the religion of Christians. The word is analogically derived, as other abstracts from their concretes, from the adjective Christian, which again is formed from the name ἡσπερος, Christus, the Anointed. The Saviour of the world was so called, from a custom which prevailed extensively in antiquity, and was originally said to be of divine institution, of anointing persons in the sacerdotal or regal character, as a public mark of their consecration to these important offices, and as a testimony that heaven itself was the guarantee of that relation which then commenced between the persons thus consecrated and their subordinates.

The disciples of Jesus, after the death of their teacher, were for some time called Nazarenes, from Nazareth in Galilee, where he dwelt; a name which afterwards became the designation of a particular sect. They who adopted the principles and professed the religion which he taught were first distinguished by the name of Christians at Antioch. That profession, and those doctrines, we now proceed briefly to describe.

When a Christian is interrogated concerning the nature and foundation of his faith and practice, his ultimate reference and last appeal is to the facts, the doctrines, and the injunctions, contained in the books of the Old and New Testament. From these, therefore, and from these alone, must every fair account, or the materials of which it is composed, be extracted or deduced. Other formulae, or confessions of faith, may deserve more or less attention, as they are more or less immediately contained or implied in the Scriptures. But whatever is not actually expressed in, or deducible by fair and necessary consequence from these writings, must be regarded as merely human, and can have no other title to our assent and observation than what it derives from its conformity with the Scriptures, as faithfully and honestly interpreted. But as the books from which the Christian derives his principles of belief and rules of conduct have been variously interpreted by different professors and commentators, these diversities have given birth to a multiplicity of different sects. It cannot, therefore, be expected, that any one who undertakes to give an account of Christianity, should advert to all the writings and opinions which have been propagated and exhibited by historical, systematical, or polemical authors. These, if at all contained... in such a work as this, should be ranged under their proper articles, whether scientific, controversial, or biographical. It is our present business, if possible, to confine ourselves to a detail of such facts and doctrines as, in the strict and primitive sense of the word, are catholic, or, in other words, to such as uniformly have been, and still continue to be, recognized and admitted by the whole body of Christians.

It has already been said that these, or at least the greatest number of them, appeal to the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament as the ultimate standard and only infallible rule of faith and manners. If the question be asked, by what authority these books claim an absolute right to determine the consciences and understandings of men with regard to what they should believe and what they should do—the answer will be, that all Scripture, whether for doctrine, correction, or reproof, has been given by immediate inspiration from God. If; again, it be asked how those books called Scripture are authenticated, the reply will be, that the evidences by which the Old and New Testament are proved to be the word of God, are either external or internal. The external may again be divided into direct or collateral. The direct evidences are such as arise from the nature, consistency, and probability, of the facts, and from the simplicity, uniformity, competency, and fidelity, of the testimonies by which they are supported. The collateral events are either the same occurrences supported by heathen testimonies, or others which concur with and corroborate the history of Christianity. The internal evidence arises either from its exact conformity with the character of God, from its aptitude to the frame and circumstances of man, or from those supernatural convictions and assistances which are impressed on the mind by the immediate operation of the divine spirit. But these can only be mentioned cursorily in a detail so concise as the present.

Such facts as are related in the history of his religion the Christian asserts to be consistent with themselves and with one another. Hence it is that, by a series of antecedents and consequences, they corroborate each other, and form a chain which cannot be broken except by an absolute subversion of all historical authority. Nor is this all. According to him, the facts on which Christianity is founded, not only of themselves constitute a series, but are likewise, in several periods, the best resources for supplying the chasms in the history of our species, and preserving the tenor of its annals entire. The facts themselves are either natural or supernatural. By natural facts we mean such occurrences as happen or may happen by the operation of mechanical laws, or the interposition of natural agents, without higher assistants. Such are all the common occurrences of history, whether natural or civil. By supernatural facts we mean such as could not have been produced without the immediate interposition of Deity, or at least of powers superior to the laws of mechanism, or the agency of human instruments. Among these may be reckoned the immediate change of water into wine, the instantaneous cure of diseases without the intervention of medicine, the resuscitation of the dead, and other acts of the same kind. In this order of occurrences may likewise be numbered the exertion and exhibition of prophetic power, in circumstances where the persons by whom this extraordinary gift was displayed could neither by penetration nor conjecture unravel the mazes of futurity, and trace the events of which they spoke from their primary causes to their remote consequences; so that persons thus gifted must have been the passive organs of some superior being, to whose view the whole concatenation of causes and effects operating from the origin to the consummation of nature, lay naked and open.

It has already been hinted, that the facts which we have called natural not only agree with the analogy of human events, and corroborate each other, but in many instances forcibly illustrate the history of nature in general. Of this a Christian may offer one instance, of which philosophy will never perhaps be able to produce any tolerable solution, without having recourse to the facts upon which Christianity is founded; for if mankind were originally descended from one pair alone, how did it happen that, long before the date of authentic history, every nation had acquired its own language? Or if it be supposed, as some philosophers have done, that man is an indigenous animal in every country, or that he was originally produced in and created for each particular soil and climate which he inhabits—still it may be demanded, whence arose the prodigious multiplicity and the immense diversity of languages? Is the language of every nation intuitive, or is it dictated by necessity, and established by convention? If the last of these suppositions be true, what an immense period of time must have passed; how many revolutions of material and intellectual nature must have happened; what accessions of knowledge, refinement, and civilization, must human intercourse have gained, before the formation and establishment even of the most simple, imperfect, and barbarous language! Why is a period so vast obliterated entirely, so as to escape the retrospect of history, tradition, or even fable itself? Why was the acquisition and improvement of other arts so infinitely distant from that of language, that the era of the latter is entirely lost, whilst we can trace the former from their origin through the various gradations of their progress? These difficulties, inextricable by all the lights of history or philosophy, are immediately dissipated by the Mosaic account of the confusion of tongues, wisely intended to separate the tribes of men one from another; to replenish the surface of the globe; and to give its multiplied inhabitants those opportunities of improvement which might be derived from experiment and industry, variously exerted, according to the different situations in which they were placed, and the different employments which these situations dictated. Thus the duration of the existence of nature is limited to a period within the reach of human intellect; and thus whatever has happened might have happened during the present mode of things; whereas, if we deduce the origin and diversity of language from a period so remotely distant as to be absolutely lost, and entirely detached from all the known occurrences and vicissitudes of time, we must admit the present forms and arrangements of things to have subsisted perhaps for a much longer duration than any mechanical philosopher will allow to be possible. Other instances equally pregnant with conviction might be multiplied; but holding this to be sufficient, we shall proceed to make a single observation upon the facts which have been termed supernatural.

Of those changes which happen in sensible objects, sensation alone can enable us to judge. Reason has nothing and proof to do in the matter. It may draw conclusions from the testimony of sense, but it can never refute them. If, therefore, our senses inform us that snow is white, it would be vain for the most learned and subtle philosopher to endeavour to convince us that it was of a contrary colour. He might confound, but he never could persuade us. Such changes, therefore, as appear to happen in sensible objects, must either be real or fallacious. If real, the miracle is admitted; if fallacious, there must be a cause of deception equally unaccountable with reference to the powers of nature, and therefore equally miraculous. If the veracity or competency of the witnesses be questioned, the Christian answers that they must be competent, because the facts which they relate were not beyond their capacity to determine; and they must likewise be faithful, because they had no secular motives for maintaining, but many for suppressing or disguising their testimony. Now the Christian appeals to the whole series of history and experience, whether such a man is or can be found, as will offer a voluntary, solemn, and deliberate sacrifice of truth at the shrine of caprice. But such facts as, after a long continuance of time, have been found exactly agreeable to predictions formerly emitted, must supersede the fidelity of testimony, and infallibly prove that the event was known to the being by whom it was foretold. It has been urged, but in vain, that prophecies are ambiguous and equivocal; for though they may prefigure subordinate events, yet if the grand occurrences to which they ultimately relate can alone fulfil them in their various circumstances, and in their utmost extent, it is plain that the being by whom they were revealed must have been actually prescient of those events, and must have had them in view when the predictions were uttered. The reader may consult a learned and ingenious dissertation on the credibility of gospel-history by Dr Macknight, where the evidences, detached and scattered through innumerable volumes, are assembled and arranged in such a manner as to derive strength and lustre from the method in which they are disposed, without diminishing the force of each in particular. The works of Hurd, and those of Newton, Sherlock, Chandler, and others, may likewise be consulted. The publication of Mr Hume's Essay on Miracles was attended with the manifest advantage of exciting much discussion on the important subject to which it relates. The sophistry of his arguments was very ably exposed by Dr Campbell, one of the most acute writers of the age; nor must we overlook the labours of Bishop Douglas and Dr Adams, who have both treated this subject with judgment and ability.

On this branch of the subject we may observe, that a question has been raised, and debated with much learning and ingenuity on both sides, namely, whether the evidence of miracles, considered apart from the peculiar nature and doctrines of Christianity, would not of itself be sufficient to establish the title of this religion to be received and acknowledged as a divine revelation. Such a disputation, however, is but little calculated to promote edification, and seems to have originated rather in a love of paradox, or a desire to strike out something apparently new, than in any sound and comprehensive estimate of the evidences of Christianity. For while it is certain, on the one hand, that the power of working real and incontestable miracles is a direct authentication of a divine mission, and forms an unchallengeable credential of a teacher sent from above; it is equally clear, on the other, that the fact of this power having been conferred presupposes that the purpose to be served is beneficent, and that the doctrines to be taught are such as immediately concern the well-being and happiness of the human race. In other words, the external can never be separated from the internal evidence; they are two parts of one great whole; and it is, therefore, vain to perplex ourselves by speculating on the supposition of a defective revelation, or torturing our ingenuity to find arguments in support of the hypothesis of the external evidence being sufficient of itself without the internal. Such an hypothesis, indeed, involves a gross absurdity, if not something worse; for it manifestly proceeds on the assumption that any set of doctrines and principles, however flagitious and detestable, may be established by the same evidence which has been employed to accredit Christianity to the human race. But it must be obvious that no kind of evidence, natural or supernatural, can ever prove that to be true which is in its own nature false, or sanction doctrines subversive of reason and morality. This, however, is an unprofitable, not to say profane, speculation, and Christians ought, therefore, to be discouraged as such. The plain and obvious view of the subject is this: God is infinitely wise; and when he interposes by immediate manifestations of his power, the purpose or object to be accomplished must be compatible with and worthy of his inconceivable wisdom and goodness. The interposition itself, and the end to be served by it, cannot possibly be disjoined. The one imports the direct sanction of heaven; and the other must reflect in vivid colours the attributes of that overruling intelligence which is the source of all knowledge, all truth, and all goodness.

It must be obvious to every reflecting mind, that whether we attempt to form the idea of any religion a priori, or to contemplate those which have been already exhibited, certain facts and principles must be pre-established, from which will result a particular frame of mind and course of action, suitable to the character and dignity of that Being by whom the religion is enjoined, and adapted to the nature and situation of those agents who are commanded to observe it. Hence Christianity may be divided into credenda or doctrines, and agenda or precepts.

As the great foundation of his religion, therefore, the Christian believes in the existence and government of an eternal and infinite essence, which even involves in itself the cause of its own existence, and inherently possesses all those perfections which are compatible with its nature; as almighty power, omniscient wisdom, infinite justice, boundless goodness, and universal presence. In this indivisible Essence the Christian recognizes three distinct subsistences, yet distinguishable in such a manner as not to be incompatible with essential unity or simplicity of being. Nor is this essential union incompatible with the personal distinction of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. Each of these persons possesses the same nature and properties to the same extent; and as they are but one God, there is none of them subordinate, none supreme. The only way by which the Christian can discriminate them is, by their various relations, properties, and offices.

This infinite Being, though absolutely independent, and for ever sufficient for his own beatitude, was graciously pleased to create a universe, replete with inferior intelligences, who might for ever contemplate and enjoy his glory, participate his happiness, and imitate his perfections. But as freedom of will is essential to the nature of moral agents, in order to enable them to co-operate with God in their own improvement and happiness, so their natures and powers are necessarily limited, and by that constitution rendered peccable. This peccability was first manifested in a rank of intelligence superior to man. But as guilt is never stationary, Satan and his apostate angels attempted to transfer their turpitude and misery to man, and were, unhappily, but too successful. Hence the heterogeneous and irreconcilable principles which operate in his nature; hence that inexplicable medley of wisdom and folly, of rectitude and error, of benevolence and malignity, of sincerity and fraud, exhibited throughout his whole conduct; hence the darkness of his understanding, the depravity of his will, the pollution of his heart, the irregularity of his affections; and the absolute subversion of his whole internal economy. These seeds of perdition soon ripened into open acts of disobedience and guilt. All the hostilities of nature were confronted, and the whole sublunary creation became a theatre of disorder and mischief.

And here the Christian once more appeals to fact and experience. If these things are so—if man is the vessel of guilt and the victim of misery—he demands how this constitution of things can be accounted for, or how it can be supposed that a being so wicked and unhappy should be the production of an infinitely perfect Creator. He therefore insists that human nature must have been disarranged and contaminated by some violent shock; and that, without the light diffused over the face of things by Christianity, all nature must remain an inscrutable and inexplicable mystery. To redress these evils, to re-establish the empire of virtue and happiness, to restore the nature of man to its primitive rectitude, to satisfy the demands of infinite justice, to purify every original or contracted stain, to expiate the guilt and destroy the power of vice, the eternal Son of God, the second person of the sacred Trinity, the Logos or Divine Word, the Redeemer or Saviour of the world, the Immanuel or God with us, from whom Christianity takes its name, and to whom it owes its origin, descended from the bosom of his Father, assumed the human nature, became the representative of man, exhibited a pattern of perfect righteousness, and at last ratified his doctrine, atoned for the sins of the world, and fully accomplished all the ends of his mission, by a cruel, unmerited, and ignominious death.

Before this divine person left our world, he delivered the doctrine of human salvation, and the rules of human conduct, to his apostles, whom he empowered to instruct the world in all that concerned their eternal felicity, and whom he invested with miraculous gifts to confirm the reality of what they taught. To them he likewise promised another comforter, even the Divine Spirit, who should enlighten the darkness, and console the woes of human nature. Having remained for a part of three days under the power of death, he rose again from the grave, discovered himself to his disciples, conversed with them for a time on earth, and then ascended into heaven; whence the Christian expects him, according to his promise, to appear at the last day as the Sovereign Judge of the living and the dead. Soon after his departure to the right hand of his Father, where, in his human nature, he sits supreme of all created beings, and invested with the absolute administration of heaven and earth, the Spirit of grace and consolation descended on his apostles with visible signs of divine power and presence. Nor were his salutary operations confined to them, but extended to all the rational world who did not by obstinate guilt repel his influence, and force him to withdraw them. These, indeed, were not so conspicuous as at the glorious era when they were visibly exhibited in the persons of the apostles; but though his energy be less observable, it is by no means less effectual to all the purposes of grace and mercy.

The Christian is convinced that there is and ever will be a society upon earth, who worship God as revealed in Jesus Christ, who believe in his doctrines, who observe his precepts, and who shall be saved by his death and the use of those external means of salvation which he has appointed. These are few and simple. The sacraments of baptism and the eucharist, the interpretation and application of scripture, the habitual exercise of public and private devotion, are obviously calculated to diffuse and promote the interests of truth and virtue, by superinducing the salutary habits of faith, love, and repentance. The Christian is firmly persuaded that, at the consummation of all things, when the purposes of providence in the various revolutions of progressive nature are accomplished, the whole human race shall once more issue from their graves; some to immortal felicity, in the actual perception and enjoyment of their Creator's presence; others to everlasting shame and misery.

The two grand principles of action, according to the Christian, are, the love of God, which is the sovereign passion in every perfect mind; and the love of man, which regulates our actions according to the various relations in which we stand, whether to communities or to individuals. This sacred connection can never be totally extinguished by any temporary injury. It ought to subsist in some degree even amongst enemies. It requires that we should pardon the offences of others, as we expect pardon for our own; and that we should no further resist evil than is necessary for the preservation of personal rights and social happiness. It dictates every relative and reciprocal duty between parents and children, masters and servants, governors and subjects, friends and friends, men and men. Nor does it merely enjoin the observation of equity; it likewise inspires the most sublime and extensive charity, a boundless and disinterested effusion of tenderness for the whole species, which feels for their distress, and labours for their relief and improvement. These heavenly dispositions, and the different duties which are their natural exertions, are the various gradations by which the Christian hopes to attain the perfection of his nature, and the most exquisite happiness of which it is susceptible.

Such are the speculative, and such the practical principles of Christianity. From the former, its votaries contend, that the origin, economy, and revolutions of intelligent nature can alone be rationally explained. From the latter they assert, that the nature of man, whether considered in its individual or social capacity, can alone be conducted to its highest perfection and happiness. With the determined Atheists they scarcely deign to expostulate. According to them, philosophers who can deduce the origin and constitution of things from casual encounters of atoms, or mechanical necessity, are capable of deducing any conclusion from any premises. Nor can a more glaring instance of absurdity be produced than the idea of a contingent or self-originated universe. When Deists and other sectarians upbraid them with mysterious or incompatible principles, they without hesitation remit such cavillers to the creed of natural religion. They demand why any reasoner should refuse to believe three distinct substances in one indivisible essence, who admits that a being may be omnipresent without extension; or that he can impress motion upon other things, whilst he himself is necessarily immovable. They ask the sage, why it should be thought more extraordinary that the Son of God should be sent to this world, that he should unite the human nature to his own, that he should suffer and die for the relief of his degenerate creatures, than that an existence whose felicity is eternal, inherent, and infinite, should have created an humble race of intelligent beings. Is it not, says the Christian, as worthy of the divine interposition to restore order and happiness where they are lost, as to communicate them where they never have been? Is not infinite goodness as conspicuous in relieving misery as in diffusing happiness? Is not the existence of what we call evil in the world, under the government of an infinitely perfect Being, as inscrutable as the means exhibited by Christianity for its abolition? Vicarious punishment, imputed guilt and righteousness, merit or demerit transferred, are certainly not less reconcilable to human reason, a priori, than the existence of vice and punishment in the productions of infinite wisdom, power, and goodness; particularly when it is considered that the virtues displayed by a perfect Being in a state of humiliation and suffering, must be meritorious, and may therefore be rewarded by the restored felicity of inferior creatures in proportion to their glory and excellence; and that such merit may apply the blessings which it has deserved, in whatever manner or degree, and to whomsoever it pleases, without being under any necessity of violating the freedom of moral agents, in recalling them to the paths of virtue and happiness by a mechanical and irresistible force.

It will be granted to philosophy by the Christian, that Miracles as no theory of mechanical nature can be formed without presupposing established laws, from which it ought rarely events. if ever, to deviate; so, in fact, it tenaciously pursues these general institutions, and from their constant observance result the order and regularity of things; but he cannot admit that the important ends of moral and intellectual improvement may be uniformly obtained by the same means. He affirms, that if the hand of God should either remain always entirely invisible, or at least only perceptible in the operation of second causes, intelligent beings would be apt, in the course of time, to resolve the interpositions of Deity into the general laws of mechanism, to forget his connection with nature, and deny their dependence upon him. Hence, according to the dictates of common sense, and to the unanimous voice of every religion in every age or country, God, for the purposes of his wisdom and benevolence, may not only control, but has actually controlled, the common course and general operations of nature; so that, as in the material world the law of cause and effect is universally observed, suspension and changes of that law may become necessary for the advancement of moral and intellectual perfection.

But the disciple of Jesus not only contends that no system of religion has ever yet been exhibited so consistent with itself, and so congruous to philosophy and the common sense of mankind, as Christianity. He likewise avers that it is infinitely more productive of real and sensible consolation, than any other system of religious or philosophical tenets that ever entered into the mind, or has been applied to the heart of man. For what is death to that mind which considers eternity as the career of its existence? What are the frowns of fortune to him who claims an eternal world as his inheritance? What is the loss of friends to that heart which feels, with more than natural conviction, that it shall quickly rejoin them in a more tender, intimate, and permanent intercourse than any of which the present life is susceptible? What are the fluctuations and vicissitudes of external things, to a mind which strongly and uniformly anticipates a state of endless and immutable felicity? What are mortifications, disappointments, and insults, to a spirit which is conscious of being the original offspring and adopted child of God; which knows that its omnipotent Father will, in proper time, effectually assert the dignity and privileges of its nature? In a word, as earth is but a speck of creation, as time is not an instant in proportion to eternity, such are the hopes and prospects of the Christian, in comparison of every sublunary misfortune or difficulty. It is therefore, in his judgment, the eternal wonder of angels, and indelible opprobrium of man, that a religion so worthy of God, so suitable to the frame and circumstances of our nature, so consonant to all the dictates of reason, so friendly to the dignity and improvement of intelligent beings, and pregnant with genuine comfort and delight, should be rejected and despised. Were there a possibility of suspense or hesitation between this and any other religion extant, he could freely trust the determination of a question so important to the candid decision of real virtue and impartial philosophy.

It must be allowed, that the utmost extent of human investigation and research into the doctrine of a future life reached no further than a splendid conjecture, before the promulgation of Christianity; at which period alone life and immortality were clearly brought to light. It is therefore a singular circumstance, that the Deist should not perceive the wonderful superiority of the Christian over every other system, if it had nothing else to recommend it but this single doctrine, so pregnant with unalloyed felicity. If Christianity be false, the believer of it has nothing to lose, since it inculcates a mode of conduct which must ever be amiable in the eye of infinite goodness; but if it be true, he has every thing to gain; while, upon this hypothesis, the Deist has every thing to lose, and nothing to gain. This is a momentous consideration; and that man must be truly infatuated who can treat such a subject with indifference.

Mr Gibbon, in his History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, mentions five secondary causes to be the reasons which he thinks the propagation of Christianity, and alluring the remarkable circumstances which attended it, may with good reason be ascribed. He seems to insinuate that Divine Providence did not act in a singular or extraordinary manner in disseminating the religion of Jesus Christ throughout the world; and that, if every argument which has been adduced to prove the sacred authority of this religion may be turned aside or refuted, nothing can be deduced from this source to prevent it from sharing the fate of mere systems of superstition. The causes of its propagation were, in his opinion, founded on the principles of human nature and the circumstances of society. If we ascribe not the propagation of Mahommedanism, or of the doctrines of Zerdust, to an extraordinary interposition of Divine Providence, operating by an unperceived influence on the dispositions of the human heart, and controlling and confounding the ordinary laws of nature; neither can we, upon any reasonable grounds, refer the promulgation of Christianity to such an interposition.

The secondary causes to which he ascribes these effects are, first, the inflexible and intolerant zeal of the Christians, derived from the Jewish religion, but purified from the narrow and unsocial spirit, which, instead of inviting, deterred the Gentiles from embracing the law of Moses; secondly, the doctrine of a future life, improved by every additional circumstance which could give weight and efficacy to that important truth; thirdly, the miraculous powers ascribed to the primitive church; fourthly, the pure and austere morals of the Christians; and, fifthly, the union and discipline of the Christian republic, which gradually formed an independent and increasing state in the heart of the Roman empire.

But before entering upon the examination of Mr Gibbon's causes in the order in which they are here enumerated, we beg leave to remark, that we cannot perceive the propriety of denominating some of these secondary causes, since the miraculous powers ascribed to the primitive church, if they were real, must have constituted a primary cause, and if fallacious, could have been no cause at all, except of its complete subversion. As little can we conceive how such an able and learned author could imagine a zeal strictly and properly inflexible and intolerant, as qualified to produce any other effect than the destruction of the system which they are allowed to have been anxious to promote. But our estimate of the causes assigned by Mr Gibbon will be more fully developed as we proceed in our first examination of them.

In pointing out the connection between the first of these causes, and the effects which he represents as arising from it, this learned and ingenious writer observes, that the religion of the Jews does not seem to have been intended to be propagated among the heathens; and that the conversion of proselytes was rather accidental than consistent with the general spirit of the institutions of Judaism. The Jews were, of consequence, studious to preserve themselves as a peculiar people. Their zeal for their own religion was intolerant, narrow, and unsocial. In Christianity, when it made its appearance in the world, all the better part of the predominant spirit of Judaism was retained; but whatever might have a tendency to confine its influence within narrow limits was laid aside. Christians were to maintain the doctrines and adhere to the constitutions of their religion with sacred fidelity. They were not to violate their allegiance to Jesus by entertain- Christianity.

ing or professing any reverence for Jupiter or any other of the heathen deities; it was not even necessary for them to comply with the positive and ceremonial institutions of the law of Moses, although these were acknowledged to have been of divine origin. The zeal, therefore, which their religion inculcated, was inflexible. It was even intolerant; for they were not to content themselves with professing Christianity and conforming to its laws; they were to labour with unremitting assiduity, and to expose themselves to every difficulty and every danger, in converting others to the same faith. But the same circumstances which rendered it thus intolerant, communicated to it a more liberal and a less unsocial spirit than that of Judaism. The religion of the Jews was intended only for the few tribes; Christianity was intended to become a catholic religion—its advantages were to be offered to all mankind. All the different sects which arose among the primitive Christians uniformly maintained the same zeal for the propagation of their own religion, and the same abhorrence for every other. The orthodox, the Ebionites, the Gnostics, and other sects, were all equally animated with the same exclusive zeal, and the same abhorrence of idolatry, which had distinguished the Jews from other nations.

Such is the general purport of what Mr Gibbon advances concerning the influence of the first of these secondary causes in the propagation of Christianity. It would be uncandid to deny, that his statement of facts appears, in this instance, to be almost fair, and his deductions tolerably logical. The first Christians were remarkable for their detestation of idolatry, and for the generous and disinterested zeal with which they laboured to convert others to the same faith. The first of these principles, no doubt, contributed to maintain the dignity and purity of Christianity; and the second to disseminate it throughout the world. But the facts which he relates are scarcely consistent throughout. He seems to represent the zeal of the first Christians as so hot and intolerant, that they could have no social intercourse with those who still adhered to the worship of heathen deities. But if so, how could they propagate their religion? Nay, we may even ask, how could they live? If they could not mingle with the heathens in the transactions either of peace or war; or witness the marriage or the funeral of the dearest friend, if a heathen; or practise the elegant arts of music, painting, eloquence, or poetry; or venture to use freely in conversation the language of Greece or of Rome; it is not easy to see what opportunities they could have had of disseminating their religious sentiments. If, in such circumstances, and observing rigidly such a tenor of conduct, they were yet able to propagate their religion with such amazing success as they are said to have done, they must surely either have practised some wonderful arts unknown to us, or have been assisted by the supernatural operation of divine power. But all the historical records of that period, whether sacred or profane, concur in proving that the primitive Christians in general did not retire with such religious horror from all intercourse with the heathens. They refused not to serve in the armies of the Roman empire. They appealed to heathen magistrates, and submitted respectfully to their decisions. The husband was often a heathen, and the wife a Christian; or, conversely, the husband a Christian, and the wife a heathen. These are facts so universally known and admitted, that we need not quote authorities in proof of them.

This distinguished writer appears, therefore, not to have stated the facts which he produces under this head with sufficient precision, nor to have reasoned from them correctly. Had the zeal of the first Christians been as intolerant as he represents it, it must have been highly unfavourable to the propagation of their religion; all their wishes to make converts would, in that case, have been counteracted by their unwillingness to mix, in the ordinary intercourse of life, with those who were to be converted. Their zeal, and the liberal spirit of their religion, were indeed secondary causes which contributed to its propagation; but their zeal was by no means so ridiculously intolerant as this writer would have us believe; for if it had, it must have produced effects directly opposite to those which he ascribes to it.

In illustrating the influence of the next of these secondary causes to which he ascribes the propagation of Christianity, Mr Gibbon displays no less ingenuity than in tracing the nature and the effects of the first. The doctrine of a future life, improved by every additional circumstance which can give weight and efficacy to that important truth, makes a conspicuous figure in the Christian system; and it is a doctrine highly flattering to the natural hopes and wishes of the human heart.

Though the heathen philosophers were not unacquainted with this doctrine, yet to them the spirituality of the human soul, its capacity of existence in a separate state from the body, its immortality, and its prospect of lasting happiness in a future life, rather appeared things possible and desirable, than truths fully established upon solid grounds. These doctrines, Mr Gibbon would persuade us, had no influence on the moral sentiments and general conduct of the heathens. Even the philosophers who amused themselves with displaying their eloquence and ingenuity on these splendid themes, did not allow them to influence the tenor of their lives; while the great body of the people, who were occupied in pursuits very different from the speculations of philosophy, and were unacquainted with the questions discussed in the schools, were scarcely ever at pains to reflect whether they consisted of a material and a spiritual part, or whether their existence was to be prolonged beyond the term of the present life; and they could not regulate their lives by principles which they did not know.

In the popular superstitions of the Greeks and Romans, the doctrine of a future state was not omitted. Mankind were not only flattered with the hopes of continuing to exist beyond the term of the present life, but different conditions of existence were promised or threatened, in which retributions for their conduct in life were to be enjoyed or suffered. Some were exalted to heaven, and associated with the gods; others were rewarded with less illustrious honours, and a more moderate state of happiness, in Elysium; while those who by their conduct in life had merited, not rewards, but punishments, were consigned to Tartarus. Such were the ideas of a future state which formed part of the popular superstitions of the Greeks and Romans. But these notions produced only a very faint impression on the minds of those among whom they prevailed. They were not truths supported by evidence; they were not even plausible; they were in fact a tissue of absurdities; they had not therefore a greater influence on the morals, than the more refined speculations of the philosophers. Even the Jews, whose religion and legislation were communicated from heaven, were in general, till within a very short period before the propagation of the gospel, as imperfectly acquainted with the doctrine of a future state as the Greeks and Romans. This doctrine formed no distinct part of the law of Moses, and it is but darkly intimated in the other parts of the Old Testament.

The rude tribes who inhabited ancient Gaul, and some other nations not more civilized than these, entertained ideas of a future life much clearer than those of the Greeks, the Romans, or even the Jews.

Christianity, however, explained and inculcated the truth of this doctrine in all its splendour and all its dignity. It exhibited an alluring, yet not absurd, view of the happiness of a future life. It conferred new horrors on the place of punishment, and added new severity to the tortures to be inflicted, in another world. The authority on which it taught these doctrines, and displayed these views, was such as to silence doubt, and to command implicit belief. What added to the influence of the doctrine of a future state of existence, thus explained and inculcated, was, that the first Christians confidently prophesied and sincerely believed that the end of the world, the consummation of all things, was fast approaching, and that the generation then present would live to witness that awful event. Another circumstance which contributed to render this doctrine favourable to the propagation of Christianity was, that the first Christians dealt damnation without remorse, and almost without making any exceptions, on all who died in the belief of the absurdities of heathen superstition. Thus taught, and enforced with these additional and heightening circumstances, this doctrine, partly by presenting alluring prospects and exciting pleasing hopes, partly by working upon the fears of the human heart with representations of terror, operated in the most powerful manner in extending the influence of the Christian faith.

Here, however, facts are rather exaggerated, and the inferences unfairly deduced. It must be admitted that the speculations of the heathen philosophers did not fully and undeniably establish the doctrine of the immortality of the human soul; and hence their arguments could scarcely impress such a conviction of this truth as would influence in a very strong degree the moral sentiments and conduct. These arguments, however, were of such a kind that they must have produced some, nay a considerable influence. Several of the most illustrious among the heathen philosophers appear to have been so impressed with the belief of the soul's immortality, and of a future state of retribution, that their general conduct was constantly and in a high degree influenced by that belief. Socrates and Plato are eminent and well-known instances. And if, in such instances as these, the belief of the truths in question produced such effects, it may be fairly inferred, though we had no further evidence, that those characters were not singular in this respect. It is a truth acknowledged as unquestionable in the history of arts and sciences, that wherever any one person has cultivated these with extraordinary success, some of his contemporaries will always be found to rival his excellence, and a number of them will engage in the same pursuits. On this occasion we may venture, without hesitation, to reason upon the same principles. When the belief of the immortality of the human soul produced such illustrious patterns of virtue as a Socrates and a Plato, it must certainly have influenced the moral sentiments and conduct of many others, although in an inferior degree. Some who profess to believe the doctrines of Christianity, make this profession, even although they have never considered seriously whether they be true or false. But notwithstanding this, these truths still exert a powerful influence on the sentiments and manners of society in general. Thus, also, it appears that the doctrines of the ancient philosophy concerning a future life, and even the notions concerning Olympus, Elysium, and Tartarus, which formed part of the popular superstitions, produced a certain influence on the sentiments and manners of the heathens in general. That influence was often indeed inconsiderable, and not always beneficent; but still it seems to have been greater than Mr Gibbon is willing to allow. Christians have been sometimes at pains to exaggerate the absurdities of Pagan superstition, in order that the advantages of Christianity might acquire new value from the contrast. But here we find one who is at heart inimical to Christianity, displaying, and even exaggerating, these absurdities for a different purpose. The truth, however, may be safely admitted; and it is only when exaggerated that it can serve any purpose adverse to the authority of our holy religion. Mr Gibbon certainly represents the religious belief of the ancient Gauls, in respect to the immortality of the human soul and a future state, in too favourable a light. It is only because the system of superstition which prevailed among the barbarians is so imperfectly known, that it has been imagined to consist of more sublime doctrines than those of the popular superstitions of the Greeks and Romans. The evidence which Mr Gibbon produces in proof of what he asserts concerning these opinions of the ancient Gauls is partial, and far from being satisfactory. They did indeed assert and believe the soul to be immortal; but this doctrine was blended with a number of absurdities still grosser than those which characterized the popular religion of the Greeks and Romans. The latter was the superstition of a civilized people, among whom reason was unfolded and improved by cultivation, and whose manners were polished and refined. The former was that of barbarians, among whom reason was, as it were, in its infancy, and who were strangers to the improvements of civilization. Accordingly, when hasty observers found that those barbarians were not absolutely strangers to the idea of immortality, they were moved to undue admiration; their surprise at finding more than they expected confounded their understanding, and led them to misconceive and misrepresent. Hence, what ought to be ascribed to the savage ferocity of those rude tribes, has been attributed by mistake to the influence of their belief of a future state.

In the law of Moses, it must be allowed that this doctrine is not particularly explained nor earnestly inculcated. The author of the Divine Legation of Moses has founded upon this fact an ingenious theory, which we shall elsewhere have occasion to examine, and has supported it with great and various erudition. The reason why this doctrine was not more fully explained to the Jews, we shall not pretend to assign, at least in this place; but we cannot help thinking, that it was more generally known among the Jews than Mr Gibbon and Bishop Warburton are willing to allow. Though it be not strongly inculcated in their code of laws; yet there is some reason to think that it was known and generally prevalent among them long before the Babylonian captivity; and in different passages in the writings of Moses it is mentioned or alluded to in an unequivocal manner. In the history of the patriarchs, it appears that this doctrine was known to these "gray fathers;" and it seems to have had a strong influence on the mind of Moses himself. Were David and Solomon strangers to this doctrine? We cannot here specify minute particulars; but surely all the efforts of ingenuity must be insufficient to torture the Sacred Scriptures of the Old Testament, so as to prove that they contain nothing concerning the doctrine of a future state except in the writings of the later prophets, and that even in these it is only darkly insinuated. Were the Jews, in the earlier stage of their history, so totally secluded from all intercourse with other nations, that a doctrine of so much importance, and more or less known to all around, could not be communicated to them? The Pharisees admitted traditions, and set upon them an undue value; yet they appear to have been considered as the most orthodox of the different sects which prevailed among the Jews; for the Sadducees were regarded as innovators and infidels.

But though we are of opinion that the ingenious historian ascribes to the doctrine of the Greek and Roman phi- losophers, concerning the immortality of the human soul, as well as the notices respecting a future state which formed part of the popular superstitions of those nations, less influence on the moral sentiments and conduct of mankind than what they really exerted; and though we cannot agree with him in allowing that the ideas of the immortality of the soul and of a future state, which were entertained by the Gauls and some other rude nations, were much superior in their nature, or much happier in their influence, than those of the Greeks and Romans; and though, from what is contained in the Old Testament, we are disposed to think that the Jews knew somewhat more concerning the immortality of the human soul, and a future state in which human beings are destined to exist, than Mr Gibbon represents them to have known; yet still we are very sensible, and very well pleased to admit, that "life and immortality were brought to light through the gospel."

The doctrine of a future life, as it was preached by the first Christians, was established on a more solid basis than that on which it had been before maintained; it was freed from every absurdity, and so much improved, that its influence, which, as explained by heathen poets and philosophers, must be confessed to have been in many instances doubtful, now became favourable only to the interests of piety and virtue, and that in no ordinary degree. It undoubtedly contributed to the successful propagation of Christianity; for it was calculated to attract and to please the speculating philosopher, as well as the simple unenlightened votary of the vulgar superstition. The views which it exhibited were distinct; and all was plausible and rational, being demonstrated by the fullest evidence. But the happiness which it promised was of a less sensual nature than the enjoyments which the heathens expected in Elysium; and it would therefore appear less alluring to those who were not capable of entertaining refined ideas, or who preferred the gratifications of the senses in the present life to every other species of good.

If the first Christians rejoiced in the hope of beholding all the votaries of Pagan idolatry afflicted with the torments of hell in a future state, and boasted of these hopes with inhuman exultation, they in all probability irritated rather than alarmed those whom they sought to convert from that superstition. The heathens, assailed with such denunciations, might be moved to regard with indignant scorn the preacher who pretended that the beings whom they venerated as gods, heroes, and wise men, were condemned to a state of unspeakable and endless torment. Every feeling of the heart would revolt at the idea of a parent, a child, a husband, a wife, a friend, a lover, or a mistress, but lately lost and still lamented, being consigned to eternal torments for actions and opinions which they had deemed highly agreeable to superior powers.

With respect, then, to the influence of this secondary cause in promoting the propagation of Christianity, we may conclude that the circumstances of the heathen world were less favourable to that influence than Mr Gibbon pretends; that the means by which he represents the primitive Christians to have improved its efficacy, were some of them not employed, and others rather likely to weaken than to strengthen it; and that therefore more is attributed to the operation of this cause than it could possibly produce.

The third cause, the miraculous powers of the primitive church, is with good reason represented as having conducted to the conviction of infidels. Mr Gibbon's reasonings under this head are, that numerous miraculous works of the most extraordinary kind were ostentatiously performed by the first Christians; that, however, from the difficulty of fixing the period at which miraculous powers ceased to be communicated to the Christian church, and from some other circumstances, there is reason to suspect, as is darkly insinuated, that they were merely the pretences of imposture; and that the heathens having been happily prepared to receive them as real by the many wonders nearly of a similar nature to which they were accustomed in their former superstition, the miracles which the first Christians employed to give a sanction to their doctrines contributed in the most effectual manner to the propagation of Christianity.

In reply to what is here advanced, it may be suggested, that the miracles recorded in the New Testament as having been performed by the first Christians when engaged in propagating their religion, are established as true, upon the most indisputable evidence which human testimony can give to any facts. Mr Hume, who was too fond of employing his ingenuity in undermining truths generally received, has endeavoured to prove that no human testimony, however strong and unexceptionable, can afford sufficient evidence of the reality of a miracle; but his reasonings on this head, which once excited doubt and wonder, have since been completely refuted; and mankind still continue to acknowledge, that though we are all liable to mistakes, and exposed to imposition, yet human testimony may afford the most convincing evidence of the most extraordinary and even supernatural facts. We cannot be expected to enter, in this place, into a particular examination of the miracles ascribed to the primitive age of the church. An inquiry into these will occupy a prominent place under the appropriate head of THEOLOGY, to which the reader is accordingly referred. We may, however, consider it an undeniable and a generally acknowledged fact, that those miracles were real, and that they contributed, in a very eminent manner, to the propagation of Christianity. But it is evident that genuine miracles are not to be ranked among the natural and secondary causes.

It was long the current opinion, even among Protestants, that a miraculous power continued for several centuries to reside in the Christian church. When Dr Middleton controverted this opinion in his Free Inquiry, he encountered the most vehement and acrimonious opposition; and many of the clergy, with Archbishop Secker at their head, thought themselves warranted in representing this lingering power as an article of faith. But the progress of reason, though slow, is commonly certain; and the present bishop of Lincoln, Dr Kaye, has ventured to express himself in the following terms—"My conclusion then is, that the power of working miracles was not extended beyond the disciples, upon whom the apostles conferred it by the imposition of their hands."1

The heathens were no strangers to pretended miracles and prophecies, and other seeming interpositions of superior beings disturbing the ordinary course of nature and of human affairs; but the miracles to which they were familiarized had been so often detected to be tricks of imposture or pretences of mad enthusiasm, that, instead of being prepared to witness or to receive accounts of new miracles with easy credulity, they must have been in general disposed to view them with jealousy and suspicion.2 Besides, the miracles to which they had been accustomed, and those performed by the apostles and the first preachers of Christianity, were directly contradictory, and there-

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1 Kaye's Ecclesiastical History of the Second and Third Centuries, illustrated from the Writings of Tertullian, p. 96. Cambridge, 1829, 8vo.

2 See Mr Weston's Enquiry into the Rejection of the Christian Miracles by the Heathens. Cambridge, 1746, 8vo. fore the one could receive no assistance from the other. Yet notwithstanding what has been advanced above, we must acknowledge, that as disagreements with respect to the principles and institutions of their religion very early arose among Christians, so they likewise sought to extend its influence, at a very early period, by the use of pious frauds, which appear to have sometimes served the immediate purposes for which they were employed, though eventually they proved highly injurious to the cause of Christianity itself.

We conclude, then, that Christianity was indebted to the influence of miracles in a considerable degree for its propagation, but that the real miracles of our Saviour and his apostles were not among the secondary causes of its success; that the heathens who were to be converted were not very happily prepared for receiving the miracles of the gospel with blind credulity; that, as it is possible to discern between sufficient and insufficient evidence, so it is not more difficult to distinguish between true and false miracles; and, lastly, that false miracles were soon employed by Christians as engines to support and propagate their religion, and perhaps not unsuccessfully, but were, upon the whole, more injurious than serviceable to the cause which they were called in to maintain.

The fourth of this series of secondary causes, which the author supposes to have been adequate to the propagation of Christianity, is the virtue of the primitive Christians, which he is willing to attribute to other and less generous motives, rather than to the pure influence of the doctrines and precepts of their religion.

The first converts to Christianity were most of them originally persons of the lowest and most worthless characters. The wise, the mighty, and those who were distinguished by specious virtues, were in general perfectly satisfied with their actual circumstances and future prospects. People whose minds were naturally weak, unenlightened, or oppressed with the sense of atrocious guilt, and who were infamous, or outcasts from society, were eager to grasp at the hopes which the gospel held out to them. When, after enlisting under the banner of Christ, they began to consider themselves as "born again to newness of life," remorse and fear, which easily prevail over weak minds; selfish hopes of regaining their reputation, and attaining to the honours and happiness of those mansions which Jesus was said to have gone to prepare; and a desire to raise the honour and extend the influence of the society of which they were become members; all operated powerfully, so as to enable them to display both active and passive virtue in an extraordinary degree. Their virtues did not flow from the purest and noblest source, yet they attracted the notice and moved the admiration of mankind. Of many who admired, some were eager to imitate, and, in order to this, thought it necessary to adopt the same principles of action. Their virtues, too, were rather of that species which excite wonder, because uncommon, and not of essential utility in the ordinary intercourse of society, than of those which are indispensably necessary to the existence of social order, and contribute to the ease and convenience of life. Such virtues were well calculated to engage the imitation of those who had failed egregiously in the practice of the more social virtues. Thus they practised extraordinary but useless and unsocial virtues, from no very generous motives; and those virtues drew upon them the eyes of the world, and induced numbers to embrace their faith.

We must, however, declare, that this is plainly an uncandid account of the virtues of the primitive Christians, and of the motives from which they originated. The social virtues are strongly recommended in the gospel. No degree of mortification or self-denial, or seclusion from the ordinary business and amusements of social life, was Christian required of the early converts to Christianity, except what was indispensably necessary to wean them from the irregular habits in which they had before indulged, and which had rendered them nuisances in society, and to form them to new habits equally necessary to their happiness and their usefulness in life. We allow that they practised virtues which in other circumstances would, however splendid, have been unnecessary; but, in the difficult circumstances in which the first Christians were placed, the virtues which they practised were in the highest degree social. The most prominent feature in their character was their continuing to entertain sentiments of generous benevolence, and to discharge scrupulously all the social duties, towards those who exercised neither charity nor humanity, and frequently not even bare integrity and justice, in their conduct towards them.

It cannot be said with truth that such a proportion of the primitive Christians were people whose characters had been infamous, and their circumstances desperate, as that the character of the religion which they embraced should suffer from this circumstance. Nor were they only the weak and illiterate whom the apostles and their immediate successors converted by their preaching. The criminal, to be sure, rejoiced to hear that he might obtain absolution of his crimes; the mourner was willing to receive comfort; and minds of refined and generous feelings were deeply affected with that goodness which had induced the Son of God to submit to the punishment due to sinners; but the simplicity, the rationality, and the beauty of the Christian system, likewise prevailed in numerous instances over the pride and prejudices of the great and the wise, and in instances sufficiently numerous to vindicate the Christian church from the aspersions by which it has been represented as being in the first period of its existence merely a body of criminals and idiots.

The principles, too, from which the virtues of the first Christians originated, were not peculiarly mean and selfish; on the contrary, they seem to have been uncommonly sublime and disinterested. Remorse in the guilty mind is a natural and reasonable sentiment; and the desire of happiness in every human breast is equally so. It is uncandid, therefore, to cavil against the first Christians for being, like the rest of mankind, influenced by these sentiments. And when we behold them overlooking temporary possessions and enjoyments, extending their views to futurity, and "living by faith;" when we observe them doing good to those who hated them, blessing those who cursed them, and praying for those by whom they were despitefully used and persecuted;" we cannot deny that their virtues were of the most generous and disinterested kind.

We allow, then, that the virtues of the first Christians must have contributed to the propagation of their religion; but it is with pain that we observe the historian studiously labouring to misrepresent the principles from which those virtues arose; and not only the principles themselves, but also the importance of the actions and conduct which naturally sprung from them.

The fifth cause was the mode of church government adopted by the first Christians, by which they were knit together in one society; and preferred the church and its interests to their country and civil concerns. We do not deny that the mutual attachment of the primitive Christians contributed to spread the influence of their religion; and the order which they maintained, by being animated with this spirit of brotherly love, and with an ardent zeal for the glory of God, must no doubt have produced those happy effects among them which order and regularity produce on every occasion when they are strictly observed.

But whether the form of church government, which was gradually established in the Christian church, was actually the happiest that could possibly have been adopted; or whether, by establishing a distinct society, with separate interests, within the Roman empire, it contributed to the dissolution of that mighty fabric; we cannot here pretend to inquire. These are subjects of discussion with respect to which we may with more propriety endeavour to satisfy our readers under another head.

From the whole, then, of this review of what Mr Gibbon has so speciously advanced concerning the influence of these five secondary causes in the propagation of the gospel, we think ourselves warranted to conclude, that the zeal of the first Christians was not, as he represents it, intolerant; that the doctrine of the immortality of the human soul was somewhat better understood in the heathen world, particularly among the Greeks and Romans, and the Jews, than he represents it to have been, and had an influence somewhat happier than that which he ascribes to it; that the additional circumstances by which, he informs us, the first preachers of Christianity improved the effects of this doctrine, were far from being calculated to allure converts; that the heathens, therefore, were not quite so well prepared for an eager reception of this doctrine as he would persuade us that they were, and, of consequence, could not be influenced by it in so considerable a degree in their conversion; that real and unquestionable miracles, performed by our Saviour, and the first race of Christians, contributed signalily to the propagation of Christianity, but are not to be ranked among the secondary causes of its diffusion; that weakness and blind zeal did at times employ pretended miracles for the same purpose not altogether ineffectually; that though these despicable and wicked means might be in some instances successful, yet they were, upon the whole, much more injurious than beneficial; that the virtues of the primitive Christians arose from the most generous and noble motives, and were in their nature and tendency highly favourable to social order, and to the comfort of mankind in the social state; and, lastly, that the order and regularity of church government, which were gradually established among the first Christians, contributed greatly to maintain the dignity and spread the influence of their religion, but tended in no degree to disjoin them from their fellow-subjects, or to render them inimical to the welfare of the state of which they were members. Upon the whole, therefore, we do not see that these secondary causes were equal to the effects which have been ascribed to them; and it seems undeniable that others of a superior kind must have co-operated in the diffusion of Christianity.