DICTIONARY, in its original acceptation, is the arranging of all the words of a language according to the order of the alphabet, and annexing a definition or explanation to each word. When arts and sciences began to be improved and extended, the multiplicity of technical terms rendered it necessary to compile dictionaries, either of science in general, or of particular sciences, according to the views of the compiler.
Dictionary of the English Language. The design of every dictionary of language is to explain, in the most accurate manner, the meaning of every word; and to show the various ways in which it can be combined with others, in as far as this tends to alter or modify its meaning. The dictionary which does this in the most accurate manner is the most complete work of the kind; therefore the principal study of a lexicographer ought to be to discover the method which may seem best adapted for that purpose. Dr Johnson, with great labour, has collected the various meanings of every word, and quoted the authorities; but it would have been an improvement if he had given an accurate definition of the precise meaning of every word; pointed out the way in which it ought to be employed with the greatest propriety; showed the various deviations from the original meaning, which custom had so far established as to render allowable; and fixed the precise limits beyond which it could not be employed without becoming a vicious expression. With this view it would have been necessary to exhibit the nice distinctions which take place between words nearly synonymous, and without which many words can only be defined in such a manner that they must be considered as exactly synonymous. We omit making any quotations from Johnson in order to point out these defects; and shall content ourselves with giving a few examples, to show in what manner, according to our idea, a dictionary of the English language ought to be compiled.
IMMEDIATELY, adv. of time.
1. Instantly, without delay. Always employed to denote future time, and never past. Thus we may say, I will come immediately; but not I am immediately come from such a place. See Presently.
2. Without the intervention of any cause or event; as opposed to mediately.
PRESENTLY, adv. of time.
1. Instantly, without delay. Exactly synonymous with immediately; being never with propriety employed to denote any thing but future time.
2. Formerly it was employed to express present time. Thus, The house presently possessed by such a one, was often used, but this has now become a vicious expression; and we ought to say, The house possessed at present. It differs from immediately in this, that even in the most corrupt phrases it never can denote past time.
FORM, subst. The external appearance of any object, when considered only with reference to shape or figure. This term, therefore, in the literal sense, can only be applied to the objects of sight and touch, and is therefore nearly synonymous with figure; but these terms differ in some respects. Form may be employed to denote more rude and unfinished shapes; figure, those which are more perfect and regular.
Form can never be employed without denoting matter, whereas figure may be employed in the abstract: thus we say a square or a triangular figure, but not a square or triangular form. And in the same manner we say the figure of a house; but we must denote the substance which forms that figure if we use the word form; as, a cloud of the form of a house. See Figure.
2. In contrast to irregularity or confusion. As beauty cannot exist without order, it is by a figure of speech employed to denote beauty, order, and the like.
3. As form respects only the external appearance of bodies, without regard to their internal qualities, it is, by a figure of speech, employed in contrast to these qualities to denote empty show, without essential qualities. In this sense it is often taken when applied to religious ceremonies, pageantry, and so forth.
4. As form is employed to denote the external appearance of bodies, so, in a figurative sense, it is applied to reasoning, denoting the particular mode or manner in which this is conducted; as, the form of a syllogism, &c.
5. In the same manner it is employed to denote the particular mode of procedure established in courts of law; as, the forms of law, religion, and the like.
6. Form is sometimes, although improperly, used to denote the different circumstances of the same body; as, water in a fluid or a solid form. But as this phrase regards the internal qualities rather than the external figure, it is improper, and ought to be, water in a fluid or a solid state.
7. But when bodies of different kinds are compared with one another, this term may be employed to denote other circumstances than shape or figure; for we may say, a juice exuding from a tree in the form of wax or resin; although, in this case, the consistence, colour, &c. and not the external arrangement of parts, constitutes the resemblance.
8. From the regular appearance of a number of persons arranged in one long seat, such persons so arranged are sometimes called a form; as, a form of students, &c. And,
9. By an easy transition the seat itself has also acquired that name.
GREAT, adj. A relative word, denoting largeness of quantity, number, &c., serving to augment the value of those terms with which it is combined, and opposed to small or little. The principal circumstances in which this word can be employed are the following:
1. When merely inanimate objects are considered with regard to quantity, great is with propriety employed to denote that the quantity is considerable; as, a great mountain, great house, and the like; and it is here contrasted with small. When great is thus employed, we have no other word which is exactly synonymous.
2. When inanimate objects are considered with regard to their extent, this term is sometimes employed, although with less propriety; as, a great plain, a great field, and the like. In this sense it is nearly synonymous with large; and these terms were often used indiscriminately, but with some difference of meaning; for, as large is a term chiefly employed to denote extent of superficies, and as great more particularly regards the quantity of matter, therefore, when large is applied to any object which is not merely superficial, it denotes that it is the extent of surface which is there meant to be considered, without regard to the other dimensions; whereas, when the term great is employed, it has reference to the whole contents.
If, therefore, we say a large house, or a large river, we express that the house, or the river, has a surface of great extent, without having any necessary connexion with the size in other respects. But if we say a great house, or a great river, it at once denotes that these objects have not only a large surface, but are also of great size in every respect.
3. Great, when applied to the human species, never denotes the size or largeness of body, but is applied solely to the qualities of the mind. Thus when we say that Socrates was a great man, we do not mean that he was a man of great size, but that he was a man who excelled in the endowments of the mind. The terms which denote largeness of size in the human body are big, bulky, huge.
4. Great is sometimes applied to the human species, as denoting high rank. In this case it is oftener used in the plural number than otherwise. Thus we say simply the great, meaning the whole body of men in high station, as opposed to the mean. It should seldom be employed in this sense, as it tends to confound dignity of rank with elevation of mind.
5. As this is a general term of augmentation, it may be joined with all nouns which denote quantity, quality, number, excellence, or defects; or such as imply praise, blame, anger, contempt, or any other affection of the mind.
6. It is employed to denote every step of ascending or descending consanguinity, as great-grandfather, great-grandson, and so on.
High, adj. Exalted in a perpendicular direction at a distance from the surface of the earth, and opposed to low.
1. High is a term altogether indefinite, and is employed to express the degree of elevation of any inanimate body. Thus we say a high mountain, a high house, steeples, tower, pillar, and the like. Nor is there any other word which can here be considered as synonymous; lofty being employed only to denote a very eminent degree of elevation.
2. To express the perpendicular elevation of vegetables either high or tall may be employed, as being in this case nearly synonymous. We may therefore say a high or tall tree, a high or tall mast, and so forth, but with this difference between these two expressions, that tall can be more properly applied to those which are much elevated and of small dimensions; and high, to such as are more bulky and of greater size.
3. The perpendicular height of man can never be expressed by the word high, tall being here the proper expression. And although high is sometimes used to express the height of other animals, yet it seems to be an improper expression. See Tall.
4. High, when applied to the human species, always refers to the mind, and denotes haughtiness, stateliness, pride, and when combined with expressions indicating energy of mind, it denotes that in a higher degree. In this sense it is opposed to meanness, abjectness, and humility.
5. As this is an indefinite term, tending to denote anything which is elevated above us, it may be combined with almost every noun which admits of this elevation. Hence, as objects high above us are always out of our reach, it is in a metaphorical sense used to denote any thing which seems to be above the ordinary condition of mankind, or those qualities or endowments of mind which are not easily acquired; as, dignity or elevation of sentiment, dignity of rank, acuteness in reasoning on difficult subjects, pride, haughtiness, or any other quality which seems beyond the ordinary level of mankind; clearness of price.
6. In the same manner we apply this term to time, which having a metaphorical resemblance to a river flowing on with an unceasing current through all successive ages, any thing of remote antiquity is denoted by the term high.
7. Likewise to those degrees of latitude far removed from the line, where the pole becomes more elevated.
8. And also to some particular crimes, as being attended with peculiar degrees of guilt, as high treason.
Tall, adj. Something elevated to a considerable degree in a perpendicular direction, and opposed to low.
1. This term is chiefly employed to express the height of man and other animals; and is applied to denote the height of the body only, without having any reference to the mind. When applied to man, no other word can be substituted in its stead; when applied to other animals, high is sometimes considered as nearly synonymous. See High.
2. It is likewise employed to denote the perpendicular height of vegetables, and in this case it is nearly synonymous with high. See High.
3. It can in no case be employed to express the height of merely inanimate objects, as we can never say a tall steeple, tower, or pillar, but a high steeple, &c. For the distinctions in these cases, see High.
Long, adj. A relative term, denoting the distance between the extremes of any body which is extended more in one of its geometrical dimensions than in another. It is opposed to short.
1. This term may be applied to all inanimate objects, of whatever kind, whose dimensions in one way exceed their dimensions in the other, and when not in an erect posture, whatever be the other circumstances attending them, whether it relates to superficies alone or to solid bodies, whether these be bounded or open, straight or crooked, flexible or rigid, or in any other circumstances whatever: thus we say a long or short line, a long or short ridge, street, ditch, rope, chain, staff, and the like. But it is to be observed, that although long is in the strict sense only opposed to short, yet as it expresses the extension of matter in one of its geometrical proportions, it is often contrasted by those words which express the other proportions when we mean only to describe the several proportions; as, a table long and broad. And as these several dimensions are expressed by different words, according to the various forms, modifications, and circumstances in which bodies are found, therefore it is in this sense contrasted by a great diversity of terms; as, a long and broad or wide, narrow or strait, street or lane; a long and thick or small rope, chain, staff. For the distinctions in these cases see Broad, Wide, &c.
2. Objects necessarily fixed in an erect position can never have this term applied to them, and therefore we cannot say a long, but a high tower or steeple. And for the same reason, while trees are growing and fixed in an erect position, we cannot apply this term to them; but when they are felled and laid upon the ground, it is quite proper and necessary. Thus we do not say a long, but a tall or high tree, while it is growing; but we say a long, not a tall log of wood; and in the same manner we say a tall mast when it is fixed in the ship, but a long mast while it lies upon the beach. See Tall and High.
3. Those vegetables which are of a tender, pliant nature, or so weak as not to be able to retain a fixed position, being considered as of a middle nature between erect and prostrate bodies, admit of either the terms long, tall, or high; as, a long or tall rush or willow wand, or a long, tall, or high stalk of corn. See High and Tall.
4. The parts of vegetables, when considered as distinct from the whole, even when growing and erect, assume the term long; for we do not say a tall, but a long shoot of a tree, and a tree with a long stem, in preference to a tree with a high stem.
5. For the same reason, a staff and pole, even when fixed in a perpendicular direction, assume the word long, in preference to tall or high.
6. With regard to animals, the general rule is applied, without any exceptions; tall, and not long, being employed to denote the height of the human body when in an erect posture; and long, and not tall, to denote its length when in an incumbent situation. Long applied to all other animals which do not walk erect, always denotes their greatest length in a horizontal position from head to tail.
7. In a figurative sense, it denotes, with regard to time, anything at a great distance from us.
8. As also, anything that takes up much time before it is finished, as, a long discourse, a protracted note in music, and the like.
Broad, adj. The distance between the two nearest sides of any body whose geometrical dimensions are larger in one direction than in another. It has a reference to superficies only, and never to the solid contents, and is opposed to narrow.
1. Broad, in the strictest acceptation, is applied to denote those bodies only whose sides are altogether open and unconfined; as, a broad table, a broad wheel, &c. and in these cases it is invariably contrasted with narrow; nor is there any other word which in these cases can be considered as synonymous with it, or be used in its stead.
2. When any object is in some sort bounded on the sides, although not quite closed up, as a road, street, ditch, and the like, either broad or wide may be employed, but with some difference of signification; broad being most properly used for those which are more open, and wide for those which are more confined; nor can this term be ever applied to such objects as are closely bounded all around, as a house, a church, and the like, wide being here employed. For the more accurate distinctions in these cases see the article Wide.
Wide, adj. A term employed to denote relative extent in certain circumstances, and opposed to narrow and strait.
1. This term is in its proper sense applied only to denote the space contained within any body closed all round and on every side; as, a house, gate, or the like; and it differs from broad in this, that it never relates to the superficies of solid objects, but is employed to express the capaciousness of any body which contains vacant space; nor can capaciousness in this sense be expressed by any other word but wide.
2. As many bodies may be considered either with respect to their capaciousness or superficial extent, in all these cases either the term broad or wide may be used; as, a broad or wide street or ditch, &c.; but with a greater Dictionary, or less degree of propriety, according to the circumstances of the object, or the idea which we wish to convey. In a street where the houses are low and the boundaries open, or in a ditch of small depth and large superficies, as this largeness of superficies bears the principal proportion, broad would be more proper; but if the houses are of great height, or the ditch of great depth, and capaciousness is the principal property which affects the mind, we would naturally say a wide street or ditch; and the same may be said of all similar cases. But there are some cases in which both these terms are applied, with a greater difference of meaning; thus we say a broad or a wide gate. As the gate, however, is employed to denote either the aperture in the wall, or the matter which closes that aperture, these terms are each of them used to denote that particular quality to which they are generally applied; and as the opening itself can never be considered as a superficies, the term wide, in this case, denotes the distance between the sides of the aperture; whilst, on the contrary, broad denotes the extent of matter fitted to close that aperture; nor can these two terms be in any case substituted for one another.
3. As a figurative expression, it is used as a cant phrase for a mistake; as, you are wide of the mark; that is, not near the truth.
Narrow, adj. A relative term, denoting a proportional smallness of distance between the sides of the superficies of plain bodies, and opposed to broad.
1. As this is only applied to superficies, it is exactly contrasted by broad, and is applied in all cases where the term broad can be used (see Broad); and in no other case but as a contrast to it, excepting the following.
2. It sometimes is employed to describe the smallness of space circumscribed between certain boundaries, as opposed to wide, and nearly synonymous with straight; thus we say a wide or a narrow house, church, and the like. For the necessary distinctions here, see the article Strait.
3. In a figurative sense it denotes parsimony, poverty, confined sentiments, and so forth.
Strait, adj. A relative term, denoting the extent of space in certain circumstances, and opposed to wide. See Wide.
1. This term is employed, in its proper sense, to denote only space, as contained between surrounding bodies in such circumstances as to denote some degree of confinement, and is exactly opposed to wide; as, a wide or a strait gate, &c. See Wide.
2. So necessary is it that the idea of confinement should be connected with this word, that in all those cases where the space contained is large, as in a church or house, we cannot express a smaller proportional width by this term. And as we have no other word to express space in these circumstances, we are obliged to force the word narrow from its natural signification, and make it express this. See Narrow.
3. In some particular cases, narrow or strait may be applied to the same object; as, a narrow or a strait line; but here strait is never employed except where an idea of confinement is suggested, and where it is exactly contrasted to wide; nor can narrow be employed except in such circumstances where broad would be a perfect contrast to it. Therefore these two terms may be always used in the same circumstances as those which contrast with them. For an account of these see Wide. 4. The term *strait* is likewise in a peculiar manner used to denote the smallness of the internal diameter of those bodies which are fitted to receive or contain others, as any kind of bag, tube, body clothes, mortises, and others of the same kind; and in all these cases this term may be employed to denote the smallness of their lesser diameter, and never the term *narrow*. But in certain circumstances the word *tight* may be substituted for it. See *Tight*.
5. *Strait*, in a figurative sense, denotes any sort of confinement of sentiment or disposition.
*TIGHT*, *adj.* A term employed in certain circumstances to denote the internal capacity of particular bodies, and nearly synonymous with *strait*. This term is confined entirely to denote the smallness of the internal dimensions of such objects as are formed to cover, or to receive or contain, other solid bodies, and can be employed in no other case. And although it agrees with *strait*, in always denoting confinement, and by being applicable to the same species of objects, yet it differs in the following respects:
1. If there be any difference of the diameter of the objects to which the term *strait* can be applied, it has always reference to the smaller; yet *tight* may be applied to any sort of confinement, whether it regards the length or breadth.
2. *Strait* can be applied to all bodies of capacity when of small diameter, without any sort of reference to the nature of the substance which it may be capable of containing. For we can say a *strait bag*, a *strait sleeve*, a *strait mortise*, a *strait gate*, and so on, whereas *tight* can only be applied to any body when it is considered as having reference to another body which is intended to be contained in it, and is pinched from want of room. Thus we say the *sleeve of a coat is too tight for the arm*, the *mortise is too tight for the tenon*, and so forth; but we cannot say the *bag* or the *gate is too tight*, because they are fitted to receive any sort of objects. And hence it happens that in many cases the dimensions of the same body may be expressed by *tight* or *strait*, when considered in different circumstances. Thus we may say, this *sleeve is too strait*, when we look at a coat lying on the table and consider its proportions; but it is not till we have tried it upon the arm which it is intended to cover, that we call it *tight*. And we may say, a *gate is too strait* or *too tight*; but in the first case we consider it as being too confined for admitting objects to pass through it; and in the next, as being too confined with respect to the "leaves" which are to shut the aperture not allowing them space to move with freedom.
These examples may serve to give some idea of the plan of an English dictionary composed upon philosophical principles. But, besides the circumstances above enumerated, there are many others which would require particular attention in the execution of a work of this kind. In the English language a great variety of terms occur which denote matter under certain general forms or circumstances, without regarding the minute diversities that may take place; as the word *cloth*, which denotes matter as manufactured into a particular form, including under it all the variety of stuffs manufactured in that particular way, of whatever materials, colour, texture, or fineness they may be. The same may be said of *wood*, *iron*, *yarn*, and a great variety of terms of the same nature, some of which cannot assume any plural; whilst others admit of it in all cases, and others, again, admit or refuse it according to the different circumstances in which they are considered.
In a dictionary, therefore, all this variety of cases ought to be clearly and distinctly pointed out under each particular article. This is the more necessary, as some of these words have others formed from them which might be readily mistaken for their plurals, although they have a very different signification; as *clothes*, which does not denote any number of pieces of different kinds of *cloth*, but *wearing apparel*. The following example will illustrate this head.
**WOOD**, *subst.* A solid substance of which the trunks and branches of trees consist.
1. This term is employed to denote the solid parts of vegetables of all kinds, in whatever form or circumstances they are found. Nor does it admit of a plural with propriety, unless in the circumstances after mentioned; for we say, *many different kinds of wood*, in preference to *many kinds of woods*; or we say, *oak, ash, or elm wood*, not *woods*.
2. But where we want to contrast wood of one quality or country with that of another, it admits of a plural; for we say, *white woods are in general softer than red*; or, *West Indian woods are in general of greater specific gravity than the European woods*. But unless where the colour, or some quality which distinguishes it from growing wood, is mentioned, this plural ought as much as possible to be avoided, as it always suggests an idea of growing wood.
3. *Wood* likewise denotes a number of trees growing near one another, being nearly synonymous with *forest*. See *Forest*. In this sense it always admits of a plural; as, *Ye woods and wilds whose melancholy gloom*, &c.
A dictionary cannot be reckoned complete without explaining obsolete words; and if the terms of the several provincial dialects were likewise given, it would be of great utility. Nor would this occupy much space, because a number of these words need no other explanation than to mark along with them the words which had come in their place, when there happened to be one perfectly synonymous; and in those cases where the same idea could not be expressed in modern language without a periphrasis, it would be of use to explain them distinctly; so that, when a writer found himself at a loss for a term, and was obliged to search for one beyond the bounds of his own language, he might take one of these, if he found it expressive and energetic, in preference to another drawn from a foreign language. This would at least have one good effect; it would render our language more fixed and stable, not to say more accurate and precise, than by borrowing from foreign languages. The following examples may serve to give some idea of the manner of treating this part of the work.
**MOE**, or *mo*, *adj.* An obsolete term still employed in the Scotch dialect, and by them pronounced *moe*, denoting a greater number, and nearly synonymous with *more*; but it differs in this respect, that in the Scotch dialect, *moe* and *mair* (English *more*) are each employed in their distinct sphere, without encroaching upon one another, *moe* being employed to denote number, but never quantity or quality, and *mair* to denote quantity and quality, but never number; thus they say *moe*, not *mair*, *apples*, *men*, &c. and *mair*, not *moe*, *cloth*, *earth*, *courage*, &c. See *Mair*. Both these terms are supplied by the word *more*, which in the English language is applied indiscriminately to denote quantity, quality, and number. See *More*.
As the English language is so exceedingly irregular in the pronunciation, the same letter in the same situation often assuming sounds totally different in different words, it is impossible to establish any general rules on this subject which do not admit of many exceptions; therefore a Dictynnia dictionary is the best means of ascertaining and pointing out the proper pronunciations of words. For, if the writer first pointed out all the different sounds which the same letter could ever be made to express, and assigned to every particular sound which each letter could be made to assume, a particular mark, appropriated to denote that particular sound of the letter whenever it occurred, by placing these particular marks above the letters in the dictionary, the sound of each letter would be pointed out in all cases with the utmost certainty. It is impossible to illustrate this by examples, without first ascertaining all the sounds of each letter, which would lead into a discussion too long for this place.
We shall only further observe, that besides having the accented syllable of every word properly distinguished in a dictionary to assist in the pronunciation, the English language requires another essential improvement, namely, the use of accents to distinguish the meaning of words and phrases, which, although it is not so properly confined to a lexicographer, yet it is not quite without his sphere. Thus, the word *as* admits of two very different sounds, as well as different significations; for example, "Cicero was nearly *as* eloquent as Demosthenes;" in which the first *as* is pronounced *ass*, and the last is pronounced *az*. Now it often happens that, in reading, the particular way in which it ought to be understood is not pointed out by the context till after the word itself is pronounced, which has an equal chance at least of being pronounced wrong; whereas, if it were always accented when employed in the one sense, and not in the other, it would free the reader from this perplexity. There are other cases in which the proper use of accents in writing would be of great consequence; as at the beginning of a sentence when it is put as a question, or used ironically. But this does not so properly belong to the lexicographer as the grammarian.
The above examples, we hope, will be sufficient to give the reader some idea of the plan which we would propose, and will enable him to determine whether or not a dictionary, executed in this way, would convey to his mind a more perfect knowledge of the English language than those dictionaries which have hitherto been published. These examples are given rather with a view to show the manner in which a work of this kind may be conducted, than as perfect and unexceptionable explanations of the several articles there enumerated; and therefore we have not thought it necessary to produce any authorities, although we are sensible that they would be requisite in such a work.
**Dictynnia**, or **Dictinnia**, in Mythology, were feasts celebrated at Lacedemon and in Crete, in honour of Diana Dictynnia or Dictynnia, or of a nymph taken for her, who, having plunged herself into the sea to escape the passion of Minos, was caught in a fisherman's net or *dóxos*, and hence the name.
**Dictys Cretensis**, a very ancient historian, who served under Idomeneus, king of Crete, in the Trojan war, and wrote the history of that expedition in nine books. Tzetzes tells us that Homer formed his Iliad upon the plan of that history. It is, however, maintained that the Latin history of Dictys now extant is spurious.
**Didactic**, in the schools, signifies the manner of speaking or writing adapted to teach or explain the nature of things. The word is formed from the Greek *διδάσκω*, *dóceo*, I teach.
There are many words which are only used in the didactic and dogmatic way; and there are also many works, ancient and modern, both in prose and verse, written after this method. Such are the Georgics of Virgil, Lucretius's poem *De Rerum Natura*, and Pope's Essays on Criticism and on Man.
**Diderot**, Denis, a French writer and philosopher. Diderot was the son of a cutter, and born at Langres in the year 1712. He received his education among the Jesuits, and being destined for the church by one of his uncles, who had a canonry to bestow upon him, he assumed the tonsure. But he discovered so little inclination for the ecclesiastical profession, that his father sent him to Paris to prosecute his studies, and afterwards placed him with an attorney. It soon appeared, however, that he was more attached to different departments of literature and science than disposed to submit to the drudgeries of the profession to which his father had destined him; and having neglected his business, his allowance was withheld, which obliged him to shift for himself, and to give lessons in order to procure a subsistence. The studies to which Diderot devoted his attention were extremely various. Physics, geometry, metaphysics, moral philosophy, and belles-lettres, were at different times the objects of his pursuit; and he even indulged in poetry and works of invention. But he attached himself chiefly to graver and more serious studies. Diderot possessed great fluency and animation of language in conversation; and this accomplishment, with a decisive tone and manner, procured him both partizans and protectors.
One of the first of his publications was a translation of Stanza's *History of Greece*. In the year 1745 he published *Principles of Moral Philosophy*, 12mo, a work by which he obtained some reputation. But the year following, when he published a piece entitled *Pensées Philosophiques*, he acquired considerable celebrity. This work was highly commended by the partizans of the new philosophy, amongst whom he had now enlisted himself. The same work was afterwards reprinted under the title of *Étrennes aux Esprits Forts*; it was very much read, and is supposed to have contributed greatly to the diffusion of those free opinions which had now become so prevalent in France. Soon after this period, Diderot, in conjunction with D'Alembert, concerted the plan of that vast undertaking, the *Dictionary Encyclopédique*. The professed object of this work was to form a magazine of every branch of human knowledge; but it has been alleged that it was also intended by the authors and editors as the great engine by means of which established opinions, whether of a religious or political nature, which they supposed had their origin in fraud and superstition, were to be subverted. The department of this work which was entrusted to Diderot was the description of arts and trades (*arts et métiers*). In fact, he was the principal architect of this great edifice; and, besides the Prospectus, and the *Système des Connaissances Humaines*, which has been much commended on account of its classification, he contributed many articles in various departments of science. But his writings in the Dictionary have been considered as extremely verbose and diffuse; and in all of them he is too fond of metaphysical subtleties and the pompous parade of scientific language. The first two volumes of the Dictionary appeared in the year 1751, and the first edition was completed and published in 1767; but although Diderot was occupied in this laborious undertaking for a period of nearly twenty years, the recompense which he obtained for his labours is said to have been extremely small.
During this time he composed various other works. Amongst these may be mentioned *A Letter on the Blind*, for the use of those who see. This work made a good deal of noise, and, in consequence of some of the sentiments it contained, gave offence to the government, for which reason the author was detained in confinement during six months at Vincennes. This piece was soon followed by another, entitled *A Letter on the Deaf and Dumb*, 2 vols. 12mo, 1751. The *Sixth Sense*, which was published in Diderot. 1752; Thoughts on the interpretation of Nature, which appeared in 1754; and The Code of Nature, in 1755; are similar works, and may be ranked in the same class. His moral character was considerably affected by the publication of Bijoux Indiscrets, in two vols. 12mo, which is a collection of licentious tales; but for this he made some kind of compensation when he published two prose comedies, entitled Le Fils Naturel, 1757, and Le Pére de Famille, 1758, which are not only interesting as dramatic pieces, but exhibit a pure and correct morality. The latter is considered as one of the best comedies of the sentimental kind which has appeared on the French stage, and it has accordingly been much admired. He afterwards published a pamphlet on Public Education, which undoubtedly contains some useful hints, but at the same time it proposes many things which are utterly absurd and impracticable. To the list of his works now mentioned we may add an eulogy on Richardson, which is full of warmth and enthusiasm; and an Essay on the Life and Writings of Seneca the Philosopher. This was his last production, and was published in 1779.
The character of Diderot suffered considerably from some defamatory attacks which he had made on his former friend Rousseau, who had quarrelled with the French philosophers, and had separated himself from their school. From the Confessions of the philosopher of Geneva, it would appear that they expected of him some anecdotes which would not have redounded much to their honour. In one of his letters Rousseau, speaking of Diderot, says, "Although born with a good heart and an open disposition, he had an unfortunate propensity to misinterpret the words and actions of his friends, and the most ingenuous explanations only supplied his subtle imagination with new interpretations against them."
Diderot was married and had a family; and, although he possessed considerable irritability of temper, he was, it seems, a kind husband and a tender parent. At the conclusion of the Dictionary, the state of his affairs having rendered it necessary for him to dispose of his library, it was purchased by the empress of Russia, who, with the king of Prussia, was at that time the great encourager of literature and literary men. These sovereigns were also considered as disciples of the French school. The price which Diderot received for his library was fifty thousand livres, and he was to have the use of it during his life. But some of his biographers, with what truth we know not, have not hesitated to charge him with disposing of it a second time; they state, that when some person commissioned by the empress wished to see it, the philosopher declined the visit on various pretences, until he had had time to fill it with books borrowed from booksellers. The examination, it is obvious, must have been extremely superficial, otherwise the truth would have been at once detected. Diderot had been admitted a member of the Academy of Sciences at Berlin; but the doors of the French Academy remained closed against him to the last. He died suddenly, as he rose from table, on the 31st July 1784. His literary and philosophical works were collected and published by his friend Naigeon, in 15 vols. 8vo, at Paris, in 1798. This collection has been enlarged, in subsequent republications, to 22 vols. 8vo, Paris, 1821; and it contains a Memoir of Diderot.
Diderot, it would seem, had a hand in several of the most remarkable works of his time, published under the names of others. "Who does not know," says Grimm, in his Correspondence, "that nearly a third of the Histoire Philosophique de Raynal belongs to him?" He laboured on it during two years, and a considerable part of it was even composed under my own eyes. Diderot himself was often startled at the boldness with which he had made his friend the abbé speak. "Who," asked he, "who will venture to subscribe this?" "I replied the abbé, 'I will subscribe it; proceed, I tell you.' What man of letters is there who may not easily recognise in the book De l'Esprit (of Helvetius), and in the Système de la Nature, all the fine passages which are, and could only be, from the pen of Diderot? If we undertook to make a more complete enumeration, we should run the risk of naming many ungrateful individuals." (Correspondance Littéraire, Philosophique, et Critique, tom. iv. p. 85.) Grimm further states that Diderot furnished a great number of pages to the Système de la Nature, and that he likewise laboured, though to less extent, on the Système Social and the Morale Universelle, also published by Baron d'Holbach. Such were some of the indirect literary efforts of Diderot. But neither as a writer nor as a philosopher did he make for himself any very enviable reputation. As a writer he was decidedly a bad model; he had neither plan nor connection, and knew not how proprie communia dicere, whilst his style was deformed by obscurity, neologisms, and a tone of insufferable dogmatism; but nevertheless he was often vigorous, sometimes eloquent, and hit off happy traits of expression, as well as striking truths, which, however, would have gained much by being more simply enunciated. In fact, he had frequently the air of being in cathedra; he aimed at ambitious formularies, and fatigued by his strained style, by his prodigal salles, and by an enthusiasm which seldom appeared natural. As a philosopher he wrote under the influence of a heated imagination rather than under that of cool reason. He was almost always exalted and extravagant; seldom or never simple and natural. His friends, however, have celebrated his goodness, his frankness, his easy and obliging character, and the vigour and entertainement of his conversation. Grimm, who has praised him warmly in his Correspondance, regards Diderot as having had the most naturally encyclopaedical head of any man that ever lived. He admires his energy, his warmth, the variety of his ideas, the multiplicity of his acquirements, the impetuous tumult of his imagination, and the charm and irregularity of his conversation. Then he adds, "However willingly I may pardon all men for believing nothing, I think that it would have been very desirable for the reputation of Diderot, perhaps even for the honour of his age, if he had not been an atheist. The determined war which he thought himself obliged to carry on against God, caused him to lose the most precious moments of his life." (Correspondance, 3me partie, tom. iv. p. 87.) But Naigeon, who is less considerate than Grimm, praises his friend without qualification, adding, besides, that "his age has not done him justice." It is possible indeed that some persons may have too much depreciated the merit of Diderot; but others again exalted it beyond all measure. The general opinion in regard to him, however, seems now to be pretty well fixed, and posterity has at length put him in his right place. He had talent; he was capable of warmth and elevation; but he wanted sagacity, moderation, and taste. "He has written fine pages," says Marmontel in his Mémoires, "but he never knew how to make a book." He adopted a desolating and destructive system, and he disdained his cause by the exaggeration of most of his principles, and by the license which reigns in many of his productions. This explains the reason why he never entered the academy, whose doors, as we have already stated, were constantly shut against him, notwithstanding the anxious desire of his friends to procure him admission. Voltaire, who had himself solicited his election, appears latterly to have become less enamoured of the merit of Diderot, and even to have formally censured some of his works. D'Alembert also cooled towards him, and at last they did not even see each other. His rupture with Rousseau, however, was the work of the latter, who began the war which was afterwards waged between them. But Diderot maintained his connection with Baron d'Holbach, whose sentiments approached the nearest to his own on several important points; and in the society of the baron he was relished and admired by reason of his facility in speaking on subjects of all sorts, and no doubt also by his antipathy to that creed, and to those institutions, which were no longer revered or respected. On this topic he never tired, and his friends often amused themselves with affording him opportunities to abandon himself to his imagination, or, in other words, to blaspheme for their diversion. In an unexcited state he exhibited constraint, awkwardness, timidity, and even a kind of affectation. He was never truly Diderot except when his fancy had transported him as it were beyond himself. Enthusiasm had become the condition of being most natural to his mind, nay, even to his voice and features; and he was himself only when in a state of intellectual inebriety. Grimm has reproached him with having consumed in fugitive conversations the time which he might have devoted to more durable labours; but Diderot loved to talk, especially when he could indulge his vehement volubility without interruption; for, as Voltaire once remarked on leaving a company where Diderot had engrossed the whole talk, "Cet homme-là n'est pas propre pour le dialogue." The correspondence recently published has thrown but little new light on the character of this remarkable man, nor has it tended in any material degree to increase the estimation in which his talents and dispositions were previously held by the world.