EPICUREAN Philosophy, the system of doctrine, canonical, physical, and ethical, taught by Epicurus, and maintained by his followers, who, from the name of their master, received that of Epicureans.

The first part of this threefold system regarded the canons or rules of judging. Disgusted with the subtle- Epicurean ties and paradoxes of the Stoics, Epicurus endeavoured to introduce a more simple and natural method of judging, and, instead of artificial modes and scholastic distinctions, appealed to the common sense and natural perceptions of mankind as the ultimate basis of all reasoning. These he assumed as first principles, or rather as unerring guides; and by giving excessive latitude to an elementary definition, which, if properly guarded and restricted, might have served as the foundation of a rational system of logic, he was betrayed into errors and extravagances not less startling than those from which it had been his object to escape. Cicero has reproached him with an alleged unphilosophical contempt of logic; but this censure, when duly weighed, must be pronounced to be entirely without foundation. Epicurus, it is true, despised and even ridiculed the modes of reasoning by means of which the Stoics evolved the paradoxes in which they delighted; and he was neither acquainted with nor had any relish for those analytical investigations in which the members of that philosophical sect displayed so much unprofitable ingenuity. But, on the other hand, all the errors with which his system is easily chargeable, may be traced to the logical strictness with which he adhered, in all his reasonings, to the primary canon which he had laid down, and to the implicit faith which he was consequently led to repose in those sensible perceptions and intuitive judgments which, though in every case relatively true, are nevertheless in many absolutely and demonstrably false. Having, as he conceived, established a principle indisputably certain, he was prepared to admit, and, in point of fact, never suffered himself to doubt or to question, any consequence, however startling, which might be logically deduced from it. His very errors, therefore, are the direct and necessary result of a rigid adherence to this principle, and of the precision with which he reasoned from the primary assumption to its consequences.

In the second or physical part of his system, Epicurus borrowed from Democritus and Leucippus the idea of the atoms or monads, which he regarded as the ultimate principles of all things. These atoms, however, which had no other properties than those of hardness and gravity, and which were therefore totally distinct from the gases of every kind that form so prominent a part of the physics and chemistry of the moderns, soon fell into discredit with philosophers; and, notwithstanding the poetical embellishments which the hypothesis received from the genius of Lucretius, it continued to be treated as a subject more fitted for ridicule than reason, until Gassendi endeavoured to revive and restore it, but without success. The efforts of this philosopher, however, can scarcely be considered as having proved altogether fruitless, since Leibnitz in his theory of monads, Boscovich in his principles of corpuscular attraction, and still more recently Dr Dalton in his theory of definite proportions, which has effected a complete revolution in the nomenclature of modern chemistry, have, each in succession, adopted modifications of the original hypothesis, and thus brought within the precincts of science a doctrine once regarded as amongst the wildest extravagances of ancient philosophy. In fact, the atomic theory of modern times is founded upon the same general principle with the hypothesis promulgated by Democritus, taught by Leucippus, and afterwards adopted by Epicurus; namely, that matter, so far from being infinitely divisible, is resolvable by division, decomposition, or analysis, into certain ultimate or primordial elements or atoms, which, again, enter synthetically, in certain definite proportions, into the constitution or composition of all things. And thus it is that the grand cycle of decay and reproduction, observable in the operations and changes which take place in the material world, may also be detected in the history of philosophical systems; they rise, decline, disappear, and are reproduced by the silent working of causes too remote to be discovered or appreciated by us; they have their various phases and occultations, even whilst they remain within the sphere of our observation; and when they altogether disappear from our view, and seem to be for ever lost, it is only to return, after having rounded their apogee, and to present nearly the same aspect as before.

With regard to the third or ethical part of this system, morality, according to Epicurus, is entirely founded upon utility. Man is placed upon earth to seek or pursue his own happiness or good, and he finds it only in a calm and tranquil life. The sage is ever upon his guard against the passions which might disturb his peace. Physical pleasure consists in the satisfaction of our natural wants; but the less trouble we take to ensure this satisfaction, the fewer privations we will be exposed to, and the greater will be our immunity from reverses of fortune. To abstain in order to enjoy, was accordingly the grand maxim of this philosopher. The happiness of individuals depends upon, and forms part of, the general happiness, from which, therefore, it can never be separated. This is his leading principle; and hence the essence of his ethical system consists in inculcating the maxima felicitas, or the greatest happiness of the greatest number. It has indeed been vulgarly alleged that Epicurus made the supreme good to consist in pleasure; and many persons persist in thus representing his doctrine, without giving themselves the trouble to inquire what he understood by pleasure; a term which, as he applied it, differs in no degree from the wisdom of the Stoics, and the maxima felicitas of the modern school of Utilitarians, founded by Bentham, the great restorer of the Epicurean ethical philosophy. In the nomenclature of this system, whatever contributes to the happiness and well-being of man as a member of society, is denominated pleasure; nor, as the happiness of individuals is made to depend upon, and declared to be inseparable from, the general happiness, can the true meaning of the term be mistaken or misapprehended by any honest and intelligent inquirer. But those false Epicureans, who limited the import of the word to mere sensual indulgence, and reasoned as if Epicurus himself had recognised this acceptation, did great injury to the sect, which they brought into unmerited discredit and odium. We accordingly find that they were banished from Rome in the time of the republic, and also, at different intervals, from a number of other cities. But the school always subsisted at Athens, where it remained in the time of Lucian; and Numanus, his contemporary, remarks, with an evident feeling of regret, that the Epicureans had preserved in all its purity the doctrine of their master, whilst that of Plato had been greatly altered and corrupted. The Stoics appropriated several of the maxims, and adopted the most remarkable aphorisms of Epicurus, which are expressed, with much spirit, in a brief, sententious style; and the principal charm of Seneca's letters to Lucilius consists in the freedom and extent to which he has borrowed from the same source.

It is very difficult to discover the real opinion of Epicurus respecting the divinity. Cicero assures us that the philosopher spoke of the Supreme Being in terms the most sublime, and that he recommended piety to his disciples. It may no doubt be alleged that this was done in order to conform to the popular belief, and that no safe conclusion can be drawn, as to the opinion really entertained by the philosopher, from mere generalities, or a convenient and safe recommendation. But, on the other hand, in his letter to Menecius, Epicurus expresses himself thus: "The gods are not such as the vulgar believe; and the impious man is not he who rejects the gods of the multitude, but he who attributes to the gods the opinions of the multitude." These expressions, if they had been known, would have been sufficient to ensure to their author the honours of persecution. But, whilst it is evident that Epicurus was not actuated by mere prudence in making the belief of a God one of the principal dogmas of his philosophy, it must at the same time be admitted that his other opinions respecting the gods rendered this belief useless. For he regarded them as beings perfectly happy, impassible, and in no degree concerned about, or disposed to intermeddle with, human affairs,—as alike indifferent to, and incapable of, being affected by the good or evil of this world; and thus destroyed at once a providence, and the hope of future recompense or punishment. To this opinion, certainly one of the most discouraging and disastrous which can be maintained or promulgated, may be mainly ascribed the charge of atheism which was early preferred, and often subsequently reiterated, against this amiable and virtuous philosopher, whose life was as remarkable for its moral purity as those of some of his pretended followers were for their dissoluteness and profligacy.