urrent in the world, involves a fallacy equally glaring and dangerous. It is no doubt true that, in the circumstances under which battles are fought, there is nothing invariable; on the contrary, it is scarcely possible to suppose two cases, we do not say alike in every particular, but resembling each other even in their great or leading features. From the very nature of things, the data of the problem are variable; but the grand principles by which the solution is to be evolved continue immutably the same.

The elements which enter into the calculations of a general are constantly changing; and it is this circumstance which affords scope for the exercise of his genius, his sagacity, and his military science. But it would be manifestly absurd to maintain, that because the conditions are incessantly diversified, the principles of the art experience equal mutations. The issue of battle is always uncertain; because the calculations of the general may be defective, his combinations unscientific, his foresight limited, or his temperament rash and impetuous; and because, even where none of these causes of failure exist, events which no human sagacity could have divined may occur to defeat the wisest plans and the ablest dispositions. But all this implies, that if every thing could have been foreseen and provided for, the result would not have been doubtful; and that the "grand chances" are always on the side of him who forms his plan with the greatest sagacity, and executes it with corresponding vigour and ability. For, variable as the results of battles appear, the most decisive success has generally crowned the exertions of the greatest commanders; and victory in the long-run has seldom failed to pay homage to science.

There is nothing, therefore, invariable in the art of combats, except those principles which science has established as, mutatis mutandis, universally applicable.

A battle is not only the most imposing, but also the most important event in war. It is the consummation to which all the previous combinations of commanders necessarily tend; it is that grand act of war which may decide the fate of kingdoms and empires, as well as that of armies and campaigns. The highest and dearest interests of nations, nay even of humanity itself, may be involved in its issue; and the mighty cause of civilization may be accelerated or retarded according as the scales of the battle turn. It cannot, therefore, we should think, be uninteresting or uninteresting, if we endeavour, by recurring to the works of the great masters, to exhibit a condensed digest of those general principles, by the skilful application of which the fate of battles, in all ages, has more or less been determined.

All the combinations of a battle may be reduced to three systems. The first, which is purely defensive, consists in waiting for the enemy in a strong position, without any other object than that of maintaining it against him. Such were the dispositions of Marshal Daun at Torgau, and of the Comte de Marsin in the lines at Turin; dispositions, we may add, which proved wholly unavailing against Frederick and Eugene, and forcibly exemplify the danger of receiving an attack even in the strongest position. The second system, on the other hand, is entirely offensive. It consists in attacking the enemy wherever he can be found, as Frederick did at Leuthen and at Torgau, Buonaparte at Jena and at Ratisbon, and the allied armies at Leipsic. The third system is in some sort a mean term between the first and second. It consists in choosing a field of battle possessing certain advantages both in a strategical and tactical point of view, in order to wait there for the enemy, and, even in the day of battle, to watch the favourable moment for assuming the initiative, and falling upon the adversary with every chance of success. The combinations of Buonaparte at Rivoli and at Austerlitz, and those of Wellington at Waterloo, as well as in the greater part of his defensive battles during the peninsular war, are examples of the mixed system, and must therefore be classed under this head.

It would be difficult, not to say impossible, to lay down any fixed rules for determining when either of these two last systems, which are the only suitable ones, ought to be employed. Regard must be had to the moral condition of the troops of each party; to the national character, considered as more or less solid or impetuous; and, lastly, to the obstacles presented by the ground. These are circumstances which must always influence the decision of a general; but allowing sufficient latitude for such considerations, the following principles will nevertheless be found generally applicable: 1st, That with veteran troops, and in an open country, the absolute offensive or initiative of attack is always most advantageous; 2dly, That in ground which, by reason of its physical conformation or other causes, is of difficult access, the better course is to allow the enemy to arrive in a position which has been previously reconnoitred, and to assume the initiative as soon as his troops shall have been exhausted by their first efforts; 3dly, That the strategical situation of the two parties may nevertheless sometimes require that the positions of an adversary be attacked by main force, without regard to any local consideration whatever; as, for example, when it is necessary to prevent the junction of two hostile armies, or to fall upon a portion of an army detached, or upon a corps isolated beyond a river. In these and in all similar cases a skilful general will direct an immediate and combined attack, without concerning himself about any consideration extrinsic to the main object of overwhelming the body opposed to him before it can be reinforced.

Orders of battle, or the dispositions best suited for conducting troops to the combat, ought to have for their object to insure at once mobility and solidity; and hence they ought neither to be too extended nor too profound. An attenuated order is weak; and troops crowded together in too dense an order are paralyzed; for as the head of the mass only is engaged, disorder is easily introduced, and the enemy's artillery causes frightful ravages. To avoid this double evil, and to fulfil both the conditions of a good order of battle, troops which remain upon the defensive should be partly deployed and partly in columns of battalions, like the Russian army under Beningen at the battle of Eylau. But troops disposed for the attack of a decisive point ought to be drawn up in two lines of battalions, each of which, instead of being deployed, should be formed in columns by divisions. This order presents infinitely more solidity than a deployed line, the fluctuations of which deprive it of the impulsion necessary for such an attack and render it impossible for the officers to exercise the necessary control over the troops. Nevertheless, in order to facilitate the march, to avoid too great depth in the mass, and to extend the front without materially lessening the consistence of an army, it may be advantageous to draw up the infantry in two ranks. The battalions will thus possess greater mobility; and, besides, they will have all the force desirable, since the three divisions deployed will possess six ranks in depth, which is more than sufficient; while the extended front will increase in a corresponding ratio the effect of the musketry. In grounds of difficult access, as vineyards, inclosures, gardens, and wooded heights, the defensive order of battle should be composed of battalions deployed, covered by numerous platoons of sharpshooters. But the troops destined for the attack, as well as the reserve, may be advantageously disposed in columns of attack by the centre. The reserve, however, may be kept in part deployed until the moment of advance; in order, by its apparent extent, to impose on the enemy. In a defensive battle upon open ground, squares of battalions may be substituted for columns, by doubling the lines of two ranks so as to form four deep; and each battalion will thus present a sufficient mass, with a front varying from forty to fifty files. This order, which was that employed by the duke of Wellington at Water- loo, appears advantageous when there is reason to appre- hend attacks of cavalry; for it affords at once safety to the infantry, and protection to the cannoniers and train of ar- tillery. But as it has both less mobility and less impulsion than that in columns of attack, the latter has been judged preferable; because, with well-disciplined troops, squares may be easily formed in each battalion by a simple con- version to the right and left of the division of the centre. The duke of Wellington, it is true, commonly fought de- ployed; but, to say nothing of the incomparable military qualities of his troops, his lines were generally formed four deep; so that, after all, the exception is more apparent than real.

See Jomini, Traité des Grandes Opérations Militaires; Archduke Charles, Der Strategie; Rogniat, Considérations sur l'Art de la Guerre; Guibert, Essai Général de Tac- tique; Bulow's Principles of War. translated by Ma- lorie.