in Physiology, is formed from the two Greek words, anti, contrary, and othos, passion. Literally taken, the word signifies incompatibility; but for the most part the term antipathy is not used to signify such incompatibilities as are merely physical; it is reserved to express the aversion which an animated or sensitive being feels at the real or ideal presence of particular objects. In this point of view, which is the light in which we at present consider the term, antipathy, in common language, signifies a natural and involuntary aversion which a sensitive being feels for some other object, whatever it is, though the person who feels this abhorrence is entirely ignorant of its cause, and can by no means account for it. Such is, they say, the natural and reciprocal hostility between the toad and the weasel, between sheep and wolves. Such is the invincible aversion of particular persons against cats, mice, spiders, &c., a prepossession which is sometimes so violent as to make them faint at the sight of these animals. To explore the matter without prejudice, we shall find it necessary to abstract from this disquisition all such antipathies as are not ascertained, as that which is supposed to be felt between the salamander and tortoise, and between the weasel and the toad. We must abstract those which can be extinguished or resumed at pleasure; those fictitious aversions which only certain persons feel or pretend to feel. When we abstract aversions, the causes of which are known and evident, we shall be surprised, after deduction of pretended antipathies, how small, how inconsiderable, is the quantity of those which are conformable to our definition. Will any one pretend to call by the name of antipathy those real, innate, and incontestable aversions which prevail between sheep and wolves? Their cause is obvious: the wolf devours the sheep, and subsists upon his victims; and every animal naturally flies with terror from pain or destruction: sheep ought therefore to regard wolves with horror, which, for their nutrition, tear and mangle the unresisting prey. From principles similar to this arises that aversion which numbers of people feel against serpents, against small animals, such as reptiles in general, and the greater number of insects. During the credulous and susceptible period of infancy, pains have been taken to impress on our minds the frightful idea that they are venomous; that their bite is mortal; that their sting is dangerous, productive of tormenting inflammations or tumours, and sometimes fatal: they have been represented to us as ugly and sordid; as being for that reason perilous to those who touch them; as poisoning those who have the misfortune to swallow them. Is it then wonderful (if our false impressions as to this subject have been corrected neither by future reflections nor experiments) that we should entertain during our whole lives an aversion for these objects, even when we have forgot the admonitions, the conversations, and examples, which have taught us to believe and apprehend them as noxious beings? To explain these facts, is it necessary to fly to the exploded subterfuge of occult qualities inherent in bodies, to latent relations productive of antipathies, of which no person could ever form an idea?

To what then are those antipathies of which we have heard so much reducible? Either to legendary tales, or to aversions against objects which we believe dangerous, or to a childish terror of imaginary perils, or to a disrelish of which the cause is disguised, or to an infirmity of the stomach,—in a word, to a real or pretended reluctance for things which are either invested or supposed to be invested with qualities hurtful to us. Too much care cannot be taken in preventing or regulating the antipathies of children; in familiarizing them with objects of every kind; in discovering to them, without emotion, such as

in Ethics, hatred, aversion, repugnancy. Hatred is entertained against persons, aversion and antipathy indiscriminately against persons or things, and repugnancy against actions alone.