Jean-Charles de, a distinguished French officer and military writer, descended of a noble but not affluent family, was born at Avignon on the 13th of February 1669. Even in his infancy he evinced a strong predilection for the profession of arms; and this inclination was confirmed by the perusal of Caesar's Commentaries, which he received as a prize at the age of fifteen. In fact, he had scarcely attained his sixteenth year, when, making his escape from the paternal roof, he enlisted in a company of infantry which happened to be passing through Avignon; and although his father obtained his discharge, and shut him up in a convent, he again made his escape about two years thereafter, and shouldered a musket as a common soldier in the regiment of Berri. But his good conduct, as well as his birth, having soon brought him into notice, he obtained a sub-lieutenancy; and it was in this grade, the lowest of commissioned officers, that he saw service for the first time in the year 1688. Fortunately for his own improvement, however, he was employed in a corps of partisans, which, as all military men know, is the best school of instruction in great operations. Folard had thus occasion to observe, and to study with advantage, the most important branches of the military art. He examined all the communications, calculated the means of attack and defence, reconnoitred positions, constructed plans and maps, and thus, in short, prepared the materials of his voluminous works. It was during this period that he composed a little treatise entitled De la Guerre de Partizan, which has never been printed, but which Marshal de Belleisle long possessed in manuscript. The Marquis de Guibrant, colonel of the regiment of Berri, having taken a great interest in Folard, obtained for him a lieutenantcy in his regiment; and immediately afterwards this corps received orders to proceed to Naples. It was during the long march which ensued that Folard, observing that the enemy received provisions and ammunition by sea, conceived the idea of surprising the post of Mesola, which protected the landing of the convoys. He accordingly submitted his plan to M. de Guibrant, by whom it was forwarded to the court, and there approved of; but another officer was charged with its execution, and the author remained unknown. The Duke of Vendome, being informed of this injustice, appointed Folard his aid-de-camp, and at the same time procured for him the rank of captain. After giving him many proofs of confidence and esteem, this prince reluctantly consented to give up Folard to his brother, the Grand Prior, who then commanded in Lombardy. To the latter, Folard, ever zealous and active, rendered important services; but his talents, and above all his frankness, made him many enemies at head-quarters. He was at the taking of the posts of Rovero and Ostiglias, and also at the defense of the Casino della Bulino, where he distinguished himself greatly by his talents and his valour. It was by his advice that the Grand Prior caused this important post to be occupied; and Folard had, by the orders of his commander, repaired thither to make the necessary dispositions, when a numerous corps of the army of Prince Eugène appeared before it, with instructions to carry it at all hazards. The defensive preparations were still incomplete, and the garrison far from numerous; but, encouraged by Folard, they withstood the reiterated and furious attacks of the imperialists. The latter penetrated several times into the interior of the Cassino; but by the intrepidity of the French, directed by Folard, they were each time repulsed, and ultimately compelled to discontinue their attacks. This brilliant affair, which procured him the cross of St Louis, is described by Folard in the notes to the third volume of his Polybius; and his relation has been cited by all military writers, not only as a model in itself, but also as containing one of the best lessons anywhere to be found on the defence of field-posts. Having rejoined the Duke of Vendôme, Folard rendered himself not less useful to that commander than he had previously done to the Grand Prior, and by his presence of mind, and the judicious advice which he gave at the battle of Cassano, fought on the 15th of August 1705, where he received two severe wounds, he acquitted himself as a brave soldier and skilful officer. This battle, remarkable for great efforts on both sides, for movements of all kinds, and for uncertain results, appears to have made a strong impression upon the imagination of Folard; and it is even said that amidst the suffering caused by his wounds he conceived his system of columns and deep formations.

Soon after the battle of Cassano, Vendôme was ordered to proceed to Flanders, whither Folard, who was much attached to the duke, wished to accompany him; but he was retained with the army of Italy by the express desire of the Duke of Orleans, who had just assumed the command. The confidence which this prince reposed in him, and the freedom with which Folard continued to express his opinions, careless whom they might offend, once more made him dangerous enemies amongst the staff. From a note to Polybius it appears, indeed, that it was entirely owing to their insinuations that he received orders to shut himself up in Modena. It had become evident that this city would be attacked; and as the command was then in the hands of a person named Bar, upon whom no reliance could be placed, and who, in fact, had resolved to surrender the place at the first summons, the chevalier, firmly resolved to do his duty, soon found himself involved in serious disputes with this cowardly superior in command. In his Traité de la Défense des Places, he has given a long recital of the indignities he experienced at the hands of this miscreant, who even attempted his life; but although Folard unveiled his proceedings without reserve, the traitor escaped with impunity. Soon after the capitulation of Modena, the chevalier, to his great joy, received orders to join the Duke of Vendôme, who had in fact reclaimed his former aid-de-camp; and having taken Versailles in his way, he was there presented to the king, who received him graciously, and granted him a pension of four hundred francs. Upon his arrival in Flanders, Folard induced the Duke of Burgundy, then in command of the army, to attack the isle of Cadzund. The enterprise succeeded beyond all calculation, and its author was appointed commandant of the fort of Lettingen. But the young prince, who had at first appreciated the advice of the chevalier, afterwards paid as little regard to his opinions as to those of Vendôme; and, in spite of their joint remonstrances, he persisted in remaining inactive in presence of the allies, whilst Prince Eugène was engaged in taking Lille. The counsels which Folard gave to Marshal Villars for the relief of Mons were also disregarded. But his services were nevertheless recognised and appreciated at court; and it was about this time that the minister conferred on him a second pension of six hundred francs; a new favour, which was the more considerate, as he had been once more severely wounded at the battle of Malplaquet. Redoubling his zeal and activity, though no longer able to take part in the movements of the army, Folard followed them on the map and in his imagination, incessantly dreaming of plans and operations, and sending all his ideas to the generals. One day he caused himself to be carried on a litter to the quarters of Marshal Boufflers, to give a piece of advice, which, however, was disregarded. Such zeal was no doubt indiscreet; and the manners of Folard were, it seems, calculated to injure the best observations. Thus M. de Montesquiou rejected the advice which the chevalier gave him respecting the position occupied by him at Douai; and it was only after his defeat that this general discovered his error in neglecting the counsels of the uncourtly chevalier. Some months afterwards Folard found Marshal Villars more docile; and he had the satisfaction of seeing the army put in motion, in consequence of a plan which he had transmitted to that general. Having subsequently been sent to M. de Guébriant, who occupied Aire, then threatened with a siege, he was taken prisoner on the road by the light troops of the enemy, who made vain attempts to discover the nature of his instructions. Prince Eugène, indeed, had recourse to every means of seduction in order to induce him to enter the service of the emperor; but Folard, immovable in his fidelity, resisted all these attempts, and even found an opportunity during his captivity of serving his sovereign, by misleading the prince as to the operations of the French army. As soon as he was exchanged, which the Duke of Burgundy lost no time in effecting, he obtained the command of the garrison of Burburg, the title and appointment of which he retained until his death.

The peace of 1712 having left him without active professional employment, Folard commenced his commentaries; but being still of an age not to remain long in a state of inaction, he profited by the alarm which the Ottomans occasioned to the knights of Malta in 1714, and, with the permission of the court, repaired to that island. The grand master received him with much cordiality; but Folard soon gave way to his characteristic vanity and indiscretion towards the French engineers, who, like himself, had come to offer the knights their best services for the defence of the island. Dissatisfied because his opinion had not prevailed, he refused the cross of the order, which was offered him, according to the ordinary usage in such cases, and immediately returned into France. But his warlike activity was not yet exhausted. The fame of the exploits of Charles XII. then resounded throughout all Europe, and Folard eagerly desired to witness the achievements of so celebrated a hero. Accordingly he embarked for Sweden on board a vessel, which was shipwrecked almost at the moment of landing; and having been saved in a sloop, he reached Stockholm destitute of everything. The king, however, received him favourably, and listened to his discourses upon tactics with extreme complaisance. Nothing could possibly be more agreeable to Folard, who, delighted with his royal pupil, at once preferred Sweden to France as a place of residence for a soldier. Nevertheless he soon afterwards returned into his own country, for the purpose of promoting the plans of the Baron de Goëritz. But the project with which the baron was entrusted having been overthrown by his arrest, Folard returned to Stockholm, and accompanied the king of Sweden in his expedition to Norway. Immediately after the death of Charles before Fredericksball, he returned to France, and was promoted to the rank of colonel in the regiment of Picardy. In this capacity he served his last campaign in 1719, under the Duke of Berwick, in the short war which France had then to maintain in Spain. A general peace speedily ensued, and Folard then saw himself condemned to a state of repose, which as yet he had never known or enjoyed.

From this time he devoted himself entirely to his literary pursuits, and was ere long in a condition to present to the Duke of Orleans, then regent, his book entitled *Nouvelles Découvertes sur la Guerre*, published at Paris in 1724. His next aim was to find a subject with which it might be possible for him to connect the results of his lengthened observations, and also to combine the explanation of his new system. And with this view he made choice of the history of Polybius. That work is, without any doubt, the most exact, and at the same time the most judicious, in a military point of view, of all the historical writings of antiquity; and hence Folard could not possibly have made a better choice. But not being acquainted with Greek, he was obliged to entrust the translation to Dom Thuillier, whilst he simultaneously laboured at his commentaries, which he placed in the form of notes at the end of each chapter of Polybius. These commentaries are of an unexampled prolixity, and the style frequently descends to triviality; in the same page things the most incoherent are often jumbled together; and he makes continual efforts to connect everything with his system of columns and deep formations. But however imperfect the work of Folard may be considered in a literary point of view, military men will find it in many respects eminently useful; for, besides judicious remarks and learned researches respecting the wars of the ancients, we meet with much valuable information, which we cannot help regretting that the historians of this period should not have oftener referred to. He explains the causes and the results of these events with a frankness which was often hurtful to himself, but which will always be useful to posterity. This frankness, indeed, which had raised up so many obstacles to his advancement whilst he had arms in his hands, also created opposition to his projects after he became author. When he had reached the sixth volume of his Polybius he was ordered to refrain from indulging in the same sort of discussions as in the preceding portion of the work. Of this injunction he complains bitterly in the preface to the volume in question, and says that he has been restrained precisely at the place where his author became more interesting, and where he felt himself inspired by events more worthy of remark and annotation.

Folard has prefixed to this immense work his *Treatise on Columns*, and the deep order, which he regards as the basis of all good tactics. His opinion in favour of deep formations encountered much opposition at the time when it was first promulgated, and the controversy which it then occasioned has not yet been altogether set to rest. The most judicious of his critics was General Savornin, a Swiss officer in the service of Holland, who published anonymously *Les Sentiments d'un Homme de Guerre sur le nouveau Système de Folard*. Of all his adversaries this author is the one whom he treats with the greatest respect in the prefaces to his volumes, which, as is well known, he converted into a sort of field of battle, where he attacked à outrance those who had ventured to dispute his opinions. But the best part of the commentaries on Polybius is undoubtedly that where Folard treats of the tactics of the ancients, and particularly of their manner of attacking and defending strong places. This is a subject which he had maturely considered, with reference to the instruments of war in use amongst the ancients. He had even caused to be constructed a catapult, the experiments made with which transported him with admiration; and he did not hesitate to affirm, that if it were possible for him, with the machines and means of the ancients, to attack a place defended by the artillery of the moderns, he would make sure of taking it in a very short time. Such an assertion, it may very easily be imagined, was much better calculated to astonish than convince. His ideas on strategies were scarcely, if at all, less extraordinary; and his system of columns and deep formations will be sufficiently appreciated if we consider that, in the numerous wars which have occurred since its publication, there is no sovereign nor general who has deemed to put it fully in practice. It must be admitted, however, that attacks in close columns, which have been so generally and so successfully employed in our time, are in some sort an imitation of Folard's system. This method no doubt proves that the deep order is sometimes the best; but attacks in close columns, by platoons, divisions, or battalions, such as have latterly been practised, present advantages which Folard had never dreamed of, namely, the power of deploying if necessary, of changing the front and direction of the mass with extreme facility, and of passing rapidly from the deep to the extended, and from the extended to the deep formation. Folard, if we may be allowed the expression,

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1 "In general the formations of a good military nation are extended, whilst those of a bad one are deep." So says Count von Bismarck (*Tracte de Cavalerie*, p. 280, Engl. transl.), and the remark is undoubtedly well founded. At the same time, the diminution of depth in the formation of modern armies has been a natural consequence of the constantly augmenting power of artillery and of small arms. In ancient times battles were generally decided by bodily strength; and as armies had then no concentric fire to apprehend, they could with safety assume that deep formation which was calculated to overwhelm the enemy by impulsion alone. But the invention of gunpowder, and the destructive effects of cannon fire, arising from the improvement of artillery, necessitated in modern times a departure from the dense formations of antiquity. This was strongly felt by Gustavus Adolphus, who, whilst his opponents, Tilly and Wallenstein, formed their infantry in solid masses, drew up his men six deep, and, in this extended formation, overwhelmed the columns of his adversaries. If we may judge from recent examples, however, deep formations are not even now so inappropriate as may be imagined; and, absurd as the columns of Folard may appear, it was by the employment of analogous masses, directed with a celerity which at once increased their momentum and diminished the ravages of cannon fire, that Napoleon proved so often successful. In the order of battle laid down by Jomini as combining in the greatest degree mobility with solidity, the corps destined for the attack are arranged in two lines of battalions, each battalion being formed in column of grand divisions. "La troupe d'attaque," says he, "aussi bien que la réserve, ne saurait être mieux disposées qu'en colonnes d'attaque par la centre; car la réserve devant être prête à tomber sur l'ennemi au moment décisif, doit la faire avec force et vivacité, c'est-à-dire, en colonnes." (*Cahier des Grandes Questions Militaires*, tom. iii. c. 35, p. 357.) The Duke of Wellington, it is true, generally attacked with deployed lines; but these, it is to be observed, were sometimes of deep formation. The body of English guards which so successfully attacked the columns of the imperial guard at Waterloo, and the battle of Waterloo was formed four deep; and the final charge of the cavalry executed by the British line on that day was also made in the same formation. It is to be observed, however, that the columns of the imperial guard were torn up and shattered by a close concentric fire of artillery, before the English guards advanced to the attack. To this indeed, columnar formations are always more or less liable; for though the evil may be prevented by celerity of movement, it cannot be avoided, and a rapid advance is always of itself productive of some confusion and disorder. Hence the attack in column has by no means been attended with the results which the Chevalier Folard expected from it. The Duke of Wellington always deployed before battle, and at Waterloo defeated an army drawn up in columns of attack, this being one of the few instances where his lines exceeded the usual formation of two deep. The French lost the battle of Essling by attacking the centre of the Austrian line in column. Massena's columns failed at Bussaco; Victor's were baffled at Barossa; and even the Spaniards broke two columns of the French army at St Marcial. At Waterloo, again, the repeated advances of Napoleon's columns proved unavailing against the linear formation of the British; and although at the close of the day the chosen columns of the imperial guard advanced with a determined bravery, which would have done honour to the troops of any nation, they had no better success. These facts naturally shake our faith in columns, and serve to confirm the remark of Bismarck, that the formations of the best military nations are not deep, but extended. An undisciplined multitude suddenly drawn together, or an army possessing little moral force, may be appalled by the imposing appearance of was so deeply infected with his system and his discoveries, that he saw everywhere the deep order and columns of attack. He had read little of the Bible; but happening one day to take up that sacred book, he exclaimed, on reading the first page, "Do you know that Moses must have been a great captain. He has discovered my column."

Count Saxe, who had known Folard in Sweden, appears to have attached much importance to his opinions. The esteem which that able commander entertained for him may be judged of from his letters, some of which are subjoined to the work entitled *Mémoires pour servir à l'Histoire de M. le Chevalier de Folard*, Paris, 1753. Folard was a good engineer, and excelled both in drawing and in the construction of military plans. It was from designs by him that the Abbé Gédéon was enabled to give the plans of the different battles in his translation of Pausanias. Folard has been denominated the French Vegetius; but he himself would not have been much flattered by this title, as he often speaks with contempt of Vegetius. As he cites a great number of ancient authors, he has often rectified their text, which had been altered by the copyists; and he has also sometimes indicated mistakes in the translations of their works. The publication of his Polybius procured him a great reputation in Europe, and was soon followed by his admission into the Royal Society of London. The king of Prussia, Frederick the Great, having desired to make trial of his system, the chevalier was invited to repair to Berlin, to be a witness of the experiment; but his advanced age prevented him from undertaking so long a journey. Nevertheless this warlike monarch attached but little importance to the writings of Folard, which he has even treated as visionary and extravagant in several passages of his correspondence, and particularly in the volume which he caused to be printed in 1761, under the title of *L'Esprit du Chevalier de Folard*, in 8vo. In the preface to this compilation, Frederick says, "Il (Folard) avait enfoui des diamants, au milieu du fumier; nous les avons retirés. On a fait main basse sur le système des colonnes: on n'a conservé que les manœuvres de guerre, dont il donne une description juste; la critique sage qu'il emploie sur la conduite de quelques généraux Français, certaines règles de tactique, des exemples de défenses singulières et ingénieuses, et quelques projets qui fournissent matière à des réflexions plus utiles encore que ces projets mêmes." Such was the opinion of the greatest captain of his time respecting the writings of Folard. The literary labours of this tactician impaired his health more rapidly than the fatigues of war, which, indeed, appear to have made little or no impression on his constitution. Wishing once more to visit his native city, Folard repaired to Avignon in 1750, and died there on the 23rd of March 1752, at the advanced age of eighty-three.

This able warrior failed to attain the first rank in the army, though he had eagerly aspired to it; nevertheless he was content with his lot; and with a small patrimony, and some pensions which had been granted him by the king, he found means to do good. His last years would have been perfectly happy if he had not recklessly disturbed their serenity by throwing himself à corps perdu into an imprudent controversy, where, from his great irascibility and excessive self-love, he often furnished arms against himself. Another circumstance also served to embitter his declining days. Having allowed himself to be drawn into the party of the Appellants, as they were called, he was represented by the pamphleteers of the time as one of those who had given themselves up to visionary convulsions upon the tomb of Deacon Pâris. The new sect was of course delighted to be able to refer to such evidence in support of its absurd pretensions; and it is easy to conceive the ridicule which this must have drawn down on the old chevalier. The Cardinal de Fleury was in fact so much displeased with him that he ordered Folard to quit Paris; and it was only at the earnest entreaty of several generals, who bore testimony to his numerous and important services, that this order was recalled. During his whole life Folard had enjoyed the most robust health. But a single infirmity afflicted him from his youth, and increased with his age; we mean, a natural deafness, which had often nearly proved fatal to him in the field of battle. In his old age he was almost entirely destitute of the sense of hearing.

Folard's military opinions, which had excited so much discussion during his lifetime, occasioned a great deal more long after his death. His system of columns, warmly attacked in the *Mémoires Militaires* of Colonel Guischardt in 1758, and also in the *Mémoires Critiques* of the same author in 1774, was defended with much heat in the *Recherches d'Antiquités Militaires* of the Chevalier de Lalozez, Paris, 1770; and likewise in another volume published by the same author in 1776, under the title of *Defense du Chevalier Folard*. The history of Polybius, with the commentaries, was first printed at Paris in six vols. 4to, 1727-1730, and next at Amsterdam, 1753, in seven vols. 4to. The seventh volume, which is a supplement, is not found in the Paris edition. It contains, 1. *Les Nouvelles Découvertes sur la Guerre*; 2. *Lettre Critique d'un Officier Hollandais* (Terson); 3. *Sentiments d'un Homme de Guerre* (Savornin) sur le Système Militaire du Chevalier de Folard; 4. Answer of Folard to his critics. The commentaries on Polybius have been abridged and printed separately by Chabot, Paris, 1757, in three vols. 4to. There are two German translations, one printed at Berlin, and the other at Vienna. The observations on the battle of Zama, and on the history of Epaminondas, which had been published separately in 1738 and 1739, form part of the commentaries on Polybius; and, as already stated, the author has also combined with these commentaries his *Traité de la Colonne*, as well as that on the attack and defence of a column advancing to the attack, and give way from apprehension; but no such effect can be produced where courage and discipline are found united. This was signalized exemplified at Albuera, where, in the attack on the key of the position, the French columns, though momentarily successful, found it impossible to deploy, under the incessant and dreadful volleys, which swept away the head of every formation, and, after a desperate and unavailing struggle, were driven headlong down the ascent. Every order is good against troops who do not defend themselves; in that case it is only necessary to march. But against troops who do defend themselves, and who to natural courage unite that discipline which teaches them to preserve unshaken the stability of their order, the attack in column will seldom prevail, unless combined with extended formations. So much, however, may be said on both sides, many writers have been led to make extreme opinions on this subject, as the following extract is extracted from a very ingenious essay on tactics, will abundantly testify. "The victory gained by the natural gallantry and intelligence of the French soldiers, in spite of the system under which they were supposed to fight, gave military opinion a bias in favour of masses and solid formations, simply disgraceful to human understanding, at a time when hundreds of pieces of artillery already frowned destruction over every field of battle. Nothing but the most profound ignorance of every principle of professional science, as well as the most callous indifference to the lives and sufferings of men, could for a moment have tolerated a system that tended to eradicate from the heart every feeling of humanity, and to stifle military genius in the bud. It was well calculated for ignorant, grasping, and ambitious leaders; it enabled such men, in the absence of military talents, to gain battles by quenching with the blood of their own soldiers the fires of the enemy, and literally to overwhelm the foe with the mangled bodies of the human victims so lavishly placed at their disposal by ruthless ukases and conscriptions." (Mitchell's *Essay on Tactics*, part iv. United Service Journal, July, 1834.)