in Law, is the tie, or ligamen, which binds the subject to the king, in return for that protection which the king affords the subject. The thing itself, or substantial part of it, is founded in reason and the nature of government: the name and the form are derived to us from our Gothic ancestors. Under the feudal system, every owner of lands held them in subjection to some superior or lord, from whom or from whose ancestors the tenant or vassal had received them; and there was a mutual trust or confidence subsisting between the lord and vassal, that the lord should protect the vassal in the enjoyment of the territory he had granted him; and, on the other hand, that the vassal should be faithful to the lord, and defend him against all his enemies. This obligation on the part of the vassal was called his fidelitas or fealty: and an oath of fealty was required by the feudal law to be taken by all tenants to their landlord, which is couched in almost the same terms as our ancient oath of allegiance; except that in the usual oath of fealty there was frequently a saving or exception of the faith due to a superior lord by name, under whom the landlord himself was perhaps only a tenant or vassal. But when the acknowledgement was made to the absolute superior himself, who was vassal to no man, it was no longer called the oath of fealty, but the oath of allegiance; and therein the tenant swore to bear faith to his sovereign lord, in opposition to all men, without any saving or exception. Land held by this exalted species of fealty was called feudum legium, a liege fee; the vassals, homines legii, or liege men; and the Allegiance, sovereign, their dominus legis, or liege lord. And when sovereign princes did homage to each other for lands held under their respective sovereignties, a distinction was always made between simple homage, which was only an acknowledgement of tenure, and liege homage, which included the fealty before mentioned, and the services consequent upon it. In Britain, it becoming a settled principle of tenure that all lands in the kingdom are holden of the king as their sovereign and lord paramount, no oath but that of fealty could ever be taken to inferior lords; and the oath of allegiance was necessarily confined to the person of the king alone. By an easy analogy, the term of allegiance was soon brought to signify all other engagements which are due from subjects to their prince, as well as those duties which were simply and merely territorial. And the oath of allegiance, as administered in England for upwards of 600 years, contained a promise "to be true and faithful to the king and his heirs, and truth and faith to bear of life and limb and terrere honour, and not to know or hear of any ill or damage intended him, without defending him therefrom." But, at the Revolution, the terms of this oath being thought perhaps to savour too much of the notion of non-resistance, the present form was introduced by the convention parliament; which is more general and indeterminate than the former, the subject only promising "that he will be faithful and bear true allegiance to the king," without mentioning "his heirs," or specifying in the least wherein that allegiance consists. The oath of supremacy is principally calculated as a renunciation of the pope's pretended authority; and the oath of abjuration, introduced in the reign of King William, very amply supplies the loose and general texture of the oath of allegiance; it recognising the right of his majesty, derived under the act of settlement engaging to support him to the utmost of the juror's power, promising to disclose all traitorous conspiracies against him, and expressly renouncing any claim on the descendants of the late Pretender, in as clear and explicit terms as the English language can furnish. This oath must be taken by all persons in any office, trust, or employment, and may be tendered by two justices of the peace to any person whom they shall suspect of disaffection; and the oath of allegiance may be tendered to all persons above the age of twelve years, whether natives, denizens, or aliens.
But, besides these express engagements, the law also holds that there is an implied, original, and virtual allegiance, owing from every subject to his sovereign, antecedently to any express promise, and although the subject never swore any faith or allegiance in form. Thus, Sir Edward Coke very justly observes that "all subjects are equally bounden to their allegiance as if they had taken the oath, because it is written by the finger of the law in their hearts, and the taking of the corporal oath is but an outward declaration of the same."
Allegiance, both express and implied, is, however, distinguished by the law into two sorts or species, the one natural, the other local; the former being also perpetual, the latter temporary.
Natural allegiance is such as is due from all men born within the king's dominions immediately upon their birth; for immediately upon their birth they are under the king's protection, at a time, too, when (during their infancy) they are incapable of protecting themselves. Natural allegiance is, therefore, a debt of gratitude, which cannot be forfeited, cancelled, or altered, by any change of time, place, or circumstance, nor by any thing but the united concurrence of the legislature. A Briton who removes to France or to China, owes the same allegiance to the king of Britain there as at home, and 20 years hence as well as now; for it is a principle of universal law, that the natural-born subject of one prince cannot by any act of his own, no, not by swearing allegiance to another, put off or discharge his natural allegiance to the former; for this natural allegiance was intrinsic and primitive, and antecedent to the other, and cannot be divested without the concurrent act of that prince to whom it was first due.
Local allegiance is such as is due from an alien, or stranger born, for so long a time as he continues within the king's dominion and protection; and it ceases the instant such stranger transfers himself from this kingdom to another. Natural allegiance is, therefore, perpetual, and local temporary only; and that for this reason, evidently founded upon the nature of government, that allegiance is a debt due from the subject, upon an implied contract with the prince; that so long as the one affords protection, so long the other will demean himself faithfully.
The oath of allegiance, or rather the allegiance itself, is held to be applicable, not only to the political capacity of the king, or regal office, but to his natural person and blood royal. And, for the misapplication of their allegiance, viz. to the regal capacity or crown, exclusive of the person of the king, were the Spencers banished in the reign of Edward II. And hence arose that principle of personal attachment and affectionate loyalty which induced our forefathers (and, if occasion required, would doubtless induce their sons) to hazard all that was dear to them, life, fortune, and family, in defence and support of their liege lord and sovereign.
It is to be observed, however, in explanation of this allegiance, that it does not preclude resistance to the king, when his misconduct or weakness is such as to make resistance beneficial to the community. It seems fairly presumable, that the convention parliament, which introduced the oath of allegiance in its present form, did not intend to exclude all resistance; since the very authority by which the members sat together was itself the effect of a successful opposition to an acknowledged sovereign.
Again, the allegiance above described can only be understood to signify obedience to lawful commands. If, therefore, the king should issue a proclamation, levying money or imposing any service or restraint upon the subject beyond what the law authorized, there would exist no sort of obligation to obey such a proclamation in consequence of having taken the oath of allegiance.
Neither can allegiance be supposed to extend to the king after he is actually and absolutely deposed, driven into exile, or otherwise rendered incapable, of exercising the regal office. The promise of allegiance implies, that the person to whom the promise is made continues king; that is, continues to exercise the power and afford the protection which belong to the office of king; for it is the possession of these which makes such a particular person the object of the oath. See Blackstone's Commentaries, and Paley's Moral and Political Philosophy.