in general, signifies dignity, grandeur, or greatness; but more particularly antiquity of family, joined with riches. In the common acceptation of the word, it means that quality or dignity which raises a man above the rank of a commoner.

Whether that equality of rank and condition which has sometimes been contended for would be more agreeable to the order of nature, or more conducive to the happiness and prosperity of mankind, may be made a question; but it is one, we apprehend, which cannot receive different answers from men capable of reflecting without prejudice and partiality. A state of perfect equality can subsist only amongst beings possessing equal talents and virtues; but such beings are not human. Were all mankind under the constant influence of the laws of virtue, a distinction of ranks would be unnecessary; but in that case civil government itself would likewise be unnecessary, because men would have attained all that perfection to which it is the object of civil government as well as of religion to guide them, and every man would then be a law unto himself. But whilst, in so many breasts, the selfish passions predominate over those which are social, violence must be restrained by authority; and there can be no authority without a distinction of ranks, such as may influence public opinion.

It is observed by Hume, that government is founded solely on opinion; and that this opinion is of two kinds, opinion of interest and opinion of right. When a people are persuaded that it is their interest to support the government under which they live, that government must necessarily be stable. But amongst the worthless and unthinking part of the community, this persuasion has seldom any place. All men, however, have a notion of rights—of a right to property, and a right to power; and when the majority of a nation considers a certain order of men as having a right to that eminence in which they are placed, this opinion, call it prejudice or what you will, contributes much to the peace and happiness of civil society.

"The distinction of rank and honours," says Blackstone, "is necessary in every well-governed state, in order to reward such as are eminent for their services to the public, in a manner the most desirable to individuals, and yet without burden to the community; exciting thereby an ambitious yet laudable ardour, and generous emulation, in others. And emulation, or virtuous ambition, is a spring of action which, however dangerous or invidious in a mere republic or under a despotic sway, will certainly be attended with good effects under a free monarchy; where, without destroying its existence, its excesses may be continually restrained by that superior power from which all honour is derived. Such a spirit, when nationally diffused, gives life and vigour to the community; it sets all the wheels of government in motion, which, under a wise regu-

lator, may be directed to any beneficial purpose; and thereby every individual may be made subservient to the public good, while he principally means to promote his own particular views. A body of nobility is also more peculiarly necessary in our mixed and compounded constitution, in order to support the rights of both the crown and the people, by forming a barrier to withstand the encroachments of both. It creates and preserves that gradual scale of dignity which proceeds from the peasant to the prince; rising like a pyramid from a broad foundation, and diminishing to a point as it rises. It is this ascending and contracting proportion that adds stability to any government; for when the departure is sudden from one extreme to another, we may pronounce that state to be precarious."

The origin of nobility in Europe is a subject involved in considerable obscurity. In this place we shall only consider the manner in which nobility may be created in this country, with the incidents attending it.

1. The right of peerage seems to have been originally territorial, that is, annexed to lands, honours, castles, manors, and the like, the proprietors and possessors of which were, in right of those estates, allowed to be peers of the realm, and were summoned to parliament to do suit and service to their sovereign; and, when the land was alienated, the dignity passed along with it as an appendage. Thus in England the bishops still sit in the House of Lords in right of succession to certain ancient baronies annexed, or supposed to be annexed, to their episcopal lands; and thus in 11 Henry VI. the possession of the castle of Arundel was adjudged to confer an earldom on its possessor. But afterwards, when alienations became frequent, the dignity of the peerage was confined to the lineage of the party ennobled, and, instead of territorial, became personal. Actual proof of a tenure by barony became no longer necessary to constitute a lord of parliament; but the record of the writ of summons to him or his ancestors was admitted as a sufficient evidence of the tenure.

Peers of Great Britain are now created either by writ or by patent; for those who claim by prescription must suppose either a writ or patent to have been issued or granted to their ancestors, though by length of time it has been lost. The creation by writ or the king's letter is a summons to attend the House of Peers, by the style and title of that barony which the king is pleased to confer; that by patent is a royal grant to a subject of any dignity and degree of peerage. The creation by writ is the more ancient way; but a man is not ennobled thereby, unless he actually take his seat in the House of Lords; and some are of opinion that there must be at least two writs of summons, and a sitting in two distinct parliaments, to establish a hereditary barony; and therefore the most usual, because the surest way, is to grant the dignity by patent, which endures to a man and his heirs according to the limitation thereof, although he himself should never make use of it. Yet it is frequent to call up the eldest son of a peer to the House of Lords by writ of summons, in the name of his father's barony, because in that case there is no danger of his children's losing the nobility in the event of his never taking his seat; for they will succeed to their grandfather. Creation by writ has also one advantage over that by patent. A person created by writ holds the dignity to himself and his heirs, without any words to that purport in the writ; but in letters-patent there must be words to direct the inheritance, otherwise the dignity endures only to the grantee for life. For a man or woman may be created noble for their own lives, and the dignity not descend to their heirs at all, or descend only to some particular heirs; as where a peerage is limited to a man and the heirs male of his body by Elizabeth his present lady, and not to such heirs by any former or future wife. Let us next take a view of a few of the principal incidents attending the nobility, exclusive of their capacity as members of parliament, and as hereditary counsellors of the crown. And here it may be observed, that in criminal cases a nobleman must be tried by his peers. The great are always obnoxious to popular envy. Were they to be judged by the people, they might be in danger from the prejudices of their judges; and would moreover be deprived of the privilege of the meanest subjects, that of being tried by their equals, which is secured to all the realm by Magna Charta (c. 29). It is said that this does not extend to bishops, who, though they are lords of parliament, and sit there by virtue of the baronies which they hold jure ecclesiae, yet are not ennobled in blood, and consequently not peers with the nobility. As to peeresses, no provision was made for their trial when accused of treason or felony, till after Eleanor duchess of Gloucester, wife to the lord protector, had been accused of treason, and found guilty of witchcraft, in an ecclesiastical synod, through the intrigues of Cardinal Beaufort. This very extraordinary trial gave occasion to a special statute (20 Hen. II. c. 9), which enacted, that peeresses, either in their own right or by marriage, should be tried before the same judicator as peers of the realm. If a woman, noble in her own right, marries a commoner, she still remains noble, and must be tried by her peers; but if she be only noble by marriage, then by a second marriage with a commoner she loses her dignity; for as by marriage it is gained, so by marriage it is also lost. Yet if a duchess-dowager marries a baron, she continues a duchess still; for all the nobility are pares, and therefore it is no degradation. A peer, or peeress, either in her own right or by marriage, cannot be arrested in civil cases; and they have likewise many peculiar privileges annexed to their peerage in the course of judicial proceedings. A peer sitting in judgment gives not his verdict upon oath, like an ordinary jurymen, but upon his honour; he answers also to bills in chancery upon his honour, and not upon his oath; but when he is examined as a witness either in civil or criminal cases, he must be sworn; for the respect which the law shows to the honour of a peer does not extend so far as to overturn a settled maxim, that in judicio non creitur nisi juratis. The honour of peers is however so highly tendered by the law, that it is much more penal to spread false reports concerning them, and certain other great officers of the realm, than concerning other men; scandal against them being called by the peculiar name of scandalum magnum, and subjected to peculiar punishment by different ancient statutes.

A peer cannot lose his nobility except by death or attainder, although there was an instance, in the reign of Edward IV., of the degradation of George Neville, duke of Bedford, by act of parliament, on account of his poverty, which rendered him unable to support his dignity. But this is a singular instance, which, by having happened, serves to show the power of parliament; and, by having happened only once, proves how tender the parliament has been in exerting so high a power. It has been said, indeed, that if a baron waste his estate, so that he be not able to support the degree, the king may degrade him; but it is expressly held by later authorities, that a peer cannot be degraded except by act of parliament.

Matthaeus observes, that nobility amongst the Romans was quite a different thing from what it is amongst us. The nobles, amongst the Romans, were either those raised to the magistracy, or descended from magistrates; there was no such thing as nobility by patent.

Bartoli states, that doctors, after they have held a professor's chair in an university for twenty years, become noble, and are entitled to all the rights of counts. But this claim is not admitted at court; though Bartoli's sentiments be backed by those of several other authors, particularly Chassangeus in his Consuetudines Burgundiae, Boyer sur la Coutume de Berry, and Faber C. de Dig. Def. 9. The last, however, restrains Bartoli's rule to doctors in law, and princes' physicians.