clear for the smelting-house. The tin, when wrought into metal, is cast into blocks weighing from $2\frac{1}{2}$ cwt. to $3\frac{1}{2}$ cwt. each, which are not saleable till assayed by the proper officers, and stamped with the Duchy seal. This is termed coining the tin. Since the reign of Henry VIII. the coinages have been held regularly four times annually, at Lady Day, Midsummer, Michaelmas, and Christmas, at the stannary towns of Launceston, Lostwithiel, Truro, and Helston, to which Penzance was added by Charles II. The annual produce of the tin mines is about 25,000 blocks, each worth ten guineas on an average. A duty of four shillings a hundred weight is paid to the Duke of Cornwall, on all the tin coined, which is said to amount to about £10,000 yearly.
Copper ores are found in great abundance and variety. Veins are frequently discovered in cliffs that are laid bare by the sea. The most encouraging indication of a rich ore, is an earthy ochreous stone, called grossan, which is of a reddish colour, and crumbles like the rust of iron. The ore does not lie at any particular depth; but it is a general rule, that, when copper is discovered in any fissure, the lode should be sunk upon, as it commonly proves best at some distance below the surface. When the metal has been properly refined, it is poured into oblong iron moulds, each containing about 150 lbs. weight. In the General View of the county, printed in 1794, the produce of all the copper mines is said to be about 40,000 tons of ore, yielding 4700 tons of copper, then worth L8 a ton.
Many other minerals have been found in this county; much capital and labour have been employed in working some of them, without their yielding any adequate return; yet the success has been in a few instances so great, that new mines are opened as fast as the old ones are abandoned. We can only mention some of the more important. Lead mines are not numerous; the kind of ore most frequently found is galena, or pure sulphuret of lead, which is met with both crystallized and in masses. The principal mines are Huel Pool and Huel Rose near Helston. Gold has been discovered, but not in such quantity as to warrant expensive operations to procure it. Silver is reported to have been obtained here in so large a quantity in the reigns of Edward I. and Edward III., as materially to aid the warlike enterprises of these monarchs, but recent searches have not been so successful. Iron ores; Sulphuret of iron, of the various colours of blue, green, purple, gold, silver, and copper, often intermixed with the copper lodes; bismuth, zinc, antimony, cobalt, arsenic, manganese, wolfram, menachinite, and molybdena or sulphuret of molybdenum, are all found here, most of them in considerable abundance. According to Phillips' map of the mines in 1800, there were wrought at that time 45 of copper, 28 of tin, 18 of copper and tin, two of lead, one of silver, one of lead and silver, one of copper and silver, one of copper and cobalt, one of tin and cobalt, and one of antimony.
Among the other fossil substances of this county, those that deserve to be mentioned for their value are slate, of which there is an excellent quality wrought near Tintagel, in the north part of the county; a freestone, resembling the Portland and Bath stone, in the parishes of Carantoc and the lower St Colomb; and the celebrated soap-rock, between the Lizard and Mullion, used in the manufacture of porcelain, and rented by the proprietors of that establishment in Worcester. But the most important of these substances is what is called the China-stone, found in the parish of St Stephen, near St Austel, which forms a principal ingredient in all the Staffordshire pottery. It is a decomposed granite, the felspar of which has lost the property of fusibility. At Truro it has been manufactured into retorts and crucibles. To these may be added the Cornish diamonds, supposed to be the finest in England, consisting of beautifully transparent quartz, crystalized in six-sided pyramids; and a curious production, called the swimming stone, found in a copper mine near Redruth, the cellular structure of which renders it lighter than water.
Of the fish which frequent the Cornish coast, the pilchard is the most abundant and valuable. In size and form it differs but little from the common herring: Immense shoals appear during the summer and autumn, the first generally arriving at the Land's End in the middle of July. The principal fisheries on the southern coast are in Mount's Bay, and thence eastward to Devonshire; and, on the northern side, at St Ives. The pilchards are caught in nets called scans, each of which is managed by three boats, containing from 17 to 24 men, the largest kind being 220 fathoms long, 16 fathoms deep in the middle, and 14 at each end. When brought on shore they are carried to storehouses or cellars, as they are termed, where the small and broken fish are picked out. They are then disposed in layers on the pavement of the cellar, salt being strewed between every layer. In this state they remain for about six weeks, after which they are taken up, washed, and placed in hogsheads, where, by means of a powerful lever, they are pressed so closely, as when turned out, to appear in a compact state. By this process the oil is extracted, which runs out of the casks through holes made for the purpose: 48 hogsheads generally yield a ton of 252 gallons, the price of which, some years ago, was from L24 to L27. The fish then sold from 35s. to 42s. a hogshead (which contains about 3000), inclusive of a bounty of 8s. 6d. allowed on those for home consumption, as well as exportation; the quantity of salt necessary for curing a hogshead is about 420 lbs. From 40,000 to 60,000 hogsheads are caught in a season. The number of people employed in the different processes is about 5000, and the capital engaged in the trade at least L300,000. Nearly all that were exported used to be consigned to Italy. The blowfish or finfish, the grampus, the porpoise or sea-hog, the blue shark, the sea-fox, visit the coasts of this county. Among the flat fish is a most uncommon one named the monk or angel fish, the turbot, the sea-adder, and the singular fish called the sun-fish. Mackerel is caught in great plenty on the southern coast, also the red mullet and the John Dory; and conger eels of an extremely large size, weighing from 60 to 120 lbs, are met with near the shores. Oysters are in great abundance.
Cornwall possesses a greater number of Parliamentary boroughs than any other county in the kingdom, and sends to the House of Commons no less than 44 members, many of them from places extremely inconsiderable, both in wealth and population; in few of them is the number of voters above 50. A thousand militia are raised for the county, and as many more for the stanneries. The assizes are held alternately at Launceston and Bodmin. As there are scarcely any manufactures here, the poor rates, excepting in the mining districts, are not high, Poor Rates, if compared with those of many other parts of the kingdom; from 2s. 6d. to 3s. in the pound may be about the usual rate; but in the mining districts, they are sometimes so high as 10s. or 12s. in the pound.
The following abstract is taken from the returns Population made under the population act of 1811:
| Inhabited houses | 87,971 | |------------------|-------| | Families occupying them | 44,189 | | Houses building | 441 | | uninhabited | 1,400 | | Families employed in agriculture | 17,465 | | in trade, manufactures, &c. | 10,954 | | all other classes | 15,770 | | Males | 103,310 | | Females | 113,357 | | Total | 216,667 | | Population in 1801 | 188,117 | | Increase from 1801 to 1811 | 28,550 |
For an account of the history of the county and its mines, the laws and privileges of the tinners, and other matters not noticed here, the reader is referred to the article Cornwall in the Encyclopedia. See also Carew's Survey, last edition, 1769; Borlase's Natural History of Cornwall, 1758, and Antiquities, Historical and Monumental, 1769; Beauties of England and Wales, Vol. II.; Transactions of the Geological Society; and Worgan's General View of the Agriculture of Cornwall, 1811.